中国地方财政分权体制下的地方公共品供给——理论与实证
|
摘要
改革开放30年以来,财政分权体制改革一直是中国经济领域研究的重要课题。经济学家们达成了一个比较广泛的共识：中国财政分权体制改革促进了地方各级政府间的竞争,提高了地方各级政府发展经济的动力,增强了地方公共品的供给,为我国30年来的经济高速发展奠定了基础。随着中央与省级“分税制”财政分权体制的确立,地方财政分权体制也沿着“分税制”的思想逐步深化,形成了地方各级政府分工、合作提供地方公共品的财政体制基础。然而,地方财政分权体制是在地方各级事权划分比较模糊,地方各级缺乏稳定收入来源的背景下实施的,而且既没有体现居民对地方公共品的偏好显示机制,也缺乏对地方各级政府有效供给地方公共品的激励。这就使得地方公共品供给中出现诸如经济增长型地方公共品投入高速扩张,各地高速公路、地铁(轻轨)、机场及城区公用事业改变惊人；以行政管理费为代表的社会管理型地方公共品增长迅猛,各地行政事业部门人员膨胀,政府治理效率低下；而医疗、教育、卫生等社会服务型地方公共品投入相对不足且效率不高。
本文以地方财政分权体制下的地方公共品供给作为研究对象,深入探讨地方财政分权体制的制度设计、分配体制、管理机制对地方各级政府提供地方公共品的影响。本文基于前人的研究,深入分析省地财政分权体制和地县财政分权体制对地方公共品供给的影响,并在此基础上提出通过地方财政分权体制和“省直管县”财政管理体制的完善途径,以便在今后的地方财政分权体制改革中更好的促进地方公共品有效供给。本文主要包括以下五个部分。
第一部分,导论。本部分介绍了本文的研究背景和意义,并对国内外关于地方财政分权体制和地方公共品供给研究进行了梳理和综述。研究发现,地方财政分权体制的实施需要相应的居民偏好显示(选择)机制、地方政府间的激励机制等措施相配套,才能使地方公共品高效供给；对地方财政分权体制与地方公共品供给之间关系的分析,需要结合不同级次的分权程度、本级财政运行状况等方面进行理论和实证方面的研究,才能得出比较可靠的结论。最后,提出了本文的研究框架和方法,总结了本文研究的创新和不足之处。
第二部分,地方财政体制与公共品供给理论分析。本部分对地方公共品理论及其有效供给、财政分权理论下地方公共品的有效供给从理论层面进行了分析。在此基础上提出了本文地方财政体制下地方公共品供给的分析框架,并从地方财政分权体制制度设计、分配体制、管理机制层面对地方公共品供给影响机理进行了分析,为地方财政体制对地方公共品供给的实证分析奠定了理论基础。
第三部分,中国地方财政分权体制下地方公共品供给一般分析。本部分介绍了改革开放以来地方财政分权体制的制度安排,并对制度安排下的地方公共品供给情况进行了分析。研究发现：地方公共品供给规模随着经济发展而增大,地方各级政府承担了过多地方公共品供给责任：随着地方财政体制分权化的推进,尤其是“省直管县”制度的实施,地方各级财政支出中发生了有利于基层的变化；地方公共品供给结构尚待优化,即使实行了“省直管县”,经济增长型和社会管理型地方公共品供给相对规模在省级、地级、县级中仍然高于社会服务型；从主要地方公共品供给职责来看,大体呈现“省级减少、地级稳定、县级增大”的趋势,即“省直管县”制度的实施使省级、县级在地方公共品供给中的责任增加,地级供给职责相应减少。
第四部分,中国地方财政分权体制下地县级公共品供给实证分析。本部分对我国地方财政分权体制下的地县级公共品供给能力和地方财政分权体制对地级、县级公共品供给的影响进行了实证分析,并对未完全实行“省直管县”的省份与完全实行“省直管县”省份的实证结果进行对比分析。研究发现：“分税制”改革后,地级、县级财政自给率出现大幅下降,全国地级财政收入基尼系数一直处于比较平均的水平,县级则接近了不平均的警戒线；全国地级、县级财政收入泰尔指数值总体呈下降趋势,就地级而言省内差异变动程度要明显大于省际变动程度,县级则呈现出相反的趋势；在省地和地县财政分权体制下,即使“省直管县”体制实施后,地级、县级政府受财政自给能力弱、财政负担重和政府治理效率低等因素的影响,并未由经济发展型政府转向社会服务型政府。
第五部分,本文实证结论与政策建议。本部分简要总结了本文的实证研究结论,并在此基础上从地方财政分权体制制度设计、分配体制、管理机制层面提出了促进地方公共品有效供给的对策。同时,在本文分析“省直管县”制度对地县级公共品供给影响的基础上,有针对性的提出了促进“省直管县”财政管理体制完善的对策。
本文创新点在于：(1)结合西方财政分权理论与地方公共品供给理论的发展和我国地方财政体制下地方公共品供给制度变迁,构建了一个解释我国当前地方公共品供给的理论框架,对地方财政体制影响地方公共品供给的机理进行分析,并在此基础上进行实证研究。(2)通过基尼系数的简便算法和泰尔指数对地方财政分权体制的分配效应进行了分析,并对地县级财政收入省际和省内的差异程度对全国地方各级财政收入差距的贡献率进行研究。(3)从分析地县级分权程度和运行情况对经济增长型(基本建设支出)、社会服务型(教育事业费)、社会管理型(行政事业费)地方公共品的影响出发,对我国地方财政分权体制下的地方公共品供给进行实证分析。并通过对比“省直管县”省份与其他省份地方财政分权体制对上述三类型地方公共品供给的影响,探讨“省直管县”制度实施的效果。
The reform of China's fiscal decentralization system has been an essential topic in the field of economic research since China's economic reform began 30 years ago. There has been a rather wide consensus reached among economists, i.e. the reform of China's fiscal decentralization system intensified the competition among at and below provincial level governments which has been becoming a strong incentive of local economic growth. It also benefited the provision of local public goods to much extent and contributed as a foundation to the national high-speed economic growth since 1978. The fiscal decentralization system between the central government and the provincial level governments is mostly embodied in the'tax-sharing system' which also directs the reform of fiscal decentralization system at and below provincial level. Governments at and below provincial level are supposed to cooperate and be divided in the provision of local public goods. However, the reform failed in regulating clearly the provision responsibilities taking by different levels of governments at and below provincial level. It didn't succeed in guaranteeing the fiscal revenue necessary for the self-sustaining of different levels of governments at and below provincial level. The residents are lack of the revealing mechanism to show their preferences for the local public goods and the governments at and below provincial level are scarce of political and fiscal incentive to provide the local public goods efficiently are the other two limitations of the system. These deficiencies are attributable to the rapid expansion of local economic-growth-promoting public goods like highways, subways, light rail, airports and some other urban public services. Of the public expenditure structure, the administrative expenditure keeps rising while the expenditures on education and health services are still far from enough which could be described as inefficiency in local public goods provision.
This paper analyzes the provision of local public goods in the context of China's fiscal decentralization system at and below provincial level and deepens the influence research on the provision of local public goods put by institution planning, allocating mechanism and administrative system of the fiscal decentralization system at and below provincial level. Based on the current research, this paper specifies the influences put by the fiscal decentralization system at and below provincial level on the provision of local public goods. Some reforms are therefore suggested to help improve the fiscal decentralization system at and below provincial level and'province-direct-governed county'fiscal system in the intent of improving the provision of local public goods. This paper consists of five chapters as followings.
Chapter I is the introduction. This part introduces the research background and needs. After comprehensively reviewing the current research in domestic and abroad, it concludes that the revealing mechanism of residents' preferences and the incentive mechanism of governments at and below provincial level are imperative to the effective implementation of the fiscal decentralization system at and below provincial level. And also, the provision of local public goods varies among different level of governments at and below provincial level due to the practical divergence which means more necessarily positive research. In the rest, the part introduces the framework and methods of this paper and also points out the innovations and shortcomings.
Chapter II prepares the theoretic foundation for the fiscal system at and below provincial level and the provision of public goods. It begins from the local public goods theory, the efficient provision of local public goods theory and the counterpart under the system of fiscal decentralization. Then it provides a framework for analyzing the efficient provision of local public goods which should include three aspects, i.e. the institution planning, allocating mechanism and administrative system of fiscal decentralization system at and below provincial level. This is the theory foundation of the following positive research.
Chapter III focuses on the reform of China's local public goods provision under the fiscal decentralization system at and below provincial level. After reviewing the institutional change of the fiscal decentralization system at and below provincial level and the consequent provision of local public goods, it concludes the governments at and below provincial level are taking more and more responsibilities in providing the local public goods even to an over-taken share. Meanwhile, as the fiscal decentralization system at and below provincial level furthered, especially after the implementation of 'province-direct-governed county' system, there has been a beneficial change happened to the government at and below provincial level in their expenditures on the provision of local public goods.However, the public expenditure structure at and below provincial level still needs adjusting because the expenditures on the administrative and economic-growth-promoting part still dominate in the whole public expenditure while public-service-type expenditure scares comparatively even after the reform. Among the responsibility shares taken for the provision of the local public goods, the provincial government tends to decrease, the district government almost keeps it unchanged while the county level tends to increase.
Chapter IV is the positive analyses on China's provision of district and county public goods. This part positively studies on the district and county's provision ability of public goods and the influences on the district and county's provision of public goods put by the fiscal decentralization system at and below provincial level. This positive analysis extends to compare the different result between the districts who employ 'province-direct-governed county' system and those who don't. After that, it finds out since the reform of 'tax sharing system', the fiscal self-sustaining ability rate of district and county level governments has been decreasing to the much extent. Specifically, as the district Gini coefficient per capita has been around the average level nationally, the county one is close to the warning off-average level. The district and county fiscal Theil index per capita is in a down trend nationally. In the district level, the inequality coefficient within provinces is obviously bigger than that among provinces. The district inequality coefficients within eastern and western provinces are bigger than that within central China provinces. This trend contradicts in an opposite way in county level. Anyway, even employing 'province-direct-governed county' system, the district and county governments still fail in transiting from an economic-growth-promoting government to a public-service-type one due to fiscal deficiency and operational inefficiency.
Chapter V is main conclusions and policy suggestions. It starts from making brief conclusions about the former chapters. Then, some suggestions are brought up about the institution planning, allocating mechanism and administrative system of the fiscal decentralization system at and below provincial level intending to provide local public goods more efficiently. At the same time, some policies are also put forward on how to adjust'the provincial government's direct administration over the county government' fiscal administration system.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:(1) it sets up a theoretical framework to explain the local public goods supply in China based on development of western fiscal decentralization theory and local public goods supply theory, and on the transformation of local public goods supply under the fiscal system at and below. provincial level in China. Within the theoretical framework the author analyzes the mechanism of how fiscal system at and below provincial level influences local public goods supply, and makes an empirical study accordingly. (2) It analyzes the redistribution effect of decentralized fiscal system at and below provincial level via the simple arithmetic of Gini coefficient and Theil index, and studies the contribution rate of municipal and prefectural government revenue disparities within a province and cross provinces to the revenue disparities of government at all levels in China. It finds that from 1999 to 2006, the Gini coefficient of municipal government revenue is at the average level all along, while the Gini coefficient of prefectural government revenue is close to the critical point of unevenness; the municipal government revenue disparity in a province varies greater than that across provinces, whereas the prefectural government revenue disparity shows an opposite tendency. (3) it makes an empirical study on local public goods supply under the decentralized fiscal system at and below provincial level in China, by analyzing the impact of municipal and prefectural decentralization degree on local public goods in three categories:economic growth (infrastructure expenditure), social service (education fees), and social management (administration fees). On the basis of comparison of the impact on the supply of above three types of local public goods by decentralized fiscal system at and below provincial level between provinces with 'province-direct-governed counties' and those without, it discusses the effects and problems of 'province-direct-governed counties' policy. The author finds that even with the policy of 'province-direct-governed counties', the decentralized fiscal system at and below provincial level at provincial level makes no help for prefectural governments to realize a transformation from'economic-growth type'to'social-service type'. A sufficient prefectural public goods supply may be more likely achieved by enhancing the prefectural government governing efficiency and alleviating its fiscal burden than simply promoting the decentralization among governments of different levels.
