我国商业银行资本监管有效性研究
|
摘要
资本是商业银行赖以生存和发展的基石,资本监管也是银行监管的核心。《巴塞尔资本协议》实施以来,资本标准成为了衡量单个银行乃至银行体系稳健性的公认的国际标准,成为维护银行业公平竞争的重要标尺。正因为资本监管在银行监管中的重要地位,资本监管是否有效将影响到商业银行安全经营和宏观经济稳定。经过几次金融危机的洗礼,资本监管取得了长足的发展。然而,商业银行处于不断创新和发展中,同样商业银行监管也需要不断地改进,以适应商业银行的发展。2008年次贷危机的爆发使金融监管受到了普遍质疑,商业银行资本监管再一次被推到风口浪尖,为什么资本监管没有让银行经营足够稳健?我国金融体系的相对封闭,使我们金融机构暂时躲过这场灾难。但是随着我国金融日益开放,如果下一次危机来临,我国资本监管能否帮助商业银行有效抵御风险,保障经济平稳运行呢?
本文遵循从理论到实践的研究路径。本文从理论上分析实施商业银行资本监管的必要性,找出资本监管有效性评价的理论依据。从实践上回顾了国外和我国商业银行资本监管发展的各个阶段。国外资本监管主要经历了主观资本监管、客观资本监管、《巴塞尔资本协议》统一监管和次贷危机后监管四个阶段,我国资本监管则经历了资本监管空白期、资本监管软约束、资本监管硬约束和次贷危机后监管四个阶段。回顾了资本监管实践发展后,就当前资本监管下我国商业银行的资本变化和资本充足率提升途径进行了分析。在理论和实践分析的基础上,本文从三个方面研究了我国资本监管有效性：资本监管是否降低了商业银行风险；资本监管是否影响了宏观经济运行；资本监管是否削弱了商业银行长期竞争力。降低商业银行风险是资本监管的首要目标,也是最终目的。资本监管可以从直接和间接两个方面影响宏观经济及经济周期。间接上,资本监管可以通过货币政策传导而影响宏观经济。直接上,资本监管可以通过商业银行贷款来影响宏观经济。资本监管对商业银行长期竞争力的影响,需要从商业银行市场占有份额、商业银行银行盈利能力和银行业公平竞争度三个方面来综合判断。资本监管的加强,可能导致商业银行缩减信贷,从而削弱商业银行与资本市场竞争中的竞争力,也会降低商业银行的盈利能力,不过严格统一的资本监管有利于银行业的公平竞争。
研究结果表明,首先,不管是资本充足情况较好的银行,还是资本充足情况不好的银行在资本监管压力下都提高了资本充足率,资本监管也促进了商业银行风险的降低,不过效果逐渐减弱；其次,短期内资本监管会恶化宏观经济,但在长期内,资本充足率较高银行的顺经济周期性要小于资本充足率低的银行,说明资本监管对宏观经济起到“稳定器”的作用；再次,资本监管在一定程度上削弱了银行业与资本市场竞争中的竞争力,银行业市场占有份额有所下降；资本监管对我国商业银行盈利能力影响不大,盈利能力主要受其他因素的影响；资本监管在一定程度上可以影响到银行业市场竞争度,但是目前影响我国银行业市场竞争度的主要因素并不是资本监管,也就是说资本监管对维护银行业公平竞争中的作用不大。总体上来看,资本监管在提高商业银行资本充足率的同时,有助于宏观经济的稳定发展,但在一定程度上削弱了商业银行长期竞争力。
我国资本监管取得了一定的效果,也存在许多需要改进的地方,尤其是在当前金融危机背景下。根据对我国商业资本监管有效性分析结果和当前金融危机下资本监管表现的不足,本文提出了提高我国商业银行资本监管有效性的政策建议：(1)建立资本监管逆周期机制；(2)建立资本监管的激励机制；(3)注意与其他宏观政策配合(4)改进资本充足率计量体系；(5)提高资本金质量的标准；(6)加强对表外业务的监管；(7)建立多元化资本补充渠道。
The capital is the foundation of the survival and development of the commercial banks,and the capital regulation is the core of banking supervision. Since the implementation of "Basel Capital Accord", capital standard has turned into a generally accepted international standard to measure the stability of single bank and even of the whole banking system, as an important benchmark to maintain fair competition in banking industry. Since capital regulation play an important role in banking supervision,the effectiveness of capital regulation will affect the safe operations of commercial banks and the stability of macroeconomic. After several financial crises, capital regulation has made considerable development. However, commercial banks are in constant innovation and development, supervision of commercial banks also need to improve continually to meet the development of commercial banks. The broke out of 2008 subprime crisis let the financial regulators to be widely questioned, commercial bank capital regulation has been pushed to cusp once again. Why can't capital regulation let bank operation robust enough? China's finncial system is relatively closed so that our financial institutions escape from this disaster temporarily. But with the increasingly open of China's financial, can our capital regulation help commercial banks to resist risks and protect the economic stability if next crisis come?
The article follows this research path that from theory to practice:analyzed the necessary of capital regulation to the commercial banks from the theory, and find out the theoretical basis to identify the effectiveness of capital regulation; reviewed all stages of development of commercial bank capital regulation at abroad from the practice. The foreign Capital Regulation experienced four stages:Subjective capital regulation, objective capital regulation, "the Basel Capital Accord" unified control and supervision of sub-prime crisis. Capital Regulation in China experienced the blank capital regulation, capital regulation of soft constraints, capital regulation of hard constraints and supervision of sub-prime crisis. After reviewed the practice of capital regulation, under the current capital regulation, the article analyzed the capital changes of commercial banks and ways to improve capital adequacy in China. Based on the analysis of theory and practice, this paper researched three aspects of the effectiveness of capital regulation in China:Does capital regulation reduces the risk of commercial banks; capital regulation affected the macro-economy; capital regulation is undermined long-term competitiveness of commercial banks. The primary objective of capital regulation is to reduce the risk of commercial banks, which is the ultimate goal of capital regulation. Capital regulation can affect the macroeconomic and business cycle from directly and indirectly. Indirectly, capital regulation can affect macroeconomic by monetary policy transmission. Directly, capital regulation can affect macroeconomic by Commercial bank loans. Capital Regulation Influenced the bank's long-term competitiveness banks, judge the impact need Consider three aspects:the competition of banking and capital markets, commercial bank's profitability and degree of fair competition in the banking industry. Strengthening of capital regulation may lead to reduced commercial bank credit, thereby weakening the commercial bank's competitiveness, will also reduce the profitability of commercial banks, but the strict and unified supervision of capital is conducive to fair competition in the banking sector.
