财政分权与地方经济发展研究
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摘要
财政分权反映了中央和地方以及其他政府层级之间的社会经济关系,是政府职能有效运转的重要组成部分。目前,对财政分权的理论研究还没有一致定论,一方面,对财政分权是否可以促进经济增长颇有争议;另一方面,财政分权是否在平抑地区差异上发挥作用也没有达成一致意见。
本文对财政分权促进地方经济发展的相关理论和实践进行了系统研究。财政分权需要兼顾效率与公平,不仅要关注地区经济增长,还要在缩小区域差距等方面发挥作用,以实现地方经济的均衡发展。中国经济转型时期的财政分权体制改革既是促进资源优化配置的过程,也是体制优化与完善的过程。中国财政分权体制改革对推动地区经济增长发挥了比较好的激励作用,但是在促进地方经济均衡发展过程中作用并不显著,一定程度上甚至成为拉大经济差距的助推力量,在相关配套机制滞后情况下这种问题尤为突出。构建和谐的财政分权体制目标模式有利于实现地方经济的均衡发展,文章提出了相应对策。
The fiscal decentralization response to the economic relations between the central and local government, even all the other levels, is an objective guarantee promotes the government reasonable operation.The FGTs concerns the link of decentralization, economic growth and economic efficiency. The SGTs further study of the incentive compatibility problems of multi-level government, government and enterprises, expand and enriched on the theory of fiscal decentralization. However, the papers has not been the same conclusion on the relations between fiscal decentralization and local economic development.On the one hand, controversy exists in fiscal decentralization can promote economic growth; On the other hand, it's not reach a consensus on fiscal decentralization can play a role on narrow the distribution gap.
Differences in culture, economy, history, territory, and so on, while most countries perform their duties through the muti-level governments practice, and generally adopted fiscal decentralization.Comparison to the United States, Germany, Japan, which represented the developed countries of the intergovernmental fiscal relations, the affairs and the structures of fiscal expenditure, the local revenue sources and intergovernmental transfer system and so on, not only the same point, but also the obvious differences have been shown.The level of economic development, relations between the government and the market determine the specific forms of financial decentralization, and the performance of fiscal decentralization is the feedback. The fiscal decentralization can not follow the law, also has no ideal model, and the level of decentralization is the result of historical evolution. The developed countries concern economic growth, also take into account to the equipoise on narrow the economic gap and improve the social welfare. No matter how the national economic structure, fiscal decentralization guaranteed a higher level in controlled circumstances on the financial resources of the sub-balance and coordination.
China's fiscal decentralization different from the developed countries.Whether under the conditions of planned economy, or the initial stage of reform and opening, even the recent years, the fiscal decentralization gradually achieved the objectives of the reform. At different stages, fiscal decentralization is the concrete expression of the national development strategies and the behalf of muti-level governments. This is the endogenous logic of fiscal decentralization reform.China's goal of fiscal decentralization reform is not only to raise the economic efficiency of local government, but also to strengthen the central financial ability to regulate and control.China's government has created favorable conditions for the realization of the objectives of decentralization, but there are also obstacles and deficiencies. The fiscal decentralization reform needs to follow the evolution of the economic system path. First, the decentralization can not be absolute; Second, should compliance with the principle of cos
t-benefit; Third, not only to promote the improvement of economic efficiency, but also ensure a relatively fair social distribution.
The fiscal decentralization reform during China's economic transformation is an optimize process of both resources and management structure. As economic activity meets the characteristics of "economic man", it is in line with the benefit of local government and the officials to maintain and enhance the competitiveness of the area and promote local economic growth. Gradual economic transformation is still some shortcomings, for example, asymmetric information, lack of economic incentives, commission-agent relations missing, lack of restraint and so on.The preference of GDP incentives of local governments and Top-down appointment system will inevitably lead to some negative effects, such as disorderly competition, local barriers, widening of the income gap, hardly rely on the relative performance appraisal system in political incentives, such as dependence. Although there are corresponding counter measures of the local government to the incentive mechanism of a higher level, and even this game will produce a certain result of the efficiency losses, the overall, the fiscal decentralization played an active role in promoting local economic growth. The analysis supports the conclusion.