本文以地方财政分权体制下的地方公共品供给作为研究对象,深入探讨地方财政分权体制的制度设计、分配体制、管理机制对地方各级政府提供地方公共品的影响。本文基于前人的研究,深入分析省地财政分权体制和地县财政分权体制对地方公共品供给的影响,并在此基础上提出通过地方财政分权体制和“省直管县”财政管理体制的完善途径,以便在今后的地方财政分权体制改革中更好的促进地方公共品有效供给。本文主要包括以下五个部分。
第一部分,导论。本部分介绍了本文的研究背景和意义,并对国内外关于地方财政分权体制和地方公共品供给研究进行了梳理和综述。研究发现,地方财政分权体制的实施需要相应的居民偏好显示(选择)机制、地方政府间的激励机制等措施相配套,才能使地方公共品高效供给；对地方财政分权体制与地方公共品供给之间关系的分析,需要结合不同级次的分权程度、本级财政运行状况等方面进行理论和实证方面的研究,才能得出比较可靠的结论。最后,提出了本文的研究框架和方法,总结了本文研究的创新和不足之处。
第二部分,地方财政体制与公共品供给理论分析。本部分对地方公共品理论及其有效供给、财政分权理论下地方公共品的有效供给从理论层面进行了分析。在此基础上提出了本文地方财政体制下地方公共品供给的分析框架,并从地方财政分权体制制度设计、分配体制、管理机制层面对地方公共品供给影响机理进行了分析,为地方财政体制对地方公共品供给的实证分析奠定了理论基础。
第三部分,中国地方财政分权体制下地方公共品供给一般分析。本部分介绍了改革开放以来地方财政分权体制的制度安排,并对制度安排下的地方公共品供给情况进行了分析。研究发现：地方公共品供给规模随着经济发展而增大,地方各级政府承担了过多地方公共品供给责任：随着地方财政体制分权化的推进,尤其是“省直管县”制度的实施,地方各级财政支出中发生了有利于基层的变化；地方公共品供给结构尚待优化,即使实行了“省直管县”,经济增长型和社会管理型地方公共品供给相对规模在省级、地级、县级中仍然高于社会服务型；从主要地方公共品供给职责来看,大体呈现“省级减少、地级稳定、县级增大”的趋势,即“省直管县”制度的实施使省级、县级在地方公共品供给中的责任增加,地级供给职责相应减少。
第四部分,中国地方财政分权体制下地县级公共品供给实证分析。本部分对我国地方财政分权体制下的地县级公共品供给能力和地方财政分权体制对地级、县级公共品供给的影响进行了实证分析,并对未完全实行“省直管县”的省份与完全实行“省直管县”省份的实证结果进行对比分析。研究发现：“分税制”改革后,地级、县级财政自给率出现大幅下降,全国地级财政收入基尼系数一直处于比较平均的水平,县级则接近了不平均的警戒线；全国地级、县级财政收入泰尔指数值总体呈下降趋势,就地级而言省内差异变动程度要明显大于省际变动程度,县级则呈现出相反的趋势；在省地和地县财政分权体制下,即使“省直管县”体制实施后,地级、县级政府受财政自给能力弱、财政负担重和政府治理效率低等因素的影响,并未由经济发展型政府转向社会服务型政府。
第五部分,本文实证结论与政策建议。本部分简要总结了本文的实证研究结论,并在此基础上从地方财政分权体制制度设计、分配体制、管理机制层面提出了促进地方公共品有效供给的对策。同时,在本文分析“省直管县”制度对地县级公共品供给影响的基础上,有针对性的提出了促进“省直管县”财政管理体制完善的对策。
本文创新点在于：(1)结合西方财政分权理论与地方公共品供给理论的发展和我国地方财政体制下地方公共品供给制度变迁,构建了一个解释我国当前地方公共品供给的理论框架,对地方财政体制影响地方公共品供给的机理进行分析,并在此基础上进行实证研究。(2)通过基尼系数的简便算法和泰尔指数对地方财政分权体制的分配效应进行了分析,并对地县级财政收入省际和省内的差异程度对全国地方各级财政收入差距的贡献率进行研究。(3)从分析地县级分权程度和运行情况对经济增长型(基本建设支出)、社会服务型(教育事业费)、社会管理型(行政事业费)地方公共品的影响出发,对我国地方财政分权体制下的地方公共品供给进行实证分析。并通过对比“省直管县”省份与其他省份地方财政分权体制对上述三类型地方公共品供给的影响,探讨“省直管县”制度实施的效果。
The reform of China's fiscal decentralization system has been an essential topic in the field of economic research since China's economic reform began 30 years ago. There has been a rather wide consensus reached among economists, i.e. the reform of China's fiscal decentralization system intensified the competition among at and below provincial level governments which has been becoming a strong incentive of local economic growth. It also benefited the provision of local public goods to much extent and contributed as a foundation to the national high-speed economic growth since 1978. The fiscal decentralization system between the central government and the provincial level governments is mostly embodied in the'tax-sharing system' which also directs the reform of fiscal decentralization system at and below provincial level. Governments at and below provincial level are supposed to cooperate and be divided in the provision of local public goods. However, the reform failed in regulating clearly the provision responsibilities taking by different levels of governments at and below provincial level. It didn't succeed in guaranteeing the fiscal revenue necessary for the self-sustaining of different levels of governments at and below provincial level. The residents are lack of the revealing mechanism to show their preferences for the local public goods and the governments at and below provincial level are scarce of political and fiscal incentive to provide the local public goods efficiently are the other two limitations of the system. These deficiencies are attributable to the rapid expansion of local economic-growth-promoting public goods like highways, subways, light rail, airports and some other urban public services. Of the public expenditure structure, the administrative expenditure keeps rising while the expenditures on education and health services are still far from enough which could be described as inefficiency in local public goods provision.
This paper analyzes the provision of local public goods in the context of China's fiscal decentralization system at and below provincial level and deepens the influence research on the provision of local public goods put by institution planning, allocating mechanism and administrative system of the fiscal decentralization system at and below provincial level. Based on the current research, this paper specifies the influences put by the fiscal decentralization system at and below provincial level on the provision of local public goods. Some reforms are therefore suggested to help improve the fiscal decentralization system at and below provincial level and'province-direct-governed county'fiscal system in the intent of improving the provision of local public goods. This paper consists of five chapters as followings.
Chapter I is the introduction. This part introduces the research background and needs. After comprehensively reviewing the current research in domestic and abroad, it concludes that the revealing mechanism of residents' preferences and the incentive mechanism of governments at and below provincial level are imperative to the effective implementation of the fiscal decentralization system at and below provincial level. And also, the provision of local public goods varies among different level of governments at and below provincial level due to the practical divergence which means more necessarily positive research. In the rest, the part introduces the framework and methods of this paper and also points out the innovations and shortcomings.
Chapter II prepares the theoretic foundation for the fiscal system at and below provincial level and the provision of public goods. It begins from the local public goods theory, the efficient provision of local public goods theory and the counterpart under the system of fiscal decentralization. Then it provides a framework for analyzing the efficient provision of local public goods which should include three aspects, i.e. the institution planning, allocating mechanism and administrative system of fiscal decentralization system at and below provincial level. This is the theory foundation of the following positive research.
Chapter III focuses on the reform of China's local public goods provision under the fiscal decentralization system at and below provincial level. After reviewing the institutional change of the fiscal decentralization system at and below provincial level and the consequent provision of local public goods, it concludes the governments at and below provincial level are taking more and more responsibilities in providing the local public goods even to an over-taken share. Meanwhile, as the fiscal decentralization system at and below provincial level furthered, especially after the implementation of 'province-direct-governed county' system, there has been a beneficial change happened to the government at and below provincial level in their expenditures on the provision of local public goods.However, the public expenditure structure at and below provincial level still needs adjusting because the expenditures on the administrative and economic-growth-promoting part still dominate in the whole public expenditure while public-service-type expenditure scares comparatively even after the reform. Among the responsibility shares taken for the provision of the local public goods, the provincial government tends to decrease, the district government almost keeps it unchanged while the county level tends to increase.
Chapter IV is the positive analyses on China's provision of district and county public goods. This part positively studies on the district and county's provision ability of public goods and the influences on the district and county's provision of public goods put by the fiscal decentralization system at and below provincial level. This positive analysis extends to compare the different result between the districts who employ 'province-direct-governed county' system and those who don't. After that, it finds out since the reform of 'tax sharing system', the fiscal self-sustaining ability rate of district and county level governments has been decreasing to the much extent. Specifically, as the district Gini coefficient per capita has been around the average level nationally, the county one is close to the warning off-average level. The district and county fiscal Theil index per capita is in a down trend nationally. In the district level, the inequality coefficient within provinces is obviously bigger than that among provinces. The district inequality coefficients within eastern and western provinces are bigger than that within central China provinces. This trend contradicts in an opposite way in county level. Anyway, even employing 'province-direct-governed county' system, the district and county governments still fail in transiting from an economic-growth-promoting government to a public-service-type one due to fiscal deficiency and operational inefficiency.
Chapter V is main conclusions and policy suggestions. It starts from making brief conclusions about the former chapters. Then, some suggestions are brought up about the institution planning, allocating mechanism and administrative system of the fiscal decentralization system at and below provincial level intending to provide local public goods more efficiently. At the same time, some policies are also put forward on how to adjust'the provincial government's direct administration over the county government' fiscal administration system.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:(1) it sets up a theoretical framework to explain the local public goods supply in China based on development of western fiscal decentralization theory and local public goods supply theory, and on the transformation of local public goods supply under the fiscal system at and below. provincial level in China. Within the theoretical framework the author analyzes the mechanism of how fiscal system at and below provincial level influences local public goods supply, and makes an empirical study accordingly. (2) It analyzes the redistribution effect of decentralized fiscal system at and below provincial level via the simple arithmetic of Gini coefficient and Theil index, and studies the contribution rate of municipal and prefectural government revenue disparities within a province and cross provinces to the revenue disparities of government at all levels in China. It finds that from 1999 to 2006, the Gini coefficient of municipal government revenue is at the average level all along, while the Gini coefficient of prefectural government revenue is close to the critical point of unevenness; the municipal government revenue disparity in a province varies greater than that across provinces, whereas the prefectural government revenue disparity shows an opposite tendency. (3) it makes an empirical study on local public goods supply under the decentralized fiscal system at and below provincial level in China, by analyzing the impact of municipal and prefectural decentralization degree on local public goods in three categories:economic growth (infrastructure expenditure), social service (education fees), and social management (administration fees). On the basis of comparison of the impact on the supply of above three types of local public goods by decentralized fiscal system at and below provincial level between provinces with 'province-direct-governed counties' and those without, it discusses the effects and problems of 'province-direct-governed counties' policy. The author finds that even with the policy of 'province-direct-governed counties', the decentralized fiscal system at and below provincial level at provincial level makes no help for prefectural governments to realize a transformation from'economic-growth type'to'social-service type'. A sufficient prefectural public goods supply may be more likely achieved by enhancing the prefectural government governing efficiency and alleviating its fiscal burden than simply promoting the decentralization among governments of different levels.
引文
①“省直接管理县”以下简称“省直管县”
②[英]亚当·斯密.国富论.上海三联书店,2009,P444-521
③ Samuelson, PA., " The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, " Reviews of Economics and Statistics, XXXVI, No.4, November,1954:pp387-389.
① Wicksell, K.:Finanztheoreticche Untersuchungen, Gustav Fisher, Jena,1896.
② Lindahl, Erick:Die Gerechtigkeit der Besteuerung, Lund,1919.
Samuelson, P A., The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure,Reviews of Economics and Statistics,No.4,November, 1954(36):pp387-389.
④ William Vickrey, Agenda for progressive taxation,New York:Ronald Press,1947
⑤ Foley,D.K. Lindahl's solution and the core of an economy with public goods. Econometrica,1970(38):pp.66-72
⑥ Tiebout, C.,1956, "A pure theory of local expenditures", Journal of Political Economics 64, pp416-424.
⑦Green,J.R.&Laffont,J.J.Incentives in public decision-making. Amsterdam:North-Holland,1979
⑧Laffont,J.J. Incentives and the allocation of public goods. In:Auerbach, A.J.& Martin,F. Handbook of public economics 2.Amsterdam:North-Holland,1987
⑨ Rose,A.S. Market models of local government:exit, voting, and the land market. Journal of Urban Economics, 1979(6):pp.319-337
⑩ Epple,D.,Filimon,R.&Romer,T. Existence of voting and housing equilibrium in a system of communities with property taxes. Regional Science and Urban Economics,1993(23):pp.585-610
①Nechyba,T.J.Existence of equilibrium and stratification in local and hierarchical Tiebout economies with property taxes and voting. NBER:Technical Working Paper 1996,No.190
②也被称为“或有估价法”(Contingent Valuation Method),这个方法建立在资料丰富的数据库基础上,不仅限于地方公共品的需求估计上,而且具有更广泛的应用领域。但这种方法在统计分析中有可能存在各种各样的偏差。
③Gunnar Rongen. Efficiency in the provision of local public goods in Norway. European Journal of Political Economy,1995, vol.11, issue 2, pp253-264
④ Oates,W.E. Fiscal federalism. New York:Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,1972
⑤ Wildasin,D.E.Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition.Journal of public economics 35,1988:pp229-240
⑥ Gordon,R.H.&Wilson,I.D. Expenditure competition. Working paper 8189,National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001
⑦Zodrow, George R.& Mieszkowski, Peter M., The new view of the property tax A reformulation, Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol, vol. May,1986,19(3):pp356-370
①Bretion,A. Competitive Governments:An Economic Theory of Politics and Public Finnnce, Cambridge:Cambridge Univeristy of Press,1998:pp.56～84
②Hayek,F.A.The use of knowledge in society. American Economic Review,1945.pp:35
③Stigler,G Tenable range of functions of local government.Washington,D.C.:Joint Economic Committee. Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy,1957:pp213-219
④ Tresch,R.W. Public finance. Business Publication,Inc,1981:pp.574-576.
⑤ Tiebout, C.,1956, "A pure theory of local expenditures", Journal of Political Economics 64, pp416-424
⑥奥茨指出：“关于该物品的每一个产出量的提供成本无论对中央政府还是对地方政府来说都是相同的。那么,让地方政府将一个帕累托有效的产出量提供给他们各自的选民,则总是要比中央政府向全体选民提供任何特定的并且一致的产出量有效得多。”
①俱乐部,一般理解为分享某种利益而联合起来的人们的一个自愿协会。
② Buchanan,J.M.An economic theory of clubs.Economics,February 1965(32):pp241～252
③[美]理曼瑟尔·奥尔森.集体行动的逻辑.上海：上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1995
④ Musgrave,R.A. Public finance in theory and practice:a study in public economy. New York:McGraw-Hill,1959
⑤[美]理查德·A·马斯格雷夫、詹姆斯·M.布坎南.公共财政与公共选择.北京：中国财政经济出版社,2000,P258-284
⑥ Bahl,R.W. Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in China. Working paper, WPS863, Policy Research Department, World Bank,Washington, D.C.,1992
①[美]费雪.州和地方财政学.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2000,P14
② Remy Prud'homme,The dangers of decentralization, World Bank Res Obs.1995(10):pp201～220
③ Qian,&Weittgast,B.,Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives.Journal of Economic Perspectives,1997(11):pp83～92
① King,D.Local economics in theory and practice.London:Routledge,1992.
