控制权转移、企业价值变动与大股东的作用
|
摘要
从古典企业到现代企业,大股东一直在企业中扮演着重要的角色,并且这些角色一直成为人们分析大股东对企业产生特殊作用的理论落脚点,包括大股东对经营者的监督、对企业融资的重要性、对企业交易中的信用提升等。但同时Fama and Jensen (1983)、DeAngelo (1985)通过实证研究发现,在现代企业中,大股东总能获得比一般股东更多的收益,Grossman and Hart(1988)之后正式将这种收益称为大股东控制权私有收益。从此人们对大股东的存在原因和所起作用有了新的看法,即一些投资者之所以想成为大股东,重要原因之一就是获取大股东控制权及控制权私有收益,且这种行为还导致企业内部大股东与小股东之间利益分配的差异和企业经营内容方面的变化。也正因为大股东在企业中的特殊作用和特殊利益,投资者之间经常展开对企业大股东控制权的争夺,并形成了大股东控制权买卖市场,现实中的企业并购很多在实质上就是争夺企业大股东控制权的问题。本文就分析大股东及大股东控制权私有收益对大股东控制权市场的影响和对控制权转移前后企业价值变化的作用。
企业大股东总体上可分为两类：控股大股东和非控股大股东。在大股东控制权买卖市场上,当某一控制权购买者出现时,目标企业的这两类大股东的反应是不一样的,两类大股东与小股东之间的博弈关系也是不一样的。本文的分析发现,对于存在控股大股东的目标企业来说,由于任何控制权购买者要想购买目标企业大股东控制权,都必须与目标企业的控股大股东交易,因此,目标企业的大股东有着绝对的发言权,并可以忽略小股东的行为。从而控股大股东的持股多少、单位股权获取的控制权私有收益多少,直接决定控制权买卖定价,也导致只有满足控股大股东控制权私有收益的控制权购买者才能购买到大股东控制权。而对于存在非控股大股东的目标企业来说,由于控制权购买者可以从目标企业分散的小股东那里购买到控股额从而获得大股东控制权,所以就对目标企业非控股大股东构成威胁,结果这类大股东在买卖交易中会时时考虑到小股东的行为,并采取相应的策略。本文的分析发现,在这种情况下,当小股东卖出股权时,这类大股东一定卖出股权,而且是卖出全部股权；当小股东不卖出股权时,这类大股东只在购买者满足其控制权私有收益以上的价格水平才可能卖出股权。正是这样一种博弈关系,使得在要约收购机制下,凡是能增加小股东股权收益的控制权购买者都能成功。不过非控股大股东的存在也提高了控制权购买者的购买成本,提高的方式主要是通过迫使控制权购买者购买更多的股权,当然在控制权购买者给小股东股权带来的价值增加较大时,非控股大股东也提高购买者的购买价格。
然后文中还对不存在大股东的企业控制权卖出定价进行了对比分析,对比结果发现,大股东的存在都提高了企业大股东控制权买卖定价。不过,非控股大股东的存在提高控制权买卖定价的同时,具有与不存在大股东的企业一样的市场交易效率,而且这两种情况都比存在控股大股东的企业的控制权交易效率高。另外,非控股大股东的存在还减少了控制权购买者的控制权私有收益,增加了控制权转移后小股东的股权价值。因此非控股大股东的存在相比之下更有利于目标企业的利益。
大股东控制权买卖定价也决定了只有满足定价要求的控制权购买者才能购买到企业控制权,这就给购买者给企业价值带来的变动限制的了底线。只要是要约收购,首先,任何成功的控制权转移都不会降低目标企业的股权收益；其次,在存在控股大股东的情况下,目标企业的股权收益在控制权转移以后一定增加,再次,如果是目标企业的原有股东购买本企业的大股东控制权,其给企业带来的价值增加比外来购买者更大,原因是股权溢价收益促使本企业的购买者更有积极性研究增进企业效益的技术。
最后文中分析了股权结构对建设有效的大股东控制权市场的含义。由于控股大股东降低了市场交易效率,而非控股大股东不损害交易效率,所以非控股大股东的存在更有利于大股东控制权市场,而且相对于股权完全分散企业,还能减少经济中的大股东控制权私有收益。通常非控股大股东持股比率越大,单位股权控制权私有收益越少,对市场的作用效果越好。
In both classical and modern business enterprises, large shareholders always play important roles that are the bases on which people analyze blockholders'special function in business enterprises in theory, the roles include the blockholder's supervision of the operator, the importance in corporate finance, the credit enhancement in corporate transactions and so on. However the empirical studies by Fama and Jensen (1983) and DeAngelo (1985) indicated that in the modern enterprise, the large shareholder could always get more than the average shareholders, Grossman and Hart(1988) formally called it large shareholder private benefits of control of corporation. From then, people have new views on the the presence and the role of large shareholders in enterprise, that is, one of the important reasons why some investors would like to become the major shareholders is that they want to get control of the corporation and get private benefits of control, and this behavior also lead to changes of business content and the difference between the major shareholder and the average shareholders in the distribution of interests. Just for the special role and interests, investors often fight for the major shareholders'control of the corporation so that the trading market of large shareholder control of corporation appears. In reality, the essence of many M&A is competition for large shareholder control right of corporation. The artical analyzes just the effect of the large shareholders and the private benefits of control on the market of large shareholder control of corporation and the change of corporate value from the transfer of control.
Blockholders include controlling and non-controlling blockholders. In the market of large shareholder control of corporation. these two types of blockholders have different responses to the purchaser who wants to buy large shareholder control right of corporation, and they have different games with average shareholders too. The article finds that, for the target company with controlling blockholder, since any purchaser who wants to buy the large shareholder control right has to transact with controlling blockholder, the controlling blockholder of target company has the absolute right to speak and can ignore the behaviors of average shareholders so that the number of shares owned by the controlling blockholder and the number of large shareholder's private benefits from every share will determine directly the sale price of large shareholder control right, this leads to only those purchasers who meet the controlling blockholder's private benefits of control to be able to gain the large shareholder control right. For the target company with non-controlling blockholder, while the purchaser can get the large shareholder control right by gaining controlling shares from those scattered average shareholders of target company, this poses a threat to the non-controlling blockholder, as a result, the non-controlling blockholder has to always take into account the behaviors of average shareholders and take appropriate strategies in the sale of large shareholder control right. The artical finds that, in this case, when the average shareholders sell their shares, the non-controlling blockholder sells all his shares too, and when the average shareholders do not sell their shares, the non-controlling blockholder sells his shares only if sale price is above the price which meets his private benefits of control. this game makes any purchasers who increase average shareholders' equity return can succeed in tender offer. However, the existence of non-controlling shareholder also increases purchaser's acquisition cost through forcing purchaser to buy more shares or raising the price when the purchasers can bring about more return on equity to average shareholders.
As a comparison, The artical also analyzes the pricing of large shareholder control right of the corporation without blackholder and find that the presence of both large shareholders raises the sale price of shares. However, the presence of non-controlling blockholder does not reduce the trading possibility of corporate control while it raises the sale price of shares, and the presence of controlling blockholder reduces the trading possibility of corporate control while it raises the sale price of shares. In addition, the presence of non-controlling blockholder also reduces perchaser's large shareholder private benefits and raises average shareholders'equity value after transfer of corporate control. Therefore, the presence of non-controlling blockholder is relatively more benificial to target corporation.
The pricing of large shareholder control rihgt means meantime that only those purchasers who meet the trading price can gain the large shareholder control of corporation, this sets the bottom line of which any buyer must bring change of equity value to target corporation. For a tender offer, first, any successful transfer of control of corporation will not reduce the target corporation's return on equity; Second, the presence of controlling blockholder certainly bring equity earnings to the target corporation after the transfer of control; Third, if the buyer is an average shareholder of target corporation. he will bring more equity earnings to the target corporation than an outside buyer with the average shareholder's equity premium promoting him to more actively research technology to improve the efficiency of target corporation.
Finally, The artical analyzes the the meanings of ownership structure for the building an effective trading market of large shareholder control of corporation. Because the presence of controlling blockolder reduces the trading possibility of corporate control while the presence of non-controlling blockholder does not reduce the possibility with reducing the large shareholder's private benefits of control in the economy, the presence of non-controlling blockholder is more favorable to trading market of large shareholder control right of corporation. Generally, the more shares non-controlling and the less private benefit of control per share blockholder holds, the better effect the presence of non-controlling large shareholder has on the traing market of large shareholder control.
企业大股东总体上可分为两类：控股大股东和非控股大股东。在大股东控制权买卖市场上,当某一控制权购买者出现时,目标企业的这两类大股东的反应是不一样的,两类大股东与小股东之间的博弈关系也是不一样的。本文的分析发现,对于存在控股大股东的目标企业来说,由于任何控制权购买者要想购买目标企业大股东控制权,都必须与目标企业的控股大股东交易,因此,目标企业的大股东有着绝对的发言权,并可以忽略小股东的行为。从而控股大股东的持股多少、单位股权获取的控制权私有收益多少,直接决定控制权买卖定价,也导致只有满足控股大股东控制权私有收益的控制权购买者才能购买到大股东控制权。而对于存在非控股大股东的目标企业来说,由于控制权购买者可以从目标企业分散的小股东那里购买到控股额从而获得大股东控制权,所以就对目标企业非控股大股东构成威胁,结果这类大股东在买卖交易中会时时考虑到小股东的行为,并采取相应的策略。本文的分析发现,在这种情况下,当小股东卖出股权时,这类大股东一定卖出股权,而且是卖出全部股权；当小股东不卖出股权时,这类大股东只在购买者满足其控制权私有收益以上的价格水平才可能卖出股权。正是这样一种博弈关系,使得在要约收购机制下,凡是能增加小股东股权收益的控制权购买者都能成功。不过非控股大股东的存在也提高了控制权购买者的购买成本,提高的方式主要是通过迫使控制权购买者购买更多的股权,当然在控制权购买者给小股东股权带来的价值增加较大时,非控股大股东也提高购买者的购买价格。
然后文中还对不存在大股东的企业控制权卖出定价进行了对比分析,对比结果发现,大股东的存在都提高了企业大股东控制权买卖定价。不过,非控股大股东的存在提高控制权买卖定价的同时,具有与不存在大股东的企业一样的市场交易效率,而且这两种情况都比存在控股大股东的企业的控制权交易效率高。另外,非控股大股东的存在还减少了控制权购买者的控制权私有收益,增加了控制权转移后小股东的股权价值。因此非控股大股东的存在相比之下更有利于目标企业的利益。
大股东控制权买卖定价也决定了只有满足定价要求的控制权购买者才能购买到企业控制权,这就给购买者给企业价值带来的变动限制的了底线。只要是要约收购,首先,任何成功的控制权转移都不会降低目标企业的股权收益；其次,在存在控股大股东的情况下,目标企业的股权收益在控制权转移以后一定增加,再次,如果是目标企业的原有股东购买本企业的大股东控制权,其给企业带来的价值增加比外来购买者更大,原因是股权溢价收益促使本企业的购买者更有积极性研究增进企业效益的技术。
最后文中分析了股权结构对建设有效的大股东控制权市场的含义。由于控股大股东降低了市场交易效率,而非控股大股东不损害交易效率,所以非控股大股东的存在更有利于大股东控制权市场,而且相对于股权完全分散企业,还能减少经济中的大股东控制权私有收益。通常非控股大股东持股比率越大,单位股权控制权私有收益越少,对市场的作用效果越好。
In both classical and modern business enterprises, large shareholders always play important roles that are the bases on which people analyze blockholders'special function in business enterprises in theory, the roles include the blockholder's supervision of the operator, the importance in corporate finance, the credit enhancement in corporate transactions and so on. However the empirical studies by Fama and Jensen (1983) and DeAngelo (1985) indicated that in the modern enterprise, the large shareholder could always get more than the average shareholders, Grossman and Hart(1988) formally called it large shareholder private benefits of control of corporation. From then, people have new views on the the presence and the role of large shareholders in enterprise, that is, one of the important reasons why some investors would like to become the major shareholders is that they want to get control of the corporation and get private benefits of control, and this behavior also lead to changes of business content and the difference between the major shareholder and the average shareholders in the distribution of interests. Just for the special role and interests, investors often fight for the major shareholders'control of the corporation so that the trading market of large shareholder control of corporation appears. In reality, the essence of many M&A is competition for large shareholder control right of corporation. The artical analyzes just the effect of the large shareholders and the private benefits of control on the market of large shareholder control of corporation and the change of corporate value from the transfer of control.
