不公平厌恶偏好、产权基础与管理层薪酬契约研究
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摘要
薪酬契约是委托代理理论的核心，其对公司管理层行为的激励也一直是学术研究的热点。近些年，我国监管部门推出的许多有关管理层薪酬规范的政策出现了反激励的效应，例如股权激励制度的推行虽然起到了一定的激励作用，但也产生许多新的代理问题；频频颁布的“限薪令”的初衷是为了减少薪酬差距，但却造成了更大的不公平，因为更多的高管转向追求隐性收入或控制权收益，而降低了正常合同薪酬的激励作用。薪酬契约制度在实务和政策中的种种反激励现象的发生的原因，在于目前在我国，不管是监管部门还是生产部门，对于薪酬激励内部机理还很不清晰，需要进一步厘清这些问题。
为了分析我国企业薪酬契约的激励效应，本文在简单回顾有关社会偏好的几种主要的形式后，基于一组实验设计，于2011年10月到2012年3月在暨南大学MBA和MPAcc课堂上进行了实验，甄别了我国管理层各种社会偏好相对强度，实验发现，相对于美国等西方国家，我国经理人员不公平厌恶偏好表现比其它社会偏好（完全自利偏好、竞争性偏好、准最大最小偏好、互惠主义等等）更加强烈，而且在策略反应实验中，发现，在进行多期博弈时，经理人员的其它社会偏好事实上很大一部分也可以由不公平厌恶偏好来解释。总体上，我国经理人员群体中，超过70%的比例可以具有明显的不公平厌恶偏好。在这个基础上，构建一个纳入管理人员不公平厌恶偏好的理论模型，对于模型中得到的相关命题和推论，本文一方面采用问卷调查的数据，直接进行检验；另一方面，基于我国A股上市公司2001-2010年公开的薪酬数据，采用有关不公平厌恶偏好替代的衡量方式，对模型的命题和推论进行了系统地检验。
在理论模型的构建中，本文主要关注管理层薪酬结构中随业绩变动的那部分薪酬（包括现金货币中变动部分、股权、期权激励以及部分控制权收益等等），理论模型揭示由于不同产权基础的公司赋予控制权收益不同权重，在提供这部分薪酬上具有系统性的差异，这种差异会内生地吸引到异质性的经理人员，从而对于公司业绩表现、公司价值等等产生系统的差异。具体而言，本文以薪酬激励合约为中介，构建了不同产权基础的公司和不同高管特质（不同的不公平厌恶感和不同的能力）内生配置的模型，主要基于社会偏好实验分析了不公平厌恶偏好在我国高管激励合约中的作用。模型的均衡结果揭示不同的配置类型，并得到五方面可供实证检验的命题：（1）分散持股或存在股权制衡的公司在提供更具有激励效应和业绩敏感性更强的薪酬合约方面更有优势；（2）公司所提供的合约的斜率部分（随业绩浮动的工资）和经理人员的能力与有利不公平厌恶成正相关；而不利不公平厌恶具有反向激励效应；（3）在均衡时，面临更加陡峭的合约斜率的经理人员将付出更多的努力、获得更多的薪酬（固定部分和变动部分）、获得更高的期望效用；（4）控制了产权基础，提供更高激励效应的公司，业绩更高、公司价值更高。（5）管理人员控制权收益对薪酬的斜率b(包括股权、期权激励等)具有替代效应，并因而产生反向的激励后果，替代程度越大，反向激励效果越大。本文在理论模型构建以后，基于问卷调查和上市公司大样本数据对这些基本命题进行了检验和分析。实证结果基本支持了上述命题和推论在我国的适用性。
在对企业内部薪酬差距的研究中，本文研究发现，相对于分散持股或者股权制衡的公司，国有控股公司和家族控股公司管理层内部薪酬差距支持了锦标赛理论。而管理层和员工之间的薪酬差距在企业里支持了行为理论下的预期。相对于分散持股或者存在股权制衡的公司，股权集中的公司内部薪酬差距与管理层盈余管理程度正相关，并且在国有控股企业中表现比在家族控股企业中更加明显。相对于分散持股或者存在股权制衡的公司，股权集中的公司内部薪酬差距与公司与管理层经营效率正相关。这种效应在国有控股企业中表现比在家族控股企业中更加明显，支持了锦标赛理论，而不支持行为理论。通过数据包络分析发现，相对于分散持股或者存在股权制衡的公司，集中股权公司内部薪酬差距的提高能够促使管理层进行更多的固定资产投资，但对其经营管理水平的改进具有负向的影响，使得整体上内部薪酬差距对全要素生产率不起作用，这种效应在国有控股企业中更加明显。
在对货币薪酬外部公平性研究中，本文研究发现，正向额外薪酬与国有控股企业和家族控股企业的公司业绩都存在负相关关系，体现为管理层权力理论下的预期，而负向额外薪酬与国有控股企业和家族控股企业的公司业绩都存在负相关关系，体现为利益协同效应。相对于分散持股或者存在股权制衡的公司，管理层额外薪酬在国有控股企业和家族控股企业中有助于减少管理层的盈余管理行为。相对于分散持股或者存在股权制衡公司，正向额外薪酬对于国有控股企业和家族控股企业都具有正向的促进效应，体现为“利益协同”效应。相对于分散持股或者存在股权制衡的公司，负向额外薪酬与国有控股企业经营效率存在正相关性，这说明在负向额外薪酬下在国有控股企业中也体现为“利益协同”效应。负向额外薪酬与家族控股公司经营效率不存在显著的相关性。相对于分散持股或者股权制衡的公司，国有控股公司和家族控股公司正向额外薪酬都与公司价值呈负相关关系，支持了行为理论下的预期，具有反向激励效应。
