论合并救济在中国的适用与完善
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摘要
合并救济是指企业合并反垄断审查中竞争主管机关和交易双方达成的旨在对拟合并交易所引起的反竞争效果进行修复的措施。合并救济在反垄断法历史悠久的欧美国家有着完善的规定和丰富的执法实践,合并救济的适用体系比较成熟。我国反垄断法第29条关于在经营者集中反垄断审查中附加限制性条件批准即是对这一制度的立法规定。自2008年8月反垄断法实施以来,商务部反垄断局作为我国合并控制的竞争主管机关在对经营者集中反垄断审查的实践中逐步摸索着适用了合并救济这一模式,截止目前,商务部反垄断局共附加限制性条件批准了6起合并案件,但是由于没有经验,缺乏具体的指导性规定,还有很多不足及不成熟之处,有待于进一步的完善。
本文拟对合并救济进行研究,通过理论和实践的分析,参考欧美相关规定及执法案例,旨在对合并救济在中国的进一步适用及完善提出一些借鉴性的意见。本文结构安排如下:
第一章对合并救济进行理论性分析。首先界定反垄断法意义下的企业合并及救济的内涵,并为下一步详细阐述合并救济奠定反垄断法上的法理基础。之后紧接着分析了适用合并救济的前提条件,即需要达到企业合并申报的标准,并经竞争主管机关的甄别确实存在损害有效竞争的效果。最后从理论高度上评价合并救济的理论价值并指出了在适用中可能存在的问题。
第二章对合并救济在实践中的适用进行分析,按照结构性救济和行为性救济的传统理论划分对合并救济的具体操作实践进行了详述,深入剖析了资产剥离,对比了结构性救济和行为性救济的适用情形及合并救济的模式选择,以美国最近TKTM与LYV合并案为例,分析了立法前沿的欧美国家在适用合并救济方面的技术,并指出了在适用结构性救济的同时,对行为性救济的态度转变。
第三章分析欧美国家在合并救济方面的相关规定,对美国、欧盟在合并救济方面立法及发布的指导性规定进行了简单分析,重点分析了我国当前对企业合并反垄断审查中关于合并救济的立法进程,并总结了我国当前规定中的不足与漏洞。
第四章结合案例评述了我国适用合并救济的实践,重点评述了中国截止到目前附加限制性条件批准的6起合并案件:英博并购AB公司、日本三菱丽阳公司收购璐彩特国际公司、通用并购德尔福、辉瑞公司收购惠氏、松下收购三洋以及诺华收购爱尔康。在案例评述的基础上总结了我国竞争主管机关在适用合并救济过程中所作出的不懈努力以及取得的巨大进步,但同时也指出了其中的不足,并就合并救济在我国进一步的适用和完善提出几点建议:第一,进一步完善立法,赋予商务部反垄断局在合并救济实施过程中的行政处罚权及相应的其他执法权,出台资产剥离的指导性规定,并尽快出台行为性救济的部门规章;第二,加强透明性,完善信息公开体系,补充反垄断审查公告内容,增加经济分析以及对合并救济的评估过程;第三,正确处理竞争政策与产业政策的关系,在保护国内产业的同时正确合理地遵循竞争政策,维护我国市场上的有效竞争;第四,在具体适用合并救济的过程中,主张在结构性救济中可以适当纳入“皇冠剥离”条款,引入“一线购买人”制度,以保证资产剥离的顺利实施。同时在行为性救济方面,要建立交易方对竞争主管机关的定期信息汇报制度,采纳欧美国家的复审条款,引入行业监管,建立其他竞争者及消费者在内的公众举报机制,保证行为性救济得到有效的监管,并从长远的角度考虑对以往案件进行跟踪回访,总结成功经验和失败教训。
最后得出结论,我国作为反垄断法的后立法国家,缺乏制度的自发性,经验也不足,但是可以站在“巨人的肩膀上”,借鉴欧美国家在合并救济适用中的合理之处,完善法律规定和指导性规定,建立相关的信息数据库,加强合并救济适用的透明度,从竞争问题源头出发以个案为基础进行考量设计行之有效的合并救济条款,采取各种有效监管措施保证合并救济的实施,从而完善合并救济在我国市场经济条件下的适用。
Merger remedies refer to the modifications proposed by the merging parties to the competition authority to address the identified competition concerns arising from the notified merger transaction. If the commitments offered are assessed to be full and effective enough to restore the conditions of effective competition, the transaction will be cleared in avoidance of prohibition.
Merger remedies consist of various commitments, which can be separated into two categories: structural and behavioral remedies. Divesture, a typical means of structural remedies, is to divest a package of assets or ongoing business to the third party to ensure sufficient competition in the affected markets. Certain requirements, such as the appointment of monitoring trustees, the crown jewel divestiture, up-front buyer, and hold-separation, are used to safeguard the implementation of the divesture. Meanwhile the other type of relief, behavioral remedies, are imposing orders or obligations on the merging entity to modify or limit its future conducts, such as fire-wall clause, obligations to refrain from discrimination sales etc.
How to choose the appropriate remedial measures among these above to remove the anti-competitive effects, how to safeguard the effectiveness and appropriateness, and how to implement and monitor the merger remedies are questions that haunt merging parties, the authorities and scholars.
