基于公司治理的预算松驰研究
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摘要
预算这一管理控制方法在上个世纪后期从西方引入到我国企业中以来,在实务界及学术界得到很大发展。但由于预算控制带来的很多副面作用使得预算受到越来越多的批判,预算松驰行为是预算副作用的一个主要方面。预算松弛导致各层预算代理人出于私利而高估成本、低估收入,以操纵经营业绩,导致企业资源配置的效率下降,造成预算管理形同虚设。
由于我国企业预算管理实践中预算松驰问题也非常突出,近年来国内一些学者逐步借鉴国外研究成果开始探讨预算松驰成因,以便为解决预算松驰问题提供一些思路。然而已有相关研究中明显存在着一些不足,一方面在研究视角上,直接借鉴国外研究成果将预算松驰成因探讨的重点放在预算本身的设计和行为等方面,而忽视了预算执行的制度背景对预算产生的根本影响；另一方面在研究深度上,这些研究直接将某些影响预算松驰的成因找出来,而对这些因素如何影响及在什么条件下影响的影响机理缺乏深入的研究。西方相关管理会计方面研究认识到过去研究中所存在的问题,从制度视角来理解管理会计领域发生的新变化已成为当前西方管理会计研究领域的一个重要方面。
鉴于已有研究存在的问题,考虑到我国特殊的制度背景,结合企业中公司治理与预算管理系统两者的紧密联系,本文基于契约理论与管理控制理论,系统地研究公司治理(公司层面治理因素)对预算松驰行为的影响。主要的研究内容如下：
(1)从理论上分析公司治理与预算松驰的关系。本文基于契约理论探讨公司治理与预算管理关系,从契约角度来看,预算管理是公司治理契约中的具体契约,公司治理这一总体契约必然影响预算契约的执行效果。从管理控制理论来看,位于企业不同层次的管理控制系统必然具有相互关系,公司治理是内部控制系统第一层次及上层建筑,对预算管理控制产生决定性影响。本文还通过建立具体地动态预算博弈模型,推导出在影响预算松驰的因素中,公司治理因素是一重要因素。
(2)通过实证研究公司治理结构对于预算松驰的影响程度与性质,同时对公司治理影响预算松驰的某些机理进行了考查。由于战略管理相关理论认为,战略管理是公司治理与企业管理的连接点,我们重点考查战略管理中多元化战略是否作为中介变量对两者关系起到一个联接作用。在影响的机理中,本文还考查环境不确定性作为两者关系调节变量的情况。通过搜集上市公司年报中自愿披露的预算信息,我们通过多元回归实证证明公司治理各因素对于预算松驰影响的大小与方向,深入考查中介变量及调节变量对两者关系的影响。
(3)研究预算松驰的经济后果。预算松驰行为产生后对企业业绩影响如何,这是对预算松驰行为性质的一个判断。先通过多元回归,认识预算松驰本身对经济业绩的影响；再通过建立联立方程,考查了公司治理、预算松驰、经营业绩三者的关系,为基于公司治理控制预算松驰行为提供进一步的理论依据。
通过实证研究,本文得出如下研究结论：
(1)公司治理因素中股权性质、股权制衡、管理层持股对预算管理效果形成了显著影响。国有企业较民营企业有着更大的预算松驰值,说明总体来看民营企业的预算管理控制较国有企业做得更好。其他大股东的制衡对预算松驰有显著的抑制作用。管理层持股与预算松驰有着显著的负相关,说明管理层持股这一作为解决代理问题的激励机制能减少企业预算松驰的程度。
(2)多元化战略管理未形成公司治理各因素影响预算管理的中介效应。战略管理没能对公司治理影响预算管理产生显著的中介效应,其主要原因可能是我国多数企业的战略管理还没有对预算管理起到一个指导性作用。
(3)公司治理在影响预算松驰时受到了环境不确定性的调节。各企业所面临的环境不确定性不同时,公司治理对预算松驰的作用也不相同。股权制衡对预算松驰的影响受到环境不确定性的调节,当企业环境不确定性逐步增大时,股权制衡的抑制作用逐步降低。管理层持股与预算松驰的关系也受到了环境不确定性的显著调节。
(4)预算松驰对企业当期业绩产生了显著的负面效果。通过联立方程考查公司治理、预算松驰、经营业绩三者的关系时得出,公司治理中管理层持股、股制制衡越大时,预算松驰越小,企业经营业绩越好。说明在样本企业中预算松驰中更多部分是由于代理问题而产生的,代理人自利行为产生的预算松驰在公司治理结构良好的情况下较低,最终促使企业业绩提升
Budget have achieved great development in the academic or in the practical community since it has been introduced into China from the West in the end of the last century. In practical fields budget has been more and more criticized by practitioners and academics.
