公司治理对我国企业资本结构选择的影响研究
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摘要
资本结构决策从方法上来讲是最优化决策技术在企业中的运用,但由于资本结构决策是由决策者作出的。故从深层次来看,企业资本结构决策的效果很大程度上将决定于公司治理水平。公司治理状况将直接影响着公司的资本结构,进而影响着公司竞争能力。而不同的资本结构,在直接影响企业综合加权平均资本成本的同时,通过负债和股权融资方式的选择会体现出公司治理的效应。论文结合我国上市公司治理的现实状况,从公司治理的角度出发,探讨公司治理机制的各方面对资本结构选择的影响过程。其中重点分析了内部治理机制中的股权结构和董事会制度对资本结构选择的影响,以及外部治理机制中的破产机制和产品市场竞争机制对于资本结构选择的影响,最后提出了改善我国上市公司公司治理水平和优化资本结构的对策建议。
论文首先分析了我国上市公司内外部治理机制的特征,指出证券市场设立之初流通股与非流通股“股权分置”的制度导致上市公司股权结构一股独大,大股东的代理人仅从大股东的利益出发来决定资本结构等财务决策,从而引发财务决策中的公司治理问题——大股东与中小投资者的利益平衡问题。
然后,采用实证方法从静态和动态两个角度分析上市公司股权结构对资本结构的影响,在静态分析中发现法人持股比例与资本结构显著正相关,管理者持股比例和国家持股比例与资本结构关系不显著;在动态分析中发现:管理者持股比例、法人股持股比例的变动与负债率的变动呈正相关,而企业成长性的变动与资本结构的变动呈负相关。而上市公司最大的持股者——国家股对企业资本结构影响并不显著。但这种状况在股权分置之后得到一定的好转。随后,论文从公司治理的另一重要方面——董事会结构角度,实证分析其对企业的资本结构选择的影响,并比较分析高科技与传统技术两类企业中,不同的董事会结构特征对资本结构产生的影响差异。
在研究了公司治理最重要的两个内部机制——股权结构、董事会结构对资本结构选择的影响之后,论文接着从治理的外部机制——破产机制和外部竞争机制出发,研究这两项外部治理机制对企业资本结构选择的影响。论文首先构建一个运用贝叶斯法计算最优公司资本结构的理论框架,并辅以算例进行说明。鉴于财务困境企业与非财务困境企业相比,资本结构选择过程中具有其特殊性。故论文重点对财务困境企业资本结构的选择过程进行实证分析,以揭示破产机制显著作用下,企业资本结构选择的问题。在此基础上,从实证分析角度探讨财务困境公司的公司治理状况。研究结果表明,我国上市公司陷入财务困境主要是由于盈利能力低下和股权集中度过高,需要改善我国上市公司“强管理者、弱董事会”的状况,提高公司治理的效率,进而避免公司陷入财务困境。最后,论文研究了外部竞争机制治理对公司资本结构选择的影响,分析和解释我国上市公司竞争策略与资本结构的关系不符合理论预期的主要原因。
论文的主要特色或创新点在于:
1、结合我国股权分置改革的制度背景,在实证过程涉及股权结构影响的研究内容均采用2003-2005面板数据与2006年截面数据比较分析的方法,不仅研究了内、外部治理机制对上市公司资本结构选择的影响问题,而且通过两组数据的对比分析,可以进一步揭示股权分置改革对本论文所研究问题的具体影响;
2、本文多角度地研究了公司治理对资本结构选择的影响,首先从股权结构和董事会结构这两个内部治理结构变量入手,不仅研究了董事会结构对企业资本结构的一般影响,而且研究了具有不同行业属性的高科技企业、传统企业的董事会结构对资本结构选择的具体影响。然后,研究用Baysian估计破产风险的最优资本结构选择问题,并对财务困境企业与公司治理的关系进行了实证分析;
3、构建了产品市场竞争与资本结构选择的理论模型,推导出具有市场优势并处于垄断地位的企业应该增加其负债水平以获得更多盈利;而处于市场竞争激烈的企业应该具有较低的负债水平以保证其竞争优势的结论。
The capital structure decision-making is the proper use of optimal decision-making method in enterprise.but because the capital structure decision-making is done by policy makers,the effect of capital structure decision-making depends on the level of corporate governance. Corporate governance either has direct impact on company's capital structure,or company's competitiveness. besides different capital structure’s direct impact on enterprise comprehensive capital cost,the options of debt and equity financing reflect the effect of corporate governance. Combining China's reality of corporate governance,from the perspective of the corporate governance The paper discussed the relevant aspects of governance mechanism’s impacts on capital structure choice process. And analyzed shareholding structure and board system of internal control mechanism’s impact on choice of capital structure,and bankruptcy system and product market competition mechanism of external governance mechanism’s impact on capital structure choice. Lastly,suggestions on how to improve corporate governance level and optimize the capital structure for China's listed companies were proposed.