China is now facing such issues in its application of merger remedies since its Anti-Monopoly Law came into force in 2008. The Anti-Monopoly Bureau of MOFCOM, as the competition authority in charge of mergers controls, has imposed the merger remedies in six transactions so far, including Bev NV SA/Anheuser-Busch Companies Inc, Mitsubishi Rayon Corp/Lucite International Inc, GM/Delphi, Pfizer/Wyeth, Panasonic/Sanyo, and Novartis/Alcon. Great progress has been made; however, the practices are still not so satisfactory due to the lack of transparency and the vacuum in guiding rules.
This dissertation is to provide the studies on merger remedies, to compare the current legislations and cases of China with the rich experiences in the mature regimes of the U.S. and the EU, and thus to extract some valuable insights for China to improve its merger remedies application in the anti-monopoly enforcement. In particular, based upon the analysis and reasoning in the theory, practice and rules on the application of merger remedies, the author drew the main conclusions that China are expected to clarify the vagueness in the rules and gap the bridge, enhance the role of economy in the identification of the anti-competition effects, and design more flexible application model of merger remedies on the case-by-case basis, and stimulate industry associations, competitors, and consumers in the market to monitor the implementation of merger remedies.
本文拟对合并救济进行研究,通过理论和实践的分析,参考欧美相关规定及执法案例,旨在对合并救济在中国的进一步适用及完善提出一些借鉴性的意见。本文结构安排如下:
第一章对合并救济进行理论性分析。首先界定反垄断法意义下的企业合并及救济的内涵,并为下一步详细阐述合并救济奠定反垄断法上的法理基础。之后紧接着分析了适用合并救济的前提条件,即需要达到企业合并申报的标准,并经竞争主管机关的甄别确实存在损害有效竞争的效果。最后从理论高度上评价合并救济的理论价值并指出了在适用中可能存在的问题。
第二章对合并救济在实践中的适用进行分析,按照结构性救济和行为性救济的传统理论划分对合并救济的具体操作实践进行了详述,深入剖析了资产剥离,对比了结构性救济和行为性救济的适用情形及合并救济的模式选择,以美国最近TKTM与LYV合并案为例,分析了立法前沿的欧美国家在适用合并救济方面的技术,并指出了在适用结构性救济的同时,对行为性救济的态度转变。
第三章分析欧美国家在合并救济方面的相关规定,对美国、欧盟在合并救济方面立法及发布的指导性规定进行了简单分析,重点分析了我国当前对企业合并反垄断审查中关于合并救济的立法进程,并总结了我国当前规定中的不足与漏洞。
第四章结合案例评述了我国适用合并救济的实践,重点评述了中国截止到目前附加限制性条件批准的6起合并案件:英博并购AB公司、日本三菱丽阳公司收购璐彩特国际公司、通用并购德尔福、辉瑞公司收购惠氏、松下收购三洋以及诺华收购爱尔康。在案例评述的基础上总结了我国竞争主管机关在适用合并救济过程中所作出的不懈努力以及取得的巨大进步,但同时也指出了其中的不足,并就合并救济在我国进一步的适用和完善提出几点建议:第一,进一步完善立法,赋予商务部反垄断局在合并救济实施过程中的行政处罚权及相应的其他执法权,出台资产剥离的指导性规定,并尽快出台行为性救济的部门规章;第二,加强透明性,完善信息公开体系,补充反垄断审查公告内容,增加经济分析以及对合并救济的评估过程;第三,正确处理竞争政策与产业政策的关系,在保护国内产业的同时正确合理地遵循竞争政策,维护我国市场上的有效竞争;第四,在具体适用合并救济的过程中,主张在结构性救济中可以适当纳入“皇冠剥离”条款,引入“一线购买人”制度,以保证资产剥离的顺利实施。同时在行为性救济方面,要建立交易方对竞争主管机关的定期信息汇报制度,采纳欧美国家的复审条款,引入行业监管,建立其他竞争者及消费者在内的公众举报机制,保证行为性救济得到有效的监管,并从长远的角度考虑对以往案件进行跟踪回访,总结成功经验和失败教训。
最后得出结论,我国作为反垄断法的后立法国家,缺乏制度的自发性,经验也不足,但是可以站在“巨人的肩膀上”,借鉴欧美国家在合并救济适用中的合理之处,完善法律规定和指导性规定,建立相关的信息数据库,加强合并救济适用的透明度,从竞争问题源头出发以个案为基础进行考量设计行之有效的合并救济条款,采取各种有效监管措施保证合并救济的实施,从而完善合并救济在我国市场经济条件下的适用。
Merger remedies refer to the modifications proposed by the merging parties to the competition authority to address the identified competition concerns arising from the notified merger transaction. If the commitments offered are assessed to be full and effective enough to restore the conditions of effective competition, the transaction will be cleared in avoidance of prohibition.
