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易逝品的动态定价机制与消费者策略行为研究
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摘要
科技的进步和市场竞争的加剧导致产品更新换代的加快,使得越来越多的产品具有易逝品的典型特征。易逝品通常具有较短的生命周期,到一个时点后若还未被出售,则该产品残值很小。同时,像牛奶、面包、蔬菜等这些易逝品,在临近产品生命周期时,消费者的感知风险会明显的增高,将会进一步导致产品滞销。因此,产品的易逝性是目前众多销售商在管理这类物品时所面临的巨大困难。
     动态定价作为易逝品收入管理的引擎,在易逝品的收益管理过程中发挥着重要的作用。而且互联网的出现导致信息的传播更为便捷,厂商调整价格的菜单成本大大降低,消费者和厂商的互动性也得到了显著加强。这些都为易逝品动态定价的实施提供了更为有效的环境和保障。与此同时,消费者也可以通过互联网更容易的获得产品的价格、供应数量等市场信息而变得越来越“聪明”,他们会权衡自己在每阶段可能得到的不同利益,而决定最佳的购买时机。
     因此,网络环境下动态定价的实施犹如一把“双刃剑”,在增加厂商利润的同时,也不可避免地导致消费者策略行为的发生,这种策略行为会对厂商的动态定价以及相关决策产生重大的影响。因此,考虑厂商如何利用新型的网络技术,以及将消费者的策略行为纳入到价格以及订购数量的决策范畴,实现易逝品的收益管理的最大化,无论在理论界还是实物界,都显得十分必要。
     本研究在以前研究的基础上,分别将网络环境下出现的新技术(RFID)以及消费者的策略行为进一步考虑到易逝品的动态定价与订购决策中,综合应用动态规划、博弈论、经济学、计量经济学、试验设计等理论和方法,对上述问题进行了探索,并得到以下结论:
     (1)销售商基于RFID技术的应用,可以在对产品价值跟踪的基础上,动态的调整价格,并决定最优的订购数量。与实行固定的价格策略相比,实行动态定价策略总能获得较大的收益,而且这种优势随着易逝品价值递减速率的增加而更为显著。销售商基于RFID技术的最优价格路径和初始的最优订购数量受到产品的成本、产品价值的递减速率、消费者保留价值的分布等因素的影响。
     (2)消费者的策略行为会对厂商定价决策产生较大的影响。在确定性需求下,当产品没有数量限制时,厂商的利润随着策略型消费者所占比例的增加而减少,厂商忽略消费者策略行为所造成的损失随着策略型消费者所占比例的增加而增大;在有数量限制时,厂商的定价决策与产品的数量水平显著相关:
     当厂商的数量较少时,厂商基本上可以忽略消费者的策略行为;当厂商有相对较多数量时,消费者会对第二阶段以较低价格获得产品的概率形成理性预期,厂商的最优决策是在第一阶段设定较高的价格,在第二阶段设定相对较低的价格,在理性预期均衡的条件下实现总利润最大化;当厂商有充足的数量时,厂商的最优定价决策与消费者的折扣因子有关,第一阶段的价格随着折扣因子的增大而减小,面临消费者的等待行为,厂商应在第二阶段设定适当的价格,尽可能使等待购买的消费者人数最少。
     在不确定需求情形下,厂商的定价决策也受到产品数量和消费者保留价格的显著影响:厂商第一阶段的价格随着产品数量的增加而下降。同时,产品数量存在一个临界水平,当该临界水平大于具有高保留价格的消费者的人数时,厂商应该实行动态定价策略;而该临界水平小于具有高保留价格的消费者的人数时,厂商应该实行差价返还策略,以减少消费者的策略行为。
     (3)消费者的策略行为会对厂商订购策略产生较大的影响。无论是确定性需求还是不确定需求,厂商的最优订购数量与消费者的价值递减速率、消费者的到达速率、消费者的保留价格以及厂商的折扣水平、厂商打折的时间等众多因素有关。与传统的报童模型相比,当消费者的保留价格较高时,厂商可以适当的减少初始的订购数量,通过制造一定的“缺货”风险,使得具有较高的保留价格的消费者在第一阶段以较高的价格购买,而不会等到第二阶段以较低的价格购买;当消费者的保留价格较低时,厂商可以忽视消费者的策略行为。
     同时,消费者的风险厌恶程度对厂商的最优订购数量有一定的影响。消费者的风险厌恶程度越高,厂商的最优订购数量也相应较大。消费者的风险厌恶从一定程度上缓解了消费者的策略行为所带来的不利影响。
