我国上市公司股权融资偏好研究
|
摘要
伴随着巨大的融资需求发展起来的中国资本市场既体现了其强大的融资功能,又反映了我国金融体系从高度依赖以银行为主的间接融资向直接融资的转变。伴随这一转变的是我国上市公司的股权融资偏好,这种偏好有悖于西方经典的优序融资理论(pecking order theory)。众多的学者对这一问题的原因进行了研究,试图找到解决问题的方法。
本文在这样的现实背景下,通过对西方经典融资理论的梳理,提出了两个问题:一是西方经典融资理论的价值基础是什么,其是否具有普适性?二是我国上市公司表现出来的股权融资偏好有悖于优序融资理论是否就说明我国上市公司的融资是非理性的?对经典理论的梳理以及相关的实证检验文献回答了第一个问题,西方经典融资论的价值基础是企业价值最大化,即资本成本最小化。而实证检验并不是都支持优序融资理论。因此,用我国上市公司的融资偏好与优序融资理论不符而否定其行为的研究就是一个错误的起点。企业形态的发展是伴随着融资尤其是外部融资行为实现的。股份制公司作为现代公司制企业的主要形式,是进行外部股权融资的结果。因此,要了解企业的融资目标不得不从企业的演变与企业的本质来寻找答案。企业融资的目标与企业财务管理的目标在以MM定理为研究起点的融资理论中发生了直接的联系,即只要实现资本成本最小化,就可以实现企业价值的最大化。而在实践中,企业作为一个法人,是否一定遵循着规范研究的假设,实现企业价值最大化?我国企业,尤其是上市公司的形态演变不是一种自然演变过程,而是制度变迁的产物,不可避免带有旧体制与制度诱导的印迹,因此,将上市公司作为一个独立的群体,而不考虑其过去的研究是否能够解释其偏好是值得怀疑的。因此本文以经济人的趋利动机为分析起点,在控制权成本—收益的经济学研究框架下,研究我国上市公司的融资偏好问题,对国有企业不同历史时期的融资偏好特点以及其市场表现、股权分置改革前后、全流通时代上市公司的融资条件、变化、趋势以及股权融资偏好的正负效应等内容进行了理论与实证分析,最后提出了解决融资偏好问题的对策性建议。
本文共分五章,其主要内容如下:
第一章为导论,通过对理论和现实背景的梳理,提出了问题以及本文的研究思路和方法,并就本文的相关概念、结构、研究结论与创新之处进行了归纳。
第二章是全文的理论基础。正是在对控制权成本与控制权收益重新界定与认识的基础上,下文运用控制权成本与控制权收益来分析我国上市公司的股权融资偏好。第一节是对控制权收益的相关文献综述。对控制权收益概念的提出、内涵以及相关的一些研究进行了概述与评价。正是由于目前对控制权收益概念内涵的不统一,因此有了对其重新界定的必要性。第二节是对控制权成本的认识。获取、维持以及执行控制权都会产生相应的成本。本节对控制权的事前成本与事后成本进行了剖析,并对资本成本与控制权成本做了比较,得出两种成本不同的适用环境。第三节对控制权收益进行了重新界定。正是由于控制权的获取、维持与执行都需要成本,因此根据经济学的一般原理,控制权的成本需要收益的补偿,从这个角度说控制权收益是合理的。但是,根据控制权发挥的两种完全不同的效应:协同效应和隧道效应,控制权收益中既有合理的成分,共享控制权收益(基于协同效应产生的收益);又有不合理的成分,私有控制权收益(基于隧道效应产生的收益)。
第三章是我国上市公司股权融资偏好的理论分析。第一节分析了我国上市公司融资的价值取向。从融资方式的变迁来看我国上市公司的融资偏好,与其说是制度变迁导致的企业融资偏好的变化,倒不如说制度的变迁并没有改变其融资的根本目标,即获取控制权收益的最大化。利用上市公司担保获得大量银行贷款资金、通过上市与股权再融资疯狂“圈钱”等融资行为都是将上市公司当成了“提款机”,充分揭示了控股股东利用上市公司获取控制权私利的侵占性和独占性本质。而委托代理理论可以解释我国上市公司以控制权收益最大化为融资目标的内在原因。第二节通过控制权成本的比较,解释了我国上市公司的股权融资偏好,在于企业融资约束效力的软化,从根本上改变软约束取决于有效制度下的微观经济行为和支撑企业融资行为的资本市场调控的有效性。第三节通过理论模型的建立与分析得出了我国上市公司追求控制权收益最大化的特定约束条件,通过对这些约束条件的限制或改变,可以实现对上市公司融资行为的引导。
第四章是我国上市公司股权融资偏好的实证分析。基于上一章分析得到的特定约束条件,股权分置改革恰好改变了其中的第一个条件。第一节分析了股权分置改革之后上市公司“定向增发热”这一新的融资偏好的原因。第二节利用Probit二元选择模型研究了后股权分置改革时期上市公司侵占度、终极控制权下的现金流权、控股股东性质等九个特征变量对上市公司股权再融资概率的影响。模型结果与特征变量的统计分析得到的结果是一致的。非国有控股的上市公司,现金流权越高,越倾向于股权再融资。这在一定程度上是由于非国有控股上市公司,尤其是其中大量的民营企业上市融资时往往规模比较小,控股股东的直接控股比例较高,而这些企业为了迅速扩大企业规模,增强抵御风险的能力,往往上市后很快提出再融资要求。当然,考虑到我国的实际情况,这一点有时候更多的取决于政策的倾斜度。但是现金流权与股权融资偏好的一致结果在一定程度上说明,随着股权分置改革的完成,上市公司获取控制权私利的一个重要来源给切断了,而这一收益几乎可以说是无成本收益。那么可以说股权分置改革客观上抑制了上市公司的“圈钱”目标,引导了其融资的行为。而实证研究结果没能通过国有控股的上市公司,侵占度越大越倾向于股权融资的显著性检验。至于这样的结果可能是由于我们选择的样本中再融资家数与非再融资家数相差比较大造成的,如果能够得到提出股权融资预案的上市公司的数据资料,样本中再融资家数就会显著增加。另一方面的原因可能是两年的数据,时间跨度太小,因此需要今后进一步积累数据,以便得出更加可靠的结论。第三节对于全流通市场下的上市公司融资趋势进行了预测。上市公司控股股股东追求控制权收益的最大化不会因为全流通而发生变化。不管控股股东是否出售股票,二级市场股价都成为影响其总体收益的关键参数。因此,对股价的操纵和控制以实现控制权收益的最大化可能成为控股股东的新增目标。控股股东的“隧道”行为将更加隐蔽,而配合股价拉升通过资产注入等的“逆向隧道”行为将会更多。这些都一定程度上会影响到企业的融资选择。
第五章是关于我国上市公司股权融资偏好的效应与对策性思考建议。以前面章节的分析为基础,本章探讨了我国上市公司的股权融资偏好的正负效应。股权融资偏好对我国宏观经济方面的贡献是有目共睹的;对满足企业的融资需求、降低资产负债率,改善资本结构等方面做出了突出的贡献。但是,我国上市公司股权融资偏好也对公司行为、资本市场功能的发挥带来了严重的危害。因此,本文提出了解决我国上市公司股权融资偏好的负面效用,促进正面效用发挥的对策性建议。这些建议的出发点就是建立和强化对控股股东的内外部治理的激励与约束机制。比如优化股权结构、改革国企人事任命制度,合理界定控制权共享收益,建立发挥“协同效应”的内部激励与约束机制;改革发行制度、培育资本成本意识、加强信息披露与信誉制度、控制权市场与退市制度、监管与法律制度等加大企业的机会主义成本,形成有效的外部约束机制。另外建立债券市场对于完善证券市场结构,均衡股市风险,增加企业融资渠道和投资者投资渠道都具有非常重要的现实意义。
本文的研究方法主要有宏观与微观、规范与实证、历史与逻辑相结合的方法。创新之处主要体现在对我国上市公司股权融资偏好根本动机的研究是基于经济人的趋利动机,在重新界定控制权收益的基础上,重点检验了股权分置改革后影响我国上市公司股权融资偏好的特征变量。我国上市公司的形态演变不是一种自然演变过程,而是制度变迁的产物,不可避免带有旧体制与制度诱导的印迹,因此,本文从对国有企业到上市公司融资变迁的历史研究为出发点,得到上市公司控股股东股权融资的的趋利动机,这一点显然与经典的融资理论中企业价值最大化目标相矛盾,因此也就不能用资本成本来分析企业的融资选择。在对控制权成本重新认识的基础上,本文对控制权收益重新界定为共享控制权收益与私有控制权收益两部分。在控制权成本-收益的经济学研究框架下,通过数理模型分析得出了控股股东追求控制权收益最大化的约束条件,并据此通过实证研究检验了在股权分置改革这一约束条件改变后上市公司融资的新特征和影响其股权融资偏好的变量特征。并且对全流通后上市公司可能的融资趋势进行了预测。最后客观分析了我国上市公司股权融资偏好的正负效应,针对负效应提出了相关的对策性建议,具有较强的指导意义和可操作性。
The development of Chinese capital market with the great fiancing demand has most directly embodied its powerful financing function and reflected the financial system changes. At the same time the listed companies' equity financing preference has attracted much attention. Many scholars have come to a conclusion that this phenomenon is contradicting to the classical pecking order theory and studied on the reseons of the preference and the methods resolving this problem.
This dissertation posing two questions after hackling the classical fiancing theories: one is that what is the value foundation of the classical fiancing theories? The other is how about their applicability? The second one is that can the equity finacing preference of Chinese listed companies against the pecking order theory mean the fiancing behavior irrational. The enterprise value maximization, namely capital cost minimization is the classical financing theories' value foundation. And not all the ampirical tests support the pecking order theory. Therefore it's a wrong starting point using the inconsistency to deny the Chinese listed companies behaviour. Enterpise form has evoluted with the financing, especially external fiancing behavioue. As the major form of morden company system enterprises, stock company is the result of external fiancing. So in order to know the enterprise's finacing target, we have to find the anwer from the evolution and the essence of them. The financing tartet has directly associated with the financial target in the financing theories which begin with MM theorem. That is when the capital cost is minimum the enterprise value can realize maximization. But in reality as a legal person will the enterprise follow the phypothessis of normative research? The Chinese enterprises, especially the listed companies are products of institutional change, not natural evolution, inevitably with blots of old system and institutional change. Therefore it is suspectable to study the the listed companies' fiancing preference, not considering the past. Because the preference is initiated from economic man's intention to pursue more benefits, this dissertation in the economic framework of cost-benefit of control studies the financing preference of Chinese listed companies and focuses on the different characteristics in different pieods、market performance、effects. Based on the theoretical and empirical studies this dissertation has stated countmeasure suggestions to solve the financing preference problem.
The major part of dissertation can be divided into five chapters.
Chapter 1 is the introduction. In this part questions have been posted after hackling the literatures. And then we put forward this dissertation's research thinking and methods and summarize the related concepts、structure、research conclusion and innavation.
Chapter 2 is the theretical foundation of this dissertation. Based on the redefination of control cost and control benefit, this dissertation has studied on the equity financing preferrence of the Chinese listed company. First we review of the related literature about control benefit. Just because of controversial points of its connotation, it's necessary to redefinate the defination of control benefit. Then we re-recognize control cost. Obtaining、maintaining and executing the right of control all need cost. After the analysis on the beforehand cost and the afterwards cost, we compare the differences between control cost and capital cost which is the standard to determine the financing choice in the classical thories. Finanlly the defination of control benefit has been redifined. From the point of control cost, control benefit is reasonable. However according to the two different kinds of effects generated by the using of control right, control benefit can be devided two parts: common-control benefit corresponding to cooperative effect and self-control benefit corresponding to tunneling effect.
Chapter 3 is the theoretical analysis on the equity financing preferrence of Chinese listed companies. In first part we disscusse the value orientation of Chinese listed companies' financing: maximum of control benefits which is concluded from the views of the financing transition path、the external behaviour of making use of the listed company to obtain huge amount of capital. This value orientation can be explained by the principal-agent theory. In the second part we study the financing preference of Chinese enterprise under the control cost. Due to soft constraint the equity finacing preference choice of Chinese listed company is rational. In the third part we discuss in the peoried of non-tradable shares what the constraint conditions of the equity financing preference are by establishing mathematical model. We can limit and guide this preference through changing these constrain conditions.
Chapter 4 is the empirical analysis on the equity financing preferrence of Chinese listed companies. In this part we have a study on the fiancing preference after shareholder structure reform. The simple and pround reasons are discussed on a new phenomenon of directional add-issuance. Then we use the Probit Binary Choice Model to analyze the probability of the influence of nine characteristic variables on the financing preference of the listed companies. The results are consistent to the statistical analysis results. Higher the cash flow right is, non-state holding listed company is inclined to choice equity financing. The non-statle holding listed company, especially more private enterprise has smaller scale after EPO、higher controlling shareholding and presents SEO quickly after IPO to expand rapidly and to strengthen ability of anti-risk. Considering the real financing condition, it maybe more due to the policy inclination. But to a certain extent shareholder structure reform has cut one way of obtaining the private control benefit that is no cost to some extent. So we can say that the reform has restrained the listed company's goal of "money-looping" and guide its financing behaviour. On the other hand the pypothethsis that more the separation degree of control right and stock control right, the state listed company is more inclined to choice equity financing doesn't pass the significance test. One fact that the listed companies with SEO are much more than the non-SEOs maybe produce this result. The other reason may be that the researching period is too short for just two years after the shareholder structure reform. So we should go on collecting materials and come to more reliable results. Last we forecast the financing preference of the Chinese listed company in the period of Full Circulation. The goal of maximum of control benefit will not change. The fluctuation of stock's market price will cause the controlling shareholder's benefit. Manipulation of stock price to obtain the benefit control will be the newly added goal that will have an effect on the listed company's financing choice.
Chapter 5 analyzes the positive and negative effects of Chinese listed company's equity financing preference and puts forward suggestions on restricting this preference according to the harm it has produced. This financing preference has a positive effect on the macro-economy and the companies' self-development. But it also has a negative effect on company behaviour and the function of capital market. We propose the suggestions to build and strengthen the internal and external restraint-incentive mechanisms, especially restraint mechanisim. Such as optimizing ownership structure、reforming personnel appointment system and rational defining common benefit of control form the effective internal restraint-incentive mechanism. Reforming stock issuing system、cultivating cost of capital consciousness、strenghening information disclosure、reputation、delisting、legal and supervision system will increase control shareholders' cost of opportunitism and build external restraint mechanism. In addition bond market is necessary to build for perfecing capital market structure、balancing stock market risk and increasing ways to finance and invest for the enterprise and investor.
