要素流动下的地方公共服务供给空间分析
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摘要
传统的对地方公共服务供给问题的讨论大都是沿着公共服务的技术特征(公共物品的非排它性和非竞争性)展开的。虽然这一思路对于研究地方政府公共服务有效供给具有重要作用,但由于研究方法等因素与条件的限制,很难对地方政府在现实生活中的行为选择与区域经济发展的结果作出全面、合理的解释。20世纪后期,人们已经认识到,在经济一体化趋势不可逆转的现代社会,有效提供公共服务,既是地方政府的行为目标,也是地方政府实现区域利益最大的工具或手段。过去的二十年来,随着以揭示区域经济发展中内生的非均衡力量为主要目的的空间经济理论研究的迅速发展和广泛应用,以政府间税收竞争理论的发展为标致,对区域经济发展中的政府行为的研究得到了深化,极大地推动了地方政府行为理论与政策的研究。
本文在总结、吸收、消化空间经济分析中关于政府间竞争所取得的研究成果的基础上,选择了不同于目前从财政(税收)竞争及其对公共服务供给影响入手的、流行的研究要素流动的技术路线。运用空间分析方法,确立了以要素流动为切入点,研究讨论地方政府公共服务供给与要素聚集相互关系的研究路径。在分析讨论地方公共服务、要素流动、政府竞争等基本范畴的基础上,沿着由“单一区域”到“两区域、两要素",再到“两区域、两要素、两部门”的建模思路,系统地讨论了地方政府公共服务供给行为与要素收益水平之间的关系。从而为地方政府如何通过政府的作用形成区域经济发展的要素聚集效应,如何按照要素流动的要求改善政府公共服务的供给提供了理论解释与政策依据。
上述研究思路,决定了本文的基本理论架构与主要内容。一是通过引入要素生产率(收益率)这一变量,在Barro研究政府与经济增长关系时建立的经济增长模型的基础上,建立了基于单一区域的讨论公共服务与要素生产率关系的模型,不仅证明了不同类型公共服务与要素收益率呈现出正相关关系,而且证明了政府提供的公共服务对提高要素收益水平有积极作用。从而为本文的后续研究打下了坚实的基础。二是按照标准的空间经济分析的建模方法,以要素是否在空间流动取决于区域间要素收益水平的差异为前提,建立了“两区域、两部门(公共部门和私人部门)、两要素(可流动要素和不可流动要素)”的非线性一般均衡模型。在区分考虑本地交易成本和不考虑本地交易成本的两种情况下,从总体上考察了对称区域下改善地方政府公共服务供给对要素流动产生的积极影响及其递减的变化趋势。运用数值模拟法讨论了政府规模、商品替代弹性和交易成本等变量在公共服务影响要素空间分布中的不同作用,进而分析了要素流动、财政竞争、与资源配置效率的关系。为了讨论资本和劳动力两种要素流动与公共服务、财政竞争的关系,在柯布—道格拉斯生产函数的基础上,建立了一个“两区域、两要素(资本和劳动力)”模型。分析了公共服务和税收政策对不同要素流动的影响,并结合我国资本与劳动力流动的实际,讨论了资本脱离所有者和劳动力脱离其户籍所在地时的公共服务与税收政策效应。三是基于地方公共服务的拥挤性特征,提出了要素流动的地方公共服务供给弹性概念。在“两区域、两要素、两部门”模型基础上证明了一般均衡状态下的区域要素流动的公共服务供给弹性的存在,并具体分析了要素收益率对公共服务供给的弹性,及其对生活性公共服务与生产性公共服务的供给弹性。在“两区域、两要素”模型的基础上得出了资本与劳动力流动的公共服务供给弹性。
虽然空间经济分析在实证分析方面并没有取得令人满意的研究成果和成功经验,但本文还是运用比较分析和统计计量经济模型等方法,对要素流动下的我国地方政府间公共服务供给规模、财政竞争与供给弹性进行了实证分析。虽然这些实证分析只是近似地描述了我国地区间要素流动中地方政府公共服务供给行为的作用,但却基本验证了理论研究结论。
Most traditional studies on the supply of local public services focuses on the technical characteristics((non-exclusive and non-competitive). Although these studies play an important role in the research of effective supply of public services of local governments, it is difficult for them to explain completely and reasonably the action choices of local governments and the results of regional economic development in real life because of the restrictions of research methods and many other causes. In the late 20th century, people realize that in a modern society of economic integration, effective delivery of public services is not only the local governments' targets, but also the local governments' instruments or tools to make regional interests largest. Over the past two decades, with the rapid development and extensive application of Spatial Economic Theory which regards revealing endogenous non-balanced strength of regional economic development as the main objective, with the development of Intergovernmental Tax Competition Theory as a milestone, the research of governmental actions in regional economy has been deepened, which greatly promoted the research of local governmental actions and policies.