② Rodden, Jonathan,Rose-Ackerman Susan,Does Federalism Preserve Markets,
③ Mckinnon,R.&Ronald,.Market-preserving federalism in the American Monerary Union.in Blejer, M. &Ter-Minassian, T. Macroeconomic dimensions of public finance:essays in Honour of Vito Tanzi.London Routledge,1997:pp73～93
④[美]哈维·S·罗森.财政学.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2000：P439-470
⑤“中国地方政府竞争”课题组.中国地方政府竞争与公共品融资.财贸经济,2002年第10期
⑥卢洪友、刘京焕.地方性公共品供给制度创新研究.中南财经政法大学学报,2003年第4期
①刘汉屏、刘锡田.地方政府竞争：分权、公共物品与制度创新.改革,2003年第6期
②陈家刚.法治框架下德国地方治理：权力、责任与财政.公共管理学报,2006年第2期
③牛艳玉.地方公共物品的定价困扰.浙江经济,2006年第3期
④高卫星.公民社会的兴起对地方公共产品供给的影响.郑州航空工业管理学院学报,2006年第4期
⑤王磊.公共品供给主体选择：基于交易费用经济学的理论分析框架及在中国的应用.财贸经济,2007年第8期
①王德祥、李建军.辖区人口、面积与地方财政支出：基于鄂鲁吉3省178个县(市)数据的实证研究.财贸经济,2009年第4期
②赵农、刘小鲁.区位性因素与公共品的最优供给.经济研究,2008年第10期
③刘小鲁.区域性公共品的最优供给：应用中国省际面板数据的分析.世界经济,2008年第4期
④闫威、肖笛.税收竞争与地方公共品供给不足问题研究.江汉论坛,2008年第7期
⑤吴亚卓.我国城乡公共品供给的一个理论模型及政策建议.财政研究,2008年第11期
①孔琳.公共品投资：地方政府行为的经济数理分析.生产力研究,2009年第4期
②贾康,白景明.县乡财政体制解困与财政体制创新.经济研究,2002年第2期
③杨之刚.中国分税财政体制：问题成因和改革建议.财贸经济,2004年第10期
④阎坤.转移支付制度与县乡财政体制构建.财贸经济,2004年第8期
⑤朱秋霞.行政区划与地方财政体制：几个相关的理论问题.经济社会体制比较,2005年第1期
①贾康、阎坤.完善省以下财政体制改革的中长期思考.管理世界,2005年第8期
②葛乃旭.重建我国政府间转移支付制度的构想.财贸经济,2005年第1期
③周飞舟.分税制十年：制度及其影响.中国社会科学,2006年第6期
④张闫龙.财政分权与省以下政府间关系的演变：对20世纪80年代A省财政体制改革中政府间关系变迁的个案研究.社会学研究,2006年第3期
⑤尹恒、康琳琳、王丽娟.政府间转移支付的财力均等化效应：基于中国县级数据的研究.管理世界,2007年第1期
①袁飞、陶然、徐志刚.财政集权过程中的转移支付和财政供养人口规模膨胀.经济研究,2008年第5期
②吴建南、李贵宁、侯一麟.财政管理、角色冲突与组织绩效：面向中国乡镇政府的探索性研究.管理世界,2005年第12期
③沈坤荣、付文林.税收竞争、地区博弈及其增长绩效税收竞争、地区博弈及其增长绩效.经济研究,2006年第6期
④平新乔、白洁.中国财政分权与地方公共品的供给.财贸经济,2006年第2期
⑤张军、高远、傅勇、张弘.中国为什么拥有了良好的基础设施?经济研究,2007年3期
①傅勇、张晏.中国式分权与财政支出结构偏向：为增长而竞争的代价.管理世界,2007年3期
②赵文哲.财政分权与前沿技术进步、技术效率关系研究.管理世界,2008年7期
③邓可斌、丁菊红.转型中的分权与公共品供给：基于中国经验的实证研究.财经研究,第35卷第3期,2009年3月
④财政部,关于推进省直接管理县财政改革的意见,财预(2009)78号
①张宇燕,何帆.由财政压力引起的制度变迁.载盛洪,张宇燕,从计划经济到市场经济,北京：中国财政经济出版社,1998
②Shumpeter,Joseph A. The crisis of the tax state In a Peacock, R. Turvey, W.F. Stolper, International Economic Papers Ⅳ, London and New York,1954
③温家宝谈财政体制改革：让人民的钱为人民谋利益,人民网：http://npc.people.com.cn/GB/28320/116286/116574/7014258.html
①A.B.阿金特森、[美]J.E.斯蒂格里茨.公共经济学.上海：上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1994：P666-668
②[美]鲍德威,威迪逊.公共部门经济学(第二版).北京：中国人民大学出版社,2002,P352
③[美]理查德·A·马斯格雷夫、佩吉·B·马斯格雷夫.财政理论与实践.北京：中国财政经济出版社,2003,P472
④平新乔.财政原理与比较财政制度.上海：上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1996：P359
⑤刘云龙.民主机制与民主财政——政府间财政分工及分工方式.北京：中国城市出版社,2001：P25
①孙开.对地方公共物品有效供给问题的规范分析.财政研究,1997年第7期
②[美]鲍德威,威迪逊.公共部门经济学(第二版).北京：中国人民大学出版社,2002,P352
① Breton, A. A Theory of Government Grants.Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science.1965,31(2):pp175-187
①[英]约翰·伊特韦尔、[美]默里·米尔盖特和彼得·纽曼.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典.北京：经济科学出版社,1996,P390-391
② Hayek,F.A.The use of knowledge in society. American Economic Review,1945(35)
③ Musgrave,R.A. Public finance in theory and practice:a study in public economy. New York:McGraw-Hill,1959
④Tiebout. C., 1956, "A pure theory of local expenditures", Journal of Political Economics 64, pp416-424.
①也被称传统财政分权理论(The theory of fiscal decentralization),或财政联邦主义理论(The theory of fiscal federalism)、联邦主义的经济理论(The economic theory of federalism),奥茨(1999)也指出从经济学文献的角度说“财政分权”与“财政联邦主义”两个术语具有大致相同涵义。
Tiebout, C.,1956, "A pure theory of local expenditures", Journal of Political Economics 64, pp416-424.
③ Oates, W.E. The effects of property taxes and local public spending on property values:an empirical study of tax capitalization and the Tiebout hypothesis[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1969 (77):pp957-971
④ Brueckner Jan K. A test for allocative efficiency in the local public sector. Journal of Public Economics,Volume 19, Issue 3, December 1982,:pp.311-331
①Stigler,G Tenable range of functions of local government.Washington,D.C.:Joint Economic Committee. Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy,1957:pp213-219
② Musgrave,R.A. Public finance in theory and practice:a study in public economy. New York:McGraw-Hill,1959
③[美]理查德·A·马斯格雷夫、佩吉·B·马斯格雷夫.财政理论与实践.北京：中国财政经济出版社,2003,P472
④ Musgrave, R.A.A Brief History of Fiscal Doctrine. A.J. Auerbach and M. Feldstein (eds.),Handbook of Public Economics, vol.1, Amsterdam:Elsevier,1985:pp.51-59.
① McGuire,M.Group segregation and optimal jurisdictions.Journal of Political Economy,1974(82):pp112～132
①Oates,W.E. Fiscal federalism. New York:Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,1972:pp.35
①Tresch,R.W. Public finance. Business Publication,Inc,1981:pp.574-576.
① Tanzi,V. On Fiscal Federalism:Issues to Worry About. Working paper,2000
②布坎南认为地方公共品是根据特定范围内居民的偏好提供的,地方政府的最优规模即分权的程度,是对公共服务和拥挤成本之间的权衡,最佳规模应界定在外部不经济所产生的边际成本等于新成员所分担成本带来的边际节约均衡点上。
③ Stiglitz, J.E., and P. Dasgupta. Differential Taxation, Public Goods, and Economic Efficiency.The Review of Economic Studies,1971(38):pp.151-174
④ Tim Besley,and Ian Jewitt. Decentralizing Public Good Supply. Econometrica,59,6, November 1991:1769-1777.
⑤诸如社区间的收入差异、个人及区域间的偏好差异和要素流动性等情况都被排除在模型外了。
① Oates.W.E. An essay on fiscal federalism. Journal of Economic Literature,1999(37):pp.1120～1149.
②沉没成本往往指由于过去的决策已经发生了的,而不能由现在或将来的任何决策改变的成本。人们在决定是否去做一件事情的时候,不仅是看这件事对自己有没有好处,而且也看过去是不是已经在这件事情上有过投入。研究者常把这些已经发生不可收回的支出,如时间、金钱、精力等称为“沉没成本”(Sunk Cost)。
③Dewatripont, Mathias and Eric Maskin, Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies, Review of Economic Studies,1995,62 (4), pp.541-556.
① Qian,&Weingast,B. China's transition to markets:market-preserving federalism, Chinese style. Journal of Policy Reform,1996,1(2) Qian,&Weittgast,B., Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives. Journal of Economic Perspectives,1997(11):pp.83～92
②[美]钱颖一.现代经济学与中国经济改革.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2003
③即:M.Dewatripont and E.Maskin.
④ Qian,&Roland,G., Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint. American Economic Review,1998,88(5)
⑤预算软约束的本来含义是指向企业提供资金的机构(政府或银行),未能坚持原先的商业约定,使企业的资金运用超过了它当期收益的范围；或者,从跨时期的时间维度来说,提供资金的机构使企业的支出途径越出了其将来收入的现值所确定的限度(平新乔,1998)。
⑥锦标式竞争作为一种激励机制的特性最早由Lazear and Rosen (1981)提出,主要特征是决定参赛人最终胜负的是竞赛结果的相对位次,而不是绝对成绩,因而易于比较和实施。各参赛人为了赢得比赛而竞相努力,
①[德]何梦笔.政府竞争：大国体制转型理论分析范式.维滕大学讨论文稿第42期中译文.陈凌译,1999年9月
② Epple,Dennis and Allan Zelenitz, The Implieations of Competition among Jurisdictions:Does Tiebout Need Politics? Journal of Political Economy,1981,(89,6):pp.1197～1217.
③ Inman,M.&Rubinfeld,D. Rethinking federalism. Journal of Economic Perspective,1997(4)
④ Keen,M. and M. Marchand, Fiscal Competition and the Pattern of Public Spending,Journal of Public Economies, 1997(66):pp.33-53.
⑤ Ruben,Enikolopov and Ekaterina V.Zhuravskaya. Decentralization and Political Institutions. Centre for Economic
Policy Research(CEPR) working Paper,2004
①蔡冬冬.中国地方财政分权体制下地方公共物品供给研究.辽宁大学博士论文,2007
①即提高财政收入占国内生产总值(GDP)的比重和中央财政收入占财政总收入的比重,增强中央的宏观调控能力。
①张志华,完善中的中国省以下财政管理体制,载沙安文,乔宝云主编,地方财政与地方政府治理：国际经验评述,北京：人民出版社,2006,P182-185
①张志华,完善中的中国省以下财政管理体制,载沙安文,乔宝云主编,地方财政与地方政府治理：国际经验评述,北京：人民出版社,2006,P182-185
②同上
①张志华,完善中的中国省以下财政管理体制,载沙安文、乔宝云主编,地方财政与地方政府治理：国际经验评述,北京：人民出版社,2006,P182-185
②张通,中国省以下财政管理体制现状及进一步改革思路,载沙安文、乔宝云主编,地方财政与地方政府治理：国际经验评述,北京：人民出版社,2006,P3-5
①财政部：2009年财政收支况,http://gks.mof.gov.cn/zhengfuxinxi/tongjishuju/201002/t20100205_269099.html
①李萍、许宏才,中国政府间财政关系图解,北京：中国财政经济出版社,2006：P101～104
②Cowell, F.,1995, Measuring Inequality (Second Edition), Prentice Hall andHarvester Wheatsheaf, London, Sen, A, 1997, On EconomicInequality, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
③Sundrum, M. Income Distribution in Less Developed Countries. London:Routledge.1990
①本文只引用了胡祖光(2004)简单的证明部分,更复杂的证明见：胡祖光,基尼系数理论最佳值及其简易计算公式研究,经济研究,2004年第9期
①国务院发展研究中心课题组,对中国医疗卫生体制改革的评价与建议(概要与重点),http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/health/927874.htm
①根据样本数据计算：东部地区基本建设支出占本级预算内财政支出的比重平均为11.48%,中部地区为8.09%,西部为12.73%。
①根据样本数据计算：东部地区行政管理费占本级预算内财政支出的比重平均为7.99%,中部地区为9.61%,西部为12.36%。
[1][英]A.B.阿金特森、[美]J.E.斯蒂格里茨.公共经济学.上海：上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1994：P666～668
[2][美]艾尔·巴比.社会研究方法.北京：华夏出版社,2005
[3][美]奥斯特罗姆.公共事物的治理之道.上海：上海三联书店,2000
[4][美]鲍德威、威迪逊.公共部门经济学(第二版).北京：中国人民大学出版社,2002,P352
[5][美]戴维·罗默.高级宏观经济学.北京：商务印书馆,1999
[6][美]道格拉斯·C.诺思.经济史上的结构和变革.北京：商务印书馆,1992
[7][美]菲利普·T.霍夫曼、凯瑟琳·诺伯格.财政危机、自由和代议制政府.上海：格致出版社、上海人民出版社,2008
[8][美]费雪.州和地方财政学.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2000,P14
[9][美]哈维·S·罗森.财政学.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2000,P439-470
[10][德]何梦笔.政府竞争：大国体制转型理论分析范式.维滕大学讨论文稿第42期中译文.陈凌译,1999年9月
[11][美]侯赛因·阿瑟、尼古拉斯·斯特恩.中国的公共财政、政府职能与经济转型.比较,第26辑,北京：中信出版社,2006
[12][美]黄仁宇.万历十五年.上海：三联书店,1997
[13][美]黄仁宇.十六世纪明代中国之财政与税收.上海：三联书店,2001
[14][美]黄佩华、迪帕克.中国：国家发展与地方财政.北京：中信出版社,2003,P76-79
[15][美]黄佩华.21世纪的中国能转变经济发展模式吗?比较,第18辑,北京：中信出版社,2005
[16][英]加雷斯.D.迈尔斯.公共经济学.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2001
[17][美]蒋中一.动态最优化基础.北京：商务印书馆,1999
[18][美]理查德·A·马斯格雷夫、詹姆斯·M.布坎南.公共财政与公共选择.北京：中国财政经济出版社,2000,P258-284
[19][美]理查德·A·马斯格雷夫.比较财政分析.上海：上海三联书店、上海三联书店,1996,P89-97
[20][美]理查德·A·马斯格雷夫、佩吉·B·马斯格雷夫.财政理论与实践.北京：中国财政经济出版社,2003,P472
[21][美]理曼瑟尔·奥尔森.权力与繁荣.上海：上海世纪出版集团,2005
[22][美]理曼瑟尔·奥尔森.集体行动的逻辑.上海：上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1995
[23][美]罗伊·鲍尔.中国的财政政策——税制与中央及地方的财政关系.北京：中国税务出版社,2000
[24][美]钱颖一.现代经济学与中国经济改革.北京：.中国人民大学出版社,2003
[25][美]沙安文、乔宝云.地方财政与地方政府治理：国际经验述评.北京：人民出版社,2006
[26][英]亚当·斯密.国富论.上海：三联书店,2009,P444-521