The combination of macroscopic and microscopic research、nomotive and empirical analysis、historical and logic study are employed in this dissertation. The creative points include the study of fundamental motivation of Chinese listed company、redefinition of control benefit、empirical test of influence factors after the shareholder structure reform. The evolution of enterprise form is not a natural process but a product of institutional change in China. We come to the conclusion that Chinese listed company pursues the maximum of control benefit not of enterprise value. Based on the redefination of control benefit we not only analysize the restraint conditions of equity preference on control cost frame but also study the influence factors after the shareholder structure reform by an empirical test. At last we put forward corresponding suggestions according to the analysis on the positive and negtive effection of financing preferrence.
本文在这样的现实背景下,通过对西方经典融资理论的梳理,提出了两个问题:一是西方经典融资理论的价值基础是什么,其是否具有普适性?二是我国上市公司表现出来的股权融资偏好有悖于优序融资理论是否就说明我国上市公司的融资是非理性的?对经典理论的梳理以及相关的实证检验文献回答了第一个问题,西方经典融资论的价值基础是企业价值最大化,即资本成本最小化。而实证检验并不是都支持优序融资理论。因此,用我国上市公司的融资偏好与优序融资理论不符而否定其行为的研究就是一个错误的起点。企业形态的发展是伴随着融资尤其是外部融资行为实现的。股份制公司作为现代公司制企业的主要形式,是进行外部股权融资的结果。因此,要了解企业的融资目标不得不从企业的演变与企业的本质来寻找答案。企业融资的目标与企业财务管理的目标在以MM定理为研究起点的融资理论中发生了直接的联系,即只要实现资本成本最小化,就可以实现企业价值的最大化。而在实践中,企业作为一个法人,是否一定遵循着规范研究的假设,实现企业价值最大化?我国企业,尤其是上市公司的形态演变不是一种自然演变过程,而是制度变迁的产物,不可避免带有旧体制与制度诱导的印迹,因此,将上市公司作为一个独立的群体,而不考虑其过去的研究是否能够解释其偏好是值得怀疑的。因此本文以经济人的趋利动机为分析起点,在控制权成本—收益的经济学研究框架下,研究我国上市公司的融资偏好问题,对国有企业不同历史时期的融资偏好特点以及其市场表现、股权分置改革前后、全流通时代上市公司的融资条件、变化、趋势以及股权融资偏好的正负效应等内容进行了理论与实证分析,最后提出了解决融资偏好问题的对策性建议。
本文共分五章,其主要内容如下:
第一章为导论,通过对理论和现实背景的梳理,提出了问题以及本文的研究思路和方法,并就本文的相关概念、结构、研究结论与创新之处进行了归纳。
第二章是全文的理论基础。正是在对控制权成本与控制权收益重新界定与认识的基础上,下文运用控制权成本与控制权收益来分析我国上市公司的股权融资偏好。第一节是对控制权收益的相关文献综述。对控制权收益概念的提出、内涵以及相关的一些研究进行了概述与评价。正是由于目前对控制权收益概念内涵的不统一,因此有了对其重新界定的必要性。第二节是对控制权成本的认识。获取、维持以及执行控制权都会产生相应的成本。本节对控制权的事前成本与事后成本进行了剖析,并对资本成本与控制权成本做了比较,得出两种成本不同的适用环境。第三节对控制权收益进行了重新界定。正是由于控制权的获取、维持与执行都需要成本,因此根据经济学的一般原理,控制权的成本需要收益的补偿,从这个角度说控制权收益是合理的。但是,根据控制权发挥的两种完全不同的效应:协同效应和隧道效应,控制权收益中既有合理的成分,共享控制权收益(基于协同效应产生的收益);又有不合理的成分,私有控制权收益(基于隧道效应产生的收益)。
第三章是我国上市公司股权融资偏好的理论分析。第一节分析了我国上市公司融资的价值取向。从融资方式的变迁来看我国上市公司的融资偏好,与其说是制度变迁导致的企业融资偏好的变化,倒不如说制度的变迁并没有改变其融资的根本目标,即获取控制权收益的最大化。利用上市公司担保获得大量银行贷款资金、通过上市与股权再融资疯狂“圈钱”等融资行为都是将上市公司当成了“提款机”,充分揭示了控股股东利用上市公司获取控制权私利的侵占性和独占性本质。而委托代理理论可以解释我国上市公司以控制权收益最大化为融资目标的内在原因。第二节通过控制权成本的比较,解释了我国上市公司的股权融资偏好,在于企业融资约束效力的软化,从根本上改变软约束取决于有效制度下的微观经济行为和支撑企业融资行为的资本市场调控的有效性。第三节通过理论模型的建立与分析得出了我国上市公司追求控制权收益最大化的特定约束条件,通过对这些约束条件的限制或改变,可以实现对上市公司融资行为的引导。
第四章是我国上市公司股权融资偏好的实证分析。基于上一章分析得到的特定约束条件,股权分置改革恰好改变了其中的第一个条件。第一节分析了股权分置改革之后上市公司“定向增发热”这一新的融资偏好的原因。第二节利用Probit二元选择模型研究了后股权分置改革时期上市公司侵占度、终极控制权下的现金流权、控股股东性质等九个特征变量对上市公司股权再融资概率的影响。模型结果与特征变量的统计分析得到的结果是一致的。非国有控股的上市公司,现金流权越高,越倾向于股权再融资。这在一定程度上是由于非国有控股上市公司,尤其是其中大量的民营企业上市融资时往往规模比较小,控股股东的直接控股比例较高,而这些企业为了迅速扩大企业规模,增强抵御风险的能力,往往上市后很快提出再融资要求。当然,考虑到我国的实际情况,这一点有时候更多的取决于政策的倾斜度。但是现金流权与股权融资偏好的一致结果在一定程度上说明,随着股权分置改革的完成,上市公司获取控制权私利的一个重要来源给切断了,而这一收益几乎可以说是无成本收益。那么可以说股权分置改革客观上抑制了上市公司的“圈钱”目标,引导了其融资的行为。而实证研究结果没能通过国有控股的上市公司,侵占度越大越倾向于股权融资的显著性检验。至于这样的结果可能是由于我们选择的样本中再融资家数与非再融资家数相差比较大造成的,如果能够得到提出股权融资预案的上市公司的数据资料,样本中再融资家数就会显著增加。另一方面的原因可能是两年的数据,时间跨度太小,因此需要今后进一步积累数据,以便得出更加可靠的结论。第三节对于全流通市场下的上市公司融资趋势进行了预测。上市公司控股股股东追求控制权收益的最大化不会因为全流通而发生变化。不管控股股东是否出售股票,二级市场股价都成为影响其总体收益的关键参数。因此,对股价的操纵和控制以实现控制权收益的最大化可能成为控股股东的新增目标。控股股东的“隧道”行为将更加隐蔽,而配合股价拉升通过资产注入等的“逆向隧道”行为将会更多。这些都一定程度上会影响到企业的融资选择。
第五章是关于我国上市公司股权融资偏好的效应与对策性思考建议。以前面章节的分析为基础,本章探讨了我国上市公司的股权融资偏好的正负效应。股权融资偏好对我国宏观经济方面的贡献是有目共睹的;对满足企业的融资需求、降低资产负债率,改善资本结构等方面做出了突出的贡献。但是,我国上市公司股权融资偏好也对公司行为、资本市场功能的发挥带来了严重的危害。因此,本文提出了解决我国上市公司股权融资偏好的负面效用,促进正面效用发挥的对策性建议。这些建议的出发点就是建立和强化对控股股东的内外部治理的激励与约束机制。比如优化股权结构、改革国企人事任命制度,合理界定控制权共享收益,建立发挥“协同效应”的内部激励与约束机制;改革发行制度、培育资本成本意识、加强信息披露与信誉制度、控制权市场与退市制度、监管与法律制度等加大企业的机会主义成本,形成有效的外部约束机制。另外建立债券市场对于完善证券市场结构,均衡股市风险,增加企业融资渠道和投资者投资渠道都具有非常重要的现实意义。
本文的研究方法主要有宏观与微观、规范与实证、历史与逻辑相结合的方法。创新之处主要体现在对我国上市公司股权融资偏好根本动机的研究是基于经济人的趋利动机,在重新界定控制权收益的基础上,重点检验了股权分置改革后影响我国上市公司股权融资偏好的特征变量。我国上市公司的形态演变不是一种自然演变过程,而是制度变迁的产物,不可避免带有旧体制与制度诱导的印迹,因此,本文从对国有企业到上市公司融资变迁的历史研究为出发点,得到上市公司控股股东股权融资的的趋利动机,这一点显然与经典的融资理论中企业价值最大化目标相矛盾,因此也就不能用资本成本来分析企业的融资选择。在对控制权成本重新认识的基础上,本文对控制权收益重新界定为共享控制权收益与私有控制权收益两部分。在控制权成本-收益的经济学研究框架下,通过数理模型分析得出了控股股东追求控制权收益最大化的约束条件,并据此通过实证研究检验了在股权分置改革这一约束条件改变后上市公司融资的新特征和影响其股权融资偏好的变量特征。并且对全流通后上市公司可能的融资趋势进行了预测。最后客观分析了我国上市公司股权融资偏好的正负效应,针对负效应提出了相关的对策性建议,具有较强的指导意义和可操作性。
The development of Chinese capital market with the great fiancing demand has most directly embodied its powerful financing function and reflected the financial system changes. At the same time the listed companies' equity financing preference has attracted much attention. Many scholars have come to a conclusion that this phenomenon is contradicting to the classical pecking order theory and studied on the reseons of the preference and the methods resolving this problem.
This dissertation posing two questions after hackling the classical fiancing theories: one is that what is the value foundation of the classical fiancing theories? The other is how about their applicability? The second one is that can the equity finacing preference of Chinese listed companies against the pecking order theory mean the fiancing behavior irrational. The enterprise value maximization, namely capital cost minimization is the classical financing theories' value foundation. And not all the ampirical tests support the pecking order theory. Therefore it's a wrong starting point using the inconsistency to deny the Chinese listed companies behaviour. Enterpise form has evoluted with the financing, especially external fiancing behavioue. As the major form of morden company system enterprises, stock company is the result of external fiancing. So in order to know the enterprise's finacing target, we have to find the anwer from the evolution and the essence of them. The financing tartet has directly associated with the financial target in the financing theories which begin with MM theorem. That is when the capital cost is minimum the enterprise value can realize maximization. But in reality as a legal person will the enterprise follow the phypothessis of normative research? The Chinese enterprises, especially the listed companies are products of institutional change, not natural evolution, inevitably with blots of old system and institutional change. Therefore it is suspectable to study the the listed companies' fiancing preference, not considering the past. Because the preference is initiated from economic man's intention to pursue more benefits, this dissertation in the economic framework of cost-benefit of control studies the financing preference of Chinese listed companies and focuses on the different characteristics in different pieods、market performance、effects. Based on the theoretical and empirical studies this dissertation has stated countmeasure suggestions to solve the financing preference problem.
The major part of dissertation can be divided into five chapters.
Chapter 1 is the introduction. In this part questions have been posted after hackling the literatures. And then we put forward this dissertation's research thinking and methods and summarize the related concepts、structure、research conclusion and innavation.
Chapter 2 is the theretical foundation of this dissertation. Based on the redefination of control cost and control benefit, this dissertation has studied on the equity financing preferrence of the Chinese listed company. First we review of the related literature about control benefit. Just because of controversial points of its connotation, it's necessary to redefinate the defination of control benefit. Then we re-recognize control cost. Obtaining、maintaining and executing the right of control all need cost. After the analysis on the beforehand cost and the afterwards cost, we compare the differences between control cost and capital cost which is the standard to determine the financing choice in the classical thories. Finanlly the defination of control benefit has been redifined. From the point of control cost, control benefit is reasonable. However according to the two different kinds of effects generated by the using of control right, control benefit can be devided two parts: common-control benefit corresponding to cooperative effect and self-control benefit corresponding to tunneling effect.
Chapter 3 is the theoretical analysis on the equity financing preferrence of Chinese listed companies. In first part we disscusse the value orientation of Chinese listed companies' financing: maximum of control benefits which is concluded from the views of the financing transition path、the external behaviour of making use of the listed company to obtain huge amount of capital. This value orientation can be explained by the principal-agent theory. In the second part we study the financing preference of Chinese enterprise under the control cost. Due to soft constraint the equity finacing preference choice of Chinese listed company is rational. In the third part we discuss in the peoried of non-tradable shares what the constraint conditions of the equity financing preference are by establishing mathematical model. We can limit and guide this preference through changing these constrain conditions.
Chapter 4 is the empirical analysis on the equity financing preferrence of Chinese listed companies. In this part we have a study on the fiancing preference after shareholder structure reform. The simple and pround reasons are discussed on a new phenomenon of directional add-issuance. Then we use the Probit Binary Choice Model to analyze the probability of the influence of nine characteristic variables on the financing preference of the listed companies. The results are consistent to the statistical analysis results. Higher the cash flow right is, non-state holding listed company is inclined to choice equity financing. The non-statle holding listed company, especially more private enterprise has smaller scale after EPO、higher controlling shareholding and presents SEO quickly after IPO to expand rapidly and to strengthen ability of anti-risk. Considering the real financing condition, it maybe more due to the policy inclination. But to a certain extent shareholder structure reform has cut one way of obtaining the private control benefit that is no cost to some extent. So we can say that the reform has restrained the listed company's goal of "money-looping" and guide its financing behaviour. On the other hand the pypothethsis that more the separation degree of control right and stock control right, the state listed company is more inclined to choice equity financing doesn't pass the significance test. One fact that the listed companies with SEO are much more than the non-SEOs maybe produce this result. The other reason may be that the researching period is too short for just two years after the shareholder structure reform. So we should go on collecting materials and come to more reliable results. Last we forecast the financing preference of the Chinese listed company in the period of Full Circulation. The goal of maximum of control benefit will not change. The fluctuation of stock's market price will cause the controlling shareholder's benefit. Manipulation of stock price to obtain the benefit control will be the newly added goal that will have an effect on the listed company's financing choice.
Chapter 5 analyzes the positive and negative effects of Chinese listed company's equity financing preference and puts forward suggestions on restricting this preference according to the harm it has produced. This financing preference has a positive effect on the macro-economy and the companies' self-development. But it also has a negative effect on company behaviour and the function of capital market. We propose the suggestions to build and strengthen the internal and external restraint-incentive mechanisms, especially restraint mechanisim. Such as optimizing ownership structure、reforming personnel appointment system and rational defining common benefit of control form the effective internal restraint-incentive mechanism. Reforming stock issuing system、cultivating cost of capital consciousness、strenghening information disclosure、reputation、delisting、legal and supervision system will increase control shareholders' cost of opportunitism and build external restraint mechanism. In addition bond market is necessary to build for perfecing capital market structure、balancing stock market risk and increasing ways to finance and invest for the enterprise and investor.
