我国承销商声誉机制有效性研究
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摘要
本文旨在全面系统研究承销商声誉机制。论文把承销商声誉机制分为市场约束机制和监管约束机制,认为它们整体构成了声誉机制的两个方面。对于市场约束机制,在证券承销商声誉机制有效发挥的情况下,可以内生出以下三种关系。这三种关系是声誉市场约束机制的统一整体,构成了一个分离均衡。
一是证券承销商声誉与发行企业质量之间的关系,在一个完善的证券发行市场中,在声誉机制的作用下,出于对自己声誉和未来收益的关切,高声誉的证券承销商往往会承销高质量企业的证券,因此从经验上而言,证券承销商的声誉与发行企业质量之间应该存在一种正相关关系,即越是声誉好的证券承销商,其所承揽的发行业务越有可能是质量好的企业的发行业务。
二是承销商声誉资本和IPO定价的关系。如果证券承销商的声誉机制起作用,则越是声誉好的证券承销商,就越能够缓解发行企业和投资者之间的信息不对称的程度,由于IPO抑价是证券发行市场中信息不对称的一个直接的后果,因此从理论上而言,声誉越好的证券承销商所承销的IPO证券的抑价水平也应该越低。
三是承销商声誉与承销服务费用的关系。因为市场为高声誉承销商提供更高的承销服务费用是对承销商建立和维持声誉的一个补偿和激励,也是促进承销商提供高质量承销服务的持续动力。因此,高声誉证券承销商可以获得比低声誉证券承销商更高的承销费用是承销商声誉资本价值的必要要求和基础,二者呈正相关关系。
由于承销商声誉具有不可挽回性,高声誉承销商在理性地权衡了采取舞弊行为能获得的收益与可能面临的直接或间接损失以后,必然会约束自身的机会主义行为,以维护长期积累起来的声誉资本价值。而高效率的外部监管会对有舞弊行为的承销商做出直接或间接的处罚。因此,在成熟的市场监管体制下,舞弊的承销商必须付出巨大的代价,而高声誉承销商则会极力维护自身的声誉,避免运作过程产生任何的机会主义行为。
文中用三种不同的标准来衡量承销商声誉,分别是承销家数、承销份额和综合业务量。选取了1999市场化发行制度改革后的数据对上述四个方面进行实证研究。而且通过不同阶段的数据来验证是不是随着时间的推移,我国承销商声誉机制的发挥有更好的效果。结果发现些有趣且有意义的结论。概括地讲,前两个关系在我国得不到实证结果的验证,而承销声声誉与承销费用之间的关系得到一定程度的市场经验数据的支持。实证结果表明在我国证券发行市场中,承销商声誉与IPO企业质量之间并不存在“认证中介理论”所表明的那种正相关关系,承销商声誉与IPO抑价水平负相关的关系在我国证券发行市场中也没有得到验证。承销服务费与承销商声誉值正相关,实证结果显著,但同时承销费用率对承销商声誉值的系数非常小,显示其有效性也不高。结合前两者的研究,出现一个很有意思的结果,就是在我国,虽然承销商的信息生产和认证中介的作用并没有显现出来,但其收取承销费的积极性却很高。而且综合业务量的承销费用声誉机制效果更好,说明了在目前我国的承销市场上,综合业务量大的券商往往可以收取更多的承销费用。
对于声誉机制的监管方面,文中运用事件研究法得出的结果表明,中国并不存在国外成熟市场上存在的承销商和发行企业之间的声誉关联性。监管当局对承销商虚假上市违规行为的稽查并没有带来显著的市场反应,不具有明显的信息含量。在对声誉的监管机制的实证中,本文用受到证监会处罚的承销商承销股票池的市场反应来做验证,实证结果也表明了我国承销商声誉机制的监管方面是无效的。
本文的四个方面的实证结果说明,在我国证券发行市场中承销商声誉机制不具有有效性。承销商声誉机制的失效不仅反映了当前我国证券发行市场效率低下,同时它也是我国证券行业行为混乱的重要原因之一。
鉴于上述我国证券承销商声誉机制有效性不足的原因和声誉机制的一般原理,结合中国证券发行市场制度变迁的背景,本文最后探讨了重塑我国证券承销商的声誉机制、规范我国证券承销商行为的政策措施。
The dissertation studies the reputation effect of Chinese underwriter on the stock market comprehensively .The dissertation argues that underwriter reputation effect can be analyed from two aspect of market discipline and regulation policy which construct the whole framework of underwriter reputation. As to market discipline , if the mechanism is effective, there will be three kinds of relationships in separate equilibrium which constitute the whole of market discipline. First ,underwriter's rank of reputation is positive with the quality of issuing firm. Under the effect of underwriter reputation,in order to get more future income and reputation capital, the more prestigious investment banker is inclined and be able to underwriter security of high quality firm. Thereby the relationship between underwriter'rank of reputation and quality of issuing firm is positive. Second ,underwriter' s rank of reputation is negative with IPOs underpricing. IPOs underpricing is direct result of asymmetric information in security issuing marker. The less information asymmetry ,the lower IPO underpricing. While a prestigious underwriter can reduce the ex ant uncertainty and alleviate the degree of information asymmetry, therefore in theory IPO underpricing underwrited by more prestigious investment banker will be smaller than by a common investment banker. Thirdly, underwriter reputation rank is positive with underwriting service's fee. The fact that underwriter with higher reputation will get more underwriting fee is a compensation and encouragement for underwriter to built and maintain reputation, it also stimulate them to provide high quality underwriting services.
