国企改革策略、大股东约束、资源约束与并购绩效
|
摘要
针对并购未能为收购方股东创造价值这一典型化事实,国内外学者提出了包括代理理论、自由现金流理论、自大理论、制度理论等等诸多理论。然而,在检验诸理论的解释力时,国内学者并未得出一致结论。
中国存在国有企业与私有企业一两种不同性质的企业。国企与私企在公司股权结构、资源获取、政策性支持等等诸多方面存在显著差异。股权结构、资源获取、政策性支持等方面构成了各个并购理论解释力的基础。因此区分国企与私企两个样本,分别检验各个样本中并购理论的解释力是有意义的。
针对两个样本的实证检验,本文发现各个并购理论在国企与私企中具有不同的解释力。即企业性质成为各个理论解释力的调节因素。这是本文的第一个发现。
在第一个发现的基础上,本文进一步探索各个理论间的关系。本文认为,虽然各个理论的解释角度不同,但各个理论的解释客体都是并购动因。并且就各个理论的解释角度而言,代理理论、自由现金流理论、制度理论都强调影响高管并购决策的环境因素,而自大理论则强调高管的行为特征对于并购决策的影响。
斯金纳的强化理论认为,外部环境能够影响个体的行为特征,进而影响个体行为。据此,本文认为代理理论、自由现金流理论、制度理论是通过自大理论进而影响并购决策的。即自大理论是前三者影响并购决策的中介变量。
以第一个发现为基础,本文通过OLS回归及Logit回归检验了上述假设。实证结果支持作者的推断。即自大理论是代理理论、自由现金流理论、制度理论解释并购决策的中介因素。这是本文的第二个发现。
本文第一部分为引言,介绍了研究目的及意义；第二部分为文献综述,作者对相关理论及国内外学者的实证检验结果分别进行了简要介绍；第三部分为理论分析与研究假设,论述了相关理论的实质,并结合国内的实际情况提出了研究假设；第四部分介绍了研究方法及各个变量的设置；第五部分为回归结果的分析；最后,作者对本文的不足及后续研究方向进行了总结。
According to the typical facts that acquisitions failed to create value for the acquirer shareholders, scholars of domestic and abroad proposed many theories which including agency theory, free cash flow theory, hubris theory, system theory and so on. However, when examining the explanatory power of those theories, domestic scholars have not reached a consensus conclusion.
There existed state-owned enterprises and private enterprises—two different kinds enterprises in China. State-owned and private enterprises are significant different in ownership structure, access to resources, policy support and so on many aspects, which constituting the basis of those theories explanatory power. Distinguishing state-owned enterprises and private enterprises samples and testing the explanatory power of those theories in the two samples are meaningful.
According to the empirical test of the two samples, we find that those theories do have different explanatory power in the two samples. Enterprise nature is the adjustment factors of those theories explanatory power, which is the first discover of this paper.
On the basis of the first discover, we further explore the relationships of those theories. We think that though those theories have different explanatory angles, the explanation object is the same—m & a drivers.
According to the explanation perspective, agency theory, free cash flow theory and system theory emphasize the environmental factors which influence the executives'merger decision-making and hubris theory stresses the point that Executives behavioral characteristics could influence merger decision.
Skinner reinforcement theory points that exterior environment can figure individual behavior characters and then affect the individual behavior. As the essence of reinforcement,we reckon that the agency theory, free cash flow theory and system theory via make clear the exterior environment which affect the managers'behavior characters which is the stressing point of the hubris theory,and then explain mergers. The hubris theory is the intermediary factor of the other three theories.
On the basis of the first discover, we checkout the above assumptions, using OLS regression and Logit regression. Our empirical result supports the inference. Hubris theory is the mediating factor of explaining the merger activity of agency theory, free cash flow theory and system theory, which is the second discover of this paper.
