基于契约观的预算松弛治理研究
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摘要
预算管理一直是企业内部管理控制的主要模式,其在我国的实践已历经30年,在各类企业的内部管理控制中发挥着积极的作用。然而,预算松弛问题,即预算目标确定过程中预算下级有意低估收入与生产能力或高估成本与所需资源,一直是企业预算管理中至今尚未破解的重要难题。其经济后果是预算管理的计划与控制职能无法有效协调,评价与激励机制失去客观标准,企业资源配置无法实现优化。在我国企业的预算管理实践中,预算松弛问题同样非常突出,究其原因在于,预算松弛的治理涉及到企业组织内部的利益冲突、激励机制设计以及管理控制系统等一系列问题。
实践中亟待破解的难题,更需要理论的先行与指导。通过对既有文献的梳理能够发现,对预算松弛相关问题的理论研究和实践应用在国外已有较长的发展历史,而且形成了较为丰富的理论研究成果与实践典范。我国对预算松弛相关问题的研究虽然起步较晚,但近几年已经成为理论界和实务界所关注的重点问题。然而,目前国内外对预算松弛相关问题的研究仍处于相对零散的状态,注重预算松弛的表现形式而忽视对预算松弛本质的研究,从而导致预算松弛的成因分析不清,在预算松弛的本质、成因与治理途径之间更缺乏一个内在一致的理论分析框架,因此预算松弛的治理效果不尽理想。
基于此,本文的研究正是从探究问题本质入手,透过本质发现问题的真正原因,找到“病因”对症下药,治理措施才能有的放矢。那么预算松弛的本质到底是什么?预算松弛究其根源是企业中人的行为,因此探讨预算松弛的本质,不能脱离企业本质而存在。从现代企业的本质看,企业是一系列契约的集合。在整个契约的集合中,包括股东、债权人、雇员、管理者等都会与企业形成各种契约关系。一方面这些参与者会向企业投入资源,如资本、技术、劳动等；另一方面又期望能够从企业中获得对自己资源投入的补偿。然而在这个契约集合中,利益目标的冲突或不一致是一个根本的事实,因此契约主体会采取逆向选择和道德风险的行为。
从这个角度看,企业预算管理也是一种契约关系,从而形成预算契约。预算契约的缔结方是企业中的预算上级和下级,双方就企业资源的投入、产出、成本、效率、报酬等内容达成契约。其中计划契约与控制契约又是预算契约联结的主要结构及运行基础。那么预算契约的缔结双方是否也同样存在利益目标的冲突或不一致呢?答案是肯定的。在预算契约的签订过程中,由于预算上级与预算下级之间信息不对称且利益目标不一致,从而使计划契约与控制契约二者之间产生内在冲突,此时预算下级便具有利用信息优势产生机会主义行为的激励。
因此,本文认为预算松弛的内涵为预算契约的缔结过程中,预算下级有意地低估收入与生产能力或是高估成本与所需的资源,‘从而导致计划契约的信息缺乏准确性,控制契约的信息缺乏客观性,计划契约和控制契约功能失效。预算松弛本质是预算契约缔结过程中,具有信息优势的预算下级隐藏信息的道德风险行为。预算松弛产生的根本原因在于预算上级与预算下级之间信息不对称且利益目标的不一致,从而使计划契约与控制契约二者之间产生内在的冲突。
是此,本文的研究视角应运而生,即以契约观为研究视角,研究之所需理论基础也由此而确立,即以契约理论为理论基础。但契约理论如此庞大与精深如何使之成为本文研究所需之利器,更是一道难题。通过对预算松弛本质的分析能够发现,预算松弛产生的根本原因在于契约双方利益目标的冲突或不一致。而既有的研究已经表明,激励机制是协调契约双方利益目标冲突的有效机制,这一点又与契约理论的精髓相一致。因此,本文最终以契约理论发展的两个主要阶段,完全契约理论和不完全契约理论为演进脉络,以显性和隐性激励机制为理论内核,形成本文研究所需之理论基础。
然而,如何根据契约理论对基于契约观的预算松弛治理进行理论分析,建立基于契约观的预算松弛治理分析框架,不仅是本文理论研究的核心,也构成本文研究的基础理论。首先,通过对预算契约的内涵与功能分析,明确了预算松弛的内涵与本质。在此基础上,对基于契约观的预算松弛治理内涵进行了界定,即在企业内部预算契约的结构安排和功能的基础上,以预算松弛的内涵、本质、成因、经济后果和治理途径为预算松弛的治理思路,以实现有效约束预算下级的预算松弛行为和激励效果的平衡为治理目标,并以报酬契约设计和声誉机制为治理途径,从而保证预算松弛治理目标的实现。其次,对基于契约观的预算松弛成因和经济后果进行了分析。预算松弛产生的根本原因在于预算上级与预算下级之间信息不对称且利益目标的不一致,从而使计划契约与控制契约二者之间产生内在的冲突。其经济后果是预算管理的计划与控制职能无法有效协调,评价与激励机制失去客观标准,企业资源配置无法实现优化。最后,基于契约观的预算松弛治理途径主要由三个层面构成：基于风险偏好的报酬契约与预算松弛治理、基于相对信息的报酬契约与预算松弛治理、声誉机制与预算松弛治理。
至此,基于契约观的预算松弛治理理论分析框架已经初步建立。然而,理论分析框架构建后更需要进一步的实证研究,从而进一步完善本文所构建的理论分析框架。如何选择合适的实证研究方法就成为首要的考虑,根据本文研究主题之需要,本文最终选择了实验研究的方法。其原因在于,其一,实验研究方法是国外对预算松弛问题的主流研究方法；其二,从研究对象看,实验研究方法能够较好地控制情景因素,特别是对风险偏好、信息不对称及报酬契约具体形式等情景因素能够实施较好的控制,从而有针对性地检验相关研究假设。
因此,论文的余下部分则主要通过模型构建和理论分析提出研究假设,然后采用实验研究的方法对三种不同的预算松弛治理途径进行实验研究。首先,对基于风险偏好的报酬契约与预算松弛治理途径进行实验研究。其次,对基于相对信息的报酬契约与预算松弛治理途径进行实验研究。最后,对声誉机制与预算松弛治理途径进行实验研究。
通过理论分析与实证检验,本文的主要研究结论如下：
第一,预算下级的风险偏好因素与预算松弛程度显著相关,但这种相关性会随着报酬契约所具有的风险分摊与激励平衡关系而变化。在真实诱导型报酬契约下,预算下级的风险厌恶程度与预算松弛程度正相关。在松弛诱导型报酬契约下,预算下级的风险厌恶程度与预算松弛负相关。即使采用真实诱导型报酬契约仍然无法有效约束风险厌恶型预算下级的预算松弛行为。