The results show that, first of all, Banks all rise their capital adequacies under the pressure caused by the capital regulation regardless of whether their capital adequacies are satisfactory. And the capital regulation also contributes to reducing the risk of commercial banks,but the effect is gradually weakened; Secondly, the capital regulation worsens the macroeconomic in the short term, but in the long term, the banks with high capital adequacy ratios are less obvious than banks wiht low capital adequacy in adapting to economic cycles, which shows that the capital regulation plays a "stabilizer "role on macroeconomic; Finally, the capital regulation weakens the competitiveness between banking and capital markets to some extent; the capital regulation has little effect on the profitability of Chinese commercial banks, which is mainly affected by other factors; the capital regulation affects the level of competition in the banking sector to a certain extent,but what affects present level of competition in the banking sector is not the regulatory capital mainly, that is the capital regulation has a tiny effect on maintaining fair competition in the banking sector.Overall, the capital regulation not only urges commercial banks to raise the capital adequacy ratio, but also has a positive effect on macroeconomic. However, it undermines the long-term competitiveness of commercial banks to a certain extent.
Capital Regulation in China has borne some fruits,but there are many areas for improvement, especially in the context of the current financial crisis. According to the results of the analysis on the effectiveness of China's commericial bank capital regulation and the ill-performance of capital regulation during the present financial crisis, we advance in this paper some effective suggestions on how to improve the effectiveness of China's capital regulation. (1)establish of mechanisms for counter-cyclical capital regulation; (2) the establishment of Regulatory capital incentives; (3) Carry out regulatory policies in accordance with other macro policies(4) improve the capital adequacy ratio measurement system;(5) improve the capital quality;(6) strengthen regulation of the off balance sheet iteams;(7)establish a diversified capital added sourse.
本文遵循从理论到实践的研究路径。本文从理论上分析实施商业银行资本监管的必要性,找出资本监管有效性评价的理论依据。从实践上回顾了国外和我国商业银行资本监管发展的各个阶段。国外资本监管主要经历了主观资本监管、客观资本监管、《巴塞尔资本协议》统一监管和次贷危机后监管四个阶段,我国资本监管则经历了资本监管空白期、资本监管软约束、资本监管硬约束和次贷危机后监管四个阶段。回顾了资本监管实践发展后,就当前资本监管下我国商业银行的资本变化和资本充足率提升途径进行了分析。在理论和实践分析的基础上,本文从三个方面研究了我国资本监管有效性：资本监管是否降低了商业银行风险；资本监管是否影响了宏观经济运行；资本监管是否削弱了商业银行长期竞争力。降低商业银行风险是资本监管的首要目标,也是最终目的。资本监管可以从直接和间接两个方面影响宏观经济及经济周期。间接上,资本监管可以通过货币政策传导而影响宏观经济。直接上,资本监管可以通过商业银行贷款来影响宏观经济。资本监管对商业银行长期竞争力的影响,需要从商业银行市场占有份额、商业银行银行盈利能力和银行业公平竞争度三个方面来综合判断。资本监管的加强,可能导致商业银行缩减信贷,从而削弱商业银行与资本市场竞争中的竞争力,也会降低商业银行的盈利能力,不过严格统一的资本监管有利于银行业的公平竞争。
研究结果表明,首先,不管是资本充足情况较好的银行,还是资本充足情况不好的银行在资本监管压力下都提高了资本充足率,资本监管也促进了商业银行风险的降低,不过效果逐渐减弱；其次,短期内资本监管会恶化宏观经济,但在长期内,资本充足率较高银行的顺经济周期性要小于资本充足率低的银行,说明资本监管对宏观经济起到“稳定器”的作用；再次,资本监管在一定程度上削弱了银行业与资本市场竞争中的竞争力,银行业市场占有份额有所下降；资本监管对我国商业银行盈利能力影响不大,盈利能力主要受其他因素的影响；资本监管在一定程度上可以影响到银行业市场竞争度,但是目前影响我国银行业市场竞争度的主要因素并不是资本监管,也就是说资本监管对维护银行业公平竞争中的作用不大。总体上来看,资本监管在提高商业银行资本充足率的同时,有助于宏观经济的稳定发展,但在一定程度上削弱了商业银行长期竞争力。
我国资本监管取得了一定的效果,也存在许多需要改进的地方,尤其是在当前金融危机背景下。根据对我国商业资本监管有效性分析结果和当前金融危机下资本监管表现的不足,本文提出了提高我国商业银行资本监管有效性的政策建议：(1)建立资本监管逆周期机制；(2)建立资本监管的激励机制；(3)注意与其他宏观政策配合(4)改进资本充足率计量体系；(5)提高资本金质量的标准；(6)加强对表外业务的监管；(7)建立多元化资本补充渠道。
The capital is the foundation of the survival and development of the commercial banks,and the capital regulation is the core of banking supervision. Since the implementation of "Basel Capital Accord", capital standard has turned into a generally accepted international standard to measure the stability of single bank and even of the whole banking system, as an important benchmark to maintain fair competition in banking industry. Since capital regulation play an important role in banking supervision,the effectiveness of capital regulation will affect the safe operations of commercial banks and the stability of macroeconomic. After several financial crises, capital regulation has made considerable development. However, commercial banks are in constant innovation and development, supervision of commercial banks also need to improve continually to meet the development of commercial banks. The broke out of 2008 subprime crisis let the financial regulators to be widely questioned, commercial bank capital regulation has been pushed to cusp once again. Why can't capital regulation let bank operation robust enough? China's finncial system is relatively closed so that our financial institutions escape from this disaster temporarily. But with the increasingly open of China's financial, can our capital regulation help commercial banks to resist risks and protect the economic stability if next crisis come?