     (4)面对消费者的策略行为,同时考虑价格和订购数量将会导致厂商收益的显著提高。在消费者同质情形,消费者的策略行为使得厂商的价格低于产品对消费者的保留价值,厂商无法实现完全价格歧视;最优数量也比不考虑这种策略行为时低。通过福利经济学的分析可以得到,与传统的报童模型相比,考虑消费者的策略行为,将会导致了生产者、消费者、社会总福利的显著提高。
     在消费者异质的情形,通过机制设计的相关理论,得到厂商在需求不确定时,必须至少拥有恰当的数量使得那些具有高保留价格的消费者不管在何种需求情况下(高需求或者低需求),都能买到该产品。如果需求数量很大时,厂商可以制造一定的缺货风险,使得高保留价格的消费者在第一阶段购买;如果需求数量很小时,厂商会兼顾两阶段的消费者需求。同时,在垄断竞争的情形,存在一个对称的Nash均衡。
     (5)通过对消费者策略行为的实证分析,得到消费者会基于厂商提供的价格和数量等产品信息,动态的优化自己的购买决策。当厂商产品的数量较少时,消费者价格敏感性会大大降低,消费者几乎不会等待厂商进一步降价,而马上购买。对厂商而言,可以通过结合目前的市场需求情况和产品的数量,策略性的发布产品的相关信息,以影响消费者的购买决策,从而获得最大利润。
     通过以上方面的分析和讨论,本文的主要创新点可以归纳为以下三个方面:
     (1)本文运用数学模型,建立易逝性产品的价值与需求之间的函数,分析了在RFID技术条件下,基于产品价值跟踪基础上动态定价的优越性,并给出如何应用RFID技术,得到最优的价格与初始的订购数量的决策。
     (2)本文分析了在消费者策略行为下,易逝品的价格、订购数量以及同时将价格和订购数量作为决策变量时的最优决策,具体而言:
     考虑易逝品的价格策略时,通过引入消费者折扣因子和理性预期,运用两阶段的动态博弈,分别在确定性需求和不确定需求下,得到厂商的最优价格策略与产品的初始数量显著相关,并提出在适当情形下可以运用差价返还策略来减少消费者策略行为的不利影响;考虑易逝品的订购策略时,运用传统的报童模型和理性预期均衡,得到厂商在确定性需求和不确定需求下的最优订购数量,发现相对于传统的报童模型,厂商在面临消费者策略行为下的最优订购数量要比传统的报童模型所得出的订购数量低;考虑易逝品的价格和订购策略相结合时,分别在消费者同质和消费者者异质的情形下,得到厂商的最优价格和初始的订购决策,同时分析了消费者的风险类型对厂商策略的影响,并通过经济学的福利分析,讨论消费者的策略行为对厂商、消费者以及社会总福利的影响。最后,建立了垄断竞争情形下基于消费者策略行为的定价和订购决策模型,证明了存在一个对称的Nash均衡。
     (3)本文通过互联网上的实验设计检验了消费者策略行为的存在性,验证了易逝品的价格、数量等信息会对消费者的购买决策产生较大影响,并为厂商的定价和订购策略提供了指导性建议。
With the development of technology and the fierce of competition in the market, the life cycle of the product is shorter than ever, and the speed product replacement is also accelerated. More and more products have the characteristic of perishability. The perishable goods always have very short life cycle and the salvage value is very small if it can not be sold out in the life cycle. At the same time, the consumer’s perceived risk will be enhanced when it approaches the product life cycle, such as milk, bread, vegetable etc. Therefore, the selling and management of perishable goods is a very difficult problem for many retailers.