First of all,the paper analyzed internal and external governance mechanisms and characteristics of equity structure of listed companies in China's,and pointed that in the beginning of securities market’s establishment the split of non-tradable and tradable shares system led to over focusing,so the agents of major shareholders decide capital structure and other financial decision-making only from the interests of the shareholders. Then,using empirical methods the paper anlyzed the shareholding structure’s impact on capital structure of listed companies.in static analysis we found that the changes in managers stake and the shareholding proportion of corporate shares and changes in the rate of liabilities are significantly positive relevent,while the changes in corporate growth and capital structure were negatively correlated. The listed company's largest shareholder - state-owned shares have no obvious impact on corporate capital structure. The situation turned for the better after the seperation of shares. Subsequently,from another important aspect of corporate governance - the board structure point of view——the article analyzed its influences on enterprise's capital structure choice empirically,and comparatively analyzed different structure of the Board’s impacts on capital structure in two types of enterprises of high-tech and traditional technologies.
After researching the impact of the two most important internal mechanism of corporate governance - shareholding structure and the board structure– on capital structure choice,this paper then investigate on the impact of the external mechanism of corporate governance–bankruptcy system and Competition Mechanism– on the capital structure choice. This paper gives a theoretical framework in using the Bayesian probability method to calculate the optimized Debt-to-Asset Ratio and also gives an example of it. Comparing other companies,companies in Financial Distress have their particularity in choosing the capital structure,so this paper put emphasis on the empirical analysis in the process of the companies in Financial Distress choosing their capital structure. Basing on this study,this paper investigates on the relationship of the companies in Financial Distress and corporate governance from empirical analysis aspect.
The study shows that China's listed companies in financial difficulties mainly result from low profitability and highly centralized equity. It is necessary to improve China's Listed Companies current situation of "strong managers,weak board of directors" and improve the efficiency of corporate management,consequently avoid the financial difficulties. Finally,the paper discussed the influence of external competition mechanism on the company’s capital structure choice,then analyzed and interpreted the main reason of inconsistence between the relationship of listed company’s competition strategy and capital structure and the theoretical expectation.
The main features or innovative points of this article are as follows:
1,This paper researched the corporate governance’s impact on capital structure choice from multi-angle. starting with two internal management structure variables of shareholding structure and board structure,the paper not only studied the the Board structure’s influence on the capital structure,but also studie board structure of different attributes of high-tech industries,traditional business structure’s impacts on the capital structure choice. Then,the article estimated the optimal choice of capital structure of bankruptcy risk via Baysian,and analyzed the relationship between financial difficulties of enterprises and the corporate governance empirically.
2,Basing on the background of China's listed companies’share-trading reform,most of the empirical research used 2002-2004 panel data and the 2006 cross-section comparison analysis. And the paper not only researched the internal and external governance’s impact on the capital structure choice of listed companies,but also reveals the share reform’s specific impact on the issues of the paper through the comparative analysis of two sets of data.
3,This paper built a theoretical model of competitive market strategies and capital structure choice,derived that enterprises owning market advantage and monopoly position should increase their debt levels to get more profits,while enterprises in intense market competition should have a lower debt Level to ensure its competitive advantages.
论文首先分析了我国上市公司内外部治理机制的特征,指出证券市场设立之初流通股与非流通股“股权分置”的制度导致上市公司股权结构一股独大,大股东的代理人仅从大股东的利益出发来决定资本结构等财务决策,从而引发财务决策中的公司治理问题——大股东与中小投资者的利益平衡问题。
然后,采用实证方法从静态和动态两个角度分析上市公司股权结构对资本结构的影响,在静态分析中发现法人持股比例与资本结构显著正相关,管理者持股比例和国家持股比例与资本结构关系不显著;在动态分析中发现:管理者持股比例、法人股持股比例的变动与负债率的变动呈正相关,而企业成长性的变动与资本结构的变动呈负相关。而上市公司最大的持股者——国家股对企业资本结构影响并不显著。但这种状况在股权分置之后得到一定的好转。随后,论文从公司治理的另一重要方面——董事会结构角度,实证分析其对企业的资本结构选择的影响,并比较分析高科技与传统技术两类企业中,不同的董事会结构特征对资本结构产生的影响差异。
在研究了公司治理最重要的两个内部机制——股权结构、董事会结构对资本结构选择的影响之后,论文接着从治理的外部机制——破产机制和外部竞争机制出发,研究这两项外部治理机制对企业资本结构选择的影响。论文首先构建一个运用贝叶斯法计算最优公司资本结构的理论框架,并辅以算例进行说明。鉴于财务困境企业与非财务困境企业相比,资本结构选择过程中具有其特殊性。故论文重点对财务困境企业资本结构的选择过程进行实证分析,以揭示破产机制显著作用下,企业资本结构选择的问题。在此基础上,从实证分析角度探讨财务困境公司的公司治理状况。研究结果表明,我国上市公司陷入财务困境主要是由于盈利能力低下和股权集中度过高,需要改善我国上市公司“强管理者、弱董事会”的状况,提高公司治理的效率,进而避免公司陷入财务困境。最后,论文研究了外部竞争机制治理对公司资本结构选择的影响,分析和解释我国上市公司竞争策略与资本结构的关系不符合理论预期的主要原因。
论文的主要特色或创新点在于:
1、结合我国股权分置改革的制度背景,在实证过程涉及股权结构影响的研究内容均采用2003-2005面板数据与2006年截面数据比较分析的方法,不仅研究了内、外部治理机制对上市公司资本结构选择的影响问题,而且通过两组数据的对比分析,可以进一步揭示股权分置改革对本论文所研究问题的具体影响;
2、本文多角度地研究了公司治理对资本结构选择的影响,首先从股权结构和董事会结构这两个内部治理结构变量入手,不仅研究了董事会结构对企业资本结构的一般影响,而且研究了具有不同行业属性的高科技企业、传统企业的董事会结构对资本结构选择的具体影响。然后,研究用Baysian估计破产风险的最优资本结构选择问题,并对财务困境企业与公司治理的关系进行了实证分析;
3、构建了产品市场竞争与资本结构选择的理论模型,推导出具有市场优势并处于垄断地位的企业应该增加其负债水平以获得更多盈利;而处于市场竞争激烈的企业应该具有较低的负债水平以保证其竞争优势的结论。