The article follows this research path that from theory to practice:analyzed the necessary of capital regulation to the commercial banks from the theory, and find out the theoretical basis to identify the effectiveness of capital regulation; reviewed all stages of development of commercial bank capital regulation at abroad from the practice. The foreign Capital Regulation experienced four stages:Subjective capital regulation, objective capital regulation, "the Basel Capital Accord" unified control and supervision of sub-prime crisis. Capital Regulation in China experienced the blank capital regulation, capital regulation of soft constraints, capital regulation of hard constraints and supervision of sub-prime crisis. After reviewed the practice of capital regulation, under the current capital regulation, the article analyzed the capital changes of commercial banks and ways to improve capital adequacy in China. Based on the analysis of theory and practice, this paper researched three aspects of the effectiveness of capital regulation in China:Does capital regulation reduces the risk of commercial banks; capital regulation affected the macro-economy; capital regulation is undermined long-term competitiveness of commercial banks. The primary objective of capital regulation is to reduce the risk of commercial banks, which is the ultimate goal of capital regulation. Capital regulation can affect the macroeconomic and business cycle from directly and indirectly. Indirectly, capital regulation can affect macroeconomic by monetary policy transmission. Directly, capital regulation can affect macroeconomic by Commercial bank loans. Capital Regulation Influenced the bank's long-term competitiveness banks, judge the impact need Consider three aspects:the competition of banking and capital markets, commercial bank's profitability and degree of fair competition in the banking industry. Strengthening of capital regulation may lead to reduced commercial bank credit, thereby weakening the commercial bank's competitiveness, will also reduce the profitability of commercial banks, but the strict and unified supervision of capital is conducive to fair competition in the banking sector.
The results show that, first of all, Banks all rise their capital adequacies under the pressure caused by the capital regulation regardless of whether their capital adequacies are satisfactory. And the capital regulation also contributes to reducing the risk of commercial banks,but the effect is gradually weakened; Secondly, the capital regulation worsens the macroeconomic in the short term, but in the long term, the banks with high capital adequacy ratios are less obvious than banks wiht low capital adequacy in adapting to economic cycles, which shows that the capital regulation plays a "stabilizer "role on macroeconomic; Finally, the capital regulation weakens the competitiveness between banking and capital markets to some extent; the capital regulation has little effect on the profitability of Chinese commercial banks, which is mainly affected by other factors; the capital regulation affects the level of competition in the banking sector to a certain extent,but what affects present level of competition in the banking sector is not the regulatory capital mainly, that is the capital regulation has a tiny effect on maintaining fair competition in the banking sector.Overall, the capital regulation not only urges commercial banks to raise the capital adequacy ratio, but also has a positive effect on macroeconomic. However, it undermines the long-term competitiveness of commercial banks to a certain extent.
Capital Regulation in China has borne some fruits,but there are many areas for improvement, especially in the context of the current financial crisis. According to the results of the analysis on the effectiveness of China's commericial bank capital regulation and the ill-performance of capital regulation during the present financial crisis, we advance in this paper some effective suggestions on how to improve the effectiveness of China's capital regulation. (1)establish of mechanisms for counter-cyclical capital regulation; (2) the establishment of Regulatory capital incentives; (3) Carry out regulatory policies in accordance with other macro policies(4) improve the capital adequacy ratio measurement system;(5) improve the capital quality;(6) strengthen regulation of the off balance sheet iteams;(7)establish a diversified capital added sourse.
引文
[1]Patricia Jackson. Capital Requirements and Bank Behavior:the Impact of the Basel Accord.BIS Working Paper,1999,(4):1-44
[2]Peltzman S. Capital Investment in Commercial Banking and Its Relation to Portfolio Regulation. Journal of Political Economy,1970,78(1):1-26