第二,在真实诱导型报酬契约中引入相对业绩信息后不仅能够有效地约束风险厌恶型预算下级的预算松弛行为,而且具有较好的激励效果。风险厌恶型预算下级预算松弛的下降程度与相对业绩所产生的保险程度正相关,而激励效果则取决于风险厌恶型预算下级规避共有风险所支付的保险成本是否大于其最大化实际业绩水平所带来的净收益,二者之间负相关。
第三,声誉机制能够有效地约束预算下级的预算松弛行为。首先,如果预算上级基于预算下级预算目标可信的声誉进行参与式预算承诺或相机奖励,此时声誉机制能够显著降低预算下级的预算松弛程度。其次,在参与式预算过程中,参与式预算承诺能够发挥报酬契约设计和紧的预算控制在约束预算松弛行为时的替代作用,而且具有较低的激励成本。
本文的研究能够得以完成不仅继承了前人的研究成果,但更重要之处在于通过研究的创新,丰富与完善了既有理论,而且能够针对具体之实践进行改进,从而更具有应用性。一言以蔽之,本文的主要创新之处如下：
第一,基于契约理论的研究视角,以构成预算契约联结的结构及运行基础——计划契约与控制契约属性的内在冲突——为切入点,对预算契约的内涵与功能、预算松弛的内涵与本质、基于契约观的预算松弛治理内涵进行了界定。不仅为预算松弛相关问题的研究提供了一个共同的参照系,而且构建了基于契约观的预算松弛治理分析框架。
第二,基于真实诱导型报酬契约与松弛诱导型报酬契约,对不同风险偏好与预算松弛程度之间的关系进行了实证检验,其研究结果为如何有效进行报酬契约设计约束预算松弛行为奠定了理论基础。首先,预算下级的风险偏好与预算松弛程度显著相关,但本文的重要发现在于这种相关性会随不同报酬契约的风险分摊与激励特征而发生变化。其次,对既有真实诱导型报酬契约无法有效约束风险厌恶型预算下级预算松弛行为进行了实证检验,从而对真实诱导型报酬契约在实践中约束预算松弛行为失效提供了理论解释。
第三,通过引入相对业绩信息对原有真实诱导型报酬契约进行了改进,构建了一种新型真实诱导型激励制度——相对业绩信息模型,不仅有效地破解了既有真实诱导型报酬契约无法有效约束风险厌恶型预算下级预算松弛行为的难题,而且保持了报酬契约的良好激励效果。该报酬契约的设计不仅在理论上具有创新性,而且在实践中具有很强的应用性。
第四,从参与式预算承诺的视角对声誉约束预算松弛行为的机制进行理论分析和实证检验,完善了声誉约束预算松弛行为的作用机制。首先,通过构建基于相对业绩信息的预算可信度声誉衡量指标解决了既有研究中预算下级预算松弛声誉无法有效衡量的问题。其次,基于参与式预算承诺的声誉机制可以发挥报酬契约设计和紧的预算控制对预算松弛行为约束的替代作用,而且具有较低的激励成本。
本文以契约观为研究视角,运用契约理论研究预算松弛问题,遵循预算松弛的内涵、本质、成因、后果及治理途径的研究脉络,不仅构建了基于契约观的预算松弛治理理论研究框架,而且对预算松弛的治理途径进行了详尽的理论分析和实证检验。不仅体现学术理论研究的先进性和超前性,同时又为企业实践中有效地破解预算松弛难题提供可具操作性的指导。
然而,本文的研究仍然属于尝试性的,加之研究水平的局限,势必存在研究的不足,而这些可能又是本文未来深入研究的内在动力,因此本文的待研问题如下：本文主要是基于契约理论中关于利益冲突、激励问题以及机制设计等相关理论研究预算松弛问题,然而对预算松弛问题的研究可能不仅会受到企业组织结构、战略决策、治理结构、企业文化等因素的影响,同时还可能受到预算下级心理和行为等因素的影响。因此,如何借鉴社会学和心理学等相关理论对预算松弛问题进行研究,并能够与契约理论视角有效地整合,不仅能够发现新的研究问题,而且能够提出更全面与有效的理论阐释。
Budget as one of major instrument of management control had played a very important role in the practice of internal management control since 1980s of the 20th century in China. However, budgetary slack, a behavior of underestimating revenues and outputs or overestimating costs and resources by subordination, is still a problem which has not been effectively resolved. The economic consquences of budgetary slack is evident, such as an inconsistent between planning and controlling, the lack of standard for incentives designing and the breaking down of optimization of resource allocation. It is very popularization in the practice of budget control for Chinese enterprise. The crucial reason in that it is affected by conflicts of interest, measurement and incentive and management control system of organization. Planning and controlling as the major function of budget would not be harmonized as a result of budgetary slack, in turn, the effect of budget management would be lower.