[27][英]约翰·伊特韦尔、[美]默里·米尔盖特和彼得·纽曼.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典.北京：经济科学出版社,1996,P390-391
[28][美]詹姆斯·M.布坎南.民主财政论.北京：商务印书馆,1993
[29][美]詹姆士·布坎南.经济自由与联邦主义.载于经济民主与经济自由,上海：上海三联书店,1997
[30][美]邹恒甫.财政、经济增长和动态经济分析.北京：北京大学出版社,2000
[31]薄贵利.集权、分权与国家兴衰.北京：经济科学出版社,2001
[32]财政部.关于推进省直接管理县财政改革的意见.财预(2009)78号
[33]财政部国库司、预算司.全国地市县财政统计资料：1994～2006.北京：中国财政经济出版社,1997～2009
[34]蔡冬冬.中国地方财政分权体制下地方公共物品供给研究.辽宁大学年博士论文,2007
[35]蔡红英.地方财政分权的若干理论问题.财贸经济,2007年第8期
[36]曹荣湘、吴欣望.蒂布特模型.北京：社会科学文献出版社,2004
[37]陈家刚.法治框架下德国地方治理：权力、责任与财政.公共管理学报,2006年第2期
[38]陈抗、Aeye L.Hillman、顾清扬.财政集权与地方政府行为变化：从援助之手到攫取之手.经济学(季刊),第2卷第1期(2002年10月)
[39]邓可斌、丁菊红.转型中的分权与公共品供给：基于中国经验的实证研究.财经研究,第35卷第3期,2009年3月
[40]丁菊红、邓可斌.政府偏好、公共品供给与转型中的财政分权.经济研究,2008年第7期
[41]董辅礽.集权与分权—中央与地方关系的构建.北京：经济科学出版社,1996
[42]樊丽明等.新农村建设中的公共品供需均衡研究.中国财政经济出版社,2008
[43]复旦公共行政评论.第四辑：公共财政与政府改革.上海：上海人民出版社,2008
[44]傅勇、张晏.中国式分权与财政支出结构偏向：为增长而竞争的代价.管理世界,2007年3期
[45]傅勇.中国的分权为何不同：一个考虑政治激励与财政激励的分析框架.世界经济,2008年第11期
[46]高鹤.财政分权、经济结构与地方政府行为：一个中国经济转型的理论框架.世界经济,2006年第10期
[47]高铁梅.计量经济分析方法与建模：EViews应用及实例.北京：清华大学出版社,2006
[48]高卫星.公民社会的兴起对地方公共产品供给的影响.郑州航空工业管理学院学报,2006年第4期
[49]葛乃旭.重建我国政府间转移支付制度的构想.财贸经济,2005年第1期
[50]古志辉、蔡方.中国1978～2002年的财政压力与经济转轨：理论与实证.管理世界,2005年第7期
[51]郭庆旺、贾俊雪.中央财政转移支付与地方公共服务提供.世界经济,2008年第9期
[52]国家统计局.中国统计年鉴(2008).北京：中国统计出版社,2008
[53]胡书东.经济发展中的中央与地方关系—中国财政制度变迁研究.上海：三联书店、上海人民出版社,2001年
[54]胡祖光.基尼系数理论最佳值及其简易计算公式研究.经济研究,2004年第9期
[55]贾康,白景明.县乡财政体制解困与财政体制创新.经济研究,2002年第2期
[56]贾康、阎坤.完善省以下财政体制改革的中长期思考.管理世界,2005年第8期
[57]贾康、阎坤.转轨中的财政制度变革.上海：上海远东出版社,1999
[58]贾康.地方财政问题研究.北京：经济科学出版社,2004,P73
[59]蒋金法、欧阳明.农村公益事业发展与公共品供给研究.财政研究,2008年第12期
[60]蒋金法.农村税费改革的制度约束与公共财政制度创新.财政研究,2005年第10期
[61]蒋经法、杨伊.加总技术条件下全球性公共品提供及激励机制设计.财贸经济,2008年第12期
[62]孔琳.公共品投资：地方政府行为的经济数理分析.生产力研究,2009年第4期
[63]寇铁军.中央与地方财政关系研究.大连：东北财经大学出版社,1996
[64]李秉龙等.中国农村贫困、公共财政与公共品.北京：中国农业出版社,2004
[65]李国峰.中国区域经济中的地方政府投资行为分析.北京：企业管理出版社,2008
[66]李萍、许宏才.中国政府间财政关系图解.北京：中国财政经济出版社,2006：P 101-104
[67]李一花.中国县乡财政运行及解困研究.北京：社会科学文献出版社,2008
[68]李永友.经济波动的财政政策稳定效应：基于中国1978年以来的经验数据的实证分析.北京：中国社会科学出版社,2007
[69]林万龙.中国农村公共服务供求的结构性失衡：表现及成因.管理世界,2007年第9期
[70]林毅夫、蔡防、李周.中国的奇迹：发展战略与经济改革.上海：上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1994年
[71]刘汉屏、刘锡田.地方政府竞争：分权、公共物品与制度创新.改革,2003年第6期
[72]刘黎明等.财政体制的理论与模型方法研究.北京：首都经济贸易大学出版社,2007
[73]刘穷志.公共支出归宿：中国政府公共服务落实到贫困人口手中了吗?管理世界,2007年第4期
[74]刘小鲁.区域性公共品的最优供给：应用中国省际面板数据的分析.世界经济,2008年第4期
[75]刘晓路.财政分权与经济增长：第二代财政分权理论.财贸经济,2007年第3期
[76]刘云龙.民主机制与民主财政——政府间财政分工及分工方式.北京：中国城市出版社,2001：P25
[77]卢洪友、刘京焕.地方性公共品供给制度创新研究.中南财经政法大学学报,2003年第4期
[78]吕炜.转轨过程中的财政职能界定与实现：基于体制的评价与改革.世界经济,2006年第11期
[79]吕炜.1998年以来财政体制与政策的宏观评价.财贸经济,2003年第3期
[80]吕炜.经济转轨理论大纲.北京：商务印书馆,2006
[81]吕炜.政府间财政关系中的支出问题：历史、数据与比较分析.财贸经济,2005年第1期
[82]罗长远.外国直接投资、国内资本与中国经济增长.上海：上海人民出版,2005
[83]罗丹、陈洁等.中国县乡财政调查.上海：上海远东出版社,2008
[84]马昊.当代中国县级公共财政制度研究.北京：中国经济出版社,2008
[85]马骏.论转移支付.北京：中国财政经济出版社,1998
[86]马拴友.财政政策与经济增长.北京：经济科学出版社,2001
.[87]马兹晖.中国地方财政收入与支出：面板数据因果性与协整研究.管理世界,2008年第3期
[88]牛艳玉.地方公共物品的定价困扰.浙江经济,2006年第3期
[89]平新乔、白洁.中国财政分权与地方公共品的供给.财贸经济,2006年第2期
[90]平新乔.“预算软约束”的新理论及其计量验证.经济研究,1998年10期
[91]平新乔.财政原理与比较财政制度.上海：上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1996：P359
[92]钱颖一.现代经济学与中国经济改革.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2003
[93]乔宝云、范剑勇、冯兴元,中国的财政分权与小学义务教育,中国社会科学,2005年第6期
[94]乔宝云、范剑勇、彭骥鸣.政府间转移支付与地方财政努力.管理世界,2006年第3期
[95]乔宝云、沙安文(Anwar Shah).中国地方政府组织和地方财政.载沙安文、乔宝云主编,地方财政与地方政府治理：国际经验评述,北京：人民出版社,2006,P15
[96]乔宝云.增长与均等的取舍—中国财政分权政策研究.北京：人民出版社,2002
[97]沈坤荣、付文林.税收竞争、地区博弈及其增长绩效税收竞争、地区博弈及其增长绩效.经济研究,2006年第6期
[98]沈坤荣、付文林.中国的财政分权制度与地区经济增长.管理世界,2005年第1期
[99]沈坤荣、张璟.中国农村公共支出及其绩效分析：基于农民收入增长和城乡收入差距的经验研究.管理世界,2007年第1期
[100]时红秀.财政分权、政府竞争与中国地方政府债务.北京：中国财政经济出版社,2007
[101]孙长清、李晖.基于经济增长的财政支出最优化.北京：中国经济出版社,2006
[102]孙开.对地方公共物品有效供给问题的规范分析.财政研究,1997年第7期
[103]王德祥、李建军.辖区人口、面积与地方财政支出：基于鄂鲁吉3省178个县(市)数据的实证研究.财贸经济,2009年第4期
[104]王磊.公共品供给主体选择：基于交易费用经济学的理论分析框架及在中国的应用.财贸经济,2007年第8期
[105]王绍光.分权的极限.北京：中国计划出版社,1997
[106]王韬、沈伟.中印财政分权的经济增长效应研究.财贸经济,2009年第1期
[107]王文剑、覃成林.地方政府行为与财政分权增长效应的地区性差异：基于经验分析的判断、假说及检验.管理世界,2008年第1期
[108]王晓洁.中国公共卫生支出均等化水平的实证分析：基于地区差别视角的量化分析.财贸经济,2009年第3期
[109]王永钦等.中国的大国发展道路：论分权式改革的得失.经济研究,2007年第1期
[110]温来成.城镇化与中国城镇财政制度变迁研究.财贸经济,2005年第6期
[111]吴建南、李贵宁、侯一麟.财政管理、角色冲突与组织绩效：面向中国乡镇政府的探索性研究.管理世界,2005年第12期
[112]吴伟.西方公共品理论的最新研究进展.财贸经济,2004年第4期
[113]吴亚卓.我国城乡公共品供给的一个理论模型及政策建议.财政研究,2008年第11期
[114]项怀诚.中国财政体制改革.北京：中国财政经济出版社,1994
[115]辛波.政府间财政能力配置问题研究.北京：中国经济出版社,2005
[116]闫威、肖笛.税收竞争与地方公共品供给不足问题研究.江汉论坛,2008年第7期
[117]阎坤.转移支付制度与县乡财政体制构建.财贸经济,2004年第8期
[118]杨灿明、赵福军.关于财政分权后果的理论述评.财贸经济,2004年第7期
[119]杨瑞龙、章泉、周业安.财政分权、公众偏好和环境污染：来自中国省级面板数据的证据.东海证券研究所工作论文,2007
[120]杨之刚.中国分税财政体制：问题成因和改革建议.财贸经济,2004年第10期
[121]杨之刚、张斌.中国基层财政体制改革中的政府级次问题.财贸经济,2006年第3期
[122]杨志勇、杨之刚.中国财政制度改革30年.上海：格致出版社、上海人民出版社,2008
[123]杨志勇.中国财政体制改革理论的回顾与展望.财经问题研究,2006年第7期
[124]殷德生.最优财政分权与经济增长.世界经济,2004年第11期
[125]尹恒、康琳琳、王丽娟.政府间转移支付的财力均等化效应：基于中国县级 数据的研究.管理世界,2007年第1期
[126]袁飞、陶然、徐志刚.财政集权过程中的转移支付和财政供养人口规模膨胀.经济研究,2008年第5期
[127]张军、高远、傅勇、张弘.中国为什么拥有了良好的基础设施?经济研究,2007年3期
[128]张军、周黎安.为增长而竞争：中国增长的政治经济学.上海：格致出版社、上海人民出版社,2008
[129]张雷宝.公共基础设施服务均等化的理论辨析与实证考察.财贸经济,2009年第2期
[130]张通.中国省以下财政管理体制现状及进一步改革思路.载沙安文、乔宝云主编,地方财政与地方政府治理：国际经验评述,北京：人民出版社,2006,P3～5
[131]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学.上海：上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1996
[132]张闫龙.财政分权与省以下政府间关系的演变：对20世纪80年代A省财政体制改革中政府间关系变迁的个案研究.社会学研究,2006年第3期
[133]张晏、龚六堂.地区差距、要素流动与财政分权.经济研究,2004年第7期
[134]张晏.分权体制下的财政政策和经济增长.上海：上海人民出版社,2005
[135]张宇燕,何帆.由财政压力引起的制度变迁.载盛洪,张宇燕,从计划经济到市场经济,北京：中国财政经济出版社,1998
[136]张志华.完善中的中国省以下财政管理体制.载沙安文,乔宝云主编,地方财政与地方政府治理：国际经验评述,北京：人民出版社,2006,P182-185
[137]赵农、刘小鲁.区位性因素与公共品的最优供给.经济研究,2008年第10期
[138]赵文哲.财政分权与前沿技术进步、技术效率关系研究.管理世界,2008年7期
[139]赵文哲、周业安.基于省际面板的财政支出与通货膨胀关系研究.经济研究,2009年10期
[140]“中国地方政府竞争”课题组.中国地方政府竞争与公共品融资.财贸经济,2002年第10期
[141]“中国基层政府财政改革”课题组.推进中国基层财政体制改革.财贸经济,2006年第8期
[142]周飞舟.分税制十年：制度及其影响.中国社会科学,2006年第6期
[143]周黎安.转型中的地方政府：官员激励与治理.上海：格致出版社、上海人民出版社,2008
[144]周业安、赵晓男.地方政府竞争模式研究：构建地方政府间良性竞争秩序的理论和政策分析.管理世界,2002年第12期
[145]周业安.县乡级财政支出管理体制改革的理论与对策.管理世界,2000年第5期
[146]朱恒鹏.地区间竞争、财政自给率和公有制企业民营化.经济研究,2004年第10期
[147]朱丘祥.分税与宪政—中央与地方财政分权的价值与逻辑.北京：知识产权出版社,2008
[148]朱秋霞.行政区划与地方财政体制：几个相关的理论问题.经济社会体制比较,2005年第1期
[149]朱秋霞.中国财政制度—以国际比较为视角.上海：立信会计出版社,2007
[150]朱玉明.转型期多重利益驱动下的地方政府行为.山东大学2006年博士论文
[151]庄序莹.城市基础设施提供的最优规模—MDP税收分配模型的一个运用.财贸经济,2005年第5期
[152]Akai,N.&Ihori, T. Central Government Subsidies to Local Public Goods. Economics of Governance,2002(3):pp.227～239
[153]Arikan,G. Fiscal Decentralization:A Remedy for Corruption. International Tax and Public Finance,2004(11):pp.214-235
[154]Aschauer,D.A. Is Public Expenditure Productive? Journal of Monetary Economics, 1989(23):pp.177-200
[155]Bahl,R.W. Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in China. Working paper, WPS863, Policy Research Department,World Bank,Washington, D.C.,1992
[156]Bahl,R.W.&Linn,J. Fiscal Decentralization and Intergovernmental Transfers in Less Developed Countries. The Journal of Federalism, Winter,1994,24(1):pp.1～19
[157]Bahl,R.W.Intergovernmental fiscal relations in China.Working paper, WPS863, Policy Research Department,World Bank,Washington,D.C.,1992
[158]Bardhan,P. Decentralization of Governance and Development. Journal of Economic Prospectives,2002:pp.164-287
[159]Bardhan,P. Mookiherjee,D.Relative Capture of Local and Central Governments. University of California, Berkeley,mimeographed,Novernmber,1999
[160]Besley, Timothy & Jewitt, Ian, Decentralizing Public Good Supply, Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol.59(6), pages 1769-78, November.1991
[161]Besley,T.&Coate,S.Centralized versus Decentralized Provision of Local Public Goods:A Political Economy Analysis,NBER Working Paper No.708
[162]Bird,Richard M. Threading the Fiscal Labyrinth:Some Issues in Fiscal Decentralization, National Tax Journal XIVI,vol.2,1993:pp.207-277.
[163]Blanchard,O.and A. Shleifer. Federalism with and without Political Centralization: China versus Russia", IMF Staff Papers,2001(48):pp.171～179.
[164]Blundell, R., and Bond, S. Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models, Journal of Econometrics,1998,87:pp.115-143.
[165]Blundell, R., S. Bond, and F. Windmeijer.'Estimation in dynamic panel data models:improving on the performance of the standard GMM estimator', in Baltagi B. (ed.),Advances in Econometrics, Nonstationary Panels, Panel Cointegration, and Dynamic Panels, JAI Elsevier Science, Amsterdam.2000. Vol.15
[166]Bretion,A. Competitive Governments:An Economic Theory of Politics and Public Finnnce, Cambridge:Cambridge Univeristy of Press,1998:pp.56-84
[167]Breton Albert and Anthony Scott, The Economic Constitution of Federal States, Toronto:University of Toronto Press.1978
[168]Brueckner Jan K. A test for allocative efficiency in the local public sector. Journal of Public Economics, Volume 19, Issue 3, December 1982,:pp.311-331
[169]Buchanan, J.M. An economic theory of clubs, Economics, February 1965 (32): pp.241～252
[170]Cowell, F., Measuring Inequality (Second Edition), Prentice Hall andHarvester Wheatsheaf, London, Sen, A,1997, On EconomicInequality, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 1995
[171]David Roodman. How to Do xtabond2:An Introduction to "Difference" and "System" GMM in Stata. Center for Global Development,Working Paper Number 103, December 2006
[172]Dewatripont, Mathias and Eric Maskin, Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies, Review of Economic Studies,1995,62 (4), pp.541-556.
