我国农产品绿色供应链耦合机制：制度经济学视角
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摘要
传统食品产业(食用加工农产品)在发展过程中,不仅造成生态环境的破坏,而且降低乃至损害着食品的质量安全,同时也造成产业链利益不平衡。人们在充分认识生态演化、互利共生规律之后,开始科学理智的思考与选择一种既有利于改善与保护生态环境,保障食品质量与安全,又有利于产业链各利益主体的新型食品产业可持续发展模式,这就是绿色化食品产业模式。大力发展绿色食品产业是有效解决“三农”问题,提高我国农业整体效益和竞争力的有效途径之一。发展绿色食品产业可以借鉴绿色供应链管理理念与手段。
长期困扰我国的食用加工农产品质量安全问题,食用加工农产品行业效率不高等问题,很大程度上是组织体制问题,即食用加工农产品供应链主体藕合问题,表现为食用加工农产品供应链各环节链接松弛,产、供、销利益不均衡,加工和购销环节利益过大,农产品的初级生产与加工和购销部门之间关系对立、矛盾尖锐。为了优化供应链上所有过程和功能,以顾客需求为导向提供绿色食品(指广义绿色食品,包括安全食品、绿色食品、有机食品),节约交易成本,提高资源利用效率,使整个农产品供应链产生的价值最大化,同时向各环节都能获得平均利润的方向发展,更好地控制食品质量和安全,实现与环境相容,促进供应链成员间传播知识、技术、扩散资本,使供应链的竞争者不易复制、模仿,从而提高食用农产品供应链的整体竞争优势,有必要对绿色农产品供应链的耦合问题进行研究。本研究将制度经济学引入到供应链关系的研究中,运用交易成本理论、委托—代理理论、博弈论等对供应链上各合作主体耦合关系进行分析,力图找到使农产品绿色供应链顺畅运行的有效制度安排。希望能丰富与发展供应链管理的理论体系,并能对我国农产品加工企业生产经营管理模式提供有价值的借鉴参考。在研究过程中,主要采用理论研究与实际调研相结合、定性和定量分析相结合、规范分析和实证分析相结合、制度经济学分析法、博弈分析法等进行研究。
全文分为九章,第一章导论,主要针对能源危机、环境污染、资源退化和农业生产效率低下等全球问题以及二十世纪90年代中期以后,世界农产品市场出现的新形势,认为目前在我国有必要对农产品绿色供应链问题进行广泛而深入的研究,在阐述本文的研究目的与意义的基础上,对国内外在供应链、绿色供应链、农产品供应链及其相关问题的研究动态进行归纳总结。
第二章是理论阐释,主要阐述农产品绿色供应链主体耦合的制度经济学理论：分工与协作理论、企业性质与边界理论、交易费用理论、契约与履约理论、关系契约及治理模式、委托代理理论；接着,对供应链主体耦合进行制度经济学分析,阐释了组织体制的制度演进逻辑,指出供应链组织是经济全球化条件下企业的一项诱致性制度变迁,提出供应链管理是供应链组织体制下的制度规范。
第三章对农产品绿色供应链耦合的动力机制进行阐述分析。首先从博弈论的视角、成本收益视角阐明农产品供应链耦合的利益；接着进一步分析供应链耦合的利益来源：供应链之间的竞争、关系资本及其关系租金创造,绿色供应链还有绿色知识的溢出；然后,基于绿色知识溢出建立农产品绿色供应链上下游企业合作博弈模型,比较企业间不开展绿色合作与开展绿色合作的经济绩效,激发供应链企业进行绿色合作的动机。
第四章对农产品绿色供应链耦合的和谐稳定机制进行分析。首先针对合作型供应链模式中的问题提出农产品绿色供应链耦合的和谐与稳定机制设计要求；提出信息共享机制是绿色供应链的效率基础,也是供应链耦合的基础,供应链合作主体之间的利益分配是供应链稳定的核心要件,和谐稳定机制就是要建立科学、合理的利益分配机制,分别对信息共享机制,合作利益分配机制,契约履行约束机制进行了定性和定量分析。
第五章对农产品绿色供应链的上游链的耦合方式进行分析,对上游链主体——农户、加工企业提出具体的行为方向指导。首先从加工企业与农户作为天生的利益共同体和绿色农产品的供给的角度指出加工企业与原料生产者耦合的必要性；然后对加工企业与原料生产者耦合的形式与问题进行了分析；运用模型对加工企业与原料生产者参与农产品绿色供应链的边界进行定量分析；对加工企业与原料生产者耦合进行博弈分析,指出以信息对称为前提条件的集中决策,其利润大于分散决策的利润,并进一步分析了完全信息条件下原料生产企业与加工厂商合作竞争博奕及其均衡。最后阐述了一个加工企业与原料生产者合作的案例,说明利益的协调是绿色供应链耦合的关键。