在对股权激励外部公平性研究中，相对于分散持股或者存在股权制衡的公司，正向额外股权激励与国有控股企业管理层盈余管理正相关；而与家族控股企业管理层盈余管理存在负相关关系。说明当前我国股权激励的施行，在国有控股企业中符合管理层权力理论下的预期，具有“壕沟”效应，而在家族控股企业中符合最优契约理论下的预期，具有“利益协同”效应。而负向额外股权激励与国有控股企业和家族控股企业管理层盈余管理都存在都存在显著正相关关系。相对于股权分散或者存在股权制衡的公司，正向额外股权激励与家族控股公司的经营效率显著正相关、与国有控股公司的经营效率显著负相关，而负向额外股权激励与家族控股公司和国有控股企业的经营效率都显著正相关。也就是说，股权激励外部公平性在家族控股企业中体现为“利益协同”效应，而在国有控股企业中体现为“壕沟”效应。进一步的研究表明，正向额外股权激励下，家族控股公司的经营效率的提高主要体现在规模效率的改进上，而国有控股公司的经营效率的下降则主要源自纯技术效率变动，也就是管理层工作效率的下降。但是，数据也表明国有控股公司在规模效率改进上具有显著的优势。此外，相对于分散持股或者股权制衡的公司，国有控股公司和家族控股公司正向额外股权激励都与公司价值呈正相关关系，体现为最优契约理论下的预期。
在对控制权收益外部公平性研究中，本文研究发现，相对于分散持股或者存在股权制衡的公司，国有控股公司和家族控股公司管理人员正向额外控制权收益与公司业绩都呈正相关关系，体现为控制权收益效率观下的预期。而相负向额外控制权收益在国有控股企业中与公司业绩正相关，在家族控股企业中则体现代理观下的预期。相对于分散持股或者存在股权制衡的公司，正向额外控制权收益在家族控股企业中与管理层盈余管理程度正相关，产生反向的激励效应。而在国有控股公司中与管理层盈余管理程度负相关，体现为效率观下的预期。而负向额外控制权收益在国有控股企业和家族控股企业中均与管理层盈余管理程度负相关，体现为控制权收益“效率观”下的预期。相对于分散持股或者存在股权制衡的公司，正向额外控制权收益对国有控股企业和家族控股企业经营效率都具有积极影响体现为“利益协同”效应。数据包络分析表明，在国有控股企业中，正向额外控制权收益有助于提高公司的全要素生产率，这主要得益于纯技术效率的提高和技术变动指数的提高。而负向额外控制权收益在国有控股企业和家族控股企业中都对技术变动指数具有反向激励效应，使得其与全要素生产率呈负相关关系。另外，相对于分散持股或者存在股权制衡的公司，正向额外控制权收益在国有控股公司中与公司价值负相关，而在家族控股公司中与公司价值正相关。
Compensation contract is the core of the principal-agent theory, whoseincentives on the behavior of managers has also been a hot topic of academicresearch. In recent years, many norms related to executive compensation policyintroduced by China's regulatory authorities has arisen the negative incentive effects,such as, although the implementation of equity incentive programs have playedcertain incentives, it generate many new agent problems; the original intension of thefrequently-issued salary limit order is to reduce the pay gap, but it causes greaterinjustice, because executives turn to pursue the hidden income or private benefits ofcontrol, while reducing the incentives of the normal compensation contract. In thepractices and policies of compensation contract system, various anti-incentivephenomenons occurs because, in China, not only the regulatory authorities but alsothe production department is far from clear of the internal mechanism ofcompensation contract. These issues need to be further clarified.