Blockholders include controlling and non-controlling blockholders. In the market of large shareholder control of corporation. these two types of blockholders have different responses to the purchaser who wants to buy large shareholder control right of corporation, and they have different games with average shareholders too. The article finds that, for the target company with controlling blockholder, since any purchaser who wants to buy the large shareholder control right has to transact with controlling blockholder, the controlling blockholder of target company has the absolute right to speak and can ignore the behaviors of average shareholders so that the number of shares owned by the controlling blockholder and the number of large shareholder's private benefits from every share will determine directly the sale price of large shareholder control right, this leads to only those purchasers who meet the controlling blockholder's private benefits of control to be able to gain the large shareholder control right. For the target company with non-controlling blockholder, while the purchaser can get the large shareholder control right by gaining controlling shares from those scattered average shareholders of target company, this poses a threat to the non-controlling blockholder, as a result, the non-controlling blockholder has to always take into account the behaviors of average shareholders and take appropriate strategies in the sale of large shareholder control right. The artical finds that, in this case, when the average shareholders sell their shares, the non-controlling blockholder sells all his shares too, and when the average shareholders do not sell their shares, the non-controlling blockholder sells his shares only if sale price is above the price which meets his private benefits of control. this game makes any purchasers who increase average shareholders' equity return can succeed in tender offer. However, the existence of non-controlling shareholder also increases purchaser's acquisition cost through forcing purchaser to buy more shares or raising the price when the purchasers can bring about more return on equity to average shareholders.
As a comparison, The artical also analyzes the pricing of large shareholder control right of the corporation without blackholder and find that the presence of both large shareholders raises the sale price of shares. However, the presence of non-controlling blockholder does not reduce the trading possibility of corporate control while it raises the sale price of shares, and the presence of controlling blockholder reduces the trading possibility of corporate control while it raises the sale price of shares. In addition, the presence of non-controlling blockholder also reduces perchaser's large shareholder private benefits and raises average shareholders'equity value after transfer of corporate control. Therefore, the presence of non-controlling blockholder is relatively more benificial to target corporation.
The pricing of large shareholder control rihgt means meantime that only those purchasers who meet the trading price can gain the large shareholder control of corporation, this sets the bottom line of which any buyer must bring change of equity value to target corporation. For a tender offer, first, any successful transfer of control of corporation will not reduce the target corporation's return on equity; Second, the presence of controlling blockholder certainly bring equity earnings to the target corporation after the transfer of control; Third, if the buyer is an average shareholder of target corporation. he will bring more equity earnings to the target corporation than an outside buyer with the average shareholder's equity premium promoting him to more actively research technology to improve the efficiency of target corporation.
Finally, The artical analyzes the the meanings of ownership structure for the building an effective trading market of large shareholder control of corporation. Because the presence of controlling blockolder reduces the trading possibility of corporate control while the presence of non-controlling blockholder does not reduce the possibility with reducing the large shareholder's private benefits of control in the economy, the presence of non-controlling blockholder is more favorable to trading market of large shareholder control right of corporation. Generally, the more shares non-controlling and the less private benefit of control per share blockholder holds, the better effect the presence of non-controlling large shareholder has on the traing market of large shareholder control.
引文
[1]Agrawal Anup, Jeffrey F. Jaffe, and Gershon N.Mandelker. the post-merger performance of acquiring firms:A Re-examination of an Anomaly[J], Journal of Finance 1992,47(4):1605-1621.
[2]Agrawal, Anup, Knoeber, Charles R. Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders[J], Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1996,31 (9):377-397.
[3]Alchian, Armen A., Demsetz, Harold. Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization[J], American Economic Review,1972,60(50),577-795.
[4]Barber, Brad M. and John D.Lyon. Detecting Long-Run Abnormal Stock Returns:The Empirical Power and Specification of Test Statistics[J], Journal of Financial Economics, 1997,43(3):341-372.
[7]Barclay, Michael J. and Clifford G. Holderness. Private Benefits from Control of Public Corporations [J], Financial Economics,1989,25(2):371-396.
[5]Baron D P. Tender Offers and Management Resistance [J], Journal of Finance,1983,38(2):331-343.
[6]Bebchuk, Lucian. Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control[J], Quarterly Journal of Economics 1994,109(4):957-994.
[7]Berkovitch,E.,and M.P.Narayanan,Competition and the Medium of Exchange in Takeovers,Review of Financial Studies,1990,3(2):153-174.
[8]Berle, A, and Means, G.,The modern corporation and private property[M], ⅰⅹ-ⅴⅹ, Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press,1932.
[9]Bonnier, K.A, and Bruner R.F. An analysis of stock price reaction to management change in distressed firms[J], Journal of Accounting and Economics,1989, 11(1):95-106.
[10]Boyd,B. CEO Duality and Firm Performance, A Contingency Model[J], Strategic Management Journal,1995,16(4):301-312.
[11]Bradley, Michael. Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control[J], Business,1980,53(4):345-376.
[12]Bradley, Michael and Gregg A. Jarrell. Comment[C], in John C. Coffee, Louis Lowenstein, Jr. and Susan Rose-Ackerman, editors, Knights, Raiders and Targets:The Impact of the Hostile Takeover, New York:Oxford University Press,1988,1-59.
[13]Bradley Michael. Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control[J], Journal of Business,1980,53(4):345-376.
[14]Bradley, Michael, Desai, Anand and Kim, E.Han. The Rationale Behind Interfirm Tender Offers, Information or Synergy[J], Journal of Financial Economics, 1983,11(4):183-206.
[15]Bukart, M.Gromb, D., and Panunzi, F. Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and Fiduciary Duty[J], Quarterly Journal of Economics 1997,112(3):693-728.
[16]Burkart, Mike, Denis Gromb, and Fausto Panunzi. Why Higher Takover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders[J], Journal of Political Economy 1998,106(1):172-204.
[17]Byrd, J.w.and K.A.Hichman. Do Outside Directors Monitor Managers? [J], Journal of Financial Economics,1992,32(2):122-152.
[18]Chen, Charles J. and P.Bikki Jaggi. Association between Independent Non-executive Directors, Family Control and Financial Disclosures in the Hong Kong[J] Journal of Accounting and Public Polio,2000,19 (4):36-57.
[19]Chen,Kevin C.W.,and Hong-Qi. Earning Management and Capital Resource Allocation, Evidemce from China's Accounting-based Regulation of rights Issue[R], Working Paper, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology,2000,1-21.
[20]Claessens, S.,Djankov, S. The Speparation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations [J], Journal of Financial Economics 2000,58(2):81-112.
[21]Clessens, Stijin. Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, Evidence from the Czech and Slovak Repulics[J] Journal of Finance,1997,51(4):1641-1658.
[22]Clifford Holderness and Dennis Sheehan. Constraints on large-block shareholders[R], NBER wording paper,1998,1-25.
[23]Coase, Ronald. The Firm, the Market, and the Law[M],Chicago, Univ, of Chicago Press,1960,1-65.
[24]Coffe, John C.Jr. The Future as History, the Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications[J], Northwestern Law Review, 1999,93(3):631-707.
[25]Coles, Jeffrey L.James A.Brickley, and Rory L.Terry. Qutside Directors and the Adoption of Posion Pills[J], Journal of Financial Economics,1994,35(2):52-78.
[26]Cotter, James Rand Zenner, Marc. How Managerial Wealth Affects the Tender Offer Process[J], Financial Economics,1994,35(1):63-97.
[27]Coughlan, A.T.and Schmidt, R.,M. Executive Compensation, Managerial Turnover, and Firm Performance, an Empirical Investigation[J], Accounting and Economics, 1985,7(4):43-66.
[28]Dann, Larry Y.and DeAngelom, Harry. Proxy Contests and the Governance of Publicly-held Corporations[J], Financial Economics,1989,23(1):29-60.
[29]Dann, Larry Y.and DeAngelo, Harry. Standstill Agreements, Privately Negotiated Stock Repurchases, and the Market for Corporate Control[J], Financial Economics, 1983,11(4):275-300.
[30]David J. Denis, and Jan M. Serrano. Active investors and management turnover following unsuccessful control contests, Journal of Financial Economics,1996,40(2): 239-266.
[31]Dawn, Helfat. CEO Duality, Succession, Capabilities and Agency Theory[J], Commentary and Research Agenda, Strategic Managment Journal,1998,19(9):901-904.
[32]De Angelo, Harry and Linda De Angelo. Managerial Ownership of Vothing Rights, a Study of Public Corporation with Dual Classes of Common Stock[J], Journal of Financial Economics,1985,14(1):89-110.
[33]DeAngelo, Linda. Equity Valuation and Corporate Control [J], The Accounting Review,1990,65(1):93-112.