Empirical analysis showed that China's fiscal decentralization reform played a relatively good incentives on promoting regional economic growth, but not significant in promoting local economic equipoise development, to some extent, as the strength propellant widen the local economic gap, especially in supporting mechanisms lag.The lack as follows: First, the structure of fiscal expenditure imbalance lead to greatly reduced of regulate social conflicts of benefits and the other is the main tool of fiscal revenue does not play an effective balance on various benefits of structural transformation and ease the distribute contradictory; Third, under the traditional framework, fiscal policy and role can not be full.This decentralized increasing tax revenue competition, widening extra budgetary income, separating between performance appraisal system and the afairs. At the same time, other supporting mechanisms including the financial transfer lag offset the expected fiscal decentralization, local protectionism strengthen the inter-regional disparities. As the effective implementation of fiscal policy carrier, the fiscal decentralization should pay attention to the organic integration of efficiency and fairness in the process of promoting local economic development. Not only concern about regional economic growth, but also concern of narrow the income gap and promote the social welfare in order to the local economy equipoise development.
Local economic development needs to build a harmonious fiscal decentralization to accommodate growth and distribution. To build a harmonious fiscal decentralization, the principle embodied are: First, to provide high-quality public goods and services; Second, to coordinate and cooperate on both efficiency and fairness; Third, to improve social welfare.Handle the following: First, deal with muti-level governments relationship; second, the relationship between centralized and decentralized is very important; Third, handling the financial expenditure and income; Fourth, properly handle the central and local government incentives relations.Improve the policy basis: First, create a service-oriented government to promote local economic development; Second, compress of the branch and save the financial cost; Third, establish of local governments horizontal coordination mechanism to reduce local Barriers; Fourth is to improve the intergovernmental monitoring and information communication mechanism. And the routing focus on: First, further standardize the scope of rights and expenditure, and the other is a reasonable division of the intergovernmental financial rights, and standardize non-tax revenue, adjustment aspects of legislative and income, The use of tax revenue (distribution) rights and other, gradually establish a harmonious environment; Third, accelerate the improvement of government transfer system, not the general transfer, but the special and the province following ones, gradually expand the scope of transfer to the county or town, and narrowing the gap in the following; The last, strengthen the budget supervision and management capacity, increase the level of incentives, increase management capabilities and management strength, and improve the performance of local government officials assessment mechanism and evaluation system ,hardening budget constraints, encourage local departments to strengthen coordination and cooperation. Also improve the mechanism for supporting the building: First to promote the optimization and upgrading of industrial structure and the other is to speed up and broaden the financing channels to support local economic development; third, constantly improve the social security system.
本文对财政分权促进地方经济发展的相关理论和实践进行了系统研究。财政分权需要兼顾效率与公平,不仅要关注地区经济增长,还要在缩小区域差距等方面发挥作用,以实现地方经济的均衡发展。中国经济转型时期的财政分权体制改革既是促进资源优化配置的过程,也是体制优化与完善的过程。中国财政分权体制改革对推动地区经济增长发挥了比较好的激励作用,但是在促进地方经济均衡发展过程中作用并不显著,一定程度上甚至成为拉大经济差距的助推力量,在相关配套机制滞后情况下这种问题尤为突出。构建和谐的财政分权体制目标模式有利于实现地方经济的均衡发展,文章提出了相应对策。
The fiscal decentralization response to the economic relations between the central and local government, even all the other levels, is an objective guarantee promotes the government reasonable operation.The FGTs concerns the link of decentralization, economic growth and economic efficiency. The SGTs further study of the incentive compatibility problems of multi-level government, government and enterprises, expand and enriched on the theory of fiscal decentralization. However, the papers has not been the same conclusion on the relations between fiscal decentralization and local economic development.On the one hand, controversy exists in fiscal decentralization can promote economic growth; On the other hand, it's not reach a consensus on fiscal decentralization can play a role on narrow the distribution gap.