中国存在国有企业与私有企业一两种不同性质的企业。国企与私企在公司股权结构、资源获取、政策性支持等等诸多方面存在显著差异。股权结构、资源获取、政策性支持等方面构成了各个并购理论解释力的基础。因此区分国企与私企两个样本,分别检验各个样本中并购理论的解释力是有意义的。
针对两个样本的实证检验,本文发现各个并购理论在国企与私企中具有不同的解释力。即企业性质成为各个理论解释力的调节因素。这是本文的第一个发现。
在第一个发现的基础上,本文进一步探索各个理论间的关系。本文认为,虽然各个理论的解释角度不同,但各个理论的解释客体都是并购动因。并且就各个理论的解释角度而言,代理理论、自由现金流理论、制度理论都强调影响高管并购决策的环境因素,而自大理论则强调高管的行为特征对于并购决策的影响。
斯金纳的强化理论认为,外部环境能够影响个体的行为特征,进而影响个体行为。据此,本文认为代理理论、自由现金流理论、制度理论是通过自大理论进而影响并购决策的。即自大理论是前三者影响并购决策的中介变量。
以第一个发现为基础,本文通过OLS回归及Logit回归检验了上述假设。实证结果支持作者的推断。即自大理论是代理理论、自由现金流理论、制度理论解释并购决策的中介因素。这是本文的第二个发现。
本文第一部分为引言,介绍了研究目的及意义；第二部分为文献综述,作者对相关理论及国内外学者的实证检验结果分别进行了简要介绍；第三部分为理论分析与研究假设,论述了相关理论的实质,并结合国内的实际情况提出了研究假设；第四部分介绍了研究方法及各个变量的设置；第五部分为回归结果的分析；最后,作者对本文的不足及后续研究方向进行了总结。
According to the typical facts that acquisitions failed to create value for the acquirer shareholders, scholars of domestic and abroad proposed many theories which including agency theory, free cash flow theory, hubris theory, system theory and so on. However, when examining the explanatory power of those theories, domestic scholars have not reached a consensus conclusion.
There existed state-owned enterprises and private enterprises—two different kinds enterprises in China. State-owned and private enterprises are significant different in ownership structure, access to resources, policy support and so on many aspects, which constituting the basis of those theories explanatory power. Distinguishing state-owned enterprises and private enterprises samples and testing the explanatory power of those theories in the two samples are meaningful.
According to the empirical test of the two samples, we find that those theories do have different explanatory power in the two samples. Enterprise nature is the adjustment factors of those theories explanatory power, which is the first discover of this paper.
On the basis of the first discover, we further explore the relationships of those theories. We think that though those theories have different explanatory angles, the explanation object is the same—m & a drivers.
According to the explanation perspective, agency theory, free cash flow theory and system theory emphasize the environmental factors which influence the executives'merger decision-making and hubris theory stresses the point that Executives behavioral characteristics could influence merger decision.
Skinner reinforcement theory points that exterior environment can figure individual behavior characters and then affect the individual behavior. As the essence of reinforcement,we reckon that the agency theory, free cash flow theory and system theory via make clear the exterior environment which affect the managers'behavior characters which is the stressing point of the hubris theory,and then explain mergers. The hubris theory is the intermediary factor of the other three theories.
On the basis of the first discover, we checkout the above assumptions, using OLS regression and Logit regression. Our empirical result supports the inference. Hubris theory is the mediating factor of explaining the merger activity of agency theory, free cash flow theory and system theory, which is the second discover of this paper.
引文
[1]陈小悦、徐晓东.股权结构,企业绩效与投资者利益保护[J].经济研究,2001,(11).
[2]樊纲等.中国市场化指数—各地区市场化相对进程报告[M].经济科学出版社,2007.
[3]冯根福、吴林江.经济研究我国上市公司并购绩效的实证研究[J].经济研究,2001, (1)
[4]郝颖等.我国上市公司管理者人员过度自信与投资决策的实证研究[J].中国管理科学,2005,(5).
[5]姜付秀等.管理者过度自信、企业扩张与财务困境[J].经济研究,2009,(1)：131-143.
[6]李善民、陈文婷.并购决策中管理者过度自信吗?—基于中国上市公司的经验研究[R].工作稿,2009.
[7]李善民、陈玉罡.上市公司兼并与收购的财富效应[J].经济研究,2002,(11).
[8]李善民、周小春.公司特征、行业特征和并购战略类型的实证研究[J].管理世界,2007,(3).
[9]李善民、朱滔.多元化并购能给股东创造价值吗?——兼论影响多元化并购长期绩效的因素[J].管理世界,2006,(3).
[10]李善民、朱滔.管理者动机与并购绩效关系研究[J].经济管理,2005,(4).
[11]李善民、朱滔.中国上市公司并购的长期绩效—基于证券市场的研究[J].中山大学学报,2005,(5)：80-86.