In order to analyze the incentive effects of the compensation contract in china,after a brief review of several major forms of the social preferences, based on a set ofexperimental design, in October2011to March2012, Jinan University, MBA andMPAcc class experiments were carried out, this paper screening of the relativeimportant of a variety of social preferences of Chinese managers, and found that,compared to the United States and other Western countries, China's managersperform more intense in inequity aversion preferences than other social preferences(completely self-interested preferences, competitive preference, quasi-maximumpreferences, reciprocity, etc.). In the response experiments we found that, during amulti-period game, a large part of other social preferences of the managers in factcan be explained by difference aversion preferences. Overall, more than70%managers in China have obvious inequity aversion preferences. On this basis, thispaper construct a theoretical model adopted managers’ inequity aversion preferences.For the proposition and its corollary obtained in the model, on the one hand, thepaper using survey data to direct prove; on the other hand, bases on China's A-share listing2001-2010Public disclosure compensation data, using an alternativemeasuring way for the inequality aversion preferences to test the proposition and thecorollary of the model systematically.
In the theoretical model, this paper focuses on the part of executivecompensation structure that sensitive to performance (including Floating wages,equity incentive programs, options, and certain private benefits of control, etc.). theequilibrium correlations predicted by a model where firms with different ownershipstructure and managers with different inequity-aversion aversion and talent matchendogenously through incentive contracts which mainly analyze the role ofinequity-aversion preference in the executive incentive contracts. Specifically,Equilibrium model provide five testable proposition:(1) dispersed shareholding or thecompany of equity balance have more advantage in the provision of more incentivescontract or contract that more sensitive to performance;(2) the slope of compensationcontract has positive correlation with advantage inequity-aversion; while disadvantageinequity-aversion has the reverse incentive effects;(3) in equilibrium, the managerswho facing the steeper slope of the contract will exert more efforts, earn more (fixedpart and floating part) and display higher job satisfaction;(4)control for ownership,the firm that provides higher incentive would have higher firm performance and alsohigher firm value.(5) the benefits of control has a substitution effect on the slopecompensation contract, and thus have the reverse incentive consequences, the greaterthe degree of substitution, the greater the reverse incentive. After this, the paper makea new questionnaire survey that contains data on managers' inequity-aversionpreferences and human capital, on their compensation schemes, and on the firms theywork for and found that the data is consistent with the equilibrium correlationspredicted by the model. The empirical results that bases on China's A-share listingPublic disclosure compensation data also support the applicability of the aboveproposition and corollary in china, broadly.
为了分析我国企业薪酬契约的激励效应，本文在简单回顾有关社会偏好的几种主要的形式后，基于一组实验设计，于2011年10月到2012年3月在暨南大学MBA和MPAcc课堂上进行了实验，甄别了我国管理层各种社会偏好相对强度，实验发现，相对于美国等西方国家，我国经理人员不公平厌恶偏好表现比其它社会偏好（完全自利偏好、竞争性偏好、准最大最小偏好、互惠主义等等）更加强烈，而且在策略反应实验中，发现，在进行多期博弈时，经理人员的其它社会偏好事实上很大一部分也可以由不公平厌恶偏好来解释。总体上，我国经理人员群体中，超过70%的比例可以具有明显的不公平厌恶偏好。在这个基础上，构建一个纳入管理人员不公平厌恶偏好的理论模型，对于模型中得到的相关命题和推论，本文一方面采用问卷调查的数据，直接进行检验；另一方面，基于我国A股上市公司2001-2010年公开的薪酬数据，采用有关不公平厌恶偏好替代的衡量方式，对模型的命题和推论进行了系统地检验。
