金融机构市场退出问题研究
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摘要
随着金融全球化的发展,世界金融体系的联系越来越紧密。2008年的美国次贷危机以及2009年的希腊债务危机使得各国金融机构的风险越发集中。危机中暴露出的大批问题金融机构以及风险事件引起人们的高度重视。同时,我国金融业近年来逐步对外开放并成立了大批中小型金融机构,促成了金融机构高度竞争的局面,国家已无法继续采用行政救助手段保护整个金融市场。因此,有效提升我国金融机构应对风险的能力,进一步建立健全金融机构退出机制,促进金融体系的健康发展,进而提升我国金融机构整体实力,成为本文研究的重要目的。
文章首先对金融机构市场退出的国内现状进行分析介绍。通过理论解释和现实考察发现,金融机构固有的脆弱性是金融机构退出必须谨慎处理的内在因素。在处理机构市场退出时,我国目前存在的主要问题有：缺乏监控金融体系整体风险状况的相关指标体系；缺乏金融风险的预警预报系统和危机机构处理的配套机制；缺乏系统的法律制度。因此本文主体部分从内在因子、事前风险防范和制度法规三个方面对金融机构退出机制进行系统分析。
首先,文章从银行体系脆弱性角度实证分析金融机构退出内在因子和宏观环境。当金融体系脆弱性上升时,金融机构市场退出的程度和影响都会增加。先运用定量和定性分析结合方法对我国银行体系脆弱性进行综合测度,实证结果表明：金融机构退出事件绝大部分发生在金融体系高风险时期,金融体系脆弱性状况是金融机构退出风潮宏观预警的重要因素；金融体系脆弱性与多种不同层面的经济指标存在复杂关系。通过对银行体系脆弱性的重要影响因素进行实证检验发现：通货膨胀率、年信贷额与GGDP比值、M2增长率、贷款增长率、一年期存款利率存贷比六个指标对银行体系脆弱性状况存在长期均衡关系；银行体系脆弱性对货币政策和信贷政策等的反馈效果明显；信贷风险因素对银行体系脆弱性解释力度较强；宏观经济基础并非影响银行脆弱性的主要因素。
其次,文章从微观角度分析单个金融机构退出前的风险预警。主要从金融机构正常经营时的风险预警、金融机构风险上升时的破产风险预警两方面进行讨论,金融机构正常经营时的风险预警可有效降低其退出概率,保持金融机构的持续稳健经营；金融机构风险上升时的破产风险预警可有效降低其退出影响,保持整体金融体系的稳定。在考察破产风险预警时,文章结合破产理论、随机利率模型及VaR模型构建了基于随机利率的金融机构破产预警数理模型,模型说明金融机构可通过破产时间、破产严重程度和破产前后盈余的VaR模型进行破产预警；增强公司的融资能力,降低融资利率以及提高资金充足水平,从而减少其转移概率矩阵两种方式可有效降低破产概率,防范破产风险。
再次,文章深入分析处理金融机构市场退出问题的决策流程和法律保障。金融机构市场退出决策是一项严密的流程化工作,它必须遵循一套成型的退市原则,同时需要具备一定的基础和支撑,方能借助相应的平台在合适的时机以最优的方式实现退市。在分析法律保障问题时,文章在考察我国金融机构市场退出法律现状的基础上从债权确认、抵付原则和清算法规三方面探讨我国金融机构市场退出的可行法律步骤,并对恒信证券公司破产案例进行重点分析,提出关于我国证券公司破产案件法律适用性问题的思考。研究表明,我国金融机构市场退出法律体系框架虽已搭建起来但不健全,缺乏专门的金融机构市场退出法将之系统化,在指定管理人、证券公司破产宣告等方面均需斟酌。
最后文章提出防范我国金融机构市场退出破坏性效应的政策建议,包括完善金融机构市场退出前的风险预警机制、加强金融监管,建立金融接管重整制度和最后贷款人救助制度,是维护金融机构有序运行以及安全退出的有效制度保障。
Along with the financial globalization, the world financial system is getting more and more closer.2008American sub crisis as well as2009Greece debt crisis caused the risks faced by financial institutions in various countries even more concentrate. In the crisis, large quantities of question financial institutions exposed which caused people to take it seriously. At the same time, financial industry in our country has been gradually opening to the outside world and large quantities of middle and small scale financial institutions have been established, which facilitated the steep competition in the financial institutions, thus the country has been unable to keep using the administrative rescue method to protect the entire money market. Therefore, the chief purpose of this article comes to how to promote financial institutions in our country to deal with the risk effectively, and guarantee the financial institution market withdrawal mechanism promoting financial system's healthy development, then promote strengthing financial institution in our country.
