电力市场的市场力规制理论及应用研究
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摘要
本论文在对国内外市场力规制的理论研究与实践进行系统地总结和评述的基础上,从确保市场有效竞争的角度,充分考虑我国电力市场环境的特殊性,对市场力的规制理论及其应用作了深入研究,分别提出了在市场设计、市场分析、市场预警和监管决策等环节识别和平抑制市场力的模型,并进行了实证分析。论文取得了以下主要研究成果:
1.利用发电公司必须运行率指标,充分考虑竞争者地位、市场供需形势以及机组实际可用情况等因素来评估发电公司对市场竞争性的影响,提出了一种合理配置中长期合同交易模式下的竞价电量比例的计算模型和分析方法。利用该模型计算得到的竞争电量分配比例可以保证在中长期合同交易中任何发电公司不具备对任何申报电量任意定价的能力,从而保证市场的有效竞争,弥补了目前中长期市场竞价电量比例大多人为制定,缺乏合理科学依据的不足。
2.论文对如何通过电力市场的准入制度、发电企业横向兼并审批制度、价格管制制度来抑制发电商行使市场力进行了探讨。此外,国内外电力市场运营的经验表明,除了市场份额、机组性能和发电成本等发电商固有的特性可以形成市场力外,很多外部因素也促成了市场力的形成。论文研究了发电报价修正、穿越网损补偿这两个看似与市场力无直接关系的因素是如何影响发电企业间竞争的公平性的,并从机制上给出了解决方案。
3.对单一买方电力市场二级委托-代理机制下的发电商一类串谋子契约(作为代理人的发电商之间的串谋行为)进行了深入研究。利用博弈均衡理论分析了cournot竞争机制下发电商的串谋行为对市场溢价的影响,得出了“溢价水平与发电商串谋联盟的市场份额成正比,与市场需求弹性成反比”的结论,并进行了实证分析。分析了电网阻塞对发电商串谋的影响,指出在电能输出受限的区域,串谋的发生多是为了防止过度恶性竞争;在电能受入阻塞的区域,串谋发生多是为了追求高额垄断利润。
4.对我国电力市场中对串谋行为进行规制的法律依据进行了研究。由于串谋行为的隐蔽性和复杂性,在现有技术水平下串谋行为难以被准确识别。论文基于负激励理论提出了一种根据现有技术水平来确定对串谋行为的合理的惩罚强度(罚款额度)的数学模型,确保发电商串谋联盟遭到惩罚的期望效用大于串谋行为不被发现的期望效用,可以有效消除发电商实施串谋的动机。该模型同样可以应用于确定其他市场力行为的惩罚强度。
5.传统的HHI集中度指标本身的静态特性不适应电力商品的特殊性,无法描述电力市场的动态结构特性。论文对现有的电力市场力度量指标进行了补充和改进,提出了一种基于潮流分析的同时面向市场和面向发电公司的市场结构分层(即系统、区域和节点)评价指标体系,并将网损和区域间功率交换考虑其中,建立实时的分层市场力指标变化曲线;这种市场结构分层评价指标体系可以反映地理位置、网络约束、运行方式等因素对发电商行使市场力的影响,可用于辅助监管部门评价和分析电力市场中潜在的市场力水平。
6.综合应用产业经济学中的SCP(结构-行为-绩效)分析框架和模糊层次综合评估方法,建立了基于市场信息的面向整个市场和面向发电商的市场力评估指标体系;提出了对市场、各阻塞区域和各发电商的市场力警戒级别进行实时评估和监控,并按照对S、C、P的警戒级别评估结果做出相应的监管决策的机制。采用美国新英格兰电力市场的实际数据为算例,验证了该评估模型可以有效地识别出多种市场力行为,从而提高监管效率。
7.论文把容量充足度和发电商必须运行率两个市场力指标作为外生变量引入到电力市场价格风险预警中,通过容量充足度反映市场整体供需状况,通过必须运行率反映发电商个体的市场地位;借鉴金融市场价格波动风险分析的广义自回归条件异方差(GARCH)理论和VaR理论建立了电力市场价格风险预警模型。算例验证表明该模型有较好的预测精度且可以有效处理电价序列的异方差特性。
我国的电力市场建设刚刚起步,在享受市场化带来的好处的同时需警惕与之俱来的市场风险。论文研究成果是对市场力规制理论的丰富和发展,对我国电力市场建设和监管的实践均具有重要意义。
With systematically summarizing the theory and practice of market power regulation in domestic and international, to guarantee the effective competition, the theory of the market power regulation in electricity environment has been further investigated, the models for distinguishing and relieving the market power in market design, market analysis, market prewarning, supervise decision-making are proposed. Below are the detailed descriptions of the results attained by the dissertation:
1. A model for calculating the proportion of competitive electric quantity in medium and long-term contract electricity market is put forward to ensure the competitive formation of market price, which use the IMRR indices of generation companies to evaluate the market power in electricity market with fully considered the factors of competitor status, market supply and demand situation as well as the units’availability. With a calculating example, it is proved that the proportion of competitive electric quantity calculated by the model proposed can guarantee that there have no generation company has the ability to decide the price of any part of its offered electric quantity in medium and long-term contract transactions, thus guarantees the effective market competition.