Theory is a forerunner for practice. By reviewing and summarizing the existing literatures, we can find that the theory research and practice had been for a long time and some fruit had been come into being, In China, some researchers and managers is paying more attention to the problem of budgetary slack. However, the theory of budgetary slack governnance has been scattered for a long time, and lacked a consistent theory framework used to research into its nature, causes and government. So the effectiveness of budgetary slack government is low.
So the dissertation should see the essence beneath budgetary slack firstly. Second, the reason that why it would happen should be found. Finally, the dissertation could provide some ways to govern it. Budgetary slack is the behavior of subordination in firm. So, we can find some answers from the nature of firm. The nature of modern firm is a set of contracts which is composed of manager, shareholders, employees, creditors and customers. The contributions and entitlements of various agents are different. But a common fact is that there is an interest divergence between them. Adverse selection and moral hazard is the familiar behavior of both parties of contracts.
From the perspective of contracts, we could see budgetary management as a set of contracts. In the dissertation we call these contracts is budgetary contracts which is composed of superior and subordination of firm. The content of budgetary contracts is the input, output, cost, efficient and compensation ec at. Planning contracts and controlling contracts are the most structure of budgetary contracts. There is an interest divergence between Superior and subordination too. In the process of contracting, not only the advantage of information possessed by subordination, but also the conflict between planning contracts and controlling contracts, subordination has an incentive to make opportunism behavior..
Therefore, the connotation of budgetary slack is a behavior of underestimating revenues and outputs or overestimateing costs and resources by subordination which result in the information of planning contracts is lack of percise and the information of control contracts is lack of objectivity. As a result, the function of planning and control is to break down. The nature of budgetary slack is a behavior of hidden information of moral hazard by subordination who had private information. The crucial reason in that the conflict of planning contracts and controlling contracts owning to asymmetric information and interest conflict.
As a result, the research perspective is the concept of contracts and the foundation of theory is contract theory. But how to apply contract theory that is comprehensive to research the problem of budgetary slack also is a difficult task. As we known, incentive mechanism which is designed to harmonize the conflict of interest between agent and principle is consistent with the core idea of contract theory. So, according to the thread of contract theory which is composed of complete contract and incomplete contract, we see explicit incentive mechanism and implicit incentive mechanism as a core of theory that make up of the foundation of theory of this dissertation.
Building up a budgetary slack governance framwork follow by applying contract theory to resolve the problem of budgetary slack is not only the core of this dissertation but also a basic theory for further research. Fistly, the connotation of budgetary slack governance is made as follows:the content of budgetary slack governance was composed of connotation, nature, reasons, consequences and governance of budgetary slack governance; the aim of budgetary slack governance is to make a balance between restraint of budgetary slack and incentive; the ways of budgetary slack governance was composed of compensation contract based on risk preference, compensation contract based on relative informatin and reputation. Secondly, based on budgetary contratcs, the dissertation made a analysis for form and nature of budgetary slack. Thirdly, the dissertation made a analysis for reasons and consequences for budgetary slack. Lastly, the ways of budgetary slack governance was made.
Heretofore, the research system about budgetary slack governance from a perspective of contracts was build up. The next task for this dissertation is to make an experiment study to test theory. The reason that why the method of experimental study was used as follow. First, experiment study is the most popular and effective method for budgetary slack for researcher; Second, the variable and environment such as risk preference and information asymmetry could be controlled effectively by experiment study and the outcome is credible. Third, owning to the archives data was not acquired, experiment study could remedy the limitation.
The remainder of the dissertation is to make an experimental study for the ways of budgetary slack governance followeds by an restruction of model and hypothesis. First, the effects of risk preference and compensation contract on budgetary slack was test by experimental study; Second, we use experiment study to test how the effect of ratchet effect and relative performance on budget slack; Third, the effect of budget control tightness and reputation on budget slack. We can draw some inclusions as follows:
First, the relationship between risk preference and budgetary slack will vary with differential compensation contract. Under the truth-induce compensation contract, the relationship will be positive correlation. Under the slack-induce compensation contract, it will be negative correlation. When subordination is risk averse, truth-induce compensation would be ineffective for restrain the behavior of budgetary slack.
Second, by incorporating relative performance information into truth-induce compensation contract, we can reduce budgetary slack of risk-averse subordination, meanwhile, the relationship between budgetary slack and insurance provided by the relative performance information is positive; furthermore, the effect on incentive depended on whether the cost of insurance exceed the net income of maximized-performance, the relationship between them is negative.
Third, if superior made a commitment of a participative budgeting or discretionary compensation to subordinates based on a reputation of budget reliable, it could low budget slack significantly in participative budgeting. Furthermore, making a commitment to participative budget may be cost effective substitutes for more expensive incentive contracting and a tight control in order to low budget slack. Further, making an accurate measurement of reputation and taking advantage of participative budgeting could enhance the effect of commitment to participative budgeting on budget slack.
The foundation of Research and conclusion made by prior researcher play an important role in the dissertation. However, in order to enrich and improver past research and make contribution to practice, the important task for the dissertation is to innovate. So the innovation of the dissertation as follows:
First, from a perspective of contracts, the connotation of budgetary contracts and functions, the connotation and nature of budgetary slack, the connotation of budgetary slack governance is made followed by analysis the conflict of planning contracts and controlling contracts which is composed of structure and function of budgetary contracts. So, the frame of reference for budgetary slack research is provided and governance framwork from a perspective of contracts was made.