Budgetary control has brought a lot of side-effects which makes the budget caught in controversy. Budget slack behavior is a major aspect of the budget side effects. Budgetary slack is a very prominent problem in our budget management practices. In recent years, many scholars began to gradually study the reasons of budgetary slack based on the foreign research in order to solve the problem of budgetary slack. However, there are still some shortcomings in existing research. On the one hand, study perspective is a problem. By referring to foreign research scholars think the design and behavior of budget system are the main causes of budget slack.However, they ignored the system background of the budget execution. On the other hand the depth of the study is another problem. These studies only directly found the causes of the budgetary slack These problems such as how these factors impact budgetary slack and under what conditions these factors affect it have not been studed yet. It has become an important aspect of the research from the system perspective to understand the field of management accounting change occurred in the new Western management accounting.
In view of the problems in existing research, this article studed systematicly how corporate governance (corporate level management factors) affects budgetary slack based on contract theory and management control theory. The main contents are as follows:
①This paper analyzed the theoretical relationship between corporate governance and budgetary slack. Based on contract theory and management control theory this paper studed the relationship between corporate governance and budgetary slack. We think corporate governance is an important factor affecting the budgetary slack through the establishment and analyzing of the budget game model.
②Empirical studies have shown the nature and to what extent and corporate governance affected budgetary slack. This paper also studed the effect of the strategic management as a mediator and the effect of environmental uncertainty as a moderator between corporate governance and budgetary slack. Our study proved the size and direction of corporate governance factors affecting the budgetary slack by multiple regression analysis of voluntary disclosure about the budget in listed companies.
③This paper studied the economic consequences of budgetary slack.We examined the relationship among corporate governance, budget slack and the performance through the establishment of simultaneous equations.This can provides a further theoretical proof of solving the problem of budgetary slack.
By empirical research, we draws the following conclusions:
①Stock nature, power balance with shareholder structure, management ownership significantly influenced the budget management system. State-owned enterprises have a larger budgetar slack value than private enterprises, which indicated overall budget management and control of private enterprise was better than state-owned enterprises. Other major shareholders power balance significantly inhibited the budgetary slack. This conclusion verified the results of current related research from another perspective which other large shareholders can play an active role in corporate governance. Managerial Ownership and budget slack has a significant negative correlation, which indicates that management shareholdings as incentive mechanism of solving the agency problem can reduce the extent of budgetary slack, management ownership has played a positive effect in budget system.
②iversified strategic management has not been an mediator between the corporate governance and budget management. Diversified strategic management has been a significant moderator between the power balance with shareholder structure and budgetary slack. As the strategic management of most enterprises in China have not played a guiding role on the budgetary management, strategic management failed to be a mediator.When the strategic management has been a moderator between the power balance with shareholder structure and budgetary slack, the power balance can play a greater inhibition on slack as the higher degree of business diversification.
③Environmental uncertainty moderates the relationship between corporate governance and budgetary slack. Environmental uncertainty moderates the relationship between power balance and the slack. When environmental uncertainty is low, the slack significantly is inhibited by the power balance with shareholder structure. When environmental uncertainty is high, power balance can not play a significant inhibition on slack. The relationship between the managerial ownership and budgetary slack has also been significantly adjusted by environmental uncertainty. When environmental uncertainty is lower, management ownership can play a greater the negative effect on slack.
④Budget slack had a significant negative effect on current performance of the enterprise. We examined the relationship among corporate governance, budget slack and performance through simultaneous equations. The greater managerial ownership and the power balance, the lower budgetary slack,and the better business performance is. This conclusion has shown that budgetary slack has been mainly caused by agency problems.Budgetary slack produced by agents self-serving behavior was lower when corporate governance structure is good, which improve the performance. To some extent this conclusion shows the nature of the current budgetary slack in business.