第六章在借鉴学者相关研究成果的基础上,针对农产品绿色供应链下游企业之间的合作,通过定量及定性的分析,探讨涉及加工制造商、零售商供应链中,产品定价、利润分配等问题。首先,以绿色食品的生产加工商→零售商→消费者的间接渠道模式为例,通过构建模型,说明绿色食品供应链下游的生产加工商与零售商进行合作的必要性,分析两者合作关系稳定的必要条件。然后,考察消费者不存在渠道偏好时,绿色食品生产商的渠道策略。得出了混合渠道是绿色食品生产加工商的理性选择的结论；进一步分析了当消费者存在渠道偏好时,绿色食品生产商在混合渠道模式下如何进行渠道份额决策。最后,探讨生产商在纳什博奕条件下如何协调好直销渠道与间接渠道之间,渠道内部的关系,激励零售商合作,使混合渠道的总利润最大化,使双方在合作后的利润均大于不合作时的利润,实现“双赢”。
第七章基于消费者在农产品绿色供应链中的重要地位,对消费者的绿色食品消费行为进行实证研究分析,为政府相关部门制定政策以及绿色农产品的产销者确定经营策略提供指导。
第八章基于农产品绿色供应链具有的正外部性,政府有必要介入农产品绿色供应链的运作,提出了政府对绿色食品实行规制、对绿色农产品生产给予补贴、对绿色农产品市场实行监管有其必要性；同时,对农产品绿色供应链政府与企业行为进行了博弈分析,为政府和企业的管理层如何激发供应链管理提供决策依据。
第九章是案例研究,以绿色食品—茶油为主要线索,通过调查为××公司提供主要原料的油茶种植户、加工生产商—××公司、经销产品的零售商—××超市,走访相关行业主管部门,深入研究茶油价格的形成、利益的分配,分别从农户、加工企业、超市、政府等不同层面进行经济分析,从中得到一些启示,期待为政府进行政策调控提供参考建议,以促进我国农产品绿色供应链的平滑运行。
最后是结论与展望,总结归纳全文的研究结论,指出研究的不足以及需进一步研究的问题。
The development of traditional food industry (food processing of agricultural products) not only damaged the ecological environment, but also reduced and even injuring the safety of product quality. It also caused imbalance of the industrial chain interests. The human beings, fully understood the of ecological evolution and mutually beneficial symbiosis, scientifically and rationally chose a new model of sustainable development of food industry——the Green Food Industry Model. This model is in favor of improving and protecting the environment and ensuring the quality and safety of foods. And still it is beneficial to each interest group in the industrial chain. Vigorously developing the Green Food Industry is an effective way to solve the issues concerning agriculture, countryside and farmers and to enhance the overall efficiency and competitiveness of Chinese agriculture. We can learn from the concepts and tools of the Green Supply Chain Management (the GSCM) to develop the Green Food Industry.