Merger remedies consist of various commitments, which can be separated into two categories: structural and behavioral remedies. Divesture, a typical means of structural remedies, is to divest a package of assets or ongoing business to the third party to ensure sufficient competition in the affected markets. Certain requirements, such as the appointment of monitoring trustees, the crown jewel divestiture, up-front buyer, and hold-separation, are used to safeguard the implementation of the divesture. Meanwhile the other type of relief, behavioral remedies, are imposing orders or obligations on the merging entity to modify or limit its future conducts, such as fire-wall clause, obligations to refrain from discrimination sales etc.
How to choose the appropriate remedial measures among these above to remove the anti-competitive effects, how to safeguard the effectiveness and appropriateness, and how to implement and monitor the merger remedies are questions that haunt merging parties, the authorities and scholars.
China is now facing such issues in its application of merger remedies since its Anti-Monopoly Law came into force in 2008. The Anti-Monopoly Bureau of MOFCOM, as the competition authority in charge of mergers controls, has imposed the merger remedies in six transactions so far, including Bev NV SA/Anheuser-Busch Companies Inc, Mitsubishi Rayon Corp/Lucite International Inc, GM/Delphi, Pfizer/Wyeth, Panasonic/Sanyo, and Novartis/Alcon. Great progress has been made; however, the practices are still not so satisfactory due to the lack of transparency and the vacuum in guiding rules.
This dissertation is to provide the studies on merger remedies, to compare the current legislations and cases of China with the rich experiences in the mature regimes of the U.S. and the EU, and thus to extract some valuable insights for China to improve its merger remedies application in the anti-monopoly enforcement. In particular, based upon the analysis and reasoning in the theory, practice and rules on the application of merger remedies, the author drew the main conclusions that China are expected to clarify the vagueness in the rules and gap the bridge, enhance the role of economy in the identification of the anti-competition effects, and design more flexible application model of merger remedies on the case-by-case basis, and stimulate industry associations, competitors, and consumers in the market to monitor the implementation of merger remedies.
引文
1 Jesse W. Markham,“Survey of the Evidence and Findings on Mergers.”In National Bureau of Economic Research, Business Concentration and Price Policy , Princeton University Press, 1955. p180;转引自W.吉帕·维斯库斯,约翰·弗农,小约瑟夫E.哈林顿著,陈甬军等译,《垄断与管制经济学》,机械工业出版社,2004年版,第110页。
2时建中主编:《三十一国竞争法典》,中国政法大学出版社,2009年版,序言第4页。
3赵旭东主编:《商法学》,高等教育出版社,2007年版,第353-354页。
4刘继峰著:《竞争法》,对外经贸大学出版社,2007年版,第299页。
5由于“企业合并”的概念被长期使用并被接受,笔者在下文介绍这一概念时,除个别立法引用“经营者集中”外,其他统一采用“企业合并”的表述。
6朱宏文,王健著:《反垄断法——转变中的法律》,社会科学文献出版社,2006年版,第77页。
7美国《克莱顿法案》第7条,第8条;《联邦贸易委员会法》第5条。
8欧盟委员会关于企业集中控制的理事会第139/ 2004号条例第3条。
9《加拿大竞争法》第91条。
10时建中主编:《三十一国竞争法典》,中国政法大学出版社,2009年版,序言第4页。
11理查德?A?波斯纳著:《反托拉斯法》,孙秋宁译,中国政法大学出版社,2003年版,第139页。
16 ICN Merger Working Group, Analytical Framework Subgroup, Merger Remedies Review Project: Report for the Fourth ICN Annual Conference at Bonn 1 (June 2005), available at http://internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc323.pdf.
17 http://www.concurrences.com/merger_remedies_article.php3?id_article=20334 (Accessed Feb.21, 2011.)
18 Keith N. Hylton: Antitrust Law: Economic Theory & Common Law Evolution, Cambridge University Press, 2003. Chapter Five: Development of Section 1 Doctrine. p90.
19刘继峰著:《竞争法》,对外经贸大学出版社,2007年版,第232页。
20 Keith N. Hylton: Antitrust Law: Economic Theory & Common Law Evolution, Cambridge University Press, 2003. p321.
21 Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59, 31 S.Ct. 502, 55 L.Ed. 619 (1911).
22 Id. 29TK654.
23赖源河编:《公平交易法新论》,月旦出版社,1997年版,第50-52页。
24 Oliver Budzinski,Isabel Ruhmer: MERGER SIMULATION IN COMPETITION POLICY: A SURVEY, in Journal of Competition Law & Economics, June, 2010, p311.
25 Id.
32刘继峰著:《竞争法》,对外经贸大学出版社,2007年版,第312页。
33 The Clayton Antitrust Act (1914) Art.7(…(t)he effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition…).
34 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings(the EC Merger Regulation), Recital (26)( A significant impediment to effective competition generally results from the creation or strengthening of a dominant position is to be declared incompatible with the common market.),译文详见许光耀主编:《欧共体竞争立法》,武汉大学出版社,2006年版,第392页。
36徐士英:《企业合并反垄断控制的双赢救济》,载于《中国社会科学报》2010年02月23日(第65期)第10版。
37同上。
38时建中主编:《三十一国竞争法典》,中国政法大学出版社,2009年版,序言第3页。
39理查德·A·波斯纳著:《反托拉斯法》,孙秋宁译,中国政法大学出版社,2003年版,第142、143页。
40 Merger control, investment scrutiny and foreign investor protection, 24 April 2009, Moulislegal China Messenger, http://www.moulislegal.com/Mergercontrolinvestmentscrutinyandforeigninvestorprotection_000.html , (Accessed May 2009);“中国禁止可口可乐并购汇源非贸易保护主义”,2009年03月19日,新华网,http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2009-03/19/content_11036206.htm ,最后访问时间2009年5月。Terry Calvani, Karen Alderman, Comparative Antitrust Policies in Mergers and Acquisitions BRIC IN THE INTERNATIONAL MERGER REVIEW EDIFICE, Cornell International Law Journal Winter 2010, 43 Cornell Int'l L.J. 73.
