基于买卖双方的市场势力研究
|
摘要
市场势力是指企业所掌握的高于边际成本的价格加成能力,市场势力越大,企业的价格加成能力就越大。随着中国钢铁工业的快速发展,对铁矿石的需求量也不断扩大,国内铁矿石的产量越来越不能满足需求。目前少数国家主导了国际市场定价权,如何把握铁矿石在国际市场上的定价权对中国具有重要意义。
本文在Song-Marchant-Reed剩余需求弹性市场势力模型的基础上,通过对该模型的进一步修正和扩展,使其更具现实解释力,并运用修正后的模型对国际铁矿石市场进行了测度,衡量了中国和澳大利亚作为买方和卖方分别拥有的市场势力大小,分析了中国在国际铁矿石市场上市场势力缺失的原因,并在此基础上提出了政策建议。
本文的研究主要观点为:基于买卖双方的视角,在Song-Marchant-Reed模型的基础上,对市场势力的测度模型做了进一步的拓展,使模型更具现实解释力;运用扩展后的模型,对中国和澳大利亚的铁矿石的贸易进行了实证分析,得出了澳大利亚的市场势力为50.44%,中国所拥有的市场势力为27.71%;通过模型分析,得出剩余供给弹性、剩余需求弹性、可替代性、相关产品和海运价格是影响市场势力的主要因素,其中剩余供给弹性和剩余需求弹性是影响市场势力的核心因素。
Market power means that companies have a price mark-up capacity higher than the marginal cost. The greater market power enterprises have, the greater price mark-up they have. With China's rapid development of the iron and steel industry, the demand for iron ore continued to expand, increasing the output of domestic iron ore demand. At present, several countries have dominated the international market pricing. How to make use of iron ore in the international market pricing is of great significance to China.
On the basis of the Song-Marchant-Reed RDE model of market power, the paper endowed it more realistic explanation through further expansion and amendment. After that, this paper, using the revised model of the international iron ore market, measured the market power of the China and Australia respectively as a buyer and seller, and analyzed the reasons for lack of market power for China's iron ore in the international market, then put forward policy recommendations on this basis.
This paper's main points are as follows: Based on the perspective of buyers and sellers and on the Song-Marchant-Reed model, this paper made a further expansion for the measurement models of the market power to make them more realistic and explanatory; used the expanded model to analyze the iron ore trade between China and Australia empirically, having concluded market power in Australia is 50.44 %, while in China it's a 27.71% market power; and through model analysis, the residual supply elasticity, residual demand elasticity, alternativity, related products' prices and sea transport prices are the main factors to influence the market prices, of which the residual supply elasticity and residual demand elasticity are the key elements to impact the market power.
本文在Song-Marchant-Reed剩余需求弹性市场势力模型的基础上,通过对该模型的进一步修正和扩展,使其更具现实解释力,并运用修正后的模型对国际铁矿石市场进行了测度,衡量了中国和澳大利亚作为买方和卖方分别拥有的市场势力大小,分析了中国在国际铁矿石市场上市场势力缺失的原因,并在此基础上提出了政策建议。
本文的研究主要观点为:基于买卖双方的视角,在Song-Marchant-Reed模型的基础上,对市场势力的测度模型做了进一步的拓展,使模型更具现实解释力;运用扩展后的模型,对中国和澳大利亚的铁矿石的贸易进行了实证分析,得出了澳大利亚的市场势力为50.44%,中国所拥有的市场势力为27.71%;通过模型分析,得出剩余供给弹性、剩余需求弹性、可替代性、相关产品和海运价格是影响市场势力的主要因素,其中剩余供给弹性和剩余需求弹性是影响市场势力的核心因素。
Market power means that companies have a price mark-up capacity higher than the marginal cost. The greater market power enterprises have, the greater price mark-up they have. With China's rapid development of the iron and steel industry, the demand for iron ore continued to expand, increasing the output of domestic iron ore demand. At present, several countries have dominated the international market pricing. How to make use of iron ore in the international market pricing is of great significance to China.