Based on the research of intergovernmental competition in Spatial Economic Theory, this paper, different from popular discussions on mobile elements which start to tackle problems from the financial (tax) competition and the impact of the supply of public services, uses the method of spatial economic analysis, establishes flowing factors as a focal point, studies the relationship between local governmental public service supply and agglutinative factors. After the analysis of local public services, flowing factors, competition between governments and other basic categories, this paper systematically discusses the relationship between local public service supply and factor income level with a guidline from "a single region" to the "two regions, two elements" and then to "two regions, two elements and two departments ".Thus we provide theoretical explanation and policy ground for local governments on how to form "economic agglomeration effect of factors" for regional economic development and how to improve public services in accordance with the requirements of the flowing factors.
The study ideas above have decided the basic theoretical framework and main contents of this paper. Firstly, based on Barro's economic growth model regarding the relationship between economic growth and the government, with the introduction of the variable of factor productivity (yield),a Single Region Model has been established to discuss the relationship between public services and factor productivity. This model not only proves that the different types of public services and factor income rate show a positive correlation, but also that governmental public services have a positive effect on the level of factor income. This has laid a solid foundation for the follow-up study. Secondly, according to the standard spatial economic analysis,with the preposition that whether the factors flow or not depends on the difference of the factor income levels between regions, a Nonlinear General Equilibrium Model has been formed on "two regions, two sectors (public and private sector), two elements (mobiling elements and non-mobiling elements)". It is proved that under symmetric regions improving local governmental public-services has a positive impact on the flow of factors and the trend of change is regressive, no matter whether local transaction cost is considered or not. The method of numerical simulation is used in discussing different roles of different variables, such as the government scale,commodities elasticity of substitution and the transaction cost, in the spatial distribution; and then further analysis has been made to discuss the relations of the flow of factors, financial competition, and the efficiency of resource allocation. In order to discuss the relation of the flow of capital and labor, public services and tax competition, a "two-region, two-factor" model is established on the basis of Cobb-Douglas production function to discuss the effect of public services and taxation policies on the flow of different factors. And at the same time, according to the actual flow of capital and labor in China, the effects of public services and tax policies are also discussed while the capital is away from the owners and labourers away from their residences. Thirdly, in view of the "crowdness" of local public services,the paper proposes a concept of supply flexiblility. On the basis of the "two regions, two elements, two departments" model,we proved the existance of supply flexibility of the flow of regional factors under general equilibrium state. Specific analysis are made to discuss the effect of the factor yield on the flexibility of public services(supply of life public services and productive public services respectively). On the basis of the "two-region, two-factor" model, the supply flexibility of the rate of capital return and labor income level on public services is accessed.
Although spatia economic analysis did not obtain satisfactory results and successful experience in the aspect of empirical analysis,this paper uses comparative analysis and econometric statistical models to make empirical analysis on the scale of local governmental public-services,financial competition and the supply flexibility in China. These empirical analysis gives us an approximate description of the flow of factors between regions and the use of local governmental public-services,but they are able to verify the above basic conclusions of the study.
本文在总结、吸收、消化空间经济分析中关于政府间竞争所取得的研究成果的基础上,选择了不同于目前从财政(税收)竞争及其对公共服务供给影响入手的、流行的研究要素流动的技术路线。运用空间分析方法,确立了以要素流动为切入点,研究讨论地方政府公共服务供给与要素聚集相互关系的研究路径。在分析讨论地方公共服务、要素流动、政府竞争等基本范畴的基础上,沿着由“单一区域”到“两区域、两要素",再到“两区域、两要素、两部门”的建模思路,系统地讨论了地方政府公共服务供给行为与要素收益水平之间的关系。从而为地方政府如何通过政府的作用形成区域经济发展的要素聚集效应,如何按照要素流动的要求改善政府公共服务的供给提供了理论解释与政策依据。
上述研究思路,决定了本文的基本理论架构与主要内容。一是通过引入要素生产率(收益率)这一变量,在Barro研究政府与经济增长关系时建立的经济增长模型的基础上,建立了基于单一区域的讨论公共服务与要素生产率关系的模型,不仅证明了不同类型公共服务与要素收益率呈现出正相关关系,而且证明了政府提供的公共服务对提高要素收益水平有积极作用。从而为本文的后续研究打下了坚实的基础。二是按照标准的空间经济分析的建模方法,以要素是否在空间流动取决于区域间要素收益水平的差异为前提,建立了“两区域、两部门(公共部门和私人部门)、两要素(可流动要素和不可流动要素)”的非线性一般均衡模型。在区分考虑本地交易成本和不考虑本地交易成本的两种情况下,从总体上考察了对称区域下改善地方政府公共服务供给对要素流动产生的积极影响及其递减的变化趋势。运用数值模拟法讨论了政府规模、商品替代弹性和交易成本等变量在公共服务影响要素空间分布中的不同作用,进而分析了要素流动、财政竞争、与资源配置效率的关系。为了讨论资本和劳动力两种要素流动与公共服务、财政竞争的关系,在柯布—道格拉斯生产函数的基础上,建立了一个“两区域、两要素(资本和劳动力)”模型。分析了公共服务和税收政策对不同要素流动的影响,并结合我国资本与劳动力流动的实际,讨论了资本脱离所有者和劳动力脱离其户籍所在地时的公共服务与税收政策效应。三是基于地方公共服务的拥挤性特征,提出了要素流动的地方公共服务供给弹性概念。在“两区域、两要素、两部门”模型基础上证明了一般均衡状态下的区域要素流动的公共服务供给弹性的存在,并具体分析了要素收益率对公共服务供给的弹性,及其对生活性公共服务与生产性公共服务的供给弹性。在“两区域、两要素”模型的基础上得出了资本与劳动力流动的公共服务供给弹性。
虽然空间经济分析在实证分析方面并没有取得令人满意的研究成果和成功经验,但本文还是运用比较分析和统计计量经济模型等方法,对要素流动下的我国地方政府间公共服务供给规模、财政竞争与供给弹性进行了实证分析。虽然这些实证分析只是近似地描述了我国地区间要素流动中地方政府公共服务供给行为的作用,但却基本验证了理论研究结论。