41欧盟竞争总司发布的最新数据截止至2011年1月31日,http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/statistics.pdf,最后访问时间2011年3月18日。
42 A. Lindsay, The EC Merger Regulation: Substantive Issues, Sweet & Maxwell, 2006, p.547.
43 Katri Paas, Non-structural Remedies in EU Merger Control, European Competition Law Review.2006, 27(5).
44 ICN Merger Working Group, Analytical Framework Subgroup, Merger Remedies Review Project: Report for the Fourth ICN Annual Conference at Bonn 1 (June 2005), p.8. available at http://internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc323.pdf.
45 Id.p11.
46见脚注15。
47 Assistant Attorney General R. Hewitt Pate, Antitrust Enforcement at the DOJ-Issues in Merger Investigations and Litigation, 12 (Dec. 10, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/200868.pdf, (Accessed Feb,
24, 2011)转引自朱石磊:“欧美横向并购法比较:于中国之借鉴”,http://www.competitionlaw.cn/show.aspx?id=3302&cid=10,最后访问日期:2010年6月。
48 OECD,A Frame work for the Design and Implementation of Competition Law and Policy,1999, p55, available at http://www.oecd.org/document/24/0,3343,en_2649_34535_1916760_1_1_1_1,00.html. (Accessed Feb. 24, 2011).
49同上。
50 Jonas S Brueckner, Thomas Hoehn: Monitoring Compliance with Merger Remedies -- The Role of the Monitoring Trustee, Competition Law International, September, 2010, p.75.
52 DG Competition, European Commission: Merger Remedies Study. October 25.p115, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/studies_reports/remedies_study.pdf, (Accessed June 1st, 2010).
53 ICN Merger Working Group, Analytical Framework Subgroup, Merger Remedies Review Project: Report for the Fourth ICN Annual Conference at Bonn 1 (June 2005), p.13. available at http://internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc323.pdf.
54 DG Competition, European Commission: Merger Remedies Study. October 25.P122 and P166, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/studies_reports/remedies_study.pdf, (Accessed June 1st, 2010).
55 Antitrust Division, Policy Guide to Merger Remedies (DOJ Guide, October 21, 2004), p23,supra note 29, p45. available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/205108.pdf (Accessed Feb.21, 2011); See also Katri Paas,Non-structural Remedies in EU Merger Control, European Competition Law Review.2006,27(5), p209-216.
56 Antitrust Division, Policy Guide to Merger Remedies (DOJ Guide, October 21, 2004), p27,supra note 29, p45. available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/205108.pdf (Accessed Feb.21, 2011);
57 Antitrust Division, Policy Guide to Merger Remedies (DOJ Guide, October 21, 2004), p21,available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/205108.pdf (Accessed Feb.21, 2011),转引自李菁华:“论反垄断法中企业合并救济制度”,载于《研究生法学》2009年2月第24卷第1期。
58卫新江:《欧盟、美国企业合并反垄断规制比较研究》,北京大学出版社,2003年版,第104页。
59 Commission notice on remedies acceptable under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 and under Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004,Official Journal of the European Union, 2008/C 267/01, Para 71-74, p22, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:267:0001:0027:EN:PDF
60 Case T-102/96, Gencor v Commission, judgment of March 3, 1999:‘‘The distinction between structural and behavioral remedies is immaterial’’, at [319]. See also, J. R. Loftis and D. K. Moskowitz,‘‘United States Federal Antitrust Merger‘Solutions’, not‘Remedies’’’, Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 2004,‘‘(t)he structure/behavior dichotomy is false to the extent it divorces solutions from problems and places value on ease of administration. Let the problem define the solution first. Then determine how to administer it’’.
61理查德?A?波斯纳著:《反托拉斯法》,孙秋宁译,中国政法大学出版社,2003年版,第140页。
62 United States v. E.I.du Point de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 330-331(1961),转引自卫新江:《欧盟、美国企业合并反垄断规制比较研究》,北京大学出版社,2003年版,第99页。
74何之迈著:《公平交易法专论》,中国政法大学出版社,2004年版,第153页。
76脚注26。
77 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (with April 8, 1997 Revisions to Section 4 Efficiency) supra note 35, and 36.
78 A Study of the Commission’s Divesture Process, Prepared by the Staff of the Bureau of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/08/divestiture.pdf, (Accessed Feb. 21, 2011).
