基于专卖体制的公司治理研究
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摘要
公司治理是世界范围内许多学科领域研究的热点问题之一。2008年世界金融危机的爆发,再次引起了世界范围内对公司治理问题的高度重视,并掀起了改善公司治理的国际性浪潮。公司治理已成为现代企业理论的重要组成部分,同时也是一门实践性和艺术性很强的跨学科的综合性新兴学科。
中国是世界上最大的烟草生产和消费国,烟草制品由国家完全垄断经营,实行“统一领导、垂直管理、专卖专营”的管理体制。随着烟草行业改革的不断深化,卷烟工业企业的规模急剧扩大,要提升我国烟草企业的竞争实力,确保烟草行业的持续平稳发展,就必须积极探索并逐步建立起符合烟草行业特点的现代企业制度和公司治理结构,不断提升管理效率,激发企业活力。本文从研究专卖体制和国有企业公司治理问题入手,力图通过探寻一种制度安排,使得现行体制下烟草企业委托--代理成本最小化、治理效率最大化,充分提高公司治理绩效。
首先,针对我国烟草专卖体制的形成历史、改革现状和发展趋势,从新制度经济学的理论出发,对我国烟草专卖制度现阶段的存续理由及发展趋势进行了分析预测。指出虽然在理论上支持取消烟草专卖制度,但由于政府的偏好、路径依赖和新制度实施机制不具备等因素,专卖制度在当前和今后一段时期内仍然会是中国烟草行业改革和发展的基石。
其次,针对经过多年烟草工业的重组改革,中国烟草总公司作为股权结构单一的国有独资公司,已经与各省级工业有限责任公司形成了二级法人母子公司管理体制的现状,着重研究了集团化母子公司的管理方式和运行机制。在系统分析了烟草行业所处内外部环境、烟草行业经营特点、管理制度特点的基础上,应用集团管控理论,提出了在以行政垄断为特征的管理体制下,为保持集团公司对市场的快速反应能力,提升公司运转效率和子公司活力,有效防止“大企业病”,烟草集团在管控模式的选择上应该实行“战略管控型”的模式,并系统阐述了这一模式的运行保障机制。
第三,对我国烟草行业产权制度及现代企业治理改革的进行了评述,系统分析了我国烟草企业治理模式存在的问题,并通过与跨国烟草公司治理模式的对比分析,提出了我国烟草企业公司治理模式优化的原则和重点。通过分析,指出目前加强和完善烟草公司治理的关键是突出董事会的地位,充分发挥董事会和董事在公司治理中的主导核心作用,通过加强董事会建设建立高效、顺畅、协调的管理体制与运行机制。
第四,由于董事会在公司治理中处于核心位置,本文从研究烟草企业董事会治理入手,在对董事会构建模式、工作机制、自身建设等问题进行广泛调查研究的基础上,提出我国烟草企业董事会建设要在妥善处理好董事会与经理层、公司党组、总公司职能部门“三个关系”的基础上,围绕完善董事会结构和运行机制、细化权责、完善决策机制、建立评价体系等几个重点推进。通过对董事会治理的综合分析,建立了我国烟草企业董事会治理质量评价指标模型,并运用AHP层次分析法及模糊综合评判对评价指标体系进行量化分析。通过分析发现,在影响我国烟草公司董事会治理质量的诸多因素中,影响最大的是对董事会激励约束机制的建立、健全和有效运行。进而提出在我国烟草行业现有管理体制下,提升烟草企业董事会治理质量的关键,是总公司通过施加更大的外部影响因素,健全和完善对下属公司董事会的激励约束机制。在此基础上,运用基于信息不对称博弈论理论的方法建立了委托人(中国烟草总公司)和代理人(省级烟草工业公司董事会)之间的委托代理模型,通过对模型的分析研究,从理论上进一步论证了董事会作为委托代理环节的核心部分,对其进行激励的必要性。在此规范研究的基础上,对如何构建有中国特色的烟草工业企业的公司治理模式提出了建议。
最后,本文从系统理论出发,提出作为国有独资的烟草企业,由于股东和股权结构单一导致系统的封闭,缺少与外界的交流,难以形成耗散结构。在下一步的改发展中,要积极通过政企分开,股权结构多元化、对内开放,加强董事会、监事会建设、推动经理市场化等层面上不断加大系统开放性,形成耗散结构,使公司治理系统走向动态有序的平衡,使各种要素配置合理,治理有效和高效。
Corporate governance is one of the hot issues discussed by many subjects filed in the world. In2008, with the world financial crisis, corporate governance once again is paid highly valued in worldwide. And an international wave of improving the governance is raised. Corporate governance has become an important part of modern enterprise' theories and it is an also a kind of practical and artistic strong interdisciplinary comprehensive emerging discipline at the same time.
