沪、深证券交易所制度变迁问题研究
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摘要
1993年斯德哥尔摩证券交易所进行制度变迁,国际证券交易所开始进入一个多事之秋。当时沪、深证券交易所正如火如荼地进行各项制度建设,根本没空理会国际证券交易所的变化。2006年纽约证券交易所完成公司化改制,国际证券交易所纷纷抢占中国证券市场,沪、深证券交易所开始需要正视自身的优缺点,并采取相应的措施,以应对国际竞争。
证券交易技术的发展,使证券交易完全可以突破地域的限制,同时证券交易所自身网络外部性的特点决定了证券交易所可以利用证券交易技术的发展,获得充分的规模经济。国际证券交易所的制度变迁是技术进步推动的诱致性制度变迁,由于证券交易技术的发展,ATS已经对传统证券交易所形成了强有力的挑战,如果证券交易所固守传统的会员制组织结构,抵制制度变迁的趋势,在市场竞争中将处于不利的境地。所以国际主要证券交易所纷纷进行制度变迁,放弃了会员制的组织结构而采用公司制的组织结构,以求在市场竞争中取得一席之地。
本文从国际证券交易所的制度变迁入手,分析国际证券交易所进行制度变迁的过程以及原因,并从理论上论证国际证券交易所进行制度变迁的机制,同时从实证方面论证影响国际证券交易所的因素,以此作为分析我国沪、深证券交易所进行制度变迁的契机,进而分析沪、深证券交易所的制度变迁之路。
沪、深证券交易所建立之初,按照国际证券交易所的惯例,采取了会员制的组织结构。沪、深证券交易所的建立,为企业融资提供了方便,为我国的经济发展做出了巨大贡献。但是沪、深证券交易所与政府管理层的关系为人们所诟病,甚至不认同沪、深证券交易所的会员制组织结构,认为其组织结构是行政会员制,顾名思义,人们认为沪、深证券交易所只是一个准政府机构。
本文首先分析了沪、深证券交易所的第一次和第二次的制度变迁,从历史的角度分析沪、深证券交易所会员制组织结构形成的原因。由于沪、深证券交易所是自上而下的制度变迁,国务院的《证券交易所管理办法》决定了沪、深证券交易所是会员制的证券交易所。
其次,本文从沪、深证券交易所的产权结构出发,分析沪、深证券交易所存在的制度缺陷。由于沪、深证券交易所是会员制的证券交易所,并且受中国证监会直接管理,所以沪、深证券交易所的产权结构不清晰,定位不明确。产权不清晰造成的直接后果是权责不明确,沪、深证券交易所成立之初分别隶属了上海政府和深圳政府,1997年之后隶属于中国证监会,从人事任命上看,沪、深证券交易所只是中国证监会的一个下属机构,沪、深证券交易所的总经理需要得到中国证监会的提名并任命,所以沪、深证券交易所的各项机制不灵活,在市场竞争中处于不利的境地。权责不明确,沪、深证券交易所的定位不明确,造成沪、深证券交易所的职能不完善。证券交易所最主要的发行股票的职能并不真正在沪、深证券交易所,而是由中国证监会决定；证券交易所的自律职能也不能真正发挥,沪、深证券交易所只能对违规者发出警告,而不能采取有执行力的处罚；沪、深证券交易所的监管职能也由中国证监会代劳。
所以本文认为沪、深证券交易所需要进行第三次制度变迁,以应对国际证券交易所的市场竞争。但沪、深证交所不能完全照搬国际证券交易所的制度变迁模式,因为沪、深证券交易所制度变迁的经济背景不同于国际证券交易所,所以沪、深证券交易所要有自己的制度变迁之路。本文认为沪、深证券交易所的制度变迁在坚持以国有资金为主的前提下,需要引进社会资金,以改变沪、深证券交易所产权不清的格局,并且国有资金的比例要逐渐降低,减少沪、深证券交易所的行政色彩。
Stockholm stock exchange carried out the institutional change in 1993, international stock exchanges raised the curtain of institutional change, the New York stock exchange, famous for its cling strongly to tradition, completed its institutional change in 2006. the institutional change of international stock exchange was induced institutional change, due to the development of the technology, stock exchange broken through the territorial restrictions, the network externality decided that the stock exchanges could make use of the development of the technology, to get the scale economy. at the same time, owing to the development of the technology, ATS strongly changed the stock exchanges. If the stock exchanges clung to traditional membership system, and refused to institutional change, the stock exchanges would be in disadvantageous position. With this point of views, the main international stock exchanges carried out institutional change one after another, in order to get position in commercial markets.
