我国垄断行业企业高管薪酬制度研究
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摘要
近年来,高管薪酬一直是一个关注多、争议大的话题,尤其是垄断行业和非垄断行业高管薪酬之间的不平衡,使得垄断行业企业高管薪酬的合理性和合法性广受质疑。本文以我国垄断行业企业高管薪酬为主要研究对象,设计高管薪酬等多个变量,采用“垄断——高管行为——企业绩效——高管薪酬——高管行为”的思路,综合运用委托代理理论和管理层权力理论,研究我国垄断行业企业高管薪酬的影响变量及是否存在高管自定薪酬的行为,以期为我国垄断行业企业高管薪酬激励机制的完善提供经验证据。
论文研究内容主要包括五个方面：一是垄断行业企业高管薪酬的影响因素研究。确立垄断行业企业高管薪酬制度分析的逻辑起点,揭示企业绩效、公司治理机制、企业基本特征、高管控制权和权变因素等与高管薪酬的内在关系,为构建垄断行业企业高管薪酬制度的理论范式提供依据。二是垄断行业企业高管薪酬制度的理论研究。利用柯布—道格拉斯式生产函数,直接将垄断优势、代理人的代理能力水平、代理人的努力程度三个因素引入到模型中,发现垄断优势放大了代理人的努力成果；垄断优势和代理人的能力水平均正向影响委托代理效果；代理人的风险规避度负向影响激励强度；外界环境的干扰负向影响代理人努力的成果。三是垄断行业企业高管薪酬测度指标的确定。垄断行业企业高管薪酬分为显性薪酬和隐性薪酬两大类,具体划分为短期激励、长期激励、权力薪酬和垄断租金薪酬四部分。行业竞争度、企业基本特征和公司治理机制等内、外部因素一起作用于高管薪酬激励机制,行业竞争度也影响着企业基本特征和公司治理机制。四是垄断行业企业高管薪酬的实证研究。选取2003-2010年间699个垄断行业企业观测值和4494个非垄断行业企业观测值为样本,利用面板数据模型,建立垄断行业企业高管薪酬制度分析的实证检验模型,提出相关理论假设,对垄断行业企业高管薪酬问题进行了详细地研究。五是完善我国垄断行业企业高管薪酬制度的政策建议。主要包括：合理确定垄断企业高管薪酬制度影响因素的重要作用；建立科学的企业绩效考核体系,客观公正地评估垄断行业企业绩效；拓宽高管激励渠道,引入多元化、多层次的激励工具；约束高管权力,规范垄断行业企业高管薪酬制度的内在支持；适度引入竞争,处理不合理的高管薪酬差异,缩小行业收入差距等。
论文的主要结论是：一是在“高管行为——企业绩效——高管薪酬——高管行为”这个动态、封闭的循环系统中,垄断优势夸大了垄断行业企业高管努力的成果,企业的高产出更可能是“好运气”而非代理人努力的结果。尤其是在不充足的现金流和较高的资产负债率的情况下,仍然维持较高的高管薪酬水平,是不合理的。二是与非垄断行业相比,垄断行业企业高管薪酬的总体特征是“高且稳定”。二者间在职消费的差异异常明显,但垄断行业企业的运营效率和薪酬结构中的长期激励明显弱于非垄断行业组；垄断行业普遍存在着较高的垄断租金薪酬,且其主要来源是企业的垄断利润；垄断行业企业高管有着高且稳定的管理层权力,高管更偏好于利用权力对会计业绩进行操纵从而获取更高的绩效薪酬,以及获取在职消费等隐性薪酬,而且在职消费的增加并未影响到货币性薪酬的减少,而非垄断行业企业高管更偏好于货币性薪酬等显性薪酬；垄断行业企业高管除了享有比非垄断行业组更高的货币薪酬外,还会通过增加业绩薪酬权重和规模薪酬权重,从而增加更为隐蔽的隐性薪酬——在职消费。三是垄断行业企业高管人员的权力寻租行为导致其薪酬出现“异质性”,我国垄断行业高管薪酬已经走进了一个“尺蠖效应”的怪圈。一方面表现为货币薪酬能升不能降的刚性特征,另一方面,表现为在职消费和垄断租金薪酬水平的非对称性增大。
论文的创新之处：一是完善了我国垄断行业企业高管薪酬制度的理论模型。将垄断优势、代理人的代理能力水平、代理人的努力程度这三个因素引入柯布——道格拉斯生产函数,构建了垄断行业企业高管薪酬制度的一般委托代理模型,并对其做了进一步地拓展,优化了多任务委托代理关系中的薪酬激励机制。二是建立了我国垄断行业企业高管薪酬的测度指标体系。针对我国垄断行业企业设定其适用的高管薪酬测度指标,包括货币性薪酬、长期薪酬、权力薪酬和垄断租金薪酬。由于权力薪酬、垄断租金薪酬的难以计量性,目前对此做实证研究的文献较少。本文拟在此方面有所突破。三是提出了完善我国垄断行业企业高管薪酬制度的政策建议。主要包括：合理确定我国垄断行业企业高管薪酬制度的影响因素；建立科学的企业绩效考核体系；约束高管权力,优化垄断行业企业高管薪酬制度的内在支持等。
Recent years, the executive pay has always been a concerned and controversial topic, especially the imbalance of the executive pay between monopoly and non-monopoly industries, which makes the rationality and legitimacy of the enterprise executive pay in monopoly industries widely questioned. Taken the enterprise executive pay of monopoly industries in our country as the main research subject, this thesis is to research the impact variables of the executive pay in monopoly industries and whether the executives make the payment by themselves, in order to provide enough experience to perfect the incentive mechanism of executive pay of monopoly industries in our country, through designing several variables, such as the executive pay, adopting the thought of "monopoly-executive behavior-corporate performance-executive payment-executive behavior" and comprehensively conducting the applicability of the principal-agent theory and the power theory of the management.