Differences in culture, economy, history, territory, and so on, while most countries perform their duties through the muti-level governments practice, and generally adopted fiscal decentralization.Comparison to the United States, Germany, Japan, which represented the developed countries of the intergovernmental fiscal relations, the affairs and the structures of fiscal expenditure, the local revenue sources and intergovernmental transfer system and so on, not only the same point, but also the obvious differences have been shown.The level of economic development, relations between the government and the market determine the specific forms of financial decentralization, and the performance of fiscal decentralization is the feedback. The fiscal decentralization can not follow the law, also has no ideal model, and the level of decentralization is the result of historical evolution. The developed countries concern economic growth, also take into account to the equipoise on narrow the economic gap and improve the social welfare. No matter how the national economic structure, fiscal decentralization guaranteed a higher level in controlled circumstances on the financial resources of the sub-balance and coordination.
China's fiscal decentralization different from the developed countries.Whether under the conditions of planned economy, or the initial stage of reform and opening, even the recent years, the fiscal decentralization gradually achieved the objectives of the reform. At different stages, fiscal decentralization is the concrete expression of the national development strategies and the behalf of muti-level governments. This is the endogenous logic of fiscal decentralization reform.China's goal of fiscal decentralization reform is not only to raise the economic efficiency of local government, but also to strengthen the central financial ability to regulate and control.China's government has created favorable conditions for the realization of the objectives of decentralization, but there are also obstacles and deficiencies. The fiscal decentralization reform needs to follow the evolution of the economic system path. First, the decentralization can not be absolute; Second, should compliance with the principle of cos
t-benefit; Third, not only to promote the improvement of economic efficiency, but also ensure a relatively fair social distribution.
The fiscal decentralization reform during China's economic transformation is an optimize process of both resources and management structure. As economic activity meets the characteristics of "economic man", it is in line with the benefit of local government and the officials to maintain and enhance the competitiveness of the area and promote local economic growth. Gradual economic transformation is still some shortcomings, for example, asymmetric information, lack of economic incentives, commission-agent relations missing, lack of restraint and so on.The preference of GDP incentives of local governments and Top-down appointment system will inevitably lead to some negative effects, such as disorderly competition, local barriers, widening of the income gap, hardly rely on the relative performance appraisal system in political incentives, such as dependence. Although there are corresponding counter measures of the local government to the incentive mechanism of a higher level, and even this game will produce a certain result of the efficiency losses, the overall, the fiscal decentralization played an active role in promoting local economic growth. The analysis supports the conclusion.
Empirical analysis showed that China's fiscal decentralization reform played a relatively good incentives on promoting regional economic growth, but not significant in promoting local economic equipoise development, to some extent, as the strength propellant widen the local economic gap, especially in supporting mechanisms lag.The lack as follows: First, the structure of fiscal expenditure imbalance lead to greatly reduced of regulate social conflicts of benefits and the other is the main tool of fiscal revenue does not play an effective balance on various benefits of structural transformation and ease the distribute contradictory; Third, under the traditional framework, fiscal policy and role can not be full.This decentralized increasing tax revenue competition, widening extra budgetary income, separating between performance appraisal system and the afairs. At the same time, other supporting mechanisms including the financial transfer lag offset the expected fiscal decentralization, local protectionism strengthen the inter-regional disparities. As the effective implementation of fiscal policy carrier, the fiscal decentralization should pay attention to the organic integration of efficiency and fairness in the process of promoting local economic development. Not only concern about regional economic growth, but also concern of narrow the income gap and promote the social welfare in order to the local economy equipoise development.
