中国上市公司绩效评价研究
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摘要
本文是以中国上市公司为研究对象，综合运用经济学(特别是新制度经济学)与管理学的相关理论，对中国上市公司综合性绩效评价的理论与模型进行了系统的研究。在综合比较分析上市公司绩效评价的DCF法、单因素评价模型、多因素评价模型和EVA&MVA模型系统等优劣的基础上，提出：需要研究和建立基于中国上市公司特色的加权综合评价模型，并认为这是中国上市公司绩效评价的方向。中国上市公司绩效评价模型既要涵盖传统的财务绩效评价体系，又要针对中国上市公司发展的特色选取其他非财务绩效评价体系，并且后者应处于主导地位，要着眼于上市公司长期绩效的持续改善。
在中国上市公司的形成过程及其融资结构，将上市公司股东分为四种类型，运用委托代理理论对中国上市公司股权融资中的委托代理关系对国有控股上市公司和民营控股上市公司的制度性缺陷进行了分析，分析了前者的“内部人控制”和后者的“大股东控制”的理论必然。
根据目前中国上市公司现状及发展趋势，分析得出上市公司绩效评价应将财务绩效评价和非财务绩效评价相结合进行。其中，财务绩效评价是充分分析上市公司的现金流因素，建立基于现金流因素的关键财务绩效评价；非财务绩效评价主要从战略绩效评价、治理绩效评价、资源整合绩效评价、创新绩效评价四个方面来对上市公司进行综合评价。
建立了基于现金流因素的关键财务绩效评价模型，该模型主要覆盖了现金流量分析、流动性分析、获取现金能力分析、收益质量分析、或有因素现金流影响分析五个方面的因素。
建立了中国上市公司战略绩效评价模型，该模型主要覆盖了上市公司行业成长前景评价、核心竞争要素评价、主营业务经营绩效评价、上市公司募集资金使用评价四个方面的因素。
建立了中国上市公司治理绩效评价模型，该模型主要覆盖了七个方面的因素：股东权利与股东大会规范评价、大股东行为规范与上市公司独立性评价、董事与董事会评价、监事与监事会评价、高管人员激励约束机制评价、利益相关者关系评价、信息披露与透明度评价。
建立了中国上市公司资源整合绩效评价模型，该模型主要覆盖三大方面的因素：内部资源配置整合绩效评价、外部资源重组整合绩效评价、上市公司壳资源整合绩效评价。
建立了中国上市公司创新绩效评价模型，该模型包括五个方面内容：技术性创新绩效评价、市场性创新绩效评价、结构性创新绩效评价、创新模式与市场周期匹配性评价和综合创新体系评价。其中，前三个评价可针对处于不同市场生命周期的上市公司主体，而后两个评价适用于所有公司的创新绩效评价。
综合建立了中国上市公司绩效评价模型框架，其中的财务绩效评价模型中，应用基于现金流因素的关键财务绩效评价模型；非财务绩效评价模型包括四个子模型：上市公司战略绩效评价模型、上市公司治理绩效评价模型、上市公司资源整合绩效评价模型和上市公司创新绩效评价模型。基于主成分分析法，构建基于现金流因素的关键财务绩效评价模型；通过模糊综合评价法，构建上市公司非财务绩效评价模型。上市公司的绩效评价综合值是采用层次分析法进行五个方面的加权获得。将各个子模型和综合模型运用到中证亚商2005年度50强上市公司的实证研究中，并对实证结果进行对比分析。
This paper takes Chinese listed companies as research objects, and systematically study its synthesized performance evaluation and model,applying economics (especially new systematic economics) and management related theory. Based on synthesizing DCF method of performance appraisal, single factor evaluating models, multiple factors evaluating models and EVA & MVA model system etc, put forward: it needs to study and establish weighted synthesis evaluation model according to the features of Chinese listed company. This is the direction of Chinese listed companies performance evaluation. The performance evaluation model of Chinese listed companies has to include not only the traditional financial performance evaluation system, but also need other non-financial performance evaluation system. Moreover, the latter should be placed in the predominance position. It needs to keep eyes on a long-term improvement of listed companies performance.
During the forming process and margin structure of Chinese listed companies, the shareholders are divided into four types. Applying deputation theory, analyze thedeputation relationship of share ownership and also the system analysis of state-owned controlling listed companies and private-running listed companies. Analyze the " internal person control" of the former with "big shareholder control" of the latter by all means.