As to regulation policy of underwriter reputation, the more prestigious underwriter is sure to restrict speculative behaviors to guard the value of reputation capital after weighing the short term of advantage and direct penalty and indirect long term loss. Under the condition of effective market regulation system, underwriter will maintain his reputation to escape big price of the speculative behavior.
The dissertation use three kind of index, the amount of underwriter issuing underwriter market share and integrated amount of operation to measure reputation of underwriter respectively. Then,this dissertation empirically analysis underwriter's reputation in our country's stock market after 1999. Time is divided into three-stage to show whether the reputation mechanism is more effective along with time going. The empirical results show that the first two theoretical relationship of market discipline are not confirmed while the third is confirmed slightly. First,there is no positive relationship between the reputation rank of underwriter and quality of issuing firm which is proved by certifying agent theory。Secongd the relationship that the reputation rank of underwriter is negative with IPOs underpricing is not significant, which means that underwriter'reputation can not alleviate information asymmetry in security market. Thirdly, although underwriting fee is positive with underwriter's reputation, the sensitivity is too small. According to the three results mentioned above, some interesting conclusions can be drawed that in our security market, although underwriters' function of information production and certifying agent has no effect, they are zealous of receive underwriter fee. The fact that the empirical test of intergrated amount of operation is better shows at present underwriter market, the bigger security corporation can ask for more underwriter fee.
As to regulation policy, my case study indicates the security authority brings negative effect on the reputation of underwriter by the impact on its market share. In this case study, however, the relationship shown in the mature market between the underwriter's reputation and IPO clients' reputation has not been verified. The effect of penalties imposed on underwriters'reputation by supervision act is weak.
To sum up ,the empirical test from four aspects of underwriter reputation indicates that function of underwriter reputation mechanism is not effective in our security market, which is an important reason for inefficiency of our security issuance market and underwriter conduct disorder.
On the reason of inefficiency of our underwriter reputation mechanism and the theory of reputation, in accord with background of institution transition and evolution of our security issuance market, this dissertation suggest some measures to improve reputation effect and reestablish underwriter's reputation mechanism and underwriter operation behavior.