This article first introduced the present situation of financial institution market withdrawal in our country. Through the theoretical and practical analysis we found that, financial institution market withdrawal must be handled carefully because of the nature of fragility. Most case of financial institution withdrawal happened in high risky periods of financial system, and in that time the negative impacts of financial institution withdrawal to the economy are serious. The main problems in our country now are:market imperfections, lack of related index system to monitor the overall financial system; lack of early warning mechanism for financial risks and crisis agencies dispose mechanism; lack of systemic legal institutions. So the main body of our article system analyses financial institution market exit mechanism from three aspects:intrinsic factor, micro risk early warning mechanism and legal institution.
Firstly, we empirically analysed financial institution market withdrawal intrinsic factor and macroscopic environment from bank system fragility angle. When financial system fragility rise, the degree and the influence of financial institution market exit can increase. We first carries on the synthesis measure using the quota and the qualitative analysis union method to Our country Bank system fragility, the research indicated as follows:At present, financial institution market exit in our country exists certain negative social impact, the existing financial organ withdrawal way lacks the accurate localizationand has a very limitation. The empirical analysis indicated that financial organ fragility has complex relations with many kinds of different economic indicators;Six indicators as inflation rate, the year credit volume and the GDP ratio, the M2rate of increment, the loan rate of increment, one year time deposit interest rate, saves to the loan exists long-term balanced relations with the bank system vulnerable condition; The feedback effect of bank system fragility to the monetary policy and the credit policy is obvious; The credit risk factor's explaning dynamics to the bank system fragility is strong; The macro economic foundation is not a primary factor affects the banks'fragility.
Secondly, we mainly analysed the risk early warning mechanism before single financial organs'withdrawal from the microscopic angle. Our analysis included normal risk warning and bankruptcy risk warning mechanism. The normal risk warning mechanism could reduce the probability of financial institution withdrawal, and keep it stable; the bankruptcy risk warning mechanism could ruduce the negative impact of financial institution withdrawal, and keep the financial system stability. When anslysed the bankruptcy risk warning mechanism, We constructed the stochastic interest rate based financial institution bankruptcy early warning mathematical model on reference of bankruptcy theory, the stochastic interest rate model and the VAR model, the model explained that the financial institutions carries on the bankrupt early warning using VAR model of bankrupt time, the bankrupt degree and the bankrupt earnings; enhancing company's financing ability, cutting the financing interest rate as well as raising the fund sufficient level, thus reducing its transition probability matrix could cut the ruin probability effectively, and prevent bankruptcy risk.
Thirdly, we analysed decision-making process and legal protection of financial institution market withdrawal. Decision-making is a rigorous process of work, it must follow a mture principle, and need certain basis and supports, then could withdrawal in its best way at the right time through appropriate platform. When analysed legal protection, we first introduced present law of financial institution market withdrawal, then we discussed the feasible legal steps from three aspects of the creditor's rights confirmation, repay principle and the settlement laws and regulations, thus carried on the selective analysis on bankrupt case of Hengxin securities company, which proposed the ponder of suitable law on security companies'bankruptcy. The research indicated that although the legal framework of financial institution market exist has built in our country, but is not perfect, and lack the special financial institution market exist law to systematic it.