Local economic development needs to build a harmonious fiscal decentralization to accommodate growth and distribution. To build a harmonious fiscal decentralization, the principle embodied are: First, to provide high-quality public goods and services; Second, to coordinate and cooperate on both efficiency and fairness; Third, to improve social welfare.Handle the following: First, deal with muti-level governments relationship; second, the relationship between centralized and decentralized is very important; Third, handling the financial expenditure and income; Fourth, properly handle the central and local government incentives relations.Improve the policy basis: First, create a service-oriented government to promote local economic development; Second, compress of the branch and save the financial cost; Third, establish of local governments horizontal coordination mechanism to reduce local Barriers; Fourth is to improve the intergovernmental monitoring and information communication mechanism. And the routing focus on: First, further standardize the scope of rights and expenditure, and the other is a reasonable division of the intergovernmental financial rights, and standardize non-tax revenue, adjustment aspects of legislative and income, The use of tax revenue (distribution) rights and other, gradually establish a harmonious environment; Third, accelerate the improvement of government transfer system, not the general transfer, but the special and the province following ones, gradually expand the scope of transfer to the county or town, and narrowing the gap in the following; The last, strengthen the budget supervision and management capacity, increase the level of incentives, increase management capabilities and management strength, and improve the performance of local government officials assessment mechanism and evaluation system ,hardening budget constraints, encourage local departments to strengthen coordination and cooperation. Also improve the mechanism for supporting the building: First to promote the optimization and upgrading of industrial structure and the other is to speed up and broaden the financing channels to support local economic development; third, constantly improve the social security system.
引文
[1]在德国社会市场经济构建过程中,包括路德维希·艾哈德和瓦尔特·奥肯在内的诸多社会精英认为,德国要建立一种新的经济和社会制度,既有别于传统资本主义,又尊重人的对社会负责的有效率的市场经济。在他们看来,德国社会市场经济必须包括有传统市场经济中的基本要素,如私有制、经营自由、择业自由、契约自由和迁徙自由等,同时还要有一个强有力的面不是“夜警式”国家。刘光耀.德国社会市场经济:理论、发展与比较[M].北京:中共中央党校出版社,2006:86-92.
[1]意志联邦共和国由16个州(Lander)组成,其中包括柏林、汉堡、不来梅等3个市州(Stadtstaaten),亦即它们是市,但是在联邦体系中具有州的地位和职责。
[2]目前,德国地方政府共有543个县、16128个镇以及117个县级(市)。参见董礼胜,欧盟成员国中央与地方关系比较研究[M].北京:中国政法大学出版社.2000:368-370.
[1]资料来源:Deutscher stadtetag(2003):[J/OL].http://www.staedtetag.de/10.presseecke/pressedienst/artikel.2003-06-30.
[1]与此相关的详细内容可参见黄恒学.公共经济学[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2002:275-278.
[1]数据来源:国家统计局.中国统计年鉴[M].北京:中国统计出版社.1992:158.
[1]在当时的历史条件下,国有企业直接持有的现金数量很少而且管理很严。国有企业资金来源主要是财政拨款,即使是银行信贷资金也主要依靠财政拨款,基本上没有商业信用等其他筹集资金的渠道。一个极端的例子足,在很多企业中,厂长能够直接支配的现金还不到1000元人民币。参见胡书东(2001)。
[1]数据来源:孙开.多级财政体制比较研究[M].北京:中国经济出版社.1999:328.
[2]即技术组织措施费、新产品试制费、劳动安全保护费和零星固定资产购置费。
[1]数据来源:叶振鹏,张馨.公共财政论[M].北京:经济科学出版社.1999:514.
[1]其中比较典型和影响较大的有上海模式、深圳模式、珠海模式等。参看国务院国有资产监督管理委员会研究室.探索与研究:国有资产监管与国有企业改革研究报告(2006)[M].北京:中国经济出版社.2007:94-96.
[1]孙立平.利益时代的冲突与和谐:和谐社会是利益均衡基础[O/RL].南方周末.http://politics.people.com.cn/.
[2]马克思恩格斯全集.第2卷,第103页。
[1]数据来源:国家统计局国民经济综合统计司.新中国50年统计资料汇编[M].北京:中国统计出版社.1999:18-19.
[1]这种状况的不利之处在于:一是收入和支出的详细分配并不可得;二是清晰的执行透明度以及严格的规则尚不健全;三是对地方政府借贷的检查和监控体系滞后等。见[美]阿萨德·阿拉女坶,[德]马克·辛德伯格.十年财政转型[J].庞娟,译.社会经济体制比较.2007,(3):26-32.