[34]DeAngelo, H.and Linda, E. The Role of Proxy Contests in the Governance of Publicly-held Corporations [J], Journal of Financial Economics,1989,23(1):29-59.
[35]DeAnGELO, Linda, E. Managerial Competition, Information Costs, and Corporate Governance:The Use of Accounting Performance Measures in Proxy Contests, Journal of Accunting and conomics[J],1988,10(1):3-36.
[36]DeFond, M.L.,Park, C.W. The effect of competition on CEO turnover[J], Accounting And Economics, 1999,27(1):33-56.
[37]Demsetz, Harold, Kenneth Lehn. The Structure of Corporate Ownership, Causes and Consequences[J], Journal of Political Economy,1985,93(6):1155-1177.
[38]Dennis C. Mueller. A Theory of Conglomerate Mergers[J], The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1969,83(4):643-59
[39]Denis, D.J.,Denis, D.K., Sarin, A. Ownership Structure and Top Executive turnover[J], Financial Economics,1997,45(2):193-221.
[40]Denis, David J. Defensive Adjustments in Corporate Payout Policy, Share Repurchases and Special Dividends[J], Finance,1990,50(5):1029-1057.
[41]Denis, D.J., Denis, D.K. Performance Changes Following Top Management Dismissals[J], Jurnal of Finance,1995,50(4):65-86.
[42]Dodd, Peter and Warner, Jerold B. On corporate governance:A study of proxy contests[J], Financial Economics,1983,11(4):401-438.
[43]Dodd, P. Merger Proposals, Management Discretion and Stockholder Wealth[J], Joural of Financial Economics,1980,8(2):105-137/
[44]Dyck, A., and Zingzles, Luigi. Private Benefits of Control, An International Comparison[R], Working paper,2001,1-32.
[45]Easterbrook, Frank and Fischel, Daniel. Voting in Corporate Law[J], Journal of Law and Economics,1983,26(7):395-412.
[46]Eckbo, B.E. Horizontal mergers, collusion, and stockholder wealth[J], Journal of Financial Economics 1983,11,(1):241-273.
[47]Edith Shwalb Hotchkiss. Post Bankruptcy Performance and Management Turnover[J], Journal of Finance,1995,50(1):3-21.
[48]Fama Eugene F., Fisher Lawrence, Jensen Michael, ETAL. The Adjustment of Stock Prices to new Information[J], International Economic Review,1969,10(2):1-21.
[49]Fama, E.F., Jensen, M,C. Separation of Ownership and Control[J], Journal of Law and Economics,1983,26(6):301-325.
[50]Fama, Eugene. Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm[J], Political Economy, 1980,88(2):288-307.
[51]Fama, E.F. and Jensen, Michael C. Agency Problems and Residual Claims[J], Journal of Law and Economics,1983,26(6):327-349.
[52]Fama, Eugence F. Efficient Capital Markets:A Review of Theory and Empirical Work[J], Journal of Finance,1970,25(11):383-417.
[53]Fama, Eugene F., and James MacBeth. Risk, Return, and Equilibrium:Empirical Tests[J], Journal of Political Economy,1973,81(3):607-636.
[54]Fama, Eugene F. Market Efficiency, Long-term Returns, and Behavioral Finance[J], Journal of Financial Economics,1998,49(3):283-306.
[55]Fama, Eugene F.and Kenneth R. French, The Cross Section of Expected Stock Returns[J], Journal of Finance,1992,46(2):427-465.
[56]Fisherman M J. A Theory of Preemptive Takeover Bidding, The Rand Journal of Economics,1988,19(1):88-101.
[57]Fanta, E.and M.Jensen. Agency Problems and Residual Claims[J], Journal of Law and Economies,1983,26(6):123-146.
[58]Furtado, E.P. and M.S.Rozeff. The Wealth Effects of Company Initiated Management Changes[J], Journal of Financial Economics,1987,18(1):147-160.
[59]Giammarino R M and R L Heinkel, A Model of Dynamic Takeover Behaveior, Journal of Finance,1986,41 (3):465-480.
[60]Gibbons, Murphy. Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers[J], Industrial and Labor Relations Review,1990,43(2):30-51.
[61]Gillan, Stuart and Starks, Laura T. Relationship Investing and Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors[R], Working Paper (University of Texas, Austrin, TX),1995,1-32.
[62]Gilson, S.A. Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders, Evidence on Changes in Corporate Ownership and Control when Firms Default[J], Financial Economics, 1990,27(2):355-387.
[63]Gilson, S.C. Management Turnover and Financial Distress[J], Journal of Financial Economics,1989,25(2):241-262.
[64]Gort, Michael. An Economic Disturbance Theory of Mergers[J], Quarterly Journal of Economics,1969,83(4):624-642.
[65]Ghosh, D. Efficiency Considerations in the Additive Hazards Model with Current Status Data[J], Netherlands Society for Statistics and Operations Research,2001,55(3): 367-376.
[66]Goyal, V.K. and Park, C.W. Board Leadership structure and CEO turnover, Corporate Finance[R], Sungkyunkwan Unviversity,2001,76-89.
[67]Gregor Andrade, Mark Mitchell, and Erik Stafford. New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers[J], Journal of Economic Perspectives,2001,15(2):103-120.
[68]Grossman, S.J.and O.Hart. One Share-One Vote and the Market of Corporate Control[J], Financial Economics,1988,20(1):175-202.
[69]Grossman, Sanford J.and Hart, Oliver D. Takeover Bids, the Free-rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation[J], Bell Journal of Economics,1980,11(1):42-64.
[70]Grossman, Sanford, and Oliver Hart. The Costs and the Benefits of Ownership, Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration[J], Political Economy,1986,94(4):691-719.
[71]Hakes, David R., Kenneth H. Brown, and Allen Rappaport. The Impact of State Deposit Caps on Bank Merger. Premiums[J], Southern Economic Journal,63 (3): 652-662.
[72]Harris, M.and A.Raviv. Corporate Control Contest and Capital Structure[J], Financial Economics,1988,20(1)55-86.
[73]Harris, M.and A.Raviv. Corporate Governance, Voting Right and Majority Rules", Financial Economics,1988,20(1):203-235.
[74]Hart, Liver. Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure[M], London, Oxford University Press,1995,1-56.
[75]Hart, Oliver, and Moor, John. Property Right and the Nature of the Firm[J], Political Economy,1990,98(6):1119-1158.
[76]Hart, Oliver. The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme[J], Bell Journal of Economics,1983,14(2):366-382.
[77]Hasbrouck, Joel. The Characteristics of Takeover Targets, and Other Measures[J], Banking and Finance,1985,9(3):351-362.
[78]Healy, Paul M., Krishna G. Palepu and Richard S.Ruback. Dose Corporate Performance Improve after Mergers[J], Jounal of Finance Economics, 1992,31(2):135-175.
[79]Henrik Horn and James Levinsohn. Merger Policies and Trade Liberalization[J], The Economic Journal,2001,111 (4):244-276.
[80]Hermalin, Benjamin E.,and Michael S., Weisbach. Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and their Monitoring of the CEO[J], American Economic Review, 1998,88(1):96-118.
[81]Hirshleifer D and I P L P'ng. Facilication of Competing Bids and the Price of a Takeover Target, Review of Financial Studies[J],1990,2(4):587-606.
[81]Hirshleifer D and S Titman,Share Tendering strategies and the Success of Hostile Takeover Bids[J] Journal of Political Economy,1990,98(5):295-324.
[82]Hirshleifer, David and Thakor, Anjan V. Managerial Performance, Board of Directors and Takeover Bidding[J], Corporate Finance,1994,1(1):63-90.
[83]Holderness, Clifford, and Dennis Sheehan. The Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations, An Exploratory Analysis[J], Journal of Financial Economics, 1988,20(1):317-346.
[84]Holmstrom, B., and J.Tirole. Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and the Real Sector[J], Quarterly Journal of Economics,1998,112(3):663-691.
[85]Holmstrom, B. Moral Hazard in Team[J], Bell Journal of Economics, 1982,13(2):324-340.
[87]Ikenberry, David and Josef Lakonishok. Corporate Governance through the Proxy Contest, Evidence and Implications[J], Journal of Business,1993,66(3):405-436.
[88]Israel, R. Capital Structure and the Market for Corporate Control, The Defensive Role of Debt Financing[J], Finance,1991,46(4):1391-1409.
[89]Jahera, J.S. and W.Pugh. State Takeover Legislation:The Case of Delaware[J], Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization,1991,7(2):410-427.
[90]Jarrell, Gregg and Poulsen, Annette B. Shark Repellants and Stock Prices, The effects of antitakeover amendments since 1980[J], Financial Economics, 1987,19(1):127-168.
[91]Jarrell, Gregg and Poulsen, Annette B. Dual-class Recapitalizations as Antitakeover Mechanisms, The Recent Evidence[J], Financial Economics,1988,20(1):129-152.
[92]Jarrell, G.A. and M.Bradley. The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulations of Cash Tender[J], Journal of Law and Economics,1980,23(2):371-407.
[93]Jarrell, G.A., Poulsen, A. The returns to acquiring firms in tender offers:Evidence from three decades[J], Financial Management,1989,18(3):12-19.
[94]Jarrell, Gregg A., James A.Brickley and Jeffrey M.Netter. The Market for Corporate Control:The Empirical Evidence Since 1980[J], Journal of Economic Perspective, 1988,2(1):49-68.
[95]Jean Tirole. Corporate Governance[J], Econometrica,2001,69(1):1-35.
[96]Jegadeesh N and B Chowdhry. Optimal Pre-tender Offer Share Acquisition Strategy in Takeovers[R], UCLA Anderson Graduate School of Management,Working Paper,1988.
[97]Jensen, M.C., Murphy, K.J. Performance pay and top management incentives[J], Journal of Political Economy,1990,98(2):225-264.
[98]Jesen, Michael C. The Takeover Controversy, Analysis and Evidence[J], Midland Corporate Finance Journal,1986,4(2):6-32.
[99]Jesen, Michael C. Takeover, Folklore and Science[J], Harvard Business Review, 1984,62(6):106-121.
[100]Jesen, Michael, and William Meckling. Theory of the Firm, Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure[J], Journal of Financial Economics, 1976,3(4):305-360.
[101]Jensen, Michael C. Takeover:Their Causes and Consequences [J], Journal of Economic Perspectives,1988,2(1):21-48.
[102]Jensen, Michael C. Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, Takeovers[J], American Economic Review,1986,76(2):323-329.
[103]Jensen, Michael C. and Richard S. Ruback. The Market for Corpotate Control:The Scientific[J], Journal of Financial Economics,1983,11(5):5-50.