The problems, such as the quality and safety of processed agricultural products and low efficiency in the food processing industry and so on, have troubled our country for a long time. To a large extent, they are organizational issues, which can be considered as problems in the coupling of the main body of the edible agricultural product supply chain. They are expressed as the relaxed link of the supply chain, the imbalance distribution of interests among production, supply and marketing, the fierce contradiction between the primary production and the processing and marketing sectors, etc. It is necessary to research the coupling problems of the supply chain of green agricultural products. In order to optimize all processes and functions of the supply chain, we are trying to provide green foods (it refers to a broad green foods, including safe foods, green foods, organic foods) under customer-driven, also to save transaction costs, to improve efficiency of resource usage, to maximize the value of the whole supply chain for agricultural products. At the same time, we hope it could develop with balance distribution of profits in each stage, better control the foods quality and safety, be compatible with the environment. It is designed to promote the dissemination of knowledge and technologies and proliferation of capital among the members of the supply chain so as to prevent the replication and imitation of competitors. Thereby, to enhance the competitiveness of edible agricultural products supply chain as a whole. This supply chain research, by introducing the institutional economics and using the transaction cost theory, the principal-agent theory, the game theory, etc., studies the relationships between the co-operators in the supply chain and attempts to find the effective institutional arrangements under which the supply chain of green agricultural products could run smoothly. It also hopes to enrich and develop the theory of supply chain management system, and to provide valuable references for the production and operation management model of Chinese agricultural enterprises. In this research, it mainly adopted the following methods:theoretical and practical research, qualitative and quantitative analysis, normative and empirical analysis, institutional economics analysis, game analysis and so on.
The whole paper is divided into nine chapters. The first is an introductory, mainly explained the global issues such as energy crisis, environmental pollution, resource degradation and agricultural production inefficiencies, etc., and introduced the new situation of the world agricultural market since the mid-1990s. It holds that China is needed to study extensively and in-depth the green supply chain problems in agricultural products. On the basis of significance and purpose of this research, the first part summarizes the research trends home and abroad about supply chain, green supply chain, supply chain for agricultural products and related issues.
The second chapter is theoretical interpretations. Firstly, the paper mainly illustrates the institutional economics theory of coupling of green supply chain for agricultural products. The institutional economics theory of main body coupling of green supply chain includes:the theory of division and collaboration, the theory of corporate nature and border, the theory of transaction cost, the theory of contract and performance, the relational contracting and governance model, the theory of principal-agent. Then, it engages in institutional economic analyses of the main body coupling of the supply chain. It illuminates the institutional evolution logic of the organizational structure and points out that the organization of supply chain is a kind of induced institutional change of enterprises under economic globalization. It proposes that the Supply Chain Management (SCM) is the institutional norm under the system of supply chain organizations.
In the third chapter, it analyzes the coupled dynamic mechanisms of green supply chain for agricultural products. At first, it clarifies the interests of the coupled agricultural supply chain in terms of game theory and cost-benefit. Then, it analyzes the source of interests of coupled supply chain, the competition between the supply chains, the creation of relationship capital and rent, the green supply chain together with the overflow of green knowledge. Thirdly, it establishes the cooperative game model between upstream and downstream enterprises in the green supply chain for agricultural products based on the overflow of green knowledge. It finally compares the economic performance between green-cooperated and non-green-cooperated enterprises so as to stimulate green-cooperative motivations among enterprises in the supply chain.
The forth chapters analyzes the harmonious and stable mechanism of coupled green supply chain for agricultural products. It started with propose of requirements in designation of harmonious and stable mechanism of coupled green supply chain for agricultural products according to the problems existing in cooperative supply chain model. It puts forward that the information-sharing mechanism is the efficiency base of green supply chain and the base of coupled supply chain. It also says that the distribution of interests among the cooperated main bodies in supply chain is the core element to stabilize the supply chain. The harmonious and stable mechanism needs a scientific and rational mechanism for benefits distribution. And this part ends with qualitative and quantitative analysis on the information-sharing mechanism, the cooperative mechanism for benefits distribution and the performance binding mechanisms respectively.
In Chapter five, it studies the coupling styles of the upstream in the green supply chain for agricultural products, and proposes some specific guidance for the main upstream bodies——farmers, and processing enterprises. Taking the processing enterprises and farmers as a natural community of interests and viewing from supply of green agricultural products, it points out the necessity of coupling between the processing enterprises of raw materials producers. Then, it explains the forms and problems about coupling of processing companies and raw material producers. Using models, it makes a quantitative analysis of the boundary about the green supply chain for agricultural products with the attendance of processing enterprises and raw materials producers. And then based on the game analysis of coupling of raw materials producers and processing enterprises, it points out that the profit under centralized decision-making prerequisited with the symmetric information is greater than that under decentralized decision-making, and further analyzes the cooperative and competitive game and its balance between raw materials producers and processing enterprises with perfect information. It ends up with a cooperation case between raw material producers and processing enterprises.