[3]Mingo J. Regulatory Influence on Bank Capital Investment. Journal of Finance,1975,30 (4):1111-1121
[4]Dietrich J K,James C. Regulation and the Determination of Bank Capital Changes. Journal of Finance,1983,38(5):1651-1658
[5]Keeley.Bank Capital Regulation in the 1980s:Effective or Ineffective? Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Review,1988,(4):1-20
[6]Shrieves R E,Dahl D. The Relationship Between Risk and Capital in Commercial Banks. Journal of Banking and Finance,1992,16(2):439-457
[7]Wall L D,Peterson D R. Bank Holding Company Capital Targets in the early 1990s:The Regulators versus the Markets. Journal of Banking and Finance, 1995,19(3):563-574
[8]Jacques K T,P Nigro. Risk-Based Capital,Portfolio Risk and Bank Capital:A Simultaneous Equations Approach. Journal of Economics and Business, 1997,(49):533-547
[9]Aggarwal R,K Jacques. A Simultaneous Equations Estimation of the Impact of Prompt Corrective Action on Bank Capital and Risk. In:Financial Services at the Crossroads:Capital Regulation in the 21st Century,Conference February 1998. Federal Reserve Bank of New York,1997,26-27
[10]Ediz T,I Michael,W Perraudin. The impact of capital requirements on U.K. bank behaviour. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review,October,1998,109-120
[11]Rime,Bertrand. Capital Requirements and Bank Behaviour:Empirical Evidence forSwitzerland. Swiss National Bank,1998,5-10
[12]Ghosh S,Nachane D M,Narain A,et al. Capital Requirements and Bank Behaviour:An Empirical Analysis of Indian Public Sector Banks. Journal of International Development,2003,15(12):145-156
[13]Heid,Porath,Stolz. Does capital regulation matter for bank behaviour? Evidence for German savings banks. Discussion Paper Series 2:Banking and Financial Supervision,2004,(3):230-248
[14]江曙霞,任婕茹.资本充足率监管压力下资本与风险的调整—基于美国商业银行数据的实证分析.厦门大学学报(社科版),2009,(4)：79-85
[15]张强,武次冰.中国商业银行资本充足性监管有效性的实证分析.湖南大学学报(自然科学版),2007,(11)：88-92
[16]Bernanke,Gertler. Inside the Black Box:The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy. The Journal of Economic Perspectives,1995,9(4):27-48
[17]Kishan,Opiela. Bank Size,Bank Capital and the Bank Lending Channel. Journal of Money,Credit and Banking,2000,32(1):121-141
[18]Philipp Engler,Terhi Jokipii,Christian Merkl,Pablo Rovira Kaltwasser,Lucio Vinhas de Souza. The Effect of Capital Requirement Regulation on the Transmission of Monetary Policy:Evidence from Austria. Austrian Central Bank Working Papers,2005,(9):1-20
[19]刘斌.资本充足率对信贷经济及货币政策传导的影响.金融研究,2005,(8)：10-22
[20]Borio,Furfine,Lowe. Exploring Aggregate Asset Price Fluctuations Across Countries:Measurement,Determinants and Monetary Policy Implications. BIS Working Paper,2001,(40):1-26
[21]Van den Heuvel. The Bank Capital Channel of Monetary Policy. University of Pennsylvania, mimeo,2001
[22]Van den Heuvel. Banking Conditions and the Effects of Monetary Policy: Evidence from U.S. States. University of Pennsylvania,mimeo,2001
[23]Van den Heuvel. Banking Conditions and the Effects of Monetary Policy: Evidence from US States. University of Pennsylvania,mimeo,2002
[24]Van den Heuvel. Does Bank Capital Matter for Monetary Transmission? FRBNY Economic Policy Review,2002
[25]Van den Heuvel. Does Bank Capital Matter for Monetary Transmission? FRBNY Economic Policy Review,forthcoming,2003
[26]Van den Heuvel. Does Bank Capital Matter for Monetary Transmission? FRBNY Economic Policy Review,2005
[27]Van den Heuvel. The Bank Capital Channel of Monetary Policy. University of Pennsylvania,mimeo,2007
[28]Gambacorta,Mistrulli. Bank Capital and Lending Behaviour:Empirical Evidence for Italy. Journal of Financial Intermediation,2004,(13):436-457
[29]Tanaka. How do Bank Capital and Capital Adequacy Regulation affect the Monetary Transmission Mechanism. CESifo Working Paper,2002,799
[30]Bernanke,Lown. The Credit Crunch. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1991,(2):205-239
[31]Hancock,Wilcox. Bank capital,Non-bank Finance,and Real Estate Activity. Journal of Housing Research,1997,(8):75-105
[32]Peek,Rosengren. The International Transmission of Financial Shocks:The Case of Japan. American Economic Review,1997,(9):495-505
[33]Peek,Rosengren. Collateral Damage:Effects of the Japanese Real Estate Collapse on Credit Availability and Real Activity in the United States. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Working paper,1997,(8):1-30
[34]Hancock,Wilcox. The "Credit Crunch" and the Availability of Credit to Small Business. Journal of Banking and Finance,1998,(8):983-1014
[35]Choi. The Macroeconomic Implications of Regulatory Capital Adequacy Requirements for Korean Banks. Economic Notes,2000,29(1):111-143
[36]Chiuri,Ferri,Majnoni. The Macro-Economic Impact of Bank Capital Requirements in Emerging Economies:Past Evidence to Assess the Future. Journal of Banking and Finance,2002,(26):881-904