The combination of macroscopic and microscopic research、nomotive and empirical analysis、historical and logic study are employed in this dissertation. The creative points include the study of fundamental motivation of Chinese listed company、redefinition of control benefit、empirical test of influence factors after the shareholder structure reform. The evolution of enterprise form is not a natural process but a product of institutional change in China. We come to the conclusion that Chinese listed company pursues the maximum of control benefit not of enterprise value. Based on the redefination of control benefit we not only analysize the restraint conditions of equity preference on control cost frame but also study the influence factors after the shareholder structure reform by an empirical test. At last we put forward corresponding suggestions according to the analysis on the positive and negtive effection of financing preferrence.
引文
[1]Fama,E.F.,and K.French,The corporate cost of capital and the return oncorporate investment[J],Journal of Finance,1999,54:1939-1967
[2]Federal Reserve Board.Balance Sheets for the U.S.Economy,1949-1988.1989.
[3]李扬.我国资本市场若干问题研究.中国证券报,1997年12月15日.
[1][1]万朝领,储诚忠,李翔,袁野,周建新.上市公司的外部资金来源问题研究——上市公司的资本结构与融资成本问题的实证研究.上证联合研究计划第三期课题报告.2002.http://www.sse.com.cn/cs/zhs/xxfw/jysjs/sseResearch/1-1/wbzjly.pdf
[2]袁国良,郑江淮,胡志乾.我国上市公司融资偏好和融资能力的实证研究.管理世界.1999,3:150-220.
[1]万朝领、储诚忠、李翔、袁野、周建新,上市公司的外部资金来源问题研究——上市公司的资本结构与融资成本问题的实证研究,上证联合研究计划第三期课题报告,2002.http://www.sse.com.cn/cs/zhs/xxfw/jysjs/sseResearch/1-1/wbzjly.pdf
[2]Modigliani Franco,Merton H.Miller.The Cost of Capital Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment.the American Economic Review.1958,48:261-97.
[1]沈艺峰,资本结构理论史,经济科学出版社,1999年第6版。
[2]Jensen,M.C.,and W.H.Meckling,Theory of the firm:managerial behavior,agency costs,and capital structure [J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3:305-360.
[1]Grossman,S.and O.Hart,Corporate financial structure and managerial incentives[M],In.J.McCall.ed.,The Economic of Information and Uncertainty.University of Chicago Press,1982,107-137.
[1]Townsend,Robert M.,Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State Verification,Journal of Economic Theory,1979,21:265-93.
[2]Diamond,D.W,Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring,Review Of Economic Studies,1984,51:393-414.
[1]Ross,S.A.The Determination of Financial Structure:the Incentive Signaling Approach,Bell Journal of Economies,1977,8:1-32.
[2]Leland,H.E.,Pyle,D.H.Informational Asymmetries.Financial structure and Financial Intermediation,Journal of Finance,1977,32:371-387.
[1]Myers,Stewart and Nicholas,Majluf,Corporate Financing and Investment Decision When Firms have Information that Investors do not have,Journal of Financial Economics 1984,13:187-221.
[1]Holmstrom,Bengt and Tirole,J.,The Theory of the Firm,Handbook of Industrial Organization:North Holland,1989
[2]Liugi Zingales,In Search of New Foundations[J],The Journal of Finance,2000,155(4):1623-1653.
[3]Harris,M.,and A.Raviv,Corporate Control Contests and Capital Structure.,Journal of Financial Economics,1998(20):55-86.
[4]Stulz,Rene M.,Managerial control of voting rights:Financing policies and the market for corporate control,Journal of Financial Economics,1988(20):25-54.
[1]Aghion,P.and Bolton,P,An incomplete contract approach to financial contracting,Review of Economic Studies.1992,59:473-494.
[2]O.Hart.Corporation Governance:Theory and Implication.Economics of Journal,1995(3).
[1]Maksimovic.V.Optimal Capital Structure in Repeated Oligopolie[J].Rand Journal of Economics,1988,(19):389-407.
[2]Bolton,Scharfiable.A theory of Predation based on agency problems in financial contracting[J].American Economic Review,1990(80):94-106.
[3]Dasgupta,S.and Titman,S..Pricing Strategy and Financial Policy[J].Review of Financial Studies,1998(11);705-737.
[4]Maksimovic,V.and Titman,S..Financial Reputation and Reputation for Product Quality[J].Review of Financial Studies,1991(2):175-200.
[5]Opler,T.,and Titman,S..Financial Distress and Corporate Performance[J].Journal of Finance,1994(49):1015-1040.
[6]Campello,Murillo.Capital Structure and Product Markets Interactions:Evidence from Business Cycle[R].SSRN Working Paper,1999
[7]Noe Thoms H.Capital Structure and Signaling Game Equilibria[J].Review of Financial Studies,1988(1):331-356.
[8]Viswanath P V.Strategic Considerations,the Pecking Order Hypothesis and Market Reactions to Equity Financing[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1993(28):213-222.
[1]Titman,Sheridan.The Modigliani and Miller Theorem and Market Efficiency,NBER Working Paper 8641,2001
[2]Lucas,Deborah,and Robert McDonald.Equity issues and stock price dynamics.Journal of Finance 1990(45):1019-1043.
[3]Korajczyk,Robert,Deborah J.Lucas,and Robert L.McDonald,The Effect of Information Release on the Pricing and the Timing of Security Issues,Review of Financial Studies,1991(4):685-708.
[4]Choe,Masulis and Nanda.Common Stock Offerings across the Business Cycle:Theory and Evidence.Journal of Empirical Finance,1993(1):3-31.
[5]Loughran,T.and J.R.Ritter.The new issues puzzle.Journal of Finance,1995(50):23-52.
[6]Spiess D.Katherine,John Affleck-Graves,Underperformance in Long-run Stock Returns Following Seasoned Equity Offerings,Journal of Financial Economics,1995(38):243-367
[7]Ikenberry,David,Lakonishok,Josef,and Vermaelen,Theo,Market underreaction to open market share repurchases.Journal of Financial Economics,1995,39(2):181-208.
[8]Bayless.M.and S.Chaplinsky.Is there a Window of Opportunity for Seasoned Equity Issuance?[J].Journal of Finance,1996,51(1):253-278.
[1]陈晓,单鑫.债务融资是否会增加上市公司的融资成本[J].经济研究,1999,(9):39-46,80.
[2]沈艺峰,田静.我国上市公司资本成本的定量研究[J].经济研究,1999,(11):62-68.
[3]黄少安,张岗.中国上市公司股权融资偏好分析[J].经济研究,2001,(11):12-27.
[4]葛结根.上市公司的股权融资偏好分析[J].中国流通经济,2003,(5):61-64
[5]郑江淮,何旭强,王华.上市公司投资的融资约束:从股权结构角度的实证分析[J].金融研究,2001,(8):92-99.
[6]黄贵海,宋敏.中国上市公司的资本结构[J].上证研究,2002,1(2):143-198.
[7]吴淑琨.对大股东行为机理的经济学分析[J].中国证券业研究,2003,(2).
[8]谭锦,姚晓民.上市公司股权融资过度偏好透析[J].生产力研究,2003,(3):119-121.
[9]李霞.我国上市公司股权融资偏好的实证分析[J].管理科学,2004,(2):59-63.
[1]罗云,姚丽莎,张月华.论上市公司融资偏好与公司治理[J].四川师范学院学报(哲学社会科学版),2001,(6):46-50.
[2]吴敏,仲夏.西方融资优序理论对我国上市公司融资的启示[J],经济与管理,2003,(4):45-47.
[3]文宏.融资偏好与融资效率—对我国上市公司的实证研究[J].当代经济科学,1999,(6);38-43.
[4]杨运杰,李静洁.我国上市公司股权融资偏好原因分析[J].理论学刊,2002,(6):61-63.
[5]王素莲.我国上市公司融资偏好悖论的经济学思考[J].山西大学学报,2003,(6):25-28.
[1]郑祖玄.股权分置与上市公司股权融资行为.[EB/OL],http://dlib.cnki.net/kns50/detail.aspx?QueryID=21&CurRec=1
[2]陆正飞,叶康涛.中国上市公司股权融资偏好解析——偏好股权融资是缘于融资成本低吗?[J].经济研究,2004(4):50-59.
[1]Titman,Sheridan and Roberto wessels.The determinants of capital structure choice[J],Journal of Finance 1988,43:1-19.
[2]Shyam-Sunder L,Myers S.Testing Static Tradeoff against Pecking Order Models of Capital Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1999,51:219-244.
[3]Brennan,Michel,and Alan Kraus.Efficient financing under asymmetric information[J],Journal of Finance 1987,42:1225-1243.
[4]Noe,T.H.,Capital structure and signaling game equilibria,the review of financial studies,1988,1(4):331-355.
[5]Constantinides,G.M.,and Grundy,B.D.,Optimal Investment with Stock Repurchase and Financing as Signals,the Review of Financial Studies 1989,2(4):445-465
[6]Helwege,Jean,and liang,Nellie,Is there a pecking order? evidence from a panel of IPO firms,Journal of Financial Economics.1996,40:429-458.
[7]Frank M,Goyal V.Testing the Pecking Order Theory of Capital Structure.Journal of Financial Economics[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2003,67:217-248.
[1]Singh,A.and Hamid,J.Corporate financial structures in developing countries[J].International Finance Corporation Technical Paper.1992,1,IFC,Washington,DC
[1]饶育蕾.制度适应与市场博弈-企业资本结构的形成机制研究[EB/OL].www.cnki.net.11.
[2][美]詹姆斯·范霍恩.小约翰·瓦霍维奇著,郭浩、徐琳译:《现代企业财务管理》(第10版),经济科学出版社1998年版,第531页.
[1]法,布罗代尔.15世纪至18世纪的物质文明、经济和资本主义[M].三联书店.1993,2.
[1]Claessens,S.,S.Djankov and L.H.P.Lang.The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58:81-112.
[2]La Porta et al..Corporate Ownership around the World[J].Journal of Finance,1999,54:471-517.
[1]Williamson Oliver.Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance[J].Journal of Finance.1988,Vol.43,567-591.
[1]钱颖一.企业的治理结构改革和融资结构改革.经济研究.1995(1).
[2]La Porta,R.,F.Lopez-de-Silanes,A.Shleifer,Corporate Ownership Around the World[J].Journal of Finance,1999,54(2):471-517.
[3]Holderness,Clifford G.,and Dennis P.Sheehan.The Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations:An Exploratory Analysis[J].Jour2nal of Financial Economics,1988(20):317-46.
[4]Faccio,M.and L.Lang.The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2002(65):365-395.
[5]Claessens,S.,Djankov,S.,& Lang,L.H.P..The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000(58):81-112.
[1]Shleifer,Andrei and Vishny,Robert W.A Survey of Corporate Governance[J].Journal of Finance,1997,Vol LⅡ,2:737-783.
[2]La Porta,R.,F.Lopez-de-Silanes,A.Shleifer,and R.Vishny.Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation,Journal of Financial Economics,2002(57):1147-1170.
[3]Grossman,Sanford,Oliver Hart.One share one vote and the market for corporate control Journal of Financial Economics,1988(20):175-202.
[1]Harris,Milton,and Arthur Raviv,Corporate governance:Voting rights and majority rules,Journal of Financial Economics,1988(20):203-235.
[2]Aghion,Philippe,and Patrick Bolton,An incomplete contract approach to financial contracting,Review of Economic Studies,1992(59):473-494.
[3]Mueller,Elisabeth.Private Benefits of Control,Capital Structure and Company Growth.London School of Economics Working Paper,2003.
[4]Bebchuk,L.A.& M.Kahan,A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contests,California Law Review.1990(78):1071-1138
[5]Johnson,S.,R.La Porta,F.Lopez-de-Silanes,and Shleifer.Tunneling.American Economic Review,Papers and Proceedings,2000(90):22-27.
[6]Ehrhardt,Olaf and Nowak,Eric.Private Benefits and Minority Shareholder Expropriation,Humboldt University,Working Paper.2003.
[1]Dyck,Alexander and Zingales,Luig.i.Private Benefits of Contro:l An International Comparison.Journal of Finance,2004,VOL LIX,NO 2:537-600.
[2]Barclay,Michae,l and Clifford Holderness.Private benefits of control of public corporations.Journal of Financial Economics,1989,(25):371-395.
[3]Joon Ho Hwang.Private Benefits,Ownership vs Control Kelley School of Business,Indiana University.Working Paper,2005.
[1]韩德宗,叶春华.控制权私人收益的理论与实证研究.统计研究,2004(2):42-46.
[2]赵昌文,蒲自立,杨安华.中国上市公司控制权私人收益的度量及影响因素.中国工业经济.2004(6):100-106.
[3]唐宗明,余颖,俞乐.我国上市公司控制权私人收益的经验研究.系统工程理论方法应用.2005(12):509-513.
[4]Zingales,Luig.i.Insider Ownership and Decision to Go Public,Review of Economic Studies,1995(62):425-448.
[5]Nenova,Tatiana.The value of corporate votes and control benefits:A cross-country analysis.Journal of Financial Economics,2003,168(3):325-351.
[1]Djankov,S.;R.Laporta,F.Lopez-de-Silanes and A.Shleifer,The Regulation of Entry,Quarterly Journal of Economics,2002(117):1-37.
[2]Stijn Claessens,Simeon D jankov,Joseph P.H Fan,Larry H.P.Lang,Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings,Journal of Finance,2002,VOL LVII(6):2741-2771.
[3]Jeremy S S.Edwards,Alfons J.W eichenrieder.Ownership Concentration and Share Valuation,German Economic Review,2004,5(2):143-171.
[4]王鹏,周黎安.控股股东的控制权、所有权与公司绩效:基于中国上市公司的证据.金融研究,2006(2):88-98.
[5]Igor Filatotchev,Tomasz Mickiewicz.Ownership Concentration,Private Benefits of Control and Debt Financing.University of London,Working Paper,2003.
[1]余明桂,夏新平,潘红波.控制权私有收益的实证分析.管理科学.2006,19(3):27-33.
[2]Demsetz,Harold and Kenneth Lehn.The structure of corporate ownership:Causes and consequences.Journal of Political Economy.1985(93),1155-1175.
[3]林朝南,刘星,郝颖.行业特征与控制权私利:来自中国上市公司的经验证据.经济科学,2006(3):61-72.
[4]La Porta,R.Lopez-de-Silanes,F.Shleifer,A.Vishny,R.W.,Law and finance.Journal of Political Economy,1998(106):1113-1155
[5]La Porta,Lopez-de-silanes,Andrei Shleifer,Robert Vishny.Investor Protection and Corporate Governance,The Journal of Financial Economics 2000(58):3-27.
[1]Lucian Arye Bebchunk.A Rent-protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control,Cambridge,Working Paper,1999.