79 Negotiating Merger Remedies, Statement of the Bureau of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/bestpractices/bestpractices030401.shtm, (Accessed Feb.22, 2011).
80同上。
81 Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, (DOJ Guide, October 21, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/205108.pdf (Accessed Feb.22, 2011).
85卫新江:《欧盟、美国企业合并反垄断规制比较研究》,北京大学出版社,2003年版,第102页。
86欧盟一直将企业合并称之为“经营者集中”,我国反垄断法也采用“经营者集中”的术语。
87许光耀主编:《欧共体竞争立法》,武汉大学出版社,2006年版,第393页。
89也有学者称之为“关于集中申报中‘可接受的补救’的通知”,参见许光耀主编:《欧共体竞争立法》,武汉大学出版社,2006年版,第497页。
90 Commission notice on remedies acceptable under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 and under Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004,Official Journal of the European Union, 2008/C 267/01,available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:267:0001:0027:EN:PDF
91 Penelope Papandropoulos and Alessandro Tajana:THE MERGER REMEDIES STUDY—IN DIVESTITURE WE TRUST?: [2006] E.C.L.R.2.2.1 p444.
92 Best Practice Guidelines: The Commission’s Model Texts for Divestiture Commitments and the Trustee Mandate under the EC Merger Regulation, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/note.pdf, (Accessed Feb.24, 2011)
94中华人民共和国国务院令第529号令,2008年8月3日。
96中华人民共和国商务部令2009年第11号,2009年11月21日。
97中华人民共和国商务部令2009年第12号,2009年11月24日。
111 Hao Qian: Merger Remedies in China: Developments and Issues, Competition Law International, September, 2010. 6 NO. 2 Competition L. Int'l 13. p14.
112 Terry Calvani, Karen Alderman, Comparative Antitrust Policies in Mergers and Acquisitions BRIC IN THE INTERNATIONAL MERGER REVIEW EDIFICE, Cornell International Law Journal Winter 2010, 43 Cornell Int'l L.J. 73. (Paragraph 131…moreover, MOFCOM is imposing a degree of oversight in excess of that contemplated by the AML (which may in any event have required notification of such future acquisitions).
113 DG Competition, European Commission: Merger Remedies Study, October 25, p121, available at. http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/remedies_study.pdf, (Accessed June 1st, 2010).
1、理查德·A·波斯纳著:《反托拉斯法》,孙秋宁译,中国政法大学出版社,2003年版。
2、理查德·A·波斯纳著:《法律的经济分析》,蒋兆康译,林毅夫校,中国大百科全书出版社,1997年版。
3、乔治·J·斯蒂格勒著:《产业组织和政府管制》,上海三联书店,1989年版。
4、时建中主编:《反垄断法——法典释评与学理探源》,中国人民大学出版社,2008年版。
5、时建中主编:《三十一国竞争法典》,中国政法大学出版社,2009年版。
6、安德雷斯·冯特·葛拉雷兹等著:《欧盟企业合并控制制度:法律、经济与实践分析》,叶军等译,法律出版社,2009年版。
7、W.吉帕·维斯库斯,约翰·弗农,小约瑟夫E.哈林顿著,陈甬军等译,《垄断与管制经济学》,机械工业出版社,2004年版。
8、许光耀主编:《欧共体竞争立法》,武汉大学出版社,2006年版。
9、许光耀:《欧共体竞争法通论》,武汉大学出版社,2006年版。
10、卫新江:《欧盟、美国企业合并反垄断规制比较研究》,北京大学出版社,2003年版。
11、赵旭东主编:《商法学》,高等教育出版社,2007年版。
12、王晓晔主编:《反垄断法与市场经济》,法律出版社1998年版。
13、王晓晔著:《企业合并中的反垄断问题》,法律出版社1996年版。
14、沈四宝、刘彤著:《美国反垄断法原理与典型案例研究》,法律出版社,2006年版。
15、徐孟洲、孟雁北著:《竞争法》,中国人民大学出版社,2008年版。
16、朱宏文,王健著:《反垄断法——转变中的法律》,社会科学文献出版社,2006年版。
17、赖源河编:《公平交易法新论》,月旦出版社,1997年版。
18、何之迈著:《公平交易法专论》,中国政法大学出版社,2004年版。
19、刘继峰著:《竞争法》,对外经贸大学出版社,2007年版。
20、沈敏容著:《法律的不确定性——反垄断法规则分析》,法律出版社,2001年版。
21、Keith N.Hylton: Antitrust Law: Economic Theory & Common Law Evolution,Cambridge University Prss, 2003.
22、A. Lindsay, The EC Merger Regulation: Substantive Issues, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2006.
1、卢代富:《严厉与宽容:反垄断中的企业合并控制政策》,载于《现代法学》1998年第14期。
2、马克·威廉姆斯:《欧盟竞争法对中国竞争立法的启示》,载《法学评论》1999年第6期。
3、赵万一、马丽莎、方娇:《反垄断法中的企业合并控制法律问题研究》,载于《广东社会科学》2006年第3期。
4、李菁华:《论反垄断法中企业合并救济制度》,载于《研究生法学》2009年2月第24卷第1期。
5、徐士英:《企业合并反垄断控制的双赢救济》,载于《中国社会科学报》2010年02月23日(第65期)第10版。
6、丁茂中:《经营者集中控制制度中的资产剥离机制》,载于《探索与争鸣》2010年第12期。
7、Jesse W. Markham,“Survey of the Evidence and Findings on Mergers.”In National Bureau of Economic Research, Business Concentration and Price Policy,Princeton University Press, 1955.