On the basis of the Song-Marchant-Reed RDE model of market power, the paper endowed it more realistic explanation through further expansion and amendment. After that, this paper, using the revised model of the international iron ore market, measured the market power of the China and Australia respectively as a buyer and seller, and analyzed the reasons for lack of market power for China's iron ore in the international market, then put forward policy recommendations on this basis.
This paper's main points are as follows: Based on the perspective of buyers and sellers and on the Song-Marchant-Reed model, this paper made a further expansion for the measurement models of the market power to make them more realistic and explanatory; used the expanded model to analyze the iron ore trade between China and Australia empirically, having concluded market power in Australia is 50.44 %, while in China it's a 27.71% market power; and through model analysis, the residual supply elasticity, residual demand elasticity, alternativity, related products' prices and sea transport prices are the main factors to influence the market prices, of which the residual supply elasticity and residual demand elasticity are the key elements to impact the market power.
引文
[1]中国经济贸易年鉴,1995-2007。
[2]张宗成、王骏,世界铁矿石的生产与贸易和我国铁矿石供需的经济学分析[J],国际贸易问题,2005.(9):31-32
[1] Aileen J. Thompson. Import Competition and Market Power: Canadian Evidence[J]. North Ameican Journal of Economics and Finance, 2002, Vol.13: 40-55.
[2] Anna Bottasso& Alessandro Sembenelli: "Market Power, Productivity and the EU Single Market Program: Evidence from a Panel of Italian Firms[J], European Economic Review, 2001, Vol.45: 167-186.
[3] Baker J.B. &T.E. Bresnahan(1988), Estimating the Residual Demand Curve Facing a Single Firm [J], International Journal of Industrial Organization. 12(6):283-346.
[4] Baohui Song, Mary A. Marchant, Michael R. Reed, Shuang Xu(2007)"Market Power and Competitive Analysis of China's Soybean Import Market", Presentation for the International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium (IATRC)July.
[5] Bils, M., 1987. The cyclical behaviour of marginal cost and price [J]. American Economic Review , pp. 839-855.
[6] Byeong-Il Ahn and Daniel A. Sumner(2006),Assessment of the Political Market Power of Milk Producers Reflected in U.S. Milk Pricing Regulations [J], Agricultural Issues Center University of California.
[7] Daniel Sullivan(1985),Testing Hypotheses about Firm Behavior in the Cigarette Industry [J],Journal of Political Economy.25(3):586-598.
[8] David Newbery, Richard Green, Karsten Neuhoff, Paul Twomey(2004),A Review of the Monitoring of Market Power [J] Report prepared at the request of ETSO.
[9] Demsetz, H(1973), Industry Structure Market Rivalry and Public Policy [J], Journal of Law and Economics.l5(6):125.
[10]Domowitz, I., Hubbard, R.G. and Petersen, B.C., 1988. Market structure and cyclical fluctuations in U.S. manufacturing. Review of Economics and Statistics, pp. 55-66.
[11]Frank A. Wolk(2003), Measuring Unilateral Market Power in Wholesale Electricity Markets:The California Market, 1998-2000, AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS.93(2)1-6.
[12] Green, E. and Porter, E., 1984. Non-cooperative collusion under imperfect price information. Econometrica [J], pp. 87-100.
[13] Grossman, G.M., 1992. Imperfect competition and international trade, MIT Press.
[14]Hall, R.E., 1986. Market structure and macroeconomic fluctuations. Brooking Papers on Economic Activity 2 [J], pp. 285-322.
[15]Hall, R.E., 1988. The relation between price and marginal cost in U.S. industry. Journal of Political Economy, pp. 921-947.
[16] Harrison. Productivity( 1994), " imperfect competition and trade reform: theory and evidence", journal of international Economics. 12(36):53-73.
[17]Haskel, J., Martin, C. and Small, I., 1994. Price, marginal cost and the business cycle. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics.