[173]Dewatripont, Mathias and Gerard Roland, Soft Budget Constraints, Transition and Financial Systems, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,2000,156, pp. 245-260.
[174]Dijk,F. van & Winden,F. Dynamics of social ties and local public good provision, Journal of Public Economics,1997(64):pp.323-341
[175]Epple,D.,Filimon,R.&Romer,T. Existence of voting and housing equilibrium in a system of communities with property taxes. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 1993(23):pp.585-610
[176]Epple,Dennis and Allan Zelenitz, The Implieations of Competition among Jurisdictions:Does Tiebout Need Politics? Journal of Political Economy, 1981,(89,6):pp.1197-1217.
[177]Faguet, Jean-Paul, "Does decentralization increase government responsiveness to local needs?:Evidence from Bolivia," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4) March2004:pp.867-893,
[178]Foley,D.K. Lindahl's solution and the core of an economy with public goods. Econometrica,1970(38):pp.66-72
[179]Gordon,R.H.&Wilson,I.D. Expenditure competition. Working paper 8189,National Bureau of Economic Research,2001
[180]Green,J.R.&Laffont,J.J. Incentives in public decision-making. Amsterdam:North-Holland,1979
[181]Green,J.R.&Laffont,J.J.Incentives in public decision-making. Amsterdam:North-Holland,1979
[182]Grewal.Bhajan S. et al (eds.),.The Economics of Federalism. Canberra:Australian National University Press,1980
[183]Gunnar Rongen. Efficiency in the provision of local public goods in Norway. European Journal of Political Economy,1995, vol.11, issue 2, pp253-264
[184]Hayek,F.A.The use of knowledge in society. American Economic Review,1945(35)
[185]Hoffman, Barak D. and Cordeira Guerra, S. Ensuring Inter-Regional Equity and Poverty Reduction. ISP Working paper, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University,2004,pp.04-11,
[186]Huther,J.&Shah. Applying a simple measure of good governance to the debate decentralization. WorldBank,Washington,DC,1998
[187]Inman,M.&Rubinfeld,D. Rethinking federalism. Journal of Economic Perspective,1997(4)
[188]J.E. Stiglitz.The Theory of Local Public Goods.The Economics of Public Services, M.S. Feldstein and R.P. Inman(eds.), London:Macmillan Press,1977.
[189]Jin&Zou,How does fiscal decentralization affect aggregate,national and subnational government size. Journal of Urban Economics,2002(52)
[190]Jin, Hehui, Yingyi Qian, and Barry R. Weingast.2000. "Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives:Federalism, Chinese Style," Working Paper, Hoover Institution, Stanford University,March,1999.
[191]Jin,Qian,&Weingast,B. Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives: Federalism, Chinese Style. Working paper,Department of Economics,University of California-Berkeley,2001
[192]Keen,M. and M. Marchand, Fiscal Competition and the Pattern of Public Spending,Journal of Public Economies,1997(66):pp.33～53.
[193]King,D.Local economics in theory and practice.London:Routledge,1992.
[194]Konrad, K.A.Local public goods and central charities. Regional Science and Urban Economics,1998(28):pp.345～362
[195]Laffont,J.J. Incentives and the allocation of public goods. In:Auerbach, A.J.& Martin,F. Handbook of public economics 2.Amsterdam:North-Holland,1987
[196]Lau, L.J., E. Sheshinski, and J.E.Stiglitz. Efficiency in the Optimum Supply of Public Goods,Econometrica.1978 (46):pp.269～284.
[197]Lin, Justin Yifu,Liu, Zhiqiang and Zhong, Funning. Fiscal Decentralization and Rural Development in China. a Report Submitted to the World Bank, June 1997
[198]Lin, Justin Yifu and Liu, Zhiqiang, Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth
[199]Lindahl, Erick:Die Gerechtigkeit der Besteuerung, Lund,1919.
[200]Liu, Zhiqiang.Fiscal Decentralization and Rural Growth. Manuscript,December 1997.
[201]Ma, Jun.Modeling Central-local Fiscal Relations in China.China Economic Review 1995(6):pp.105-136.
[202]Ma, Jun, Intergovernmental Relations and Economic Management in China, England, Macmillan Press,1997
[203]Martine-Vazquez, Jorge and R.M. McNab, Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth, World Development,2003,31,1597-1616.
[204]Maskin Eric,Yingyi Qian and Chenggang Xu. Incentives, Scale Economies, and Organizational Form.Review of Economic Studies,2000(67):pp.359-379
[205]Mauro, P. Corruption and the Composition of Government Expenditure.Journal of Public Economics,1998(69):pp.263～279.
[206]McGuire,M.Group segregation and optimal jurisdictions.Journal of Political Economy,1974(82):pp112～132
[207]Mckinnon,R.&Ronald,.Market-preserving federalism in the American Monerary Union.in Blejer, M.&Ter-Minassian, T. Macroeconomic dimensions of public finance:essays in Honour of Vito Tanzi.London Routledge,1997:pp73～93
[208]Montinola.G,Qian & Weingast,B.Federalism,Chinese style:the political basis for economic success in China.World Politics,1995(48)
[209]Musgrave, R.A..A Brief History of Fiscal Doctrine. A.J. Auerbach and M. Feldstein (eds.),Handbook of Public Economics, vol.1, Amsterdam:Elsevier,1985: pp.1～59.
[210]Musgrave,R.A. Public finance in theory and practice:a study in public economy. New York:McGraw-Hill,1959
[211]Nechyba,T.J.Existence of equilibrium and stratification in local and hierarchical Tiebout economies with property taxes and voting. NBER:Technical Working Paper 1996,No.190
[212]Oates,W.E. Fiscal decentralization and economic development. National Tax Journal XIVI, 1993:pp.237-243.
[213]Oates,W.E. Fiscal federalism. New York:Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,1972
[214]Oates,W.E. On local finance and the Tiebout model. American Economic Review, 1981(71):pp.93-98.
[215]Oates,W.E. Searching for Leviathan:An empirical analysis. American Economic Review,1985(75):pp.748-757.
[216]Oates, W.E. The effects of property taxes and local public spending on property values:an empirical study of tax capitalization and the Tiebout hypothesis[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1969 (77):pp957-971
[217]Oates,W.E. An essay on fiscal federalism. Journal of Economic Literature, 1999(37):pp.1120-1149.
[218]Oates,W.E.Fiscal competition and European Union:Contrasting perspectives. Regional Science and Urban Economics,2001(31):pp.133-145.
[219]Oates,WE.Fiscal competition or harmonization? Some reflections. National Tax Journal 2001(54):pp.507-512.
[220]Oates,W.E. Fiscal federalism. New York:Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,1972:pp.35 Qian,&Roland,G., Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint. American Economic Review,1998,88(5)
[221]Qian,&Weingast,B. China's transition to markets:market-preserving federalism, Chinese style. Journal of Policy Reform,1996,1(2)
[222]Qian,&Weittgast,B., Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives. Journal of Economic Perspectives,1997(11):pp.83～92
[223]Qian,Yingyi and Weingast, Barry R. China's Transition to Markets:Market-preserving Federalism, Chinese Style, Stanford, CA:Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University,1995
[224]Qian,Yingyi,Barry Weingast and Gabriella Montinola. Federalism,Chinese Style: the political basis for economic success in China. World Politics 1995.48 (1):pp.50-81.
[225]Remy Prud'homme,The dangers of decentralization, World Bank Res Obs.1995(10):pp201-220
[226]Rodden, Jonathan.Rose-Ackerman Susan, Does Federalism Preserve Markets, Virginia Law Review, Vol.83, No.7,1997 (Oct.,):pp.1521-1572
[227]Rongen,G Efficiency in the provision of local public goods in Norway. European Journal of Political Economy,1995(Vol,11):pp.253-264
[228]Rose,A.S.Market models of local government:exit, voting, and the land market. Journal of Urban Economics,1979 (6):pp.319～337
[229]Ruben,Enikolopov and Ekaterina V.Zhuravskaya. Decentralization and Political Institutions. Centre for Economic Policy Research(CEPR) working Paper,2004
[230]Samuelson, P.A. Diagrammatic exposition of a theory of public expenditure. Review of Economics and Statistics,1955(37):pp.350-356
[231]Samuelson, P A., The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure,Reviews of Economics and Statistics,No.4,November,1954(36):pp387-389.
[232]Schultza,C.& Syjstremb,T. Local public goods, debt and migration. Journal of Public Economics,2001(80):pp.313-337
[233]Shumpeter,Joseph A. The crisis of the tax state In a Peacock, R. Turvey, W.F. Stolper, International Economic Papers IV, London and New York,1954
[234]Stigler,G. Tenable range of functions of local government. Washington, D.C.:Joint Economic Committee. Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy,1957:pp.213～219
[235]Stigler,G Tenable range of functions of local government.Washington,D.C.:Joint Economic Committee. Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy,1957:pp213～219
[236]Stiglitz, J.E., and P. Dasgupta. Differential Taxation, Public Goods, and Economic Efficiency.The Review of Economic Studies,1971 (38):pp.151-174.
[237]Stiglitz,J.E.The theory of local public goods twenty-five years after Tiebout:A perspective, NBER Working Paper,1983,No.954
[238]Sundrum, M. Income Distribution in Less Developed Countries. London.Routledge.1990
[239]Tanzi,V. On Fiscal Federalism:Issues to Worry About. Working paper,2000
[240]Tiebout, C.,1956, "A pure theory of local expenditures", Journal of Political
Economics 64, pp416-424.
[241]Tresch,R.W. Public finance. Business Publication,Inc,1981:pp.574-576.
[242]Wang Shuna,YangYao, Grass roots Democracy and Local Governance:Evidence form Rural China, CCER,Peking University, Working paper Series,2006,NO. E2006001
[243]Weingast,B.The Economic Role of Political Institutions:Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development.Journal of Law and Economic Organization,1995(11):pp.1～31.
[244]Wicksell, K.:Finanztheoreticche Untersuchungen, Gustav Fisher, Jena,1896.
[245]Wildasin,D.E.Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition.Journal of public economics 35,1988:pp229～240
[246]William Vickrey, Agenda for progressive taxation,New York:Ronald Press,1947
[247]World Bank, China:National Development and Sub-national Finance:A Review of Provincial Expenditure, Washington D.C.2002
[248]World Bank, Fiscal Decentralization and Rural Health care in China, Working paper, Mimeo,2006
[249]Zhang, Jun. Investment, Investment Efficiency and Economic Growth in China. Journal of Asian Economics,2003,14(5):pp.713～734.
[250]Zhang, Xiaobo, Shenggen Fan, Linxiu Zhang and Jikun Huang,Local governance and Public goods Provision in rural China. Journal of Public Economics,2004,88,
[251]Zhang,Xiaobo. Fiscal decentralization and political centralization in China: Implications for growth and inequality. Journal of Comparative Economics,2006(34):pp.713-726
[252]Zhuravskaya,E.V. Incentives to provide local public goods:Fiscal federalism, Russian style. Journal of Public Economics,2000(76):pp.337～368
[253]Zodrow, George R.& Mieszkowski, Peter M., The new view of the property tax A reformulation, Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol, vol. May,1986,19(3):pp356-370
②[英]亚当·斯密.国富论.上海三联书店,2009,P444-521
③ Samuelson, PA., " The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, " Reviews of Economics and Statistics, XXXVI, No.4, November,1954:pp387-389.
① Wicksell, K.:Finanztheoreticche Untersuchungen, Gustav Fisher, Jena,1896.
② Lindahl, Erick:Die Gerechtigkeit der Besteuerung, Lund,1919.
Samuelson, P A., The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure,Reviews of Economics and Statistics,No.4,November, 1954(36):pp387-389.
④ William Vickrey, Agenda for progressive taxation,New York:Ronald Press,1947
⑤ Foley,D.K. Lindahl's solution and the core of an economy with public goods. Econometrica,1970(38):pp.66-72
⑥ Tiebout, C.,1956, "A pure theory of local expenditures", Journal of Political Economics 64, pp416-424.
⑦Green,J.R.&Laffont,J.J.Incentives in public decision-making. Amsterdam:North-Holland,1979
⑧Laffont,J.J. Incentives and the allocation of public goods. In:Auerbach, A.J.& Martin,F. Handbook of public economics 2.Amsterdam:North-Holland,1987
⑨ Rose,A.S. Market models of local government:exit, voting, and the land market. Journal of Urban Economics, 1979(6):pp.319-337
⑩ Epple,D.,Filimon,R.&Romer,T. Existence of voting and housing equilibrium in a system of communities with property taxes. Regional Science and Urban Economics,1993(23):pp.585-610
①Nechyba,T.J.Existence of equilibrium and stratification in local and hierarchical Tiebout economies with property taxes and voting. NBER:Technical Working Paper 1996,No.190
②也被称为“或有估价法”(Contingent Valuation Method),这个方法建立在资料丰富的数据库基础上,不仅限于地方公共品的需求估计上,而且具有更广泛的应用领域。但这种方法在统计分析中有可能存在各种各样的偏差。
③Gunnar Rongen. Efficiency in the provision of local public goods in Norway. European Journal of Political Economy,1995, vol.11, issue 2, pp253-264
④ Oates,W.E. Fiscal federalism. New York:Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,1972
⑤ Wildasin,D.E.Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition.Journal of public economics 35,1988:pp229-240
⑥ Gordon,R.H.&Wilson,I.D. Expenditure competition. Working paper 8189,National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001
⑦Zodrow, George R.& Mieszkowski, Peter M., The new view of the property tax A reformulation, Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol, vol. May,1986,19(3):pp356-370
①Bretion,A. Competitive Governments:An Economic Theory of Politics and Public Finnnce, Cambridge:Cambridge Univeristy of Press,1998:pp.56～84
②Hayek,F.A.The use of knowledge in society. American Economic Review,1945.pp:35
③Stigler,G Tenable range of functions of local government.Washington,D.C.:Joint Economic Committee. Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy,1957:pp213-219
④ Tresch,R.W. Public finance. Business Publication,Inc,1981:pp.574-576.