China is the world's largest tobacco producer and consumer. Tobacco products are completely monopolized by the state and implemented of the "unified leadership, vertical management, monopoly" management system. With the deepening reform of the tobacco industry, the scale of the tobacco industrial enterprise widened sharply. In order to improving tobacco enterprise's competition and keeping the tobacco industry steady development, it is necessary to explore and conform the characteristics of the modern enterprise system in tobacco industry actively and establish the corporate governance structure gradually. And improve the efficiency of management, stimulate the enterprise vitality. This article, started with the monopoly system and state-owned enterprise management problem, tries to explore a kind of system arrangement that can achieve the delegate-agency cost minimization, maximum management efficiency and fully improve the management performance under the existing system.
First of all, according to the formation of the history, present situation and development trend of China's tobacco monopoly system, begin with the new institutional economics theory, we analyzed and forecast the reason and developing trends of the tobacco monopoly system. As a result of the government's preference, path dependence and the new system implementation mechanism and other factors do not possessed, we still think that monopoly system will be the foundation of the reform and development in China's tobacco industry in the current and a period of time although there has the support to cancelling the tobacco monopoly system.
Secondly, in view of the restructuring of the tobacco industry after years of reform, China national tobacco corporation as a single ownership structure of a wholly state-owned company, has been with the provincial industrial co., LTD formed secondary legal necessity of the management system, this paper studies the present situation of the parent and subsidiary companies collectivization management mode and operation mechanism. In the system analysis of the tobacco industry in internal and external environment, the tobacco industry management characteristics, based on the characteristics of the management system, the application of group control theory, this paper puts forward in the administrative monopoly for the characteristics of the management system, to keep the group company to market the rapid reaction capability, improve the operation efficiency and subsidiary vitality, effectively preventing the "big enterprise disease", tobacco group in control on the choice of mode should carry out a "strategic control type" mode, and introduced the operating modes of the safeguard mechanism.
Third, the tobacco industry of our country property rights system and the reform of modern enterprise management is discussed, a systematic analysis of the governance model of China tobacco enterprise existing problems, and through the and transnational tobacco company governance model of comparative analysis, proposed our country tobacco company governance model optimization principle and key. Through the analysis, it is pointed out that at present, to strengthen the management and improve the tobacco companies is the key to highlight the status of the board of directors, and give full play to the board of directors and directors in the leading role as the core of corporate governance, to strengthen the construction of the board of directors of the building of an efficient and smooth, harmonious management system and operation mechanism.
Fourth, due to the board of directors in corporate governance is the core position, this paper studies the tobacco enterprise board governance of tobacco enterprise, in the construction mode, working mechanism, the construction of their own problems such as widely on the basis of investigation and study, puts forward the construction of the board of directors of the tobacco enterprises to properly deal with the board of directors and managers, company, corporation functional departments of the party of "three relationship", on the basis of the board of directors structure and around perfect operation mechanism, refined, responsibility, perfect the decision-making mechanism, establishing the evaluation system and so on several key propulsion. Based on the comprehensive analysis of the management of the board of directors, we established Chinese tobacco enterprise' board governance efficiency evaluation model and used AHP analytic hierarchy process (AHP) and fuzzy comprehensive evaluation to give a quantitative analysis of the system's indicators. Through the analysis found that the effect on our country's tobacco the board of directors of the company quality management of the many factors, is the greatest impact on the board of directors is incentive and constraint mechanism, perfect and effective operation. And then put forward in China's tobacco industry the existing management system, improve the quality of the tobacco enterprise board governance is the key, the company put more external influence factors, improve and perfect the subordinate to the board of directors of the company of incentive and constraint mechanism. On this basis, based on incomplete information dynamic game theory based on the theory of the management of the method of game theory studies the principal (China national tobacco corporation) and agent (provincial tobacco industry the board of directors of the company), by analyzing and research on this model, theoretically further demonstrates the board of directors as a commission agent link core part, the necessity of motivation. In the normative research on the basis of how to construct has the Chinese characteristic the tobacco industry enterprise corporate governance model and puts forward some Suggestions.
Finally, from the view of the system theory, tobacco enterprise, as a wholly state-owned, due to the single structure of the shareholders and the ownership, exposed closed system and lack of communication with the outside of the world, so, it is difficult to form the dissipative structure. In the next step of the development, we should actively through the separation of ownership structure, diversified and internal open, strengthen construction of board of directors, board of supervisors, promoting the manager market level, such as increasing openness system, forming dissipative structure, the company management system to dynamic and orderly balance, make various elements configuration is reasonable, effective and efficient management.