[18]Holger Gorg & Frederic Warzynski, Price Cost Margins and Exporting Behavior: Evidence from Firm Level Data[M], 2003
[19]Hummels, D., Lugovskyy, V. and Skiba. A, 2008, The Trade Reducing Effects of Market Power in International Shipping, NBER Accepted Manuscripts.
[20] Kim, Dae-Wook, and C. R. Knittel(2004), Biases in Static Oligopoly Models? Evidence from the California Electricity Market [J], NBER Working Paper.
[21]Lerner, A. P(1934), "The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monopoly Power". Review of Economic Studies, 15(1): 15-29.
[22]Lu(?)s M. B. Cabral(2005), Market Power and Efficiencyin Card Payment Systems: A Comment on Rochet and Tirole [J], New York University and CEPR
[23]Pedro Pereira, Market Power, Cost Reduction and Consumer Search[J], International Journal of Industrial Economics, 2001, Vol.19: 1457-1473,
[24]Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg & Michael M. Knetter(1999)" Measuring the Intensity of Competition in Export Markets", Journal of International Economics. 19(47): 27-60.
[25]Roland Michelitsch & Praveem Kujal(2002),"Monopoly power and term of trade",www.eco.uc3m.es/-kujal/ch06.pdf.
[26]Rotemberg,J.J.and Saloner,G.,1986.A supergame - theoretic model of price wars during booms.American Economic Review,pp.390-407.
[27]Rotemberg,J.J.and Woodford,M.,1991.Markups and business cycle.NBER Macroeconomic Annual 6,pp.63-128.
[28]Schmalensee,R.,1989.Inter-industry studies of structure and performance[J].In:Schmalensee,R.and Willig,R.D.,Editors,1989.Handbook of Industrial Organization Handbooks in Economics Vol.Ⅱ,North Holland,Amsterdam,pp.951-1009.Abstract
[29]Sergio de Nardis & Cristina Pensa(2004),How intense is Competition in International Markets of Traditional Goods?---The Case of Italian Exports[J],Istituto Di Studie Analisi Economica(ISAE) Working Paper.15(45):251-264.
[30]Summer D,Measurement of Monopoly Power:an Application to the Cigarette Industry,Journal of Political Economy,1981,Vol.89,1010-1019.
[31]Timothy F.Bresnaham,Empirical Studies of Industries with Market Power[C],Handbook of Industrial Organization,Volume Ⅱ:1012-1055.
[32]Ville Aalto-Setala(2002),"The effect of concentration and market power on food price:evidence from Finland[J],.Journal of Retailing 15(78):207-216.
[33]Waldman,R.J.and DeLong,B.,1992.Interpreting procyclical productivity:Evidence from a cross-nation cross-industry panel[J].In:Working Paper 92/98,European University Institute,Florence.
[34]William M.Landes & Richard Posner,Market Power in Antitrust Cases,Harvard Law Review,1981,Vol.94:937-996.