[2]Peter Roosenboorn.Willem Schramade.The price of Power:Valuing the controlling position of owner-managers in French IPO firms.Journal of Corporate Finance,2006(12):270-295.
[3]Craig Doidge,G Andrew Karolyi,Karl V.Lins,Darius P.Miller,Rene M.Stulz.Private Benefits of Control Ownership,and the Cross-listing Decision.University ofToronto,Working Paper.2005.
[4]Xue ping Wu,Zheng Wang.Equity Financing in a Myers-Majluf Framework with Private Benefits of control.Journal of Corporate Finance.2005(11):915-945.
[1]Holderness,Clifford G.A Survey of Block holders and Corporate Control.Economic Policy Review,2003(4):51-64.
[2]Hart oliver.Corporate Governance:Some Theory and Implications,Economic Journal,Royal Economic Society.1995,105(430):678-89 Jones.
[3]Hart oliver.Financial Contracting,Journal of economic Literature,2001(39):1079-1101.
[4]Zingales,Luig.i.In Search of New Foundations.Journal of Finance,2001,VolLV(4):1623-1653.
[1]否则,没有人愿意去争夺控制权。Shleifer,A.,and Vishny,R.,A Survey of Corporate Governance,Journal of Finance,1997(52):737-783.
[2]从企业形态演变可知,公司制企业成立之初往往是存在一个发起人,也就是控股股东。
[3]Demsetz,H.,and Lehn,K.,the Structure of Corporate Ownership:Causes and Consequences.Journal of Political Economy,1985(93):1155-1177.
[4]Shleifer,Ahdrei,and Robert Vishny,1986,"Large Shareholders and Corporate Control",Journal ofPolitical Economy,94,461-488.
[1]申尊焕.大股东侵害与控制权收益关系的研究[J].统计与决策.2007(20):116-118,117.
[2]Fan,J.,and Wong,T..Corporate Ownership Structure and the Informativeness of Accounting Earnings in East Asia,Journal of Accounting and Economics,2002(33):401-425.
[3]Lucian Bebchuk,Reinier Krankman and George Triantis,Stock Pyramids,Cross-ownership,and Dual Class Equity:The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control From Cash Flow Rights,NBER working paper,1999:6951.
[1]唐宗明,蒋位.中国上市公司大股东侵害度实证分析,经济研究.2002(4).
[2]F.Modigliani and M.H.Miller.The Cost of Capital,Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment,American Economic Review,1958(48):261-97.
[3]有关现代融资理论的文献,参看第一章,第一节.
[1]新帕尔格雷夫货币金融大辞典[M].北京:经济科学出版社.2000,第一卷:470.
[2]朱武祥.资本成本理念在公司财务决策中的作用[J].投资研究,2000,(1)
[3]宋琳.资本成本缺位与我国资本市场功能缺陷.博士论文.2006:37.
[1]Grossman,S.,O.Hart.The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Intergration[J].Journal of Political Economy,1986,94(4):691-719.
[1]根据Holderness和Sheehan对美国纽约股票交易所(NYSE)和美国股票交易(AMEX)所拥有绝对控股股东的公司研究,90%以上的控股股东安排自己的直接代表(当控股股东为公司时),或自己本人(当控股股东为个人时)担任公司董事长或首席执行官。在东亚和欧洲等家族企业控制的上市公司中,家族成员同时担任公司总经理或公司董事长的现象也非常普遍。
[2]没有持股或少量持股的经理也可能拥有控制权,但经理控制权形成的情况比较复杂。
[3]100%控股实际上是不可能存在的一种情形,否则就不属于现代意义的股份公司而是独资企业。
[4]51%的控股权是一种极为稳妥的界定,实际上,如果通过金字塔结构、交叉持股结构和二元股份结构等实现控股的话,远低于此比例。LLSV(1999)均以20%的股权比为起点来分析这类问题。根据肖腾文研究,在我国第一大股东的持股比例与其在董事会中的席位比例,基本保持一定的正向线性关系,达到完全控制董事会(代表第一大股东的董事比例≥50%)所需的最低控股比例在23%左右。
[5]如果控股权模式是家族式的金字塔结构的话,股权与现金流权的对应就远非这样机械。
[6]杨瑞龙.企业共同治理的经济学分析[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2001:122.
[1]张维迎.企业的企业家——契约理论[M].上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1995:292-293.
[2]陈郁.企业制度与生产组织——交易费用经济学文选[M].上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1996:271.
[1]Shleifer,A.,and Vishny,R.,A Survey of Corporate Governance,Journal of Finance,1997(52):737-783.
[1]Claessens,S.,S.Djankov,J.Fan,and Lang,L.,Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Share holdings,Journal of Finance,2002(57):2741-2771.
[1]章迪诚.中国国有企业改革编年史(1978—2005)[M].北京:中国工人出版社,2006.
[1]于东智.资本结构、债权治理与公司绩效:一项经验分析[J].中国工业经济,2003(1):87-94.
[2]王满四.负债融资的公司治理效应及其机制研究[M].中国社会科学出版社,2005年.
[1]如新泰科技,3亿多资金多半被占用,平均一个月挪用4笔资金,公司资产变成了大股东独享的盘中美餐。2005年4月6日,中国经济时报.
[2]策划人:蔡云伟,调研组成员:袁克成王璐.解构大股东千亿占——上市公司大股东占款调查.2004年8月11日,上海证券报.
[1]Grossman,Sanford and Oliver Hart,1986,The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory of Vertical and Lateral lntergration,Journal of Political Economy,1986,94:691-719.
[2]Hart,oliver and John Moore,Property Rights and the Nature of Firm,Journal of Political Economy,1990,98:1119-1158.
[1]Jensen M,Meckling W.Theory of firm:managerial behavior,agency costs and ownership structure,Journal of Financial Economics,1976.3:305-306
[1]杨瑞龙.国有企业股份制改造的理论思考[J].经济研究,1995(2).
[1]李爽,吴溪.审计失败与证券市场监管.会计研究.2002(2):28-36.
[2]倪全宏,中国上市公司股权再融资过程中的寻租行为研究,2006博士论文:47-48.
[1]对于通过造假等手段骗取上市资格的上市公司,其寻租、造假成本是显性的,但其违法违规行为还具有潜在成本,即受到法律法规制裁的成本。
[2]倪全宏,中国上市公司股权再融资过程中的寻租行为研究,2006博士论文:49.
[1]第三节内容以作者的《再论我国上市公司股权融资偏好》为基础整理而成,该文发表在山东大学学报(哲学社会科学版)2007(5):77-83.
[1]2000年至2001年度实施配股的公司中,非流通股参与配股将平均获得28%的每股净资产增长,不参加配股每股净资产增长33%;参与配股的流通股股东只有3.85%的超额收益;不参与配股的流通股股东则有3.70%的超额损失。非流通股股东仅靠运用认配权就可以轻而易举地从流通股股东那里攫取超额收益,这或许就是配股融资行为长盛不衰的深层原因吧!吴江.中国上市公司融资行为与超额融资回报[J],经济导刊,2004,(5):63-66.
[1]陈建军.定向增发报批排长队渐成过去,http://www.cs.com.cn/ssgs/02/200805/t20080508_1452001.htm,中证网,2008.5.8,来源,上海证券报
[1]钟加勇,央企整体上市背后玄机,中国企业家,2007(6):67.
[1]皮海州,东方集团复牌暴跌为注资题材炒作敲警钟,南方日报,2007.9.18,http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/southnews/dd/nfrb/a18/200709180222.asp
[1]陈章波,于彪.相互制衡的股权结构与上市公司治理改进.科技与管理.2006(5):73.
[2]于建霞,曹廷求.股权结构的国际比较.山东社会科学.2002(4):46.
[1]Campello,Murillo,Capital structure and product market interactions:evidence from business circles.SSRN working paper,1999.
[1]张维迎.理性思考中国改革.经济观察报.2006.2.27.
[1]Pagano,Marco and Roell,Ailsa.The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure:Agency Costs,Monitoring,and the Decision to go public.The Quarterly Journal of Economics.1998(2):187-225
[1]Bennedsen M,Wolfenzon D,The Balance of Power in Closely Held Corporations,Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58(1/2):113-139
[2]陈晓,王琨,关联交易、公司治理与国有股改革—来自我国资本市场的实证证据,经济研究,2005(4):77-86
[1]上市国企高管薪酬首超民企,最高年薪平均34万,北京晨报,2007.5.29.
[2]8位行长薪水曝光引发争议银行行长该拿多少钱?中国青年报,2007.4.26.
[1]皖一国企亏损上亿元,高管奖金过百万,2007.4.24,新华网,http://news.xinhuanet.com/focus/2007-04/24/content_6016470.htm
[1]宋琳.资本成本缺位与我国资本市场功能缺陷.博士论文.2006.88-89.
[2]何祚庥:必须向股民征收个人所得税 检察日报 2002.3.20.
[1]程胜.中小板成为退市改革“试验田”.中国证券报.2006.11.30
[1]中国证监会.资本市场发展报告(摘要).2008.1.24:6
[2]Fama,E.F.,and K.French,The corporate cost of capital and the return oncorporate investment[J],Journal of Finance,1999,54:1939-1967.
[3]Federal Reserve Board,1989,Balance Sheets for the U.S.Economy,1949-1988.
[4]李扬.我国资本市场若干问题研究.中国证券报,1997年12月15日.
[5]袁国良,郑江淮,胡志乾.我国上市公司融资偏好和融资能力的实证研究.管理世界[J].1999,3:150-220.
[6]万朝领、储诚忠、李翔、袁野、周建新,上市公司的外部资金来源问题研究——上市公司的资本结构与融资成本问题的实证研究,上证联合研究计划第三期课题报告,2002.http://www.sse.com.cn/cs/zhs/xxfw/jysjs/sseResearch/1-1/wbzjly.pdf
[7]Modigliani Franco,Merton H.Miller,The Cost of Capital Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment,the American Economic Review,1958(48):261-97.
[8]沈艺峰,资本结构理论史[M],经济科学出版社,1999年第6版.
[9]Jensen,M.C.,and W.H.Meckling,Theory of the firm:managerial behavior,agency costs,and capital structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics 3,1976,305-360.
[10]Grossman,S.and O.Hart,Corporate financial structure and managerial incentives[M],In.J.McCall.ed.,The Economic of Information and Uncertainty.University of Chicago Press,1982,107-137.
[11]Townsend,Robert M.,"Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with CostlyState Verification," Journal of Economic Theory,21(October 1979),265-93
[12]Diamond,D.W,1984,Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring,Review Of Economic Studies,51,393-414.
[13]Ross,S.A.The Determination of Financial Structure:the Incentive Signaling Approach,Bell Journal of Economies,8,1977,1-32.
[14]Leland,H.E.,Pyle,D.H.Informational Asymmetries.Financial structure and Financial Intermediation",Journal of Finance,32,1977,371-387.
[15]Myers,Stewart and Nicholas,Majluf,Corporate Financing and Investment Decision When Firms have Information that Investors do not have,Journal of Financial Economics 13,187-221,1984.
[16]Holmstrom, Bengt and Tirole, J.. The Theory of the Firm, "Schmalensee, R., and Willig Eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization: North Holland, (1989) .
[17]Liugi Zingales, In Search of New Foundations[J], The Journal of Finance, Vol55, No 4,1623-1653,2000.
[18]Harris, M., and A. Raviv, Corporate Control Contests and Capital Structure., Journal of Financial Economics, 1998 (20):55-86.
[19]Stulz, Rene M., Managerial control of voting rights: Financing policies and the market for corporate control, Journal of Financial Economics, 1988 (20):25-54.
[20]Aghion, P. and Bolton, P. An incomplete contract approach to financial contracting. Review of Economic Studies 59: 473-494, 1992.
[21]O. Hart. Corporation Governance: Theory and Implication. Economics of Journal.1995(3).
[22]Maksimovic. V. Optimal Capital Structure in Repeated Oligopolies [J].Rand Journal of Economics, 1988, (19) :389-407.
[23]Bolton, Scharfiable. A theory of Predation based on agency problems in financial contracting [J]. American Economic Review, 1990(80): 94-106.
[24]Dasgupta, S. and Titman, S.. Pricing Strategy and Financial Policy[J]. Review of Financial Studies, 1998(11): 705 -737.
[25]Maksimovic, V. and Titman, S.. Financial Reputation and Reputation for Product Quality[J]. Review of Financial Studies, 1991 (2): 175 - 200.
[26]Opler, T., and Titman, S.. Financial Distress and Corporate Performance[J]. Journal of Finance, 1994 (49): 1015 -1040.
[27]Campello, Murillo. Capital Structure and Product Markets Interactions: Evidence from Business Cycle[R]. SSRN Working Paper, 1999.
[28]Noe Thorns H. Capital Structure and Signaling Game Equilibria[J]. Review of Financial Studies. 1988(1):331-356.
[29]Viswanath P V. Strategic Considerations, the Pecking Order Hypothesis and Market Reactions to Equity Financing[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1993(28):213-222.
[30]Titman, Sheridan. The Modigliani and Miller Theorem and Market Efficiency, NBER Working Paper 8641,2001.
[31]Lucas,Deborah and Robert McDonald.Equity issues and stock price dynamics.Journal of Finance 1990(45):1019-1043.
[32]Korajczyk,Robert,Deborah J.Lucas,and Robert L.McDonald,The Effect of Information Release on the Pricing and the Timing of Security Issues,Review of Financial Studies,1991(4):685-708.
[33]Choe,Masulis and Nanda.Common Stock Offerings across the Business Cycle:Theory and Evidence.Journal of Empirical Finance,1993(1):3-31.
[34]Loughran,T.and J.R.Ritter.The new issues puzzle.Journal of Finance,1995(50):23-52.
[35]Spiess D.Katherine and John Affleck-Graves,Underperformance in Long-run Stock Returns Following Seasoned Equity Offerings.Journal of Financial Economics,1995(38):243-367
[36]Ikenberry,David,Lakonisbok,Josef,and Vermaelen,Theo,Market underreaction to open market share repurchases.Journal of Financial Economics,1995,39(2):181-208.
[37]Bayless.M.and S.Chaplinsky.Is there a Window of Opportunity for Seasoned Equity Issuance?[J].Journal of Finance,1996,51(1):253-278.
[38]陈晓,单鑫.债务融资是否会增加上市公司的融资成本[J].经济研究,1999,(9):39-46,80.
[39]沈艺峰,田静.我国上市公司资本成本的定量研究[J].经济研究,1999,(11);62-68.
[40]黄少安,张岗.中国上市公司股权融资偏好分析[J].经济研究,2001,(11):12-27.
[41]葛结根.上市公司的股权融资偏好分析[J].中国流通经济,2003,(5):61-64
[42]郑江淮,何旭强,王华.上市公司投资的融资约束:从股权结构角度的实证分析[J].金融研究,2001,(8):92-99.
