上市公司资本结构与产品市场竞争契约理论研究
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摘要
现代契约理论，以新古典契约理论与现实不一致的假设条件入手，通过引入信息不对称、有限理性和不完全竞争假设，由外生转向内生性研究范式。在此背景下的资本结构理论，也由注重税收、破产因素的现代资本结构理论体系，发展为以公司契约缔结体中股东、经理及债权人之间代理冲突为核心的新资本结构理论体系。
资本结构的产品市场竞争理论，作为新体系的一个重要分支，以公司资本结构决策与公司产品市场竞争决策的互动关系为主线，将资本结构的代理冲突问题反映到产品市场，开辟资本结构影响企业价值的新渠道，成为资本结构契约理论的前沿领域。但目前对该领域的研究，尚需理论基础的分析和实证检验的丰富。有鉴于此，本文致力于这一互动关系的实质，通过理论模型构建及相应的实证分析，试图对我国上市公司的实际，做出合理的解释，提供理论指导。
在文献研究的基础上，本文指出资本结构与产品市场竞争产生联系的契约理论基础，即以企业契约属性为基础，以股东价值最大化为目标，反映现代契约理论的委托代理和控制权转移思想，是资本结构代理成本理论在企业产品市场的延伸。
本文分别从产品市场竞争、资本结构以及代理冲突三个角度考察资本结构与产品市场竞争的互动关系。首先，建立资本结构决策弹性期权模型，新“优序”融资理论合理解释了我国上市公司股权融资偏好行为，线性固定效应回归结果支持了模型结论，非线性回归结果则进一步表明，不同行业产品市场竞争因素对资本结构决策的作用程度不同，是融资弹性和融资成本权衡的结果；其次，延伸产品市场竞争资本结构理论的B-L经典模型，建立长期负债需求不确定条件联立方程，相应的实证结果表明，长期负债融资能够强化上市公司价格竞争能力，并通过价格与产量间的正向传递关系，同时强化其产量竞争能力，从而成为缓解煤炭行业过度竞争问题的新思路；最后，兼顾公司股东与债权人以及公司股东与经理间两类冲突，建立资本结构双重效应模型，引入交叉项的实证研究表明，资本结构与产品市场竞争及其互动关系都对公司代理成本具有重要影响，互动关系中，公司股权集中度越高，产品市场竞争的激励效果越弱，产品市场竞争与股权代理成本互补而与负债代理成本替代，结论对我国上市公司治理改革的实践具有重要理论指导作用。
资本结构与产品市场竞争联系的实质是代理冲突，契约冲突理论与转轨经济制度背景下的我国上市公司实际相联系，对企业行为、行业及公司治理问题进行了深刻剖析，给出了增加企业价值及深化市场体制改革的理论指导和政策建议，丰富了资本结构与产品市场竞争领域的研究。
With the inconsistence between neoclassical contract theory assumptions and the realities, moderncontract theory shifts its exogenous nature of paradigm to the endogenous one through the introductionof asymmetric information, bounded rationality and imperfect competition assumptions. Under thisbackground, capital structure theory develops a new system which has the agency conflicts amongshareholders, managers and debt creditors as the subject on the basis of modern system which focuseson tax and bankruptcy factors.
As an important branch of the new system, capital structure and product market competitiontheory makes the interaction of capital structure and product market competition decisions as the mainthread and reflects the agency conflicts of capital structure into the product market of the company. Itopens up a new channel by which capital structure affects the company value and becomes the frontierof capital structure contract theory. So far, the theory basis research and extensive empirical tests in thisfield are still needed. The thesis dedicates to the essence of the interaction and tries to give the practiceof China's listed companies some reasonable explanations and theoretical guidance by building modeland corresponding empirical analysis.
Based on the literature study, the thesis analyzes the contract theory basis of the link betweencapital structure and product market competition and draws the conclusion that the interaction betweenthem builds on the basis of enterprise contract attributes, makes maximizing shareholders value as theobjective and reflects principal-agent and control transfer ideas of modern contract theory. It is theextension of the agency cost theory of capital structure in enterprise product markets.
The interaction is studied from three perspectives, product market competition, capital structureand agency conflicts. Firstly, the thesis creates a flexibility option model of capital structuredecision-making. Its new “pecking order”theory gives an reasonable explanation to the equityfinancing preference behavior of China's listed companies. The linear fixed effects regression supportsthe conclusion of the model. The nonlinear regression further gives the evidence that differentindustries the degree of product market competition impacts on capital structure is different and that itis the trade-off results of financing flexibilities and financing costs. Secondly, the thesis extends theclassical B-L model and develops simultaneous equations under long-term demand uncertainty conditions. The corresponding empirical test shows that long-term debt financing can strengthen thelisted company's price competitiveness, and the product competitiveness can also be strengthen throughthe positive pass relationship between them. Thus it becomes the new idea to ease the problem ofexcessive competition in coal industry. Finally, with thinking of two types of agency conflicts amongshareholders, managers and debt creditors, the thesis establishes dual effects of capital structure model.The introduction of the cross-term empirical study shows that both capital structure and product marketcompetition and their interactions have an important role on the company agency costs. In thisinteraction, the higher the concentration of company stock, the weaker the incentive effects of productmarket competition, and there is a complementary relationship between product market competitionand equity agency costs and an alternative one between product market competition and debt agencycosts. The conclusions have important theoretical guidance roles on the practice of China's listedcompany governance reforms.