一是证券承销商声誉与发行企业质量之间的关系,在一个完善的证券发行市场中,在声誉机制的作用下,出于对自己声誉和未来收益的关切,高声誉的证券承销商往往会承销高质量企业的证券,因此从经验上而言,证券承销商的声誉与发行企业质量之间应该存在一种正相关关系,即越是声誉好的证券承销商,其所承揽的发行业务越有可能是质量好的企业的发行业务。
二是承销商声誉资本和IPO定价的关系。如果证券承销商的声誉机制起作用,则越是声誉好的证券承销商,就越能够缓解发行企业和投资者之间的信息不对称的程度,由于IPO抑价是证券发行市场中信息不对称的一个直接的后果,因此从理论上而言,声誉越好的证券承销商所承销的IPO证券的抑价水平也应该越低。
三是承销商声誉与承销服务费用的关系。因为市场为高声誉承销商提供更高的承销服务费用是对承销商建立和维持声誉的一个补偿和激励,也是促进承销商提供高质量承销服务的持续动力。因此,高声誉证券承销商可以获得比低声誉证券承销商更高的承销费用是承销商声誉资本价值的必要要求和基础,二者呈正相关关系。
由于承销商声誉具有不可挽回性,高声誉承销商在理性地权衡了采取舞弊行为能获得的收益与可能面临的直接或间接损失以后,必然会约束自身的机会主义行为,以维护长期积累起来的声誉资本价值。而高效率的外部监管会对有舞弊行为的承销商做出直接或间接的处罚。因此,在成熟的市场监管体制下,舞弊的承销商必须付出巨大的代价,而高声誉承销商则会极力维护自身的声誉,避免运作过程产生任何的机会主义行为。
文中用三种不同的标准来衡量承销商声誉,分别是承销家数、承销份额和综合业务量。选取了1999市场化发行制度改革后的数据对上述四个方面进行实证研究。而且通过不同阶段的数据来验证是不是随着时间的推移,我国承销商声誉机制的发挥有更好的效果。结果发现些有趣且有意义的结论。概括地讲,前两个关系在我国得不到实证结果的验证,而承销声声誉与承销费用之间的关系得到一定程度的市场经验数据的支持。实证结果表明在我国证券发行市场中,承销商声誉与IPO企业质量之间并不存在“认证中介理论”所表明的那种正相关关系,承销商声誉与IPO抑价水平负相关的关系在我国证券发行市场中也没有得到验证。承销服务费与承销商声誉值正相关,实证结果显著,但同时承销费用率对承销商声誉值的系数非常小,显示其有效性也不高。结合前两者的研究,出现一个很有意思的结果,就是在我国,虽然承销商的信息生产和认证中介的作用并没有显现出来,但其收取承销费的积极性却很高。而且综合业务量的承销费用声誉机制效果更好,说明了在目前我国的承销市场上,综合业务量大的券商往往可以收取更多的承销费用。
对于声誉机制的监管方面,文中运用事件研究法得出的结果表明,中国并不存在国外成熟市场上存在的承销商和发行企业之间的声誉关联性。监管当局对承销商虚假上市违规行为的稽查并没有带来显著的市场反应,不具有明显的信息含量。在对声誉的监管机制的实证中,本文用受到证监会处罚的承销商承销股票池的市场反应来做验证,实证结果也表明了我国承销商声誉机制的监管方面是无效的。
本文的四个方面的实证结果说明,在我国证券发行市场中承销商声誉机制不具有有效性。承销商声誉机制的失效不仅反映了当前我国证券发行市场效率低下,同时它也是我国证券行业行为混乱的重要原因之一。
鉴于上述我国证券承销商声誉机制有效性不足的原因和声誉机制的一般原理,结合中国证券发行市场制度变迁的背景,本文最后探讨了重塑我国证券承销商的声誉机制、规范我国证券承销商行为的政策措施。
The dissertation studies the reputation effect of Chinese underwriter on the stock market comprehensively .The dissertation argues that underwriter reputation effect can be analyed from two aspect of market discipline and regulation policy which construct the whole framework of underwriter reputation. As to market discipline , if the mechanism is effective, there will be three kinds of relationships in separate equilibrium which constitute the whole of market discipline. First ,underwriter's rank of reputation is positive with the quality of issuing firm. Under the effect of underwriter reputation,in order to get more future income and reputation capital, the more prestigious investment banker is inclined and be able to underwriter security of high quality firm. Thereby the relationship between underwriter'rank of reputation and quality of issuing firm is positive. Second ,underwriter' s rank of reputation is negative with IPOs underpricing. IPOs underpricing is direct result of asymmetric information in security issuing marker. The less information asymmetry ,the lower IPO underpricing. While a prestigious underwriter can reduce the ex ant uncertainty and alleviate the degree of information asymmetry, therefore in theory IPO underpricing underwrited by more prestigious investment banker will be smaller than by a common investment banker. Thirdly, underwriter reputation rank is positive with underwriting service's fee. The fact that underwriter with higher reputation will get more underwriting fee is a compensation and encouragement for underwriter to built and maintain reputation, it also stimulate them to provide high quality underwriting services.
