建设项目动态联盟运作模式研究
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摘要
本文以契约理论、新古典经济理论、核心能力理论、现代公司治理理论等原理为基础,采用博弈论、网络分析法、BP神经网络、遗传算法、模糊数学等分析方法,对建设项目动态联盟运作模式的构建、运行机制、决策机制、管理机制等方面进行了探索性的研究。
(1)从我国建筑行业面临的形势出发,在分析了国内外现有的建设模式的基础上分析了建设项目动态联盟模式的优势;从数学、新古典经济学、新制度经济学的角度建立模型,分析建设项目动态联盟模式的形成动因;结合我国建筑市场的发展形势和环境条件,并利用非合作博弈理论对建设项目动态联盟模式进行了可行性分析。
(2)通过相关文献分析,在前人研究的基础上,建立了伙伴选择的评价指标体系,并对应用网络分析法评价选择伙伴进行了可行性分析;构建了项目选择的评价指标体系,并对应用BP神经网络方法评价选择项目进行了可行性分析。这两种方法都能将专家智慧融入评价过程,又能避免人为的主观影响,本着定性与定量相结合的思想,建立了评价模型,对候选伙伴和拟投标项目进行了科学评价,评价结果与现实情况有着很好的一致性。
(3)以委托代理理论为基础,设计了单任务激励模型和多任务激励模型,并对盟员绩效进行评价,为联盟激励决策和收益分配决策提供依据。通过比较在信息对称与信息不对称情况下单任务激励模型的解,分析了总包商与分包商的特质、外生随机变量及其影响程度等因素对激励报酬强度系数的影响,通过模型分析,识别出了建设项目动态联盟中设计激励机制必须考虑的因素。对多任务激励模型,通过相对激励强度比较静态分析表明,总包商对于重要性高的任务、不确定性较低任务的激励力度应该得到加强,以便合理配置资源,最大化联盟的效用。基于建设项目动态联盟伙伴绩效评价相关文献的分析,结合南京栖霞建设股份有限公司的实际情况,构建了评价的指标体系,研究了模糊系统评价的可行性,建立了模糊系统评价的数学模型,并对南京栖霞建设股份有限公司进行了实例分析。
(4)利用遗传算法求解建设项目动态联盟多项目资源均衡问题。根据建设项目动态联盟的特点,将多项目资源均衡问题转化为单项目资源均衡问题;通过建立数学模型,求解单位时间内资源消耗函数的最小方差,使资源消耗尽量均衡;设计遗传算法,并利用MATLAB遗传算法工具编程实现,求出各子项目的最优开始时间;实例分析表明利用遗传算法求解建设项目动态联盟多项目资源均衡问题是有效的。
(5)通过对建设项目动态联盟中多层委托代理关系的分析,研究了建设项目动态联盟治理结构概念的内涵,对建设项目动态联盟中存在不同委托代理关系的利益主体间的权、责、利关系进行界定。针对建设项目动态联盟运行过程中的问题,分析了建设项目动态联盟治理的必要性。依据建设项目动态联盟的组织结构和涉及联盟的各利益相关者受契约约束的紧密程度把建设项目动态联盟治理结构划分为三个层次。从内部治理、外部治理和社会治理三个层次分析了建设项目动态联盟治理结构的制度框架和控制权的配置。通过设置良好的制度框架,规定其网络框架,从而提高联盟的组织效率,实现联盟的效用最大化。并对浙江宝业集团所建立的动态联盟的治理结构进行了实例分析。
(6)针对联盟确定的以伙伴努力水平所实现的收益为收益分配对象的不公正性,根据建设项目动态联盟的实际情况,建立联盟、业主、项目利益相关者等确定的以伙伴最终实现的项目价值为收益分配对象的数学模型,并通过对伙伴所完成分包项目价值状态的确认,确定一个奖励额度,实现对正式契约和模型的改进,采用遗传算法对模型进行求解,算例结果表明,改进后的模型极大地提高了伙伴的努力程度,提高了收益分配的合理性。
This paper probes the operational mode of virtual enterprise of construction project into construction, operation mechanism, decision-making mechanism and management mechanism etc, based on such theories as contract, new classical economics, core competence and modern corporation government, with game theory, analytic network process, back-propagation neural network, genetic algorithms and fuzzy math.
(1) Based on the analysis of the situation of the construction industry in China and the delivery model of construction project the present day, suggest the operation model of virtual enterprise of construction project. Based on math theory, new classical economics and new institution economics, establish models to analyze the motivation of virtual enterprise of construction project. Considering development situation and environment in China, prove the feasibility of virtual enterprise of construction project using non-cooperative game model.
(2) Based on reviewing concerned literatures and former research, the evaluation criteria system of partner selection and project selection is assumed, the feasibility of carrying out Back-Propagation Neural Network method and Analytic Network Process method is investigated, the two methods both embrace expert intelligence in evaluating process. Based on the idea of combining both qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis, the project evaluation model is constructed, and the candidate partners and candidate projects are systematically evaluated, and the evaluation results are consistent with the fact perfectly.