中国是世界上最大的烟草生产和消费国,烟草制品由国家完全垄断经营,实行“统一领导、垂直管理、专卖专营”的管理体制。随着烟草行业改革的不断深化,卷烟工业企业的规模急剧扩大,要提升我国烟草企业的竞争实力,确保烟草行业的持续平稳发展,就必须积极探索并逐步建立起符合烟草行业特点的现代企业制度和公司治理结构,不断提升管理效率,激发企业活力。本文从研究专卖体制和国有企业公司治理问题入手,力图通过探寻一种制度安排,使得现行体制下烟草企业委托--代理成本最小化、治理效率最大化,充分提高公司治理绩效。
首先,针对我国烟草专卖体制的形成历史、改革现状和发展趋势,从新制度经济学的理论出发,对我国烟草专卖制度现阶段的存续理由及发展趋势进行了分析预测。指出虽然在理论上支持取消烟草专卖制度,但由于政府的偏好、路径依赖和新制度实施机制不具备等因素,专卖制度在当前和今后一段时期内仍然会是中国烟草行业改革和发展的基石。
其次,针对经过多年烟草工业的重组改革,中国烟草总公司作为股权结构单一的国有独资公司,已经与各省级工业有限责任公司形成了二级法人母子公司管理体制的现状,着重研究了集团化母子公司的管理方式和运行机制。在系统分析了烟草行业所处内外部环境、烟草行业经营特点、管理制度特点的基础上,应用集团管控理论,提出了在以行政垄断为特征的管理体制下,为保持集团公司对市场的快速反应能力,提升公司运转效率和子公司活力,有效防止“大企业病”,烟草集团在管控模式的选择上应该实行“战略管控型”的模式,并系统阐述了这一模式的运行保障机制。
第三,对我国烟草行业产权制度及现代企业治理改革的进行了评述,系统分析了我国烟草企业治理模式存在的问题,并通过与跨国烟草公司治理模式的对比分析,提出了我国烟草企业公司治理模式优化的原则和重点。通过分析,指出目前加强和完善烟草公司治理的关键是突出董事会的地位,充分发挥董事会和董事在公司治理中的主导核心作用,通过加强董事会建设建立高效、顺畅、协调的管理体制与运行机制。
第四,由于董事会在公司治理中处于核心位置,本文从研究烟草企业董事会治理入手,在对董事会构建模式、工作机制、自身建设等问题进行广泛调查研究的基础上,提出我国烟草企业董事会建设要在妥善处理好董事会与经理层、公司党组、总公司职能部门“三个关系”的基础上,围绕完善董事会结构和运行机制、细化权责、完善决策机制、建立评价体系等几个重点推进。通过对董事会治理的综合分析,建立了我国烟草企业董事会治理质量评价指标模型,并运用AHP层次分析法及模糊综合评判对评价指标体系进行量化分析。通过分析发现,在影响我国烟草公司董事会治理质量的诸多因素中,影响最大的是对董事会激励约束机制的建立、健全和有效运行。进而提出在我国烟草行业现有管理体制下,提升烟草企业董事会治理质量的关键,是总公司通过施加更大的外部影响因素,健全和完善对下属公司董事会的激励约束机制。在此基础上,运用基于信息不对称博弈论理论的方法建立了委托人(中国烟草总公司)和代理人(省级烟草工业公司董事会)之间的委托代理模型,通过对模型的分析研究,从理论上进一步论证了董事会作为委托代理环节的核心部分,对其进行激励的必要性。在此规范研究的基础上,对如何构建有中国特色的烟草工业企业的公司治理模式提出了建议。
最后,本文从系统理论出发,提出作为国有独资的烟草企业,由于股东和股权结构单一导致系统的封闭,缺少与外界的交流,难以形成耗散结构。在下一步的改发展中,要积极通过政企分开,股权结构多元化、对内开放,加强董事会、监事会建设、推动经理市场化等层面上不断加大系统开放性,形成耗散结构,使公司治理系统走向动态有序的平衡,使各种要素配置合理,治理有效和高效。
Corporate governance is one of the hot issues discussed by many subjects filed in the world. In2008, with the world financial crisis, corporate governance once again is paid highly valued in worldwide. And an international wave of improving the governance is raised. Corporate governance has become an important part of modern enterprise' theories and it is an also a kind of practical and artistic strong interdisciplinary comprehensive emerging discipline at the same time.