Second, the dissertation lays the foundation for designing compensation contracts by test the effect of risk preference on budgetary slack. The results show that the relationship between risk preference and budgetary slack will vary with differential compensation contract. Furthermore, When subordination is risk averse, truth-induce compensation would be ineffective for restrain the behavior of budgetary slack.
Third, we build up an new truth-induce compensation by incorporating relative performance information into truth-induce compensation. It not only restrains the behavior of budgetary slack but also keeps incentive effectively when subordination is risk averse.
Fourth, from a perspective of commitment of a participative budgeting made by superior, we enrich the mechanism of how reputation would be used to restrain the behavior of budgetary slack. In the dissertation, we build up a new measurement of reputation of budgetary credible by relative performance information. The results show that making a commitment to participative budget may be cost effective substitutes for more expensive incentive contracting and a tight control in order to low budget slack.
According to the nature of firm is a set of contracts, we made the research for budgetary slack based on contracts theory. The research road is the nature of budgetary slack followed by reasons, effect and governance. The research is not only a representation of forerunner but also a direction for practice.
However, owning to the limitation of ability, the research for budgetary slack from an perspective of contracts is a try. So there are some limitations in the dissertation. For example, budgetary slack may not only a problem with incentive and conflict of interest. Other variables such as organization structure, strategic decisions, corporation governance and culture may produce some effect on budgetary slack. Meanwhile, budgetary slack may be an outcome of psychology and behavior. As a result, the future research would be how to integrate contracts theory with theory of psychology and sociology to find new sights and create more complete and valid explanations of the causes and effects of budgeting practices.
实践中亟待破解的难题,更需要理论的先行与指导。通过对既有文献的梳理能够发现,对预算松弛相关问题的理论研究和实践应用在国外已有较长的发展历史,而且形成了较为丰富的理论研究成果与实践典范。我国对预算松弛相关问题的研究虽然起步较晚,但近几年已经成为理论界和实务界所关注的重点问题。然而,目前国内外对预算松弛相关问题的研究仍处于相对零散的状态,注重预算松弛的表现形式而忽视对预算松弛本质的研究,从而导致预算松弛的成因分析不清,在预算松弛的本质、成因与治理途径之间更缺乏一个内在一致的理论分析框架,因此预算松弛的治理效果不尽理想。
基于此,本文的研究正是从探究问题本质入手,透过本质发现问题的真正原因,找到“病因”对症下药,治理措施才能有的放矢。那么预算松弛的本质到底是什么?预算松弛究其根源是企业中人的行为,因此探讨预算松弛的本质,不能脱离企业本质而存在。从现代企业的本质看,企业是一系列契约的集合。在整个契约的集合中,包括股东、债权人、雇员、管理者等都会与企业形成各种契约关系。一方面这些参与者会向企业投入资源,如资本、技术、劳动等；另一方面又期望能够从企业中获得对自己资源投入的补偿。然而在这个契约集合中,利益目标的冲突或不一致是一个根本的事实,因此契约主体会采取逆向选择和道德风险的行为。
从这个角度看,企业预算管理也是一种契约关系,从而形成预算契约。预算契约的缔结方是企业中的预算上级和下级,双方就企业资源的投入、产出、成本、效率、报酬等内容达成契约。其中计划契约与控制契约又是预算契约联结的主要结构及运行基础。那么预算契约的缔结双方是否也同样存在利益目标的冲突或不一致呢?答案是肯定的。在预算契约的签订过程中,由于预算上级与预算下级之间信息不对称且利益目标不一致,从而使计划契约与控制契约二者之间产生内在冲突,此时预算下级便具有利用信息优势产生机会主义行为的激励。
因此,本文认为预算松弛的内涵为预算契约的缔结过程中,预算下级有意地低估收入与生产能力或是高估成本与所需的资源,‘从而导致计划契约的信息缺乏准确性,控制契约的信息缺乏客观性,计划契约和控制契约功能失效。预算松弛本质是预算契约缔结过程中,具有信息优势的预算下级隐藏信息的道德风险行为。预算松弛产生的根本原因在于预算上级与预算下级之间信息不对称且利益目标的不一致,从而使计划契约与控制契约二者之间产生内在的冲突。
是此,本文的研究视角应运而生,即以契约观为研究视角,研究之所需理论基础也由此而确立,即以契约理论为理论基础。但契约理论如此庞大与精深如何使之成为本文研究所需之利器,更是一道难题。通过对预算松弛本质的分析能够发现,预算松弛产生的根本原因在于契约双方利益目标的冲突或不一致。而既有的研究已经表明,激励机制是协调契约双方利益目标冲突的有效机制,这一点又与契约理论的精髓相一致。因此,本文最终以契约理论发展的两个主要阶段,完全契约理论和不完全契约理论为演进脉络,以显性和隐性激励机制为理论内核,形成本文研究所需之理论基础。