2. Methods to restrain the market power of generation companies using admittance system and price regulation are discussed. In addition, experience obtained in the domestic and international electricity market shows that many external factors can form market power too, except characteristics of market share, performance of units and product cost. How generation biding converting with loss and wheeling loss compensation influence the competing fairness which seem have no direct relationship with market power, then the solution in mechanism is proposed.
3. The first kind of subordinate collusion contracts (collusion contracts made by agents of generation companies) under two grades Principal-Agent mechanism of electricity market is thoroughly studied in this article. Using equilibrium theory, the influence of colluding behaviors among generation companies to market premium is analyzed, the premium level in direct proportion to the market share of collusion union, in inverse proportion to market demand elasticity. Then the influence of congestion in power network to collusion is analyzed, point out that the occurrence of collusion in regions where power output is limited is usually to prevent the malignant competition, and in regions where power input is limited, collusion is usually to pursue the high monopoly profit.
4. Legal basis for regulating the colluding behaviors in electricity market of China is studied, and a negative incentive mechanism for effectively restraining the colluding behaviors with existing technical level is put forward, which will guarantee the expect punishment of colluding union greater than expect profit, it will effectively restrain the collusion motive. The model proposed can also be used to regulate other market power conductions.
5. The static characteristic of HHI does not meet the particularity of the electric goods; it is unable to describe the dynamic structural characteristic of the electricity market. The exiting market power measure indexes are improved ,and a layered index system for evaluating the electricity market structure is put forward which is based on power flow analyze and includes the influence of transmission loss and power exchange among different load areas or congestion areas. Through establishing layered index curve of real time, it can reflect the influence factors of location, network restriction, operation mode, which may affect generation companies to exert the market power. The Index system can be used to assist the supervision department to evaluate and analyze the potential market power degree in electric market.
6. According to the SCP analysis frame (market structure, market behavior, market performance) in the industrial economics, construct index systems to evaluate the market power level of the entire market and the market power of specified generation company separately. Then, a fuzzy hierarchy comprehensive evaluation method is put forward to evaluate the market power warning levels of the market, congestion areas and specified generation companies in real time. According to the evaluating result of SCP, paint the monitor map with different colors and make corresponding supervision decision to the link of problem in time. Finally, using the historical market data of a real electricity market, it is proved that the market power warning and surveillance decision-making mechanism based on SCP model proposed in this article can effectively identify the market power level of S, C, P and the tactical bidding behaviors of generation companies.
7. Introduce market power evaluating indices of Icsr(capacity sufficient rate) and Imrr(must run rate) as the external variables into the electricity market price risk prewarning, using Icsr reflect the whole market state between supply and demand, using Imrr reflect individual generation company’s market status. Then, use ARCH and VaR theory for analyzing the price fluctuation in financial market for reference, put forward an electricity price risk prewarning model. The numeric example proved that the model proposed has better prediction precision and can effectively deal with the different variance characteristic of electricity price array.