The nature of the link between capital structure and product market competition is agencyconflicts. The combination of contract conflict theory and practices of listed companies under thecontext of China's transition system, and the depth analysis on conducts of business, industries andcorporate governance issues, give the theory guidance and policy recommendations for increasingcorporate value and deepening market system reforms, and thus enrich the field of strategic capitalstructure research.
资本结构的产品市场竞争理论，作为新体系的一个重要分支，以公司资本结构决策与公司产品市场竞争决策的互动关系为主线，将资本结构的代理冲突问题反映到产品市场，开辟资本结构影响企业价值的新渠道，成为资本结构契约理论的前沿领域。但目前对该领域的研究，尚需理论基础的分析和实证检验的丰富。有鉴于此，本文致力于这一互动关系的实质，通过理论模型构建及相应的实证分析，试图对我国上市公司的实际，做出合理的解释，提供理论指导。
在文献研究的基础上，本文指出资本结构与产品市场竞争产生联系的契约理论基础，即以企业契约属性为基础，以股东价值最大化为目标，反映现代契约理论的委托代理和控制权转移思想，是资本结构代理成本理论在企业产品市场的延伸。
本文分别从产品市场竞争、资本结构以及代理冲突三个角度考察资本结构与产品市场竞争的互动关系。首先，建立资本结构决策弹性期权模型，新“优序”融资理论合理解释了我国上市公司股权融资偏好行为，线性固定效应回归结果支持了模型结论，非线性回归结果则进一步表明，不同行业产品市场竞争因素对资本结构决策的作用程度不同，是融资弹性和融资成本权衡的结果；其次，延伸产品市场竞争资本结构理论的B-L经典模型，建立长期负债需求不确定条件联立方程，相应的实证结果表明，长期负债融资能够强化上市公司价格竞争能力，并通过价格与产量间的正向传递关系，同时强化其产量竞争能力，从而成为缓解煤炭行业过度竞争问题的新思路；最后，兼顾公司股东与债权人以及公司股东与经理间两类冲突，建立资本结构双重效应模型，引入交叉项的实证研究表明，资本结构与产品市场竞争及其互动关系都对公司代理成本具有重要影响，互动关系中，公司股权集中度越高，产品市场竞争的激励效果越弱，产品市场竞争与股权代理成本互补而与负债代理成本替代，结论对我国上市公司治理改革的实践具有重要理论指导作用。
资本结构与产品市场竞争联系的实质是代理冲突，契约冲突理论与转轨经济制度背景下的我国上市公司实际相联系，对企业行为、行业及公司治理问题进行了深刻剖析，给出了增加企业价值及深化市场体制改革的理论指导和政策建议，丰富了资本结构与产品市场竞争领域的研究。
With the inconsistence between neoclassical contract theory assumptions and the realities, moderncontract theory shifts its exogenous nature of paradigm to the endogenous one through the introductionof asymmetric information, bounded rationality and imperfect competition assumptions. Under thisbackground, capital structure theory develops a new system which has the agency conflicts amongshareholders, managers and debt creditors as the subject on the basis of modern system which focuseson tax and bankruptcy factors.
As an important branch of the new system, capital structure and product market competitiontheory makes the interaction of capital structure and product market competition decisions as the mainthread and reflects the agency conflicts of capital structure into the product market of the company. Itopens up a new channel by which capital structure affects the company value and becomes the frontierof capital structure contract theory. So far, the theory basis research and extensive empirical tests in thisfield are still needed. The thesis dedicates to the essence of the interaction and tries to give the practiceof China's listed companies some reasonable explanations and theoretical guidance by building modeland corresponding empirical analysis.
Based on the literature study, the thesis analyzes the contract theory basis of the link betweencapital structure and product market competition and draws the conclusion that the interaction betweenthem builds on the basis of enterprise contract attributes, makes maximizing shareholders value as theobjective and reflects principal-agent and control transfer ideas of modern contract theory. It is theextension of the agency cost theory of capital structure in enterprise product markets.
The interaction is studied from three perspectives, product market competition, capital structureand agency conflicts. Firstly, the thesis creates a flexibility option model of capital structuredecision-making. Its new “pecking order”theory gives an reasonable explanation to the equityfinancing preference behavior of China's listed companies. The linear fixed effects regression supportsthe conclusion of the model. The nonlinear regression further gives the evidence that differentindustries the degree of product market competition impacts on capital structure is different and that itis the trade-off results of financing flexibilities and financing costs. Secondly, the thesis extends theclassical B-L model and develops simultaneous equations under long-term demand uncertainty conditions. The corresponding empirical test shows that long-term debt financing can strengthen thelisted company's price competitiveness, and the product competitiveness can also be strengthen throughthe positive pass relationship between them. Thus it becomes the new idea to ease the problem ofexcessive competition in coal industry. Finally, with thinking of two types of agency conflicts amongshareholders, managers and debt creditors, the thesis establishes dual effects of capital structure model.The introduction of the cross-term empirical study shows that both capital structure and product marketcompetition and their interactions have an important role on the company agency costs. In thisinteraction, the higher the concentration of company stock, the weaker the incentive effects of productmarket competition, and there is a complementary relationship between product market competitionand equity agency costs and an alternative one between product market competition and debt agencycosts. The conclusions have important theoretical guidance roles on the practice of China's listedcompany governance reforms.
The nature of the link between capital structure and product market competition is agencyconflicts. The combination of contract conflict theory and practices of listed companies under thecontext of China's transition system, and the depth analysis on conducts of business, industries andcorporate governance issues, give the theory guidance and policy recommendations for increasingcorporate value and deepening market system reforms, and thus enrich the field of strategic capitalstructure research.
引文
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