制度约束、内在激励与盈余稳健性
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摘要
盈余稳健性,是会计确认与计量的一项重要原则,被誉为“会计计价中最古老同时可能也是最深入人心的原则”(Sterling,1967),纵观国内外文献,盈余稳健性可理解为这样一种会计处理原则——当面临不确定性因素时,在不影响会计处理方法选择合理性的基础上,在金额上,尽量多计可能发生的负债或费用,尽量少计或不计可能取得的资产或收入；在时间上,尽可能及时或提前确认负债或费用,而尽可能延迟确认资产或收入。盈余稳健性的实质是对具有不确定性的损失和收益所采用的非对称性确认标准,即收益的确认标准严格高于损失的确认标准(Basu,1997).
盈余稳健性对企业和市场产生了深远影响。众多研究发现,盈余稳健性不仅提升了会计信息质量,增强了财务报告的有用性,而且有助于抑制经理人机会主义行为,降低委托代理成本,从而提升企业价值。盈余稳健性的重要价值受到全球会计学界和业界的广泛关注,并且在会计准则中充分运用。
盈余稳健性是如何形成的?西方学界从公司契约、法律诉讼、税收因素和会计监管四方面作出了解释。然而,由于我国具有特殊的制度背景和市场环境——国有企业股份制改革所形成的独特内部治理结构、资本市场结构和监管的缺陷、相关法律法规的缺失、税法体系和会计监管模式的差异,西方四大经典解释并不能完全适用于中国企业。
基于利益相关者理论,盈余稳健性可以视作为了缓解企业各利益相关者冲突并降低企业经济社会成本而形成的一份广义契约。对中国上市公司而言,各利益相关者对盈余稳健性具有不同偏好,而政府监管者和上市公司内部人由于博弈力量相对较强,成为影响盈余稳健性的主体。一方面,基于经济和社会目标,政府监管者具有较大的盈余稳健性需求,并且通过建立会计制度约束来予以实现；另一方面,基于经济和政治利益,上市公司内部人具有削弱盈余稳健性的内在激励。因此,中国上市公司盈余稳健性的存在水平及变化程度取决于两者的博弈,体现为会计制度约束和公司内在激励的综合影响。
为了克服现有研究普遍使用的Basu (1997)稳健性测度模型的局限性,在评述迄今为止国内外文献涉及的所有测度模型的基础上,本文从营运周期效应入手,构建了基于流动性应计和经营性现金流量的最新测度模型,并以1999—2006年持续经营的非金融类A股上市公司为样本,检验了会计制度约束和公司内在激励对盈余稳健性的综合影响。
研究结果表明：第一,我国上市公司在整体上并不具有盈余稳健性。政府强力推行的会计改革虽然通过“四项计提”、“八项计提”等制度安排强化了对企业盈余稳健性的要求,但是制度约束并没有促使上市公司在整体上体现出盈余稳健性,这一结论与国内相关研究并不完全一致。第二,会计制度改革对上市公司盈余稳健性的增强具有积极作用,但这种作用具有非对称性。伴随着会计制度改革,上市公司的盈余稳健性显著增强,但是这主要源自损失确认及时性的提高,在收益确认延迟性方面并没有显著改善。第三,国家控股在一定程度上削弱了盈余稳健性。在损失确认方面,国家控股具有显著负向影响,但在收益确认方面,终极控制人性质对稳健性并不具有显著影响。第四,内部人控制削弱了盈余稳健性,且国有控股公司更为严重。国有公司内部人控制在损失和收益确认两方面均削弱了稳健性,而非国有公司内部人控制在收益确认方面未表现出显著影响。第五,债务机制对稳健性并不具有显著影响。从整体上看,债务在损失确认和收益确认两方面均无显著影响；债务虽然能够增强非国有公司稳健性,但不影响国有公司的稳健性。
.通过本研究可以看到,会计制度改革虽然对盈余稳健性产生了积极影响,但是受制于上市公司的内在利益激励,制度约束的效力并未充分发挥。对中国上市公司而言,会计制度作为政府强制施加的外在约束,只是形成和增强盈余稳健性的必要条件,制度的实施效果还有赖于上市公司的内在需求。因此,政府在着力完善会计制度的同时,应建立健全与之相配套的其他机制,培育和引导上市公司生成高质量会计信息的内在需求。唯有如此,才能促使上市公司提供高质量的会计信息,不断改善公司治理水平,从而提升整个资本市场的运行效率。
本文的结构安排如下：
第1章,导论。本章介绍三方面内容：研究背景与主题；本文的主要创新；研究思路与论文结构。
第2章,盈余稳健性的一般理论。本章首先讨论盈余稳健性的概念,在介绍稳健性的历史演进基础上,归纳国内外文献中关于稳健性的各种定义,进而对本研究的盈余稳健性作出界定。接着,从盈余稳健性的现实存在、国际比较和变动趋势三方面,综述盈余稳健性的存在证据。然后,回顾了盈余稳健性对公司投资、融资以及会计报表质量等方面产生的影响。最后,从适用对象、适用条件、模型设定等角度总结和评述了国内外文献出现过的主要稳健性测度方法。
第3章,制度背景分析。本章阐述了中国上市公司盈余稳健性所根植的特殊制度背景,包括三方面内容：一是会计制度改革,本文在回顾改革历程基础上,从政府主导、资本市场推动和稳健性贯穿等三方面进行了评述；二是国有企业股份制改革,本文在回顾改革历程基础上,着重阐述了股权分置及其影响；三是股权融资偏好和管制,本文从我国资本市场结构、上市公司融资方式、政府管制等方面进行探讨。