Most traditional studies on the supply of local public services focuses on the technical characteristics((non-exclusive and non-competitive). Although these studies play an important role in the research of effective supply of public services of local governments, it is difficult for them to explain completely and reasonably the action choices of local governments and the results of regional economic development in real life because of the restrictions of research methods and many other causes. In the late 20th century, people realize that in a modern society of economic integration, effective delivery of public services is not only the local governments' targets, but also the local governments' instruments or tools to make regional interests largest. Over the past two decades, with the rapid development and extensive application of Spatial Economic Theory which regards revealing endogenous non-balanced strength of regional economic development as the main objective, with the development of Intergovernmental Tax Competition Theory as a milestone, the research of governmental actions in regional economy has been deepened, which greatly promoted the research of local governmental actions and policies.
Based on the research of intergovernmental competition in Spatial Economic Theory, this paper, different from popular discussions on mobile elements which start to tackle problems from the financial (tax) competition and the impact of the supply of public services, uses the method of spatial economic analysis, establishes flowing factors as a focal point, studies the relationship between local governmental public service supply and agglutinative factors. After the analysis of local public services, flowing factors, competition between governments and other basic categories, this paper systematically discusses the relationship between local public service supply and factor income level with a guidline from "a single region" to the "two regions, two elements" and then to "two regions, two elements and two departments ".Thus we provide theoretical explanation and policy ground for local governments on how to form "economic agglomeration effect of factors" for regional economic development and how to improve public services in accordance with the requirements of the flowing factors.
The study ideas above have decided the basic theoretical framework and main contents of this paper. Firstly, based on Barro's economic growth model regarding the relationship between economic growth and the government, with the introduction of the variable of factor productivity (yield),a Single Region Model has been established to discuss the relationship between public services and factor productivity. This model not only proves that the different types of public services and factor income rate show a positive correlation, but also that governmental public services have a positive effect on the level of factor income. This has laid a solid foundation for the follow-up study. Secondly, according to the standard spatial economic analysis,with the preposition that whether the factors flow or not depends on the difference of the factor income levels between regions, a Nonlinear General Equilibrium Model has been formed on "two regions, two sectors (public and private sector), two elements (mobiling elements and non-mobiling elements)". It is proved that under symmetric regions improving local governmental public-services has a positive impact on the flow of factors and the trend of change is regressive, no matter whether local transaction cost is considered or not. The method of numerical simulation is used in discussing different roles of different variables, such as the government scale,commodities elasticity of substitution and the transaction cost, in the spatial distribution; and then further analysis has been made to discuss the relations of the flow of factors, financial competition, and the efficiency of resource allocation. In order to discuss the relation of the flow of capital and labor, public services and tax competition, a "two-region, two-factor" model is established on the basis of Cobb-Douglas production function to discuss the effect of public services and taxation policies on the flow of different factors. And at the same time, according to the actual flow of capital and labor in China, the effects of public services and tax policies are also discussed while the capital is away from the owners and labourers away from their residences. Thirdly, in view of the "crowdness" of local public services,the paper proposes a concept of supply flexiblility. On the basis of the "two regions, two elements, two departments" model,we proved the existance of supply flexibility of the flow of regional factors under general equilibrium state. Specific analysis are made to discuss the effect of the factor yield on the flexibility of public services(supply of life public services and productive public services respectively). On the basis of the "two-region, two-factor" model, the supply flexibility of the rate of capital return and labor income level on public services is accessed.
Although spatia economic analysis did not obtain satisfactory results and successful experience in the aspect of empirical analysis,this paper uses comparative analysis and econometric statistical models to make empirical analysis on the scale of local governmental public-services,financial competition and the supply flexibility in China. These empirical analysis gives us an approximate description of the flow of factors between regions and the use of local governmental public-services,but they are able to verify the above basic conclusions of the study.
引文
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