Based on results of the related academic researches, aiming at the cooperation between downstream enterprises in green supply chain for agricultural products and adopting quantitative and qualitative analysis, chapter six explores problems as pricing, distribution of profits, etc. involving manufacturers and retailers in the supply chain. It begins with an example of indirect channel model of processors→retailers→consumer of green food. By constructing models, it illustrates the necessity of cooperation between processors and retailers in the downstream of the green food supply chain, and the necessary conditions for their stable cooperation. Then, it examines the channel strategies of the green food manufacturers when there are no consumer preferences about channels. It arrives at conclusion that it is the rational choice for the green food manufacturers to have mixed channels. It also analyzes in depth that how to make the channel-share decision for green food manufacturers in the mixed-channel mode when there are consumer preferences about channels. In the end of this part, it explores the behaviors of producers conditioned with Nash-Game in the following aspects:how to coordinate the relations between the direct and indirect channels and among the internal parts of channels; how to incentive the cooperation of retailers to maximize the total profit of mixed-channel and achieve win-win situation that the profits on both parts respectively after cooperation are larger than those before cooperation.
On the strength of the important role of consumers in the green supply chain for agricultural products, Chapter seven conducts an empirical analysis on consumer behaviors when consuming green foods, so as to provide guidance to producers and marketers of green agricultural products in determining business strategies.
Chapter eight points out that it's necessary for the government to intervene in the operation of the green supply chain for agricultural products for its positive externalities. It proposes the necessities for government's intervention in regulating the green foods, subsidizing the producers of green agricultural products and supervising the market of green agricultural products. At the same time, adopting the game theory, it analyzes the acts of the government and the enterprise to the green supply chain for agricultural product aiming to provide with decision-making basis for governments and enterprises to motivate SCM.
Chapter nine is a case study. It in-depth reaserches the the formation of the camellia oil's price and the distribution of benefits by taking the green food, the camellia oil, as the main line, through the survey of the camellia growers who providing the chief raw materials for××company, the processor××company and the retailor××supermarket, together with visiting relevant industrial competent authorities. It obtains some inspiration from the economic analysis respectively at different levels like the farmers, the processors, the supermarkets, the government and so on. It looks forward to provide some referential recommendations for the government's policy-control, so as to promote smooth operations of the green supply chain of agricultural products in China.
The last chapter of this paper points out major achievements, deficiency of the study and suggests the direction for further study.