[12]李增泉等.掏空、支持与并购重组——来自我国上市公司的经验数据[J].经济研究,2005,(1).
[13]潘红波等.政府干预、政治关联与地方国有企业并购[J].经济研究,2008,(4).
[14]邱世远、徐国栋.上市公司股权激励的实证分析[J].统计与决策,2003,(12).
[15]孙永祥、黄祖辉.上市公司的股权结构与绩效[J].经济研究,1999,(12).
[16]谭劲松等.企业合并：政府主导下的多方利益博弈——来自10起换股合并案 例的检验[J].管理世界,2005,(2).
[17]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2000,(3)
[18]吴斌、倪林明.自由现金流假说相关研究回顾：一个综述报告[J].南京社会科学,2008,(3).
[19]吴超鹏等.管理者行为与连续并购绩效的理论与实证研究[J].管理世界,2008,(7).
[20]吴淑琨.股权结构与公司绩效的U型关系研究——1997-2000年上市公司的实证研究[J].中国工业经济,2002,(1).
[21]夏立军、陈信元.市场化进程、国企改革策略与公司治理结构的内生决定[J].经济管理,2007,(7).
[22]余明桂等.管理者过度自信与企业激进负债行为[J].管理世界,2006,(8).
[23]张新.并购重组是否创造价值?—中国证券市场的理论与实证研究[J].经济研究,2003,(6)：20-29.
[24]曾亚敏、张俊生.中国上市公司股权收购动因研究：构建内部资本市场抑或滥用自由现金流[J].世界经济,2005,(2).
[25]张永伟、张政军.国有企业并购：情况、原因和若干政策建议[J].国研视点,2009, (7).
[26]周小春、李善民.并购价值创造的影响因素研究[J].管理世界,2008,(5).
[27]朱武祥、宋勇.股权结构与企业价值——对家电行业上市公司实证分析[J].经济研究,2001,(12).
[28]Allen, R, J et al. "Law, Finance and Economic Growth in China" [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2005, Vol.77, (1):57-116.
[29]Andrade,G et al. "New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers" [J]. The Journal of Economic Perspectives,2001, vol.15, (2):103-120.
[30]Andrade.G et al "New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers" [R]. Working Paper,2001.
[31]Brown,R.,& Sarma,N. " CEO Overconfidence, CEO Dominance and Corporate Acquisitions " [J]. Journal of Economics and Business, 2007,vol.59,(5):358-379.
[32]Campbell,J.Y et al. "The Econometrics of Financial Markets" [M]. Princeton University Press,1997.
[33]Cong Wang et al. "Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns" [J]. The Journal of Finance,2007, vol.62, (4):1851-1889.
[34]Copeland,T.E.,& Galai,D. "Information Effects on the Bid-Ask Spread" [J]. The Journal of Finance,1983, vol.38, (5):1457-1469.
[35]Daniel,K.D et al. "Investor Psychology and Security Market Under-and Overreactions" [J].The Journal of Finance,1998, vol.53, (6):1839-1885.
[36]Denis,D.J.,& Denis,D.K. "Performance Changes Following Top Management Dismissals" [J]. Journal of Finance,1995, vol.50, (4):1029-1057.
[37]Doukas,J.A.,& Petmezas,D. "Acquisitions, Overconfident Managers and Self-attribution Bias" [J]. European Financial Management,2007, vol.13, (3): 531-577.
[38]Fama,E.F.,& French,K.R. "The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns" [J]. The Journal of Finance,1992, Vol.47, (2):427-465.
[39]Frank, J.D. "Some psychological determinants of the level of aspiration" [J]. American Journal of Psychology,1935, vol.47, (2):285-293.
[40]Franks,J.K.,& Mayer,C. "Ownership and Control of German Corporations" [J]. Review of Financial Studies, Vol.14, (2):197-216.
[41]Freund,S.et al. "Operating Performance and Free Cash Flow of Asset Buyers" [J]. Financial Management,2003, vol.32, (4):87-106.
[42]Fuller, K.et al. "What Do Returns to Acquiring Firms Tell Us? Evidence from Firms That Make Many Acquisitions" [J]. The Journal of Finance,2002,vol.57, (4):1763-1793.