     Dynamic pricing mechanism as an engine of perishable good assets management, plays a very important role in all the process. With the coming of Internet, the cost of changing the price is very small and the information can spread quickly in the Internet. The interaction between firms and consumers also enhanced. All of these create a good environment for implementing dynamic pricing. At the same time, consumers can get the information of the product from the Internet easily, such as price、amounts etc .They can become cleverer than ever and can weigh their payoff of immediate purchase against the expected payoff of delaying their purchases, then, make the optimal purchasing decisions by the information.
     Thus, the implement of dynamic pricing in the Internet environment is a sword with two sides. On one hand, it can increase the profit of the firm, on the other hand, it can not be avoided the strategic behavior of some consumers. This strategic behavior can have a great impact on the firm’s dynamic pricing and other decisions. Therefore, it is very necessary to consider how to realize maximize profit in the perishable goods assets management using the Internet technology, at the same time, incorporating the strategic behavior of consumers in the Internet environment for the enterprisers and the theorists.
     This study based on the formers’shoulders, incorporating the new technology RFID in Internet and the consumer’s strategic behavior into the dynamic pricing and ordering decision of perishable goods, using dynamic programming、game theory、economics、econometrics、experiments design etc to explore the problem and get some conclusions below:
     (1)The seller can maximize profits of selling perishable food through price adjustment based on real-time product quality and values through RFID technology. Dynamic pricing policy always brings a better profit than fixed pricing policy with a given cycle length; at the same time , the profit difference between dynamic pricing with RFID for tanking and tracking product value and fixed price becomes larger with the larger decay rate . The optimal price and the initial inventory level based on RFID is effected by many factors, such as the cost, the dropping rate of the value, the consumers’reserved price, the consumers’arrival rate etc.
     (2)Consumer’s strategic behavior has great effects on the firm’s pricing decision. Under the deterministic demand situations, if the amount of the goods is limitless, the profit of the firm will decease with the proportion of strategic consumer increasing. If the firm makes the price decision ignoring the consumers’strategic behavior, the loss of the profit will increase with the proportion of strategic consumer increasing. If the amount of the good is limit, the firm’s pricing decision is high interrelated with the amounts:
     When the amounts is small, the firm can ignore the consumer’s strategic behavior; when the amounts is relative much, the consumers can form a rational expectation of getting the product with a lowed price in the second period. The firm’s optimal decision is setting a high price in the first period and a relative low price in the second period to realize the equilibrium of rational expectation and to get the maximized profit; when the amounts is plenty, the optimal pricing decision is related with the discounted factor of the consumers. The price in the first period decreases with the increasing of consumers’discounted factor. The firm should set a proper price in the second period to make less consumers would wait to purchase the product in the second.
     Under the stochastic demand situations, the firm’s pricing decision is also effected by the amounts and the consumers’reserved price: the price in the first period decreases with the increasing of initial amounts. At the same time, it exists a critical amounts, when the high reserved price consumer in the market is lager the critical amounts, the firm should choose dynamic pricing decision; when the high reserved price consumer in the market is less than the critical amounts, the firm should choose a refund policy decision to minimize the consumer’s strategic behavior.
     (3) Consumer’s strategic behavior has great effects on the firm’s pricing decision. Whether under the deterministic demand situations or the stochastic demand situations, the optimal ordering decision is effected by the factors such as the magnitude of price discounting over time, the decay in consumers’valuations, and the arrival rate of the consumers. In contrast with traditional newsvendor model, When the market consists of a sufficiently large number of high-value consumers, rationing is optimal that is, to make a rationing risk to make the high reserved price consumer not wait to purchase in the second period with low price, and the firm to serve the market only at the high price in period 1; when the market consists of a sufficiently large number of low-value consumers , the rationing is never optimal , and the firm to serve all the market.
