认知偏向与决策理性
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摘要
本文在西蒙提出的有限理性的基础之上,对造成有限理性的原因从认知上进行思考和探析,西蒙认为人们的决策永远不可能达到“完美理性”的程度,因为人们不仅对信息的获取相当有限,而且人们对信息的处理能力也是十分有限的。而“完美理性”决策所要求的是人们在决策中不仅相当了解决策所需信息,而且对决策信息的处理的能力也是十分完备的。西蒙认为这与真实人的决策不相符合,他从人们处理信息的能力有限这个角度定义了决策的有限理性。
本文主要通过文献分析的方法,研究发现人们决策的有限理性除了处理信息能力这个原因以外,人们对决策信息处理的偏向也会导致对“完美理性”决策的偏离。因此,为了更好地了解个体决策过程中的有限理性问题,本文从认知偏向角度对决策中的信息处理方式进行剖析。本文认为,决策中的信息处理方式受个体认知偏向的影响;而认知偏向又包括认知方式简化性、认知内容一致性、认知趋同效应等。这些认知偏向使人们对决策信息的处理出现一定的偏差,从而有可能使做出的决策欠合理性。认知方式简化属于人们认知策略的一种,这种策略有时候能减少对事物认识或决策所需要的时间和精神活动,但正是因为这种对事物采取认知上的捷径,就容易对决策信息的产生不完全或者不正确的认识,从而产生决策信息的歪曲。认知方式简化主要包括各种认知代表性偏向、获得性偏向、参照效应等等,这些偏向使得人们在决策中对信息的处理也产生偏向或偏差,这样决策理性的最大实现就受到局限。认知内容一致性也属于人们认知上的一种倾向,人们习惯于保持对外界事物已有信息认知元素上的协调一致性,习惯于保持对事物认知
This paper is about the cognitive reason why the bounded rationality proposed by Simon exits in decision-making, it is the Simon's idea that there is no "perfect rationality" in decision-making, because a individual not only gets bounded information in decision-making, but also has a bounded ability to deal with the information. And the "perfect rationality" decision-making requires not only enough information but also perfect ability to deal with the information in the decision-making process. Simon thought this disobeyed the decision-making in real environments, and he proposed the bounded rationality theory in the way that individuals have the bounded ability to deal with the information.On the bases of literature analysis, it is concluded in this paper that the reason why the bounded rationality exits in decision-making is due to not only the bounded ability to deal with information but also the departure of the process to deal with information, so it happens that real decision-making has the departure of the "perfect rationality". In order to understand the bounded rationality well enough in an individual decision-making process, this paper plays a key on the decision-making process to deal with information from the cognitive inclinations. This paper takes the point that the way to deal with the information in decision-making is influenced by the individual's cognitive inclinations, and the cognitive inclinations contains the predigestion of the cognition means, the consistency of the cognition elements and the conformity of the cognition. Individuals will have the bounded rational decision-making because of these
cognitive inclinations. And the predigestion of the cognition means is the one of individual's cognitive strategy, which can economize the time and the spirit action, but it is the cognitive shortcut that individuals may take mistakes on information in the decision-making, so the distortion of the information in decision-making occurs. The predigestion of the cognition means contains the representativeness bias, availability bias and reference efficiency, which make the biases or the departure of the information in decision-making occur, so the perfect rationality is bounded in decision-making. And the consistency of cognition elements is another one of the cognitive inclinations; individuals form the habits of the cognitive consistency of the information about things in the world, and the habits of the consistency between the cognition and the feelings about things in the world, which makes it very hard to deal with the information properly and objectively in real decision-making environments. And the conformity of the cognition can be used to interpret the conformity to the public in a certain degree, though this phenomenon can take the extra information to decision-maker, the integration of a decision-maker is broken, and this may bring useless or harmful information to decision-makers. So the degree of the rationality is bounded in decision-making. In a word, the degree of the rationality in real decision-making is not as the perfect rationality, which the classic decision-making theory proposed. So the reason why the bounded rationality exits in decision-making is due to not only the bounded ability to deal with information but also the departure of the process to deal with it
本文主要通过文献分析的方法,研究发现人们决策的有限理性除了处理信息能力这个原因以外,人们对决策信息处理的偏向也会导致对“完美理性”决策的偏离。因此,为了更好地了解个体决策过程中的有限理性问题,本文从认知偏向角度对决策中的信息处理方式进行剖析。本文认为,决策中的信息处理方式受个体认知偏向的影响;而认知偏向又包括认知方式简化性、认知内容一致性、认知趋同效应等。这些认知偏向使人们对决策信息的处理出现一定的偏差,从而有可能使做出的决策欠合理性。认知方式简化属于人们认知策略的一种,这种策略有时候能减少对事物认识或决策所需要的时间和精神活动,但正是因为这种对事物采取认知上的捷径,就容易对决策信息的产生不完全或者不正确的认识,从而产生决策信息的歪曲。认知方式简化主要包括各种认知代表性偏向、获得性偏向、参照效应等等,这些偏向使得人们在决策中对信息的处理也产生偏向或偏差,这样决策理性的最大实现就受到局限。认知内容一致性也属于人们认知上的一种倾向,人们习惯于保持对外界事物已有信息认知元素上的协调一致性,习惯于保持对事物认知