[2]虽然随着体制性改革不断深入,信息沟通和意愿表达逐步透明和顺畅,预算约束逐渐硬化,但是这些毕竟都是一个渐进的过程。
[3]这一内容在后续章节中作进一步分析。
[1]张军对财政分权引起的地方竞争所产生的影响进行了概括,归纳为促进和维护了不可逆转的市场机制的发展(即market preserving);促进了乡镇企业(TVEs)的发展;促进了城市化和基础设施的建设:导致了改革实验的发生和模仿:促进了外商直接投资(FDIs)的流入。参见张车.分权与增长:中国的故事[J].经济学(季刊).2007,(01):21-52.
[2]在王永钦等(2007)看来,一个完全的分权理论应该不仅能够分析分权体制下地方政府获得的正面激励(分权的收益),也应该能够分析分权体制下地方政府有损社会目标的负面激励(分权的成本)。
[1]按照斯蒂芬·贝利(2006)的概括,地方政府的模型主要包括四种:第一,专制而又仁慈的家长制模型。这种地方政府最确切地知道任何事情,而且其行动在实现经济福利最大化时考虑了市场失灵的因素。第二,财政交换模型。政府的服务供应仅仅和选民们支付税收的意愿相符合。第三,财政转移模型。公共部门服务的提供是为了实现社会政策性目标。第四,利维坦模型。专制的自我满足的官僚和政治家最大化他们自己的福利,而不是为了全体国民和地方居民的利益。
[2]马克思恩格斯全集,第1卷,人民出版社1995年版,第164-165页。
[3]马克思恩格斯全集.第1卷,人民出版社1995年版,第82页。
[4]马克思恩格斯全集,第1卷,人民出版社1995年版,第250页。
[1]各级政府官僚机构存在着预算最大化的倾向,而权力、地位等都与预算最大化正相关。参见Niskanen (1971)。
[1]企业激励方式与政策激励方式不同,主要表现在四个方面。第一,政治组织委托人的偏好往往是异质的,而企业组织中股东的偏好基本上是一致的,即收益最大化。第二,与追求利润最大化的企业不同,政治组织一般是多任务的,除了效率和经济增长之外,政治组织还需要追求社会公正、收入平等、环境保护、公共服务质量等等目标。第三,与企业绩效易于找到同类企业作参照不同,政治组织的绩效难以找到一个可以参照的标准。第四,政治组织与经济组织不同,它在激励机制的设计方面更多地会采用相对绩效评估,而非绝对绩效评估。王水钦等(2007)。
[2]数据来源:王亚华,胡鞍钢.从五大资本比较看中国经济追赶美国[J].经济社会体制比较.2007,(1):29-32.
[1]对此,不妨参见[比]热若尔·罗兰(2002)的论述。
[1]财政支出结构中,“硬性支出”主要是指经济建设性支出,在1989至2005年期间虽然有所下降,但是比重仍旧偏高:而“软性支出”主要是指教育、科研费以及保障类支出等,则落后于经济发展,甚至在这些支出内部也存在着结构性不均衡甚至“缺位”的客观事实。参见邵学峰.财政转型下的公共投资结构分析[J].吉林大学社会科学学报.2007,(5):46-53.
[2]数据来源:平新乔.中国地方政府支出规模的膨胀趋势[J].经济社会体制改革.2007,(1):50-58.
[1]数据来源:宋超,邵智.中国财政转移支付规模问题研究[J].地方财政研究,2005,(01):26-29.
[1]资料来源:周建元.和谐财政的三种功能[J/OL].中国财经报.http://www.cfen.com.cn/web/c-jb/2007-04/24/.
[2]资料来源:孙永尧.关于和谐财政思考[J/OL].http://www.studa.net/yanjiu/061014/10375543.html.
[1]资料来源:邓子基.和谐社会需要和谐财政[R/OL].http://www.xmcz.gov.cn/tqck /tqck073/lltt/,2007-9-1.