According to the present condition and development trend of currently Chinese listed companies, the analysis shows performance evaluation of listed companies should combine both financial evaluation and that of non-finance. Financial performance evaluation well analyzed cash flow factors, and establish the key financial performance evaluation based on them. The performance evaluation of non-finance mainly base on strategy performance evaluation, governance performance evaluation,resources conformity performance evaluation, and innovation performance evaluation.
Have established the key financial performance evaluation model based on cash flow factors. The model mainly overlaid cash flow analysis, mobility analysis, cash obtaining ability analysis, income quality analysis, or cash flow related influence analysis.
Have built up a strategy performance evaluation model of Chinese listed companies. It mainly overlaid growth prospect evaluation, core competency analysis, main business management performance evaluation and collecting funds usage evaluation.
Have built up governance performance evaluation model of Chinese listed companies. This model mainly includes seven factors: shareholder rights and shareholder meeting criterion evaluation, big shareholder behavior criterion and listed companies independence evaluation, director and directorate evaluation, supervisor and board of supervisor evaluation, executive encouragement restriction evaluation, interests relation evaluation, information publishing with clarity evaluation.
Have built up resources conformity performance evaluation model of Chinese listed companies. It mainly overlaid three generous factors: internal resource allocation conformity performance evaluation, exterior resources reform conformity performance evaluation, listed companies hull resources integration performance evaluation.
Have built up innovation performance evaluation model of Chinese listed companies. It includes five aspects: technicality innovation performance evaluation, marketability innovation performance evaluation, structure innovation performance evaluation, innovation model and market period matching evaluation and comprehensive innovation system evaluation. Among them, the first three evaluations aim at the listed companies being placed in the different market lifecycle, and the last two are applicable to the innovation performance evaluation of all companies.
Have comprehensively built up performance evaluation model frame. The financial performance evaluation model applies to key financial performance evaluation model based on cash flow factor. The performance evaluation of non-finance includes four sub-models:strategy performance evaluation model, gonernance performance evaluation model, resources conformity performance evaluation model and innovation performance evaluation model. According to the analytical method of principal component, set up key financial performance evaluation model based on cash flow factor. Via faintness synthesis evaluation method, set up performance evaluation model of non-finance. The performance evaluation synthesis value of listed companies adopt level analytic method carrying on five adding power to acquire. Five sub-models and unified model have been used to real diagnosis research and contrast analysis based on 50 top Chinese listed companies in 2005 which have been evaluated by Asian Business Company and Chinese securities paper.
在中国上市公司的形成过程及其融资结构，将上市公司股东分为四种类型，运用委托代理理论对中国上市公司股权融资中的委托代理关系对国有控股上市公司和民营控股上市公司的制度性缺陷进行了分析，分析了前者的“内部人控制”和后者的“大股东控制”的理论必然。
根据目前中国上市公司现状及发展趋势，分析得出上市公司绩效评价应将财务绩效评价和非财务绩效评价相结合进行。其中，财务绩效评价是充分分析上市公司的现金流因素，建立基于现金流因素的关键财务绩效评价；非财务绩效评价主要从战略绩效评价、治理绩效评价、资源整合绩效评价、创新绩效评价四个方面来对上市公司进行综合评价。
建立了基于现金流因素的关键财务绩效评价模型，该模型主要覆盖了现金流量分析、流动性分析、获取现金能力分析、收益质量分析、或有因素现金流影响分析五个方面的因素。
建立了中国上市公司战略绩效评价模型，该模型主要覆盖了上市公司行业成长前景评价、核心竞争要素评价、主营业务经营绩效评价、上市公司募集资金使用评价四个方面的因素。
建立了中国上市公司治理绩效评价模型，该模型主要覆盖了七个方面的因素：股东权利与股东大会规范评价、大股东行为规范与上市公司独立性评价、董事与董事会评价、监事与监事会评价、高管人员激励约束机制评价、利益相关者关系评价、信息披露与透明度评价。
建立了中国上市公司资源整合绩效评价模型，该模型主要覆盖三大方面的因素：内部资源配置整合绩效评价、外部资源重组整合绩效评价、上市公司壳资源整合绩效评价。
建立了中国上市公司创新绩效评价模型，该模型包括五个方面内容：技术性创新绩效评价、市场性创新绩效评价、结构性创新绩效评价、创新模式与市场周期匹配性评价和综合创新体系评价。其中，前三个评价可针对处于不同市场生命周期的上市公司主体，而后两个评价适用于所有公司的创新绩效评价。
综合建立了中国上市公司绩效评价模型框架，其中的财务绩效评价模型中，应用基于现金流因素的关键财务绩效评价模型；非财务绩效评价模型包括四个子模型：上市公司战略绩效评价模型、上市公司治理绩效评价模型、上市公司资源整合绩效评价模型和上市公司创新绩效评价模型。基于主成分分析法，构建基于现金流因素的关键财务绩效评价模型；通过模糊综合评价法，构建上市公司非财务绩效评价模型。上市公司的绩效评价综合值是采用层次分析法进行五个方面的加权获得。将各个子模型和综合模型运用到中证亚商2005年度50强上市公司的实证研究中，并对实证结果进行对比分析。