[35]Brad Howarth,杨政文编译.海外并购:中国强硬回击铁矿石涨价:中国“敌意”收购澳铁巨人[J].财经文摘,Financial Digest,2008,(6):51-52
[36]安同良,杨羽云.易发生价格竞争的产业特征及企业策略[J].经济研究,2002,(6):46-54
[37]曹建海.过度竞争论[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社:2000.1
[38]陈晓华.中国出口产业市场势力研究--基于纺织服装业的实证分析[D].浙江大学经济学院硕士论文,2007年5月
[39]陈晓静.中国出口企业市场势力研究--基于鞋类出口的实证分析[D].浙江大学经济学院硕士论文,2004年11月
[40]地震出版社,中国矿业年鉴,2007年:489
[41]范里安著、费方域等译.微观经济学一现代观点[M].上海:上海人民大学出版社:1994.1
[42]范涛.论中国应将对外贸易竞争优势作为贸易战略出发点[J].经济评论,2005,(1):43-49
[43]顾国达、张磊.对西欧五国生丝出口价格模型的研究[J].丝绸,2000,(1 1):1-3
[44]顾海兵,廖俊霞.国外学者对政府管制的研究综述[N].开放导报,2001.7.16
[45]郭海涛.市场势力理论研究的新进展[J].经济评论,2006,(3):132-139
[46]国际劳工组织:http://www.ilo.org/[Z]
[47]郝冬梅,王秀清.中国烟草价格业的市场力量与配置效率损失估测[J].产业经济评论,2003,(1):152-161
[48]黄先海,陈晓华,浙江企业国际市场势力的测度与分析--以纺织服装业为例[J],浙江社会科学,2007,(6):41-46
[49]江勋.定价权丧失:背后的三重阴谋[J].经济展望,2008,(10):163-164
[50]联合国数据库:http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade[Z]
[51]刘志彪,产业的市场势力理论及其估计方法[J],当代财经,2002,(11):43-47
[52]刘志彪,石奇.竞争、垄断和市场势力[J],产业经济研究,2003,(4):71-77
[53]美国劳动统计局:http:www.bls.gov/data/home.html[Z]
[54]沈国兵.贸易统计差异与中美贸易平衡问题[J].经济研究,2005,(6):82-93
[55]石洁心.中国铁矿石贸易的国际定价权研究[d].浙江大学经济学院硕士论文,2007年3月
[56]世界经济年鉴编辑委员会,世界经济年鉴,1995.2007
[57]世界银行网站:http://web.worldbank.org[Z]
[58]唐晓华,苏梅梅.产业过度竞争测度的基准及聚类分析[J].中国工业经济, 2003,(6):29-35
[59]汪贵浦,陈明亮.邮电通信业市场势力测度及对行业发展影响的实证分析[J].中国工业经济,2007,(1):21-28
[60]王如忠.贫困化增长:贸易条件变动中的疑问[M].上海:上海社会科学院出版社:1999.1
[61]王廷惠.市场过程内生的垄断:市场权势和自然垄断[J].财经研究,2007:(1):26-36
[62]王相林.我国制药产业市场势力解析[J].卫生经济研究,2004,(2):7-9
[63]卫星.澳铁矿石创记录涨价的新启示[J].上海金属,2008,30卷,(5):60-61
[64]魏后凯.中国制造业集中状况及其国际比较[J].中国工业经济,2002,(1):41-49
[65]晏林,我国纺织服装出口的市场势力测度与分析[D],浙江大学经济学院硕士论文,2006年5月
[66]杨丹辉.中国服装业产业组织的实证分析[J].产业经济研究,2003,(5):35-41
[67]杨晓玲.垄断势力、市场势力与当代产业组织关系[J].南开经济研究,2005,(4):41-46
[68]叶卉,孙锡丽.进口铁矿石现状分析及策略研究[J].2008,(9):7-10
[69]叶泽.电力市场的市场势力及其治理[J1.中国工业经济,2004,(7):42-49
[70]于立,王询.当代西方产业组织学[M].大连:东北财经大学出版社:1996.1:30-185
[71]曾次玲,张步涵.电力市场中的市场势力问题初探[J].电力建设,2002,(5月:62-66
[72]张伯玲.铁矿石谈判机制空前危机[J].财经,128-130
[73]张宇波,罗先觉和邹晓松等.发电市场势力研究与交易方式对发电市场势力影响的分析[J].中国电机工程学报,2004,(4)
[74]赵小钊,沈小静.铁矿石涨价对我国钢铁产业的影响及对策分析[J].中国流通经济,2008,(10):32-35
[75]赵勇.对中国贸易条件状况的分析[J].当代经济,2004,(7):80
[76]植草益.日本的产业组织:理论与实证的前沿[M].北京:经济管理出版社, 2000周小梅,析世贸组织下中国垄断性产业的放松管制---政策安排与管制机制重构[J].国际贸易问题,2005,(6)
[77]中国对外经济贸易年鉴(中文版),中国对外经济贸易年鉴编辑委员会,1993/1994-2007年
[78]中国钢铁统计年鉴编辑部,中国钢铁统计年鉴2007:105
[79]中国统计出版社,中国贸易外经统计年鉴,2008
[80]中华人民共和国国家统计局:http://www.stats.gov.cn/[Z]
[81]中华人民共和国统计局,中国统计年鉴,2007年:57
[82]朱有为,储震和陈柳.用差异化策略来赢取竞争优势[J].产业经济研究,2003,(2):56-61
[2]张宗成、王骏,世界铁矿石的生产与贸易和我国铁矿石供需的经济学分析[J],国际贸易问题,2005.(9):31-32
[1] Aileen J. Thompson. Import Competition and Market Power: Canadian Evidence[J]. North Ameican Journal of Economics and Finance, 2002, Vol.13: 40-55.