Five parts are mainly discussed in the thesis. The first part is to study the influencing factors of the enterprise executive pay in monopoly industries by establishing the logical starting point of the analysis of the system of the enterprise executive pay in monopoly industries and revealing the intrinsic relationship between executive payment with the enterprise performance, corporate governance mechanism, corporate basic characteristics, executive control, and contingency factors, to provide the basis to the theory construction of the system of the corporate executive pay in monopoly industries. The second part is about the theoretical study of the corporate executive pay in monopoly industries. Monopoly advantage, the capacity level of the agent and the degree of the agent's effort are directly introduced into the model by using Cobb-Douglas production function. Conclusions have been drawn that the monopolistic advantages amplifies agents'efforts; the monopoly advantages and the capacity level of the agent had a positive influence on the principal-agent effect; the degree of agent's risk aversion impacts the excitation intensity negatively; the interference of the external environment impacts the achievements of the agents. The third part is to define the measuring index of the corporate executive pay in monopoly industries. The corporate executive pay in monopoly industries is divided into two categories of dominant and recessive salary and is classified specifically into four parts including short-term incentives, long-term incentives, the power's payment and renting payment in monopoly. The internal and external factors play a role in the pay incentives together, such as the degree of competition in the industry, the basic characteristics of the enterprise and the corporate governance mechanisms. The degree of competition in the industry also affects the basic characteristics and the corporate governance mechanism. The fourth part is about the empirical research of the corporate executive pay in monopoly industries. Taken the observed values of699enterprises in monopoly industries and4,494enterprises in non-monopoly industries from2003to2010as the sample, the relevant theoretical assumptions are put forward to make a detailed research on the problems of the corporate executive pay in monopoly industries through making use of panel data model to set up the empirical test model of the analysis of the corporate executive pay in monopoly industries. The fifth aspect was to perfect the policy proposals of the corporate executive pay in monopoly industries. They are as follows. It is important to make sure the influencing factors of the system of the corporate executive pay in the monopoly industries. It should establish a scientific appraisal system of the enterprise performance and evaluate the enterprise performance objectively and justly. It can expand executive excitation channels and lead into diversified and multi-level motivational tool. It should restrict the power of the executives and regulate the internal support of the corporate executive pay in monopoly industries. It can introduce competition moderately, process unreasonable executive pay differences and reduce the Industries'income gap-
Here are the main conclusions of the thesis. First, in the "executive behavior-corporate performance-executive compensation-executive behavior" dynamic and closed loop system, the monopoly advantage exaggerates the efforts of the corporate executive pay in the monopoly industries. The high output of the enterprise is more likely the result of efforts by the "good luck" rather than agents. Especially in the case of insufficient cash flow and higher asset-liability ratio, it is unreasonable to maintain a high level of the executive pay all the time. Second, though the long-term