8、Terry Calvani, Karen Alderman, Comparative Antitrust Policies in Mergers and Acquisitions BRIC IN THE INTERNATIONAL MERGER REVIEW EDIFICE, Cornell International Law Journal Winter 2010, 43 Cornell Int'l L.J. 73.
9、Jonas S Brueckner, Thomas Hoehn: Monitoring Compliance with Merger Remedies -- The Role of the Monitoring Trustee. In Competition Law International, September, 2010.
10、Hao Qian: Merger Remedies in China: Developments and Issues.In Competition Law International, September, 2010. 6 NO. 2.
11、Katri Paas,Non-structural Remedies in EU Merger Control. In European Competition Law Review.2006,27(5),209-216.
12、J. R. Loftis and D. K. Moskowitz, United States Federal Antitrust Merger‘Solutions’, not‘Remedies’. In Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 2004.
13、Penelope Papandropoulos and Alessandro Tajana, THE MERGER REMEDIES STUDY—IN DIVESTITURE WE TRUST? [2006] E.C.L.R.2.2.1.
14、Oliver Budzinski, Isabel Ruhmer: MERGER SIMULATION IN COMPETITION POLICY: A SURVEY. In Journal of Competition Law & Economics, June, 2010.
1、FTC, A Study of the Commission’s Divesture Process, http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/08/divestiture.pdf
2、FTC, Negotiating Merger Remedies,Statement of the Bureau of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/bestpractices/bestpractices030401.shtm
3、DOJ,Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies,2004, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/205108.htm;
4、Best Practice Guidelines: The Commission’s Model Texts for Divestiture Commitments and the Trustee Mandate under the EC Merger Regulation, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/note.pdf
5、DG COMP, Merger Remedies Study, European Commission October 2005, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/remedies_study.pdf
6、ICN Merger Working Group, Analytical Framework Subgroup, Merger Remedies Review Project: Report for the Fourth ICN Annual Conference at Bonn 1 (June 2005)
7、OECD, A Framework for the Design and Implementation of Competition Law and Policy, 1999.
1、商务部反垄断局: http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/?3675636983=2377445938
2、欧盟竞争总司: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html
3、美国司法部: http://www.justice.gov/atr/
4、美国联邦贸易委员会: http://www.ftc.gov/bc/index.shtml
5、ICN: http://internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/
6、OECD:http://www.oecd.org/topic/0,3699,en_2649_37463_1_1_1_1_37463,00.html
7、Institute of Competition Law http://www.concurrences.com/merger_remedies_accueil.php3
8、“商务部部长陈德铭:外资准入将与反垄断审查结合”http://www.china.com.cn/economic/txt/2010-12/23/content_21599113.htm
9、商务部反垄断局尹燕玲:中国经营者集中控制立法与实践http://www.asiancompetitionforum.org/download/20101207_ACF_ppt/2-02%2020101206present_final.pdf .
10、“中国禁止可口可乐并购汇源非贸易保护主义”,2009年03月19日,新华网http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2009-03/19/content_11036206.htm
11、“松下补交救济方案闯关审查并购三洋终获通过”http://business.sohu.com/20091105/n267973734.shtml.
12、“松下剥离部分镍氢电池资产中国企业正式接手”2011年02月10日载于《北京商报》,http://homea.people.com.cn/GB/13881453.html.
13、戴建民:《三菱丽阳收购案附限制性条件获准至评析》,2010年3月, http://www.competitionlaw.cn/show.aspx?id=5344&cid=17.
14、刘旭法律博客:反垄断法比较研究http://kartellrecht.fyfz.cn/art/500031.htm
15、杨东:由“三菱丽阳收购璐彩特”案透析政府“救济”策略,载于《法制日报》2009年6月http://www.chinaantimonopoly.cn/_d270085505.htm.
16、韩伟著:反垄断规则明晰的重要一步——商务部“结构性救济”新规略评,首发于中国法学网http://www.iolaw.org.cn/showNews.asp?id=22822.
17、朱石磊:“欧美横向并购法比较:于中国之借鉴”,http://www.competitionlaw.cn/show.aspx?id=3302&cid=10
18、FTC Notice: Revised Jurisdictional Thresholds for Section 7a of The Clayton Act,http://ftc.gov/os/fedreg/2011/01/110121clayton7afrn.pdf
19、Joseph J. Romagnoli, J. Craig Pell and Mayah Y. Judovits:U.S. Federal Trade Commission Announces Increased M&A Reporting Thresholds, Torys on Competition and Antitrust, 2011.Jan. 26, http://www.torys.com/Publications/Documents/Publication%20PDFs/CA2011-1.pdf.