在理论模型的构建中，本文主要关注管理层薪酬结构中随业绩变动的那部分薪酬（包括现金货币中变动部分、股权、期权激励以及部分控制权收益等等），理论模型揭示由于不同产权基础的公司赋予控制权收益不同权重，在提供这部分薪酬上具有系统性的差异，这种差异会内生地吸引到异质性的经理人员，从而对于公司业绩表现、公司价值等等产生系统的差异。具体而言，本文以薪酬激励合约为中介，构建了不同产权基础的公司和不同高管特质（不同的不公平厌恶感和不同的能力）内生配置的模型，主要基于社会偏好实验分析了不公平厌恶偏好在我国高管激励合约中的作用。模型的均衡结果揭示不同的配置类型，并得到五方面可供实证检验的命题：（1）分散持股或存在股权制衡的公司在提供更具有激励效应和业绩敏感性更强的薪酬合约方面更有优势；（2）公司所提供的合约的斜率部分（随业绩浮动的工资）和经理人员的能力与有利不公平厌恶成正相关；而不利不公平厌恶具有反向激励效应；（3）在均衡时，面临更加陡峭的合约斜率的经理人员将付出更多的努力、获得更多的薪酬（固定部分和变动部分）、获得更高的期望效用；（4）控制了产权基础，提供更高激励效应的公司，业绩更高、公司价值更高。（5）管理人员控制权收益对薪酬的斜率b(包括股权、期权激励等)具有替代效应，并因而产生反向的激励后果，替代程度越大，反向激励效果越大。本文在理论模型构建以后，基于问卷调查和上市公司大样本数据对这些基本命题进行了检验和分析。实证结果基本支持了上述命题和推论在我国的适用性。
在对企业内部薪酬差距的研究中，本文研究发现，相对于分散持股或者股权制衡的公司，国有控股公司和家族控股公司管理层内部薪酬差距支持了锦标赛理论。而管理层和员工之间的薪酬差距在企业里支持了行为理论下的预期。相对于分散持股或者存在股权制衡的公司，股权集中的公司内部薪酬差距与管理层盈余管理程度正相关，并且在国有控股企业中表现比在家族控股企业中更加明显。相对于分散持股或者存在股权制衡的公司，股权集中的公司内部薪酬差距与公司与管理层经营效率正相关。这种效应在国有控股企业中表现比在家族控股企业中更加明显，支持了锦标赛理论，而不支持行为理论。通过数据包络分析发现，相对于分散持股或者存在股权制衡的公司，集中股权公司内部薪酬差距的提高能够促使管理层进行更多的固定资产投资，但对其经营管理水平的改进具有负向的影响，使得整体上内部薪酬差距对全要素生产率不起作用，这种效应在国有控股企业中更加明显。
在对货币薪酬外部公平性研究中，本文研究发现，正向额外薪酬与国有控股企业和家族控股企业的公司业绩都存在负相关关系，体现为管理层权力理论下的预期，而负向额外薪酬与国有控股企业和家族控股企业的公司业绩都存在负相关关系，体现为利益协同效应。相对于分散持股或者存在股权制衡的公司，管理层额外薪酬在国有控股企业和家族控股企业中有助于减少管理层的盈余管理行为。相对于分散持股或者存在股权制衡公司，正向额外薪酬对于国有控股企业和家族控股企业都具有正向的促进效应，体现为“利益协同”效应。相对于分散持股或者存在股权制衡的公司，负向额外薪酬与国有控股企业经营效率存在正相关性，这说明在负向额外薪酬下在国有控股企业中也体现为“利益协同”效应。负向额外薪酬与家族控股公司经营效率不存在显著的相关性。相对于分散持股或者股权制衡的公司，国有控股公司和家族控股公司正向额外薪酬都与公司价值呈负相关关系，支持了行为理论下的预期，具有反向激励效应。
在对股权激励外部公平性研究中，相对于分散持股或者存在股权制衡的公司，正向额外股权激励与国有控股企业管理层盈余管理正相关；而与家族控股企业管理层盈余管理存在负相关关系。说明当前我国股权激励的施行，在国有控股企业中符合管理层权力理论下的预期，具有“壕沟”效应，而在家族控股企业中符合最优契约理论下的预期，具有“利益协同”效应。而负向额外股权激励与国有控股企业和家族控股企业管理层盈余管理都存在都存在显著正相关关系。相对于股权分散或者存在股权制衡的公司，正向额外股权激励与家族控股公司的经营效率显著正相关、与国有控股公司的经营效率显著负相关，而负向额外股权激励与家族控股公司和国有控股企业的经营效率都显著正相关。也就是说，股权激励外部公平性在家族控股企业中体现为“利益协同”效应，而在国有控股企业中体现为“壕沟”效应。进一步的研究表明，正向额外股权激励下，家族控股公司的经营效率的提高主要体现在规模效率的改进上，而国有控股公司的经营效率的下降则主要源自纯技术效率变动，也就是管理层工作效率的下降。但是，数据也表明国有控股公司在规模效率改进上具有显著的优势。此外，相对于分散持股或者股权制衡的公司，国有控股公司和家族控股公司正向额外股权激励都与公司价值呈正相关关系，体现为最优契约理论下的预期。
在对控制权收益外部公平性研究中，本文研究发现，相对于分散持股或者存在股权制衡的公司，国有控股公司和家族控股公司管理人员正向额外控制权收益与公司业绩都呈正相关关系，体现为控制权收益效率观下的预期。而相负向额外控制权收益在国有控股企业中与公司业绩正相关，在家族控股企业中则体现代理观下的预期。相对于分散持股或者存在股权制衡的公司，正向额外控制权收益在家族控股企业中与管理层盈余管理程度正相关，产生反向的激励效应。而在国有控股公司中与管理层盈余管理程度负相关，体现为效率观下的预期。而负向额外控制权收益在国有控股企业和家族控股企业中均与管理层盈余管理程度负相关，体现为控制权收益“效率观”下的预期。相对于分散持股或者存在股权制衡的公司，正向额外控制权收益对国有控股企业和家族控股企业经营效率都具有积极影响体现为“利益协同”效应。数据包络分析表明，在国有控股企业中，正向额外控制权收益有助于提高公司的全要素生产率，这主要得益于纯技术效率的提高和技术变动指数的提高。而负向额外控制权收益在国有控股企业和家族控股企业中都对技术变动指数具有反向激励效应，使得其与全要素生产率呈负相关关系。另外，相对于分散持股或者存在股权制衡的公司，正向额外控制权收益在国有控股公司中与公司价值负相关，而在家族控股公司中与公司价值正相关。
Compensation contract is the core of the principal-agent theory, whoseincentives on the behavior of managers has also been a hot topic of academicresearch. In recent years, many norms related to executive compensation policyintroduced by China's regulatory authorities has arisen the negative incentive effects,such as, although the implementation of equity incentive programs have playedcertain incentives, it generate many new agent problems; the original intension of thefrequently-issued salary limit order is to reduce the pay gap, but it causes greaterinjustice, because executives turn to pursue the hidden income or private benefits ofcontrol, while reducing the incentives of the normal compensation contract. In thepractices and policies of compensation contract system, various anti-incentivephenomenons occurs because, in China, not only the regulatory authorities but alsothe production department is far from clear of the internal mechanism ofcompensation contract. These issues need to be further clarified.