长期困扰我国的食用加工农产品质量安全问题,食用加工农产品行业效率不高等问题,很大程度上是组织体制问题,即食用加工农产品供应链主体藕合问题,表现为食用加工农产品供应链各环节链接松弛,产、供、销利益不均衡,加工和购销环节利益过大,农产品的初级生产与加工和购销部门之间关系对立、矛盾尖锐。为了优化供应链上所有过程和功能,以顾客需求为导向提供绿色食品(指广义绿色食品,包括安全食品、绿色食品、有机食品),节约交易成本,提高资源利用效率,使整个农产品供应链产生的价值最大化,同时向各环节都能获得平均利润的方向发展,更好地控制食品质量和安全,实现与环境相容,促进供应链成员间传播知识、技术、扩散资本,使供应链的竞争者不易复制、模仿,从而提高食用农产品供应链的整体竞争优势,有必要对绿色农产品供应链的耦合问题进行研究。本研究将制度经济学引入到供应链关系的研究中,运用交易成本理论、委托—代理理论、博弈论等对供应链上各合作主体耦合关系进行分析,力图找到使农产品绿色供应链顺畅运行的有效制度安排。希望能丰富与发展供应链管理的理论体系,并能对我国农产品加工企业生产经营管理模式提供有价值的借鉴参考。在研究过程中,主要采用理论研究与实际调研相结合、定性和定量分析相结合、规范分析和实证分析相结合、制度经济学分析法、博弈分析法等进行研究。
全文分为九章,第一章导论,主要针对能源危机、环境污染、资源退化和农业生产效率低下等全球问题以及二十世纪90年代中期以后,世界农产品市场出现的新形势,认为目前在我国有必要对农产品绿色供应链问题进行广泛而深入的研究,在阐述本文的研究目的与意义的基础上,对国内外在供应链、绿色供应链、农产品供应链及其相关问题的研究动态进行归纳总结。
第二章是理论阐释,主要阐述农产品绿色供应链主体耦合的制度经济学理论：分工与协作理论、企业性质与边界理论、交易费用理论、契约与履约理论、关系契约及治理模式、委托代理理论；接着,对供应链主体耦合进行制度经济学分析,阐释了组织体制的制度演进逻辑,指出供应链组织是经济全球化条件下企业的一项诱致性制度变迁,提出供应链管理是供应链组织体制下的制度规范。
第三章对农产品绿色供应链耦合的动力机制进行阐述分析。首先从博弈论的视角、成本收益视角阐明农产品供应链耦合的利益；接着进一步分析供应链耦合的利益来源：供应链之间的竞争、关系资本及其关系租金创造,绿色供应链还有绿色知识的溢出；然后,基于绿色知识溢出建立农产品绿色供应链上下游企业合作博弈模型,比较企业间不开展绿色合作与开展绿色合作的经济绩效,激发供应链企业进行绿色合作的动机。
第四章对农产品绿色供应链耦合的和谐稳定机制进行分析。首先针对合作型供应链模式中的问题提出农产品绿色供应链耦合的和谐与稳定机制设计要求；提出信息共享机制是绿色供应链的效率基础,也是供应链耦合的基础,供应链合作主体之间的利益分配是供应链稳定的核心要件,和谐稳定机制就是要建立科学、合理的利益分配机制,分别对信息共享机制,合作利益分配机制,契约履行约束机制进行了定性和定量分析。
第五章对农产品绿色供应链的上游链的耦合方式进行分析,对上游链主体——农户、加工企业提出具体的行为方向指导。首先从加工企业与农户作为天生的利益共同体和绿色农产品的供给的角度指出加工企业与原料生产者耦合的必要性；然后对加工企业与原料生产者耦合的形式与问题进行了分析；运用模型对加工企业与原料生产者参与农产品绿色供应链的边界进行定量分析；对加工企业与原料生产者耦合进行博弈分析,指出以信息对称为前提条件的集中决策,其利润大于分散决策的利润,并进一步分析了完全信息条件下原料生产企业与加工厂商合作竞争博奕及其均衡。最后阐述了一个加工企业与原料生产者合作的案例,说明利益的协调是绿色供应链耦合的关键。
第六章在借鉴学者相关研究成果的基础上,针对农产品绿色供应链下游企业之间的合作,通过定量及定性的分析,探讨涉及加工制造商、零售商供应链中,产品定价、利润分配等问题。首先,以绿色食品的生产加工商→零售商→消费者的间接渠道模式为例,通过构建模型,说明绿色食品供应链下游的生产加工商与零售商进行合作的必要性,分析两者合作关系稳定的必要条件。然后,考察消费者不存在渠道偏好时,绿色食品生产商的渠道策略。得出了混合渠道是绿色食品生产加工商的理性选择的结论；进一步分析了当消费者存在渠道偏好时,绿色食品生产商在混合渠道模式下如何进行渠道份额决策。最后,探讨生产商在纳什博奕条件下如何协调好直销渠道与间接渠道之间,渠道内部的关系,激励零售商合作,使混合渠道的总利润最大化,使双方在合作后的利润均大于不合作时的利润,实现“双赢”。
第七章基于消费者在农产品绿色供应链中的重要地位,对消费者的绿色食品消费行为进行实证研究分析,为政府相关部门制定政策以及绿色农产品的产销者确定经营策略提供指导。
第八章基于农产品绿色供应链具有的正外部性,政府有必要介入农产品绿色供应链的运作,提出了政府对绿色食品实行规制、对绿色农产品生产给予补贴、对绿色农产品市场实行监管有其必要性；同时,对农产品绿色供应链政府与企业行为进行了博弈分析,为政府和企业的管理层如何激发供应链管理提供决策依据。
第九章是案例研究,以绿色食品—茶油为主要线索,通过调查为××公司提供主要原料的油茶种植户、加工生产商—××公司、经销产品的零售商—××超市,走访相关行业主管部门,深入研究茶油价格的形成、利益的分配,分别从农户、加工企业、超市、政府等不同层面进行经济分析,从中得到一些启示,期待为政府进行政策调控提供参考建议,以促进我国农产品绿色供应链的平滑运行。
最后是结论与展望,总结归纳全文的研究结论,指出研究的不足以及需进一步研究的问题。
The development of traditional food industry (food processing of agricultural products) not only damaged the ecological environment, but also reduced and even injuring the safety of product quality. It also caused imbalance of the industrial chain interests. The human beings, fully understood the of ecological evolution and mutually beneficial symbiosis, scientifically and rationally chose a new model of sustainable development of food industry——the Green Food Industry Model. This model is in favor of improving and protecting the environment and ensuring the quality and safety of foods. And still it is beneficial to each interest group in the industrial chain. Vigorously developing the Green Food Industry is an effective way to solve the issues concerning agriculture, countryside and farmers and to enhance the overall efficiency and competitiveness of Chinese agriculture. We can learn from the concepts and tools of the Green Supply Chain Management (the GSCM) to develop the Green Food Industry.