[37]Hahn. The Effect of Bank Capital on Bank Credit Creation:Panel Evidence from Austria. WIFO Working Paper,2002,(188):1-13
[38]刘斌.资本充足率对我国贷款和经济影响的实证研究.金融研究,2005,(11)：18-30
[39]黄宪,马里,代勋军.资本充足率监管下银行信贷风险偏好于选择分析.金融研究.2005,(7)：95-103
[40]刘澜飚.银行资本充足率监管对宏观经济的影响-基于亚洲地区的实证研究.南开经济研究,2007,(6)：3-16
[41]Van den Heuvel. The welfare cost of bank capital requirements. Journal of Monetary Economics,2008,55(2):298-320
[42]Heid. Cyclical implications of minimum capital requirements. Banking and Financial Studies Discussion Paper Series,2005,(6):1-20
[43]Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report. Credit growth,bank capital and economic activity. Discussion Paper,2005,(3):15-27
[44]Blum,Hellwig. The Macroeconomic Implications of Capital Adequacy Requirements for Banks. European Economic Review,1995,(39):739-749
[45]Holmstrom,Tirole. Financial Intermediation,Loanable Funds,and the Real Sector. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1997,112(3):663-691
[46]Gambacorta,Mistrulli. Bank Capital and Lending Behaviour:Empirical Evidence for Italy. Journal of Financial Intermediation,2004,(13):436-457
[47]Borio,Zhu. Capital regulation,risk-taking and monetary policy:a missing link in the transmission mechanism? BIS Working Paper,2008,(12):1-15
[48]Hoshi,Kashyap,Scharfstein. Corporate Structure,Liquidity,and Investment: Evidence form Japanese Industrial Groups. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1991,(06):33-60
[49]Shirasu,Xu. The Choice of financing with public debt versus private debt:new evidence from Japan after critical binding regulations were removed. Japan and World Economy,2007,(19):393-424
[50]Arikawa. The Choice between Public and Private Debt by Japanese Firms. Journal of International Economic Studies,2008,(22):19-30
[51]Thakor,Wilson. Capital requirements,loan renegotiations and the borrower's choice of financing source. Journal of Banking and Finance,1995,(19): 693-711
[52]田贞余,叶峰.企业债券融资对银行业的影响及银行的对策.上海合作经济,2002,(10)：34-36
[53]Boot,Marinc. The Evolving Landscape of Banking. Amsterdam Center for Law&Economics Working Paper,2008,(3):20-38
[54]Eyssell,Arshadi. The Wealth Effects of the Risk-based Capital Requirement in Banking:The Evidence from the Capital Markets. Journal of Banking and Finance,1990,(14):179-197
[55]Madura,Zarruk. Market Reaction to Uniform Capital AdequacyGuidelines in the Banking Industry. Journal of Economics and Finance,1993,(3):59-72
[56]Cooper, Kolari, Wagster. A Note on the Stock Market Effects of theAdoption of Risk-based Capital Requirements on International Banks in Different Countries. Journalof Banking and Finance,1991,(15):367-381
[57]Wagster. Impact of the 1988 Basle Accord on International Banks. Journal ofFinance,1996,(51):1321-1346
[58]Cornett,Tehranian. An Examination of Voluntary versusInvoluntary Security Issuance By Commercial Banks. Journal of Financial Economics,1994,(35): 99-122
[59]Laderman. Wealth Effects of Bank Holding Company Securities Issuance and Loan Growth under the Risk-based Capital Requirements. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Review,1994,(2):30-41
[60]Lu,Chiuling,Yangpin Shen,and Raymond So. Wealth Effects of the Basle Accord on Small Banks",Journal of Economics and Finance,1999,(23): 246-254
[61]Boot,Dezelan,Milbourn. Regulatory Distortions in a Competitive Financial Services Industry. Journal of Financial Services Research,2000,17(1):249-259
[62]Vlaar. Capital Requirements and Competition in the Banking Industry. Federal ReserveBank of Chicago Working Paper,2000,(18):1-18
[63]Vlaar. On the influence of capital requirements on competition and risk taking in banking. EFA 2003 Annual Conference Paper,2003,(136):1-33
[64]Rime. An alternative view on regulatory distortions in a competitive financial services industry. Journal of Financial Services Research,2001,(19):27-38
[65]姜建清.国际商业银行监管环境与体制.北京：中国金融出版社,2006,453-454
[66]巴茨,卡普里奥,莱文.反思银行监管.北京：中国金融出版社,2008,99
[67]姜建清.国际商业银行监管环境与体制.北京：中国金融出版社,2006,454-455
[68]李豪明.英美银行监监管度比较与借鉴.北京：中国金融出版社,1998,53-54
[69]姜建清.国际商业银行监管环境与体制.北京：中国金融出版社,2006,174-175
[70]中国银行业监督管理委员会.商业银行资本充足率管理办法.www.cbrc.gov.cn,2004-1-2
[71]中国银行业监督管理委员会.商业银行资本充足率监督检查指引.www.cbre.gov.cn,2010-33-34
[72]邱蓉.银行资本充足性监管研究：[西南财经大学博士学位论文].成都：西南财经大学,2002,27-32
[73]尚静.银行资本监管绩效研究：[河海大学博士学位论文].南京：河海大学,2004,77-83
[74]王学龙.有效银行监管研究.上海：上海财经大学出版社,2008,122-123
[75]江曙霞.银行监督管理与资本充足性监管.北京：中国发展出版社,1994,44-45
[76]温信祥.银行资本监管研究——银行行为、货币政策与金融稳定：[中国人民银行金融研究所博士学位论文].北京：中国人民银行金融研究所,2006,41-44
[77]叶良艺.商业银行资本监管的紧缩效应探析.金融论坛,2002,(9)：13-14
[78]戴金平,金永军,刘斌.资本监管、银行信贷与货币政策非对称效应.经济学(季刊),2008,(1)：481-506
[79]温信祥.银行资本监管研究——银行行为、货币政策与金融稳定：[中国人民银行金融研究所博士学位论文].北京：中国人民银行金融研究 所,2006,96-97
[80]张晓宏.银行资本监管与宏观经济增长：一个定性的关系.北京行政学院学报,2009,(3)：72-76
[81]Thakor,Wilson. Capital requirements,loan renegotiations and the borrower's choice of financing source. Journal of Banking and Finance,1995,(19): 693-711