China is the world's largest tobacco producer and consumer. Tobacco products are completely monopolized by the state and implemented of the "unified leadership, vertical management, monopoly" management system. With the deepening reform of the tobacco industry, the scale of the tobacco industrial enterprise widened sharply. In order to improving tobacco enterprise's competition and keeping the tobacco industry steady development, it is necessary to explore and conform the characteristics of the modern enterprise system in tobacco industry actively and establish the corporate governance structure gradually. And improve the efficiency of management, stimulate the enterprise vitality. This article, started with the monopoly system and state-owned enterprise management problem, tries to explore a kind of system arrangement that can achieve the delegate-agency cost minimization, maximum management efficiency and fully improve the management performance under the existing system.
First of all, according to the formation of the history, present situation and development trend of China's tobacco monopoly system, begin with the new institutional economics theory, we analyzed and forecast the reason and developing trends of the tobacco monopoly system. As a result of the government's preference, path dependence and the new system implementation mechanism and other factors do not possessed, we still think that monopoly system will be the foundation of the reform and development in China's tobacco industry in the current and a period of time although there has the support to cancelling the tobacco monopoly system.
Secondly, in view of the restructuring of the tobacco industry after years of reform, China national tobacco corporation as a single ownership structure of a wholly state-owned company, has been with the provincial industrial co., LTD formed secondary legal necessity of the management system, this paper studies the present situation of the parent and subsidiary companies collectivization management mode and operation mechanism. In the system analysis of the tobacco industry in internal and external environment, the tobacco industry management characteristics, based on the characteristics of the management system, the application of group control theory, this paper puts forward in the administrative monopoly for the characteristics of the management system, to keep the group company to market the rapid reaction capability, improve the operation efficiency and subsidiary vitality, effectively preventing the "big enterprise disease", tobacco group in control on the choice of mode should carry out a "strategic control type" mode, and introduced the operating modes of the safeguard mechanism.
Third, the tobacco industry of our country property rights system and the reform of modern enterprise management is discussed, a systematic analysis of the governance model of China tobacco enterprise existing problems, and through the and transnational tobacco company governance model of comparative analysis, proposed our country tobacco company governance model optimization principle and key. Through the analysis, it is pointed out that at present, to strengthen the management and improve the tobacco companies is the key to highlight the status of the board of directors, and give full play to the board of directors and directors in the leading role as the core of corporate governance, to strengthen the construction of the board of directors of the building of an efficient and smooth, harmonious management system and operation mechanism.
Fourth, due to the board of directors in corporate governance is the core position, this paper studies the tobacco enterprise board governance of tobacco enterprise, in the construction mode, working mechanism, the construction of their own problems such as widely on the basis of investigation and study, puts forward the construction of the board of directors of the tobacco enterprises to properly deal with the board of directors and managers, company, corporation functional departments of the party of "three relationship", on the basis of the board of directors structure and around perfect operation mechanism, refined, responsibility, perfect the decision-making mechanism, establishing the evaluation system and so on several key propulsion. Based on the comprehensive analysis of the management of the board of directors, we established Chinese tobacco enterprise' board governance efficiency evaluation model and used AHP analytic hierarchy process (AHP) and fuzzy comprehensive evaluation to give a quantitative analysis of the system's indicators. Through the analysis found that the effect on our country's tobacco the board of directors of the company quality management of the many factors, is the greatest impact on the board of directors is incentive and constraint mechanism, perfect and effective operation. And then put forward in China's tobacco industry the existing management system, improve the quality of the tobacco enterprise board governance is the key, the company put more external influence factors, improve and perfect the subordinate to the board of directors of the company of incentive and constraint mechanism. On this basis, based on incomplete information dynamic game theory based on the theory of the management of the method of game theory studies the principal (China national tobacco corporation) and agent (provincial tobacco industry the board of directors of the company), by analyzing and research on this model, theoretically further demonstrates the board of directors as a commission agent link core part, the necessity of motivation. In the normative research on the basis of how to construct has the Chinese characteristic the tobacco industry enterprise corporate governance model and puts forward some Suggestions.
Finally, from the view of the system theory, tobacco enterprise, as a wholly state-owned, due to the single structure of the shareholders and the ownership, exposed closed system and lack of communication with the outside of the world, so, it is difficult to form the dissipative structure. In the next step of the development, we should actively through the separation of ownership structure, diversified and internal open, strengthen construction of board of directors, board of supervisors, promoting the manager market level, such as increasing openness system, forming dissipative structure, the company management system to dynamic and orderly balance, make various elements configuration is reasonable, effective and efficient management.
引文
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