第4章,盈余稳健性的形成：理论分析与研究假说。首先,介绍西方学界关于盈余稳健性形成的经典解释；其次,逐一分析西方解释在中国市场的适用性；再者,利用利益相关者理论分析中国上市公司盈余稳健性的形成。其中,首先介绍利益相关者理论；然后,界定盈余稳健性利益相关者并分析中国上市公司各主要利益相关者的主要特点、利益动机、博弈力量；接着,分别讨论会计制度约束和上市公司内在激励与盈余稳健性的相互关系；最后,由此提出盈余稳健性的广义契约解释以及有待实证检验的研究假说。
第5章,研究设计。本章阐述实证检验制度约束和内在激励对盈余稳健性影响的研究设计,分为两部分：一是介绍本研究的模型设计。鉴于现有研究模型的缺陷,本文借鉴现有文献中最新的稳健性测度模型,通过理论推导和模型设定修改,构建了基于当期流动性应计与未来经营性现金流关系的计量模型。二是介绍实证检验的样本选择、数据来源和变量设定。
第6章,实证结果与分析。本章列示和分析了实证检验的结果,包括：现金流变化与应计关系的检验、现金流变化与异常应计关系的检验、现金流变化与正负异常应计关系的检验、会计制度约束对盈余稳健性影响的检验、内在激励对盈余稳健性影响的检验。
第7章,结论、启示与研究局限。本章首先归纳了主要研究结论,然后阐述研究中获得的一些政策启示,最后说明本研究的局限性,提出对后续研究的展望。
与已有研究相比,本文试图在以下方面形成特色、实现创新。
第一,系统性地研究了中国上市公司盈余稳健性的形成机理,丰富了盈余稳健性理论。目前国内研究大多直接检验西方经典解释,缺乏对中国上市公司盈余稳健性形成机理的系统性剖析。本文综合运用契约理论和利益相关者理论,充分结合中国特殊的制度背景,逐一分析了影响盈余稳健性的利益相关者的主要特点、利益动机和博弈力量,从而提炼出盈余稳健性形成的广义契约解释,并在此框架内分析了盈余稳健性的形成机理,拓展了不完善市场条件下有关盈余稳健性影响因素的理论。
第二,从“当期流动性应计与未来经营性现金流变化的相互关系”这一崭新视角来测度中国上市公司的盈余稳健性,拓展了盈余稳健性测度方法。鉴于现有研究普遍使用的Basu (1997)模型存在较大局限性,本文直接聚焦于企业营运周期这一微观过程,构建了基于当期流动性应计和未来经营性现金流关系的稳健性测度计量模型,有利于更加本源和全面地反映盈余稳健性的形成机理和表现程度。
第三,全面检验了会计制度约束和公司内在激励对盈余稳健性的综合影响,得到新的发现与启示。基于制度背景分析和相关理论分析,本文运用最新测度模型全面检验了会计制度约束和内在激励对盈余稳健性的综合影响,得到一些与现有相关研究不尽一致的新发现。这有助于理解转型国家和新兴市场中的政府和企业行为,也有助于政府对其政策效果进行评价。
当然,由于研究主题和资料的限制以及本人知识、经验和能力的局限,本文存在以下不足：一是囿于稳健性测度方法,本研究将会计制度考察期间设定为1999—2006年,未检验新会计准则对盈余稳健性的影响,考察时间和样本不够充分。二是上市公司的内在激励难以观测,本文仅使用终极控制人性质、内部人控制程度等代理变量刻画内在激励,未对其他可能更为重要的因素进行讨论。三是由于定量测度上的困难,本研究未将证券监管部门的市场监管纳入模型之中进行考察。这些研究局限也成为本文未来的改进方向。
Conservatism, which has been regarded as "the most ancient and the most influential accounting principle (Sterling,1967)", plays a fundamental role in the accounting recognition and measurement. According to the present literatures, we are able to make a summation for it:on the aspect of special phenomena resulted from conservatism:①about the magnitude of account recorded, it demands the methods that least likely to overestimate net income or net assets when facing uncertainty;②at the aspect of timeliness, it demands a more timely recognition of losses than gains—the essence of earnings conservatism:the asymmetric recognition of losses vs gains (Basu,1997).
Conservatism has a profound influence to the enterprise and the market. Based on the numerous researches, earnings conservatism can not only improve the quality of accounting information, but also suppress opportunism behavior of the managers. Thus, earnings conservatism is an proxy of high-quality financial reporting, and also an effective corporate governance mechanism. Therefore, earnings conservatism has been received growing attention throughout global accounting academic and practical circles, and has been applied in accounting standards extensively.