然而,如何根据契约理论对基于契约观的预算松弛治理进行理论分析,建立基于契约观的预算松弛治理分析框架,不仅是本文理论研究的核心,也构成本文研究的基础理论。首先,通过对预算契约的内涵与功能分析,明确了预算松弛的内涵与本质。在此基础上,对基于契约观的预算松弛治理内涵进行了界定,即在企业内部预算契约的结构安排和功能的基础上,以预算松弛的内涵、本质、成因、经济后果和治理途径为预算松弛的治理思路,以实现有效约束预算下级的预算松弛行为和激励效果的平衡为治理目标,并以报酬契约设计和声誉机制为治理途径,从而保证预算松弛治理目标的实现。其次,对基于契约观的预算松弛成因和经济后果进行了分析。预算松弛产生的根本原因在于预算上级与预算下级之间信息不对称且利益目标的不一致,从而使计划契约与控制契约二者之间产生内在的冲突。其经济后果是预算管理的计划与控制职能无法有效协调,评价与激励机制失去客观标准,企业资源配置无法实现优化。最后,基于契约观的预算松弛治理途径主要由三个层面构成：基于风险偏好的报酬契约与预算松弛治理、基于相对信息的报酬契约与预算松弛治理、声誉机制与预算松弛治理。
至此,基于契约观的预算松弛治理理论分析框架已经初步建立。然而,理论分析框架构建后更需要进一步的实证研究,从而进一步完善本文所构建的理论分析框架。如何选择合适的实证研究方法就成为首要的考虑,根据本文研究主题之需要,本文最终选择了实验研究的方法。其原因在于,其一,实验研究方法是国外对预算松弛问题的主流研究方法；其二,从研究对象看,实验研究方法能够较好地控制情景因素,特别是对风险偏好、信息不对称及报酬契约具体形式等情景因素能够实施较好的控制,从而有针对性地检验相关研究假设。
因此,论文的余下部分则主要通过模型构建和理论分析提出研究假设,然后采用实验研究的方法对三种不同的预算松弛治理途径进行实验研究。首先,对基于风险偏好的报酬契约与预算松弛治理途径进行实验研究。其次,对基于相对信息的报酬契约与预算松弛治理途径进行实验研究。最后,对声誉机制与预算松弛治理途径进行实验研究。
通过理论分析与实证检验,本文的主要研究结论如下：
第一,预算下级的风险偏好因素与预算松弛程度显著相关,但这种相关性会随着报酬契约所具有的风险分摊与激励平衡关系而变化。在真实诱导型报酬契约下,预算下级的风险厌恶程度与预算松弛程度正相关。在松弛诱导型报酬契约下,预算下级的风险厌恶程度与预算松弛负相关。即使采用真实诱导型报酬契约仍然无法有效约束风险厌恶型预算下级的预算松弛行为。
第二,在真实诱导型报酬契约中引入相对业绩信息后不仅能够有效地约束风险厌恶型预算下级的预算松弛行为,而且具有较好的激励效果。风险厌恶型预算下级预算松弛的下降程度与相对业绩所产生的保险程度正相关,而激励效果则取决于风险厌恶型预算下级规避共有风险所支付的保险成本是否大于其最大化实际业绩水平所带来的净收益,二者之间负相关。
第三,声誉机制能够有效地约束预算下级的预算松弛行为。首先,如果预算上级基于预算下级预算目标可信的声誉进行参与式预算承诺或相机奖励,此时声誉机制能够显著降低预算下级的预算松弛程度。其次,在参与式预算过程中,参与式预算承诺能够发挥报酬契约设计和紧的预算控制在约束预算松弛行为时的替代作用,而且具有较低的激励成本。
本文的研究能够得以完成不仅继承了前人的研究成果,但更重要之处在于通过研究的创新,丰富与完善了既有理论,而且能够针对具体之实践进行改进,从而更具有应用性。一言以蔽之,本文的主要创新之处如下：
第一,基于契约理论的研究视角,以构成预算契约联结的结构及运行基础——计划契约与控制契约属性的内在冲突——为切入点,对预算契约的内涵与功能、预算松弛的内涵与本质、基于契约观的预算松弛治理内涵进行了界定。不仅为预算松弛相关问题的研究提供了一个共同的参照系,而且构建了基于契约观的预算松弛治理分析框架。
第二,基于真实诱导型报酬契约与松弛诱导型报酬契约,对不同风险偏好与预算松弛程度之间的关系进行了实证检验,其研究结果为如何有效进行报酬契约设计约束预算松弛行为奠定了理论基础。首先,预算下级的风险偏好与预算松弛程度显著相关,但本文的重要发现在于这种相关性会随不同报酬契约的风险分摊与激励特征而发生变化。其次,对既有真实诱导型报酬契约无法有效约束风险厌恶型预算下级预算松弛行为进行了实证检验,从而对真实诱导型报酬契约在实践中约束预算松弛行为失效提供了理论解释。
第三,通过引入相对业绩信息对原有真实诱导型报酬契约进行了改进,构建了一种新型真实诱导型激励制度——相对业绩信息模型,不仅有效地破解了既有真实诱导型报酬契约无法有效约束风险厌恶型预算下级预算松弛行为的难题,而且保持了报酬契约的良好激励效果。该报酬契约的设计不仅在理论上具有创新性,而且在实践中具有很强的应用性。
第四,从参与式预算承诺的视角对声誉约束预算松弛行为的机制进行理论分析和实证检验,完善了声誉约束预算松弛行为的作用机制。首先,通过构建基于相对业绩信息的预算可信度声誉衡量指标解决了既有研究中预算下级预算松弛声誉无法有效衡量的问题。其次,基于参与式预算承诺的声誉机制可以发挥报酬契约设计和紧的预算控制对预算松弛行为约束的替代作用,而且具有较低的激励成本。
本文以契约观为研究视角,运用契约理论研究预算松弛问题,遵循预算松弛的内涵、本质、成因、后果及治理途径的研究脉络,不仅构建了基于契约观的预算松弛治理理论研究框架,而且对预算松弛的治理途径进行了详尽的理论分析和实证检验。不仅体现学术理论研究的先进性和超前性,同时又为企业实践中有效地破解预算松弛难题提供可具操作性的指导。
然而,本文的研究仍然属于尝试性的,加之研究水平的局限,势必存在研究的不足,而这些可能又是本文未来深入研究的内在动力,因此本文的待研问题如下：本文主要是基于契约理论中关于利益冲突、激励问题以及机制设计等相关理论研究预算松弛问题,然而对预算松弛问题的研究可能不仅会受到企业组织结构、战略决策、治理结构、企业文化等因素的影响,同时还可能受到预算下级心理和行为等因素的影响。因此,如何借鉴社会学和心理学等相关理论对预算松弛问题进行研究,并能够与契约理论视角有效地整合,不仅能够发现新的研究问题,而且能够提出更全面与有效的理论阐释。
Budget as one of major instrument of management control had played a very important role in the practice of internal management control since 1980s of the 20th century in China. However, budgetary slack, a behavior of underestimating revenues and outputs or overestimating costs and resources by subordination, is still a problem which has not been effectively resolved. The economic consquences of budgetary slack is evident, such as an inconsistent between planning and controlling, the lack of standard for incentives designing and the breaking down of optimization of resource allocation. It is very popularization in the practice of budget control for Chinese enterprise. The crucial reason in that it is affected by conflicts of interest, measurement and incentive and management control system of organization. Planning and controlling as the major function of budget would not be harmonized as a result of budgetary slack, in turn, the effect of budget management would be lower.