As to regulation policy of underwriter reputation, the more prestigious underwriter is sure to restrict speculative behaviors to guard the value of reputation capital after weighing the short term of advantage and direct penalty and indirect long term loss. Under the condition of effective market regulation system, underwriter will maintain his reputation to escape big price of the speculative behavior.
The dissertation use three kind of index, the amount of underwriter issuing underwriter market share and integrated amount of operation to measure reputation of underwriter respectively. Then,this dissertation empirically analysis underwriter's reputation in our country's stock market after 1999. Time is divided into three-stage to show whether the reputation mechanism is more effective along with time going. The empirical results show that the first two theoretical relationship of market discipline are not confirmed while the third is confirmed slightly. First,there is no positive relationship between the reputation rank of underwriter and quality of issuing firm which is proved by certifying agent theory。Secongd the relationship that the reputation rank of underwriter is negative with IPOs underpricing is not significant, which means that underwriter'reputation can not alleviate information asymmetry in security market. Thirdly, although underwriting fee is positive with underwriter's reputation, the sensitivity is too small. According to the three results mentioned above, some interesting conclusions can be drawed that in our security market, although underwriters' function of information production and certifying agent has no effect, they are zealous of receive underwriter fee. The fact that the empirical test of intergrated amount of operation is better shows at present underwriter market, the bigger security corporation can ask for more underwriter fee.
As to regulation policy, my case study indicates the security authority brings negative effect on the reputation of underwriter by the impact on its market share. In this case study, however, the relationship shown in the mature market between the underwriter's reputation and IPO clients' reputation has not been verified. The effect of penalties imposed on underwriters'reputation by supervision act is weak.
To sum up ,the empirical test from four aspects of underwriter reputation indicates that function of underwriter reputation mechanism is not effective in our security market, which is an important reason for inefficiency of our security issuance market and underwriter conduct disorder.
On the reason of inefficiency of our underwriter reputation mechanism and the theory of reputation, in accord with background of institution transition and evolution of our security issuance market, this dissertation suggest some measures to improve reputation effect and reestablish underwriter's reputation mechanism and underwriter operation behavior.