[2] Anna Bottasso& Alessandro Sembenelli: "Market Power, Productivity and the EU Single Market Program: Evidence from a Panel of Italian Firms[J], European Economic Review, 2001, Vol.45: 167-186.
[3] Baker J.B. &T.E. Bresnahan(1988), Estimating the Residual Demand Curve Facing a Single Firm [J], International Journal of Industrial Organization. 12(6):283-346.
[4] Baohui Song, Mary A. Marchant, Michael R. Reed, Shuang Xu(2007)"Market Power and Competitive Analysis of China's Soybean Import Market", Presentation for the International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium (IATRC)July.
[5] Bils, M., 1987. The cyclical behaviour of marginal cost and price [J]. American Economic Review , pp. 839-855.
[6] Byeong-Il Ahn and Daniel A. Sumner(2006),Assessment of the Political Market Power of Milk Producers Reflected in U.S. Milk Pricing Regulations [J], Agricultural Issues Center University of California.
[7] Daniel Sullivan(1985),Testing Hypotheses about Firm Behavior in the Cigarette Industry [J],Journal of Political Economy.25(3):586-598.
[8] David Newbery, Richard Green, Karsten Neuhoff, Paul Twomey(2004),A Review of the Monitoring of Market Power [J] Report prepared at the request of ETSO.
[9] Demsetz, H(1973), Industry Structure Market Rivalry and Public Policy [J], Journal of Law and Economics.l5(6):125.
[10]Domowitz, I., Hubbard, R.G. and Petersen, B.C., 1988. Market structure and cyclical fluctuations in U.S. manufacturing. Review of Economics and Statistics, pp. 55-66.
[11]Frank A. Wolk(2003), Measuring Unilateral Market Power in Wholesale Electricity Markets:The California Market, 1998-2000, AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS.93(2)1-6.
[12] Green, E. and Porter, E., 1984. Non-cooperative collusion under imperfect price information. Econometrica [J], pp. 87-100.
[13] Grossman, G.M., 1992. Imperfect competition and international trade, MIT Press.
[14]Hall, R.E., 1986. Market structure and macroeconomic fluctuations. Brooking Papers on Economic Activity 2 [J], pp. 285-322.
[15]Hall, R.E., 1988. The relation between price and marginal cost in U.S. industry. Journal of Political Economy, pp. 921-947.
[16] Harrison. Productivity( 1994), " imperfect competition and trade reform: theory and evidence", journal of international Economics. 12(36):53-73.
[17]Haskel, J., Martin, C. and Small, I., 1994. Price, marginal cost and the business cycle. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics.
[18]Holger Gorg & Frederic Warzynski, Price Cost Margins and Exporting Behavior: Evidence from Firm Level Data[M], 2003
[19]Hummels, D., Lugovskyy, V. and Skiba. A, 2008, The Trade Reducing Effects of Market Power in International Shipping, NBER Accepted Manuscripts.
[20] Kim, Dae-Wook, and C. R. Knittel(2004), Biases in Static Oligopoly Models? Evidence from the California Electricity Market [J], NBER Working Paper.