[43]Gervais,S.et al. " Overconfidence, investment policy and executive Stock options" [R]. Working Paper,2003.
[44]Griffin,D.,& Tversky,A. "The weighing of evidence and the determinants of confidence" [J]. Cognitive Psychology,1992, vol.24, (3):411-435.
[45]Griffin,J.M. "A Test of the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis:Results from the Petroleum Industry" [J]. The Review of Economics and Statistics,1988, vol.70, (1):76-82.
[46]Grossman, S.J et al. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration" [J]. The Journal of Political Economy,1986, vol.94, (4):691-719.
[47]Hanson,R.C. "Tender Offers and Free Cash Flow:An Empirical Analysis" [J]. The Financial Review,1992, vol.27, (2):185-209.
[48]Hayward, M.,& Hambrick, D. " Explaining the Premiums Paid for Large Acquisitions:Evidence of CEO Hubris" [J]. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1997,vol.42,(1):103-127.
[49]Heaton,J.B. "Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance" [J]. Financial Management,2002, vol.31, (2):33-45.
[50]Holderness,C.G et al. "Were the Good Old Days That Good? Changes in Managerial Stock Ownership Since the Great Depression" [J]. The Journal of Finance,1999, vol.54, (2):435-469.
[51]Hribar Paul and Holly Yang. "CEO Overconfidence, Management Earnings Forecasts, and Earnings Management" [R]. Working Paper,2006.
[52]Jaggi,B.,& Gul,F.A. " An Analysis of Joint Effects of Investment Opportunity Set, Free Cash Flows and Size on Corporate Debt Policy" [J].1999, vol.12, (4): 371-381.
[53]James M Griffin" [J]. The Review of Economics and Statistics,1988, vol.70, (1): 76-82.
[54]Jarrell,G.A et al. " The Market for Corporate Control:The Empirical Evidence Since 1980" [J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives,1988, vol.2, (1):49-68
[55]Jensen,M.C,& Murphy,K.J. "Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives" [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1990, vol.98, (2):225-264.
[56]Jensen, M.C.,& Ruback, R.S. "The market for corporate control:The scientific evidence" [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1983, vol.11, (1-4):5-50.
[57]Jensen,M.C. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers" [J]. American Economic Review,1986, vol.76, (2):323-329.
[58]Jensen,M.C,& Meckling,W.H. "Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure" [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1976, vol.3, (4):305-360.
[59]Kunda,Z. "Motivated Inference:Self-Serving Generation and Evaluation of Causal Theories" [J]. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,1987, vol.(53), (4):636-647.
[60]Khanna, Tarun and Krishna Palepu,2000, "Is Group AffiliationProfitable in Emerging Markets? An Analysis of Diversified Indian Business Groups", Journal of Finance,55, pp.867-891.
[61]Lang,L.H.P,& Litzenberger,R.H. " Dividend announcements:Cash flow signalling vs. free cash flow hypothesis?" [J]. The Journal of Financial Economics,1989, vol.24, (1):181-191.
[62]Lang,L.H.P et al "A test of the free cash flow hypothesis:The case of bidder returns" [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1991, vol.29, (2):315-335.
[63]Lehn,K.,& Poulsen,A. "Free Cash Flow and Stockholder Gains in Going Private Transactions" [J]. The Journal of Finance,1989, vol.44, (3):771-781.
[64]Levy,H. "Economic Evaluation of Voting Power of Common Stock" [J].The Journal of Finance,1983, vol.38,(1):79-93
[65]Lin Y, S.Hu, M Chen. "Managerial Optimism and Corporate Investment:Some Empirical Evidence fromTaiwan" [J]. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,2005, vol.13, (5):523-546.
[66]Malmendier,U.,& Tate,G. " CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment" [J]. The Journal of Finance,2005, vol.66, (6):2661-2700.
[67]Malmendier,U.,& Tate,G. "Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfdence and the Market's Reaction" [J]. Journal of Finance Economics,2008, vol.89,(1):20-43.
[68]Mann,S.V.,& Sicherman,N.W. "The Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow: Acquisition Activity and Equity Issues" [J]. The Journal of Business,1991, vol.64, (2):213-227.
[69]McConnella,J.J.,& Servaes,H. "Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value" [J]. Journal of Financial Economics.1990, vol.27, (2):595-612.