How can the earnings conservatism be made? Western academic circles have the explanations from contracting、litigation、taxation and regulation. However, given the effects from special shares structures, poor corporate governance, strong influence of government on the local banks, poor regulation and ineffective legal system etc, those four explanations have significantly different weight on earnings conservatism in China from that in developed countries.
Based on the Stakeholder Theory, earnings conservatism can be regard as a generalized contract, which can alleviate the conflicts of stakeholders and reduce firms' economic cost. Speaking of Chinese listed firms, various stakeholders have disparate preferences to the earnings conservatism. And, the government supervisors and the insiders of listed firms are the main body of earnings conservatism forming, because of the stronger gambling strength. For one thing, the government supervisors prefer the conservatism and realize it by establishing the accounting regulations. For another, the insiders of listed firms have the incentives to weaken the conservatism, which may shrink their economic and political benefit. Therefore, the existence and the change of earnings conservatism of Chinese listed firms are decided by the gambling of government supervisors and insiders, namely the synthesis influence of accounting regulation restraint and firms'incentives.
In order to overcome the limitations of Basu (1997) model which is used extensively in the existing research, this dissertation construct a new model to measure the earnings conservatism, from the perspective of DKW(1998) model(Operation Cycle Effects Model) and based on the relationship of operating accruals and operating cash flows. Also, this dissertation uses the observations from Chinese listed firms (year1999-year2006, A share market, excluding the ones from the finance industry) to empirically test the synthesis influence of accounting regulation restraint and firms'incentives.