⑤ Tiebout, C.,1956, "A pure theory of local expenditures", Journal of Political Economics 64, pp416-424
⑥奥茨指出：“关于该物品的每一个产出量的提供成本无论对中央政府还是对地方政府来说都是相同的。那么,让地方政府将一个帕累托有效的产出量提供给他们各自的选民,则总是要比中央政府向全体选民提供任何特定的并且一致的产出量有效得多。”
①俱乐部,一般理解为分享某种利益而联合起来的人们的一个自愿协会。
② Buchanan,J.M.An economic theory of clubs.Economics,February 1965(32):pp241～252
③[美]理曼瑟尔·奥尔森.集体行动的逻辑.上海：上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1995
④ Musgrave,R.A. Public finance in theory and practice:a study in public economy. New York:McGraw-Hill,1959
⑤[美]理查德·A·马斯格雷夫、詹姆斯·M.布坎南.公共财政与公共选择.北京：中国财政经济出版社,2000,P258-284
⑥ Bahl,R.W. Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in China. Working paper, WPS863, Policy Research Department, World Bank,Washington, D.C.,1992
①[美]费雪.州和地方财政学.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2000,P14
② Remy Prud'homme,The dangers of decentralization, World Bank Res Obs.1995(10):pp201～220
③ Qian,&Weittgast,B.,Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives.Journal of Economic Perspectives,1997(11):pp83～92
① King,D.Local economics in theory and practice.London:Routledge,1992.
② Rodden, Jonathan,Rose-Ackerman Susan,Does Federalism Preserve Markets,
③ Mckinnon,R.&Ronald,.Market-preserving federalism in the American Monerary Union.in Blejer, M. &Ter-Minassian, T. Macroeconomic dimensions of public finance:essays in Honour of Vito Tanzi.London Routledge,1997:pp73～93
④[美]哈维·S·罗森.财政学.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2000：P439-470
⑤“中国地方政府竞争”课题组.中国地方政府竞争与公共品融资.财贸经济,2002年第10期
⑥卢洪友、刘京焕.地方性公共品供给制度创新研究.中南财经政法大学学报,2003年第4期
①刘汉屏、刘锡田.地方政府竞争：分权、公共物品与制度创新.改革,2003年第6期
②陈家刚.法治框架下德国地方治理：权力、责任与财政.公共管理学报,2006年第2期
③牛艳玉.地方公共物品的定价困扰.浙江经济,2006年第3期
④高卫星.公民社会的兴起对地方公共产品供给的影响.郑州航空工业管理学院学报,2006年第4期
⑤王磊.公共品供给主体选择：基于交易费用经济学的理论分析框架及在中国的应用.财贸经济,2007年第8期
①王德祥、李建军.辖区人口、面积与地方财政支出：基于鄂鲁吉3省178个县(市)数据的实证研究.财贸经济,2009年第4期
②赵农、刘小鲁.区位性因素与公共品的最优供给.经济研究,2008年第10期
③刘小鲁.区域性公共品的最优供给：应用中国省际面板数据的分析.世界经济,2008年第4期
④闫威、肖笛.税收竞争与地方公共品供给不足问题研究.江汉论坛,2008年第7期
⑤吴亚卓.我国城乡公共品供给的一个理论模型及政策建议.财政研究,2008年第11期
①孔琳.公共品投资：地方政府行为的经济数理分析.生产力研究,2009年第4期
②贾康,白景明.县乡财政体制解困与财政体制创新.经济研究,2002年第2期
③杨之刚.中国分税财政体制：问题成因和改革建议.财贸经济,2004年第10期
④阎坤.转移支付制度与县乡财政体制构建.财贸经济,2004年第8期
⑤朱秋霞.行政区划与地方财政体制：几个相关的理论问题.经济社会体制比较,2005年第1期
①贾康、阎坤.完善省以下财政体制改革的中长期思考.管理世界,2005年第8期
②葛乃旭.重建我国政府间转移支付制度的构想.财贸经济,2005年第1期
③周飞舟.分税制十年：制度及其影响.中国社会科学,2006年第6期
④张闫龙.财政分权与省以下政府间关系的演变：对20世纪80年代A省财政体制改革中政府间关系变迁的个案研究.社会学研究,2006年第3期
⑤尹恒、康琳琳、王丽娟.政府间转移支付的财力均等化效应：基于中国县级数据的研究.管理世界,2007年第1期
①袁飞、陶然、徐志刚.财政集权过程中的转移支付和财政供养人口规模膨胀.经济研究,2008年第5期
②吴建南、李贵宁、侯一麟.财政管理、角色冲突与组织绩效：面向中国乡镇政府的探索性研究.管理世界,2005年第12期
③沈坤荣、付文林.税收竞争、地区博弈及其增长绩效税收竞争、地区博弈及其增长绩效.经济研究,2006年第6期
④平新乔、白洁.中国财政分权与地方公共品的供给.财贸经济,2006年第2期
⑤张军、高远、傅勇、张弘.中国为什么拥有了良好的基础设施?经济研究,2007年3期
①傅勇、张晏.中国式分权与财政支出结构偏向：为增长而竞争的代价.管理世界,2007年3期
②赵文哲.财政分权与前沿技术进步、技术效率关系研究.管理世界,2008年7期
③邓可斌、丁菊红.转型中的分权与公共品供给：基于中国经验的实证研究.财经研究,第35卷第3期,2009年3月
④财政部,关于推进省直接管理县财政改革的意见,财预(2009)78号
①张宇燕,何帆.由财政压力引起的制度变迁.载盛洪,张宇燕,从计划经济到市场经济,北京：中国财政经济出版社,1998
②Shumpeter,Joseph A. The crisis of the tax state In a Peacock, R. Turvey, W.F. Stolper, International Economic Papers Ⅳ, London and New York,1954
③温家宝谈财政体制改革：让人民的钱为人民谋利益,人民网：http://npc.people.com.cn/GB/28320/116286/116574/7014258.html
①A.B.阿金特森、[美]J.E.斯蒂格里茨.公共经济学.上海：上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1994：P666-668
②[美]鲍德威,威迪逊.公共部门经济学(第二版).北京：中国人民大学出版社,2002,P352
③[美]理查德·A·马斯格雷夫、佩吉·B·马斯格雷夫.财政理论与实践.北京：中国财政经济出版社,2003,P472
④平新乔.财政原理与比较财政制度.上海：上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1996：P359
⑤刘云龙.民主机制与民主财政——政府间财政分工及分工方式.北京：中国城市出版社,2001：P25
①孙开.对地方公共物品有效供给问题的规范分析.财政研究,1997年第7期
②[美]鲍德威,威迪逊.公共部门经济学(第二版).北京：中国人民大学出版社,2002,P352
① Breton, A. A Theory of Government Grants.Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science.1965,31(2):pp175-187
①[英]约翰·伊特韦尔、[美]默里·米尔盖特和彼得·纽曼.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典.北京：经济科学出版社,1996,P390-391
② Hayek,F.A.The use of knowledge in society. American Economic Review,1945(35)
③ Musgrave,R.A. Public finance in theory and practice:a study in public economy. New York:McGraw-Hill,1959
④Tiebout. C., 1956, "A pure theory of local expenditures", Journal of Political Economics 64, pp416-424.
①也被称传统财政分权理论(The theory of fiscal decentralization),或财政联邦主义理论(The theory of fiscal federalism)、联邦主义的经济理论(The economic theory of federalism),奥茨(1999)也指出从经济学文献的角度说“财政分权”与“财政联邦主义”两个术语具有大致相同涵义。
Tiebout, C.,1956, "A pure theory of local expenditures", Journal of Political Economics 64, pp416-424.
③ Oates, W.E. The effects of property taxes and local public spending on property values:an empirical study of tax capitalization and the Tiebout hypothesis[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1969 (77):pp957-971
④ Brueckner Jan K. A test for allocative efficiency in the local public sector. Journal of Public Economics,Volume 19, Issue 3, December 1982,:pp.311-331
①Stigler,G Tenable range of functions of local government.Washington,D.C.:Joint Economic Committee. Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy,1957:pp213-219
② Musgrave,R.A. Public finance in theory and practice:a study in public economy. New York:McGraw-Hill,1959
③[美]理查德·A·马斯格雷夫、佩吉·B·马斯格雷夫.财政理论与实践.北京：中国财政经济出版社,2003,P472
④ Musgrave, R.A.A Brief History of Fiscal Doctrine. A.J. Auerbach and M. Feldstein (eds.),Handbook of Public Economics, vol.1, Amsterdam:Elsevier,1985:pp.51-59.
① McGuire,M.Group segregation and optimal jurisdictions.Journal of Political Economy,1974(82):pp112～132
①Oates,W.E. Fiscal federalism. New York:Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,1972:pp.35
①Tresch,R.W. Public finance. Business Publication,Inc,1981:pp.574-576.
① Tanzi,V. On Fiscal Federalism:Issues to Worry About. Working paper,2000
②布坎南认为地方公共品是根据特定范围内居民的偏好提供的,地方政府的最优规模即分权的程度,是对公共服务和拥挤成本之间的权衡,最佳规模应界定在外部不经济所产生的边际成本等于新成员所分担成本带来的边际节约均衡点上。
③ Stiglitz, J.E., and P. Dasgupta. Differential Taxation, Public Goods, and Economic Efficiency.The Review of Economic Studies,1971(38):pp.151-174
④ Tim Besley,and Ian Jewitt. Decentralizing Public Good Supply. Econometrica,59,6, November 1991:1769-1777.
⑤诸如社区间的收入差异、个人及区域间的偏好差异和要素流动性等情况都被排除在模型外了。
① Oates.W.E. An essay on fiscal federalism. Journal of Economic Literature,1999(37):pp.1120～1149.
②沉没成本往往指由于过去的决策已经发生了的,而不能由现在或将来的任何决策改变的成本。人们在决定是否去做一件事情的时候,不仅是看这件事对自己有没有好处,而且也看过去是不是已经在这件事情上有过投入。研究者常把这些已经发生不可收回的支出,如时间、金钱、精力等称为“沉没成本”(Sunk Cost)。
③Dewatripont, Mathias and Eric Maskin, Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies, Review of Economic Studies,1995,62 (4), pp.541-556.
① Qian,&Weingast,B. China's transition to markets:market-preserving federalism, Chinese style. Journal of Policy Reform,1996,1(2) Qian,&Weittgast,B., Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives. Journal of Economic Perspectives,1997(11):pp.83～92
②[美]钱颖一.现代经济学与中国经济改革.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2003
③即:M.Dewatripont and E.Maskin.
④ Qian,&Roland,G., Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint. American Economic Review,1998,88(5)
⑤预算软约束的本来含义是指向企业提供资金的机构(政府或银行),未能坚持原先的商业约定,使企业的资金运用超过了它当期收益的范围；或者,从跨时期的时间维度来说,提供资金的机构使企业的支出途径越出了其将来收入的现值所确定的限度(平新乔,1998)。
⑥锦标式竞争作为一种激励机制的特性最早由Lazear and Rosen (1981)提出,主要特征是决定参赛人最终胜负的是竞赛结果的相对位次,而不是绝对成绩,因而易于比较和实施。各参赛人为了赢得比赛而竞相努力,
①[德]何梦笔.政府竞争：大国体制转型理论分析范式.维滕大学讨论文稿第42期中译文.陈凌译,1999年9月
② Epple,Dennis and Allan Zelenitz, The Implieations of Competition among Jurisdictions:Does Tiebout Need Politics? Journal of Political Economy,1981,(89,6):pp.1197～1217.
③ Inman,M.&Rubinfeld,D. Rethinking federalism. Journal of Economic Perspective,1997(4)
④ Keen,M. and M. Marchand, Fiscal Competition and the Pattern of Public Spending,Journal of Public Economies, 1997(66):pp.33-53.