[70]McLaughlin,R.et al. "The Operating Performance of Seasoned Equity Issuers: Free Cash Flow and Post-Issue Performance" [J]. Financial Management,1996, vol.25, (4):41-53.
[71]Myers,S.C,&Majluf,N.S. " Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have" [R].Working Paper,1984.
[72]Nohel,T.,& Tarhan,V. " Share repurchases and firm performance:new evidence on the agency costs of free cash flow" [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1998, vol.49, (2):187-222.
[73]Opler,T.,&Titman,S. " The Determinants of Leveraged Buyout Activity:Free Cash Flow vs. Financial Distress Costs" [J]. Journal of Finance,1993, vol.48, (5):1985-1999.
[74]Pedersen,T.,& Thomsen,S. "Business Systems and Corporate Governance" [J]. International Studies of Management & Organization,1999, vol.29, (2):43-59.
[75]Roll, R. "The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers" [J]. The Journal of Business,1986, vol.59, (2):197-216.
[76]Shleifer, A.,&Vishny, R.W. "The Grabbing Hand:Government Pathologies and their Cures" [M].Cambridge, Mass:Harvard University Press,1998.
[77]Shleifer, A.,&Vishny, R.W. "The Grabbing Hand:Government Pathologies and their Cures" [M].Cambridge, Mass:Harvard University Press,1998.
[78]Stulz,M. "Managerial control of voting rights:Financing policies and the market for corporate control" [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1988, vol.20, (1-2):25-54.
[79]Weston,F.J et al. "TAKEOVERS, RESTRUCTURING, AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE" [M].Prentice Hall Press,1998.
[2]樊纲等.中国市场化指数—各地区市场化相对进程报告[M].经济科学出版社,2007.
[3]冯根福、吴林江.经济研究我国上市公司并购绩效的实证研究[J].经济研究,2001, (1)
[4]郝颖等.我国上市公司管理者人员过度自信与投资决策的实证研究[J].中国管理科学,2005,(5).
[5]姜付秀等.管理者过度自信、企业扩张与财务困境[J].经济研究,2009,(1)：131-143.
[6]李善民、陈文婷.并购决策中管理者过度自信吗?—基于中国上市公司的经验研究[R].工作稿,2009.
[7]李善民、陈玉罡.上市公司兼并与收购的财富效应[J].经济研究,2002,(11).
[8]李善民、周小春.公司特征、行业特征和并购战略类型的实证研究[J].管理世界,2007,(3).
[9]李善民、朱滔.多元化并购能给股东创造价值吗?——兼论影响多元化并购长期绩效的因素[J].管理世界,2006,(3).
[10]李善民、朱滔.管理者动机与并购绩效关系研究[J].经济管理,2005,(4).
[11]李善民、朱滔.中国上市公司并购的长期绩效—基于证券市场的研究[J].中山大学学报,2005,(5)：80-86.
[12]李增泉等.掏空、支持与并购重组——来自我国上市公司的经验数据[J].经济研究,2005,(1).
[13]潘红波等.政府干预、政治关联与地方国有企业并购[J].经济研究,2008,(4).
[14]邱世远、徐国栋.上市公司股权激励的实证分析[J].统计与决策,2003,(12).
[15]孙永祥、黄祖辉.上市公司的股权结构与绩效[J].经济研究,1999,(12).
[16]谭劲松等.企业合并：政府主导下的多方利益博弈——来自10起换股合并案 例的检验[J].管理世界,2005,(2).
[17]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2000,(3)
[18]吴斌、倪林明.自由现金流假说相关研究回顾：一个综述报告[J].南京社会科学,2008,(3).
[19]吴超鹏等.管理者行为与连续并购绩效的理论与实证研究[J].管理世界,2008,(7).
[20]吴淑琨.股权结构与公司绩效的U型关系研究——1997-2000年上市公司的实证研究[J].中国工业经济,2002,(1).
[21]夏立军、陈信元.市场化进程、国企改革策略与公司治理结构的内生决定[J].经济管理,2007,(7).
[22]余明桂等.管理者过度自信与企业激进负债行为[J].管理世界,2006,(8).
[23]张新.并购重组是否创造价值?—中国证券市场的理论与实证研究[J].经济研究,2003,(6)：20-29.
[24]曾亚敏、张俊生.中国上市公司股权收购动因研究：构建内部资本市场抑或滥用自由现金流[J].世界经济,2005,(2).