After testing, the research indicates that:①No trace of conditional conservatism in Chinese listed firm in year1999-year2006.②As the effects of accounting reform, the firms have made significant progress in the sense of earnings conservatism. The effects from the reforms of accounting standards are asymmetric—it has significantly improved the timeliness of losses recognition, meanwhile its effects on the deferral of gains recognition are not significant, nearly 0.③The state ownership and control has weakened the earnings conservatism to a certain extent.④The insider control problem have weakened the earnings conservatism significantly, and the state-owned firms have been more serious.⑤The debt has no significant influence to the earnings conservatism.
The research also shows that although the reforms of Chinese accounting regulations has put more and more weight on the principle of conservatism, the actual effects are not satisfactory, because the effects are restrained by the benefit drive of listed firms. Speaking of Chinese listed firms, the accounting regulation, which is a compulsory external restraint made by government, is no more than a necessary condition for the improvement of earnings conservatism; its final effects also depend on the incentives of listed firms.
The government should not only improve the quality of accounting regulation, but also improve the quality of the legal and the regulation systems related, such as it also demands to further strengthen the legal liabilities of the external auditors, improve the regulation system for the disclosure mechanism of accounting information and the disclosure mechanism itself, introduce more effective regulation system and more severe punishment for the firms and their management manipulating earnings.
This paper attempts to realize the innovation in the following aspects:
First, this paper has systematically studied the formation mechanism of conservatism of Chinese listed firms, and enriched the theory of conservatism. At present, most domestic researches focus on the empirical testing of the western explanation, lacking in analyzing the formation mechanism of conservatism. Based on the Contact Theory, Stakeholder Theory and Chinese special system, this paper has analyzed the stakeholders who affect conservatism, improved the generalized contracting explanation, and analyzed the formation mechanism of conservatism of Chinese listed firms.
Second, this paper has measured the conservatism from a new perspective, developing the measurement of conservatism. Considering the fact that there are serious limitations of Basu (1997) model, the paper has constructed a new econometric model for measuring conservatism, which is based on the relationship of operating accruals and operating cash flows.
Third, this paper has empirically tested the synthesis influence of accounting regulation restraint and firms'incentives on conservatism. Based on the theoretical analysis and the new econometric model, the paper has some discoveries, which are inconsistent with the existing related researches.
This paper is arranged in seven chapters. The content of each chapter is as following:
Chapter 1:Introduction. This chapter introduces the research context, research topics, paper's structure and innovation.
Chapter 2:General Theory of Conservatism. Firstly, this chapter discusses the concept of conservatism. Secondly, reviewing the existence proof of conservatism, from cross-section existence, international comparison and developing trends. Thirdly, reviewing the influence of conservatism on investment, financing and the quality of financial report. Finally, summarizing the conservatism measurements, which was quoted in the relevant literature.
Chapter 3:Analysis of Chinese Special System Background. First, introducing China's accounting system reform, and commenting on it from the perspectives of governance, capital market and conservatism. Second, introducing and commenting on the states enterprises reform, especially on split-share problem. Third, discussing the equity financing preference of listed firms and securities regulation.
Chapter 4:Formation of Conservatism:Theoretical Analysis and Research Hypothesis. First, introducing the four explanations of western academic circle. Second, analyzing the suitability of the western explanation in China. Third, analyzing the formation mechanism of conservatism.of Chinese listed firms, using the Stakeholder Theory. Fourth, improving generalized contracting explanation and the research hypothesis to be empirically tested.
Chapter 5:Design of the Research. First, this chapter elaborates the econometric model used for empirically test, which is based on the relationship of operating accruals and operating cash flows. Second, giving the detailed explanation about the sampling method, data source and variables definition..
Chapter 6:Empirical Test Results and Analysis. This chapter shows and analyze the empirical test results, including:test of the relationship of the cash flow change and accruals, test of the relationship of the cash flow change and abnormal accruals, test of the relationship of the cash flow change and positive/negative abnormal accruals, test of the influence of accounting regulation on conservatism, test of the influence of accounting regulation and firms' incentives on conservatism.