[104]Jones, G.R. and C.W.L. Hill. Transaction Cost Analysis of Strategy-Structure Choice[J],Strategic Management Journal,1988,9(2):159-172.
[105]John, K. and Senbet, L.M. Corporate Governance and Board Effectiveness[J], Banking and Finance,1998,22(4):371-403.
[106]Kaplan, S.N. Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance, A Comparison of Japan and the United States[J], Political Economy,1994,102(3):510-546.
[107]Kaplan, S.N. Top Executives, Turnover, and Firm Performance in Germany[J], Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,1994b,10(1):142-159.
[108]Kaplan, Steven N. and Bernadette A.Minton. Appointments of Outsiders to Japanese Boards Determinants and Implications for Managers[J], Journal of Financial Economics,1994,36(2):65-89.
[109]Kevin J.Murphy arrd Jerold L. Zimmerman. Financial Performance Surrounding CEO Turnover[J], Journal of Accounting and Economics,1993,16(1):273-315.
[110]Klein, April and Rosenfeld, Jams. Targeted Share Requrchases and Top Management Changes[J], Financial Economics,1988,20(1):493-506.
[111]Knoeber, C.R. Golden Parachutes, Shark Repullents, and Hostile Tender Offers[J], American Economic Review,1986,76(1):155-167.
[112]Kreps, D., R.Wilson. Sequential Equilibrium[J], Econometrica,1982,50(4):863-894.
[113]La Porta, Refael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Sheifer, Robert W.Vishny. Legal Determinants of External Finance[J], Finance,1997,52(3):1131-1150.
[114]La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Sheifer, Robert W.Vishny. Law and Finance[J], Political Economy,1998,106(6):1113-1155.
[115]La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Sheifer, Robert W.Vishny. Investor Protection and corporate Valuation[R], Harvard Institute for Economics Research, Discussion Paper 1882,1999,1-25.
[116]La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Sheifer. Corporate Ovnership Around the World[R], BNER, Working Paper 6625,1998,1-33.
[117]Lakonishok, Josef, Andrei Shliefer and Robert Vishny. Contrarian Investment, Extrapolation, and Rish[J], Journal of Finance,1994,49(5):1541-1578.
[118]Levine, Ross, and Sara Zervos. Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic, Growth[J], American Economic Review,1998,88(3):537-558.
[119]Levy, Harm. Economic Valuation of Voting Power of Common Stock[J], Journal of Finance,1983,38(3):79-93.
[120]Linn S.C., Switzer J.A. Are cash acquisitions associated with better postcombination operating performance than stock acquisitions? [J], Journal of Banking and Finance,2001,25(6):1113-1138.
[121]Malatesta, Paul H., and Walking, Ralph A. Poison Pill Securities, Stockholder Wealth Profitability, and Ownership Structure[J], Journal of Financial Economics, 1988,20(1):347-376.
[122]Manne, Henry G. Mergers and the Market for Corpporate Control[J]" Journal of Political Economy,1965,73(2):110-120.
[123]Martin, K.J., MeConnell, J. Corporate Performance Corporate Takeovers, and Management Turnover[J], Journal of Finance,1991,46(2):671-687.
[124]McConnell, John and Henri Servaes. Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value[J], Financial Economics,1990,27(2):595-612.
[125]McConnell, John and Chirs Muscarella. Corporate Capital Expenditure Decisions and Market Value of the Firm[J], Journal of Financial Economics,1985,14(3):399-422.
[126]Mcguckin, Robert H. and Sang V.Nguyen. The Impact of Ownership Changes, A View from Labor Markets[J], International Journal of industrial Organization, 2001,19(5):739-762.
[127]Michael C Jensen.Clifford W Smith. The Theory of Corporate Finance:A History Overview[C], the Modern Theory of Corporate Finance, New York:Mc Graw-Hill Inc.,1984,2-20.
[128]Mike Burkart,Denis Gromb,and Fausto Panunzi. Minority Blocks and Takeover Premia[J] Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,2006,162(3):32-49.
[129]Mikkelson, W.H. and Partch, M.M. The Decline of Takeovers and Disciplinary Managerial Takeovers and Disciplinary Managerial Turnover[J], Financial Economics, 1997,44(2):205-228.
[130]Mikkelson, Wayne H.and Partch, Megan M. The Decline of Takeovers and Disciplinary Managrial Turnover[R], Working paper, University of Oregon, Eugene, 1995,1-27.
[131]Milgrom, P., and J.Roberts. Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information, An Equilibrium Analysis[J], Economica,1982,50(2):433-459.
[132]Milgrom, P., and J.Roberts. Economics,Organization and Management[M], Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Pretice Hall,1992,1-56.
[133]Mitchell, Mark I., and J.Harold Mulherin. The Impact of Industry Shicks on Takeover and Restructuring Activity[J], Journal of Financial Economics, 1996,41(2):193-229.
[134]Modigliani, F.m and Miller, M. The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Investment[J], American Economic Review,1958,48(3):261-297.
[135]Morck, Pandall, Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert W. Characteristics of Hostile and Friendly Takeover Targets [C], Corporate Takeovers:Causes and Consequences,National Bureau of Economic Research,Inc,1988,101-136.
[136]Morck, R., Shleifer A. and Vishny R.W. Ownership Structure and Cambridge Performance, An Empirical Analysis[R], Miemographed, Cambridge, Mass., NBER.1985,1-22.
[137]Morck, R.,Shleifer, A., and Vishny R.W. Alternative Mechanism for Corporate Control[J], American Economic Review,1989,79(4):842-852.
[138]Morck, Randall, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W., Vishny. Comparing Acquisitions and Divestitures[J], Journal of Corporate Finance,2000,6(2):117-139.
[139]Murphy, K., and J.Zimmerman. Financial Performance Surrounding CEO Turnover[J], Accounting and Economics,1993,16(1):67-85.
[140]Myeong-Hyeon Cho. Ownership Structure, Investment, and the Corporate Value, An Empirical Analysis[J], Financial Economics,1998,47(1):103-121.
[141]Niden, C. M. An empirical examination of white knight corporate takeovers: synergy and overbidding[J], Financial Management,1993,22(4):28-45
[142]Palepu, Krishna. Predicting Takeover Targets, a Methodological and Empirical Analysis[J], Accounting and Economics,1986,8(1):3-35.
[143]Parrino. CEO Turnover and Outside Succession a Cross Sectional Analysis[J], Financial Economics,1997,46(2):165-197.
[144]Peter Dodd and Richard Ruback. Tender offers and stockholder returns:An empirical analysis[J], Journal of Financial Economics,1977,5(3):351-373.
[145]Pound, John. Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight[J], Journal of Financial Economics,1988,20(1):237-265.
[146]Pound, John. On the Motives for Choosing a Corporate Governance Structure:A Study of Corporate Reaction to the Pennsylvania Takeover Law[J], Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization,1992,8(3):656-672.
[147]Pozen, Robert C. Institutional inverstors, The reluctant activists[J], Harvard Business Review,1994,72(1):140-149.
[148]Pugh, W.N.and J.S.Jahera, Jr. State Antitakeover Legislation and Shareholder Wealth[J], Journal of Financial Research,1990,13(3):211-231.
[149]Rajan, Raghuram, and Luigi Zingales. Financial Dependence and Growth[J], American Economic Review,1998,88(3):559-586.
[150]Raua, P. R and Vermaelen,T. Glamour, value and the post-acquisition performance of acquiring firms[J], Journal of Financial Economics,1998,49(2):223-253.
[151]Reed.R,Luffman,GA. Diversification:the growing confusion[J], Strategic Management Journal,1986,7(1):29-35.
[152]Robert Parrino. CEO Turnover and Outside Succession A Cross-Sectional Analysis[J], Journal of Financial Economics,1997,46(2):165-197.
[153]Roll, R. The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers[J], Business,1986,59(2): 197-216.
[154]Roll, R. A Critique of the Asset Pricing Theory's Tests' Part Ⅰ:On Past and Potential Testability of the Theory[J], Journal of Financial Economics,1977,4(2):129-176.
[155]Rosenstein S, and J.G.Wyatt. Outside Directors, Board Independence, and Shareholder Wealth[J], Journal of Financial Economics,1990,26(2):65-87.
[156]Ruback, R.S. The Cities Service Takeover:A Case Study[J], The Journal of Finance, 1983,38(2):319-329.
[157]Ruback, Richard S. Do Target Shareholders Lose in Unsuccessful Control Contests? [C], in Alet Auerbach, ed., Economic effects of mergers and acquisitions, University of Chicago Press (Chicago, IL),1988,1-76.
[158]Ryngaert, Michael. The Effect of Poison Pill Securities on Shareholder Wealth[J], Financial Economics,1988,20(1):377-418.
[159]Servaes, H. Tobin's q and the gains from takeovers[J], Journal of Finance,1991,46(1):409-419.
[160]Schumann, L. State Regulation of Takeovers and Shareholder Wealth:the Case of New York's 1985 Takeover Statutes[J], Rand Journal of Economics,1988,19(4):557-567.
[161]Schwert, G, William. Markup Pricing in Mergers and Acquisitions[J], Financial Economics,1996,41(2).153-192.
[162]Schwert, G,w. Hostility in Takeovers:In the Eyes of the Beholder? [J], Journal of Finance,2000,55(6):599-2640.
[163]Shleifer A. and Vishny, R.W. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control[J], Journal of Political Economy,1986,94(31):45-78.
[164]Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. A survey of Corporate Governance[J], Finance,1997, 52(2):737-783.
[165]Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert W. Value-Max-imization and the Acquisition Process[J], Economic Perspectives,1988,2(1):7-20.
[166]Sirower, M. L. The synergy trap:How companies lose the acquisition game[M], New York:Free Press.1997.
[167]Stulz, R.M. Managerial Control of Voting Rights, Financing Policies and the Market for Corporate Control[J], Financial Economics,1988,20(1):25-54.
[168]Thomsen, Steen and Torbin Pedersen. Industry and Ownership Structure[J], International Review of Law and Economics,1998,18(4):385-402.
[169]Wahal, Sunil, Keneth W.Wiles, and Mare Zenner. Who Opts Out of State Antitakeover Prtection?:The Case of Pennsylvania's SB 1310[J], Financial Management, 1995,24(3):22-39.
[170]Weston, J Fred. Mansinghka, Surendra K. Tests of the Efficiency Performance of Conglomerate Firms[J], Journal of finance,1971,26(4):919-936.
[171]Weston, J.Fred, Chung, Kwang S., and Siu, Juan A. Takeovers, Restructuring, and Corporate Governance[M], Second Edition, Prentice Hall,1998,10-18.