Finally, we proposed four policy recommendations on prevent negative impact of financial institution withdrawal, including complete the financial institutions withdrawal risk pre-warning mechanism, strengthening the financial supervision, establishing the financial control rallying system and the final lender rescuing system is the safeguard to maintain the financial institutions' orderly movement as well as the safe exist.
文章首先对金融机构市场退出的国内现状进行分析介绍。通过理论解释和现实考察发现,金融机构固有的脆弱性是金融机构退出必须谨慎处理的内在因素。在处理机构市场退出时,我国目前存在的主要问题有：缺乏监控金融体系整体风险状况的相关指标体系；缺乏金融风险的预警预报系统和危机机构处理的配套机制；缺乏系统的法律制度。因此本文主体部分从内在因子、事前风险防范和制度法规三个方面对金融机构退出机制进行系统分析。
首先,文章从银行体系脆弱性角度实证分析金融机构退出内在因子和宏观环境。当金融体系脆弱性上升时,金融机构市场退出的程度和影响都会增加。先运用定量和定性分析结合方法对我国银行体系脆弱性进行综合测度,实证结果表明：金融机构退出事件绝大部分发生在金融体系高风险时期,金融体系脆弱性状况是金融机构退出风潮宏观预警的重要因素；金融体系脆弱性与多种不同层面的经济指标存在复杂关系。通过对银行体系脆弱性的重要影响因素进行实证检验发现：通货膨胀率、年信贷额与GGDP比值、M2增长率、贷款增长率、一年期存款利率存贷比六个指标对银行体系脆弱性状况存在长期均衡关系；银行体系脆弱性对货币政策和信贷政策等的反馈效果明显；信贷风险因素对银行体系脆弱性解释力度较强；宏观经济基础并非影响银行脆弱性的主要因素。
其次,文章从微观角度分析单个金融机构退出前的风险预警。主要从金融机构正常经营时的风险预警、金融机构风险上升时的破产风险预警两方面进行讨论,金融机构正常经营时的风险预警可有效降低其退出概率,保持金融机构的持续稳健经营；金融机构风险上升时的破产风险预警可有效降低其退出影响,保持整体金融体系的稳定。在考察破产风险预警时,文章结合破产理论、随机利率模型及VaR模型构建了基于随机利率的金融机构破产预警数理模型,模型说明金融机构可通过破产时间、破产严重程度和破产前后盈余的VaR模型进行破产预警；增强公司的融资能力,降低融资利率以及提高资金充足水平,从而减少其转移概率矩阵两种方式可有效降低破产概率,防范破产风险。
再次,文章深入分析处理金融机构市场退出问题的决策流程和法律保障。金融机构市场退出决策是一项严密的流程化工作,它必须遵循一套成型的退市原则,同时需要具备一定的基础和支撑,方能借助相应的平台在合适的时机以最优的方式实现退市。在分析法律保障问题时,文章在考察我国金融机构市场退出法律现状的基础上从债权确认、抵付原则和清算法规三方面探讨我国金融机构市场退出的可行法律步骤,并对恒信证券公司破产案例进行重点分析,提出关于我国证券公司破产案件法律适用性问题的思考。研究表明,我国金融机构市场退出法律体系框架虽已搭建起来但不健全,缺乏专门的金融机构市场退出法将之系统化,在指定管理人、证券公司破产宣告等方面均需斟酌。
最后文章提出防范我国金融机构市场退出破坏性效应的政策建议,包括完善金融机构市场退出前的风险预警机制、加强金融监管,建立金融接管重整制度和最后贷款人救助制度,是维护金融机构有序运行以及安全退出的有效制度保障。
Along with the financial globalization, the world financial system is getting more and more closer.2008American sub crisis as well as2009Greece debt crisis caused the risks faced by financial institutions in various countries even more concentrate. In the crisis, large quantities of question financial institutions exposed which caused people to take it seriously. At the same time, financial industry in our country has been gradually opening to the outside world and large quantities of middle and small scale financial institutions have been established, which facilitated the steep competition in the financial institutions, thus the country has been unable to keep using the administrative rescue method to protect the entire money market. Therefore, the chief purpose of this article comes to how to promote financial institutions in our country to deal with the risk effectively, and guarantee the financial institution market withdrawal mechanism promoting financial system's healthy development, then promote strengthing financial institution in our country.