Theory is a forerunner for practice. By reviewing and summarizing the existing literatures, we can find that the theory research and practice had been for a long time and some fruit had been come into being, In China, some researchers and managers is paying more attention to the problem of budgetary slack. However, the theory of budgetary slack governnance has been scattered for a long time, and lacked a consistent theory framework used to research into its nature, causes and government. So the effectiveness of budgetary slack government is low.
So the dissertation should see the essence beneath budgetary slack firstly. Second, the reason that why it would happen should be found. Finally, the dissertation could provide some ways to govern it. Budgetary slack is the behavior of subordination in firm. So, we can find some answers from the nature of firm. The nature of modern firm is a set of contracts which is composed of manager, shareholders, employees, creditors and customers. The contributions and entitlements of various agents are different. But a common fact is that there is an interest divergence between them. Adverse selection and moral hazard is the familiar behavior of both parties of contracts.
From the perspective of contracts, we could see budgetary management as a set of contracts. In the dissertation we call these contracts is budgetary contracts which is composed of superior and subordination of firm. The content of budgetary contracts is the input, output, cost, efficient and compensation ec at. Planning contracts and controlling contracts are the most structure of budgetary contracts. There is an interest divergence between Superior and subordination too. In the process of contracting, not only the advantage of information possessed by subordination, but also the conflict between planning contracts and controlling contracts, subordination has an incentive to make opportunism behavior..
Therefore, the connotation of budgetary slack is a behavior of underestimating revenues and outputs or overestimateing costs and resources by subordination which result in the information of planning contracts is lack of percise and the information of control contracts is lack of objectivity. As a result, the function of planning and control is to break down. The nature of budgetary slack is a behavior of hidden information of moral hazard by subordination who had private information. The crucial reason in that the conflict of planning contracts and controlling contracts owning to asymmetric information and interest conflict.
As a result, the research perspective is the concept of contracts and the foundation of theory is contract theory. But how to apply contract theory that is comprehensive to research the problem of budgetary slack also is a difficult task. As we known, incentive mechanism which is designed to harmonize the conflict of interest between agent and principle is consistent with the core idea of contract theory. So, according to the thread of contract theory which is composed of complete contract and incomplete contract, we see explicit incentive mechanism and implicit incentive mechanism as a core of theory that make up of the foundation of theory of this dissertation.
Building up a budgetary slack governance framwork follow by applying contract theory to resolve the problem of budgetary slack is not only the core of this dissertation but also a basic theory for further research. Fistly, the connotation of budgetary slack governance is made as follows:the content of budgetary slack governance was composed of connotation, nature, reasons, consequences and governance of budgetary slack governance; the aim of budgetary slack governance is to make a balance between restraint of budgetary slack and incentive; the ways of budgetary slack governance was composed of compensation contract based on risk preference, compensation contract based on relative informatin and reputation. Secondly, based on budgetary contratcs, the dissertation made a analysis for form and nature of budgetary slack. Thirdly, the dissertation made a analysis for reasons and consequences for budgetary slack. Lastly, the ways of budgetary slack governance was made.
Heretofore, the research system about budgetary slack governance from a perspective of contracts was build up. The next task for this dissertation is to make an experiment study to test theory. The reason that why the method of experimental study was used as follow. First, experiment study is the most popular and effective method for budgetary slack for researcher; Second, the variable and environment such as risk preference and information asymmetry could be controlled effectively by experiment study and the outcome is credible. Third, owning to the archives data was not acquired, experiment study could remedy the limitation.
The remainder of the dissertation is to make an experimental study for the ways of budgetary slack governance followeds by an restruction of model and hypothesis. First, the effects of risk preference and compensation contract on budgetary slack was test by experimental study; Second, we use experiment study to test how the effect of ratchet effect and relative performance on budget slack; Third, the effect of budget control tightness and reputation on budget slack. We can draw some inclusions as follows:
First, the relationship between risk preference and budgetary slack will vary with differential compensation contract. Under the truth-induce compensation contract, the relationship will be positive correlation. Under the slack-induce compensation contract, it will be negative correlation. When subordination is risk averse, truth-induce compensation would be ineffective for restrain the behavior of budgetary slack.
Second, by incorporating relative performance information into truth-induce compensation contract, we can reduce budgetary slack of risk-averse subordination, meanwhile, the relationship between budgetary slack and insurance provided by the relative performance information is positive; furthermore, the effect on incentive depended on whether the cost of insurance exceed the net income of maximized-performance, the relationship between them is negative.