引文
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40.Balvers,R.J.,McDonald,B.,and Miller,R.E.,Uderpicing of New Issues and the Choice of Auditor as a Signal of Investment Banker Reputation,Accounting Review,1988,63,605-622
41.Baron,David P.,A Model of the Demand for Investment Banking Advising and Distribution Services for New Issues,Journal of Finance,1982.4,955-976
42.Barth,M.E.,and Kasznik,R.,Share Repurchase and Intangible Asset,Journal of Accounting and Economics,1999,28,211-241
43.Bates,T.W.,and Dunbar,G.G.,Investment Bank Reputation,Market Power,and the Pricing and Performance of IPOs, 2002, working paper in http://www,ssrn.com
44. Beatty,R.and J.Ritter, Investment Banking Reputation and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings, Journal of Financial Economics, 1986,15.213-232
45. Beatty,R, Bunsis H,and Hand.J, The Indirect Economic Penaltities in SEC Investigation of Uderwriters, Journal of Financial Economics,1998,50.151-186
46. Beatty, R ,and Welch,I., Issue Expenses and Legal Liability in Initial Public Offerings, Journal of Law and Economics, 1996,39,545-602
47. Benveniste,L.M., Busaba, W.Y., and Wilhelm, W.J., Information Externalities and the Role of Underwriters in Primary Markets, Journal of Financial Intermediation,2002,11,61-86
48. Benveniste,L.M., Spindt, P., How Investment Banker Determine the Offer Price and Allocation of New Issue, Journal of Financial Economics,1989,24,343-361
49. Booth,J., and Smith,R., Capital raising, Underwriting and the Certification Process, Journal of Financial Economics, 1986,15,261-281
50. Booth, I.C., Underwriter Reputation and Aftermarket Performance of Closed-end Funds, Journal of Financial Reseach,2004,27,539-557
51. Bradley,D.J., Cooney,J.W., Dolvin,J.S., and Jordan,B.D., Penny Stock IPOs, Financial Management, 2006,3,5-29
52. Brennan,M.J.,and Franks,J., Underpricing,Ownership and Control in Initial Public Offerings of Equity Securities in the UK, Journal of Financial Economics, 1997,45,391-413
53. Campell,T.S., Kracaw,W.A., Information Production ,Market Signaling and the Theory of Financial Intermediation, Journal of Finance, 1980,35,863-882
54. Carter,R.B., Dark,F.H.,. and Ajar K.S.,1998, Underwriter Reputation, and the Long-Run Performance of IPO Stocks, Journal of Finance,53,285-311
55. Carter,R.B., Dark,F.H.,and Piwowar,M.S., IPOs and Underwriter Reputation:Redeeming the Value of Reputaition, Working Paper, Iowa State University,2002
56. Carter,R. and Steven Manaster,1990, Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation, the Journal of Fiannce,45,1045-1067.
57. Chemmanur,Thomas.J and Paolo Fulghieri, Invstment Bank Reputation,Information Production,and Financial Intermediation. Journal of Finance, 1994,49,57-79
58. Chemmanur,T.J., The Pricing of Initial Public Offerings:A Dynanmic Model with Information Production, Journal of Finance,1993,48,285-304
59.Chen Hsuan-Chi,and Ritter,J.R.The Seven Percent Solution,Journal of Finance,2000,6,1105-1131
60.Cooney,J.W.,Singh,A.K.,Carter,R.B.,and Dark,F.H.,IPO Initial Returns and Underwriter Reputation:Has the Inverse Relationship Flipped in the 1900s?,2001,working paper,University of Kentucky,Case Western Reseach University,and Iowa State University.
61.Cooney,J.W.,Singh,A.K.,Carter,R.B.,and Dark,F.H,IPO Partial-adjustment Phenomenon and Underwriter Reputation,Working Paper,2000
62.Corwin,S.A.,and Paul,S.,The Role of IPO Underwriting Syndicates:Underpricing,Inforamtion Productin,and Underwriter Competiton,Working Paper,University of Notre Dame,2003
63.Diamond,D.W.,Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring,Review of Economic Studies1984,51,393-414
64.Dunbar,Craig G.,Factors affecting investment bank initial public offering market share,Journal of Financial Economics,2000,55,3-41