[82]Hellman,Thomas,Kevin Murdock,Stiglitz. Liberalization,Moral Hazard in Banking and Prudential Regulation:Are Capital Control Enough?. American Economic Review,2000,(90):147-165
[83]王学龙.有效银行监管研究.上海：上海财经大学出版社,2008,140-142
[84]Vlaar. On the influence of capital requirements on competition and risk taking in banking. EFA 2003 Annual Conference Paper,2003,(136):1-33
[85]姜波.商业银行资本充足率管理.北京：中国金融出版社,2004,43-47
[86]李晓光.银行资本充足性要求的历史沿革.烟台大学学报(社科版),1998,(3)：70-75
[87]马红磊. 《新资本协议》框架下的我国商业银行资本充足率监管研究：[山东大学硕士学位论文].济南：山东大学,2005,15-16
[88]克里斯·马滕.银行资本管理：资本配置和绩效测评.北京：机械工业出版社,2004,54
[89]Berger Allen N,Anil K Kashyap,Joseph M Scalise. The Transformation of the U.S. Banking Industry:What a Long,Strange Trip It's Been. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,1995,(2):55-218
[90]全先银,闫小娜.美国的金融监管改革.中国金融,2009,(17)：17-19
[91]汤柳,尹振涛.欧盟的金额监管改革.中国金融,2009,(17)：20-22
[92]宣晓影,全先银.日本金融监管体制对全球金融危机的反应及原因.中国金融,2009,(17)：29-31
[93]张强,武次冰.商业银行资本监管与金融稳定.光明日报(理论周刊),2010-3-23
[94]李怀珍.有效银行监管方式研究与实践.北京：中国金融出版社,2007,12
[95]卢鸿.我国商业银行资本充足比率的探讨.经济评论,2000,(6)：43-46
[96]陈艺云.资本充足性监管与我国商业银行监管研究：[暨南大学硕士学位论文].广州：暨南大学,2004,4
[97]张强,武次冰.资本监管新规对中国商业银行的影响.广东金融学院学报,2010,(1)：63-70
[98]张强,武次冰.我国商业银行资本充足率的提升途径分析.西部论坛,2010,(2)
[99]高铁梅.计量经济分析方法与建模：EViews应用与实例.北京：清华大学出版社,2006,400-401
[100]周小川.关于改变宏观和微观顺周期性的进一步探讨.新华网,http://news. xinhuanet.com/fortune/2009-03/26/conten 11079284.htm,2009-03-26
[101]张强,武次冰.金融危机下我国商业银行资本约束的逆周期性研究.财经理论与实践,2010,(1)：2-6
[102]秦建文.我国保险业发展与区域经济增长相互关系实证研究.广西大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2009,(1)：40-41
[103]汪涛.Panel Data单位根检验与协整分析.统计研究,2002,(5)：53-57
[104]杨子晖.政府消费与私人消费的期内替代和跨期替代.统计研究,2006,(8)：27-32
[105]苏良军,何一峰.中国城乡居民消费与收入关系的面板数据协整研究.世界经济,2006,(5)：65-72
[106]赵子铱,彭琦,邹康.我国银行业市场竞争结构分析——基于Panzar-Rosse范式的考察.统计研究,2005,(6)：69-74
[107]黄隽,汤珂.商业银行竞争、效率及其关系研究.中国社会科学,2008,(1)：69-84
[108]李伟,韩立岩.外资银行进入对我国银行业市场竞争度的影响：基于Panzar-Rosse模型的实证分析.金融研究,2008,(5)：87-98
[109]武次冰.资本监管对我国银行业市场竞争度的影响研究.海南金融,2010,(4)：14-16
[110]钟伟.对次贷危机的十点反思.中国金融,2008,(23)：12-15
[111]肖崎.商业银行监管资本套利与资本有效配置.新金融,2006,(4)：35-38
[112]王胜邦,陈颖.危机测试新资本协议.当代金融家,2009,(7)：22-26
[113]中国银监会课题组.顺应资本监管国际规则变化完善我国资本监管制度安排.中国金融,2010,(7)：81
[114]中国银监会课题组.提高资本工具质量增强银行损失吸收能力.中国金融,2010,(2)：69-70
[115]张赟,胡海鸥.次贷危机对新巴塞尔资本协议提出的挑战与启示.上海金融,2009,(3)：20-24
[116]中国银监会课题组.修改新资本协议漏洞扩大资本覆盖风险范围.中国金融,2010,(1)：85-86
[2]Peltzman S. Capital Investment in Commercial Banking and Its Relation to Portfolio Regulation. Journal of Political Economy,1970,78(1):1-26
[3]Mingo J. Regulatory Influence on Bank Capital Investment. Journal of Finance,1975,30 (4):1111-1121
[4]Dietrich J K,James C. Regulation and the Determination of Bank Capital Changes. Journal of Finance,1983,38(5):1651-1658
[5]Keeley.Bank Capital Regulation in the 1980s:Effective or Ineffective? Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Review,1988,(4):1-20
[6]Shrieves R E,Dahl D. The Relationship Between Risk and Capital in Commercial Banks. Journal of Banking and Finance,1992,16(2):439-457
[7]Wall L D,Peterson D R. Bank Holding Company Capital Targets in the early 1990s:The Regulators versus the Markets. Journal of Banking and Finance, 1995,19(3):563-574
[8]Jacques K T,P Nigro. Risk-Based Capital,Portfolio Risk and Bank Capital:A Simultaneous Equations Approach. Journal of Economics and Business, 1997,(49):533-547
[9]Aggarwal R,K Jacques. A Simultaneous Equations Estimation of the Impact of Prompt Corrective Action on Bank Capital and Risk. In:Financial Services at the Crossroads:Capital Regulation in the 21st Century,Conference February 1998. Federal Reserve Bank of New York,1997,26-27
[10]Ediz T,I Michael,W Perraudin. The impact of capital requirements on U.K. bank behaviour. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review,October,1998,109-120
[11]Rime,Bertrand. Capital Requirements and Bank Behaviour:Empirical Evidence forSwitzerland. Swiss National Bank,1998,5-10
[12]Ghosh S,Nachane D M,Narain A,et al. Capital Requirements and Bank Behaviour:An Empirical Analysis of Indian Public Sector Banks. Journal of International Development,2003,15(12):145-156
[13]Heid,Porath,Stolz. Does capital regulation matter for bank behaviour? Evidence for German savings banks. Discussion Paper Series 2:Banking and Financial Supervision,2004,(3):230-248
[14]江曙霞,任婕茹.资本充足率监管压力下资本与风险的调整—基于美国商业银行数据的实证分析.厦门大学学报(社科版),2009,(4)：79-85
[15]张强,武次冰.中国商业银行资本充足性监管有效性的实证分析.湖南大学学报(自然科学版),2007,(11)：88-92
[16]Bernanke,Gertler. Inside the Black Box:The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy. The Journal of Economic Perspectives,1995,9(4):27-48
[17]Kishan,Opiela. Bank Size,Bank Capital and the Bank Lending Channel. Journal of Money,Credit and Banking,2000,32(1):121-141
[18]Philipp Engler,Terhi Jokipii,Christian Merkl,Pablo Rovira Kaltwasser,Lucio Vinhas de Souza. The Effect of Capital Requirement Regulation on the Transmission of Monetary Policy:Evidence from Austria. Austrian Central Bank Working Papers,2005,(9):1-20