Third, if superior made a commitment of a participative budgeting or discretionary compensation to subordinates based on a reputation of budget reliable, it could low budget slack significantly in participative budgeting. Furthermore, making a commitment to participative budget may be cost effective substitutes for more expensive incentive contracting and a tight control in order to low budget slack. Further, making an accurate measurement of reputation and taking advantage of participative budgeting could enhance the effect of commitment to participative budgeting on budget slack.
The foundation of Research and conclusion made by prior researcher play an important role in the dissertation. However, in order to enrich and improver past research and make contribution to practice, the important task for the dissertation is to innovate. So the innovation of the dissertation as follows:
First, from a perspective of contracts, the connotation of budgetary contracts and functions, the connotation and nature of budgetary slack, the connotation of budgetary slack governance is made followed by analysis the conflict of planning contracts and controlling contracts which is composed of structure and function of budgetary contracts. So, the frame of reference for budgetary slack research is provided and governance framwork from a perspective of contracts was made.
Second, the dissertation lays the foundation for designing compensation contracts by test the effect of risk preference on budgetary slack. The results show that the relationship between risk preference and budgetary slack will vary with differential compensation contract. Furthermore, When subordination is risk averse, truth-induce compensation would be ineffective for restrain the behavior of budgetary slack.
Third, we build up an new truth-induce compensation by incorporating relative performance information into truth-induce compensation. It not only restrains the behavior of budgetary slack but also keeps incentive effectively when subordination is risk averse.
Fourth, from a perspective of commitment of a participative budgeting made by superior, we enrich the mechanism of how reputation would be used to restrain the behavior of budgetary slack. In the dissertation, we build up a new measurement of reputation of budgetary credible by relative performance information. The results show that making a commitment to participative budget may be cost effective substitutes for more expensive incentive contracting and a tight control in order to low budget slack.
According to the nature of firm is a set of contracts, we made the research for budgetary slack based on contracts theory. The research road is the nature of budgetary slack followed by reasons, effect and governance. The research is not only a representation of forerunner but also a direction for practice.
However, owning to the limitation of ability, the research for budgetary slack from an perspective of contracts is a try. So there are some limitations in the dissertation. For example, budgetary slack may not only a problem with incentive and conflict of interest. Other variables such as organization structure, strategic decisions, corporation governance and culture may produce some effect on budgetary slack. Meanwhile, budgetary slack may be an outcome of psychology and behavior. As a result, the future research would be how to integrate contracts theory with theory of psychology and sociology to find new sights and create more complete and valid explanations of the causes and effects of budgeting practices.
引文
①刘建秋.企业契约联结的结构与运行：一个分析框架[J].审计与经济究,2007：(4)：68-72.
①谢德仁.企业剩余索取权：分享安排与剩余计量[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2001.
②贺颖奇.企业契约性质管理会计系统职能及其设计原则[J].会计研究,2004,(6)：53-56.
①关于契约理论的详细分析可进一步参考科斯、哈特、斯蒂格里茨.契约经济学[M],北京：经济科学出版社,1999：10-22。
①Foss(1999)认为以委托代理理论为代表的完全契约理论与阿罗德布鲁的完美合同理论之间并不存在本质差别。
②关于契约理论的详细分析可进一步参考科斯、哈特、斯蒂格里茨.契约经济学[M],北京：经济科学出版社,1999：10-22。
①相关证明可参考张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学,上海：上海人民出版社,1996：405-418。
[1]蔡宏图.应用“HU”理论实现利润翻番——中国石化集团洛阳石油化工总厂的试验[J].商业经济与管理,2006,(10)：37-39.
[2]陈艳.会计信息披露方式的经济学思考[J].会计研究,2004,(8)：51-56.
[3]池国华,迟旭升.我国上市公司经营业绩评价系统研究[J].会计研究.2003,(8)：45-47.
[4]程新生,李春荠,朱琳红,等.参与式预算行为实验研究[J].会计研究,2008,(5)：53-60.
[5]冯巧根.超越预算的实务发展动向与评价[J].会计研究,2005, (12)：15-19.
[6]贺颖奇.企业契约性质管理会计系统职能及其设计原则[J].会计研究,2004,(6)： 53-56.
[7]胡祖光.联合确定基数合约：对魏茨曼模型的一个改进[J].经济研究,2007,(3)：81-91.
[8]江苏平.应用“联合确定基数法”利润增加3000万——北京北辰实业股份有限公司的试验[J].商业经济与管理,2001,(4)：13-14.
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[10]刘建秋.企业契约联结的结构与运行：一个分析框架[J].审计与经济研究,2007,22, (4)：68-72.
[11]刘淑莲.企业价值评估与与价值创造战略研究——两种价值模式与六大驱动因素[J].会计研究,2004,(9)：67-71.
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[20]谢盛纹,杨颖婷.预算松弛的影响因素与公司业绩研究——来自2004至2007年我国A股市场的证据[J].当代财经.2008. (12)：114-119.
[21]于增彪,梁文涛.现代公司预算编制起点问题的探讨[J].会计研究,2002,(3)：18-24.
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[23]万良勇.企业预算松弛成因浅析[J].财会通讯.2002, (12)：26.
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[26]王景升.我国国有资本经营预算体系及运营机制研究[J].财经问题研究,2008, (11)：90-94.
[27]张先治.财务信息在契约中的作用[J].会计研究.2000,(9)：12-16.
[28]张先治.建立企业内部管理控制系统框架的探讨[J].财经问题研究.2003,(11)：67-71.
[29]张先治.基于价值的企业集团预算控制系统——预算控制变量与预算控制标准确定[J].财经问题研究,2005, (6)：78-84.
[30]张先治,袁克利.公司治理财务契约与财务控制[J].会计研究.2005,(11)：21-25.