[43]贵海,宋敏.中国上市公司的资本结构[J].上证研究,2002,1(2):143-198.
[44]吴淑琨.对大股东行为机理的经济学分析[J].中国证券业研究,2003,(2).
[45]谭锦,姚晓民.上市公司股权融资过度偏好透析[J].生产力研,2003,(3):119-121.
[46]李霞.我国上市公司股权融资偏好的实证分析[J].管理科学,2004,(2):59-63.
[47]罗云,姚丽莎,张月华.论上市公司融资偏好与公司治理[J].四川师范学院学报(哲学社会科学版),2001,(6):46-50.
[48]吴敏,仲夏.西方融资优序理论对我国上市公司融资的启示[J],经济与管理,2003, (4):45-47.
[49]文宏.融资偏好与融资效率—对我国上市公司的实证研究[J].当代经济科学,1999,(6):38-43.
[50]杨运杰,李静洁.我国上市公司股权融资偏好原因分析[J].理论学刊,2002,(6):61-63.
[51]王素莲.我国上市公司融资偏好悖论的经济学思考[J].山西大学学报,2003,(6):25-28.
[52]郑祖玄.股权分置与上市公司股权融资行为.[EB/OL].http://dlib.cnki.net/kns50/detail.aspx?QueryID=21&CurRec=1
[53]陆正飞,叶康涛.中国上市公司股权融资偏好解析——偏好股权融资是缘于融资成本低吗?[J].经济研究,2004(4):50-59.
[54]Titman,Sheridan and Roberto wessels,The determinants of capital structure choice,Journal of Finance 1988,43:1-19.
[55]Shyam-Sunder L,Myers S.Testing Static Tradeoff against Pecking Order Models of Capital Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1999,51:219-244.
[56]Brennan,Michel,and Alan Kraus,Efficient financing under asymmetric information,Journal of Finance 1987,42:1225-1243.
[57]Noe,T.H.,Capital structure and signaling game equilibria,the review of financial studies,1988,1(4):331-355.
[58]Constantinides,G.M.,and Grundy,B.D.,Optimal Investment with Stock Repurchase and Financing as Signals,the Review of Financial Studies 1989,2(4):445-465
[59]Helwege,Jean,and liang,Nellie,Is there a pecking order?,evidence from a panel of IPO firms,Journal of Financial Economies.1996,40:429-458.
[60]Frank M,Goyal V.Testing the Peeking Order Theory of Capital Structure.Journal of Financial Eeonomies[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2003,67:217-248.
[61]Singh,A.and Hamid,J,Corporate fmancial structures in developing countries[J].International Finance Corporation Technical Paper,1992(1),IFC,Washington,DC.
[62]饶育蕾.制度适应与市场博弈-企业资本结构的形成机制研究[EB/OL].www.cnki.net.
[63][美]詹姆斯·范霍恩.小约翰·瓦霍维奇著,郭浩、徐琳译.现代企业财务管理(第10版)[M],经济科学出版社1998年版,第531页.
[64]法,布罗代,15世纪至18世纪的物质文明、经济和资本主义[M].三联书店,1993.2.
[65]Claessens,S.,S.Djankov and L.H.P.Lang.The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations[J]Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58:81-112.
[66] La Porta et al..Corporate Ownership Around the World[J].Journal of Finance,1999,54:471-517.
[67]Williamson Oliver.Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance[J].Journal of Finance,1988,Vol.43:567-591.
[68]钱颖一.企业的治理结构改革和融资结构改革.经济研究.1995(1).
[69]Holdemess,Clifford G.,and Dennis P.Sheehan.The Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations:An Exploratory Analysis[J].Jour2nal of Financial Economics,1988(20):317-46.
[70]Faccio,M.and L.Lang.The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2002(65):365-395.
[71]Claessens,S.,Djankov,S.,& Lang,L.H.P..The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000(58):81-112.
[72]Shleifer,Andrei and Vishny,Robert W.A Survey of Corporate Governance[J].Journal of Finance,1997,Vol LII,2:737-783.
[73]La Porta,R.,F.Lopez-de-Silanes,A.Shleifer,and R.Vishny.Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation,Journal of Financial Economics,2002(57):1147-1170.
[74]Grossman,Sanford,Oliver Hart.One share one vote and the market for corporate control Journal of Financial Economics,1988(20):175-202.
[75]Harris,Milton,and Arthur Raviv,Corporate governance:Voting rights and majority rules,Journal of Financial Economics,1988(20):203-235.
[76]Aghion,Philippe,and Patrick Bolton,An incomplete contract approach to financial contracting,Review of Economic Studies,1992(59):473-494.
[77]Mueller,Elisabeth.Private Benefits of Control,Capital Structure and Company Growth.London School of Economics Working Paper,2003.
[78]Bebchuk,L.A.& M.Kahan,A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contests,California Law Review.1990(78):1071-1138
[79]Johnson,S.,R.La Porta,F.Lopez-de-Silanes,and Shleifer.Tunneling.American Economic Review,Papers and Proceedings,2000(90):22-27.
[80]Ehrhardt,Olaf and Nowak,Eric.Private Benefits and Minority Shareholder Expropriation,Humboldt University,Working Paper.2003.
[81]Dyck,Alexander and Zingales,Luig.i.Private Benefits of Contro:l An International Comparison.Journal of Finance,2004,VOL LIX,NO 2:537-600.
[82]Barclay,Michae,l and Clifford Holdemess.Private benefits of control of public corporations.Journal of Financial Economics,1989(25):371-395.
[83]Joon Ho Hwang.Private Benefits,Ownership vs Control Kelley School of Business,Indiana University.Working Paper.2005.
[84]韩德宗,叶春华.控制权私人收益的理论与实证研究[J].统计研究,2004(2):42-46.
[85]赵昌文,蒲自立,杨安华.中国上市公司控制权私人收益的度量及影响因素[J].中国工业经济.2004(6):100-106.
[86]唐宗明,余颖,俞乐.我国上市公司控制权私人收益的经验研究[J].系统工程理论方法应用,2005(12):509-513.
[87]Zingales,Luig.i.Insider Ownership and Decision to Go Public,Review of Economic Studies,1995(62):425-448.
[88]Nenova,Tatiana.The value of corporate votes and control benefits:A cross-country analysis.Journal of Financial Economies,2003,168(3):325-351.
[89]Djankov,S.;R.Laporta,F.Lopez-de-Silanes and A.Shleifer,The Regulation of Entry,Quarterly Journal of Economies,2002(117):1-37.
[90]Stijn Claessens,Simeon D jankov,Joseph P.H Fan,Larry H.P.Lang.Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings,Journal of Finance,2002,VOL LⅦ(6):2741-2771.
[91]Jeremy S S.Edwards,A lfons J.W eichenrieder.Ownership Concentration and Share Valuation,German Economic Review,2004,5(2):143-171.
[92]王鹏,周黎安.控股股东的控制权、所有权与公司绩效:基于中国上市公司的证据[J].金融研究,2006(2):88-98.
[93]Igor Filatotchev,Tomasz Mickiewicz.Ownership Concentration,Private Benefits of Control and Debt Financing.University of London,Working Paper,2003.
[94]余明桂,夏新平,潘红波.控制权私有收益的实证分析[J].管理科学,2006,19(3): 27-33.
[95]Demsetz,Harold and Kenneth Lehn.The structure of corporate ownership:Causes and consequences.Journal of Political Economy,1985(93):1155-1175.
[96]林朝南,刘星,郝颖.行业特征与控制权私利:来自中国上市公司的经验证据.经济科学,2006(3):61-72.
[97]La Porta,R.Lopez-de-Silanes,F.Shleifer,A.Vishny,R.W.,Law and finance.Journal of Political Economy,1998(106):1113-1155.
[98]La Porta,Lopez-de-silanes,Andrei Shleifer,Robert Vishny.Investor Protection and Corporate Governance,The Journal of Financial Economics 2000(58):3-27.
[99]Lucian Arye Bebehunk.A Rent-protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control,Cambridge,Working Paper,1999.
[100]Peter Roosenboom,Willem Schramade.The price of Power:Valuing the controlling position of owner-managers in French IPO firms.Journal of Corporate Finance,2006(12):270-295.
[101]Craig Doidge,G.Andrew Karolyi,Karl V.Lins,Darius P.Miller,Rene M.Stulz.Private Benefits of Control Ownership,and the Cross-listing Decision.University of Toronto,Working Paper,2005.
[102]Xue ping Wu,Zheng Wang.Equity Financing in a Myers-Majluf Framework with Private Benefits of control[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2005(11):915-945.
[1103]Holdemess,Clifford G.A Survey of Block holders and Corporate Control.Economic Policy Review,2003(4):51-64.
[104]Hart Oliver.Corporate Governance:Some Theory and Implications,Economic Journal,Royal Economic Society.1995,105(430):678-89 Jones.
[105]Hart Oliver.Financial Contracting[J].Journal of Economic Literature.2001(39):1079-1101.
[106]Zingales,Luig.i.In Search of New Foundations.Journal of Finance,2001,VolLV(4):1623-1653.
[107]Shleifer,A.,and Vishny,R.,A Survey of Corporate Governance,Journal of Finance,1997(52):737-783.
[108]Demsetz,H.,and Lehn,K.,the Structure of Corporate Ownership:Causes and Consequences.Journal of Political Economy,1985(93):1155-1177.
[109]Shleifer,Ahdrei,and Robert Vishny,1986,"Large Shareholders and Corporate Control",Journal of Political Economy,94,461-488.
[110]申尊焕.大股东侵害与控制权收益关系的研究[J].统计与决策,2007(20):116-118.117.
[111]Fan,J.,and Wong,T..Corporate Ownership Structure and the Informativeness of Accounting Earnings in East Asia,Journal of Accounting and Economies,2002(33):401-425.
[112]Lueian Bebchuk,Reinier Kraakman and George Triantis,Stock Pyramids,Cross-ownership,and Dual Class Equity:The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control From Cash Flow Rights,NBER working paper,1999:6951.
[113]宗明,蒋位.中国上市公司大股东侵害度实证分析[J].经济研究,2002(4).
[114]刘峰、贺建刚、魏明海.控制权、业绩与利益输送——基于五粮液的案例研究[J].管理世界,2004(8).
[115]李增泉,余谦,王晓坤.掏空、支持与并购重组[J].经济研究.2005(1):95-105.
[116]田利辉.国有股权对上市公司绩效影响的U型曲线和政府股东两手论[J].经济研究,2005(10):48-58.
[117]新帕尔格雷夫货币金融大辞典[M].北京:经济科学出版社.2000,第一卷:470.
[118]朱武祥.资本成本理念在公司财务决策中的作用[J].投资研究,2000,(1).
[119]宋琳.资本成本缺位与我国资本市场功能缺陷.博士论文.2006,37.
[120]Grossman,S.,O.Hart.The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Intergration[J].Journal of Political Economy,1986,94(4):691-719.
[121]杨瑞龙.企业共同治理的经济学分析[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2001:122.
[122]张维迎.企业的企业家——契约理论[M].上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1995:292-293.
[123]陈郁.企业制度与生产组织——交易费用经济学文选[M].上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1996:271.
[124]Shleifer,A.,and Vishny,R.,A Survey of Corporate Governance,Journal of Finance,1997(52):737-783.
[125]Claessens,S.,S.Djankov,J.Fan,and Lang,L.,Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Share holdings,Journal of Finance,2002(57):2741-2771.
[126]章迪诚.中国国有企业改革编年史(1978—2005)[M].北京:中国工人出版社,2006.
[127]于东智.资本结构、债权治理与公司绩效:一项经验分析[J].中国工业经济,2003(1):87-94.
[128]王满四.负债融资的公司治理效应及其机制研究[M].中国社会科学出版社,2005年
[129]策划人:蔡云伟,调研组成员:袁克成王璐.解构大股东千亿占——上市公司大股东占款调查.2004年8月11日,上海证券报.
[130]宋琳,柳光程,李文君.论资本成本与资金成本的混淆对资本市场融资功能、配置功能的影响.山东省金融学会2003-2004年度重点研究课题一等奖.
[131]张维迎.所有制、治理结构与委托—代理关系[J].经济研究,1996(9).
[132]Grossman,Sanford and Oliver Hart,1986,The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Intergration,Journal of Political Economy,1986,94:691-719.
[133]Hart,oliver and John Moore,Property Rights and the Nature of Firm,Journal of Political Economy,1990,98:1119-1158.
[134]Jensen M,Meckling W.Theory of firm:managerial behavior,agency costs and ownership structure,Journal of Financial Economics,1976.3:305-306.
[135]杨瑞龙.国有企业股份制改造的理论思考[J].经济研究,1995(2).
[136]Mc Chesney.F·Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory,In C.K.Rowley.R·D·tollison and G·Tullock ed,1988.
[137]李爽,吴溪.审计失败与证券市场监管.会计研究.2002(2):28-36.
[138]倪全宏,中国上市公司股权再融资过程中的寻租行为研究,2006博士论文:47-49.
[139]李文君.再论我国上市公司股权融资偏好[J].山东大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2007(5):77-83.
[140]吴江.中国上市公司融资行为与超额融资回报[J],经济导刊,2004,(5):63-66.
[141]陈建军.定向增发报批排长队渐成过去,http://www.cs.com.cn/ssgs/02/200805/t20080508_1452001.htm,2008.5.8,来源:上海证券报.
[142]钟加勇,央企整体上市背后玄机,中国企业家,2007(6):67.
[143]皮海州,东方集团复牌暴跌为注资题材炒作敲警钟,南方日报,2007.9.18,http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/southnews/dd/nfrb/a18/200709180222.asp
[144]陈章波,于彪.相互制衡的股权结构与上市公司治理改进.科技与管理.2006(5):73.
[145]于建霞,曹廷求.股权结构的国际比较.山东社会科学.2002(4):46.
[146]Campello,Murillo,Capital structure and product market interactions:evidence from business circles.SSRN working paper,1999.
[147]张维迎.理性思考中国改革.经济观察报.2006.2.27.
[148]Pagano,Marco and Roell,Ailsa.The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure:Agency Costs,Monitoring,and the Decision to go public.The Quarterly Journal of Economics.1998(2):187-225
[149]Bennedsen M,Wolfenzon D,The Balance of Power in Closely Held Corporations,Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58(1/2):113-139
[150]陈晓,王琨,关联交易、公司治理与国有股改革—来自我国资本市场的实证证据,经济研究,2005(4):77-86
[151]上市国企高管薪酬首超民企,最高年薪平均34万,北京晨报,2007.5.29.
[152]8位行长薪水曝光引发争议银行行长该拿多少钱?中国青年报,2007.4.26.
[153]皖—国企亏损上上亿元,高管奖金过百万,2007.4.24,新华网,http://news.xinhuanet.com/focus/2007-04/24/content_6016470.htm
[154]宋琳.资本成本缺位与我国资本市场功能缺陷.博士论文.2006.88-89.