20、Merger control, investment scrutiny and foreign investor protection, 24 April 2009, Moulislegal China Messenger, http://www.moulislegal.com/Mergercontrolinvestmentscrutinyandforeigninvestorprotection_000.html
2时建中主编:《三十一国竞争法典》,中国政法大学出版社,2009年版,序言第4页。
3赵旭东主编:《商法学》,高等教育出版社,2007年版,第353-354页。
4刘继峰著:《竞争法》,对外经贸大学出版社,2007年版,第299页。
5由于“企业合并”的概念被长期使用并被接受,笔者在下文介绍这一概念时,除个别立法引用“经营者集中”外,其他统一采用“企业合并”的表述。
6朱宏文,王健著:《反垄断法——转变中的法律》,社会科学文献出版社,2006年版,第77页。
7美国《克莱顿法案》第7条,第8条;《联邦贸易委员会法》第5条。
8欧盟委员会关于企业集中控制的理事会第139/ 2004号条例第3条。
9《加拿大竞争法》第91条。
10时建中主编:《三十一国竞争法典》,中国政法大学出版社,2009年版,序言第4页。
11理查德?A?波斯纳著:《反托拉斯法》,孙秋宁译,中国政法大学出版社,2003年版,第139页。
16 ICN Merger Working Group, Analytical Framework Subgroup, Merger Remedies Review Project: Report for the Fourth ICN Annual Conference at Bonn 1 (June 2005), available at http://internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc323.pdf.
17 http://www.concurrences.com/merger_remedies_article.php3?id_article=20334 (Accessed Feb.21, 2011.)
18 Keith N. Hylton: Antitrust Law: Economic Theory & Common Law Evolution, Cambridge University Press, 2003. Chapter Five: Development of Section 1 Doctrine. p90.
19刘继峰著:《竞争法》,对外经贸大学出版社,2007年版,第232页。
20 Keith N. Hylton: Antitrust Law: Economic Theory & Common Law Evolution, Cambridge University Press, 2003. p321.
21 Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59, 31 S.Ct. 502, 55 L.Ed. 619 (1911).
22 Id. 29TK654.
23赖源河编:《公平交易法新论》,月旦出版社,1997年版,第50-52页。
24 Oliver Budzinski,Isabel Ruhmer: MERGER SIMULATION IN COMPETITION POLICY: A SURVEY, in Journal of Competition Law & Economics, June, 2010, p311.
25 Id.
32刘继峰著:《竞争法》,对外经贸大学出版社,2007年版,第312页。
33 The Clayton Antitrust Act (1914) Art.7(…(t)he effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition…).
34 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings(the EC Merger Regulation), Recital (26)( A significant impediment to effective competition generally results from the creation or strengthening of a dominant position is to be declared incompatible with the common market.),译文详见许光耀主编:《欧共体竞争立法》,武汉大学出版社,2006年版,第392页。
36徐士英:《企业合并反垄断控制的双赢救济》,载于《中国社会科学报》2010年02月23日(第65期)第10版。
37同上。
38时建中主编:《三十一国竞争法典》,中国政法大学出版社,2009年版,序言第3页。
39理查德·A·波斯纳著:《反托拉斯法》,孙秋宁译,中国政法大学出版社,2003年版,第142、143页。
40 Merger control, investment scrutiny and foreign investor protection, 24 April 2009, Moulislegal China Messenger, http://www.moulislegal.com/Mergercontrolinvestmentscrutinyandforeigninvestorprotection_000.html , (Accessed May 2009);“中国禁止可口可乐并购汇源非贸易保护主义”,2009年03月19日,新华网,http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2009-03/19/content_11036206.htm ,最后访问时间2009年5月。Terry Calvani, Karen Alderman, Comparative Antitrust Policies in Mergers and Acquisitions BRIC IN THE INTERNATIONAL MERGER REVIEW EDIFICE, Cornell International Law Journal Winter 2010, 43 Cornell Int'l L.J. 73.
41欧盟竞争总司发布的最新数据截止至2011年1月31日,http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/statistics.pdf,最后访问时间2011年3月18日。
42 A. Lindsay, The EC Merger Regulation: Substantive Issues, Sweet & Maxwell, 2006, p.547.
43 Katri Paas, Non-structural Remedies in EU Merger Control, European Competition Law Review.2006, 27(5).
44 ICN Merger Working Group, Analytical Framework Subgroup, Merger Remedies Review Project: Report for the Fourth ICN Annual Conference at Bonn 1 (June 2005), p.8. available at http://internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc323.pdf.
45 Id.p11.
46见脚注15。
47 Assistant Attorney General R. Hewitt Pate, Antitrust Enforcement at the DOJ-Issues in Merger Investigations and Litigation, 12 (Dec. 10, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/200868.pdf, (Accessed Feb,
24, 2011)转引自朱石磊:“欧美横向并购法比较:于中国之借鉴”,http://www.competitionlaw.cn/show.aspx?id=3302&cid=10,最后访问日期:2010年6月。
48 OECD,A Frame work for the Design and Implementation of Competition Law and Policy,1999, p55, available at http://www.oecd.org/document/24/0,3343,en_2649_34535_1916760_1_1_1_1,00.html. (Accessed Feb. 24, 2011).