This paper is about the cognitive reason why the bounded rationality proposed by Simon exits in decision-making, it is the Simon's idea that there is no "perfect rationality" in decision-making, because a individual not only gets bounded information in decision-making, but also has a bounded ability to deal with the information. And the "perfect rationality" decision-making requires not only enough information but also perfect ability to deal with the information in the decision-making process. Simon thought this disobeyed the decision-making in real environments, and he proposed the bounded rationality theory in the way that individuals have the bounded ability to deal with the information.On the bases of literature analysis, it is concluded in this paper that the reason why the bounded rationality exits in decision-making is due to not only the bounded ability to deal with information but also the departure of the process to deal with information, so it happens that real decision-making has the departure of the "perfect rationality". In order to understand the bounded rationality well enough in an individual decision-making process, this paper plays a key on the decision-making process to deal with information from the cognitive inclinations. This paper takes the point that the way to deal with the information in decision-making is influenced by the individual's cognitive inclinations, and the cognitive inclinations contains the predigestion of the cognition means, the consistency of the cognition elements and the conformity of the cognition. Individuals will have the bounded rational decision-making because of these
cognitive inclinations. And the predigestion of the cognition means is the one of individual's cognitive strategy, which can economize the time and the spirit action, but it is the cognitive shortcut that individuals may take mistakes on information in the decision-making, so the distortion of the information in decision-making occurs. The predigestion of the cognition means contains the representativeness bias, availability bias and reference efficiency, which make the biases or the departure of the information in decision-making occur, so the perfect rationality is bounded in decision-making. And the consistency of cognition elements is another one of the cognitive inclinations; individuals form the habits of the cognitive consistency of the information about things in the world, and the habits of the consistency between the cognition and the feelings about things in the world, which makes it very hard to deal with the information properly and objectively in real decision-making environments. And the conformity of the cognition can be used to interpret the conformity to the public in a certain degree, though this phenomenon can take the extra information to decision-maker, the integration of a decision-maker is broken, and this may bring useless or harmful information to decision-makers. So the degree of the rationality is bounded in decision-making. In a word, the degree of the rationality in real decision-making is not as the perfect rationality, which the classic decision-making theory proposed. So the reason why the bounded rationality exits in decision-making is due to not only the bounded ability to deal with information but also the departure of the process to deal with it
引文
[1] Neumann von J, Morgenstern O. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior(3rd ed. ) [M] Princeton University Press. Princeton. 1944。
[2] Allais M. Le comportement de I' home rationel devant le risque: Critique des postulats et axioms de I'ecole americaine. [J] Ecomometrica, 1953, 21:503～546
[3] Kahneman D, Tversky A. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. [J] Econometrica, 1979, 47:263-291
[4] Tversky A, Kahneman D. Rational Choice and framing of decisions. [J] Journal of Business, 1986, 59:S252～278
[5] Christopher K. Hsee(1996)"The Evaluability Hypothesis: An Explanation for Preference Reversals between Joint and Separate Evaluations of Alternatives" Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes67, No. 3, pp. 247-257