[155]何祚庥:必须向股民征收个人所得税 检察日报 2002.3.20.
[156]李齐云,李文君.基于税收视角的上市公司资本结构选择分析[J].税务与经济,2006(2):1-7.
[157]程胜.中小板成为退市改革“试验田”.中国证券报,2006.11.30.
[2]Federal Reserve Board.Balance Sheets for the U.S.Economy,1949-1988.1989.
[3]李扬.我国资本市场若干问题研究.中国证券报,1997年12月15日.
[1][1]万朝领,储诚忠,李翔,袁野,周建新.上市公司的外部资金来源问题研究——上市公司的资本结构与融资成本问题的实证研究.上证联合研究计划第三期课题报告.2002.http://www.sse.com.cn/cs/zhs/xxfw/jysjs/sseResearch/1-1/wbzjly.pdf
[2]袁国良,郑江淮,胡志乾.我国上市公司融资偏好和融资能力的实证研究.管理世界.1999,3:150-220.
[1]万朝领、储诚忠、李翔、袁野、周建新,上市公司的外部资金来源问题研究——上市公司的资本结构与融资成本问题的实证研究,上证联合研究计划第三期课题报告,2002.http://www.sse.com.cn/cs/zhs/xxfw/jysjs/sseResearch/1-1/wbzjly.pdf
[2]Modigliani Franco,Merton H.Miller.The Cost of Capital Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment.the American Economic Review.1958,48:261-97.
[1]沈艺峰,资本结构理论史,经济科学出版社,1999年第6版。
[2]Jensen,M.C.,and W.H.Meckling,Theory of the firm:managerial behavior,agency costs,and capital structure [J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3:305-360.
[1]Grossman,S.and O.Hart,Corporate financial structure and managerial incentives[M],In.J.McCall.ed.,The Economic of Information and Uncertainty.University of Chicago Press,1982,107-137.
[1]Townsend,Robert M.,Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State Verification,Journal of Economic Theory,1979,21:265-93.
[2]Diamond,D.W,Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring,Review Of Economic Studies,1984,51:393-414.
[1]Ross,S.A.The Determination of Financial Structure:the Incentive Signaling Approach,Bell Journal of Economies,1977,8:1-32.
[2]Leland,H.E.,Pyle,D.H.Informational Asymmetries.Financial structure and Financial Intermediation,Journal of Finance,1977,32:371-387.
[1]Myers,Stewart and Nicholas,Majluf,Corporate Financing and Investment Decision When Firms have Information that Investors do not have,Journal of Financial Economics 1984,13:187-221.
[1]Holmstrom,Bengt and Tirole,J.,The Theory of the Firm,Handbook of Industrial Organization:North Holland,1989
[2]Liugi Zingales,In Search of New Foundations[J],The Journal of Finance,2000,155(4):1623-1653.
[3]Harris,M.,and A.Raviv,Corporate Control Contests and Capital Structure.,Journal of Financial Economics,1998(20):55-86.
[4]Stulz,Rene M.,Managerial control of voting rights:Financing policies and the market for corporate control,Journal of Financial Economics,1988(20):25-54.
[1]Aghion,P.and Bolton,P,An incomplete contract approach to financial contracting,Review of Economic Studies.1992,59:473-494.
[2]O.Hart.Corporation Governance:Theory and Implication.Economics of Journal,1995(3).
[1]Maksimovic.V.Optimal Capital Structure in Repeated Oligopolie[J].Rand Journal of Economics,1988,(19):389-407.
[2]Bolton,Scharfiable.A theory of Predation based on agency problems in financial contracting[J].American Economic Review,1990(80):94-106.
[3]Dasgupta,S.and Titman,S..Pricing Strategy and Financial Policy[J].Review of Financial Studies,1998(11);705-737.
[4]Maksimovic,V.and Titman,S..Financial Reputation and Reputation for Product Quality[J].Review of Financial Studies,1991(2):175-200.
[5]Opler,T.,and Titman,S..Financial Distress and Corporate Performance[J].Journal of Finance,1994(49):1015-1040.
[6]Campello,Murillo.Capital Structure and Product Markets Interactions:Evidence from Business Cycle[R].SSRN Working Paper,1999
[7]Noe Thoms H.Capital Structure and Signaling Game Equilibria[J].Review of Financial Studies,1988(1):331-356.
[8]Viswanath P V.Strategic Considerations,the Pecking Order Hypothesis and Market Reactions to Equity Financing[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1993(28):213-222.
[1]Titman,Sheridan.The Modigliani and Miller Theorem and Market Efficiency,NBER Working Paper 8641,2001
[2]Lucas,Deborah,and Robert McDonald.Equity issues and stock price dynamics.Journal of Finance 1990(45):1019-1043.
[3]Korajczyk,Robert,Deborah J.Lucas,and Robert L.McDonald,The Effect of Information Release on the Pricing and the Timing of Security Issues,Review of Financial Studies,1991(4):685-708.
[4]Choe,Masulis and Nanda.Common Stock Offerings across the Business Cycle:Theory and Evidence.Journal of Empirical Finance,1993(1):3-31.
[5]Loughran,T.and J.R.Ritter.The new issues puzzle.Journal of Finance,1995(50):23-52.
[6]Spiess D.Katherine,John Affleck-Graves,Underperformance in Long-run Stock Returns Following Seasoned Equity Offerings,Journal of Financial Economics,1995(38):243-367
[7]Ikenberry,David,Lakonishok,Josef,and Vermaelen,Theo,Market underreaction to open market share repurchases.Journal of Financial Economics,1995,39(2):181-208.
[8]Bayless.M.and S.Chaplinsky.Is there a Window of Opportunity for Seasoned Equity Issuance?[J].Journal of Finance,1996,51(1):253-278.
[1]陈晓,单鑫.债务融资是否会增加上市公司的融资成本[J].经济研究,1999,(9):39-46,80.
[2]沈艺峰,田静.我国上市公司资本成本的定量研究[J].经济研究,1999,(11):62-68.
[3]黄少安,张岗.中国上市公司股权融资偏好分析[J].经济研究,2001,(11):12-27.
[4]葛结根.上市公司的股权融资偏好分析[J].中国流通经济,2003,(5):61-64
[5]郑江淮,何旭强,王华.上市公司投资的融资约束:从股权结构角度的实证分析[J].金融研究,2001,(8):92-99.
[6]黄贵海,宋敏.中国上市公司的资本结构[J].上证研究,2002,1(2):143-198.
[7]吴淑琨.对大股东行为机理的经济学分析[J].中国证券业研究,2003,(2).
[8]谭锦,姚晓民.上市公司股权融资过度偏好透析[J].生产力研究,2003,(3):119-121.
[9]李霞.我国上市公司股权融资偏好的实证分析[J].管理科学,2004,(2):59-63.
[1]罗云,姚丽莎,张月华.论上市公司融资偏好与公司治理[J].四川师范学院学报(哲学社会科学版),2001,(6):46-50.
[2]吴敏,仲夏.西方融资优序理论对我国上市公司融资的启示[J],经济与管理,2003,(4):45-47.
[3]文宏.融资偏好与融资效率—对我国上市公司的实证研究[J].当代经济科学,1999,(6);38-43.
[4]杨运杰,李静洁.我国上市公司股权融资偏好原因分析[J].理论学刊,2002,(6):61-63.
[5]王素莲.我国上市公司融资偏好悖论的经济学思考[J].山西大学学报,2003,(6):25-28.
[1]郑祖玄.股权分置与上市公司股权融资行为.[EB/OL],http://dlib.cnki.net/kns50/detail.aspx?QueryID=21&CurRec=1
[2]陆正飞,叶康涛.中国上市公司股权融资偏好解析——偏好股权融资是缘于融资成本低吗?[J].经济研究,2004(4):50-59.
[1]Titman,Sheridan and Roberto wessels.The determinants of capital structure choice[J],Journal of Finance 1988,43:1-19.
[2]Shyam-Sunder L,Myers S.Testing Static Tradeoff against Pecking Order Models of Capital Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1999,51:219-244.
[3]Brennan,Michel,and Alan Kraus.Efficient financing under asymmetric information[J],Journal of Finance 1987,42:1225-1243.
[4]Noe,T.H.,Capital structure and signaling game equilibria,the review of financial studies,1988,1(4):331-355.
[5]Constantinides,G.M.,and Grundy,B.D.,Optimal Investment with Stock Repurchase and Financing as Signals,the Review of Financial Studies 1989,2(4):445-465
[6]Helwege,Jean,and liang,Nellie,Is there a pecking order? evidence from a panel of IPO firms,Journal of Financial Economics.1996,40:429-458.
[7]Frank M,Goyal V.Testing the Pecking Order Theory of Capital Structure.Journal of Financial Economics[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2003,67:217-248.
[1]Singh,A.and Hamid,J.Corporate financial structures in developing countries[J].International Finance Corporation Technical Paper.1992,1,IFC,Washington,DC
[1]饶育蕾.制度适应与市场博弈-企业资本结构的形成机制研究[EB/OL].www.cnki.net.11.
[2][美]詹姆斯·范霍恩.小约翰·瓦霍维奇著,郭浩、徐琳译:《现代企业财务管理》(第10版),经济科学出版社1998年版,第531页.
[1]法,布罗代尔.15世纪至18世纪的物质文明、经济和资本主义[M].三联书店.1993,2.
[1]Claessens,S.,S.Djankov and L.H.P.Lang.The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58:81-112.
[2]La Porta et al..Corporate Ownership around the World[J].Journal of Finance,1999,54:471-517.
[1]Williamson Oliver.Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance[J].Journal of Finance.1988,Vol.43,567-591.
[1]钱颖一.企业的治理结构改革和融资结构改革.经济研究.1995(1).
[2]La Porta,R.,F.Lopez-de-Silanes,A.Shleifer,Corporate Ownership Around the World[J].Journal of Finance,1999,54(2):471-517.
[3]Holderness,Clifford G.,and Dennis P.Sheehan.The Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations:An Exploratory Analysis[J].Jour2nal of Financial Economics,1988(20):317-46.
[4]Faccio,M.and L.Lang.The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2002(65):365-395.
[5]Claessens,S.,Djankov,S.,& Lang,L.H.P..The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000(58):81-112.
[1]Shleifer,Andrei and Vishny,Robert W.A Survey of Corporate Governance[J].Journal of Finance,1997,Vol LⅡ,2:737-783.
[2]La Porta,R.,F.Lopez-de-Silanes,A.Shleifer,and R.Vishny.Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation,Journal of Financial Economics,2002(57):1147-1170.
[3]Grossman,Sanford,Oliver Hart.One share one vote and the market for corporate control Journal of Financial Economics,1988(20):175-202.
[1]Harris,Milton,and Arthur Raviv,Corporate governance:Voting rights and majority rules,Journal of Financial Economics,1988(20):203-235.
[2]Aghion,Philippe,and Patrick Bolton,An incomplete contract approach to financial contracting,Review of Economic Studies,1992(59):473-494.
[3]Mueller,Elisabeth.Private Benefits of Control,Capital Structure and Company Growth.London School of Economics Working Paper,2003.
[4]Bebchuk,L.A.& M.Kahan,A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contests,California Law Review.1990(78):1071-1138
[5]Johnson,S.,R.La Porta,F.Lopez-de-Silanes,and Shleifer.Tunneling.American Economic Review,Papers and Proceedings,2000(90):22-27.
[6]Ehrhardt,Olaf and Nowak,Eric.Private Benefits and Minority Shareholder Expropriation,Humboldt University,Working Paper.2003.
[1]Dyck,Alexander and Zingales,Luig.i.Private Benefits of Contro:l An International Comparison.Journal of Finance,2004,VOL LIX,NO 2:537-600.
[2]Barclay,Michae,l and Clifford Holderness.Private benefits of control of public corporations.Journal of Financial Economics,1989,(25):371-395.
[3]Joon Ho Hwang.Private Benefits,Ownership vs Control Kelley School of Business,Indiana University.Working Paper,2005.
[1]韩德宗,叶春华.控制权私人收益的理论与实证研究.统计研究,2004(2):42-46.
[2]赵昌文,蒲自立,杨安华.中国上市公司控制权私人收益的度量及影响因素.中国工业经济.2004(6):100-106.
[3]唐宗明,余颖,俞乐.我国上市公司控制权私人收益的经验研究.系统工程理论方法应用.2005(12):509-513.
[4]Zingales,Luig.i.Insider Ownership and Decision to Go Public,Review of Economic Studies,1995(62):425-448.
[5]Nenova,Tatiana.The value of corporate votes and control benefits:A cross-country analysis.Journal of Financial Economics,2003,168(3):325-351.
[1]Djankov,S.;R.Laporta,F.Lopez-de-Silanes and A.Shleifer,The Regulation of Entry,Quarterly Journal of Economics,2002(117):1-37.
[2]Stijn Claessens,Simeon D jankov,Joseph P.H Fan,Larry H.P.Lang,Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings,Journal of Finance,2002,VOL LVII(6):2741-2771.
[3]Jeremy S S.Edwards,Alfons J.W eichenrieder.Ownership Concentration and Share Valuation,German Economic Review,2004,5(2):143-171.
[4]王鹏,周黎安.控股股东的控制权、所有权与公司绩效:基于中国上市公司的证据.金融研究,2006(2):88-98.
[5]Igor Filatotchev,Tomasz Mickiewicz.Ownership Concentration,Private Benefits of Control and Debt Financing.University of London,Working Paper,2003.
[1]余明桂,夏新平,潘红波.控制权私有收益的实证分析.管理科学.2006,19(3):27-33.
[2]Demsetz,Harold and Kenneth Lehn.The structure of corporate ownership:Causes and consequences.Journal of Political Economy.1985(93),1155-1175.
[3]林朝南,刘星,郝颖.行业特征与控制权私利:来自中国上市公司的经验证据.经济科学,2006(3):61-72.
[4]La Porta,R.Lopez-de-Silanes,F.Shleifer,A.Vishny,R.W.,Law and finance.Journal of Political Economy,1998(106):1113-1155
[5]La Porta,Lopez-de-silanes,Andrei Shleifer,Robert Vishny.Investor Protection and Corporate Governance,The Journal of Financial Economics 2000(58):3-27.
[1]Lucian Arye Bebchunk.A Rent-protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control,Cambridge,Working Paper,1999.
[2]Peter Roosenboorn.Willem Schramade.The price of Power:Valuing the controlling position of owner-managers in French IPO firms.Journal of Corporate Finance,2006(12):270-295.
[3]Craig Doidge,G Andrew Karolyi,Karl V.Lins,Darius P.Miller,Rene M.Stulz.Private Benefits of Control Ownership,and the Cross-listing Decision.University ofToronto,Working Paper.2005.