65.Dunbar,Craig G.,The Use of Warrants as Underwriter Compensation in Initial Public Offerrings,Journal of Financial Economics,1995,38,59-78
66.Ellis,K.,Michaely,R.,and O'Hara,M.,When the Underwriter is the Market Maker:an Examination of Trading in the IPOs aftermarket,Journal of Finance,2000,55,1039-1074
67.Ellis,K.,Michaely,R.,and O'Hara,M.,Competition in Investment Banking:Proactive,Reactive,or Retaliatiry?,Working Paper,http://www.ssrn.com,2005
68.Fama,E.F.,Agency Problem and the Theory of the Firm,Journal of Political Econoimy,1980,88,288-307
69.Fama,E.F.,and Freneh,F.,Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Bonds and Stocks,Journal of Financial Economics,1993,33,3-56
70.Fang,L.H.,Investment Bank Reputation,the Pricing and Quality of Underpricing Services,Working paper in http://www.ssrn.com,2002
71.Fang,L.H.,and Yasuda,A.,The Effectiveness of Reputation as a Disciplinary Device in Sell-side Reseaeh,Working Paper,http://www.ssrn.com,2005
72.Gilson,R.J.,and Kraakman,R.H.,The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency,Virginia Law Review,1984,70,549-644
73.Grinblatt,M.,Hwang,C.,Signaling and the Pricing of Unseasoned New Issue.Journal of Finance,1989.44,393-413
74. Hanley, K.W., The Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings and the Partial Adjustment Phenomenon, Journal of Financial Ecnomics, 1993,34,231-250
75. Hansen,R.S, and Torregrosa,P, Underwriter Compensation and Corporate Monitoring, Journal of Finance, 11992,47,1537-1555
76. Hayes, S., Investment Banking Power Structure in Flux, Harvard Business Review, 1971,49,136-152
77. Ibbotson,R.G., Pricing Performance of Common Stock New Issue, Journal of Financial Economics, 1975,3,235-272
78. Jain,B., and Kini,O., On Investment Banker Monitoring in the New Issue Market, Journal of Banking and Finance, 1999,23,49-84
79. James, C., Relationship-Specfic Assets and the Pricing of Underwriter Services, Journal of Finance, 1992,47,1865-1885
80. Jelic,R., Saaddouni,B., and Briston,R., Performance of Malsysian IPOS: Underwriters Reputation and Management Earnings Forecasts, Pacific-Basin Financial Journal,2001,9,457-486
81. Johnson, J.M.and Robert E. Miller, Invstment Banker Pretige and the Underpricing of initial Public Offerings, Financial Management, 1988,17.19-29
82. Kanatas,G.,and Jianping,Q., Integration of Lending and Underwriting:Implications of Scope Economics,Journal of Finance,2003,58,1167-1191
83. Karpoff,J.M., and Lott,J.R., The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear for Committing Criminal Fraud, The Journal of Law and Economics, 1993,34,757-802
84. Kirkulak,B. and Davis,C., Underwriter Reputation and Underpricing :Evidence from the Japanese IPOs Market, Pacific-Basin Financial Journal,2005,13.451-470
85. Kreps,D., P. Milgrom, Roberts,J.and Wilson,R., Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisonners "Dilemma", Journal of Economic Theory, 1982,27,245-252
86. Krigman,L., W.Shaw, and Womack, K., Why Do Firms Switch Underwriters?, Journal of Financial Economics, 2001,60,245-284
87. Kutsuna,Kenji, and Richard Smith, Why Does Book Building Drive Out Auction Methods of IPO Issuance? Evidence from Japan,2004,17(4), 1129-1166
88. Leland,H., Pyle,D., Informational Asymmetries,Financail Struture and Financial Intermediation, Journal of Finance, 1977,32,371 -387
89. Livingstone, M., and Miller,R.E., Investment Bank Reputation and the Underwriting of Noncnvertible Debt, Finnacial Management,2000,29,21-34
90. Livingstone, M., and Williams,G., Dexel Burnham Lambert's Bankruptcy and the Subsequent Decline in Underwriter Fees, Journal of Financial Economics, 2007,84,472-501