(3)According to principal-agent theory, design the single task and multi-task incentive model between contractor and subcontractor. And evaluating partners` performance which can provide evidence for incentive decision and assigning profit .Considering such factors as special character of contractor and subcontractor、exogenous random variable and its influence, by comparing answers of the incentive model under symmetric information with asymmetric information, analyze the influence of these factors on the sensitiveness compensation performance, and factors to be considered while designing the incentive system are put forward. The comparative static analysis of multi-task model for the relative incentive intensity is done. The results show that the more important task suits the stronger incentive contract, the stronger incentive contract suits the more uncertain task, which is in order to distribute resources correctly, and improve the utility of the virtual enterprise of construction project. Based on reviewing concerned literatures and considering the fact of Nanjing Chixia construction Co., Ltd., the evaluation index system is assumed, the feasibility of carrying out fuzzy math method is investigated, the math models for fuzzy systematically evaluating are built, and the analytic demonstration of Nanjing Chixia construction Co., Ltd. is performed.
(4)We use genetic algorithms to solve multi-project resource leveling problem in virtual enterprise of construction project. Basing on the characteristics of the virtual enterprise, we transform multi-project resource leveling problem into single-project resource leveling problem; we design a mathematic model to minimize the variance of resource consuming every day, to level the problem; we design the genetic algorithms and use MATLAB to program to get the optimal start time of every sub-project; finally, we give an application to demonstrate its effectiveness.
(5)Based on the analysis of the multilevel principal-agent relationship of the virtual enterprise of construction project, conceive the conception of governance structure for virtual enterprise of construction project. Analyze the necessity of governance. According to the organization structure of virtual enterprise of construction project and the contract relationship restricting all participants, divide the governance structure into three parts. Analyze the system structure and power distribution from the three parts for governance structure for virtual enterprise of construction project, in order to benefit the virtual enterprise. Finally, we provide an analytic demonstration of Baoye group in ZheJiang province.
(6)Due to the irrationality of profit allocation basing on the struggling level confirmed by the virtual enterprise only, according to the reality of the virtual enterprise of construction project, we establish the profit allocation model basing on the final values of the subproject confirmed by the virtual enterprise, owner and other participants; then, we mend the model using a bonus confirmed by the final values of the subproject finished by partners; finally, we solve the mend model using genetic algorithms, and the results prove that the mend model improve the struggling level greatly, and improve the rationality of profit allocation.
(1)从我国建筑行业面临的形势出发,在分析了国内外现有的建设模式的基础上分析了建设项目动态联盟模式的优势;从数学、新古典经济学、新制度经济学的角度建立模型,分析建设项目动态联盟模式的形成动因;结合我国建筑市场的发展形势和环境条件,并利用非合作博弈理论对建设项目动态联盟模式进行了可行性分析。
(2)通过相关文献分析,在前人研究的基础上,建立了伙伴选择的评价指标体系,并对应用网络分析法评价选择伙伴进行了可行性分析;构建了项目选择的评价指标体系,并对应用BP神经网络方法评价选择项目进行了可行性分析。这两种方法都能将专家智慧融入评价过程,又能避免人为的主观影响,本着定性与定量相结合的思想,建立了评价模型,对候选伙伴和拟投标项目进行了科学评价,评价结果与现实情况有着很好的一致性。
(3)以委托代理理论为基础,设计了单任务激励模型和多任务激励模型,并对盟员绩效进行评价,为联盟激励决策和收益分配决策提供依据。通过比较在信息对称与信息不对称情况下单任务激励模型的解,分析了总包商与分包商的特质、外生随机变量及其影响程度等因素对激励报酬强度系数的影响,通过模型分析,识别出了建设项目动态联盟中设计激励机制必须考虑的因素。对多任务激励模型,通过相对激励强度比较静态分析表明,总包商对于重要性高的任务、不确定性较低任务的激励力度应该得到加强,以便合理配置资源,最大化联盟的效用。基于建设项目动态联盟伙伴绩效评价相关文献的分析,结合南京栖霞建设股份有限公司的实际情况,构建了评价的指标体系,研究了模糊系统评价的可行性,建立了模糊系统评价的数学模型,并对南京栖霞建设股份有限公司进行了实例分析。
(4)利用遗传算法求解建设项目动态联盟多项目资源均衡问题。根据建设项目动态联盟的特点,将多项目资源均衡问题转化为单项目资源均衡问题;通过建立数学模型,求解单位时间内资源消耗函数的最小方差,使资源消耗尽量均衡;设计遗传算法,并利用MATLAB遗传算法工具编程实现,求出各子项目的最优开始时间;实例分析表明利用遗传算法求解建设项目动态联盟多项目资源均衡问题是有效的。
(5)通过对建设项目动态联盟中多层委托代理关系的分析,研究了建设项目动态联盟治理结构概念的内涵,对建设项目动态联盟中存在不同委托代理关系的利益主体间的权、责、利关系进行界定。针对建设项目动态联盟运行过程中的问题,分析了建设项目动态联盟治理的必要性。依据建设项目动态联盟的组织结构和涉及联盟的各利益相关者受契约约束的紧密程度把建设项目动态联盟治理结构划分为三个层次。从内部治理、外部治理和社会治理三个层次分析了建设项目动态联盟治理结构的制度框架和控制权的配置。通过设置良好的制度框架,规定其网络框架,从而提高联盟的组织效率,实现联盟的效用最大化。并对浙江宝业集团所建立的动态联盟的治理结构进行了实例分析。
(6)针对联盟确定的以伙伴努力水平所实现的收益为收益分配对象的不公正性,根据建设项目动态联盟的实际情况,建立联盟、业主、项目利益相关者等确定的以伙伴最终实现的项目价值为收益分配对象的数学模型,并通过对伙伴所完成分包项目价值状态的确认,确定一个奖励额度,实现对正式契约和模型的改进,采用遗传算法对模型进行求解,算例结果表明,改进后的模型极大地提高了伙伴的努力程度,提高了收益分配的合理性。