incentives in the operational efficiency and the pay structure of the enterprises in monopoly industries is significantly weaker than the group of the non-monopoly industries, the main performance of the corporate executive pay between monopoly and non-monopoly industries is that the executive of the enterprise in monopoly industries had a high and stable pay, especially the job consumption is very obvious; The higher monopoly rents pay is widespread and its main source is from the monopoly profits of the enterprise; The executives in monopoly industries have high and stable management powers. They prefer using the power to manipulating accounting in order to gain a higher performance pay and access to the job consumption and other recessive remuneration. Moreover, the addition of the job consumption does not affect the reduction of monetary remuneration. However, the non-monopoly industries prefer for monetary remuneration; a executive in monopoly industry not only enjoys a higher monetary remuneration than the non-monopoly industry group, but also increase the more subtle recessive remuneration-job consumption by opening out the weights of the performance pay and the scale of remuneration. Third, the power rent-seeking behavior lead to their pay was heterogeneity. Our country's executive pay in monopoly industries has walked into an "inchworm" effect of the cycle. On the one hand, it expresses as the rigid characteristics that the monetary remuneration can only go up but can not down. On the other hand, the asymmetry of job consumption and monopoly rents pay has increased.
The innovations of this thesis are four points. Firstly, it builds a theoretical model of the system of the corporate executive pay in our country's monopoly industries. On the one hand, it cites the monopoly advantage, the level of the agent's ability and the level of the agent's effort into Cobb-Douglas production function, and builds a general principal-agent model of the system of the corporate executive pay in our country's monopoly industries; On the other hand, when taking into account the reality, agents were often faced with multiple tasks. So the principal-agent model was further expanded, and the pay incentives in the multi-task agency relationship are optimized. Secondly, it establishes the measurement index system of the corporate executive pay in our country's monopoly industries. In accordance with the corporate executive pay in our country's monopoly industries, it establishes the applicable measurement index of the corporate executive pay, including monetary remuneration, long-term remuneration, the remuneration of power and monopoly rents pay. Due to the power remuneration and monopoly rents pay are difficult to measure, and this literature of the empirical research is less currently. So this paper has a breakthrough in this regard. Thirdly, it puts forward the proposed policy recommendations to improve the system of the corporate executive pay in the monopoly industries. It includes determining the Influencing factors of the system of the corporate executive pay in our country's monopoly industries reasonably, establishing a scientific appraisal system of the enterprise performance, constraining executive powers, and optimizing the internal support of the system of the corporate executive pay in monopoly industries.