[25]张永伟、张政军.国有企业并购：情况、原因和若干政策建议[J].国研视点,2009, (7).
[26]周小春、李善民.并购价值创造的影响因素研究[J].管理世界,2008,(5).
[27]朱武祥、宋勇.股权结构与企业价值——对家电行业上市公司实证分析[J].经济研究,2001,(12).
[28]Allen, R, J et al. "Law, Finance and Economic Growth in China" [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2005, Vol.77, (1):57-116.
[29]Andrade,G et al. "New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers" [J]. The Journal of Economic Perspectives,2001, vol.15, (2):103-120.
[30]Andrade.G et al "New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers" [R]. Working Paper,2001.
[31]Brown,R.,& Sarma,N. " CEO Overconfidence, CEO Dominance and Corporate Acquisitions " [J]. Journal of Economics and Business, 2007,vol.59,(5):358-379.
[32]Campbell,J.Y et al. "The Econometrics of Financial Markets" [M]. Princeton University Press,1997.
[33]Cong Wang et al. "Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns" [J]. The Journal of Finance,2007, vol.62, (4):1851-1889.
[34]Copeland,T.E.,& Galai,D. "Information Effects on the Bid-Ask Spread" [J]. The Journal of Finance,1983, vol.38, (5):1457-1469.
[35]Daniel,K.D et al. "Investor Psychology and Security Market Under-and Overreactions" [J].The Journal of Finance,1998, vol.53, (6):1839-1885.
[36]Denis,D.J.,& Denis,D.K. "Performance Changes Following Top Management Dismissals" [J]. Journal of Finance,1995, vol.50, (4):1029-1057.
[37]Doukas,J.A.,& Petmezas,D. "Acquisitions, Overconfident Managers and Self-attribution Bias" [J]. European Financial Management,2007, vol.13, (3): 531-577.
[38]Fama,E.F.,& French,K.R. "The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns" [J]. The Journal of Finance,1992, Vol.47, (2):427-465.
[39]Frank, J.D. "Some psychological determinants of the level of aspiration" [J]. American Journal of Psychology,1935, vol.47, (2):285-293.
[40]Franks,J.K.,& Mayer,C. "Ownership and Control of German Corporations" [J]. Review of Financial Studies, Vol.14, (2):197-216.
[41]Freund,S.et al. "Operating Performance and Free Cash Flow of Asset Buyers" [J]. Financial Management,2003, vol.32, (4):87-106.
[42]Fuller, K.et al. "What Do Returns to Acquiring Firms Tell Us? Evidence from Firms That Make Many Acquisitions" [J]. The Journal of Finance,2002,vol.57, (4):1763-1793.
[43]Gervais,S.et al. " Overconfidence, investment policy and executive Stock options" [R]. Working Paper,2003.
[44]Griffin,D.,& Tversky,A. "The weighing of evidence and the determinants of confidence" [J]. Cognitive Psychology,1992, vol.24, (3):411-435.
[45]Griffin,J.M. "A Test of the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis:Results from the Petroleum Industry" [J]. The Review of Economics and Statistics,1988, vol.70, (1):76-82.
[46]Grossman, S.J et al. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration" [J]. The Journal of Political Economy,1986, vol.94, (4):691-719.
[47]Hanson,R.C. "Tender Offers and Free Cash Flow:An Empirical Analysis" [J]. The Financial Review,1992, vol.27, (2):185-209.
[48]Hayward, M.,& Hambrick, D. " Explaining the Premiums Paid for Large Acquisitions:Evidence of CEO Hubris" [J]. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1997,vol.42,(1):103-127.
[49]Heaton,J.B. "Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance" [J]. Financial Management,2002, vol.31, (2):33-45.
[50]Holderness,C.G et al. "Were the Good Old Days That Good? Changes in Managerial Stock Ownership Since the Great Depression" [J]. The Journal of Finance,1999, vol.54, (2):435-469.
[51]Hribar Paul and Holly Yang. "CEO Overconfidence, Management Earnings Forecasts, and Earnings Management" [R]. Working Paper,2006.
[52]Jaggi,B.,& Gul,F.A. " An Analysis of Joint Effects of Investment Opportunity Set, Free Cash Flows and Size on Corporate Debt Policy" [J].1999, vol.12, (4): 371-381.