Chapter 7:Conclusion, Policy Enlightenment and Research Limitation. First, this chapter has induced the main conclusion of the paper. Then, elaborating some policy enlightenment from the research. Finally, some limitation in this paper and future research issues are discussed.
盈余稳健性对企业和市场产生了深远影响。众多研究发现,盈余稳健性不仅提升了会计信息质量,增强了财务报告的有用性,而且有助于抑制经理人机会主义行为,降低委托代理成本,从而提升企业价值。盈余稳健性的重要价值受到全球会计学界和业界的广泛关注,并且在会计准则中充分运用。
盈余稳健性是如何形成的?西方学界从公司契约、法律诉讼、税收因素和会计监管四方面作出了解释。然而,由于我国具有特殊的制度背景和市场环境——国有企业股份制改革所形成的独特内部治理结构、资本市场结构和监管的缺陷、相关法律法规的缺失、税法体系和会计监管模式的差异,西方四大经典解释并不能完全适用于中国企业。
基于利益相关者理论,盈余稳健性可以视作为了缓解企业各利益相关者冲突并降低企业经济社会成本而形成的一份广义契约。对中国上市公司而言,各利益相关者对盈余稳健性具有不同偏好,而政府监管者和上市公司内部人由于博弈力量相对较强,成为影响盈余稳健性的主体。一方面,基于经济和社会目标,政府监管者具有较大的盈余稳健性需求,并且通过建立会计制度约束来予以实现；另一方面,基于经济和政治利益,上市公司内部人具有削弱盈余稳健性的内在激励。因此,中国上市公司盈余稳健性的存在水平及变化程度取决于两者的博弈,体现为会计制度约束和公司内在激励的综合影响。
为了克服现有研究普遍使用的Basu (1997)稳健性测度模型的局限性,在评述迄今为止国内外文献涉及的所有测度模型的基础上,本文从营运周期效应入手,构建了基于流动性应计和经营性现金流量的最新测度模型,并以1999—2006年持续经营的非金融类A股上市公司为样本,检验了会计制度约束和公司内在激励对盈余稳健性的综合影响。
研究结果表明：第一,我国上市公司在整体上并不具有盈余稳健性。政府强力推行的会计改革虽然通过“四项计提”、“八项计提”等制度安排强化了对企业盈余稳健性的要求,但是制度约束并没有促使上市公司在整体上体现出盈余稳健性,这一结论与国内相关研究并不完全一致。第二,会计制度改革对上市公司盈余稳健性的增强具有积极作用,但这种作用具有非对称性。伴随着会计制度改革,上市公司的盈余稳健性显著增强,但是这主要源自损失确认及时性的提高,在收益确认延迟性方面并没有显著改善。第三,国家控股在一定程度上削弱了盈余稳健性。在损失确认方面,国家控股具有显著负向影响,但在收益确认方面,终极控制人性质对稳健性并不具有显著影响。第四,内部人控制削弱了盈余稳健性,且国有控股公司更为严重。国有公司内部人控制在损失和收益确认两方面均削弱了稳健性,而非国有公司内部人控制在收益确认方面未表现出显著影响。第五,债务机制对稳健性并不具有显著影响。从整体上看,债务在损失确认和收益确认两方面均无显著影响；债务虽然能够增强非国有公司稳健性,但不影响国有公司的稳健性。
.通过本研究可以看到,会计制度改革虽然对盈余稳健性产生了积极影响,但是受制于上市公司的内在利益激励,制度约束的效力并未充分发挥。对中国上市公司而言,会计制度作为政府强制施加的外在约束,只是形成和增强盈余稳健性的必要条件,制度的实施效果还有赖于上市公司的内在需求。因此,政府在着力完善会计制度的同时,应建立健全与之相配套的其他机制,培育和引导上市公司生成高质量会计信息的内在需求。唯有如此,才能促使上市公司提供高质量的会计信息,不断改善公司治理水平,从而提升整个资本市场的运行效率。
本文的结构安排如下：
第1章,导论。本章介绍三方面内容：研究背景与主题；本文的主要创新；研究思路与论文结构。
第2章,盈余稳健性的一般理论。本章首先讨论盈余稳健性的概念,在介绍稳健性的历史演进基础上,归纳国内外文献中关于稳健性的各种定义,进而对本研究的盈余稳健性作出界定。接着,从盈余稳健性的现实存在、国际比较和变动趋势三方面,综述盈余稳健性的存在证据。然后,回顾了盈余稳健性对公司投资、融资以及会计报表质量等方面产生的影响。最后,从适用对象、适用条件、模型设定等角度总结和评述了国内外文献出现过的主要稳健性测度方法。
第3章,制度背景分析。本章阐述了中国上市公司盈余稳健性所根植的特殊制度背景,包括三方面内容：一是会计制度改革,本文在回顾改革历程基础上,从政府主导、资本市场推动和稳健性贯穿等三方面进行了评述；二是国有企业股份制改革,本文在回顾改革历程基础上,着重阐述了股权分置及其影响；三是股权融资偏好和管制,本文从我国资本市场结构、上市公司融资方式、政府管制等方面进行探讨。
第4章,盈余稳健性的形成：理论分析与研究假说。首先,介绍西方学界关于盈余稳健性形成的经典解释；其次,逐一分析西方解释在中国市场的适用性；再者,利用利益相关者理论分析中国上市公司盈余稳健性的形成。其中,首先介绍利益相关者理论；然后,界定盈余稳健性利益相关者并分析中国上市公司各主要利益相关者的主要特点、利益动机、博弈力量；接着,分别讨论会计制度约束和上市公司内在激励与盈余稳健性的相互关系；最后,由此提出盈余稳健性的广义契约解释以及有待实证检验的研究假说。
第5章,研究设计。本章阐述实证检验制度约束和内在激励对盈余稳健性影响的研究设计,分为两部分：一是介绍本研究的模型设计。鉴于现有研究模型的缺陷,本文借鉴现有文献中最新的稳健性测度模型,通过理论推导和模型设定修改,构建了基于当期流动性应计与未来经营性现金流关系的计量模型。二是介绍实证检验的样本选择、数据来源和变量设定。