论文研究内容主要包括五个方面：一是垄断行业企业高管薪酬的影响因素研究。确立垄断行业企业高管薪酬制度分析的逻辑起点,揭示企业绩效、公司治理机制、企业基本特征、高管控制权和权变因素等与高管薪酬的内在关系,为构建垄断行业企业高管薪酬制度的理论范式提供依据。二是垄断行业企业高管薪酬制度的理论研究。利用柯布—道格拉斯式生产函数,直接将垄断优势、代理人的代理能力水平、代理人的努力程度三个因素引入到模型中,发现垄断优势放大了代理人的努力成果；垄断优势和代理人的能力水平均正向影响委托代理效果；代理人的风险规避度负向影响激励强度；外界环境的干扰负向影响代理人努力的成果。三是垄断行业企业高管薪酬测度指标的确定。垄断行业企业高管薪酬分为显性薪酬和隐性薪酬两大类,具体划分为短期激励、长期激励、权力薪酬和垄断租金薪酬四部分。行业竞争度、企业基本特征和公司治理机制等内、外部因素一起作用于高管薪酬激励机制,行业竞争度也影响着企业基本特征和公司治理机制。四是垄断行业企业高管薪酬的实证研究。选取2003-2010年间699个垄断行业企业观测值和4494个非垄断行业企业观测值为样本,利用面板数据模型,建立垄断行业企业高管薪酬制度分析的实证检验模型,提出相关理论假设,对垄断行业企业高管薪酬问题进行了详细地研究。五是完善我国垄断行业企业高管薪酬制度的政策建议。主要包括：合理确定垄断企业高管薪酬制度影响因素的重要作用；建立科学的企业绩效考核体系,客观公正地评估垄断行业企业绩效；拓宽高管激励渠道,引入多元化、多层次的激励工具；约束高管权力,规范垄断行业企业高管薪酬制度的内在支持；适度引入竞争,处理不合理的高管薪酬差异,缩小行业收入差距等。
论文的主要结论是：一是在“高管行为——企业绩效——高管薪酬——高管行为”这个动态、封闭的循环系统中,垄断优势夸大了垄断行业企业高管努力的成果,企业的高产出更可能是“好运气”而非代理人努力的结果。尤其是在不充足的现金流和较高的资产负债率的情况下,仍然维持较高的高管薪酬水平,是不合理的。二是与非垄断行业相比,垄断行业企业高管薪酬的总体特征是“高且稳定”。二者间在职消费的差异异常明显,但垄断行业企业的运营效率和薪酬结构中的长期激励明显弱于非垄断行业组；垄断行业普遍存在着较高的垄断租金薪酬,且其主要来源是企业的垄断利润；垄断行业企业高管有着高且稳定的管理层权力,高管更偏好于利用权力对会计业绩进行操纵从而获取更高的绩效薪酬,以及获取在职消费等隐性薪酬,而且在职消费的增加并未影响到货币性薪酬的减少,而非垄断行业企业高管更偏好于货币性薪酬等显性薪酬；垄断行业企业高管除了享有比非垄断行业组更高的货币薪酬外,还会通过增加业绩薪酬权重和规模薪酬权重,从而增加更为隐蔽的隐性薪酬——在职消费。三是垄断行业企业高管人员的权力寻租行为导致其薪酬出现“异质性”,我国垄断行业高管薪酬已经走进了一个“尺蠖效应”的怪圈。一方面表现为货币薪酬能升不能降的刚性特征,另一方面,表现为在职消费和垄断租金薪酬水平的非对称性增大。
论文的创新之处：一是完善了我国垄断行业企业高管薪酬制度的理论模型。将垄断优势、代理人的代理能力水平、代理人的努力程度这三个因素引入柯布——道格拉斯生产函数,构建了垄断行业企业高管薪酬制度的一般委托代理模型,并对其做了进一步地拓展,优化了多任务委托代理关系中的薪酬激励机制。二是建立了我国垄断行业企业高管薪酬的测度指标体系。针对我国垄断行业企业设定其适用的高管薪酬测度指标,包括货币性薪酬、长期薪酬、权力薪酬和垄断租金薪酬。由于权力薪酬、垄断租金薪酬的难以计量性,目前对此做实证研究的文献较少。本文拟在此方面有所突破。三是提出了完善我国垄断行业企业高管薪酬制度的政策建议。主要包括：合理确定我国垄断行业企业高管薪酬制度的影响因素；建立科学的企业绩效考核体系；约束高管权力,优化垄断行业企业高管薪酬制度的内在支持等。
Recent years, the executive pay has always been a concerned and controversial topic, especially the imbalance of the executive pay between monopoly and non-monopoly industries, which makes the rationality and legitimacy of the enterprise executive pay in monopoly industries widely questioned. Taken the enterprise executive pay of monopoly industries in our country as the main research subject, this thesis is to research the impact variables of the executive pay in monopoly industries and whether the executives make the payment by themselves, in order to provide enough experience to perfect the incentive mechanism of executive pay of monopoly industries in our country, through designing several variables, such as the executive pay, adopting the thought of "monopoly-executive behavior-corporate performance-executive payment-executive behavior" and comprehensively conducting the applicability of the principal-agent theory and the power theory of the management.