The construction of electricity market in China is still at the beginning stage, we should watch out for the market risk while enjoying the advantage brought by marketization. The research results of the dissertation enrich and develop the market power regulation theory; it is significant to the practice of electricity market construction and supervision in China.
1.利用发电公司必须运行率指标,充分考虑竞争者地位、市场供需形势以及机组实际可用情况等因素来评估发电公司对市场竞争性的影响,提出了一种合理配置中长期合同交易模式下的竞价电量比例的计算模型和分析方法。利用该模型计算得到的竞争电量分配比例可以保证在中长期合同交易中任何发电公司不具备对任何申报电量任意定价的能力,从而保证市场的有效竞争,弥补了目前中长期市场竞价电量比例大多人为制定,缺乏合理科学依据的不足。
2.论文对如何通过电力市场的准入制度、发电企业横向兼并审批制度、价格管制制度来抑制发电商行使市场力进行了探讨。此外,国内外电力市场运营的经验表明,除了市场份额、机组性能和发电成本等发电商固有的特性可以形成市场力外,很多外部因素也促成了市场力的形成。论文研究了发电报价修正、穿越网损补偿这两个看似与市场力无直接关系的因素是如何影响发电企业间竞争的公平性的,并从机制上给出了解决方案。
3.对单一买方电力市场二级委托-代理机制下的发电商一类串谋子契约(作为代理人的发电商之间的串谋行为)进行了深入研究。利用博弈均衡理论分析了cournot竞争机制下发电商的串谋行为对市场溢价的影响,得出了“溢价水平与发电商串谋联盟的市场份额成正比,与市场需求弹性成反比”的结论,并进行了实证分析。分析了电网阻塞对发电商串谋的影响,指出在电能输出受限的区域,串谋的发生多是为了防止过度恶性竞争;在电能受入阻塞的区域,串谋发生多是为了追求高额垄断利润。
4.对我国电力市场中对串谋行为进行规制的法律依据进行了研究。由于串谋行为的隐蔽性和复杂性,在现有技术水平下串谋行为难以被准确识别。论文基于负激励理论提出了一种根据现有技术水平来确定对串谋行为的合理的惩罚强度(罚款额度)的数学模型,确保发电商串谋联盟遭到惩罚的期望效用大于串谋行为不被发现的期望效用,可以有效消除发电商实施串谋的动机。该模型同样可以应用于确定其他市场力行为的惩罚强度。
5.传统的HHI集中度指标本身的静态特性不适应电力商品的特殊性,无法描述电力市场的动态结构特性。论文对现有的电力市场力度量指标进行了补充和改进,提出了一种基于潮流分析的同时面向市场和面向发电公司的市场结构分层(即系统、区域和节点)评价指标体系,并将网损和区域间功率交换考虑其中,建立实时的分层市场力指标变化曲线;这种市场结构分层评价指标体系可以反映地理位置、网络约束、运行方式等因素对发电商行使市场力的影响,可用于辅助监管部门评价和分析电力市场中潜在的市场力水平。
6.综合应用产业经济学中的SCP(结构-行为-绩效)分析框架和模糊层次综合评估方法,建立了基于市场信息的面向整个市场和面向发电商的市场力评估指标体系;提出了对市场、各阻塞区域和各发电商的市场力警戒级别进行实时评估和监控,并按照对S、C、P的警戒级别评估结果做出相应的监管决策的机制。采用美国新英格兰电力市场的实际数据为算例,验证了该评估模型可以有效地识别出多种市场力行为,从而提高监管效率。
7.论文把容量充足度和发电商必须运行率两个市场力指标作为外生变量引入到电力市场价格风险预警中,通过容量充足度反映市场整体供需状况,通过必须运行率反映发电商个体的市场地位;借鉴金融市场价格波动风险分析的广义自回归条件异方差(GARCH)理论和VaR理论建立了电力市场价格风险预警模型。算例验证表明该模型有较好的预测精度且可以有效处理电价序列的异方差特性。
我国的电力市场建设刚刚起步,在享受市场化带来的好处的同时需警惕与之俱来的市场风险。论文研究成果是对市场力规制理论的丰富和发展,对我国电力市场建设和监管的实践均具有重要意义。
With systematically summarizing the theory and practice of market power regulation in domestic and international, to guarantee the effective competition, the theory of the market power regulation in electricity environment has been further investigated, the models for distinguishing and relieving the market power in market design, market analysis, market prewarning, supervise decision-making are proposed. Below are the detailed descriptions of the results attained by the dissertation:
1. A model for calculating the proportion of competitive electric quantity in medium and long-term contract electricity market is put forward to ensure the competitive formation of market price, which use the IMRR indices of generation companies to evaluate the market power in electricity market with fully considered the factors of competitor status, market supply and demand situation as well as the units’availability. With a calculating example, it is proved that the proportion of competitive electric quantity calculated by the model proposed can guarantee that there have no generation company has the ability to decide the price of any part of its offered electric quantity in medium and long-term contract transactions, thus guarantees the effective market competition.