[31]张先治.基于价值的管理与公司理财创新[J].会计研究.2008, (8)：32-39.
[32]张先治,翟月雷.基于风险偏好的报酬契约与预算松弛研究[J].财经问题研究,2009, (6)：72-79.
[33]张朝宓,卓毅,胡春香.当代西方预算管理研究综述[J].外国经济与管理.2003,(12)：18-22.
[34]张朝宓,卓毅,董伟等.预算松弛行为的实验研究[J].管理科学学报,2004,(3)：46-53.
[35]郑石桥,王建军.信息不对称和报酬方案对预算松弛的影响研究[J].会计研究,2008, (5)：61-68.
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①谢德仁.企业剩余索取权：分享安排与剩余计量[M].上海：上海人民出版社,2001.
②贺颖奇.企业契约性质管理会计系统职能及其设计原则[J].会计研究,2004,(6)：53-56.
①关于契约理论的详细分析可进一步参考科斯、哈特、斯蒂格里茨.契约经济学[M],北京：经济科学出版社,1999：10-22。
①Foss(1999)认为以委托代理理论为代表的完全契约理论与阿罗德布鲁的完美合同理论之间并不存在本质差别。
②关于契约理论的详细分析可进一步参考科斯、哈特、斯蒂格里茨.契约经济学[M],北京：经济科学出版社,1999：10-22。
①相关证明可参考张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学,上海：上海人民出版社,1996：405-418。
[1]蔡宏图.应用“HU”理论实现利润翻番——中国石化集团洛阳石油化工总厂的试验[J].商业经济与管理,2006,(10)：37-39.
[2]陈艳.会计信息披露方式的经济学思考[J].会计研究,2004,(8)：51-56.
[3]池国华,迟旭升.我国上市公司经营业绩评价系统研究[J].会计研究.2003,(8)：45-47.
[4]程新生,李春荠,朱琳红,等.参与式预算行为实验研究[J].会计研究,2008,(5)：53-60.
[5]冯巧根.超越预算的实务发展动向与评价[J].会计研究,2005, (12)：15-19.
[6]贺颖奇.企业契约性质管理会计系统职能及其设计原则[J].会计研究,2004,(6)： 53-56.
[7]胡祖光.联合确定基数合约：对魏茨曼模型的一个改进[J].经济研究,2007,(3)：81-91.
[8]江苏平.应用“联合确定基数法”利润增加3000万——北京北辰实业股份有限公司的试验[J].商业经济与管理,2001,(4)：13-14.
[9]姜英兵.财务学的基本理论框架[J].会计研究,2007, (8)：22-27.
[10]刘建秋.企业契约联结的结构与运行：一个分析框架[J].审计与经济研究,2007,22, (4)：68-72.
[11]刘淑莲.企业价值评估与与价值创造战略研究——两种价值模式与六大驱动因素[J].会计研究,2004,(9)：67-71.
[12]刘媛媛,池国华.公司财务理论的发展及未来展望[J].财会通讯(理财版)2008, (6)： 53-55.
[13]刘凌冰,李长群,姜宇明.再论国有资本经营预算监控体系的构建[J].国有资产管理,2007, (11)：17-18.
[14]孟焰,朱小芳.“企业内部控制与预算管理”专题研讨会综述[J].会计研究,2004, (8)：92-94.
[15]潘飞,程明.预算松弛的影响因素与经济后果——来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].财经研究,2007,(6)：55-66.
[16]潘爱香,潘小倩,葛苏君.案例篇：从“榨油计划”到以人为本[J].新理财2007,(3)： 26-27.
[17]彭金辉.对企业预算松弛问题的经济学分析[J].中国总会计师.2008,(12)：38-39.
[18]任翠玉.关于国有企业经营者业绩评价的思考[J].国有资产管理.2006,(9)：59-60.
[19]宋岩.企业管理中的预算松弛问题研究[J].工业技术经济.2001, (2)：58-59.
[20]谢盛纹,杨颖婷.预算松弛的影响因素与公司业绩研究——来自2004至2007年我国A股市场的证据[J].当代财经.2008. (12)：114-119.
[21]于增彪,梁文涛.现代公司预算编制起点问题的探讨[J].会计研究,2002,(3)：18-24.
[22]于增彪,袁光华,刘桂英,等.关于集团公司预算管理系统的框架研究[J].会计研究,2004,(8)：22-29.
[23]万良勇.企业预算松弛成因浅析[J].财会通讯.2002, (12)：26.
[24]王满,于悦.财务战略管理学科体系的构建[J].会计研究,2008,(1)：33-38.
[25]王玉红,佟慧捷.内部管理业绩评价系统构成及要素选择[J].财经问题研究,2004, (6)： 92-96.
[26]王景升.我国国有资本经营预算体系及运营机制研究[J].财经问题研究,2008, (11)：90-94.
[27]张先治.财务信息在契约中的作用[J].会计研究.2000,(9)：12-16.
[28]张先治.建立企业内部管理控制系统框架的探讨[J].财经问题研究.2003,(11)：67-71.
[29]张先治.基于价值的企业集团预算控制系统——预算控制变量与预算控制标准确定[J].财经问题研究,2005, (6)：78-84.
[30]张先治,袁克利.公司治理财务契约与财务控制[J].会计研究.2005,(11)：21-25.
[31]张先治.基于价值的管理与公司理财创新[J].会计研究.2008, (8)：32-39.
[32]张先治,翟月雷.基于风险偏好的报酬契约与预算松弛研究[J].财经问题研究,2009, (6)：72-79.
[33]张朝宓,卓毅,胡春香.当代西方预算管理研究综述[J].外国经济与管理.2003,(12)：18-22.
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