Five parts are mainly discussed in the thesis. The first part is to study the influencing factors of the enterprise executive pay in monopoly industries by establishing the logical starting point of the analysis of the system of the enterprise executive pay in monopoly industries and revealing the intrinsic relationship between executive payment with the enterprise performance, corporate governance mechanism, corporate basic characteristics, executive control, and contingency factors, to provide the basis to the theory construction of the system of the corporate executive pay in monopoly industries. The second part is about the theoretical study of the corporate executive pay in monopoly industries. Monopoly advantage, the capacity level of the agent and the degree of the agent's effort are directly introduced into the model by using Cobb-Douglas production function. Conclusions have been drawn that the monopolistic advantages amplifies agents'efforts; the monopoly advantages and the capacity level of the agent had a positive influence on the principal-agent effect; the degree of agent's risk aversion impacts the excitation intensity negatively; the interference of the external environment impacts the achievements of the agents. The third part is to define the measuring index of the corporate executive pay in monopoly industries. The corporate executive pay in monopoly industries is divided into two categories of dominant and recessive salary and is classified specifically into four parts including short-term incentives, long-term incentives, the power's payment and renting payment in monopoly. The internal and external factors play a role in the pay incentives together, such as the degree of competition in the industry, the basic characteristics of the enterprise and the corporate governance mechanisms. The degree of competition in the industry also affects the basic characteristics and the corporate governance mechanism. The fourth part is about the empirical research of the corporate executive pay in monopoly industries. Taken the observed values of699enterprises in monopoly industries and4,494enterprises in non-monopoly industries from2003to2010as the sample, the relevant theoretical assumptions are put forward to make a detailed research on the problems of the corporate executive pay in monopoly industries through making use of panel data model to set up the empirical test model of the analysis of the corporate executive pay in monopoly industries. The fifth aspect was to perfect the policy proposals of the corporate executive pay in monopoly industries. They are as follows. It is important to make sure the influencing factors of the system of the corporate executive pay in the monopoly industries. It should establish a scientific appraisal system of the enterprise performance and evaluate the enterprise performance objectively and justly. It can expand executive excitation channels and lead into diversified and multi-level motivational tool. It should restrict the power of the executives and regulate the internal support of the corporate executive pay in monopoly industries. It can introduce competition moderately, process unreasonable executive pay differences and reduce the Industries'income gap-
Here are the main conclusions of the thesis. First, in the "executive behavior-corporate performance-executive compensation-executive behavior" dynamic and closed loop system, the monopoly advantage exaggerates the efforts of the corporate executive pay in the monopoly industries. The high output of the enterprise is more likely the result of efforts by the "good luck" rather than agents. Especially in the case of insufficient cash flow and higher asset-liability ratio, it is unreasonable to maintain a high level of the executive pay all the time. Second, though the long-term incentives in the operational efficiency and the pay structure of the enterprises in monopoly industries is significantly weaker than the group of the non-monopoly industries, the main performance of the corporate executive pay between monopoly and non-monopoly industries is that the executive of the enterprise in monopoly industries had a high and stable pay, especially the job consumption is very obvious; The higher monopoly rents pay is widespread and its main source is from the monopoly profits of the enterprise; The executives in monopoly industries have high and stable management powers. They prefer using the power to manipulating accounting in order to gain a higher performance pay and access to the job consumption and other recessive remuneration. Moreover, the addition of the job consumption does not affect the reduction of monetary remuneration. However, the non-monopoly industries prefer for monetary remuneration; a executive in monopoly industry not only enjoys a higher monetary remuneration than the non-monopoly industry group, but also increase the more subtle recessive remuneration-job consumption by opening out the weights of the performance pay and the scale of remuneration. Third, the power rent-seeking behavior lead to their pay was heterogeneity. Our country's executive pay in monopoly industries has walked into an "inchworm" effect of the cycle. On the one hand, it expresses as the rigid characteristics that the monetary remuneration can only go up but can not down. On the other hand, the asymmetry of job consumption and monopoly rents pay has increased.