The problems, such as the quality and safety of processed agricultural products and low efficiency in the food processing industry and so on, have troubled our country for a long time. To a large extent, they are organizational issues, which can be considered as problems in the coupling of the main body of the edible agricultural product supply chain. They are expressed as the relaxed link of the supply chain, the imbalance distribution of interests among production, supply and marketing, the fierce contradiction between the primary production and the processing and marketing sectors, etc. It is necessary to research the coupling problems of the supply chain of green agricultural products. In order to optimize all processes and functions of the supply chain, we are trying to provide green foods (it refers to a broad green foods, including safe foods, green foods, organic foods) under customer-driven, also to save transaction costs, to improve efficiency of resource usage, to maximize the value of the whole supply chain for agricultural products. At the same time, we hope it could develop with balance distribution of profits in each stage, better control the foods quality and safety, be compatible with the environment. It is designed to promote the dissemination of knowledge and technologies and proliferation of capital among the members of the supply chain so as to prevent the replication and imitation of competitors. Thereby, to enhance the competitiveness of edible agricultural products supply chain as a whole. This supply chain research, by introducing the institutional economics and using the transaction cost theory, the principal-agent theory, the game theory, etc., studies the relationships between the co-operators in the supply chain and attempts to find the effective institutional arrangements under which the supply chain of green agricultural products could run smoothly. It also hopes to enrich and develop the theory of supply chain management system, and to provide valuable references for the production and operation management model of Chinese agricultural enterprises. In this research, it mainly adopted the following methods:theoretical and practical research, qualitative and quantitative analysis, normative and empirical analysis, institutional economics analysis, game analysis and so on.
The whole paper is divided into nine chapters. The first is an introductory, mainly explained the global issues such as energy crisis, environmental pollution, resource degradation and agricultural production inefficiencies, etc., and introduced the new situation of the world agricultural market since the mid-1990s. It holds that China is needed to study extensively and in-depth the green supply chain problems in agricultural products. On the basis of significance and purpose of this research, the first part summarizes the research trends home and abroad about supply chain, green supply chain, supply chain for agricultural products and related issues.
The second chapter is theoretical interpretations. Firstly, the paper mainly illustrates the institutional economics theory of coupling of green supply chain for agricultural products. The institutional economics theory of main body coupling of green supply chain includes:the theory of division and collaboration, the theory of corporate nature and border, the theory of transaction cost, the theory of contract and performance, the relational contracting and governance model, the theory of principal-agent. Then, it engages in institutional economic analyses of the main body coupling of the supply chain. It illuminates the institutional evolution logic of the organizational structure and points out that the organization of supply chain is a kind of induced institutional change of enterprises under economic globalization. It proposes that the Supply Chain Management (SCM) is the institutional norm under the system of supply chain organizations.
In the third chapter, it analyzes the coupled dynamic mechanisms of green supply chain for agricultural products. At first, it clarifies the interests of the coupled agricultural supply chain in terms of game theory and cost-benefit. Then, it analyzes the source of interests of coupled supply chain, the competition between the supply chains, the creation of relationship capital and rent, the green supply chain together with the overflow of green knowledge. Thirdly, it establishes the cooperative game model between upstream and downstream enterprises in the green supply chain for agricultural products based on the overflow of green knowledge. It finally compares the economic performance between green-cooperated and non-green-cooperated enterprises so as to stimulate green-cooperative motivations among enterprises in the supply chain.