[21]Lerner, A. P(1934), "The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monopoly Power". Review of Economic Studies, 15(1): 15-29.
[22]Lu(?)s M. B. Cabral(2005), Market Power and Efficiencyin Card Payment Systems: A Comment on Rochet and Tirole [J], New York University and CEPR
[23]Pedro Pereira, Market Power, Cost Reduction and Consumer Search[J], International Journal of Industrial Economics, 2001, Vol.19: 1457-1473,
[24]Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg & Michael M. Knetter(1999)" Measuring the Intensity of Competition in Export Markets", Journal of International Economics. 19(47): 27-60.
[25]Roland Michelitsch & Praveem Kujal(2002),"Monopoly power and term of trade",www.eco.uc3m.es/-kujal/ch06.pdf.
[26]Rotemberg,J.J.and Saloner,G.,1986.A supergame - theoretic model of price wars during booms.American Economic Review,pp.390-407.
[27]Rotemberg,J.J.and Woodford,M.,1991.Markups and business cycle.NBER Macroeconomic Annual 6,pp.63-128.
[28]Schmalensee,R.,1989.Inter-industry studies of structure and performance[J].In:Schmalensee,R.and Willig,R.D.,Editors,1989.Handbook of Industrial Organization Handbooks in Economics Vol.Ⅱ,North Holland,Amsterdam,pp.951-1009.Abstract
[29]Sergio de Nardis & Cristina Pensa(2004),How intense is Competition in International Markets of Traditional Goods?---The Case of Italian Exports[J],Istituto Di Studie Analisi Economica(ISAE) Working Paper.15(45):251-264.
[30]Summer D,Measurement of Monopoly Power:an Application to the Cigarette Industry,Journal of Political Economy,1981,Vol.89,1010-1019.
[31]Timothy F.Bresnaham,Empirical Studies of Industries with Market Power[C],Handbook of Industrial Organization,Volume Ⅱ:1012-1055.
[32]Ville Aalto-Setala(2002),"The effect of concentration and market power on food price:evidence from Finland[J],.Journal of Retailing 15(78):207-216.
[33]Waldman,R.J.and DeLong,B.,1992.Interpreting procyclical productivity:Evidence from a cross-nation cross-industry panel[J].In:Working Paper 92/98,European University Institute,Florence.
[34]William M.Landes & Richard Posner,Market Power in Antitrust Cases,Harvard Law Review,1981,Vol.94:937-996.
[35]Brad Howarth,杨政文编译.海外并购:中国强硬回击铁矿石涨价:中国“敌意”收购澳铁巨人[J].财经文摘,Financial Digest,2008,(6):51-52
[36]安同良,杨羽云.易发生价格竞争的产业特征及企业策略[J].经济研究,2002,(6):46-54