[172]Wilson G P. The relative information content of accruals and cash flow:combined evidence at the earning announcement and annual and report release date[J], Journal of Accounting Research,1986,24 (supplement):165-200.
[173]Zingales, Laigi, The Value of Voting Right. A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience[J], The Riview of Financial Studies,1994,7(1):125-148.
[1]安同良、张金华.中国上市公司国有股减持的行业次序[J].经济社会体制比较,2002(3)：76—84。
[2]白云霞,吴联生,徐信忠.资产收购与控制权转移对经营业绩的影响.经济研究[J],2004,(12)：35-44。
[3]毕肖辉.企业兼并的制度演化及其并存结构分析[J].中国社会科学,1998(5)：118一127。
[4]曹廷求、刘呼声.大股东治理与公司治理效率[J].改革,2003(1)：33—37。
[5]陈共、周升业、吴晓求.公司购并原理与案例[J].北京：中国财政经济出版社2000
[6]陈晓、江东.股权多元化、公司绩效与行业竞争性[J].经济研究,2000(8)：28—35。
[7]陈晓、单鑫.债务融资是否会增加上市企业的融资成本[J].经济研究,1999(9)：39—46。
[8]陈小悦、徐晓东.股权结构、企业绩效与投资者保护[J].经济研究,2001(11)：3—11。
[9]陈小悦、肖星、过小艳.配股权与上市公司利润操纵[J].经济研究,2000(1)：30-36。
[10]陈信元、原红旗.上市公司资产重组财务会计问题研究[J].会计研究,1998(10)： 1-10。
[11]陈志斌、施建军.公司治理层面的控制与所有权实位化[J].经济理论与经济管理2003(1)：48-52。
[12]陈郁.所有权、控制权与激励[M].上海：上海三联书店、上海人民出版社1997
[13]崔之元.美国二十九个州公司法变革的理论背景[J].经济研究,1996(4)：35-40。
[14]杜莹、刘立国.股权结构与公司治理效率：中国上市公司的实证分析[J].管理世界2002年(11)124-133。
[15]范从来、袁静.成长性、成熟性和衰退性产业上市公司并购绩效的实证研究[J].中国工业经济,2002(8)：65-72。
[16]费方域.控制内部人控制[J].经济研究,1996(6)31-39。
[17]冯根福、韩冰.中国上市公司股权集中度变动的实证分析[J].经济研究,2002(8)： 12-18
[18]冯根福、吴林江.我国上市公司并购绩效的实证研究[J].经济研究,2001(1)54-61。
[19]J.弗雷德·威斯通、S.郑光、胡安·A.苏.接管、重组与公司治理[J].大连：东北财经大学出版社,2000
[20]龚玉池.公司绩效与高层更换[J].经济研究,2001(10)75-82
[21]郭金林.论美国机构股东的战略转变及其公司治理原则[J].世界经济,2002(4)64-68
[22]哈特.企业、合同与财务结构[J].上海三联书店,1995
[23]哈罗德·德姆塞茨.所有权、控制与企业[M].经济科学出版社,1988
[24]何浚.上市公司治理结构的实证分析[J].经济研究,1998(5)：第50-57。
[25]胡援成.企业资本结构与效益及效率关系的实证研究[J].管理世界,2002(10)：146-147
[26]李东平.大股东控制,盈余管理和上市公司业绩滑坡[D].上海财经大学2001年博士学位论文。
[27]李有根、赵西萍、李怀祖.上市公司的董事会构成和公司绩效研究[J].中国工业经济,2001(5)：48-53
[28]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2000(3)：32-39
[29]林新.企业并购与竞争规则[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,2001
[30]刘冰.企业权力争压和企业治理[J].中国工业经济,2002(4)：89-94
[31]刘峰、魏明海.公司控制权市场问题,君安与万科之争的再探讨[J].管理世界,2001(3)：187-190
[32]刘少波.控制权收益悖论与超控制权收益[J].经济研究,2007(2)：85-96
[33]刘彤.小股东权益与公司治理绩效改善[J].经济科学,2002(2)：65-74
[34]卢文彬、朱红军.IPO公司经营业绩变动与股权结构研究[J].财经研究,2001(7)： 45-52
[35]刘文通.公司兼并收购论[M].北京：北京大学出版社,1997
[36]玛格丽特·M.布莱尔.所有权与控制：面向21世纪的公司治理探索[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,1999
[37]青木昌彦、钱颖一.转轨经济中的公司治理结构[M].北京：中国经济出版社,1995
[38]青木昌彦.比较制度分析[M].上海：上海远东出版社,2001
[39]青木昌彦、奥野正宽.经济体制的比较制度分析[M].北京：中国发展出版社,1999
[40]沈艺峰.公司控制权市场理论的现代演变(上)(下)[J].中国经济问题,2000(2)：20-35
[41]施东辉.股权结构、公司治理与绩效表现[J].世界经济,2000(12)：37-44
[42]孙永祥.所有权、融资结构与公司治理机制[J].经济研究,2001(9)：45-53
[43]孙永祥、黄祖辉.上市公司的股权结构与绩效[J].经济研究,1999(12)：23.30
[44]唐宗明、蒋位.中国上市公司大股东侵害度实证研究[J].经济研究,2002(4)：44-50
[45]吴淑琨.股权结构与公司绩效的U型关系研究[J].中国工业经济,2002(1)：80-87页。
[46]吴晓求.国有股减持修正案的设计原则、定价机制和资金运作模式[J].金融研 究,2000(2)：8-20
[47]徐晓东、陈小悦.第一大股东对公司治理、企业绩效的影响分析[J].经济研究,2003(2)：64-74
[48]杨瑞龙、周业安.企业的利益相关者理论及其应用[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2000
[49]杨瑞龙.一个关于企业所有权安排的规范分析框架及其理论含义[J].经济研究,1997(10)：12-22
[50]殷醒民.企业购并的金融经济学解释[M].上海：上海财经大学出版社,1999
[51]于东智.转轨经济中的上市公司治理[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2002
[52]张维迎.控制权损失的不可补偿性与国有企业兼并中的产权障碍[J].经济研究,1998(8)：3-14
[53]张维迎.产权安排与企业内部的权力斗争[J].经济研究,2000(5)：41-50
[54]张维迎.企业的企业家——契约理论[M].上海：上海三联书店,1995
[55]张维迎.所有权、治理结构与委托代理关系[J].经济研究,1996(10)：4-15
[56]赵山.中国上市公司高层更换实证研究[J].改革,2001(6)：29-34
[57]赵通、朱武祥.上市公司兼并收购可预测性[J].经济研究,2000(4)：19-25
[58]赵增耀.董事会的构成与其职能发挥[J].管理世界,2002(3)：125-129
[59]郑德珵、沈华珊.公司治理中的股权结构[M].广州：中山大学出版社,2002
[60]周刚、姜彦福、雷家肃、傅家骥.战略性大股东的公司治理[J].中国管理科学,2002(4)：76-78
[61]周鹏、张宏志.利益相关者间的谈判与企业治理结构[J].经济研究,2002(6)：55-62
[62]周业安.金融抑制对中国企业融资能力影响的实证分析[J].经济研究,1999(2)：13-20
[63]周其仁.“控制权回报”和“企业家控制的企业”[J].经济研究,1997(5)：31-42
[64]朱宝宪、王怡凯.1998年中国上市公司并购实践的效应分析[J].经济研究,2002(11)：20-26
[65]朱红军.大陆上市公司盈余管理分析实用税务(台湾)[J].实用税务,2000(12)：79-86
[66]朱红军.大股东变更与高级管理人员更换：经营绩效的作用[J].会计研究,2002 (9)： 31-40
[67]朱红军.大股东变更与高级管理人员更换的现状分析[J].管理世界,2002(5)：126-141
[68]朱筠笙.公司控制权转让的效率分析[J].中国工业经济,2002(8)：73-80[84]
[69]张慕濒.公司控制权市场治理效率论[M].北京：商务印书馆,2008
[70]朱武祥、宋勇.股权结构与企业价值[J].经济研究,2001(9)：66-72
[2]Agrawal, Anup, Knoeber, Charles R. Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders[J], Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1996,31 (9):377-397.
[3]Alchian, Armen A., Demsetz, Harold. Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization[J], American Economic Review,1972,60(50),577-795.
[4]Barber, Brad M. and John D.Lyon. Detecting Long-Run Abnormal Stock Returns:The Empirical Power and Specification of Test Statistics[J], Journal of Financial Economics, 1997,43(3):341-372.
[7]Barclay, Michael J. and Clifford G. Holderness. Private Benefits from Control of Public Corporations [J], Financial Economics,1989,25(2):371-396.
[5]Baron D P. Tender Offers and Management Resistance [J], Journal of Finance,1983,38(2):331-343.
[6]Bebchuk, Lucian. Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control[J], Quarterly Journal of Economics 1994,109(4):957-994.
[7]Berkovitch,E.,and M.P.Narayanan,Competition and the Medium of Exchange in Takeovers,Review of Financial Studies,1990,3(2):153-174.
[8]Berle, A, and Means, G.,The modern corporation and private property[M], ⅰⅹ-ⅴⅹ, Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press,1932.
[9]Bonnier, K.A, and Bruner R.F. An analysis of stock price reaction to management change in distressed firms[J], Journal of Accounting and Economics,1989, 11(1):95-106.
[10]Boyd,B. CEO Duality and Firm Performance, A Contingency Model[J], Strategic Management Journal,1995,16(4):301-312.
[11]Bradley, Michael. Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control[J], Business,1980,53(4):345-376.
[12]Bradley, Michael and Gregg A. Jarrell. Comment[C], in John C. Coffee, Louis Lowenstein, Jr. and Susan Rose-Ackerman, editors, Knights, Raiders and Targets:The Impact of the Hostile Takeover, New York:Oxford University Press,1988,1-59.
[13]Bradley Michael. Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control[J], Journal of Business,1980,53(4):345-376.
[14]Bradley, Michael, Desai, Anand and Kim, E.Han. The Rationale Behind Interfirm Tender Offers, Information or Synergy[J], Journal of Financial Economics, 1983,11(4):183-206.
[15]Bukart, M.Gromb, D., and Panunzi, F. Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and Fiduciary Duty[J], Quarterly Journal of Economics 1997,112(3):693-728.
[16]Burkart, Mike, Denis Gromb, and Fausto Panunzi. Why Higher Takover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders[J], Journal of Political Economy 1998,106(1):172-204.
[17]Byrd, J.w.and K.A.Hichman. Do Outside Directors Monitor Managers? [J], Journal of Financial Economics,1992,32(2):122-152.