The forth chapters analyzes the harmonious and stable mechanism of coupled green supply chain for agricultural products. It started with propose of requirements in designation of harmonious and stable mechanism of coupled green supply chain for agricultural products according to the problems existing in cooperative supply chain model. It puts forward that the information-sharing mechanism is the efficiency base of green supply chain and the base of coupled supply chain. It also says that the distribution of interests among the cooperated main bodies in supply chain is the core element to stabilize the supply chain. The harmonious and stable mechanism needs a scientific and rational mechanism for benefits distribution. And this part ends with qualitative and quantitative analysis on the information-sharing mechanism, the cooperative mechanism for benefits distribution and the performance binding mechanisms respectively.
In Chapter five, it studies the coupling styles of the upstream in the green supply chain for agricultural products, and proposes some specific guidance for the main upstream bodies——farmers, and processing enterprises. Taking the processing enterprises and farmers as a natural community of interests and viewing from supply of green agricultural products, it points out the necessity of coupling between the processing enterprises of raw materials producers. Then, it explains the forms and problems about coupling of processing companies and raw material producers. Using models, it makes a quantitative analysis of the boundary about the green supply chain for agricultural products with the attendance of processing enterprises and raw materials producers. And then based on the game analysis of coupling of raw materials producers and processing enterprises, it points out that the profit under centralized decision-making prerequisited with the symmetric information is greater than that under decentralized decision-making, and further analyzes the cooperative and competitive game and its balance between raw materials producers and processing enterprises with perfect information. It ends up with a cooperation case between raw material producers and processing enterprises.
Based on results of the related academic researches, aiming at the cooperation between downstream enterprises in green supply chain for agricultural products and adopting quantitative and qualitative analysis, chapter six explores problems as pricing, distribution of profits, etc. involving manufacturers and retailers in the supply chain. It begins with an example of indirect channel model of processors→retailers→consumer of green food. By constructing models, it illustrates the necessity of cooperation between processors and retailers in the downstream of the green food supply chain, and the necessary conditions for their stable cooperation. Then, it examines the channel strategies of the green food manufacturers when there are no consumer preferences about channels. It arrives at conclusion that it is the rational choice for the green food manufacturers to have mixed channels. It also analyzes in depth that how to make the channel-share decision for green food manufacturers in the mixed-channel mode when there are consumer preferences about channels. In the end of this part, it explores the behaviors of producers conditioned with Nash-Game in the following aspects:how to coordinate the relations between the direct and indirect channels and among the internal parts of channels; how to incentive the cooperation of retailers to maximize the total profit of mixed-channel and achieve win-win situation that the profits on both parts respectively after cooperation are larger than those before cooperation.
On the strength of the important role of consumers in the green supply chain for agricultural products, Chapter seven conducts an empirical analysis on consumer behaviors when consuming green foods, so as to provide guidance to producers and marketers of green agricultural products in determining business strategies.
Chapter eight points out that it's necessary for the government to intervene in the operation of the green supply chain for agricultural products for its positive externalities. It proposes the necessities for government's intervention in regulating the green foods, subsidizing the producers of green agricultural products and supervising the market of green agricultural products. At the same time, adopting the game theory, it analyzes the acts of the government and the enterprise to the green supply chain for agricultural product aiming to provide with decision-making basis for governments and enterprises to motivate SCM.
Chapter nine is a case study. It in-depth reaserches the the formation of the camellia oil's price and the distribution of benefits by taking the green food, the camellia oil, as the main line, through the survey of the camellia growers who providing the chief raw materials for××company, the processor××company and the retailor××supermarket, together with visiting relevant industrial competent authorities. It obtains some inspiration from the economic analysis respectively at different levels like the farmers, the processors, the supermarkets, the government and so on. It looks forward to provide some referential recommendations for the government's policy-control, so as to promote smooth operations of the green supply chain of agricultural products in China.
The last chapter of this paper points out major achievements, deficiency of the study and suggests the direction for further study.
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