[1]详见本文第三章第二节。
[2]包括社会、经济、政治等多角度的公共安全预警管理保障体系。
[3]详见本文第三章第二节。
[4]在现行财政分权体制框架下,事权范闱与财政支出范匝不够协调,尤其是新增支出的负担与分级财政体制矛盾突出。由于这些缺陷,下级的收入短缺问题最终会转化为支出问题上交上级,形成支出上的“倒逼机制”。这种“倒逼机制”形成的一个直接后果就是财权向上聚集,事权向下积压。从近年来全国和中央财政收入逐年增加,县(乡)财政却没有根本好转、甚至困难不断增大可见一斑。
[1]资料来源:刘旭.传新分税制调整方案形成,中央与地方将重新分配[R/OL].http://news.sohu.com/20080629/n257815307.shtml.
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[1]意志联邦共和国由16个州(Lander)组成,其中包括柏林、汉堡、不来梅等3个市州(Stadtstaaten),亦即它们是市,但是在联邦体系中具有州的地位和职责。
[2]目前,德国地方政府共有543个县、16128个镇以及117个县级(市)。参见董礼胜,欧盟成员国中央与地方关系比较研究[M].北京:中国政法大学出版社.2000:368-370.
[1]资料来源:Deutscher stadtetag(2003):[J/OL].http://www.staedtetag.de/10.presseecke/pressedienst/artikel.2003-06-30.
[1]与此相关的详细内容可参见黄恒学.公共经济学[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2002:275-278.
[1]数据来源:国家统计局.中国统计年鉴[M].北京:中国统计出版社.1992:158.
[1]在当时的历史条件下,国有企业直接持有的现金数量很少而且管理很严。国有企业资金来源主要是财政拨款,即使是银行信贷资金也主要依靠财政拨款,基本上没有商业信用等其他筹集资金的渠道。一个极端的例子足,在很多企业中,厂长能够直接支配的现金还不到1000元人民币。参见胡书东(2001)。
[1]数据来源:孙开.多级财政体制比较研究[M].北京:中国经济出版社.1999:328.
[2]即技术组织措施费、新产品试制费、劳动安全保护费和零星固定资产购置费。
[1]数据来源:叶振鹏,张馨.公共财政论[M].北京:经济科学出版社.1999:514.
[1]其中比较典型和影响较大的有上海模式、深圳模式、珠海模式等。参看国务院国有资产监督管理委员会研究室.探索与研究:国有资产监管与国有企业改革研究报告(2006)[M].北京:中国经济出版社.2007:94-96.
[1]孙立平.利益时代的冲突与和谐:和谐社会是利益均衡基础[O/RL].南方周末.http://politics.people.com.cn/.
[2]马克思恩格斯全集.第2卷,第103页。
[1]数据来源:国家统计局国民经济综合统计司.新中国50年统计资料汇编[M].北京:中国统计出版社.1999:18-19.
[1]这种状况的不利之处在于:一是收入和支出的详细分配并不可得;二是清晰的执行透明度以及严格的规则尚不健全;三是对地方政府借贷的检查和监控体系滞后等。见[美]阿萨德·阿拉女坶,[德]马克·辛德伯格.十年财政转型[J].庞娟,译.社会经济体制比较.2007,(3):26-32.
[2]虽然随着体制性改革不断深入,信息沟通和意愿表达逐步透明和顺畅,预算约束逐渐硬化,但是这些毕竟都是一个渐进的过程。
[3]这一内容在后续章节中作进一步分析。
[1]张军对财政分权引起的地方竞争所产生的影响进行了概括,归纳为促进和维护了不可逆转的市场机制的发展(即market preserving);促进了乡镇企业(TVEs)的发展;促进了城市化和基础设施的建设:导致了改革实验的发生和模仿:促进了外商直接投资(FDIs)的流入。参见张车.分权与增长:中国的故事[J].经济学(季刊).2007,(01):21-52.