The capital structure decision-making is the proper use of optimal decision-making method in enterprise.but because the capital structure decision-making is done by policy makers,the effect of capital structure decision-making depends on the level of corporate governance. Corporate governance either has direct impact on company's capital structure,or company's competitiveness. besides different capital structure’s direct impact on enterprise comprehensive capital cost,the options of debt and equity financing reflect the effect of corporate governance. Combining China's reality of corporate governance,from the perspective of the corporate governance The paper discussed the relevant aspects of governance mechanism’s impacts on capital structure choice process. And analyzed shareholding structure and board system of internal control mechanism’s impact on choice of capital structure,and bankruptcy system and product market competition mechanism of external governance mechanism’s impact on capital structure choice. Lastly,suggestions on how to improve corporate governance level and optimize the capital structure for China's listed companies were proposed.
First of all,the paper analyzed internal and external governance mechanisms and characteristics of equity structure of listed companies in China's,and pointed that in the beginning of securities market’s establishment the split of non-tradable and tradable shares system led to over focusing,so the agents of major shareholders decide capital structure and other financial decision-making only from the interests of the shareholders. Then,using empirical methods the paper anlyzed the shareholding structure’s impact on capital structure of listed companies.in static analysis we found that the changes in managers stake and the shareholding proportion of corporate shares and changes in the rate of liabilities are significantly positive relevent,while the changes in corporate growth and capital structure were negatively correlated. The listed company's largest shareholder - state-owned shares have no obvious impact on corporate capital structure. The situation turned for the better after the seperation of shares. Subsequently,from another important aspect of corporate governance - the board structure point of view——the article analyzed its influences on enterprise's capital structure choice empirically,and comparatively analyzed different structure of the Board’s impacts on capital structure in two types of enterprises of high-tech and traditional technologies.
After researching the impact of the two most important internal mechanism of corporate governance - shareholding structure and the board structure– on capital structure choice,this paper then investigate on the impact of the external mechanism of corporate governance–bankruptcy system and Competition Mechanism– on the capital structure choice. This paper gives a theoretical framework in using the Bayesian probability method to calculate the optimized Debt-to-Asset Ratio and also gives an example of it. Comparing other companies,companies in Financial Distress have their particularity in choosing the capital structure,so this paper put emphasis on the empirical analysis in the process of the companies in Financial Distress choosing their capital structure. Basing on this study,this paper investigates on the relationship of the companies in Financial Distress and corporate governance from empirical analysis aspect.
The study shows that China's listed companies in financial difficulties mainly result from low profitability and highly centralized equity. It is necessary to improve China's Listed Companies current situation of "strong managers,weak board of directors" and improve the efficiency of corporate management,consequently avoid the financial difficulties. Finally,the paper discussed the influence of external competition mechanism on the company’s capital structure choice,then analyzed and interpreted the main reason of inconsistence between the relationship of listed company’s competition strategy and capital structure and the theoretical expectation.
The main features or innovative points of this article are as follows:
1,This paper researched the corporate governance’s impact on capital structure choice from multi-angle. starting with two internal management structure variables of shareholding structure and board structure,the paper not only studied the the Board structure’s influence on the capital structure,but also studie board structure of different attributes of high-tech industries,traditional business structure’s impacts on the capital structure choice. Then,the article estimated the optimal choice of capital structure of bankruptcy risk via Baysian,and analyzed the relationship between financial difficulties of enterprises and the corporate governance empirically.
2,Basing on the background of China's listed companies’share-trading reform,most of the empirical research used 2002-2004 panel data and the 2006 cross-section comparison analysis. And the paper not only researched the internal and external governance’s impact on the capital structure choice of listed companies,but also reveals the share reform’s specific impact on the issues of the paper through the comparative analysis of two sets of data.
3,This paper built a theoretical model of competitive market strategies and capital structure choice,derived that enterprises owning market advantage and monopoly position should increase their debt levels to get more profits,while enterprises in intense market competition should have a lower debt Level to ensure its competitive advantages.
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