This paper probes the operational mode of virtual enterprise of construction project into construction, operation mechanism, decision-making mechanism and management mechanism etc, based on such theories as contract, new classical economics, core competence and modern corporation government, with game theory, analytic network process, back-propagation neural network, genetic algorithms and fuzzy math.
(1) Based on the analysis of the situation of the construction industry in China and the delivery model of construction project the present day, suggest the operation model of virtual enterprise of construction project. Based on math theory, new classical economics and new institution economics, establish models to analyze the motivation of virtual enterprise of construction project. Considering development situation and environment in China, prove the feasibility of virtual enterprise of construction project using non-cooperative game model.
(2) Based on reviewing concerned literatures and former research, the evaluation criteria system of partner selection and project selection is assumed, the feasibility of carrying out Back-Propagation Neural Network method and Analytic Network Process method is investigated, the two methods both embrace expert intelligence in evaluating process. Based on the idea of combining both qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis, the project evaluation model is constructed, and the candidate partners and candidate projects are systematically evaluated, and the evaluation results are consistent with the fact perfectly.
(3)According to principal-agent theory, design the single task and multi-task incentive model between contractor and subcontractor. And evaluating partners` performance which can provide evidence for incentive decision and assigning profit .Considering such factors as special character of contractor and subcontractor、exogenous random variable and its influence, by comparing answers of the incentive model under symmetric information with asymmetric information, analyze the influence of these factors on the sensitiveness compensation performance, and factors to be considered while designing the incentive system are put forward. The comparative static analysis of multi-task model for the relative incentive intensity is done. The results show that the more important task suits the stronger incentive contract, the stronger incentive contract suits the more uncertain task, which is in order to distribute resources correctly, and improve the utility of the virtual enterprise of construction project. Based on reviewing concerned literatures and considering the fact of Nanjing Chixia construction Co., Ltd., the evaluation index system is assumed, the feasibility of carrying out fuzzy math method is investigated, the math models for fuzzy systematically evaluating are built, and the analytic demonstration of Nanjing Chixia construction Co., Ltd. is performed.
(4)We use genetic algorithms to solve multi-project resource leveling problem in virtual enterprise of construction project. Basing on the characteristics of the virtual enterprise, we transform multi-project resource leveling problem into single-project resource leveling problem; we design a mathematic model to minimize the variance of resource consuming every day, to level the problem; we design the genetic algorithms and use MATLAB to program to get the optimal start time of every sub-project; finally, we give an application to demonstrate its effectiveness.
(5)Based on the analysis of the multilevel principal-agent relationship of the virtual enterprise of construction project, conceive the conception of governance structure for virtual enterprise of construction project. Analyze the necessity of governance. According to the organization structure of virtual enterprise of construction project and the contract relationship restricting all participants, divide the governance structure into three parts. Analyze the system structure and power distribution from the three parts for governance structure for virtual enterprise of construction project, in order to benefit the virtual enterprise. Finally, we provide an analytic demonstration of Baoye group in ZheJiang province.
(6)Due to the irrationality of profit allocation basing on the struggling level confirmed by the virtual enterprise only, according to the reality of the virtual enterprise of construction project, we establish the profit allocation model basing on the final values of the subproject confirmed by the virtual enterprise, owner and other participants; then, we mend the model using a bonus confirmed by the final values of the subproject finished by partners; finally, we solve the mend model using genetic algorithms, and the results prove that the mend model improve the struggling level greatly, and improve the rationality of profit allocation.
引文
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