[53]James M Griffin" [J]. The Review of Economics and Statistics,1988, vol.70, (1): 76-82.
[54]Jarrell,G.A et al. " The Market for Corporate Control:The Empirical Evidence Since 1980" [J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives,1988, vol.2, (1):49-68
[55]Jensen,M.C,& Murphy,K.J. "Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives" [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1990, vol.98, (2):225-264.
[56]Jensen, M.C.,& Ruback, R.S. "The market for corporate control:The scientific evidence" [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1983, vol.11, (1-4):5-50.
[57]Jensen,M.C. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers" [J]. American Economic Review,1986, vol.76, (2):323-329.
[58]Jensen,M.C,& Meckling,W.H. "Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure" [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1976, vol.3, (4):305-360.
[59]Kunda,Z. "Motivated Inference:Self-Serving Generation and Evaluation of Causal Theories" [J]. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,1987, vol.(53), (4):636-647.
[60]Khanna, Tarun and Krishna Palepu,2000, "Is Group AffiliationProfitable in Emerging Markets? An Analysis of Diversified Indian Business Groups", Journal of Finance,55, pp.867-891.
[61]Lang,L.H.P,& Litzenberger,R.H. " Dividend announcements:Cash flow signalling vs. free cash flow hypothesis?" [J]. The Journal of Financial Economics,1989, vol.24, (1):181-191.
[62]Lang,L.H.P et al "A test of the free cash flow hypothesis:The case of bidder returns" [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1991, vol.29, (2):315-335.
[63]Lehn,K.,& Poulsen,A. "Free Cash Flow and Stockholder Gains in Going Private Transactions" [J]. The Journal of Finance,1989, vol.44, (3):771-781.
[64]Levy,H. "Economic Evaluation of Voting Power of Common Stock" [J].The Journal of Finance,1983, vol.38,(1):79-93
[65]Lin Y, S.Hu, M Chen. "Managerial Optimism and Corporate Investment:Some Empirical Evidence fromTaiwan" [J]. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,2005, vol.13, (5):523-546.
[66]Malmendier,U.,& Tate,G. " CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment" [J]. The Journal of Finance,2005, vol.66, (6):2661-2700.
[67]Malmendier,U.,& Tate,G. "Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfdence and the Market's Reaction" [J]. Journal of Finance Economics,2008, vol.89,(1):20-43.
[68]Mann,S.V.,& Sicherman,N.W. "The Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow: Acquisition Activity and Equity Issues" [J]. The Journal of Business,1991, vol.64, (2):213-227.
[69]McConnella,J.J.,& Servaes,H. "Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value" [J]. Journal of Financial Economics.1990, vol.27, (2):595-612.
[70]McLaughlin,R.et al. "The Operating Performance of Seasoned Equity Issuers: Free Cash Flow and Post-Issue Performance" [J]. Financial Management,1996, vol.25, (4):41-53.
[71]Myers,S.C,&Majluf,N.S. " Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have" [R].Working Paper,1984.
[72]Nohel,T.,& Tarhan,V. " Share repurchases and firm performance:new evidence on the agency costs of free cash flow" [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1998, vol.49, (2):187-222.
[73]Opler,T.,&Titman,S. " The Determinants of Leveraged Buyout Activity:Free Cash Flow vs. Financial Distress Costs" [J]. Journal of Finance,1993, vol.48, (5):1985-1999.
[74]Pedersen,T.,& Thomsen,S. "Business Systems and Corporate Governance" [J]. International Studies of Management & Organization,1999, vol.29, (2):43-59.
[75]Roll, R. "The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers" [J]. The Journal of Business,1986, vol.59, (2):197-216.
[76]Shleifer, A.,&Vishny, R.W. "The Grabbing Hand:Government Pathologies and their Cures" [M].Cambridge, Mass:Harvard University Press,1998.
[77]Shleifer, A.,&Vishny, R.W. "The Grabbing Hand:Government Pathologies and their Cures" [M].Cambridge, Mass:Harvard University Press,1998.
[78]Stulz,M. "Managerial control of voting rights:Financing policies and the market for corporate control" [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1988, vol.20, (1-2):25-54.
[79]Weston,F.J et al. "TAKEOVERS, RESTRUCTURING, AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE" [M].Prentice Hall Press,1998.