Beginning with the institutional change of the international stock exchanges, this dissertation analyzed the process and the reasons of the institutional change,, and demonstrated the mechanism of the institutional change in theory. Again the dissertation demonstrated the factors which had an influence upon the institutional change, and took this as clues to analyze the institutional change of Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange.
When the Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange were established, they adopt the membership system, according to the international practice. Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange facilitated the enterprise to finance, and greatly contributed the economic development of our country. But the relationship between the stock exchanges and the government was blamed, people believed that the Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange were administrative membership system, they were government agencies.
At first, this dissertation analyzed the first and the second institutional change of Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange, and analyzed the reason of membership system. Because Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange were established by government, the Regulation for Controlling the Stock Exchanges promulgated by the State Council decided that Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange were membership stock exchanges. Secondly, according to the ownership structure of Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange, this dissertation analyzed the institutional imperfection of stock exchanges. Because Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange were membership system, they were governed by China's Securities Regulatory Commission. The ownership structure of Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange were unclear, which led to the ambiguity of power and duties. When Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange were established, they subjected to Shanghai government and Shenzhen government respectively, and subjected to China's Securities Regulatory Commission after 1997. In the view of appointed official, Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange were subordinate body of China's Securities Regulatory Commission. The ambiguity of power and duties led to the mechanisms of stock exchanges were inflexible, the stock exchanges were at disadvantage in market competition. Due to the ambiguity of power and duties, the functions of the stock exchanges were imperfectness. The function of stock issue was not under the control by the stock exchanges but by China's Securities Regulatory Commission, the function of self-discipline was not under control by the stock exchanges, Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange had not the power to punish violator, but warn, China's Securities Regulatory Commission carried out the function of supervision in stead of the stock exchanges.
To sum up the above arguments, the dissertation analyzed that Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange need to carry out the third institutional change, in order to respond the market competition of international stock exchanges. But Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange could not copy the international stock exchange's institutional change, because their economic background were difference, Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange need to carry out the institutional change of their own. The dissertation analyzed that Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange need to import social fund on the base of state fund, so that we could change situation of ambiguity of power and duties, then we reduced the share of state fund, lessen the stock exchanges' administrative nature.
证券交易技术的发展,使证券交易完全可以突破地域的限制,同时证券交易所自身网络外部性的特点决定了证券交易所可以利用证券交易技术的发展,获得充分的规模经济。国际证券交易所的制度变迁是技术进步推动的诱致性制度变迁,由于证券交易技术的发展,ATS已经对传统证券交易所形成了强有力的挑战,如果证券交易所固守传统的会员制组织结构,抵制制度变迁的趋势,在市场竞争中将处于不利的境地。所以国际主要证券交易所纷纷进行制度变迁,放弃了会员制的组织结构而采用公司制的组织结构,以求在市场竞争中取得一席之地。
本文从国际证券交易所的制度变迁入手,分析国际证券交易所进行制度变迁的过程以及原因,并从理论上论证国际证券交易所进行制度变迁的机制,同时从实证方面论证影响国际证券交易所的因素,以此作为分析我国沪、深证券交易所进行制度变迁的契机,进而分析沪、深证券交易所的制度变迁之路。
沪、深证券交易所建立之初,按照国际证券交易所的惯例,采取了会员制的组织结构。沪、深证券交易所的建立,为企业融资提供了方便,为我国的经济发展做出了巨大贡献。但是沪、深证券交易所与政府管理层的关系为人们所诟病,甚至不认同沪、深证券交易所的会员制组织结构,认为其组织结构是行政会员制,顾名思义,人们认为沪、深证券交易所只是一个准政府机构。
本文首先分析了沪、深证券交易所的第一次和第二次的制度变迁,从历史的角度分析沪、深证券交易所会员制组织结构形成的原因。由于沪、深证券交易所是自上而下的制度变迁,国务院的《证券交易所管理办法》决定了沪、深证券交易所是会员制的证券交易所。
其次,本文从沪、深证券交易所的产权结构出发,分析沪、深证券交易所存在的制度缺陷。由于沪、深证券交易所是会员制的证券交易所,并且受中国证监会直接管理,所以沪、深证券交易所的产权结构不清晰,定位不明确。产权不清晰造成的直接后果是权责不明确,沪、深证券交易所成立之初分别隶属了上海政府和深圳政府,1997年之后隶属于中国证监会,从人事任命上看,沪、深证券交易所只是中国证监会的一个下属机构,沪、深证券交易所的总经理需要得到中国证监会的提名并任命,所以沪、深证券交易所的各项机制不灵活,在市场竞争中处于不利的境地。权责不明确,沪、深证券交易所的定位不明确,造成沪、深证券交易所的职能不完善。证券交易所最主要的发行股票的职能并不真正在沪、深证券交易所,而是由中国证监会决定；证券交易所的自律职能也不能真正发挥,沪、深证券交易所只能对违规者发出警告,而不能采取有执行力的处罚；沪、深证券交易所的监管职能也由中国证监会代劳。
所以本文认为沪、深证券交易所需要进行第三次制度变迁,以应对国际证券交易所的市场竞争。但沪、深证交所不能完全照搬国际证券交易所的制度变迁模式,因为沪、深证券交易所制度变迁的经济背景不同于国际证券交易所,所以沪、深证券交易所要有自己的制度变迁之路。本文认为沪、深证券交易所的制度变迁在坚持以国有资金为主的前提下,需要引进社会资金,以改变沪、深证券交易所产权不清的格局,并且国有资金的比例要逐渐降低,减少沪、深证券交易所的行政色彩。