     At the same time, the consumer’s risk preference has an effect on the optimal amounts. When the consumer’s risk aversion is high, the initial ordering amounts can be increased. Thus, the consumer’s risk aversion can buffer the adverse impact of the consumer’s strategic behavior.
     (4) Faced with the consumer’s strategic behavior, incorporated the price and ordering decision together in the perishable good assets management will enhance the firm’s profit. When the consumers are homogeneous, the optimal price is less than the consumer’s reserved price, that is, the firm can not realize the first price discrimination; the optimal ordering amounts is lower than ignoring the consumer’s strategic behavior; the consumer’s risk aversion can buffer the adverse impact of the consumer’s strategic behavior. By the welfare analyses, we can get that considering the consumer’s strategic behavior will enhance the consumer、the firm and the social welfare.
     When the consumers are heterogeneous, using the mechanism theory, we get the firm should choose a proper ordering amount in order that the high reserved price consumers can get the product whether at high demand situations or at low demand situations. At the high demand situations, the firm can make a rationing risk to make the high reserved price consumer purchase at the first period; at the low demand situations , the rationing is never optimal , and the firm to serve all the market.
     In the monopolistic competition, it exist a symmetrical Nash equilibrium; all the firms make the identical pricing decision and ordering decision.
     (5)By the empirical study of consumer’s strategic behavior, we find that the consumers can make the optimal purchasing decision dynamically based on the information of the price and the amounts ,etc. The firm can incorporate the demand in the market and the amounts of the product together, spreading the information strategically in order to effect the consumer’s purchasing decision.
     For the discussion and analysis above, the innovations of this dissertation mainly embody as below:
     (1) we first consider a RFID-based system and develop ordering decisions and the dynamic pricing schedule for perishable goods with a deterministic demand function in the Internet environment. Then, we extend the model to a stochastic demand case.
     The most of existing research on RFID or RFID-enabled business models has been focusing on the conceptualization and descriptive analyses on its potential benefits of replacing barcode systems. Quantitative analysis on innovative business models based on RFID data has been rare. Using a price and value dependant demand function, we prove that the benefit of RFID-enabled dynamic pricing and tell the firm how to use RFID technology to implement the price and the ordering decision.
     (2)Under the consumer’s strategic behavior, we consider how to make the optimal price、optimal initial ordering decision respective and how to make the optimal price and optimal initial ordering decision together.
     The most of existing research on dynamic pricing model or traditional newsvendor model has been ignoring the consumer’s strategic behavior. This dissertation uses a discounted factor of consumer value getting a rational expectation equilibrium and the consumer’s optimal decision. Then, through the Stackelberg game theory, we get the optimal decision of the firm.
     When we consider the pricing decision of the firm, we analyze the optimal pricing decision under different amount level in deterministic demand. In the stochastic demand, we get the optimal price and advise that in some situations the firm can use return policy to minimize the consumer’s strategic behavior; when we consider the optimal ordering decision of the firm, based on a model in deterministic demand, we extend the model to the stochastic demand when the consumers arrive the market simultaneously or the consumers arrive the market sequentially; when we consider the optimal price and optimal initial ordering decision together, we get the optimal price and optimal ordering amount, by the way, we analyze the consumer’s risk aversion’effect on the firm’s decision and the consumer’s strategic behavior’s effect on the consumer、the firm and the social welfare. In the end,we extent the model to the monopolistic competition markets.
     (3)Through an Internet-based experiments, we confirm the existence of consumer’s strategic behavior. At the same time, we get that the difference of price and the amounts information can have great effect on consumer’s optimal purchasing decision. We also give some suggestion to the firm of implementing the price and ordering decision.
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