第6章,实证结果与分析。本章列示和分析了实证检验的结果,包括：现金流变化与应计关系的检验、现金流变化与异常应计关系的检验、现金流变化与正负异常应计关系的检验、会计制度约束对盈余稳健性影响的检验、内在激励对盈余稳健性影响的检验。
第7章,结论、启示与研究局限。本章首先归纳了主要研究结论,然后阐述研究中获得的一些政策启示,最后说明本研究的局限性,提出对后续研究的展望。
与已有研究相比,本文试图在以下方面形成特色、实现创新。
第一,系统性地研究了中国上市公司盈余稳健性的形成机理,丰富了盈余稳健性理论。目前国内研究大多直接检验西方经典解释,缺乏对中国上市公司盈余稳健性形成机理的系统性剖析。本文综合运用契约理论和利益相关者理论,充分结合中国特殊的制度背景,逐一分析了影响盈余稳健性的利益相关者的主要特点、利益动机和博弈力量,从而提炼出盈余稳健性形成的广义契约解释,并在此框架内分析了盈余稳健性的形成机理,拓展了不完善市场条件下有关盈余稳健性影响因素的理论。
第二,从“当期流动性应计与未来经营性现金流变化的相互关系”这一崭新视角来测度中国上市公司的盈余稳健性,拓展了盈余稳健性测度方法。鉴于现有研究普遍使用的Basu (1997)模型存在较大局限性,本文直接聚焦于企业营运周期这一微观过程,构建了基于当期流动性应计和未来经营性现金流关系的稳健性测度计量模型,有利于更加本源和全面地反映盈余稳健性的形成机理和表现程度。
第三,全面检验了会计制度约束和公司内在激励对盈余稳健性的综合影响,得到新的发现与启示。基于制度背景分析和相关理论分析,本文运用最新测度模型全面检验了会计制度约束和内在激励对盈余稳健性的综合影响,得到一些与现有相关研究不尽一致的新发现。这有助于理解转型国家和新兴市场中的政府和企业行为,也有助于政府对其政策效果进行评价。
当然,由于研究主题和资料的限制以及本人知识、经验和能力的局限,本文存在以下不足：一是囿于稳健性测度方法,本研究将会计制度考察期间设定为1999—2006年,未检验新会计准则对盈余稳健性的影响,考察时间和样本不够充分。二是上市公司的内在激励难以观测,本文仅使用终极控制人性质、内部人控制程度等代理变量刻画内在激励,未对其他可能更为重要的因素进行讨论。三是由于定量测度上的困难,本研究未将证券监管部门的市场监管纳入模型之中进行考察。这些研究局限也成为本文未来的改进方向。
Conservatism, which has been regarded as "the most ancient and the most influential accounting principle (Sterling,1967)", plays a fundamental role in the accounting recognition and measurement. According to the present literatures, we are able to make a summation for it:on the aspect of special phenomena resulted from conservatism:①about the magnitude of account recorded, it demands the methods that least likely to overestimate net income or net assets when facing uncertainty;②at the aspect of timeliness, it demands a more timely recognition of losses than gains—the essence of earnings conservatism:the asymmetric recognition of losses vs gains (Basu,1997).
Conservatism has a profound influence to the enterprise and the market. Based on the numerous researches, earnings conservatism can not only improve the quality of accounting information, but also suppress opportunism behavior of the managers. Thus, earnings conservatism is an proxy of high-quality financial reporting, and also an effective corporate governance mechanism. Therefore, earnings conservatism has been received growing attention throughout global accounting academic and practical circles, and has been applied in accounting standards extensively.
How can the earnings conservatism be made? Western academic circles have the explanations from contracting、litigation、taxation and regulation. However, given the effects from special shares structures, poor corporate governance, strong influence of government on the local banks, poor regulation and ineffective legal system etc, those four explanations have significantly different weight on earnings conservatism in China from that in developed countries.