49同上。
50 Jonas S Brueckner, Thomas Hoehn: Monitoring Compliance with Merger Remedies -- The Role of the Monitoring Trustee, Competition Law International, September, 2010, p.75.
52 DG Competition, European Commission: Merger Remedies Study. October 25.p115, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/studies_reports/remedies_study.pdf, (Accessed June 1st, 2010).
53 ICN Merger Working Group, Analytical Framework Subgroup, Merger Remedies Review Project: Report for the Fourth ICN Annual Conference at Bonn 1 (June 2005), p.13. available at http://internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc323.pdf.
54 DG Competition, European Commission: Merger Remedies Study. October 25.P122 and P166, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/studies_reports/remedies_study.pdf, (Accessed June 1st, 2010).
55 Antitrust Division, Policy Guide to Merger Remedies (DOJ Guide, October 21, 2004), p23,supra note 29, p45. available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/205108.pdf (Accessed Feb.21, 2011); See also Katri Paas,Non-structural Remedies in EU Merger Control, European Competition Law Review.2006,27(5), p209-216.
56 Antitrust Division, Policy Guide to Merger Remedies (DOJ Guide, October 21, 2004), p27,supra note 29, p45. available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/205108.pdf (Accessed Feb.21, 2011);
57 Antitrust Division, Policy Guide to Merger Remedies (DOJ Guide, October 21, 2004), p21,available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/205108.pdf (Accessed Feb.21, 2011),转引自李菁华:“论反垄断法中企业合并救济制度”,载于《研究生法学》2009年2月第24卷第1期。
58卫新江:《欧盟、美国企业合并反垄断规制比较研究》,北京大学出版社,2003年版,第104页。
59 Commission notice on remedies acceptable under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 and under Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004,Official Journal of the European Union, 2008/C 267/01, Para 71-74, p22, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:267:0001:0027:EN:PDF
60 Case T-102/96, Gencor v Commission, judgment of March 3, 1999:‘‘The distinction between structural and behavioral remedies is immaterial’’, at [319]. See also, J. R. Loftis and D. K. Moskowitz,‘‘United States Federal Antitrust Merger‘Solutions’, not‘Remedies’’’, Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 2004,‘‘(t)he structure/behavior dichotomy is false to the extent it divorces solutions from problems and places value on ease of administration. Let the problem define the solution first. Then determine how to administer it’’.
61理查德?A?波斯纳著:《反托拉斯法》,孙秋宁译,中国政法大学出版社,2003年版,第140页。
62 United States v. E.I.du Point de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 330-331(1961),转引自卫新江:《欧盟、美国企业合并反垄断规制比较研究》,北京大学出版社,2003年版,第99页。
74何之迈著:《公平交易法专论》,中国政法大学出版社,2004年版,第153页。
76脚注26。
77 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (with April 8, 1997 Revisions to Section 4 Efficiency) supra note 35, and 36.
78 A Study of the Commission’s Divesture Process, Prepared by the Staff of the Bureau of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/08/divestiture.pdf, (Accessed Feb. 21, 2011).
79 Negotiating Merger Remedies, Statement of the Bureau of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/bestpractices/bestpractices030401.shtm, (Accessed Feb.22, 2011).
80同上。
81 Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, (DOJ Guide, October 21, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/205108.pdf (Accessed Feb.22, 2011).
85卫新江:《欧盟、美国企业合并反垄断规制比较研究》,北京大学出版社,2003年版,第102页。
86欧盟一直将企业合并称之为“经营者集中”,我国反垄断法也采用“经营者集中”的术语。
87许光耀主编:《欧共体竞争立法》,武汉大学出版社,2006年版,第393页。
89也有学者称之为“关于集中申报中‘可接受的补救’的通知”,参见许光耀主编:《欧共体竞争立法》,武汉大学出版社,2006年版,第497页。
90 Commission notice on remedies acceptable under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 and under Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004,Official Journal of the European Union, 2008/C 267/01,available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:267:0001:0027:EN:PDF
91 Penelope Papandropoulos and Alessandro Tajana:THE MERGER REMEDIES STUDY—IN DIVESTITURE WE TRUST?: [2006] E.C.L.R.2.2.1 p444.
92 Best Practice Guidelines: The Commission’s Model Texts for Divestiture Commitments and the Trustee Mandate under the EC Merger Regulation, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/note.pdf, (Accessed Feb.24, 2011)
94中华人民共和国国务院令第529号令,2008年8月3日。
96中华人民共和国商务部令2009年第11号,2009年11月21日。
97中华人民共和国商务部令2009年第12号,2009年11月24日。
111 Hao Qian: Merger Remedies in China: Developments and Issues, Competition Law International, September, 2010. 6 NO. 2 Competition L. Int'l 13. p14.
112 Terry Calvani, Karen Alderman, Comparative Antitrust Policies in Mergers and Acquisitions BRIC IN THE INTERNATIONAL MERGER REVIEW EDIFICE, Cornell International Law Journal Winter 2010, 43 Cornell Int'l L.J. 73. (Paragraph 131…moreover, MOFCOM is imposing a degree of oversight in excess of that contemplated by the AML (which may in any event have required notification of such future acquisitions).
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