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36.Akerlof,G,The market for "Lemons":Quality and the Market Mechanism,Quarterly Journal of Economics,1970,84,488-500
37.Allen,F.,Reputation and Product Quality,Rand Journal of Economics,1984,15,311-327
38.Allen,F.and G,R,Faulhaber,Signaling by Underpricing in the IPO Market,Journal of Financial Economics,1989,23.303-324
39.Altinkilic,O.,and Robert,S,H.,Are There Economics of Scale in Underwriting Fees? Evidence from Rising External Financing Costs,Review of Financail Studies,2000,13,191-218
40.Balvers,R.J.,McDonald,B.,and Miller,R.E.,Uderpicing of New Issues and the Choice of Auditor as a Signal of Investment Banker Reputation,Accounting Review,1988,63,605-622
41.Baron,David P.,A Model of the Demand for Investment Banking Advising and Distribution Services for New Issues,Journal of Finance,1982.4,955-976
42.Barth,M.E.,and Kasznik,R.,Share Repurchase and Intangible Asset,Journal of Accounting and Economics,1999,28,211-241
43.Bates,T.W.,and Dunbar,G.G.,Investment Bank Reputation,Market Power,and the Pricing and Performance of IPOs, 2002, working paper in http://www,ssrn.com
44. Beatty,R.and J.Ritter, Investment Banking Reputation and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings, Journal of Financial Economics, 1986,15.213-232
45. Beatty,R, Bunsis H,and Hand.J, The Indirect Economic Penaltities in SEC Investigation of Uderwriters, Journal of Financial Economics,1998,50.151-186
46. Beatty, R ,and Welch,I., Issue Expenses and Legal Liability in Initial Public Offerings, Journal of Law and Economics, 1996,39,545-602
47. Benveniste,L.M., Busaba, W.Y., and Wilhelm, W.J., Information Externalities and the Role of Underwriters in Primary Markets, Journal of Financial Intermediation,2002,11,61-86
48. Benveniste,L.M., Spindt, P., How Investment Banker Determine the Offer Price and Allocation of New Issue, Journal of Financial Economics,1989,24,343-361
49. Booth,J., and Smith,R., Capital raising, Underwriting and the Certification Process, Journal of Financial Economics, 1986,15,261-281
50. Booth, I.C., Underwriter Reputation and Aftermarket Performance of Closed-end Funds, Journal of Financial Reseach,2004,27,539-557
51. Bradley,D.J., Cooney,J.W., Dolvin,J.S., and Jordan,B.D., Penny Stock IPOs, Financial Management, 2006,3,5-29
52. Brennan,M.J.,and Franks,J., Underpricing,Ownership and Control in Initial Public Offerings of Equity Securities in the UK, Journal of Financial Economics, 1997,45,391-413
53. Campell,T.S., Kracaw,W.A., Information Production ,Market Signaling and the Theory of Financial Intermediation, Journal of Finance, 1980,35,863-882
54. Carter,R.B., Dark,F.H.,. and Ajar K.S.,1998, Underwriter Reputation, and the Long-Run Performance of IPO Stocks, Journal of Finance,53,285-311
55. Carter,R.B., Dark,F.H.,and Piwowar,M.S., IPOs and Underwriter Reputation:Redeeming the Value of Reputaition, Working Paper, Iowa State University,2002
56. Carter,R. and Steven Manaster,1990, Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation, the Journal of Fiannce,45,1045-1067.
57. Chemmanur,Thomas.J and Paolo Fulghieri, Invstment Bank Reputation,Information Production,and Financial Intermediation. Journal of Finance, 1994,49,57-79
58. Chemmanur,T.J., The Pricing of Initial Public Offerings:A Dynanmic Model with Information Production, Journal of Finance,1993,48,285-304
59.Chen Hsuan-Chi,and Ritter,J.R.The Seven Percent Solution,Journal of Finance,2000,6,1105-1131
60.Cooney,J.W.,Singh,A.K.,Carter,R.B.,and Dark,F.H.,IPO Initial Returns and Underwriter Reputation:Has the Inverse Relationship Flipped in the 1900s?,2001,working paper,University of Kentucky,Case Western Reseach University,and Iowa State University.