[4]Xue ping Wu,Zheng Wang.Equity Financing in a Myers-Majluf Framework with Private Benefits of control.Journal of Corporate Finance.2005(11):915-945.
[1]Holderness,Clifford G.A Survey of Block holders and Corporate Control.Economic Policy Review,2003(4):51-64.
[2]Hart oliver.Corporate Governance:Some Theory and Implications,Economic Journal,Royal Economic Society.1995,105(430):678-89 Jones.
[3]Hart oliver.Financial Contracting,Journal of economic Literature,2001(39):1079-1101.
[4]Zingales,Luig.i.In Search of New Foundations.Journal of Finance,2001,VolLV(4):1623-1653.
[1]否则,没有人愿意去争夺控制权。Shleifer,A.,and Vishny,R.,A Survey of Corporate Governance,Journal of Finance,1997(52):737-783.
[2]从企业形态演变可知,公司制企业成立之初往往是存在一个发起人,也就是控股股东。
[3]Demsetz,H.,and Lehn,K.,the Structure of Corporate Ownership:Causes and Consequences.Journal of Political Economy,1985(93):1155-1177.
[4]Shleifer,Ahdrei,and Robert Vishny,1986,"Large Shareholders and Corporate Control",Journal ofPolitical Economy,94,461-488.
[1]申尊焕.大股东侵害与控制权收益关系的研究[J].统计与决策.2007(20):116-118,117.
[2]Fan,J.,and Wong,T..Corporate Ownership Structure and the Informativeness of Accounting Earnings in East Asia,Journal of Accounting and Economics,2002(33):401-425.
[3]Lucian Bebchuk,Reinier Krankman and George Triantis,Stock Pyramids,Cross-ownership,and Dual Class Equity:The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control From Cash Flow Rights,NBER working paper,1999:6951.
[1]唐宗明,蒋位.中国上市公司大股东侵害度实证分析,经济研究.2002(4).
[2]F.Modigliani and M.H.Miller.The Cost of Capital,Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment,American Economic Review,1958(48):261-97.
[3]有关现代融资理论的文献,参看第一章,第一节.
[1]新帕尔格雷夫货币金融大辞典[M].北京:经济科学出版社.2000,第一卷:470.
[2]朱武祥.资本成本理念在公司财务决策中的作用[J].投资研究,2000,(1)
[3]宋琳.资本成本缺位与我国资本市场功能缺陷.博士论文.2006:37.
[1]Grossman,S.,O.Hart.The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Intergration[J].Journal of Political Economy,1986,94(4):691-719.
[1]根据Holderness和Sheehan对美国纽约股票交易所(NYSE)和美国股票交易(AMEX)所拥有绝对控股股东的公司研究,90%以上的控股股东安排自己的直接代表(当控股股东为公司时),或自己本人(当控股股东为个人时)担任公司董事长或首席执行官。在东亚和欧洲等家族企业控制的上市公司中,家族成员同时担任公司总经理或公司董事长的现象也非常普遍。
[2]没有持股或少量持股的经理也可能拥有控制权,但经理控制权形成的情况比较复杂。
[3]100%控股实际上是不可能存在的一种情形,否则就不属于现代意义的股份公司而是独资企业。
[4]51%的控股权是一种极为稳妥的界定,实际上,如果通过金字塔结构、交叉持股结构和二元股份结构等实现控股的话,远低于此比例。LLSV(1999)均以20%的股权比为起点来分析这类问题。根据肖腾文研究,在我国第一大股东的持股比例与其在董事会中的席位比例,基本保持一定的正向线性关系,达到完全控制董事会(代表第一大股东的董事比例≥50%)所需的最低控股比例在23%左右。
[5]如果控股权模式是家族式的金字塔结构的话,股权与现金流权的对应就远非这样机械。
[6]杨瑞龙.企业共同治理的经济学分析[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2001:122.
[1]张维迎.企业的企业家——契约理论[M].上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1995:292-293.
[2]陈郁.企业制度与生产组织——交易费用经济学文选[M].上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1996:271.
[1]Shleifer,A.,and Vishny,R.,A Survey of Corporate Governance,Journal of Finance,1997(52):737-783.
[1]Claessens,S.,S.Djankov,J.Fan,and Lang,L.,Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Share holdings,Journal of Finance,2002(57):2741-2771.
[1]章迪诚.中国国有企业改革编年史(1978—2005)[M].北京:中国工人出版社,2006.
[1]于东智.资本结构、债权治理与公司绩效:一项经验分析[J].中国工业经济,2003(1):87-94.
[2]王满四.负债融资的公司治理效应及其机制研究[M].中国社会科学出版社,2005年.
[1]如新泰科技,3亿多资金多半被占用,平均一个月挪用4笔资金,公司资产变成了大股东独享的盘中美餐。2005年4月6日,中国经济时报.
[2]策划人:蔡云伟,调研组成员:袁克成王璐.解构大股东千亿占——上市公司大股东占款调查.2004年8月11日,上海证券报.
[1]Grossman,Sanford and Oliver Hart,1986,The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory of Vertical and Lateral lntergration,Journal of Political Economy,1986,94:691-719.
[2]Hart,oliver and John Moore,Property Rights and the Nature of Firm,Journal of Political Economy,1990,98:1119-1158.
[1]Jensen M,Meckling W.Theory of firm:managerial behavior,agency costs and ownership structure,Journal of Financial Economics,1976.3:305-306
[1]杨瑞龙.国有企业股份制改造的理论思考[J].经济研究,1995(2).
[1]李爽,吴溪.审计失败与证券市场监管.会计研究.2002(2):28-36.
[2]倪全宏,中国上市公司股权再融资过程中的寻租行为研究,2006博士论文:47-48.
[1]对于通过造假等手段骗取上市资格的上市公司,其寻租、造假成本是显性的,但其违法违规行为还具有潜在成本,即受到法律法规制裁的成本。
[2]倪全宏,中国上市公司股权再融资过程中的寻租行为研究,2006博士论文:49.
[1]第三节内容以作者的《再论我国上市公司股权融资偏好》为基础整理而成,该文发表在山东大学学报(哲学社会科学版)2007(5):77-83.
[1]2000年至2001年度实施配股的公司中,非流通股参与配股将平均获得28%的每股净资产增长,不参加配股每股净资产增长33%;参与配股的流通股股东只有3.85%的超额收益;不参与配股的流通股股东则有3.70%的超额损失。非流通股股东仅靠运用认配权就可以轻而易举地从流通股股东那里攫取超额收益,这或许就是配股融资行为长盛不衰的深层原因吧!吴江.中国上市公司融资行为与超额融资回报[J],经济导刊,2004,(5):63-66.
[1]陈建军.定向增发报批排长队渐成过去,http://www.cs.com.cn/ssgs/02/200805/t20080508_1452001.htm,中证网,2008.5.8,来源,上海证券报
[1]钟加勇,央企整体上市背后玄机,中国企业家,2007(6):67.
[1]皮海州,东方集团复牌暴跌为注资题材炒作敲警钟,南方日报,2007.9.18,http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/southnews/dd/nfrb/a18/200709180222.asp
[1]陈章波,于彪.相互制衡的股权结构与上市公司治理改进.科技与管理.2006(5):73.
[2]于建霞,曹廷求.股权结构的国际比较.山东社会科学.2002(4):46.
[1]Campello,Murillo,Capital structure and product market interactions:evidence from business circles.SSRN working paper,1999.
[1]张维迎.理性思考中国改革.经济观察报.2006.2.27.
[1]Pagano,Marco and Roell,Ailsa.The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure:Agency Costs,Monitoring,and the Decision to go public.The Quarterly Journal of Economics.1998(2):187-225
[1]Bennedsen M,Wolfenzon D,The Balance of Power in Closely Held Corporations,Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58(1/2):113-139
[2]陈晓,王琨,关联交易、公司治理与国有股改革—来自我国资本市场的实证证据,经济研究,2005(4):77-86
[1]上市国企高管薪酬首超民企,最高年薪平均34万,北京晨报,2007.5.29.
[2]8位行长薪水曝光引发争议银行行长该拿多少钱?中国青年报,2007.4.26.
[1]皖一国企亏损上亿元,高管奖金过百万,2007.4.24,新华网,http://news.xinhuanet.com/focus/2007-04/24/content_6016470.htm
[1]宋琳.资本成本缺位与我国资本市场功能缺陷.博士论文.2006.88-89.
[2]何祚庥:必须向股民征收个人所得税 检察日报 2002.3.20.
[1]程胜.中小板成为退市改革“试验田”.中国证券报.2006.11.30
[1]中国证监会.资本市场发展报告(摘要).2008.1.24:6
[2]Fama,E.F.,and K.French,The corporate cost of capital and the return oncorporate investment[J],Journal of Finance,1999,54:1939-1967.
[3]Federal Reserve Board,1989,Balance Sheets for the U.S.Economy,1949-1988.
[4]李扬.我国资本市场若干问题研究.中国证券报,1997年12月15日.
[5]袁国良,郑江淮,胡志乾.我国上市公司融资偏好和融资能力的实证研究.管理世界[J].1999,3:150-220.
[6]万朝领、储诚忠、李翔、袁野、周建新,上市公司的外部资金来源问题研究——上市公司的资本结构与融资成本问题的实证研究,上证联合研究计划第三期课题报告,2002.http://www.sse.com.cn/cs/zhs/xxfw/jysjs/sseResearch/1-1/wbzjly.pdf
[7]Modigliani Franco,Merton H.Miller,The Cost of Capital Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment,the American Economic Review,1958(48):261-97.
[8]沈艺峰,资本结构理论史[M],经济科学出版社,1999年第6版.
[9]Jensen,M.C.,and W.H.Meckling,Theory of the firm:managerial behavior,agency costs,and capital structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics 3,1976,305-360.
[10]Grossman,S.and O.Hart,Corporate financial structure and managerial incentives[M],In.J.McCall.ed.,The Economic of Information and Uncertainty.University of Chicago Press,1982,107-137.
[11]Townsend,Robert M.,"Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with CostlyState Verification," Journal of Economic Theory,21(October 1979),265-93
[12]Diamond,D.W,1984,Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring,Review Of Economic Studies,51,393-414.
[13]Ross,S.A.The Determination of Financial Structure:the Incentive Signaling Approach,Bell Journal of Economies,8,1977,1-32.
[14]Leland,H.E.,Pyle,D.H.Informational Asymmetries.Financial structure and Financial Intermediation",Journal of Finance,32,1977,371-387.
[15]Myers,Stewart and Nicholas,Majluf,Corporate Financing and Investment Decision When Firms have Information that Investors do not have,Journal of Financial Economics 13,187-221,1984.
[16]Holmstrom, Bengt and Tirole, J.. The Theory of the Firm, "Schmalensee, R., and Willig Eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization: North Holland, (1989) .
[17]Liugi Zingales, In Search of New Foundations[J], The Journal of Finance, Vol55, No 4,1623-1653,2000.
[18]Harris, M., and A. Raviv, Corporate Control Contests and Capital Structure., Journal of Financial Economics, 1998 (20):55-86.
[19]Stulz, Rene M., Managerial control of voting rights: Financing policies and the market for corporate control, Journal of Financial Economics, 1988 (20):25-54.
[20]Aghion, P. and Bolton, P. An incomplete contract approach to financial contracting. Review of Economic Studies 59: 473-494, 1992.
[21]O. Hart. Corporation Governance: Theory and Implication. Economics of Journal.1995(3).
[22]Maksimovic. V. Optimal Capital Structure in Repeated Oligopolies [J].Rand Journal of Economics, 1988, (19) :389-407.
[23]Bolton, Scharfiable. A theory of Predation based on agency problems in financial contracting [J]. American Economic Review, 1990(80): 94-106.
[24]Dasgupta, S. and Titman, S.. Pricing Strategy and Financial Policy[J]. Review of Financial Studies, 1998(11): 705 -737.
[25]Maksimovic, V. and Titman, S.. Financial Reputation and Reputation for Product Quality[J]. Review of Financial Studies, 1991 (2): 175 - 200.
[26]Opler, T., and Titman, S.. Financial Distress and Corporate Performance[J]. Journal of Finance, 1994 (49): 1015 -1040.
[27]Campello, Murillo. Capital Structure and Product Markets Interactions: Evidence from Business Cycle[R]. SSRN Working Paper, 1999.
[28]Noe Thorns H. Capital Structure and Signaling Game Equilibria[J]. Review of Financial Studies. 1988(1):331-356.
[29]Viswanath P V. Strategic Considerations, the Pecking Order Hypothesis and Market Reactions to Equity Financing[J].Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1993(28):213-222.
[30]Titman, Sheridan. The Modigliani and Miller Theorem and Market Efficiency, NBER Working Paper 8641,2001.
[31]Lucas,Deborah and Robert McDonald.Equity issues and stock price dynamics.Journal of Finance 1990(45):1019-1043.
[32]Korajczyk,Robert,Deborah J.Lucas,and Robert L.McDonald,The Effect of Information Release on the Pricing and the Timing of Security Issues,Review of Financial Studies,1991(4):685-708.
[33]Choe,Masulis and Nanda.Common Stock Offerings across the Business Cycle:Theory and Evidence.Journal of Empirical Finance,1993(1):3-31.
[34]Loughran,T.and J.R.Ritter.The new issues puzzle.Journal of Finance,1995(50):23-52.
[35]Spiess D.Katherine and John Affleck-Graves,Underperformance in Long-run Stock Returns Following Seasoned Equity Offerings.Journal of Financial Economics,1995(38):243-367
[36]Ikenberry,David,Lakonisbok,Josef,and Vermaelen,Theo,Market underreaction to open market share repurchases.Journal of Financial Economics,1995,39(2):181-208.
[37]Bayless.M.and S.Chaplinsky.Is there a Window of Opportunity for Seasoned Equity Issuance?[J].Journal of Finance,1996,51(1):253-278.
[38]陈晓,单鑫.债务融资是否会增加上市公司的融资成本[J].经济研究,1999,(9):39-46,80.
[39]沈艺峰,田静.我国上市公司资本成本的定量研究[J].经济研究,1999,(11);62-68.
[40]黄少安,张岗.中国上市公司股权融资偏好分析[J].经济研究,2001,(11):12-27.
[41]葛结根.上市公司的股权融资偏好分析[J].中国流通经济,2003,(5):61-64
[42]郑江淮,何旭强,王华.上市公司投资的融资约束:从股权结构角度的实证分析[J].金融研究,2001,(8):92-99.
[43]贵海,宋敏.中国上市公司的资本结构[J].上证研究,2002,1(2):143-198.
[44]吴淑琨.对大股东行为机理的经济学分析[J].中国证券业研究,2003,(2).
[45]谭锦,姚晓民.上市公司股权融资过度偏好透析[J].生产力研,2003,(3):119-121.
[46]李霞.我国上市公司股权融资偏好的实证分析[J].管理科学,2004,(2):59-63.
