我国高技术产业技术引进与自主研发技术创新优化策略研究
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摘要
2005年我国首次将自主创新提到了国家战略高度,并提出“到2020年要将我国建设成为技术创新型国家”的战略目标,要实现上述战略目标,必须从根本上提高我国高技术产业的国际竞争力和自主创新能力。根据OECD的规定,高技术产业主要包括航天航空器制造业、电子及通信设备制造业、电子计算机及办公设备制造业、医药制造业和医疗设备、仪器仪表制造业等行业。经过多年的发展,我国高技术产业发展现状和外部环境出现了以下特点,应在后续发展中充分重视:(1)我国高技术行业已拥有部分低质量的高技术产品;(2)国际技术发展出现多元化趋势,为我国高技术产业的技术引进提供了选择空间;(3)我国高技术产业国际技术引进形式已经由简单的商品贸易,逐渐向技术许可、股权投资等更深层次合作发展;(4)高技术产业具有网络外部性、规模经济性、技术壁垒较高、边际生产成本较低等特点,且根据消费者产品选择标准的差别,企业之间的竞争表现为质量标准竞争和多维标准竞争两种类型;(5)缺乏高质量的核心技术是制约我国高技术产业参与国际竞争的重要因素,多年的发展经验表明,核心技术是无法通过国际技术引进获得的,必须要依靠我国企业的自主研发。
为了提高我国高技术产业的核心竞争力,本文认为应加强我国企业自主创新,而技术引进消化吸收再创新和自力更生创新是自主创新两种最主要的途径。为此,在未来的发展中,我国高技术产业应解决好自主研发技术与国际引进技术之间的利益分配,利用当前国际高技术产业技术发展多元化的趋势,根据技术特性进行引进技术的优化选择,处理好引进技术创新与自立更生创新之间的关系,在维护社会福利的基础上,促进自主研发技术的发展。
根据高技术产品目标消费者产品选择标准,本文将高技术产业划分为两种类型:一类为质量标准竞争型产业,将选用纵向差异化模型对其进行刻画;另一类为多维标准竞争型产业,将选用多维差异化模型对其进行刻画。本文主要内容大致可分为四个部分:第一部分介绍了文章的研究背景、理论背景和现实背景;第二部分重点分析了如何利用国际高质量技术引进提升我国社会福利,促进产业发展;第三部分重点分析了如何在开放环境下,维护我国自主研发企业的创新与发展;第四部分对全文进行了总结与展望。具体内容如下:
1、第一部分主要包括本文的第一、二、三章,对全文的研究背景、理论基础和现实产业情况进行深入研究,为后续理论分析展开奠定基础。其中,理论综述主要集中于战略性贸易理论、技术创新经济学中企业创新动机和政府创新政策、开放经济中技术转移和技术创新问题以及网络外部性的相关研究等问题,同时指出现有研究对我国高技术产业的技术引进和自主研发技术创新等问题的分析中存在的不足。在对我国高技术产业发展现状、技术引进现状以及发展问题等进行深入剖析之后,本文提出尽管经过多年努力我国高技术产业已经取得一定的发展成绩,但仍面临缺少核心技术等问题。
2、文章的第二部分主要包括第四、五章,重点分析了我国高技术产业的国际技术引进策略。第四章利用多维差异化模型,研究了在具有网络外部性特征的多维标准竞争型市场中,技术质量差距、技术兼容性、产品网络外部性强度、消费者消费偏好损失、国际高技术企业技术转移收费比例等技术特性对技术后进国社会福利和后续技术创新的影响,从维护社会福利的角度出发,提出不同市场条件下我国高技术产业技术引进优化策略。在此分析基础上,本章结合我国在数字电视产业、DVD产业、互联网产业等所采取的差异化政策,对多维标准竞争型产业的技术引进策略和技术发展策略提出建议。第五章利用纵向差异化竞争模型,研究了在具有网络外部性特征和规模经济性特征的质量标准竞争型市场中,技术质量差距、生产规模经济性差距、国际高技术企业技术转移收费比例等技术特性对技术后进国社会福利的影响,为我国质量标准竞争型高技术产业技术引进策略提出建议。文章结合我国第三代移动通信设备产业、大飞机产业、高速铁路产业等发展情况,针对质量标准竞争型高技术产业的技术引进问题提出策略建议。
3、第三部分围绕如何维护本国自主研发企业创新与发展展开深入分析,主要包括第六章和第七章。第六章利用纵向差异化竞争模型,比较分析了在存在技术溢出的质量标准竞争型市场中,技术后进国高技术自主研发企业在产品进口创新模式和自立更生创新模式中的创新动机,为我国高技术产业自主研发技术的创新模式选择提出策略建议。第七章提出我国政府可借鉴日本、韩国等发展中国家成功经验,采用设置技术保护期的方式,为我国高技术自主研发技术留出一定的技术开发期,利用本国市场培育我国自主研发企业的国际竞争力。第七章利用多维差异化模型对上述措施在多维标准竞争型市场中的可行性进行深入研究,同时比较了企业创新动机与社会创新动机之间的差异,以提出促进企业动机与政府动机统一的策略建议。在第三部分中,分别以我国移动通信设备制造业、我国和韩国数字电视产业的技术发展为案例,对各行业的发展经验进行总结和点评,验证了理论分析结果的实际应用价值。
4、第四部分即第八章,对全文的研究内容进行全面总结,并提出研究展望。通过上述研究,本文得到以下主要结论:
1、对于具有网络外部性特征高技术产业而言,若企业之间进行多维标准竞争,则各企业出于扩大企业经营利润和推进后续技术创新的目的,自身所偏好的引进技术特性相类似,具有一定的连贯性,但企业之间的技术选择偏好完全不同。若我国自主研发技术与国际先进技术之间质量差距相对于消费者消费偏好损失较小,应维护自主研发企业在我国市场上的垄断利润,以促进自主研发技术的发展和社会福利的提高。若市场竞争企业不断开展质量提高型技术研发,高质量的引进企业利用逐步增强的技术优势将自主研发企业挤出市场的可能性会不断加大。
2、对于消费中具有网络外部性特征,生产中具有规模经济性特征的高技术产业而言,企业之间进行纵向差异化竞争,则自主研发技术与国际高质量技术之间所存在的质量差距和规模经济性差距,构成了我国高技术企业的技术特性选择空间。在国际高质量技术具有较强生产效率的情况下,我国政府应控制引进技术的质量,以维护市场竞争均衡结构,防止技术引进企业利用竞争优势,形成企业共谋,损害消费者剩余。在我国自主研发企业具有生产效率优势的情况下,若可引进的国际技术相对于自主研发技术的质量优势较小,且国际技术转移收费比例较高时,应适当控制引进技术的质量,以维护我国自主研发企业经营利益。