Based on the Stakeholder Theory, earnings conservatism can be regard as a generalized contract, which can alleviate the conflicts of stakeholders and reduce firms' economic cost. Speaking of Chinese listed firms, various stakeholders have disparate preferences to the earnings conservatism. And, the government supervisors and the insiders of listed firms are the main body of earnings conservatism forming, because of the stronger gambling strength. For one thing, the government supervisors prefer the conservatism and realize it by establishing the accounting regulations. For another, the insiders of listed firms have the incentives to weaken the conservatism, which may shrink their economic and political benefit. Therefore, the existence and the change of earnings conservatism of Chinese listed firms are decided by the gambling of government supervisors and insiders, namely the synthesis influence of accounting regulation restraint and firms'incentives.
In order to overcome the limitations of Basu (1997) model which is used extensively in the existing research, this dissertation construct a new model to measure the earnings conservatism, from the perspective of DKW(1998) model(Operation Cycle Effects Model) and based on the relationship of operating accruals and operating cash flows. Also, this dissertation uses the observations from Chinese listed firms (year1999-year2006, A share market, excluding the ones from the finance industry) to empirically test the synthesis influence of accounting regulation restraint and firms'incentives.
After testing, the research indicates that:①No trace of conditional conservatism in Chinese listed firm in year1999-year2006.②As the effects of accounting reform, the firms have made significant progress in the sense of earnings conservatism. The effects from the reforms of accounting standards are asymmetric—it has significantly improved the timeliness of losses recognition, meanwhile its effects on the deferral of gains recognition are not significant, nearly 0.③The state ownership and control has weakened the earnings conservatism to a certain extent.④The insider control problem have weakened the earnings conservatism significantly, and the state-owned firms have been more serious.⑤The debt has no significant influence to the earnings conservatism.