[2]在王永钦等(2007)看来,一个完全的分权理论应该不仅能够分析分权体制下地方政府获得的正面激励(分权的收益),也应该能够分析分权体制下地方政府有损社会目标的负面激励(分权的成本)。
[1]按照斯蒂芬·贝利(2006)的概括,地方政府的模型主要包括四种:第一,专制而又仁慈的家长制模型。这种地方政府最确切地知道任何事情,而且其行动在实现经济福利最大化时考虑了市场失灵的因素。第二,财政交换模型。政府的服务供应仅仅和选民们支付税收的意愿相符合。第三,财政转移模型。公共部门服务的提供是为了实现社会政策性目标。第四,利维坦模型。专制的自我满足的官僚和政治家最大化他们自己的福利,而不是为了全体国民和地方居民的利益。
[2]马克思恩格斯全集,第1卷,人民出版社1995年版,第164-165页。
[3]马克思恩格斯全集.第1卷,人民出版社1995年版,第82页。
[4]马克思恩格斯全集,第1卷,人民出版社1995年版,第250页。
[1]各级政府官僚机构存在着预算最大化的倾向,而权力、地位等都与预算最大化正相关。参见Niskanen (1971)。
[1]企业激励方式与政策激励方式不同,主要表现在四个方面。第一,政治组织委托人的偏好往往是异质的,而企业组织中股东的偏好基本上是一致的,即收益最大化。第二,与追求利润最大化的企业不同,政治组织一般是多任务的,除了效率和经济增长之外,政治组织还需要追求社会公正、收入平等、环境保护、公共服务质量等等目标。第三,与企业绩效易于找到同类企业作参照不同,政治组织的绩效难以找到一个可以参照的标准。第四,政治组织与经济组织不同,它在激励机制的设计方面更多地会采用相对绩效评估,而非绝对绩效评估。王水钦等(2007)。
[2]数据来源:王亚华,胡鞍钢.从五大资本比较看中国经济追赶美国[J].经济社会体制比较.2007,(1):29-32.
[1]对此,不妨参见[比]热若尔·罗兰(2002)的论述。
[1]财政支出结构中,“硬性支出”主要是指经济建设性支出,在1989至2005年期间虽然有所下降,但是比重仍旧偏高:而“软性支出”主要是指教育、科研费以及保障类支出等,则落后于经济发展,甚至在这些支出内部也存在着结构性不均衡甚至“缺位”的客观事实。参见邵学峰.财政转型下的公共投资结构分析[J].吉林大学社会科学学报.2007,(5):46-53.
[2]数据来源:平新乔.中国地方政府支出规模的膨胀趋势[J].经济社会体制改革.2007,(1):50-58.
[1]数据来源:宋超,邵智.中国财政转移支付规模问题研究[J].地方财政研究,2005,(01):26-29.
[1]资料来源:周建元.和谐财政的三种功能[J/OL].中国财经报.http://www.cfen.com.cn/web/c-jb/2007-04/24/.
[2]资料来源:孙永尧.关于和谐财政思考[J/OL].http://www.studa.net/yanjiu/061014/10375543.html.
[1]资料来源:邓子基.和谐社会需要和谐财政[R/OL].http://www.xmcz.gov.cn/tqck /tqck073/lltt/,2007-9-1.
[1]详见本文第三章第二节。
[2]包括社会、经济、政治等多角度的公共安全预警管理保障体系。
[3]详见本文第三章第二节。
[4]在现行财政分权体制框架下,事权范闱与财政支出范匝不够协调,尤其是新增支出的负担与分级财政体制矛盾突出。由于这些缺陷,下级的收入短缺问题最终会转化为支出问题上交上级,形成支出上的“倒逼机制”。这种“倒逼机制”形成的一个直接后果就是财权向上聚集,事权向下积压。从近年来全国和中央财政收入逐年增加,县(乡)财政却没有根本好转、甚至困难不断增大可见一斑。
[1]资料来源:刘旭.传新分税制调整方案形成,中央与地方将重新分配[R/OL].http://news.sohu.com/20080629/n257815307.shtml.
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