This paper takes Chinese listed companies as research objects, and systematically study its synthesized performance evaluation and model,applying economics (especially new systematic economics) and management related theory. Based on synthesizing DCF method of performance appraisal, single factor evaluating models, multiple factors evaluating models and EVA & MVA model system etc, put forward: it needs to study and establish weighted synthesis evaluation model according to the features of Chinese listed company. This is the direction of Chinese listed companies performance evaluation. The performance evaluation model of Chinese listed companies has to include not only the traditional financial performance evaluation system, but also need other non-financial performance evaluation system. Moreover, the latter should be placed in the predominance position. It needs to keep eyes on a long-term improvement of listed companies performance.
During the forming process and margin structure of Chinese listed companies, the shareholders are divided into four types. Applying deputation theory, analyze thedeputation relationship of share ownership and also the system analysis of state-owned controlling listed companies and private-running listed companies. Analyze the " internal person control" of the former with "big shareholder control" of the latter by all means.
According to the present condition and development trend of currently Chinese listed companies, the analysis shows performance evaluation of listed companies should combine both financial evaluation and that of non-finance. Financial performance evaluation well analyzed cash flow factors, and establish the key financial performance evaluation based on them. The performance evaluation of non-finance mainly base on strategy performance evaluation, governance performance evaluation,resources conformity performance evaluation, and innovation performance evaluation.
Have established the key financial performance evaluation model based on cash flow factors. The model mainly overlaid cash flow analysis, mobility analysis, cash obtaining ability analysis, income quality analysis, or cash flow related influence analysis.
Have built up a strategy performance evaluation model of Chinese listed companies. It mainly overlaid growth prospect evaluation, core competency analysis, main business management performance evaluation and collecting funds usage evaluation.
Have built up governance performance evaluation model of Chinese listed companies. This model mainly includes seven factors: shareholder rights and shareholder meeting criterion evaluation, big shareholder behavior criterion and listed companies independence evaluation, director and directorate evaluation, supervisor and board of supervisor evaluation, executive encouragement restriction evaluation, interests relation evaluation, information publishing with clarity evaluation.
Have built up resources conformity performance evaluation model of Chinese listed companies. It mainly overlaid three generous factors: internal resource allocation conformity performance evaluation, exterior resources reform conformity performance evaluation, listed companies hull resources integration performance evaluation.
Have built up innovation performance evaluation model of Chinese listed companies. It includes five aspects: technicality innovation performance evaluation, marketability innovation performance evaluation, structure innovation performance evaluation, innovation model and market period matching evaluation and comprehensive innovation system evaluation. Among them, the first three evaluations aim at the listed companies being placed in the different market lifecycle, and the last two are applicable to the innovation performance evaluation of all companies.
Have comprehensively built up performance evaluation model frame. The financial performance evaluation model applies to key financial performance evaluation model based on cash flow factor. The performance evaluation of non-finance includes four sub-models:strategy performance evaluation model, gonernance performance evaluation model, resources conformity performance evaluation model and innovation performance evaluation model. According to the analytical method of principal component, set up key financial performance evaluation model based on cash flow factor. Via faintness synthesis evaluation method, set up performance evaluation model of non-finance. The performance evaluation synthesis value of listed companies adopt level analytic method carrying on five adding power to acquire. Five sub-models and unified model have been used to real diagnosis research and contrast analysis based on 50 top Chinese listed companies in 2005 which have been evaluated by Asian Business Company and Chinese securities paper.
引文
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