[18]Chen, Charles J. and P.Bikki Jaggi. Association between Independent Non-executive Directors, Family Control and Financial Disclosures in the Hong Kong[J] Journal of Accounting and Public Polio,2000,19 (4):36-57.
[19]Chen,Kevin C.W.,and Hong-Qi. Earning Management and Capital Resource Allocation, Evidemce from China's Accounting-based Regulation of rights Issue[R], Working Paper, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology,2000,1-21.
[20]Claessens, S.,Djankov, S. The Speparation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations [J], Journal of Financial Economics 2000,58(2):81-112.
[21]Clessens, Stijin. Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, Evidence from the Czech and Slovak Repulics[J] Journal of Finance,1997,51(4):1641-1658.
[22]Clifford Holderness and Dennis Sheehan. Constraints on large-block shareholders[R], NBER wording paper,1998,1-25.
[23]Coase, Ronald. The Firm, the Market, and the Law[M],Chicago, Univ, of Chicago Press,1960,1-65.
[24]Coffe, John C.Jr. The Future as History, the Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications[J], Northwestern Law Review, 1999,93(3):631-707.
[25]Coles, Jeffrey L.James A.Brickley, and Rory L.Terry. Qutside Directors and the Adoption of Posion Pills[J], Journal of Financial Economics,1994,35(2):52-78.
[26]Cotter, James Rand Zenner, Marc. How Managerial Wealth Affects the Tender Offer Process[J], Financial Economics,1994,35(1):63-97.
[27]Coughlan, A.T.and Schmidt, R.,M. Executive Compensation, Managerial Turnover, and Firm Performance, an Empirical Investigation[J], Accounting and Economics, 1985,7(4):43-66.
[28]Dann, Larry Y.and DeAngelom, Harry. Proxy Contests and the Governance of Publicly-held Corporations[J], Financial Economics,1989,23(1):29-60.
[29]Dann, Larry Y.and DeAngelo, Harry. Standstill Agreements, Privately Negotiated Stock Repurchases, and the Market for Corporate Control[J], Financial Economics, 1983,11(4):275-300.
[30]David J. Denis, and Jan M. Serrano. Active investors and management turnover following unsuccessful control contests, Journal of Financial Economics,1996,40(2): 239-266.
[31]Dawn, Helfat. CEO Duality, Succession, Capabilities and Agency Theory[J], Commentary and Research Agenda, Strategic Managment Journal,1998,19(9):901-904.
[32]De Angelo, Harry and Linda De Angelo. Managerial Ownership of Vothing Rights, a Study of Public Corporation with Dual Classes of Common Stock[J], Journal of Financial Economics,1985,14(1):89-110.
[33]DeAngelo, Linda. Equity Valuation and Corporate Control [J], The Accounting Review,1990,65(1):93-112.
[34]DeAngelo, H.and Linda, E. The Role of Proxy Contests in the Governance of Publicly-held Corporations [J], Journal of Financial Economics,1989,23(1):29-59.
[35]DeAnGELO, Linda, E. Managerial Competition, Information Costs, and Corporate Governance:The Use of Accounting Performance Measures in Proxy Contests, Journal of Accunting and conomics[J],1988,10(1):3-36.
[36]DeFond, M.L.,Park, C.W. The effect of competition on CEO turnover[J], Accounting And Economics, 1999,27(1):33-56.
[37]Demsetz, Harold, Kenneth Lehn. The Structure of Corporate Ownership, Causes and Consequences[J], Journal of Political Economy,1985,93(6):1155-1177.
[38]Dennis C. Mueller. A Theory of Conglomerate Mergers[J], The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1969,83(4):643-59
[39]Denis, D.J.,Denis, D.K., Sarin, A. Ownership Structure and Top Executive turnover[J], Financial Economics,1997,45(2):193-221.
[40]Denis, David J. Defensive Adjustments in Corporate Payout Policy, Share Repurchases and Special Dividends[J], Finance,1990,50(5):1029-1057.
[41]Denis, D.J., Denis, D.K. Performance Changes Following Top Management Dismissals[J], Jurnal of Finance,1995,50(4):65-86.
[42]Dodd, Peter and Warner, Jerold B. On corporate governance:A study of proxy contests[J], Financial Economics,1983,11(4):401-438.
[43]Dodd, P. Merger Proposals, Management Discretion and Stockholder Wealth[J], Joural of Financial Economics,1980,8(2):105-137/
[44]Dyck, A., and Zingzles, Luigi. Private Benefits of Control, An International Comparison[R], Working paper,2001,1-32.
[45]Easterbrook, Frank and Fischel, Daniel. Voting in Corporate Law[J], Journal of Law and Economics,1983,26(7):395-412.
[46]Eckbo, B.E. Horizontal mergers, collusion, and stockholder wealth[J], Journal of Financial Economics 1983,11,(1):241-273.
[47]Edith Shwalb Hotchkiss. Post Bankruptcy Performance and Management Turnover[J], Journal of Finance,1995,50(1):3-21.
[48]Fama Eugene F., Fisher Lawrence, Jensen Michael, ETAL. The Adjustment of Stock Prices to new Information[J], International Economic Review,1969,10(2):1-21.
[49]Fama, E.F., Jensen, M,C. Separation of Ownership and Control[J], Journal of Law and Economics,1983,26(6):301-325.
[50]Fama, Eugene. Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm[J], Political Economy, 1980,88(2):288-307.
[51]Fama, E.F. and Jensen, Michael C. Agency Problems and Residual Claims[J], Journal of Law and Economics,1983,26(6):327-349.
[52]Fama, Eugence F. Efficient Capital Markets:A Review of Theory and Empirical Work[J], Journal of Finance,1970,25(11):383-417.
[53]Fama, Eugene F., and James MacBeth. Risk, Return, and Equilibrium:Empirical Tests[J], Journal of Political Economy,1973,81(3):607-636.
[54]Fama, Eugene F. Market Efficiency, Long-term Returns, and Behavioral Finance[J], Journal of Financial Economics,1998,49(3):283-306.
[55]Fama, Eugene F.and Kenneth R. French, The Cross Section of Expected Stock Returns[J], Journal of Finance,1992,46(2):427-465.
[56]Fisherman M J. A Theory of Preemptive Takeover Bidding, The Rand Journal of Economics,1988,19(1):88-101.
[57]Fanta, E.and M.Jensen. Agency Problems and Residual Claims[J], Journal of Law and Economies,1983,26(6):123-146.
[58]Furtado, E.P. and M.S.Rozeff. The Wealth Effects of Company Initiated Management Changes[J], Journal of Financial Economics,1987,18(1):147-160.
[59]Giammarino R M and R L Heinkel, A Model of Dynamic Takeover Behaveior, Journal of Finance,1986,41 (3):465-480.
[60]Gibbons, Murphy. Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers[J], Industrial and Labor Relations Review,1990,43(2):30-51.
[61]Gillan, Stuart and Starks, Laura T. Relationship Investing and Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors[R], Working Paper (University of Texas, Austrin, TX),1995,1-32.
[62]Gilson, S.A. Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders, Evidence on Changes in Corporate Ownership and Control when Firms Default[J], Financial Economics, 1990,27(2):355-387.
[63]Gilson, S.C. Management Turnover and Financial Distress[J], Journal of Financial Economics,1989,25(2):241-262.
[64]Gort, Michael. An Economic Disturbance Theory of Mergers[J], Quarterly Journal of Economics,1969,83(4):624-642.
[65]Ghosh, D. Efficiency Considerations in the Additive Hazards Model with Current Status Data[J], Netherlands Society for Statistics and Operations Research,2001,55(3): 367-376.
[66]Goyal, V.K. and Park, C.W. Board Leadership structure and CEO turnover, Corporate Finance[R], Sungkyunkwan Unviversity,2001,76-89.
[67]Gregor Andrade, Mark Mitchell, and Erik Stafford. New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers[J], Journal of Economic Perspectives,2001,15(2):103-120.
[68]Grossman, S.J.and O.Hart. One Share-One Vote and the Market of Corporate Control[J], Financial Economics,1988,20(1):175-202.
[69]Grossman, Sanford J.and Hart, Oliver D. Takeover Bids, the Free-rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation[J], Bell Journal of Economics,1980,11(1):42-64.
[70]Grossman, Sanford, and Oliver Hart. The Costs and the Benefits of Ownership, Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration[J], Political Economy,1986,94(4):691-719.
[71]Hakes, David R., Kenneth H. Brown, and Allen Rappaport. The Impact of State Deposit Caps on Bank Merger. Premiums[J], Southern Economic Journal,63 (3): 652-662.
[72]Harris, M.and A.Raviv. Corporate Control Contest and Capital Structure[J], Financial Economics,1988,20(1)55-86.
[73]Harris, M.and A.Raviv. Corporate Governance, Voting Right and Majority Rules", Financial Economics,1988,20(1):203-235.
[74]Hart, Liver. Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure[M], London, Oxford University Press,1995,1-56.
[75]Hart, Oliver, and Moor, John. Property Right and the Nature of the Firm[J], Political Economy,1990,98(6):1119-1158.
[76]Hart, Oliver. The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme[J], Bell Journal of Economics,1983,14(2):366-382.
[77]Hasbrouck, Joel. The Characteristics of Takeover Targets, and Other Measures[J], Banking and Finance,1985,9(3):351-362.
[78]Healy, Paul M., Krishna G. Palepu and Richard S.Ruback. Dose Corporate Performance Improve after Mergers[J], Jounal of Finance Economics, 1992,31(2):135-175.
[79]Henrik Horn and James Levinsohn. Merger Policies and Trade Liberalization[J], The Economic Journal,2001,111 (4):244-276.
[80]Hermalin, Benjamin E.,and Michael S., Weisbach. Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and their Monitoring of the CEO[J], American Economic Review, 1998,88(1):96-118.
[81]Hirshleifer D and I P L P'ng. Facilication of Competing Bids and the Price of a Takeover Target, Review of Financial Studies[J],1990,2(4):587-606.
[81]Hirshleifer D and S Titman,Share Tendering strategies and the Success of Hostile Takeover Bids[J] Journal of Political Economy,1990,98(5):295-324.
[82]Hirshleifer, David and Thakor, Anjan V. Managerial Performance, Board of Directors and Takeover Bidding[J], Corporate Finance,1994,1(1):63-90.
[83]Holderness, Clifford, and Dennis Sheehan. The Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations, An Exploratory Analysis[J], Journal of Financial Economics, 1988,20(1):317-346.
[84]Holmstrom, B., and J.Tirole. Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and the Real Sector[J], Quarterly Journal of Economics,1998,112(3):663-691.
[85]Holmstrom, B. Moral Hazard in Team[J], Bell Journal of Economics, 1982,13(2):324-340.