61.Cooney,J.W.,Singh,A.K.,Carter,R.B.,and Dark,F.H,IPO Partial-adjustment Phenomenon and Underwriter Reputation,Working Paper,2000
62.Corwin,S.A.,and Paul,S.,The Role of IPO Underwriting Syndicates:Underpricing,Inforamtion Productin,and Underwriter Competiton,Working Paper,University of Notre Dame,2003
63.Diamond,D.W.,Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring,Review of Economic Studies1984,51,393-414
64.Dunbar,Craig G.,Factors affecting investment bank initial public offering market share,Journal of Financial Economics,2000,55,3-41
65.Dunbar,Craig G.,The Use of Warrants as Underwriter Compensation in Initial Public Offerrings,Journal of Financial Economics,1995,38,59-78
66.Ellis,K.,Michaely,R.,and O'Hara,M.,When the Underwriter is the Market Maker:an Examination of Trading in the IPOs aftermarket,Journal of Finance,2000,55,1039-1074
67.Ellis,K.,Michaely,R.,and O'Hara,M.,Competition in Investment Banking:Proactive,Reactive,or Retaliatiry?,Working Paper,http://www.ssrn.com,2005
68.Fama,E.F.,Agency Problem and the Theory of the Firm,Journal of Political Econoimy,1980,88,288-307
69.Fama,E.F.,and Freneh,F.,Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Bonds and Stocks,Journal of Financial Economics,1993,33,3-56
70.Fang,L.H.,Investment Bank Reputation,the Pricing and Quality of Underpricing Services,Working paper in http://www.ssrn.com,2002
71.Fang,L.H.,and Yasuda,A.,The Effectiveness of Reputation as a Disciplinary Device in Sell-side Reseaeh,Working Paper,http://www.ssrn.com,2005
72.Gilson,R.J.,and Kraakman,R.H.,The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency,Virginia Law Review,1984,70,549-644
73.Grinblatt,M.,Hwang,C.,Signaling and the Pricing of Unseasoned New Issue.Journal of Finance,1989.44,393-413
74. Hanley, K.W., The Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings and the Partial Adjustment Phenomenon, Journal of Financial Ecnomics, 1993,34,231-250
75. Hansen,R.S, and Torregrosa,P, Underwriter Compensation and Corporate Monitoring, Journal of Finance, 11992,47,1537-1555
76. Hayes, S., Investment Banking Power Structure in Flux, Harvard Business Review, 1971,49,136-152
77. Ibbotson,R.G., Pricing Performance of Common Stock New Issue, Journal of Financial Economics, 1975,3,235-272
78. Jain,B., and Kini,O., On Investment Banker Monitoring in the New Issue Market, Journal of Banking and Finance, 1999,23,49-84
79. James, C., Relationship-Specfic Assets and the Pricing of Underwriter Services, Journal of Finance, 1992,47,1865-1885
80. Jelic,R., Saaddouni,B., and Briston,R., Performance of Malsysian IPOS: Underwriters Reputation and Management Earnings Forecasts, Pacific-Basin Financial Journal,2001,9,457-486
81. Johnson, J.M.and Robert E. Miller, Invstment Banker Pretige and the Underpricing of initial Public Offerings, Financial Management, 1988,17.19-29
82. Kanatas,G.,and Jianping,Q., Integration of Lending and Underwriting:Implications of Scope Economics,Journal of Finance,2003,58,1167-1191
83. Karpoff,J.M., and Lott,J.R., The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear for Committing Criminal Fraud, The Journal of Law and Economics, 1993,34,757-802
84. Kirkulak,B. and Davis,C., Underwriter Reputation and Underpricing :Evidence from the Japanese IPOs Market, Pacific-Basin Financial Journal,2005,13.451-470
85. Kreps,D., P. Milgrom, Roberts,J.and Wilson,R., Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisonners "Dilemma", Journal of Economic Theory, 1982,27,245-252
86. Krigman,L., W.Shaw, and Womack, K., Why Do Firms Switch Underwriters?, Journal of Financial Economics, 2001,60,245-284
87. Kutsuna,Kenji, and Richard Smith, Why Does Book Building Drive Out Auction Methods of IPO Issuance? Evidence from Japan,2004,17(4), 1129-1166
88. Leland,H., Pyle,D., Informational Asymmetries,Financail Struture and Financial Intermediation, Journal of Finance, 1977,32,371 -387
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