In order to analyze the incentive effects of the compensation contract in china,after a brief review of several major forms of the social preferences, based on a set ofexperimental design, in October2011to March2012, Jinan University, MBA andMPAcc class experiments were carried out, this paper screening of the relativeimportant of a variety of social preferences of Chinese managers, and found that,compared to the United States and other Western countries, China's managersperform more intense in inequity aversion preferences than other social preferences(completely self-interested preferences, competitive preference, quasi-maximumpreferences, reciprocity, etc.). In the response experiments we found that, during amulti-period game, a large part of other social preferences of the managers in factcan be explained by difference aversion preferences. Overall, more than70%managers in China have obvious inequity aversion preferences. On this basis, thispaper construct a theoretical model adopted managers’ inequity aversion preferences.For the proposition and its corollary obtained in the model, on the one hand, thepaper using survey data to direct prove; on the other hand, bases on China's A-share listing2001-2010Public disclosure compensation data, using an alternativemeasuring way for the inequality aversion preferences to test the proposition and thecorollary of the model systematically.
In the theoretical model, this paper focuses on the part of executivecompensation structure that sensitive to performance (including Floating wages,equity incentive programs, options, and certain private benefits of control, etc.). theequilibrium correlations predicted by a model where firms with different ownershipstructure and managers with different inequity-aversion aversion and talent matchendogenously through incentive contracts which mainly analyze the role ofinequity-aversion preference in the executive incentive contracts. Specifically,Equilibrium model provide five testable proposition:(1) dispersed shareholding or thecompany of equity balance have more advantage in the provision of more incentivescontract or contract that more sensitive to performance;(2) the slope of compensationcontract has positive correlation with advantage inequity-aversion; while disadvantageinequity-aversion has the reverse incentive effects;(3) in equilibrium, the managerswho facing the steeper slope of the contract will exert more efforts, earn more (fixedpart and floating part) and display higher job satisfaction;(4)control for ownership,the firm that provides higher incentive would have higher firm performance and alsohigher firm value.(5) the benefits of control has a substitution effect on the slopecompensation contract, and thus have the reverse incentive consequences, the greaterthe degree of substitution, the greater the reverse incentive. After this, the paper makea new questionnaire survey that contains data on managers' inequity-aversionpreferences and human capital, on their compensation schemes, and on the firms theywork for and found that the data is consistent with the equilibrium correlationspredicted by the model. The empirical results that bases on China's A-share listingPublic disclosure compensation data also support the applicability of the aboveproposition and corollary in china, broadly.
引文
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