[87]Ikenberry, David and Josef Lakonishok. Corporate Governance through the Proxy Contest, Evidence and Implications[J], Journal of Business,1993,66(3):405-436.
[88]Israel, R. Capital Structure and the Market for Corporate Control, The Defensive Role of Debt Financing[J], Finance,1991,46(4):1391-1409.
[89]Jahera, J.S. and W.Pugh. State Takeover Legislation:The Case of Delaware[J], Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization,1991,7(2):410-427.
[90]Jarrell, Gregg and Poulsen, Annette B. Shark Repellants and Stock Prices, The effects of antitakeover amendments since 1980[J], Financial Economics, 1987,19(1):127-168.
[91]Jarrell, Gregg and Poulsen, Annette B. Dual-class Recapitalizations as Antitakeover Mechanisms, The Recent Evidence[J], Financial Economics,1988,20(1):129-152.
[92]Jarrell, G.A. and M.Bradley. The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulations of Cash Tender[J], Journal of Law and Economics,1980,23(2):371-407.
[93]Jarrell, G.A., Poulsen, A. The returns to acquiring firms in tender offers:Evidence from three decades[J], Financial Management,1989,18(3):12-19.
[94]Jarrell, Gregg A., James A.Brickley and Jeffrey M.Netter. The Market for Corporate Control:The Empirical Evidence Since 1980[J], Journal of Economic Perspective, 1988,2(1):49-68.
[95]Jean Tirole. Corporate Governance[J], Econometrica,2001,69(1):1-35.
[96]Jegadeesh N and B Chowdhry. Optimal Pre-tender Offer Share Acquisition Strategy in Takeovers[R], UCLA Anderson Graduate School of Management,Working Paper,1988.
[97]Jensen, M.C., Murphy, K.J. Performance pay and top management incentives[J], Journal of Political Economy,1990,98(2):225-264.
[98]Jesen, Michael C. The Takeover Controversy, Analysis and Evidence[J], Midland Corporate Finance Journal,1986,4(2):6-32.
[99]Jesen, Michael C. Takeover, Folklore and Science[J], Harvard Business Review, 1984,62(6):106-121.
[100]Jesen, Michael, and William Meckling. Theory of the Firm, Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure[J], Journal of Financial Economics, 1976,3(4):305-360.
[101]Jensen, Michael C. Takeover:Their Causes and Consequences [J], Journal of Economic Perspectives,1988,2(1):21-48.
[102]Jensen, Michael C. Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, Takeovers[J], American Economic Review,1986,76(2):323-329.
[103]Jensen, Michael C. and Richard S. Ruback. The Market for Corpotate Control:The Scientific[J], Journal of Financial Economics,1983,11(5):5-50.
[104]Jones, G.R. and C.W.L. Hill. Transaction Cost Analysis of Strategy-Structure Choice[J],Strategic Management Journal,1988,9(2):159-172.
[105]John, K. and Senbet, L.M. Corporate Governance and Board Effectiveness[J], Banking and Finance,1998,22(4):371-403.
[106]Kaplan, S.N. Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance, A Comparison of Japan and the United States[J], Political Economy,1994,102(3):510-546.
[107]Kaplan, S.N. Top Executives, Turnover, and Firm Performance in Germany[J], Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,1994b,10(1):142-159.
[108]Kaplan, Steven N. and Bernadette A.Minton. Appointments of Outsiders to Japanese Boards Determinants and Implications for Managers[J], Journal of Financial Economics,1994,36(2):65-89.
[109]Kevin J.Murphy arrd Jerold L. Zimmerman. Financial Performance Surrounding CEO Turnover[J], Journal of Accounting and Economics,1993,16(1):273-315.
[110]Klein, April and Rosenfeld, Jams. Targeted Share Requrchases and Top Management Changes[J], Financial Economics,1988,20(1):493-506.
[111]Knoeber, C.R. Golden Parachutes, Shark Repullents, and Hostile Tender Offers[J], American Economic Review,1986,76(1):155-167.
[112]Kreps, D., R.Wilson. Sequential Equilibrium[J], Econometrica,1982,50(4):863-894.
[113]La Porta, Refael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Sheifer, Robert W.Vishny. Legal Determinants of External Finance[J], Finance,1997,52(3):1131-1150.
[114]La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Sheifer, Robert W.Vishny. Law and Finance[J], Political Economy,1998,106(6):1113-1155.
[115]La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Sheifer, Robert W.Vishny. Investor Protection and corporate Valuation[R], Harvard Institute for Economics Research, Discussion Paper 1882,1999,1-25.
[116]La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Sheifer. Corporate Ovnership Around the World[R], BNER, Working Paper 6625,1998,1-33.
[117]Lakonishok, Josef, Andrei Shliefer and Robert Vishny. Contrarian Investment, Extrapolation, and Rish[J], Journal of Finance,1994,49(5):1541-1578.
[118]Levine, Ross, and Sara Zervos. Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic, Growth[J], American Economic Review,1998,88(3):537-558.
[119]Levy, Harm. Economic Valuation of Voting Power of Common Stock[J], Journal of Finance,1983,38(3):79-93.
[120]Linn S.C., Switzer J.A. Are cash acquisitions associated with better postcombination operating performance than stock acquisitions? [J], Journal of Banking and Finance,2001,25(6):1113-1138.
[121]Malatesta, Paul H., and Walking, Ralph A. Poison Pill Securities, Stockholder Wealth Profitability, and Ownership Structure[J], Journal of Financial Economics, 1988,20(1):347-376.
[122]Manne, Henry G. Mergers and the Market for Corpporate Control[J]" Journal of Political Economy,1965,73(2):110-120.
[123]Martin, K.J., MeConnell, J. Corporate Performance Corporate Takeovers, and Management Turnover[J], Journal of Finance,1991,46(2):671-687.
[124]McConnell, John and Henri Servaes. Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value[J], Financial Economics,1990,27(2):595-612.
[125]McConnell, John and Chirs Muscarella. Corporate Capital Expenditure Decisions and Market Value of the Firm[J], Journal of Financial Economics,1985,14(3):399-422.
[126]Mcguckin, Robert H. and Sang V.Nguyen. The Impact of Ownership Changes, A View from Labor Markets[J], International Journal of industrial Organization, 2001,19(5):739-762.
[127]Michael C Jensen.Clifford W Smith. The Theory of Corporate Finance:A History Overview[C], the Modern Theory of Corporate Finance, New York:Mc Graw-Hill Inc.,1984,2-20.
[128]Mike Burkart,Denis Gromb,and Fausto Panunzi. Minority Blocks and Takeover Premia[J] Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics,2006,162(3):32-49.
[129]Mikkelson, W.H. and Partch, M.M. The Decline of Takeovers and Disciplinary Managerial Takeovers and Disciplinary Managerial Turnover[J], Financial Economics, 1997,44(2):205-228.
[130]Mikkelson, Wayne H.and Partch, Megan M. The Decline of Takeovers and Disciplinary Managrial Turnover[R], Working paper, University of Oregon, Eugene, 1995,1-27.
[131]Milgrom, P., and J.Roberts. Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information, An Equilibrium Analysis[J], Economica,1982,50(2):433-459.
[132]Milgrom, P., and J.Roberts. Economics,Organization and Management[M], Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Pretice Hall,1992,1-56.
[133]Mitchell, Mark I., and J.Harold Mulherin. The Impact of Industry Shicks on Takeover and Restructuring Activity[J], Journal of Financial Economics, 1996,41(2):193-229.
[134]Modigliani, F.m and Miller, M. The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Investment[J], American Economic Review,1958,48(3):261-297.
[135]Morck, Pandall, Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert W. Characteristics of Hostile and Friendly Takeover Targets [C], Corporate Takeovers:Causes and Consequences,National Bureau of Economic Research,Inc,1988,101-136.
[136]Morck, R., Shleifer A. and Vishny R.W. Ownership Structure and Cambridge Performance, An Empirical Analysis[R], Miemographed, Cambridge, Mass., NBER.1985,1-22.
[137]Morck, R.,Shleifer, A., and Vishny R.W. Alternative Mechanism for Corporate Control[J], American Economic Review,1989,79(4):842-852.
[138]Morck, Randall, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W., Vishny. Comparing Acquisitions and Divestitures[J], Journal of Corporate Finance,2000,6(2):117-139.
[139]Murphy, K., and J.Zimmerman. Financial Performance Surrounding CEO Turnover[J], Accounting and Economics,1993,16(1):67-85.
[140]Myeong-Hyeon Cho. Ownership Structure, Investment, and the Corporate Value, An Empirical Analysis[J], Financial Economics,1998,47(1):103-121.
[141]Niden, C. M. An empirical examination of white knight corporate takeovers: synergy and overbidding[J], Financial Management,1993,22(4):28-45
[142]Palepu, Krishna. Predicting Takeover Targets, a Methodological and Empirical Analysis[J], Accounting and Economics,1986,8(1):3-35.
[143]Parrino. CEO Turnover and Outside Succession a Cross Sectional Analysis[J], Financial Economics,1997,46(2):165-197.
[144]Peter Dodd and Richard Ruback. Tender offers and stockholder returns:An empirical analysis[J], Journal of Financial Economics,1977,5(3):351-373.
[145]Pound, John. Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight[J], Journal of Financial Economics,1988,20(1):237-265.
[146]Pound, John. On the Motives for Choosing a Corporate Governance Structure:A Study of Corporate Reaction to the Pennsylvania Takeover Law[J], Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization,1992,8(3):656-672.
[147]Pozen, Robert C. Institutional inverstors, The reluctant activists[J], Harvard Business Review,1994,72(1):140-149.
[148]Pugh, W.N.and J.S.Jahera, Jr. State Antitakeover Legislation and Shareholder Wealth[J], Journal of Financial Research,1990,13(3):211-231.
[149]Rajan, Raghuram, and Luigi Zingales. Financial Dependence and Growth[J], American Economic Review,1998,88(3):559-586.
[150]Raua, P. R and Vermaelen,T. Glamour, value and the post-acquisition performance of acquiring firms[J], Journal of Financial Economics,1998,49(2):223-253.
[151]Reed.R,Luffman,GA. Diversification:the growing confusion[J], Strategic Management Journal,1986,7(1):29-35.
[152]Robert Parrino. CEO Turnover and Outside Succession A Cross-Sectional Analysis[J], Journal of Financial Economics,1997,46(2):165-197.
[153]Roll, R. The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers[J], Business,1986,59(2): 197-216.
[154]Roll, R. A Critique of the Asset Pricing Theory's Tests' Part Ⅰ:On Past and Potential Testability of the Theory[J], Journal of Financial Economics,1977,4(2):129-176.