[37]曹建海.过度竞争论[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社:2000.1
[38]陈晓华.中国出口产业市场势力研究--基于纺织服装业的实证分析[D].浙江大学经济学院硕士论文,2007年5月
[39]陈晓静.中国出口企业市场势力研究--基于鞋类出口的实证分析[D].浙江大学经济学院硕士论文,2004年11月
[40]地震出版社,中国矿业年鉴,2007年:489
[41]范里安著、费方域等译.微观经济学一现代观点[M].上海:上海人民大学出版社:1994.1
[42]范涛.论中国应将对外贸易竞争优势作为贸易战略出发点[J].经济评论,2005,(1):43-49
[43]顾国达、张磊.对西欧五国生丝出口价格模型的研究[J].丝绸,2000,(1 1):1-3
[44]顾海兵,廖俊霞.国外学者对政府管制的研究综述[N].开放导报,2001.7.16
[45]郭海涛.市场势力理论研究的新进展[J].经济评论,2006,(3):132-139
[46]国际劳工组织:http://www.ilo.org/[Z]
[47]郝冬梅,王秀清.中国烟草价格业的市场力量与配置效率损失估测[J].产业经济评论,2003,(1):152-161
[48]黄先海,陈晓华,浙江企业国际市场势力的测度与分析--以纺织服装业为例[J],浙江社会科学,2007,(6):41-46
[49]江勋.定价权丧失:背后的三重阴谋[J].经济展望,2008,(10):163-164
[50]联合国数据库:http://unstats.un.org/unsd/comtrade[Z]
[51]刘志彪,产业的市场势力理论及其估计方法[J],当代财经,2002,(11):43-47
[52]刘志彪,石奇.竞争、垄断和市场势力[J],产业经济研究,2003,(4):71-77
[53]美国劳动统计局:http:www.bls.gov/data/home.html[Z]
[54]沈国兵.贸易统计差异与中美贸易平衡问题[J].经济研究,2005,(6):82-93
[55]石洁心.中国铁矿石贸易的国际定价权研究[d].浙江大学经济学院硕士论文,2007年3月
[56]世界经济年鉴编辑委员会,世界经济年鉴,1995.2007
[57]世界银行网站:http://web.worldbank.org[Z]
[58]唐晓华,苏梅梅.产业过度竞争测度的基准及聚类分析[J].中国工业经济, 2003,(6):29-35
[59]汪贵浦,陈明亮.邮电通信业市场势力测度及对行业发展影响的实证分析[J].中国工业经济,2007,(1):21-28
[60]王如忠.贫困化增长:贸易条件变动中的疑问[M].上海:上海社会科学院出版社:1999.1
[61]王廷惠.市场过程内生的垄断:市场权势和自然垄断[J].财经研究,2007:(1):26-36
[62]王相林.我国制药产业市场势力解析[J].卫生经济研究,2004,(2):7-9
[63]卫星.澳铁矿石创记录涨价的新启示[J].上海金属,2008,30卷,(5):60-61
[64]魏后凯.中国制造业集中状况及其国际比较[J].中国工业经济,2002,(1):41-49
[65]晏林,我国纺织服装出口的市场势力测度与分析[D],浙江大学经济学院硕士论文,2006年5月
[66]杨丹辉.中国服装业产业组织的实证分析[J].产业经济研究,2003,(5):35-41
[67]杨晓玲.垄断势力、市场势力与当代产业组织关系[J].南开经济研究,2005,(4):41-46
[68]叶卉,孙锡丽.进口铁矿石现状分析及策略研究[J].2008,(9):7-10
[69]叶泽.电力市场的市场势力及其治理[J1.中国工业经济,2004,(7):42-49
[70]于立,王询.当代西方产业组织学[M].大连:东北财经大学出版社:1996.1:30-185
[71]曾次玲,张步涵.电力市场中的市场势力问题初探[J].电力建设,2002,(5月:62-66
[72]张伯玲.铁矿石谈判机制空前危机[J].财经,128-130
[73]张宇波,罗先觉和邹晓松等.发电市场势力研究与交易方式对发电市场势力影响的分析[J].中国电机工程学报,2004,(4)
[74]赵小钊,沈小静.铁矿石涨价对我国钢铁产业的影响及对策分析[J].中国流通经济,2008,(10):32-35
[75]赵勇.对中国贸易条件状况的分析[J].当代经济,2004,(7):80
[76]植草益.日本的产业组织:理论与实证的前沿[M].北京:经济管理出版社, 2000周小梅,析世贸组织下中国垄断性产业的放松管制---政策安排与管制机制重构[J].国际贸易问题,2005,(6)
[77]中国对外经济贸易年鉴(中文版),中国对外经济贸易年鉴编辑委员会,1993/1994-2007年
[78]中国钢铁统计年鉴编辑部,中国钢铁统计年鉴2007:105
[79]中国统计出版社,中国贸易外经统计年鉴,2008
[80]中华人民共和国国家统计局:http://www.stats.gov.cn/[Z]
[81]中华人民共和国统计局,中国统计年鉴,2007年:57
[82]朱有为,储震和陈柳.用差异化策略来赢取竞争优势[J].产业经济研究,2003,(2):56-61