由于我国企业预算管理实践中预算松驰问题也非常突出,近年来国内一些学者逐步借鉴国外研究成果开始探讨预算松驰成因,以便为解决预算松驰问题提供一些思路。然而已有相关研究中明显存在着一些不足,一方面在研究视角上,直接借鉴国外研究成果将预算松驰成因探讨的重点放在预算本身的设计和行为等方面,而忽视了预算执行的制度背景对预算产生的根本影响；另一方面在研究深度上,这些研究直接将某些影响预算松驰的成因找出来,而对这些因素如何影响及在什么条件下影响的影响机理缺乏深入的研究。西方相关管理会计方面研究认识到过去研究中所存在的问题,从制度视角来理解管理会计领域发生的新变化已成为当前西方管理会计研究领域的一个重要方面。
鉴于已有研究存在的问题,考虑到我国特殊的制度背景,结合企业中公司治理与预算管理系统两者的紧密联系,本文基于契约理论与管理控制理论,系统地研究公司治理(公司层面治理因素)对预算松驰行为的影响。主要的研究内容如下：
(1)从理论上分析公司治理与预算松驰的关系。本文基于契约理论探讨公司治理与预算管理关系,从契约角度来看,预算管理是公司治理契约中的具体契约,公司治理这一总体契约必然影响预算契约的执行效果。从管理控制理论来看,位于企业不同层次的管理控制系统必然具有相互关系,公司治理是内部控制系统第一层次及上层建筑,对预算管理控制产生决定性影响。本文还通过建立具体地动态预算博弈模型,推导出在影响预算松驰的因素中,公司治理因素是一重要因素。
(2)通过实证研究公司治理结构对于预算松驰的影响程度与性质,同时对公司治理影响预算松驰的某些机理进行了考查。由于战略管理相关理论认为,战略管理是公司治理与企业管理的连接点,我们重点考查战略管理中多元化战略是否作为中介变量对两者关系起到一个联接作用。在影响的机理中,本文还考查环境不确定性作为两者关系调节变量的情况。通过搜集上市公司年报中自愿披露的预算信息,我们通过多元回归实证证明公司治理各因素对于预算松驰影响的大小与方向,深入考查中介变量及调节变量对两者关系的影响。
(3)研究预算松驰的经济后果。预算松驰行为产生后对企业业绩影响如何,这是对预算松驰行为性质的一个判断。先通过多元回归,认识预算松驰本身对经济业绩的影响；再通过建立联立方程,考查了公司治理、预算松驰、经营业绩三者的关系,为基于公司治理控制预算松驰行为提供进一步的理论依据。
通过实证研究,本文得出如下研究结论：
(1)公司治理因素中股权性质、股权制衡、管理层持股对预算管理效果形成了显著影响。国有企业较民营企业有着更大的预算松驰值,说明总体来看民营企业的预算管理控制较国有企业做得更好。其他大股东的制衡对预算松驰有显著的抑制作用。管理层持股与预算松驰有着显著的负相关,说明管理层持股这一作为解决代理问题的激励机制能减少企业预算松驰的程度。
(2)多元化战略管理未形成公司治理各因素影响预算管理的中介效应。战略管理没能对公司治理影响预算管理产生显著的中介效应,其主要原因可能是我国多数企业的战略管理还没有对预算管理起到一个指导性作用。
(3)公司治理在影响预算松驰时受到了环境不确定性的调节。各企业所面临的环境不确定性不同时,公司治理对预算松驰的作用也不相同。股权制衡对预算松驰的影响受到环境不确定性的调节,当企业环境不确定性逐步增大时,股权制衡的抑制作用逐步降低。管理层持股与预算松驰的关系也受到了环境不确定性的显著调节。
(4)预算松驰对企业当期业绩产生了显著的负面效果。通过联立方程考查公司治理、预算松驰、经营业绩三者的关系时得出,公司治理中管理层持股、股制制衡越大时,预算松驰越小,企业经营业绩越好。说明在样本企业中预算松驰中更多部分是由于代理问题而产生的,代理人自利行为产生的预算松驰在公司治理结构良好的情况下较低,最终促使企业业绩提升
Budget have achieved great development in the academic or in the practical community since it has been introduced into China from the West in the end of the last century. In practical fields budget has been more and more criticized by practitioners and academics.