[155]Rosenstein S, and J.G.Wyatt. Outside Directors, Board Independence, and Shareholder Wealth[J], Journal of Financial Economics,1990,26(2):65-87.
[156]Ruback, R.S. The Cities Service Takeover:A Case Study[J], The Journal of Finance, 1983,38(2):319-329.
[157]Ruback, Richard S. Do Target Shareholders Lose in Unsuccessful Control Contests? [C], in Alet Auerbach, ed., Economic effects of mergers and acquisitions, University of Chicago Press (Chicago, IL),1988,1-76.
[158]Ryngaert, Michael. The Effect of Poison Pill Securities on Shareholder Wealth[J], Financial Economics,1988,20(1):377-418.
[159]Servaes, H. Tobin's q and the gains from takeovers[J], Journal of Finance,1991,46(1):409-419.
[160]Schumann, L. State Regulation of Takeovers and Shareholder Wealth:the Case of New York's 1985 Takeover Statutes[J], Rand Journal of Economics,1988,19(4):557-567.
[161]Schwert, G, William. Markup Pricing in Mergers and Acquisitions[J], Financial Economics,1996,41(2).153-192.
[162]Schwert, G,w. Hostility in Takeovers:In the Eyes of the Beholder? [J], Journal of Finance,2000,55(6):599-2640.
[163]Shleifer A. and Vishny, R.W. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control[J], Journal of Political Economy,1986,94(31):45-78.
[164]Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. A survey of Corporate Governance[J], Finance,1997, 52(2):737-783.
[165]Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert W. Value-Max-imization and the Acquisition Process[J], Economic Perspectives,1988,2(1):7-20.
[166]Sirower, M. L. The synergy trap:How companies lose the acquisition game[M], New York:Free Press.1997.
[167]Stulz, R.M. Managerial Control of Voting Rights, Financing Policies and the Market for Corporate Control[J], Financial Economics,1988,20(1):25-54.
[168]Thomsen, Steen and Torbin Pedersen. Industry and Ownership Structure[J], International Review of Law and Economics,1998,18(4):385-402.
[169]Wahal, Sunil, Keneth W.Wiles, and Mare Zenner. Who Opts Out of State Antitakeover Prtection?:The Case of Pennsylvania's SB 1310[J], Financial Management, 1995,24(3):22-39.
[170]Weston, J Fred. Mansinghka, Surendra K. Tests of the Efficiency Performance of Conglomerate Firms[J], Journal of finance,1971,26(4):919-936.
[171]Weston, J.Fred, Chung, Kwang S., and Siu, Juan A. Takeovers, Restructuring, and Corporate Governance[M], Second Edition, Prentice Hall,1998,10-18.
[172]Wilson G P. The relative information content of accruals and cash flow:combined evidence at the earning announcement and annual and report release date[J], Journal of Accounting Research,1986,24 (supplement):165-200.
[173]Zingales, Laigi, The Value of Voting Right. A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience[J], The Riview of Financial Studies,1994,7(1):125-148.
[1]安同良、张金华.中国上市公司国有股减持的行业次序[J].经济社会体制比较,2002(3)：76—84。
[2]白云霞,吴联生,徐信忠.资产收购与控制权转移对经营业绩的影响.经济研究[J],2004,(12)：35-44。
[3]毕肖辉.企业兼并的制度演化及其并存结构分析[J].中国社会科学,1998(5)：118一127。
[4]曹廷求、刘呼声.大股东治理与公司治理效率[J].改革,2003(1)：33—37。
[5]陈共、周升业、吴晓求.公司购并原理与案例[J].北京：中国财政经济出版社2000
[6]陈晓、江东.股权多元化、公司绩效与行业竞争性[J].经济研究,2000(8)：28—35。
[7]陈晓、单鑫.债务融资是否会增加上市企业的融资成本[J].经济研究,1999(9)：39—46。
[8]陈小悦、徐晓东.股权结构、企业绩效与投资者保护[J].经济研究,2001(11)：3—11。
[9]陈小悦、肖星、过小艳.配股权与上市公司利润操纵[J].经济研究,2000(1)：30-36。
[10]陈信元、原红旗.上市公司资产重组财务会计问题研究[J].会计研究,1998(10)： 1-10。
[11]陈志斌、施建军.公司治理层面的控制与所有权实位化[J].经济理论与经济管理2003(1)：48-52。
[12]陈郁.所有权、控制权与激励[M].上海：上海三联书店、上海人民出版社1997
[13]崔之元.美国二十九个州公司法变革的理论背景[J].经济研究,1996(4)：35-40。
[14]杜莹、刘立国.股权结构与公司治理效率：中国上市公司的实证分析[J].管理世界2002年(11)124-133。
[15]范从来、袁静.成长性、成熟性和衰退性产业上市公司并购绩效的实证研究[J].中国工业经济,2002(8)：65-72。
[16]费方域.控制内部人控制[J].经济研究,1996(6)31-39。
[17]冯根福、韩冰.中国上市公司股权集中度变动的实证分析[J].经济研究,2002(8)： 12-18
[18]冯根福、吴林江.我国上市公司并购绩效的实证研究[J].经济研究,2001(1)54-61。
[19]J.弗雷德·威斯通、S.郑光、胡安·A.苏.接管、重组与公司治理[J].大连：东北财经大学出版社,2000
[20]龚玉池.公司绩效与高层更换[J].经济研究,2001(10)75-82
[21]郭金林.论美国机构股东的战略转变及其公司治理原则[J].世界经济,2002(4)64-68
[22]哈特.企业、合同与财务结构[J].上海三联书店,1995
[23]哈罗德·德姆塞茨.所有权、控制与企业[M].经济科学出版社,1988
[24]何浚.上市公司治理结构的实证分析[J].经济研究,1998(5)：第50-57。
[25]胡援成.企业资本结构与效益及效率关系的实证研究[J].管理世界,2002(10)：146-147
[26]李东平.大股东控制,盈余管理和上市公司业绩滑坡[D].上海财经大学2001年博士学位论文。
[27]李有根、赵西萍、李怀祖.上市公司的董事会构成和公司绩效研究[J].中国工业经济,2001(5)：48-53
[28]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2000(3)：32-39
[29]林新.企业并购与竞争规则[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,2001
[30]刘冰.企业权力争压和企业治理[J].中国工业经济,2002(4)：89-94
[31]刘峰、魏明海.公司控制权市场问题,君安与万科之争的再探讨[J].管理世界,2001(3)：187-190
[32]刘少波.控制权收益悖论与超控制权收益[J].经济研究,2007(2)：85-96
[33]刘彤.小股东权益与公司治理绩效改善[J].经济科学,2002(2)：65-74
[34]卢文彬、朱红军.IPO公司经营业绩变动与股权结构研究[J].财经研究,2001(7)： 45-52
[35]刘文通.公司兼并收购论[M].北京：北京大学出版社,1997
[36]玛格丽特·M.布莱尔.所有权与控制：面向21世纪的公司治理探索[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,1999
[37]青木昌彦、钱颖一.转轨经济中的公司治理结构[M].北京：中国经济出版社,1995
[38]青木昌彦.比较制度分析[M].上海：上海远东出版社,2001
[39]青木昌彦、奥野正宽.经济体制的比较制度分析[M].北京：中国发展出版社,1999
[40]沈艺峰.公司控制权市场理论的现代演变(上)(下)[J].中国经济问题,2000(2)：20-35
[41]施东辉.股权结构、公司治理与绩效表现[J].世界经济,2000(12)：37-44
[42]孙永祥.所有权、融资结构与公司治理机制[J].经济研究,2001(9)：45-53
[43]孙永祥、黄祖辉.上市公司的股权结构与绩效[J].经济研究,1999(12)：23.30
[44]唐宗明、蒋位.中国上市公司大股东侵害度实证研究[J].经济研究,2002(4)：44-50
[45]吴淑琨.股权结构与公司绩效的U型关系研究[J].中国工业经济,2002(1)：80-87页。
[46]吴晓求.国有股减持修正案的设计原则、定价机制和资金运作模式[J].金融研 究,2000(2)：8-20
[47]徐晓东、陈小悦.第一大股东对公司治理、企业绩效的影响分析[J].经济研究,2003(2)：64-74
[48]杨瑞龙、周业安.企业的利益相关者理论及其应用[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2000
[49]杨瑞龙.一个关于企业所有权安排的规范分析框架及其理论含义[J].经济研究,1997(10)：12-22
[50]殷醒民.企业购并的金融经济学解释[M].上海：上海财经大学出版社,1999
[51]于东智.转轨经济中的上市公司治理[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社,2002
[52]张维迎.控制权损失的不可补偿性与国有企业兼并中的产权障碍[J].经济研究,1998(8)：3-14
[53]张维迎.产权安排与企业内部的权力斗争[J].经济研究,2000(5)：41-50
[54]张维迎.企业的企业家——契约理论[M].上海：上海三联书店,1995
[55]张维迎.所有权、治理结构与委托代理关系[J].经济研究,1996(10)：4-15
[56]赵山.中国上市公司高层更换实证研究[J].改革,2001(6)：29-34
[57]赵通、朱武祥.上市公司兼并收购可预测性[J].经济研究,2000(4)：19-25
[58]赵增耀.董事会的构成与其职能发挥[J].管理世界,2002(3)：125-129
[59]郑德珵、沈华珊.公司治理中的股权结构[M].广州：中山大学出版社,2002
[60]周刚、姜彦福、雷家肃、傅家骥.战略性大股东的公司治理[J].中国管理科学,2002(4)：76-78
[61]周鹏、张宏志.利益相关者间的谈判与企业治理结构[J].经济研究,2002(6)：55-62
[62]周业安.金融抑制对中国企业融资能力影响的实证分析[J].经济研究,1999(2)：13-20
[63]周其仁.“控制权回报”和“企业家控制的企业”[J].经济研究,1997(5)：31-42
[64]朱宝宪、王怡凯.1998年中国上市公司并购实践的效应分析[J].经济研究,2002(11)：20-26
[65]朱红军.大陆上市公司盈余管理分析实用税务(台湾)[J].实用税务,2000(12)：79-86
[66]朱红军.大股东变更与高级管理人员更换：经营绩效的作用[J].会计研究,2002 (9)： 31-40
[67]朱红军.大股东变更与高级管理人员更换的现状分析[J].管理世界,2002(5)：126-141
[68]朱筠笙.公司控制权转让的效率分析[J].中国工业经济,2002(8)：73-80[84]
[69]张慕濒.公司控制权市场治理效率论[M].北京：商务印书馆,2008
[70]朱武祥、宋勇.股权结构与企业价值[J].经济研究,2001(9)：66-72