2. Methods to restrain the market power of generation companies using admittance system and price regulation are discussed. In addition, experience obtained in the domestic and international electricity market shows that many external factors can form market power too, except characteristics of market share, performance of units and product cost. How generation biding converting with loss and wheeling loss compensation influence the competing fairness which seem have no direct relationship with market power, then the solution in mechanism is proposed.
3. The first kind of subordinate collusion contracts (collusion contracts made by agents of generation companies) under two grades Principal-Agent mechanism of electricity market is thoroughly studied in this article. Using equilibrium theory, the influence of colluding behaviors among generation companies to market premium is analyzed, the premium level in direct proportion to the market share of collusion union, in inverse proportion to market demand elasticity. Then the influence of congestion in power network to collusion is analyzed, point out that the occurrence of collusion in regions where power output is limited is usually to prevent the malignant competition, and in regions where power input is limited, collusion is usually to pursue the high monopoly profit.
4. Legal basis for regulating the colluding behaviors in electricity market of China is studied, and a negative incentive mechanism for effectively restraining the colluding behaviors with existing technical level is put forward, which will guarantee the expect punishment of colluding union greater than expect profit, it will effectively restrain the collusion motive. The model proposed can also be used to regulate other market power conductions.
5. The static characteristic of HHI does not meet the particularity of the electric goods; it is unable to describe the dynamic structural characteristic of the electricity market. The exiting market power measure indexes are improved ,and a layered index system for evaluating the electricity market structure is put forward which is based on power flow analyze and includes the influence of transmission loss and power exchange among different load areas or congestion areas. Through establishing layered index curve of real time, it can reflect the influence factors of location, network restriction, operation mode, which may affect generation companies to exert the market power. The Index system can be used to assist the supervision department to evaluate and analyze the potential market power degree in electric market.
6. According to the SCP analysis frame (market structure, market behavior, market performance) in the industrial economics, construct index systems to evaluate the market power level of the entire market and the market power of specified generation company separately. Then, a fuzzy hierarchy comprehensive evaluation method is put forward to evaluate the market power warning levels of the market, congestion areas and specified generation companies in real time. According to the evaluating result of SCP, paint the monitor map with different colors and make corresponding supervision decision to the link of problem in time. Finally, using the historical market data of a real electricity market, it is proved that the market power warning and surveillance decision-making mechanism based on SCP model proposed in this article can effectively identify the market power level of S, C, P and the tactical bidding behaviors of generation companies.
7. Introduce market power evaluating indices of Icsr(capacity sufficient rate) and Imrr(must run rate) as the external variables into the electricity market price risk prewarning, using Icsr reflect the whole market state between supply and demand, using Imrr reflect individual generation company’s market status. Then, use ARCH and VaR theory for analyzing the price fluctuation in financial market for reference, put forward an electricity price risk prewarning model. The numeric example proved that the model proposed has better prediction precision and can effectively deal with the different variance characteristic of electricity price array.
The construction of electricity market in China is still at the beginning stage, we should watch out for the market risk while enjoying the advantage brought by marketization. The research results of the dissertation enrich and develop the market power regulation theory; it is significant to the practice of electricity market construction and supervision in China.
引文
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