[19]刘斌.资本充足率对信贷经济及货币政策传导的影响.金融研究,2005,(8)：10-22
[20]Borio,Furfine,Lowe. Exploring Aggregate Asset Price Fluctuations Across Countries:Measurement,Determinants and Monetary Policy Implications. BIS Working Paper,2001,(40):1-26
[21]Van den Heuvel. The Bank Capital Channel of Monetary Policy. University of Pennsylvania, mimeo,2001
[22]Van den Heuvel. Banking Conditions and the Effects of Monetary Policy: Evidence from U.S. States. University of Pennsylvania,mimeo,2001
[23]Van den Heuvel. Banking Conditions and the Effects of Monetary Policy: Evidence from US States. University of Pennsylvania,mimeo,2002
[24]Van den Heuvel. Does Bank Capital Matter for Monetary Transmission? FRBNY Economic Policy Review,2002
[25]Van den Heuvel. Does Bank Capital Matter for Monetary Transmission? FRBNY Economic Policy Review,forthcoming,2003
[26]Van den Heuvel. Does Bank Capital Matter for Monetary Transmission? FRBNY Economic Policy Review,2005
[27]Van den Heuvel. The Bank Capital Channel of Monetary Policy. University of Pennsylvania,mimeo,2007
[28]Gambacorta,Mistrulli. Bank Capital and Lending Behaviour:Empirical Evidence for Italy. Journal of Financial Intermediation,2004,(13):436-457
[29]Tanaka. How do Bank Capital and Capital Adequacy Regulation affect the Monetary Transmission Mechanism. CESifo Working Paper,2002,799
[30]Bernanke,Lown. The Credit Crunch. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1991,(2):205-239
[31]Hancock,Wilcox. Bank capital,Non-bank Finance,and Real Estate Activity. Journal of Housing Research,1997,(8):75-105
[32]Peek,Rosengren. The International Transmission of Financial Shocks:The Case of Japan. American Economic Review,1997,(9):495-505
[33]Peek,Rosengren. Collateral Damage:Effects of the Japanese Real Estate Collapse on Credit Availability and Real Activity in the United States. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Working paper,1997,(8):1-30
[34]Hancock,Wilcox. The "Credit Crunch" and the Availability of Credit to Small Business. Journal of Banking and Finance,1998,(8):983-1014
[35]Choi. The Macroeconomic Implications of Regulatory Capital Adequacy Requirements for Korean Banks. Economic Notes,2000,29(1):111-143
[36]Chiuri,Ferri,Majnoni. The Macro-Economic Impact of Bank Capital Requirements in Emerging Economies:Past Evidence to Assess the Future. Journal of Banking and Finance,2002,(26):881-904
[37]Hahn. The Effect of Bank Capital on Bank Credit Creation:Panel Evidence from Austria. WIFO Working Paper,2002,(188):1-13
[38]刘斌.资本充足率对我国贷款和经济影响的实证研究.金融研究,2005,(11)：18-30
[39]黄宪,马里,代勋军.资本充足率监管下银行信贷风险偏好于选择分析.金融研究.2005,(7)：95-103
[40]刘澜飚.银行资本充足率监管对宏观经济的影响-基于亚洲地区的实证研究.南开经济研究,2007,(6)：3-16
[41]Van den Heuvel. The welfare cost of bank capital requirements. Journal of Monetary Economics,2008,55(2):298-320
[42]Heid. Cyclical implications of minimum capital requirements. Banking and Financial Studies Discussion Paper Series,2005,(6):1-20
[43]Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report. Credit growth,bank capital and economic activity. Discussion Paper,2005,(3):15-27
[44]Blum,Hellwig. The Macroeconomic Implications of Capital Adequacy Requirements for Banks. European Economic Review,1995,(39):739-749
[45]Holmstrom,Tirole. Financial Intermediation,Loanable Funds,and the Real Sector. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1997,112(3):663-691
[46]Gambacorta,Mistrulli. Bank Capital and Lending Behaviour:Empirical Evidence for Italy. Journal of Financial Intermediation,2004,(13):436-457
[47]Borio,Zhu. Capital regulation,risk-taking and monetary policy:a missing link in the transmission mechanism? BIS Working Paper,2008,(12):1-15
[48]Hoshi,Kashyap,Scharfstein. Corporate Structure,Liquidity,and Investment: Evidence form Japanese Industrial Groups. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1991,(06):33-60
[49]Shirasu,Xu. The Choice of financing with public debt versus private debt:new evidence from Japan after critical binding regulations were removed. Japan and World Economy,2007,(19):393-424
[50]Arikawa. The Choice between Public and Private Debt by Japanese Firms. Journal of International Economic Studies,2008,(22):19-30
[51]Thakor,Wilson. Capital requirements,loan renegotiations and the borrower's choice of financing source. Journal of Banking and Finance,1995,(19): 693-711
[52]田贞余,叶峰.企业债券融资对银行业的影响及银行的对策.上海合作经济,2002,(10)：34-36
[53]Boot,Marinc. The Evolving Landscape of Banking. Amsterdam Center for Law&Economics Working Paper,2008,(3):20-38
[54]Eyssell,Arshadi. The Wealth Effects of the Risk-based Capital Requirement in Banking:The Evidence from the Capital Markets. Journal of Banking and Finance,1990,(14):179-197