⑤ Ruben,Enikolopov and Ekaterina V.Zhuravskaya. Decentralization and Political Institutions. Centre for Economic
Policy Research(CEPR) working Paper,2004
①蔡冬冬.中国地方财政分权体制下地方公共物品供给研究.辽宁大学博士论文,2007
①即提高财政收入占国内生产总值(GDP)的比重和中央财政收入占财政总收入的比重,增强中央的宏观调控能力。
①张志华,完善中的中国省以下财政管理体制,载沙安文,乔宝云主编,地方财政与地方政府治理：国际经验评述,北京：人民出版社,2006,P182-185
①张志华,完善中的中国省以下财政管理体制,载沙安文,乔宝云主编,地方财政与地方政府治理：国际经验评述,北京：人民出版社,2006,P182-185
②同上
①张志华,完善中的中国省以下财政管理体制,载沙安文、乔宝云主编,地方财政与地方政府治理：国际经验评述,北京：人民出版社,2006,P182-185
②张通,中国省以下财政管理体制现状及进一步改革思路,载沙安文、乔宝云主编,地方财政与地方政府治理：国际经验评述,北京：人民出版社,2006,P3-5
①财政部：2009年财政收支况,http://gks.mof.gov.cn/zhengfuxinxi/tongjishuju/201002/t20100205_269099.html
①李萍、许宏才,中国政府间财政关系图解,北京：中国财政经济出版社,2006：P101～104
②Cowell, F.,1995, Measuring Inequality (Second Edition), Prentice Hall andHarvester Wheatsheaf, London, Sen, A, 1997, On EconomicInequality, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
③Sundrum, M. Income Distribution in Less Developed Countries. London:Routledge.1990
①本文只引用了胡祖光(2004)简单的证明部分,更复杂的证明见：胡祖光,基尼系数理论最佳值及其简易计算公式研究,经济研究,2004年第9期
①国务院发展研究中心课题组,对中国医疗卫生体制改革的评价与建议(概要与重点),http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/health/927874.htm
①根据样本数据计算：东部地区基本建设支出占本级预算内财政支出的比重平均为11.48%,中部地区为8.09%,西部为12.73%。
①根据样本数据计算：东部地区行政管理费占本级预算内财政支出的比重平均为7.99%,中部地区为9.61%,西部为12.36%。
[1][英]A.B.阿金特森、[美]J.E.斯蒂格里茨.公共经济学.上海：上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1994：P666～668
[2][美]艾尔·巴比.社会研究方法.北京：华夏出版社,2005
[3][美]奥斯特罗姆.公共事物的治理之道.上海：上海三联书店,2000
[4][美]鲍德威、威迪逊.公共部门经济学(第二版).北京：中国人民大学出版社,2002,P352
[5][美]戴维·罗默.高级宏观经济学.北京：商务印书馆,1999
[6][美]道格拉斯·C.诺思.经济史上的结构和变革.北京：商务印书馆,1992
[7][美]菲利普·T.霍夫曼、凯瑟琳·诺伯格.财政危机、自由和代议制政府.上海：格致出版社、上海人民出版社,2008
[8][美]费雪.州和地方财政学.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2000,P14
[9][美]哈维·S·罗森.财政学.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2000,P439-470
[10][德]何梦笔.政府竞争：大国体制转型理论分析范式.维滕大学讨论文稿第42期中译文.陈凌译,1999年9月
[11][美]侯赛因·阿瑟、尼古拉斯·斯特恩.中国的公共财政、政府职能与经济转型.比较,第26辑,北京：中信出版社,2006
[12][美]黄仁宇.万历十五年.上海：三联书店,1997
[13][美]黄仁宇.十六世纪明代中国之财政与税收.上海：三联书店,2001
[14][美]黄佩华、迪帕克.中国：国家发展与地方财政.北京：中信出版社,2003,P76-79
[15][美]黄佩华.21世纪的中国能转变经济发展模式吗?比较,第18辑,北京：中信出版社,2005
[16][英]加雷斯.D.迈尔斯.公共经济学.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2001
[17][美]蒋中一.动态最优化基础.北京：商务印书馆,1999
[18][美]理查德·A·马斯格雷夫、詹姆斯·M.布坎南.公共财政与公共选择.北京：中国财政经济出版社,2000,P258-284
[19][美]理查德·A·马斯格雷夫.比较财政分析.上海：上海三联书店、上海三联书店,1996,P89-97
[20][美]理查德·A·马斯格雷夫、佩吉·B·马斯格雷夫.财政理论与实践.北京：中国财政经济出版社,2003,P472
[21][美]理曼瑟尔·奥尔森.权力与繁荣.上海：上海世纪出版集团,2005
[22][美]理曼瑟尔·奥尔森.集体行动的逻辑.上海：上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1995
[23][美]罗伊·鲍尔.中国的财政政策——税制与中央及地方的财政关系.北京：中国税务出版社,2000
[24][美]钱颖一.现代经济学与中国经济改革.北京：.中国人民大学出版社,2003
[25][美]沙安文、乔宝云.地方财政与地方政府治理：国际经验述评.北京：人民出版社,2006
[26][英]亚当·斯密.国富论.上海：三联书店,2009,P444-521
[27][英]约翰·伊特韦尔、[美]默里·米尔盖特和彼得·纽曼.新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典.北京：经济科学出版社,1996,P390-391
[28][美]詹姆斯·M.布坎南.民主财政论.北京：商务印书馆,1993
[29][美]詹姆士·布坎南.经济自由与联邦主义.载于经济民主与经济自由,上海：上海三联书店,1997
[30][美]邹恒甫.财政、经济增长和动态经济分析.北京：北京大学出版社,2000
[31]薄贵利.集权、分权与国家兴衰.北京：经济科学出版社,2001
[32]财政部.关于推进省直接管理县财政改革的意见.财预(2009)78号
[33]财政部国库司、预算司.全国地市县财政统计资料：1994～2006.北京：中国财政经济出版社,1997～2009
[34]蔡冬冬.中国地方财政分权体制下地方公共物品供给研究.辽宁大学年博士论文,2007
[35]蔡红英.地方财政分权的若干理论问题.财贸经济,2007年第8期
[36]曹荣湘、吴欣望.蒂布特模型.北京：社会科学文献出版社,2004
[37]陈家刚.法治框架下德国地方治理：权力、责任与财政.公共管理学报,2006年第2期
[38]陈抗、Aeye L.Hillman、顾清扬.财政集权与地方政府行为变化：从援助之手到攫取之手.经济学(季刊),第2卷第1期(2002年10月)
[39]邓可斌、丁菊红.转型中的分权与公共品供给：基于中国经验的实证研究.财经研究,第35卷第3期,2009年3月
[40]丁菊红、邓可斌.政府偏好、公共品供给与转型中的财政分权.经济研究,2008年第7期
[41]董辅礽.集权与分权—中央与地方关系的构建.北京：经济科学出版社,1996
[42]樊丽明等.新农村建设中的公共品供需均衡研究.中国财政经济出版社,2008
[43]复旦公共行政评论.第四辑：公共财政与政府改革.上海：上海人民出版社,2008
[44]傅勇、张晏.中国式分权与财政支出结构偏向：为增长而竞争的代价.管理世界,2007年3期
[45]傅勇.中国的分权为何不同：一个考虑政治激励与财政激励的分析框架.世界经济,2008年第11期
[46]高鹤.财政分权、经济结构与地方政府行为：一个中国经济转型的理论框架.世界经济,2006年第10期
[47]高铁梅.计量经济分析方法与建模：EViews应用及实例.北京：清华大学出版社,2006
[48]高卫星.公民社会的兴起对地方公共产品供给的影响.郑州航空工业管理学院学报,2006年第4期
[49]葛乃旭.重建我国政府间转移支付制度的构想.财贸经济,2005年第1期
[50]古志辉、蔡方.中国1978～2002年的财政压力与经济转轨：理论与实证.管理世界,2005年第7期
[51]郭庆旺、贾俊雪.中央财政转移支付与地方公共服务提供.世界经济,2008年第9期
[52]国家统计局.中国统计年鉴(2008).北京：中国统计出版社,2008
[53]胡书东.经济发展中的中央与地方关系—中国财政制度变迁研究.上海：三联书店、上海人民出版社,2001年
[54]胡祖光.基尼系数理论最佳值及其简易计算公式研究.经济研究,2004年第9期
[55]贾康,白景明.县乡财政体制解困与财政体制创新.经济研究,2002年第2期
[56]贾康、阎坤.完善省以下财政体制改革的中长期思考.管理世界,2005年第8期
[57]贾康、阎坤.转轨中的财政制度变革.上海：上海远东出版社,1999
[58]贾康.地方财政问题研究.北京：经济科学出版社,2004,P73
[59]蒋金法、欧阳明.农村公益事业发展与公共品供给研究.财政研究,2008年第12期
[60]蒋金法.农村税费改革的制度约束与公共财政制度创新.财政研究,2005年第10期
[61]蒋经法、杨伊.加总技术条件下全球性公共品提供及激励机制设计.财贸经济,2008年第12期
[62]孔琳.公共品投资：地方政府行为的经济数理分析.生产力研究,2009年第4期
[63]寇铁军.中央与地方财政关系研究.大连：东北财经大学出版社,1996
[64]李秉龙等.中国农村贫困、公共财政与公共品.北京：中国农业出版社,2004
[65]李国峰.中国区域经济中的地方政府投资行为分析.北京：企业管理出版社,2008
[66]李萍、许宏才.中国政府间财政关系图解.北京：中国财政经济出版社,2006：P 101-104
[67]李一花.中国县乡财政运行及解困研究.北京：社会科学文献出版社,2008
[68]李永友.经济波动的财政政策稳定效应：基于中国1978年以来的经验数据的实证分析.北京：中国社会科学出版社,2007
[69]林万龙.中国农村公共服务供求的结构性失衡：表现及成因.管理世界,2007年第9期
[70]林毅夫、蔡防、李周.中国的奇迹：发展战略与经济改革.上海：上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1994年
[71]刘汉屏、刘锡田.地方政府竞争：分权、公共物品与制度创新.改革,2003年第6期
[72]刘黎明等.财政体制的理论与模型方法研究.北京：首都经济贸易大学出版社,2007
[73]刘穷志.公共支出归宿：中国政府公共服务落实到贫困人口手中了吗?管理世界,2007年第4期
[74]刘小鲁.区域性公共品的最优供给：应用中国省际面板数据的分析.世界经济,2008年第4期
[75]刘晓路.财政分权与经济增长：第二代财政分权理论.财贸经济,2007年第3期
[76]刘云龙.民主机制与民主财政——政府间财政分工及分工方式.北京：中国城市出版社,2001：P25
[77]卢洪友、刘京焕.地方性公共品供给制度创新研究.中南财经政法大学学报,2003年第4期
[78]吕炜.转轨过程中的财政职能界定与实现：基于体制的评价与改革.世界经济,2006年第11期
[79]吕炜.1998年以来财政体制与政策的宏观评价.财贸经济,2003年第3期
[80]吕炜.经济转轨理论大纲.北京：商务印书馆,2006
[81]吕炜.政府间财政关系中的支出问题：历史、数据与比较分析.财贸经济,2005年第1期
[82]罗长远.外国直接投资、国内资本与中国经济增长.上海：上海人民出版,2005
[83]罗丹、陈洁等.中国县乡财政调查.上海：上海远东出版社,2008
[84]马昊.当代中国县级公共财政制度研究.北京：中国经济出版社,2008
[85]马骏.论转移支付.北京：中国财政经济出版社,1998
[86]马拴友.财政政策与经济增长.北京：经济科学出版社,2001
.[87]马兹晖.中国地方财政收入与支出：面板数据因果性与协整研究.管理世界,2008年第3期
[88]牛艳玉.地方公共物品的定价困扰.浙江经济,2006年第3期
[89]平新乔、白洁.中国财政分权与地方公共品的供给.财贸经济,2006年第2期
[90]平新乔.“预算软约束”的新理论及其计量验证.经济研究,1998年10期
[91]平新乔.财政原理与比较财政制度.上海：上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1996：P359
[92]钱颖一.现代经济学与中国经济改革.北京：中国人民大学出版社,2003
[93]乔宝云、范剑勇、冯兴元,中国的财政分权与小学义务教育,中国社会科学,2005年第6期
[94]乔宝云、范剑勇、彭骥鸣.政府间转移支付与地方财政努力.管理世界,2006年第3期
[95]乔宝云、沙安文(Anwar Shah).中国地方政府组织和地方财政.载沙安文、乔宝云主编,地方财政与地方政府治理：国际经验评述,北京：人民出版社,2006,P15
[96]乔宝云.增长与均等的取舍—中国财政分权政策研究.北京：人民出版社,2002
[97]沈坤荣、付文林.税收竞争、地区博弈及其增长绩效税收竞争、地区博弈及其增长绩效.经济研究,2006年第6期
[98]沈坤荣、付文林.中国的财政分权制度与地区经济增长.管理世界,2005年第1期
[99]沈坤荣、张璟.中国农村公共支出及其绩效分析：基于农民收入增长和城乡收入差距的经验研究.管理世界,2007年第1期
[100]时红秀.财政分权、政府竞争与中国地方政府债务.北京：中国财政经济出版社,2007
[101]孙长清、李晖.基于经济增长的财政支出最优化.北京：中国经济出版社,2006
[102]孙开.对地方公共物品有效供给问题的规范分析.财政研究,1997年第7期
[103]王德祥、李建军.辖区人口、面积与地方财政支出：基于鄂鲁吉3省178个县(市)数据的实证研究.财贸经济,2009年第4期
[104]王磊.公共品供给主体选择：基于交易费用经济学的理论分析框架及在中国的应用.财贸经济,2007年第8期
[105]王绍光.分权的极限.北京：中国计划出版社,1997
[106]王韬、沈伟.中印财政分权的经济增长效应研究.财贸经济,2009年第1期
[107]王文剑、覃成林.地方政府行为与财政分权增长效应的地区性差异：基于经验分析的判断、假说及检验.管理世界,2008年第1期
[108]王晓洁.中国公共卫生支出均等化水平的实证分析：基于地区差别视角的量化分析.财贸经济,2009年第3期
[109]王永钦等.中国的大国发展道路：论分权式改革的得失.经济研究,2007年第1期
[110]温来成.城镇化与中国城镇财政制度变迁研究.财贸经济,2005年第6期
[111]吴建南、李贵宁、侯一麟.财政管理、角色冲突与组织绩效：面向中国乡镇政府的探索性研究.管理世界,2005年第12期
[112]吴伟.西方公共品理论的最新研究进展.财贸经济,2004年第4期
[113]吴亚卓.我国城乡公共品供给的一个理论模型及政策建议.财政研究,2008年第11期
[114]项怀诚.中国财政体制改革.北京：中国财政经济出版社,1994
[115]辛波.政府间财政能力配置问题研究.北京：中国经济出版社,2005
[116]闫威、肖笛.税收竞争与地方公共品供给不足问题研究.江汉论坛,2008年第7期
[117]阎坤.转移支付制度与县乡财政体制构建.财贸经济,2004年第8期
[118]杨灿明、赵福军.关于财政分权后果的理论述评.财贸经济,2004年第7期
[119]杨瑞龙、章泉、周业安.财政分权、公众偏好和环境污染：来自中国省级面板数据的证据.东海证券研究所工作论文,2007
[120]杨之刚.中国分税财政体制：问题成因和改革建议.财贸经济,2004年第10期
[121]杨之刚、张斌.中国基层财政体制改革中的政府级次问题.财贸经济,2006年第3期
[122]杨志勇、杨之刚.中国财政制度改革30年.上海：格致出版社、上海人民出版社,2008
[123]杨志勇.中国财政体制改革理论的回顾与展望.财经问题研究,2006年第7期
[124]殷德生.最优财政分权与经济增长.世界经济,2004年第11期
[125]尹恒、康琳琳、王丽娟.政府间转移支付的财力均等化效应：基于中国县级 数据的研究.管理世界,2007年第1期
[126]袁飞、陶然、徐志刚.财政集权过程中的转移支付和财政供养人口规模膨胀.经济研究,2008年第5期
[127]张军、高远、傅勇、张弘.中国为什么拥有了良好的基础设施?经济研究,2007年3期
[128]张军、周黎安.为增长而竞争：中国增长的政治经济学.上海：格致出版社、上海人民出版社,2008
[129]张雷宝.公共基础设施服务均等化的理论辨析与实证考察.财贸经济,2009年第2期
[130]张通.中国省以下财政管理体制现状及进一步改革思路.载沙安文、乔宝云主编,地方财政与地方政府治理：国际经验评述,北京：人民出版社,2006,P3～5
[131]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学.上海：上海三联书店、上海人民出版社,1996
[132]张闫龙.财政分权与省以下政府间关系的演变：对20世纪80年代A省财政体制改革中政府间关系变迁的个案研究.社会学研究,2006年第3期
[133]张晏、龚六堂.地区差距、要素流动与财政分权.经济研究,2004年第7期
[134]张晏.分权体制下的财政政策和经济增长.上海：上海人民出版社,2005
[135]张宇燕,何帆.由财政压力引起的制度变迁.载盛洪,张宇燕,从计划经济到市场经济,北京：中国财政经济出版社,1998
[136]张志华.完善中的中国省以下财政管理体制.载沙安文,乔宝云主编,地方财政与地方政府治理：国际经验评述,北京：人民出版社,2006,P182-185
[137]赵农、刘小鲁.区位性因素与公共品的最优供给.经济研究,2008年第10期
[138]赵文哲.财政分权与前沿技术进步、技术效率关系研究.管理世界,2008年7期
[139]赵文哲、周业安.基于省际面板的财政支出与通货膨胀关系研究.经济研究,2009年10期
[140]“中国地方政府竞争”课题组.中国地方政府竞争与公共品融资.财贸经济,2002年第10期
[141]“中国基层政府财政改革”课题组.推进中国基层财政体制改革.财贸经济,2006年第8期
[142]周飞舟.分税制十年：制度及其影响.中国社会科学,2006年第6期
[143]周黎安.转型中的地方政府：官员激励与治理.上海：格致出版社、上海人民出版社,2008
[144]周业安、赵晓男.地方政府竞争模式研究：构建地方政府间良性竞争秩序的理论和政策分析.管理世界,2002年第12期
[145]周业安.县乡级财政支出管理体制改革的理论与对策.管理世界,2000年第5期
[146]朱恒鹏.地区间竞争、财政自给率和公有制企业民营化.经济研究,2004年第10期
[147]朱丘祥.分税与宪政—中央与地方财政分权的价值与逻辑.北京：知识产权出版社,2008
[148]朱秋霞.行政区划与地方财政体制：几个相关的理论问题.经济社会体制比较,2005年第1期
[149]朱秋霞.中国财政制度—以国际比较为视角.上海：立信会计出版社,2007
[150]朱玉明.转型期多重利益驱动下的地方政府行为.山东大学2006年博士论文
[151]庄序莹.城市基础设施提供的最优规模—MDP税收分配模型的一个运用.财贸经济,2005年第5期
[152]Akai,N.&Ihori, T. Central Government Subsidies to Local Public Goods. Economics of Governance,2002(3):pp.227～239
[153]Arikan,G. Fiscal Decentralization:A Remedy for Corruption. International Tax and Public Finance,2004(11):pp.214-235
[154]Aschauer,D.A. Is Public Expenditure Productive? Journal of Monetary Economics, 1989(23):pp.177-200
[155]Bahl,R.W. Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in China. Working paper, WPS863, Policy Research Department,World Bank,Washington, D.C.,1992
[156]Bahl,R.W.&Linn,J. Fiscal Decentralization and Intergovernmental Transfers in Less Developed Countries. The Journal of Federalism, Winter,1994,24(1):pp.1～19
[157]Bahl,R.W.Intergovernmental fiscal relations in China.Working paper, WPS863, Policy Research Department,World Bank,Washington,D.C.,1992
[158]Bardhan,P. Decentralization of Governance and Development. Journal of Economic Prospectives,2002:pp.164-287
[159]Bardhan,P. Mookiherjee,D.Relative Capture of Local and Central Governments. University of California, Berkeley,mimeographed,Novernmber,1999
[160]Besley, Timothy & Jewitt, Ian, Decentralizing Public Good Supply, Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol.59(6), pages 1769-78, November.1991
[161]Besley,T.&Coate,S.Centralized versus Decentralized Provision of Local Public Goods:A Political Economy Analysis,NBER Working Paper No.708
[162]Bird,Richard M. Threading the Fiscal Labyrinth:Some Issues in Fiscal Decentralization, National Tax Journal XIVI,vol.2,1993:pp.207-277.