[47]罗云,姚丽莎,张月华.论上市公司融资偏好与公司治理[J].四川师范学院学报(哲学社会科学版),2001,(6):46-50.
[48]吴敏,仲夏.西方融资优序理论对我国上市公司融资的启示[J],经济与管理,2003, (4):45-47.
[49]文宏.融资偏好与融资效率—对我国上市公司的实证研究[J].当代经济科学,1999,(6):38-43.
[50]杨运杰,李静洁.我国上市公司股权融资偏好原因分析[J].理论学刊,2002,(6):61-63.
[51]王素莲.我国上市公司融资偏好悖论的经济学思考[J].山西大学学报,2003,(6):25-28.
[52]郑祖玄.股权分置与上市公司股权融资行为.[EB/OL].http://dlib.cnki.net/kns50/detail.aspx?QueryID=21&CurRec=1
[53]陆正飞,叶康涛.中国上市公司股权融资偏好解析——偏好股权融资是缘于融资成本低吗?[J].经济研究,2004(4):50-59.
[54]Titman,Sheridan and Roberto wessels,The determinants of capital structure choice,Journal of Finance 1988,43:1-19.
[55]Shyam-Sunder L,Myers S.Testing Static Tradeoff against Pecking Order Models of Capital Structure[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1999,51:219-244.
[56]Brennan,Michel,and Alan Kraus,Efficient financing under asymmetric information,Journal of Finance 1987,42:1225-1243.
[57]Noe,T.H.,Capital structure and signaling game equilibria,the review of financial studies,1988,1(4):331-355.
[58]Constantinides,G.M.,and Grundy,B.D.,Optimal Investment with Stock Repurchase and Financing as Signals,the Review of Financial Studies 1989,2(4):445-465
[59]Helwege,Jean,and liang,Nellie,Is there a pecking order?,evidence from a panel of IPO firms,Journal of Financial Economies.1996,40:429-458.
[60]Frank M,Goyal V.Testing the Peeking Order Theory of Capital Structure.Journal of Financial Eeonomies[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2003,67:217-248.
[61]Singh,A.and Hamid,J,Corporate fmancial structures in developing countries[J].International Finance Corporation Technical Paper,1992(1),IFC,Washington,DC.
[62]饶育蕾.制度适应与市场博弈-企业资本结构的形成机制研究[EB/OL].www.cnki.net.
[63][美]詹姆斯·范霍恩.小约翰·瓦霍维奇著,郭浩、徐琳译.现代企业财务管理(第10版)[M],经济科学出版社1998年版,第531页.
[64]法,布罗代,15世纪至18世纪的物质文明、经济和资本主义[M].三联书店,1993.2.
[65]Claessens,S.,S.Djankov and L.H.P.Lang.The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations[J]Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58:81-112.
[66] La Porta et al..Corporate Ownership Around the World[J].Journal of Finance,1999,54:471-517.
[67]Williamson Oliver.Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance[J].Journal of Finance,1988,Vol.43:567-591.
[68]钱颖一.企业的治理结构改革和融资结构改革.经济研究.1995(1).
[69]Holdemess,Clifford G.,and Dennis P.Sheehan.The Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations:An Exploratory Analysis[J].Jour2nal of Financial Economics,1988(20):317-46.
[70]Faccio,M.and L.Lang.The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2002(65):365-395.
[71]Claessens,S.,Djankov,S.,& Lang,L.H.P..The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2000(58):81-112.
[72]Shleifer,Andrei and Vishny,Robert W.A Survey of Corporate Governance[J].Journal of Finance,1997,Vol LII,2:737-783.
[73]La Porta,R.,F.Lopez-de-Silanes,A.Shleifer,and R.Vishny.Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation,Journal of Financial Economics,2002(57):1147-1170.
[74]Grossman,Sanford,Oliver Hart.One share one vote and the market for corporate control Journal of Financial Economics,1988(20):175-202.
[75]Harris,Milton,and Arthur Raviv,Corporate governance:Voting rights and majority rules,Journal of Financial Economics,1988(20):203-235.
[76]Aghion,Philippe,and Patrick Bolton,An incomplete contract approach to financial contracting,Review of Economic Studies,1992(59):473-494.
[77]Mueller,Elisabeth.Private Benefits of Control,Capital Structure and Company Growth.London School of Economics Working Paper,2003.
[78]Bebchuk,L.A.& M.Kahan,A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contests,California Law Review.1990(78):1071-1138
[79]Johnson,S.,R.La Porta,F.Lopez-de-Silanes,and Shleifer.Tunneling.American Economic Review,Papers and Proceedings,2000(90):22-27.
[80]Ehrhardt,Olaf and Nowak,Eric.Private Benefits and Minority Shareholder Expropriation,Humboldt University,Working Paper.2003.
[81]Dyck,Alexander and Zingales,Luig.i.Private Benefits of Contro:l An International Comparison.Journal of Finance,2004,VOL LIX,NO 2:537-600.
[82]Barclay,Michae,l and Clifford Holdemess.Private benefits of control of public corporations.Journal of Financial Economics,1989(25):371-395.
[83]Joon Ho Hwang.Private Benefits,Ownership vs Control Kelley School of Business,Indiana University.Working Paper.2005.
[84]韩德宗,叶春华.控制权私人收益的理论与实证研究[J].统计研究,2004(2):42-46.
[85]赵昌文,蒲自立,杨安华.中国上市公司控制权私人收益的度量及影响因素[J].中国工业经济.2004(6):100-106.
[86]唐宗明,余颖,俞乐.我国上市公司控制权私人收益的经验研究[J].系统工程理论方法应用,2005(12):509-513.
[87]Zingales,Luig.i.Insider Ownership and Decision to Go Public,Review of Economic Studies,1995(62):425-448.
[88]Nenova,Tatiana.The value of corporate votes and control benefits:A cross-country analysis.Journal of Financial Economies,2003,168(3):325-351.
[89]Djankov,S.;R.Laporta,F.Lopez-de-Silanes and A.Shleifer,The Regulation of Entry,Quarterly Journal of Economies,2002(117):1-37.
[90]Stijn Claessens,Simeon D jankov,Joseph P.H Fan,Larry H.P.Lang.Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings,Journal of Finance,2002,VOL LⅦ(6):2741-2771.
[91]Jeremy S S.Edwards,A lfons J.W eichenrieder.Ownership Concentration and Share Valuation,German Economic Review,2004,5(2):143-171.
[92]王鹏,周黎安.控股股东的控制权、所有权与公司绩效:基于中国上市公司的证据[J].金融研究,2006(2):88-98.
[93]Igor Filatotchev,Tomasz Mickiewicz.Ownership Concentration,Private Benefits of Control and Debt Financing.University of London,Working Paper,2003.
[94]余明桂,夏新平,潘红波.控制权私有收益的实证分析[J].管理科学,2006,19(3): 27-33.
[95]Demsetz,Harold and Kenneth Lehn.The structure of corporate ownership:Causes and consequences.Journal of Political Economy,1985(93):1155-1175.
[96]林朝南,刘星,郝颖.行业特征与控制权私利:来自中国上市公司的经验证据.经济科学,2006(3):61-72.
[97]La Porta,R.Lopez-de-Silanes,F.Shleifer,A.Vishny,R.W.,Law and finance.Journal of Political Economy,1998(106):1113-1155.
[98]La Porta,Lopez-de-silanes,Andrei Shleifer,Robert Vishny.Investor Protection and Corporate Governance,The Journal of Financial Economics 2000(58):3-27.
[99]Lucian Arye Bebehunk.A Rent-protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control,Cambridge,Working Paper,1999.
[100]Peter Roosenboom,Willem Schramade.The price of Power:Valuing the controlling position of owner-managers in French IPO firms.Journal of Corporate Finance,2006(12):270-295.
[101]Craig Doidge,G.Andrew Karolyi,Karl V.Lins,Darius P.Miller,Rene M.Stulz.Private Benefits of Control Ownership,and the Cross-listing Decision.University of Toronto,Working Paper,2005.
[102]Xue ping Wu,Zheng Wang.Equity Financing in a Myers-Majluf Framework with Private Benefits of control[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2005(11):915-945.
[1103]Holdemess,Clifford G.A Survey of Block holders and Corporate Control.Economic Policy Review,2003(4):51-64.
[104]Hart Oliver.Corporate Governance:Some Theory and Implications,Economic Journal,Royal Economic Society.1995,105(430):678-89 Jones.
[105]Hart Oliver.Financial Contracting[J].Journal of Economic Literature.2001(39):1079-1101.
[106]Zingales,Luig.i.In Search of New Foundations.Journal of Finance,2001,VolLV(4):1623-1653.
[107]Shleifer,A.,and Vishny,R.,A Survey of Corporate Governance,Journal of Finance,1997(52):737-783.
[108]Demsetz,H.,and Lehn,K.,the Structure of Corporate Ownership:Causes and Consequences.Journal of Political Economy,1985(93):1155-1177.
[109]Shleifer,Ahdrei,and Robert Vishny,1986,"Large Shareholders and Corporate Control",Journal of Political Economy,94,461-488.
[110]申尊焕.大股东侵害与控制权收益关系的研究[J].统计与决策,2007(20):116-118.117.
[111]Fan,J.,and Wong,T..Corporate Ownership Structure and the Informativeness of Accounting Earnings in East Asia,Journal of Accounting and Economies,2002(33):401-425.
[112]Lueian Bebchuk,Reinier Kraakman and George Triantis,Stock Pyramids,Cross-ownership,and Dual Class Equity:The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control From Cash Flow Rights,NBER working paper,1999:6951.
[113]宗明,蒋位.中国上市公司大股东侵害度实证分析[J].经济研究,2002(4).
[114]刘峰、贺建刚、魏明海.控制权、业绩与利益输送——基于五粮液的案例研究[J].管理世界,2004(8).
[115]李增泉,余谦,王晓坤.掏空、支持与并购重组[J].经济研究.2005(1):95-105.
[116]田利辉.国有股权对上市公司绩效影响的U型曲线和政府股东两手论[J].经济研究,2005(10):48-58.
[117]新帕尔格雷夫货币金融大辞典[M].北京:经济科学出版社.2000,第一卷:470.
[118]朱武祥.资本成本理念在公司财务决策中的作用[J].投资研究,2000,(1).
[119]宋琳.资本成本缺位与我国资本市场功能缺陷.博士论文.2006,37.
[120]Grossman,S.,O.Hart.The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Intergration[J].Journal of Political Economy,1986,94(4):691-719.
[121]杨瑞龙.企业共同治理的经济学分析[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2001:122.
[122]张维迎.企业的企业家——契约理论[M].上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1995:292-293.
[123]陈郁.企业制度与生产组织——交易费用经济学文选[M].上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1996:271.
[124]Shleifer,A.,and Vishny,R.,A Survey of Corporate Governance,Journal of Finance,1997(52):737-783.
[125]Claessens,S.,S.Djankov,J.Fan,and Lang,L.,Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Share holdings,Journal of Finance,2002(57):2741-2771.
[126]章迪诚.中国国有企业改革编年史(1978—2005)[M].北京:中国工人出版社,2006.
[127]于东智.资本结构、债权治理与公司绩效:一项经验分析[J].中国工业经济,2003(1):87-94.
[128]王满四.负债融资的公司治理效应及其机制研究[M].中国社会科学出版社,2005年
[129]策划人:蔡云伟,调研组成员:袁克成王璐.解构大股东千亿占——上市公司大股东占款调查.2004年8月11日,上海证券报.
[130]宋琳,柳光程,李文君.论资本成本与资金成本的混淆对资本市场融资功能、配置功能的影响.山东省金融学会2003-2004年度重点研究课题一等奖.
[131]张维迎.所有制、治理结构与委托—代理关系[J].经济研究,1996(9).
[132]Grossman,Sanford and Oliver Hart,1986,The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Intergration,Journal of Political Economy,1986,94:691-719.
[133]Hart,oliver and John Moore,Property Rights and the Nature of Firm,Journal of Political Economy,1990,98:1119-1158.
[134]Jensen M,Meckling W.Theory of firm:managerial behavior,agency costs and ownership structure,Journal of Financial Economics,1976.3:305-306.
[135]杨瑞龙.国有企业股份制改造的理论思考[J].经济研究,1995(2).
[136]Mc Chesney.F·Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory,In C.K.Rowley.R·D·tollison and G·Tullock ed,1988.
[137]李爽,吴溪.审计失败与证券市场监管.会计研究.2002(2):28-36.
[138]倪全宏,中国上市公司股权再融资过程中的寻租行为研究,2006博士论文:47-49.
[139]李文君.再论我国上市公司股权融资偏好[J].山东大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2007(5):77-83.
[140]吴江.中国上市公司融资行为与超额融资回报[J],经济导刊,2004,(5):63-66.
[141]陈建军.定向增发报批排长队渐成过去,http://www.cs.com.cn/ssgs/02/200805/t20080508_1452001.htm,2008.5.8,来源:上海证券报.
[142]钟加勇,央企整体上市背后玄机,中国企业家,2007(6):67.
[143]皮海州,东方集团复牌暴跌为注资题材炒作敲警钟,南方日报,2007.9.18,http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/southnews/dd/nfrb/a18/200709180222.asp
[144]陈章波,于彪.相互制衡的股权结构与上市公司治理改进.科技与管理.2006(5):73.
[145]于建霞,曹廷求.股权结构的国际比较.山东社会科学.2002(4):46.
[146]Campello,Murillo,Capital structure and product market interactions:evidence from business circles.SSRN working paper,1999.
[147]张维迎.理性思考中国改革.经济观察报.2006.2.27.
[148]Pagano,Marco and Roell,Ailsa.The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure:Agency Costs,Monitoring,and the Decision to go public.The Quarterly Journal of Economics.1998(2):187-225
[149]Bennedsen M,Wolfenzon D,The Balance of Power in Closely Held Corporations,Journal of Financial Economics,2000,58(1/2):113-139
[150]陈晓,王琨,关联交易、公司治理与国有股改革—来自我国资本市场的实证证据,经济研究,2005(4):77-86
[151]上市国企高管薪酬首超民企,最高年薪平均34万,北京晨报,2007.5.29.
[152]8位行长薪水曝光引发争议银行行长该拿多少钱?中国青年报,2007.4.26.
[153]皖—国企亏损上上亿元,高管奖金过百万,2007.4.24,新华网,http://news.xinhuanet.com/focus/2007-04/24/content_6016470.htm
[154]宋琳.资本成本缺位与我国资本市场功能缺陷.博士论文.2006.88-89.
[155]何祚庥:必须向股民征收个人所得税 检察日报 2002.3.20.
[156]李齐云,李文君.基于税收视角的上市公司资本结构选择分析[J].税务与经济,2006(2):1-7.
[157]程胜.中小板成为退市改革“试验田”.中国证券报,2006.11.30.