This article first introduced the present situation of financial institution market withdrawal in our country. Through the theoretical and practical analysis we found that, financial institution market withdrawal must be handled carefully because of the nature of fragility. Most case of financial institution withdrawal happened in high risky periods of financial system, and in that time the negative impacts of financial institution withdrawal to the economy are serious. The main problems in our country now are:market imperfections, lack of related index system to monitor the overall financial system; lack of early warning mechanism for financial risks and crisis agencies dispose mechanism; lack of systemic legal institutions. So the main body of our article system analyses financial institution market exit mechanism from three aspects:intrinsic factor, micro risk early warning mechanism and legal institution.
Firstly, we empirically analysed financial institution market withdrawal intrinsic factor and macroscopic environment from bank system fragility angle. When financial system fragility rise, the degree and the influence of financial institution market exit can increase. We first carries on the synthesis measure using the quota and the qualitative analysis union method to Our country Bank system fragility, the research indicated as follows:At present, financial institution market exit in our country exists certain negative social impact, the existing financial organ withdrawal way lacks the accurate localizationand has a very limitation. The empirical analysis indicated that financial organ fragility has complex relations with many kinds of different economic indicators;Six indicators as inflation rate, the year credit volume and the GDP ratio, the M2rate of increment, the loan rate of increment, one year time deposit interest rate, saves to the loan exists long-term balanced relations with the bank system vulnerable condition; The feedback effect of bank system fragility to the monetary policy and the credit policy is obvious; The credit risk factor's explaning dynamics to the bank system fragility is strong; The macro economic foundation is not a primary factor affects the banks'fragility.
Secondly, we mainly analysed the risk early warning mechanism before single financial organs'withdrawal from the microscopic angle. Our analysis included normal risk warning and bankruptcy risk warning mechanism. The normal risk warning mechanism could reduce the probability of financial institution withdrawal, and keep it stable; the bankruptcy risk warning mechanism could ruduce the negative impact of financial institution withdrawal, and keep the financial system stability. When anslysed the bankruptcy risk warning mechanism, We constructed the stochastic interest rate based financial institution bankruptcy early warning mathematical model on reference of bankruptcy theory, the stochastic interest rate model and the VAR model, the model explained that the financial institutions carries on the bankrupt early warning using VAR model of bankrupt time, the bankrupt degree and the bankrupt earnings; enhancing company's financing ability, cutting the financing interest rate as well as raising the fund sufficient level, thus reducing its transition probability matrix could cut the ruin probability effectively, and prevent bankruptcy risk.
Thirdly, we analysed decision-making process and legal protection of financial institution market withdrawal. Decision-making is a rigorous process of work, it must follow a mture principle, and need certain basis and supports, then could withdrawal in its best way at the right time through appropriate platform. When analysed legal protection, we first introduced present law of financial institution market withdrawal, then we discussed the feasible legal steps from three aspects of the creditor's rights confirmation, repay principle and the settlement laws and regulations, thus carried on the selective analysis on bankrupt case of Hengxin securities company, which proposed the ponder of suitable law on security companies'bankruptcy. The research indicated that although the legal framework of financial institution market exist has built in our country, but is not perfect, and lack the special financial institution market exist law to systematic it.
Finally, we proposed four policy recommendations on prevent negative impact of financial institution withdrawal, including complete the financial institutions withdrawal risk pre-warning mechanism, strengthening the financial supervision, establishing the financial control rallying system and the final lender rescuing system is the safeguard to maintain the financial institutions' orderly movement as well as the safe exist.
引文
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