[6] Herbert A. Simon Models of Though (Volume ⅱ) [M] YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS NEW HAVEN AND LONDON 1989
[7] Herbert A.Simon(1996)Bounded Rationality《新帕雷夫经济学大辞典》(第一卷)[M]北京:经济科学出版社
[8] Kahneman, D., Slovic, P. &Tversky, A. (1982) Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristic and Biases[M]. New York: Cambridge University Press
[9] Wing Hong Loke Perspectives on Judgment and Decision-Making [M] The Scarecrow Press, Inc. Lanham, Md., &London
[10] Tversky A, Kahneman D. Rational Choice and framing of decisions. [J] Journal of Business, 1986, 59:S252～278
[11] Neumann von J, Morgenstern O. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior(3ra ed. ) [M] Princeton University Press. Princeton. 1944
[12] Herbert A. Simon A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice [J] The Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. 69. No. 1 (Feb., 1955), 99-118
[13] 刘霞 潘晓良 风险决策心理学研究[J]湖北大学学报(哲社)1995年 第6期
[14] [美]赫伯特·西蒙《现代决策理论的基石》[M]杨砾 徐立 翻译 北京经济学院出版 社1989年3月第1版
[15] 詹姆士《心理学原理》[M]纽约:霍尔特公司 1890年版,
[16] 《政治学,经济学和福利》,纽约:哈泼兄弟出版公司 1953年版,
[17] 刘霞《风险决策:过程、心理与文化》[M]经济科学出版社 1998年第8月第一版
[18] [美]J.Edward Russo安宝生 徐联仓著《决策行为分析》[M]北京师范大学98年8月第1版
[19] 常鑫 殷红海 Daniel Kahneman与行为经济学[J]心理科学进展 2003,11(3):256～261。
[20] 薛求知《行为经济-理论与应用》[M]复旦大学出版社 2003年11月第一版
[21] 奚恺元《别做正常的傻瓜》[M]机械工业出版社 2004年5月第1版 P26
[22] [美]利昂.费斯汀格《认知失调理论》[M]郑全全 译 浙江教育出版社 1999年12月第1版
[23] [美]DAVID O.SEARS JONATHAN L.FREEDMAN LETITIA ANNE PEPLAU《社会心理学》第5版[M]陈皎眉校订 黄安邦(台)翻译 五南图书出版公司 1986年印行
[24] [美]西蒙《管理行为》[M]杨砾 徐立 翻译 北京经济学院出版社 1988年5月第1版
[25] [美]克雷奇 克拉奇菲尔德《心理学纲要》[M]周先庚 林传鼎 等译 文化教育出版社 1980年10月第1版
[26] S.Z菲斯克S.E.泰勒《社会认知——人怎么认识自己和他人》[M]张庆林 陈兴强 等译 贵州人民出版社 1994年4月第1版
[27] 刘凤英 许锐《西蒙评传》[M]山西经济出版社 1999年12月第1版
[28] 朱新秤《社会认知心理学研究的新进展》[J]心理学动态 2000年第2期
[29] 郭生 王耀斌《决策科学—从传统到现代》[M]经济日报出版社 1991年6月第1版
[2] Allais M. Le comportement de I' home rationel devant le risque: Critique des postulats et axioms de I'ecole americaine. [J] Ecomometrica, 1953, 21:503～546
[3] Kahneman D, Tversky A. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. [J] Econometrica, 1979, 47:263-291
[4] Tversky A, Kahneman D. Rational Choice and framing of decisions. [J] Journal of Business, 1986, 59:S252～278
[5] Christopher K. Hsee(1996)"The Evaluability Hypothesis: An Explanation for Preference Reversals between Joint and Separate Evaluations of Alternatives" Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes67, No. 3, pp. 247-257
[6] Herbert A. Simon Models of Though (Volume ⅱ) [M] YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS NEW HAVEN AND LONDON 1989
[7] Herbert A.Simon(1996)Bounded Rationality《新帕雷夫经济学大辞典》(第一卷)[M]北京:经济科学出版社
[8] Kahneman, D., Slovic, P. &Tversky, A. (1982) Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristic and Biases[M]. New York: Cambridge University Press
[9] Wing Hong Loke Perspectives on Judgment and Decision-Making [M] The Scarecrow Press, Inc. Lanham, Md., &London
[10] Tversky A, Kahneman D. Rational Choice and framing of decisions. [J] Journal of Business, 1986, 59:S252～278
[11] Neumann von J, Morgenstern O. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior(3ra ed. ) [M] Princeton University Press. Princeton. 1944
[12] Herbert A. Simon A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice [J] The Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. 69. No. 1 (Feb., 1955), 99-118
[13] 刘霞 潘晓良 风险决策心理学研究[J]湖北大学学报(哲社)1995年 第6期
[14] [美]赫伯特·西蒙《现代决策理论的基石》[M]杨砾 徐立 翻译 北京经济学院出版 社1989年3月第1版
[15] 詹姆士《心理学原理》[M]纽约:霍尔特公司 1890年版,
[16] 《政治学,经济学和福利》,纽约:哈泼兄弟出版公司 1953年版,
[17] 刘霞《风险决策:过程、心理与文化》[M]经济科学出版社 1998年第8月第一版
[18] [美]J.Edward Russo安宝生 徐联仓著《决策行为分析》[M]北京师范大学98年8月第1版
[19] 常鑫 殷红海 Daniel Kahneman与行为经济学[J]心理科学进展 2003,11(3):256～261。
[20] 薛求知《行为经济-理论与应用》[M]复旦大学出版社 2003年11月第一版
[21] 奚恺元《别做正常的傻瓜》[M]机械工业出版社 2004年5月第1版 P26
[22] [美]利昂.费斯汀格《认知失调理论》[M]郑全全 译 浙江教育出版社 1999年12月第1版
[23] [美]DAVID O.SEARS JONATHAN L.FREEDMAN LETITIA ANNE PEPLAU《社会心理学》第5版[M]陈皎眉校订 黄安邦(台)翻译 五南图书出版公司 1986年印行
[24] [美]西蒙《管理行为》[M]杨砾 徐立 翻译 北京经济学院出版社 1988年5月第1版
[25] [美]克雷奇 克拉奇菲尔德《心理学纲要》[M]周先庚 林传鼎 等译 文化教育出版社 1980年10月第1版
[26] S.Z菲斯克S.E.泰勒《社会认知——人怎么认识自己和他人》[M]张庆林 陈兴强 等译 贵州人民出版社 1994年4月第1版
[27] 刘凤英 许锐《西蒙评传》[M]山西经济出版社 1999年12月第1版
[28] 朱新秤《社会认知心理学研究的新进展》[J]心理学动态 2000年第2期
[29] 郭生 王耀斌《决策科学—从传统到现代》[M]经济日报出版社 1991年6月第1版
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