Stockholm stock exchange carried out the institutional change in 1993, international stock exchanges raised the curtain of institutional change, the New York stock exchange, famous for its cling strongly to tradition, completed its institutional change in 2006. the institutional change of international stock exchange was induced institutional change, due to the development of the technology, stock exchange broken through the territorial restrictions, the network externality decided that the stock exchanges could make use of the development of the technology, to get the scale economy. at the same time, owing to the development of the technology, ATS strongly changed the stock exchanges. If the stock exchanges clung to traditional membership system, and refused to institutional change, the stock exchanges would be in disadvantageous position. With this point of views, the main international stock exchanges carried out institutional change one after another, in order to get position in commercial markets.
Beginning with the institutional change of the international stock exchanges, this dissertation analyzed the process and the reasons of the institutional change,, and demonstrated the mechanism of the institutional change in theory. Again the dissertation demonstrated the factors which had an influence upon the institutional change, and took this as clues to analyze the institutional change of Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange.
When the Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange were established, they adopt the membership system, according to the international practice. Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange facilitated the enterprise to finance, and greatly contributed the economic development of our country. But the relationship between the stock exchanges and the government was blamed, people believed that the Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange were administrative membership system, they were government agencies.
At first, this dissertation analyzed the first and the second institutional change of Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange, and analyzed the reason of membership system. Because Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange were established by government, the Regulation for Controlling the Stock Exchanges promulgated by the State Council decided that Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange were membership stock exchanges. Secondly, according to the ownership structure of Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange, this dissertation analyzed the institutional imperfection of stock exchanges. Because Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange were membership system, they were governed by China's Securities Regulatory Commission. The ownership structure of Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange were unclear, which led to the ambiguity of power and duties. When Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange were established, they subjected to Shanghai government and Shenzhen government respectively, and subjected to China's Securities Regulatory Commission after 1997. In the view of appointed official, Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange were subordinate body of China's Securities Regulatory Commission. The ambiguity of power and duties led to the mechanisms of stock exchanges were inflexible, the stock exchanges were at disadvantage in market competition. Due to the ambiguity of power and duties, the functions of the stock exchanges were imperfectness. The function of stock issue was not under the control by the stock exchanges but by China's Securities Regulatory Commission, the function of self-discipline was not under control by the stock exchanges, Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange had not the power to punish violator, but warn, China's Securities Regulatory Commission carried out the function of supervision in stead of the stock exchanges.
To sum up the above arguments, the dissertation analyzed that Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange need to carry out the third institutional change, in order to respond the market competition of international stock exchanges. But Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange could not copy the international stock exchange's institutional change, because their economic background were difference, Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange need to carry out the institutional change of their own. The dissertation analyzed that Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchange need to import social fund on the base of state fund, so that we could change situation of ambiguity of power and duties, then we reduced the share of state fund, lessen the stock exchanges' administrative nature.
引文
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