Budgetary control has brought a lot of side-effects which makes the budget caught in controversy. Budget slack behavior is a major aspect of the budget side effects. Budgetary slack is a very prominent problem in our budget management practices. In recent years, many scholars began to gradually study the reasons of budgetary slack based on the foreign research in order to solve the problem of budgetary slack. However, there are still some shortcomings in existing research. On the one hand, study perspective is a problem. By referring to foreign research scholars think the design and behavior of budget system are the main causes of budget slack.However, they ignored the system background of the budget execution. On the other hand the depth of the study is another problem. These studies only directly found the causes of the budgetary slack These problems such as how these factors impact budgetary slack and under what conditions these factors affect it have not been studed yet. It has become an important aspect of the research from the system perspective to understand the field of management accounting change occurred in the new Western management accounting.
In view of the problems in existing research, this article studed systematicly how corporate governance (corporate level management factors) affects budgetary slack based on contract theory and management control theory. The main contents are as follows:
①This paper analyzed the theoretical relationship between corporate governance and budgetary slack. Based on contract theory and management control theory this paper studed the relationship between corporate governance and budgetary slack. We think corporate governance is an important factor affecting the budgetary slack through the establishment and analyzing of the budget game model.
②Empirical studies have shown the nature and to what extent and corporate governance affected budgetary slack. This paper also studed the effect of the strategic management as a mediator and the effect of environmental uncertainty as a moderator between corporate governance and budgetary slack. Our study proved the size and direction of corporate governance factors affecting the budgetary slack by multiple regression analysis of voluntary disclosure about the budget in listed companies.
③This paper studied the economic consequences of budgetary slack.We examined the relationship among corporate governance, budget slack and the performance through the establishment of simultaneous equations.This can provides a further theoretical proof of solving the problem of budgetary slack.
By empirical research, we draws the following conclusions:
①Stock nature, power balance with shareholder structure, management ownership significantly influenced the budget management system. State-owned enterprises have a larger budgetar slack value than private enterprises, which indicated overall budget management and control of private enterprise was better than state-owned enterprises. Other major shareholders power balance significantly inhibited the budgetary slack. This conclusion verified the results of current related research from another perspective which other large shareholders can play an active role in corporate governance. Managerial Ownership and budget slack has a significant negative correlation, which indicates that management shareholdings as incentive mechanism of solving the agency problem can reduce the extent of budgetary slack, management ownership has played a positive effect in budget system.
②iversified strategic management has not been an mediator between the corporate governance and budget management. Diversified strategic management has been a significant moderator between the power balance with shareholder structure and budgetary slack. As the strategic management of most enterprises in China have not played a guiding role on the budgetary management, strategic management failed to be a mediator.When the strategic management has been a moderator between the power balance with shareholder structure and budgetary slack, the power balance can play a greater inhibition on slack as the higher degree of business diversification.
③Environmental uncertainty moderates the relationship between corporate governance and budgetary slack. Environmental uncertainty moderates the relationship between power balance and the slack. When environmental uncertainty is low, the slack significantly is inhibited by the power balance with shareholder structure. When environmental uncertainty is high, power balance can not play a significant inhibition on slack. The relationship between the managerial ownership and budgetary slack has also been significantly adjusted by environmental uncertainty. When environmental uncertainty is lower, management ownership can play a greater the negative effect on slack.
④Budget slack had a significant negative effect on current performance of the enterprise. We examined the relationship among corporate governance, budget slack and performance through simultaneous equations. The greater managerial ownership and the power balance, the lower budgetary slack,and the better business performance is. This conclusion has shown that budgetary slack has been mainly caused by agency problems.Budgetary slack produced by agents self-serving behavior was lower when corporate governance structure is good, which improve the performance. To some extent this conclusion shows the nature of the current budgetary slack in business.
引文
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