[55]Madura,Zarruk. Market Reaction to Uniform Capital AdequacyGuidelines in the Banking Industry. Journal of Economics and Finance,1993,(3):59-72
[56]Cooper, Kolari, Wagster. A Note on the Stock Market Effects of theAdoption of Risk-based Capital Requirements on International Banks in Different Countries. Journalof Banking and Finance,1991,(15):367-381
[57]Wagster. Impact of the 1988 Basle Accord on International Banks. Journal ofFinance,1996,(51):1321-1346
[58]Cornett,Tehranian. An Examination of Voluntary versusInvoluntary Security Issuance By Commercial Banks. Journal of Financial Economics,1994,(35): 99-122
[59]Laderman. Wealth Effects of Bank Holding Company Securities Issuance and Loan Growth under the Risk-based Capital Requirements. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Review,1994,(2):30-41
[60]Lu,Chiuling,Yangpin Shen,and Raymond So. Wealth Effects of the Basle Accord on Small Banks",Journal of Economics and Finance,1999,(23): 246-254
[61]Boot,Dezelan,Milbourn. Regulatory Distortions in a Competitive Financial Services Industry. Journal of Financial Services Research,2000,17(1):249-259
[62]Vlaar. Capital Requirements and Competition in the Banking Industry. Federal ReserveBank of Chicago Working Paper,2000,(18):1-18
[63]Vlaar. On the influence of capital requirements on competition and risk taking in banking. EFA 2003 Annual Conference Paper,2003,(136):1-33
[64]Rime. An alternative view on regulatory distortions in a competitive financial services industry. Journal of Financial Services Research,2001,(19):27-38
[65]姜建清.国际商业银行监管环境与体制.北京：中国金融出版社,2006,453-454
[66]巴茨,卡普里奥,莱文.反思银行监管.北京：中国金融出版社,2008,99
[67]姜建清.国际商业银行监管环境与体制.北京：中国金融出版社,2006,454-455
[68]李豪明.英美银行监监管度比较与借鉴.北京：中国金融出版社,1998,53-54
[69]姜建清.国际商业银行监管环境与体制.北京：中国金融出版社,2006,174-175
[70]中国银行业监督管理委员会.商业银行资本充足率管理办法.www.cbrc.gov.cn,2004-1-2
[71]中国银行业监督管理委员会.商业银行资本充足率监督检查指引.www.cbre.gov.cn,2010-33-34
[72]邱蓉.银行资本充足性监管研究：[西南财经大学博士学位论文].成都：西南财经大学,2002,27-32
[73]尚静.银行资本监管绩效研究：[河海大学博士学位论文].南京：河海大学,2004,77-83
[74]王学龙.有效银行监管研究.上海：上海财经大学出版社,2008,122-123
[75]江曙霞.银行监督管理与资本充足性监管.北京：中国发展出版社,1994,44-45
[76]温信祥.银行资本监管研究——银行行为、货币政策与金融稳定：[中国人民银行金融研究所博士学位论文].北京：中国人民银行金融研究所,2006,41-44
[77]叶良艺.商业银行资本监管的紧缩效应探析.金融论坛,2002,(9)：13-14
[78]戴金平,金永军,刘斌.资本监管、银行信贷与货币政策非对称效应.经济学(季刊),2008,(1)：481-506
[79]温信祥.银行资本监管研究——银行行为、货币政策与金融稳定：[中国人民银行金融研究所博士学位论文].北京：中国人民银行金融研究 所,2006,96-97
[80]张晓宏.银行资本监管与宏观经济增长：一个定性的关系.北京行政学院学报,2009,(3)：72-76
[81]Thakor,Wilson. Capital requirements,loan renegotiations and the borrower's choice of financing source. Journal of Banking and Finance,1995,(19): 693-711
[82]Hellman,Thomas,Kevin Murdock,Stiglitz. Liberalization,Moral Hazard in Banking and Prudential Regulation:Are Capital Control Enough?. American Economic Review,2000,(90):147-165
[83]王学龙.有效银行监管研究.上海：上海财经大学出版社,2008,140-142
[84]Vlaar. On the influence of capital requirements on competition and risk taking in banking. EFA 2003 Annual Conference Paper,2003,(136):1-33
[85]姜波.商业银行资本充足率管理.北京：中国金融出版社,2004,43-47
[86]李晓光.银行资本充足性要求的历史沿革.烟台大学学报(社科版),1998,(3)：70-75
[87]马红磊. 《新资本协议》框架下的我国商业银行资本充足率监管研究：[山东大学硕士学位论文].济南：山东大学,2005,15-16
[88]克里斯·马滕.银行资本管理：资本配置和绩效测评.北京：机械工业出版社,2004,54
[89]Berger Allen N,Anil K Kashyap,Joseph M Scalise. The Transformation of the U.S. Banking Industry:What a Long,Strange Trip It's Been. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,1995,(2):55-218
[90]全先银,闫小娜.美国的金融监管改革.中国金融,2009,(17)：17-19
[91]汤柳,尹振涛.欧盟的金额监管改革.中国金融,2009,(17)：20-22
[92]宣晓影,全先银.日本金融监管体制对全球金融危机的反应及原因.中国金融,2009,(17)：29-31
[93]张强,武次冰.商业银行资本监管与金融稳定.光明日报(理论周刊),2010-3-23
[94]李怀珍.有效银行监管方式研究与实践.北京：中国金融出版社,2007,12
[95]卢鸿.我国商业银行资本充足比率的探讨.经济评论,2000,(6)：43-46
[96]陈艺云.资本充足性监管与我国商业银行监管研究：[暨南大学硕士学位论文].广州：暨南大学,2004,4
[97]张强,武次冰.资本监管新规对中国商业银行的影响.广东金融学院学报,2010,(1)：63-70
[98]张强,武次冰.我国商业银行资本充足率的提升途径分析.西部论坛,2010,(2)
[99]高铁梅.计量经济分析方法与建模：EViews应用与实例.北京：清华大学出版社,2006,400-401
[100]周小川.关于改变宏观和微观顺周期性的进一步探讨.新华网,http://news. xinhuanet.com/fortune/2009-03/26/conten 11079284.htm,2009-03-26
[101]张强,武次冰.金融危机下我国商业银行资本约束的逆周期性研究.财经理论与实践,2010,(1)：2-6
[102]秦建文.我国保险业发展与区域经济增长相互关系实证研究.广西大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2009,(1)：40-41
[103]汪涛.Panel Data单位根检验与协整分析.统计研究,2002,(5)：53-57
[104]杨子晖.政府消费与私人消费的期内替代和跨期替代.统计研究,2006,(8)：27-32
[105]苏良军,何一峰.中国城乡居民消费与收入关系的面板数据协整研究.世界经济,2006,(5)：65-72
[106]赵子铱,彭琦,邹康.我国银行业市场竞争结构分析——基于Panzar-Rosse范式的考察.统计研究,2005,(6)：69-74
[107]黄隽,汤珂.商业银行竞争、效率及其关系研究.中国社会科学,2008,(1)：69-84
[108]李伟,韩立岩.外资银行进入对我国银行业市场竞争度的影响：基于Panzar-Rosse模型的实证分析.金融研究,2008,(5)：87-98
[109]武次冰.资本监管对我国银行业市场竞争度的影响研究.海南金融,2010,(4)：14-16
[110]钟伟.对次贷危机的十点反思.中国金融,2008,(23)：12-15
[111]肖崎.商业银行监管资本套利与资本有效配置.新金融,2006,(4)：35-38
[112]王胜邦,陈颖.危机测试新资本协议.当代金融家,2009,(7)：22-26
[113]中国银监会课题组.顺应资本监管国际规则变化完善我国资本监管制度安排.中国金融,2010,(7)：81
[114]中国银监会课题组.提高资本工具质量增强银行损失吸收能力.中国金融,2010,(2)：69-70
[115]张赟,胡海鸥.次贷危机对新巴塞尔资本协议提出的挑战与启示.上海金融,2009,(3)：20-24
[116]中国银监会课题组.修改新资本协议漏洞扩大资本覆盖风险范围.中国金融,2010,(1)：85-86