The research also shows that although the reforms of Chinese accounting regulations has put more and more weight on the principle of conservatism, the actual effects are not satisfactory, because the effects are restrained by the benefit drive of listed firms. Speaking of Chinese listed firms, the accounting regulation, which is a compulsory external restraint made by government, is no more than a necessary condition for the improvement of earnings conservatism; its final effects also depend on the incentives of listed firms.
The government should not only improve the quality of accounting regulation, but also improve the quality of the legal and the regulation systems related, such as it also demands to further strengthen the legal liabilities of the external auditors, improve the regulation system for the disclosure mechanism of accounting information and the disclosure mechanism itself, introduce more effective regulation system and more severe punishment for the firms and their management manipulating earnings.
This paper attempts to realize the innovation in the following aspects:
First, this paper has systematically studied the formation mechanism of conservatism of Chinese listed firms, and enriched the theory of conservatism. At present, most domestic researches focus on the empirical testing of the western explanation, lacking in analyzing the formation mechanism of conservatism. Based on the Contact Theory, Stakeholder Theory and Chinese special system, this paper has analyzed the stakeholders who affect conservatism, improved the generalized contracting explanation, and analyzed the formation mechanism of conservatism of Chinese listed firms.
Second, this paper has measured the conservatism from a new perspective, developing the measurement of conservatism. Considering the fact that there are serious limitations of Basu (1997) model, the paper has constructed a new econometric model for measuring conservatism, which is based on the relationship of operating accruals and operating cash flows.
Third, this paper has empirically tested the synthesis influence of accounting regulation restraint and firms'incentives on conservatism. Based on the theoretical analysis and the new econometric model, the paper has some discoveries, which are inconsistent with the existing related researches.
This paper is arranged in seven chapters. The content of each chapter is as following:
Chapter 1:Introduction. This chapter introduces the research context, research topics, paper's structure and innovation.
Chapter 2:General Theory of Conservatism. Firstly, this chapter discusses the concept of conservatism. Secondly, reviewing the existence proof of conservatism, from cross-section existence, international comparison and developing trends. Thirdly, reviewing the influence of conservatism on investment, financing and the quality of financial report. Finally, summarizing the conservatism measurements, which was quoted in the relevant literature.
Chapter 3:Analysis of Chinese Special System Background. First, introducing China's accounting system reform, and commenting on it from the perspectives of governance, capital market and conservatism. Second, introducing and commenting on the states enterprises reform, especially on split-share problem. Third, discussing the equity financing preference of listed firms and securities regulation.
Chapter 4:Formation of Conservatism:Theoretical Analysis and Research Hypothesis. First, introducing the four explanations of western academic circle. Second, analyzing the suitability of the western explanation in China. Third, analyzing the formation mechanism of conservatism.of Chinese listed firms, using the Stakeholder Theory. Fourth, improving generalized contracting explanation and the research hypothesis to be empirically tested.
Chapter 5:Design of the Research. First, this chapter elaborates the econometric model used for empirically test, which is based on the relationship of operating accruals and operating cash flows. Second, giving the detailed explanation about the sampling method, data source and variables definition..
Chapter 6:Empirical Test Results and Analysis. This chapter shows and analyze the empirical test results, including:test of the relationship of the cash flow change and accruals, test of the relationship of the cash flow change and abnormal accruals, test of the relationship of the cash flow change and positive/negative abnormal accruals, test of the influence of accounting regulation on conservatism, test of the influence of accounting regulation and firms' incentives on conservatism.
Chapter 7:Conclusion, Policy Enlightenment and Research Limitation. First, this chapter has induced the main conclusion of the paper. Then, elaborating some policy enlightenment from the research. Finally, some limitation in this paper and future research issues are discussed.
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