[163]Blanchard,O.and A. Shleifer. Federalism with and without Political Centralization: China versus Russia", IMF Staff Papers,2001(48):pp.171～179.
[164]Blundell, R., and Bond, S. Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models, Journal of Econometrics,1998,87:pp.115-143.
[165]Blundell, R., S. Bond, and F. Windmeijer.'Estimation in dynamic panel data models:improving on the performance of the standard GMM estimator', in Baltagi B. (ed.),Advances in Econometrics, Nonstationary Panels, Panel Cointegration, and Dynamic Panels, JAI Elsevier Science, Amsterdam.2000. Vol.15
[166]Bretion,A. Competitive Governments:An Economic Theory of Politics and Public Finnnce, Cambridge:Cambridge Univeristy of Press,1998:pp.56-84
[167]Breton Albert and Anthony Scott, The Economic Constitution of Federal States, Toronto:University of Toronto Press.1978
[168]Brueckner Jan K. A test for allocative efficiency in the local public sector. Journal of Public Economics, Volume 19, Issue 3, December 1982,:pp.311-331
[169]Buchanan, J.M. An economic theory of clubs, Economics, February 1965 (32): pp.241～252
[170]Cowell, F., Measuring Inequality (Second Edition), Prentice Hall andHarvester Wheatsheaf, London, Sen, A,1997, On EconomicInequality, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 1995
[171]David Roodman. How to Do xtabond2:An Introduction to "Difference" and "System" GMM in Stata. Center for Global Development,Working Paper Number 103, December 2006
[172]Dewatripont, Mathias and Eric Maskin, Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies, Review of Economic Studies,1995,62 (4), pp.541-556.
[173]Dewatripont, Mathias and Gerard Roland, Soft Budget Constraints, Transition and Financial Systems, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,2000,156, pp. 245-260.
[174]Dijk,F. van & Winden,F. Dynamics of social ties and local public good provision, Journal of Public Economics,1997(64):pp.323-341
[175]Epple,D.,Filimon,R.&Romer,T. Existence of voting and housing equilibrium in a system of communities with property taxes. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 1993(23):pp.585-610
[176]Epple,Dennis and Allan Zelenitz, The Implieations of Competition among Jurisdictions:Does Tiebout Need Politics? Journal of Political Economy, 1981,(89,6):pp.1197-1217.
[177]Faguet, Jean-Paul, "Does decentralization increase government responsiveness to local needs?:Evidence from Bolivia," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4) March2004:pp.867-893,
[178]Foley,D.K. Lindahl's solution and the core of an economy with public goods. Econometrica,1970(38):pp.66-72
[179]Gordon,R.H.&Wilson,I.D. Expenditure competition. Working paper 8189,National Bureau of Economic Research,2001
[180]Green,J.R.&Laffont,J.J. Incentives in public decision-making. Amsterdam:North-Holland,1979
[181]Green,J.R.&Laffont,J.J.Incentives in public decision-making. Amsterdam:North-Holland,1979
[182]Grewal.Bhajan S. et al (eds.),.The Economics of Federalism. Canberra:Australian National University Press,1980
[183]Gunnar Rongen. Efficiency in the provision of local public goods in Norway. European Journal of Political Economy,1995, vol.11, issue 2, pp253-264
[184]Hayek,F.A.The use of knowledge in society. American Economic Review,1945(35)
[185]Hoffman, Barak D. and Cordeira Guerra, S. Ensuring Inter-Regional Equity and Poverty Reduction. ISP Working paper, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University,2004,pp.04-11,
[186]Huther,J.&Shah. Applying a simple measure of good governance to the debate decentralization. WorldBank,Washington,DC,1998
[187]Inman,M.&Rubinfeld,D. Rethinking federalism. Journal of Economic Perspective,1997(4)
[188]J.E. Stiglitz.The Theory of Local Public Goods.The Economics of Public Services, M.S. Feldstein and R.P. Inman(eds.), London:Macmillan Press,1977.
[189]Jin&Zou,How does fiscal decentralization affect aggregate,national and subnational government size. Journal of Urban Economics,2002(52)
[190]Jin, Hehui, Yingyi Qian, and Barry R. Weingast.2000. "Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives:Federalism, Chinese Style," Working Paper, Hoover Institution, Stanford University,March,1999.
[191]Jin,Qian,&Weingast,B. Regional Decentralization and Fiscal Incentives: Federalism, Chinese Style. Working paper,Department of Economics,University of California-Berkeley,2001
[192]Keen,M. and M. Marchand, Fiscal Competition and the Pattern of Public Spending,Journal of Public Economies,1997(66):pp.33～53.
[193]King,D.Local economics in theory and practice.London:Routledge,1992.
[194]Konrad, K.A.Local public goods and central charities. Regional Science and Urban Economics,1998(28):pp.345～362
[195]Laffont,J.J. Incentives and the allocation of public goods. In:Auerbach, A.J.& Martin,F. Handbook of public economics 2.Amsterdam:North-Holland,1987
[196]Lau, L.J., E. Sheshinski, and J.E.Stiglitz. Efficiency in the Optimum Supply of Public Goods,Econometrica.1978 (46):pp.269～284.
[197]Lin, Justin Yifu,Liu, Zhiqiang and Zhong, Funning. Fiscal Decentralization and Rural Development in China. a Report Submitted to the World Bank, June 1997
[198]Lin, Justin Yifu and Liu, Zhiqiang, Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth
[199]Lindahl, Erick:Die Gerechtigkeit der Besteuerung, Lund,1919.
[200]Liu, Zhiqiang.Fiscal Decentralization and Rural Growth. Manuscript,December 1997.
[201]Ma, Jun.Modeling Central-local Fiscal Relations in China.China Economic Review 1995(6):pp.105-136.
[202]Ma, Jun, Intergovernmental Relations and Economic Management in China, England, Macmillan Press,1997
[203]Martine-Vazquez, Jorge and R.M. McNab, Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth, World Development,2003,31,1597-1616.
[204]Maskin Eric,Yingyi Qian and Chenggang Xu. Incentives, Scale Economies, and Organizational Form.Review of Economic Studies,2000(67):pp.359-379
[205]Mauro, P. Corruption and the Composition of Government Expenditure.Journal of Public Economics,1998(69):pp.263～279.
[206]McGuire,M.Group segregation and optimal jurisdictions.Journal of Political Economy,1974(82):pp112～132
[207]Mckinnon,R.&Ronald,.Market-preserving federalism in the American Monerary Union.in Blejer, M.&Ter-Minassian, T. Macroeconomic dimensions of public finance:essays in Honour of Vito Tanzi.London Routledge,1997:pp73～93
[208]Montinola.G,Qian & Weingast,B.Federalism,Chinese style:the political basis for economic success in China.World Politics,1995(48)
[209]Musgrave, R.A..A Brief History of Fiscal Doctrine. A.J. Auerbach and M. Feldstein (eds.),Handbook of Public Economics, vol.1, Amsterdam:Elsevier,1985: pp.1～59.
[210]Musgrave,R.A. Public finance in theory and practice:a study in public economy. New York:McGraw-Hill,1959
[211]Nechyba,T.J.Existence of equilibrium and stratification in local and hierarchical Tiebout economies with property taxes and voting. NBER:Technical Working Paper 1996,No.190
[212]Oates,W.E. Fiscal decentralization and economic development. National Tax Journal XIVI, 1993:pp.237-243.
[213]Oates,W.E. Fiscal federalism. New York:Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,1972
[214]Oates,W.E. On local finance and the Tiebout model. American Economic Review, 1981(71):pp.93-98.
[215]Oates,W.E. Searching for Leviathan:An empirical analysis. American Economic Review,1985(75):pp.748-757.
[216]Oates, W.E. The effects of property taxes and local public spending on property values:an empirical study of tax capitalization and the Tiebout hypothesis[J]. Journal of Political Economy,1969 (77):pp957-971
[217]Oates,W.E. An essay on fiscal federalism. Journal of Economic Literature, 1999(37):pp.1120-1149.
[218]Oates,W.E.Fiscal competition and European Union:Contrasting perspectives. Regional Science and Urban Economics,2001(31):pp.133-145.
[219]Oates,WE.Fiscal competition or harmonization? Some reflections. National Tax Journal 2001(54):pp.507-512.
[220]Oates,W.E. Fiscal federalism. New York:Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,1972:pp.35 Qian,&Roland,G., Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint. American Economic Review,1998,88(5)
[221]Qian,&Weingast,B. China's transition to markets:market-preserving federalism, Chinese style. Journal of Policy Reform,1996,1(2)
[222]Qian,&Weittgast,B., Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives. Journal of Economic Perspectives,1997(11):pp.83～92
[223]Qian,Yingyi and Weingast, Barry R. China's Transition to Markets:Market-preserving Federalism, Chinese Style, Stanford, CA:Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University,1995
[224]Qian,Yingyi,Barry Weingast and Gabriella Montinola. Federalism,Chinese Style: the political basis for economic success in China. World Politics 1995.48 (1):pp.50-81.
[225]Remy Prud'homme,The dangers of decentralization, World Bank Res Obs.1995(10):pp201-220
[226]Rodden, Jonathan.Rose-Ackerman Susan, Does Federalism Preserve Markets, Virginia Law Review, Vol.83, No.7,1997 (Oct.,):pp.1521-1572
[227]Rongen,G Efficiency in the provision of local public goods in Norway. European Journal of Political Economy,1995(Vol,11):pp.253-264
[228]Rose,A.S.Market models of local government:exit, voting, and the land market. Journal of Urban Economics,1979 (6):pp.319～337
[229]Ruben,Enikolopov and Ekaterina V.Zhuravskaya. Decentralization and Political Institutions. Centre for Economic Policy Research(CEPR) working Paper,2004
[230]Samuelson, P.A. Diagrammatic exposition of a theory of public expenditure. Review of Economics and Statistics,1955(37):pp.350-356
[231]Samuelson, P A., The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure,Reviews of Economics and Statistics,No.4,November,1954(36):pp387-389.
[232]Schultza,C.& Syjstremb,T. Local public goods, debt and migration. Journal of Public Economics,2001(80):pp.313-337
[233]Shumpeter,Joseph A. The crisis of the tax state In a Peacock, R. Turvey, W.F. Stolper, International Economic Papers IV, London and New York,1954
[234]Stigler,G. Tenable range of functions of local government. Washington, D.C.:Joint Economic Committee. Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy,1957:pp.213～219
[235]Stigler,G Tenable range of functions of local government.Washington,D.C.:Joint Economic Committee. Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy,1957:pp213～219
[236]Stiglitz, J.E., and P. Dasgupta. Differential Taxation, Public Goods, and Economic Efficiency.The Review of Economic Studies,1971 (38):pp.151-174.
[237]Stiglitz,J.E.The theory of local public goods twenty-five years after Tiebout:A perspective, NBER Working Paper,1983,No.954
[238]Sundrum, M. Income Distribution in Less Developed Countries. London.Routledge.1990
[239]Tanzi,V. On Fiscal Federalism:Issues to Worry About. Working paper,2000
[240]Tiebout, C.,1956, "A pure theory of local expenditures", Journal of Political
Economics 64, pp416-424.
[241]Tresch,R.W. Public finance. Business Publication,Inc,1981:pp.574-576.
[242]Wang Shuna,YangYao, Grass roots Democracy and Local Governance:Evidence form Rural China, CCER,Peking University, Working paper Series,2006,NO. E2006001
[243]Weingast,B.The Economic Role of Political Institutions:Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development.Journal of Law and Economic Organization,1995(11):pp.1～31.
[244]Wicksell, K.:Finanztheoreticche Untersuchungen, Gustav Fisher, Jena,1896.
[245]Wildasin,D.E.Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition.Journal of public economics 35,1988:pp229～240
[246]William Vickrey, Agenda for progressive taxation,New York:Ronald Press,1947
[247]World Bank, China:National Development and Sub-national Finance:A Review of Provincial Expenditure, Washington D.C.2002
[248]World Bank, Fiscal Decentralization and Rural Health care in China, Working paper, Mimeo,2006
[249]Zhang, Jun. Investment, Investment Efficiency and Economic Growth in China. Journal of Asian Economics,2003,14(5):pp.713～734.
[250]Zhang, Xiaobo, Shenggen Fan, Linxiu Zhang and Jikun Huang,Local governance and Public goods Provision in rural China. Journal of Public Economics,2004,88,
[251]Zhang,Xiaobo. Fiscal decentralization and political centralization in China: Implications for growth and inequality. Journal of Comparative Economics,2006(34):pp.713-726
[252]Zhuravskaya,E.V. Incentives to provide local public goods:Fiscal federalism, Russian style. Journal of Public Economics,2000(76):pp.337～368
[253]Zodrow, George R.& Mieszkowski, Peter M., The new view of the property tax A reformulation, Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol, vol. May,1986,19(3):pp356-370