The innovations of this thesis are four points. Firstly, it builds a theoretical model of the system of the corporate executive pay in our country's monopoly industries. On the one hand, it cites the monopoly advantage, the level of the agent's ability and the level of the agent's effort into Cobb-Douglas production function, and builds a general principal-agent model of the system of the corporate executive pay in our country's monopoly industries; On the other hand, when taking into account the reality, agents were often faced with multiple tasks. So the principal-agent model was further expanded, and the pay incentives in the multi-task agency relationship are optimized. Secondly, it establishes the measurement index system of the corporate executive pay in our country's monopoly industries. In accordance with the corporate executive pay in our country's monopoly industries, it establishes the applicable measurement index of the corporate executive pay, including monetary remuneration, long-term remuneration, the remuneration of power and monopoly rents pay. Due to the power remuneration and monopoly rents pay are difficult to measure, and this literature of the empirical research is less currently. So this paper has a breakthrough in this regard. Thirdly, it puts forward the proposed policy recommendations to improve the system of the corporate executive pay in the monopoly industries. It includes determining the Influencing factors of the system of the corporate executive pay in our country's monopoly industries reasonably, establishing a scientific appraisal system of the enterprise performance, constraining executive powers, and optimizing the internal support of the system of the corporate executive pay in monopoly industries.
引文
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② PER是price-earnings ratio的英文缩写；PBR是price-book ratio的英文缩写；SP是Stock Price的英文缩写；SR是Stock returns的英文缩写：CVC是Changes in the value of the company的英文缩写。
③ 80%以上的垄断行业企业属于国有性质,考察其资产保值增值率对于衡量国有资产的保值增值状况有着重要意义。
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③ “金色降落伞(Golden Parachute)指按照公司控制权变动条款的规定,在雇用合同中对被迫离职(不是由于自身的工作原因)的管理人员进行补偿的分离规定。一般地,企业在员工被迫离职时会向其提供一大笔“离职金”,其目的是减少股东与高管人员之间的利益冲突,降低高管人员在抵制被迫离职过程中的交易成本,从而接受这种可以为股东带来某种利益的控制权变动。所谓“金色”是指丰厚的补偿,“降落伞”则寓意高管人员在控制权变动过程中的平稳过渡。“金色降落伞”计划的执行在西方国家主要应用于高管人员在企业收购兼并过程中被解雇时的补偿,在我国则主要用于解决企业历史遗留问题,以弥补企业元老在退休前后物质利益和心理的落差。
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④ 从本文的描述性统计可以发现,与竞争行业企业相比,垄断行业企业有着较大规模和较高的企业绩效。
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④ 为了研究问题的方便,这里假定行业存在一个合理的正常净资产收益率。
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② PER是price-earnings ratio的英文缩写；PBR是price-book ratio的英文缩写；SP是Stock Price的英文缩写；SR是Stock returns的英文缩写：CVC是Changes in the value of the company的英文缩写。
③ 80%以上的垄断行业企业属于国有性质,考察其资产保值增值率对于衡量国有资产的保值增值状况有着重要意义。
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④ 从本文的描述性统计可以发现,与竞争行业企业相比,垄断行业企业有着较大规模和较高的企业绩效。
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