3、在质量标准竞争型市场中,若进口产品相对于自主研发技术的质量优势较大(或产品进口产生较强的技术溢出作用),迫于进口产品所带来的竞争,我国自主研发企业创新动力会有所提高,此时我国政府应开放市场,坚持走产品进口创新路线。如果进口产品相对于自主研发技术质量优势较小且产品进口所带来的技术溢出作用较小,则我国政府应支持本国自主研发企业选择自力更生创新模式,以便更加有效地促进自主研发企业的创新动力。本文对我国移动通信设备制造业的技术发展经验进行了总结,指出其从进口产品反求工程到模仿创新到自主研发的发展历程,为我国高技术企业自主研发树立了良好的榜样。
4、借鉴日本、韩国等国家高技术产业发展经验,本文研究了在多维标准竞争市场中,技术保护期限措施的合理性。研究结果表明,在市场贴现因子较大的情况下,我国政府采用“时间换空间”的策略,利用设置技术保护期的方式提高高技术产品自主研发企业的产品质量和市场竞争能力的预期目标能够实现,但政府应控制保护期限时长。我国政府应该根据实际的市场情况,灵活利用R&D补贴、R&D税收等措施,协调企业利益与社会利益矛盾,实现社会创新动机与企业创新动机的统一。
本文主要创新点如下:
1、从我国高技术产业所具有的选择权出发,通过理论研究获得各类技术引进策略的市场边界条件。区别于大部分的理论研究,本文强调了我国高技术产业开展优化技术引进的可行性和必要性,指出面对多元化的国际高技术产业发展趋势,我国企业应以已掌握的自主研发技术为基础,结合国际高质量技术的技术特性,选择性地开展国际技术引进工作。本文利用纵向差异化模型和多维差异化模型,分析了我国高技术产业各类技术引进策略适用的市场边界条件,从理论上证明了在部分市场条件下,不应该过度追求高精尖引进技术。
2、以我国高技术产业已掌握的低质量技术为基础,研究了我国自主研发技术的可持续性发展策略,证明了在部分市场条件下自立更生创新的合理性。与以往研究有别,本文对我国自主研发技术可持续性发展策略的研究,是建立在充分强调我国现有技术资源的基础之上的,使全文的研究结论更加符合现实情况。本研究对自主研发技术可持续性发展策略的研究主要集中于以下两个方面:从经营利益出发,分析了自主研发企业对国际技术引进的技术选择偏好;从技术创新利益出发,分析了自主研发企业的创新模式选择。通过模型研究,不但求证出各种技术创新策略所适用的市场边际条件,而且研究结果表明,若我国现有技术已具有一定竞争能力,则利用国内市场开展自力更生创新是符合长远发展利益的。
3、在多维标准竞争型产业中验证了“时间换空间”策略的可行性。借鉴日本、韩国等国家高技术产业的发展经验,本文利用多维标准差异化模型,验证了在一定的市场条件下,我国政府利用技术保护期措施维护高技术产业自主研发技术发展的可行性,同时指出在技术保护期内,政府应调整企业创新动机,以实现社会福利最大化。通过上述理论分析,在新的国际竞争环境中,为我国政府求证出一种维护高技术产业自主研发技术发展的新思路。
China firstly set self-innovation as a nation’s strategy in 2005, and put“to set up an innovation-independent country in 2020”as a strategic aim in 2006. In order to achieve this strategic aim, we have to improve the abilities of international competition and self-innovation for high-technology industries. According to the regulations of OECD, high-technology industries include the industry of aerospace and aircraft, electronics and communication equipments, computers and office equipments, medicine and medical equipments and instruments. In terms of current situations, this dissertation suggests Chinese high-technology industries to focus on below features in future developments: (1) there are some low-quality high-technology products in China; (2) the developing tendency of high-technologies is diversifying, which provides a choice space for Chinese technology introduction; (3) methods of international technology introduction have expanded from commodity trade to licensing, FDI, and other deep cooperation; (4) high-technology industries have features, such as network externalities, scale economics, high entry barrier of technology, low marginal producing cost. And according to different choice standard of consumers, the competition can be classified as two kinds, one of which is quality-standard competition and the other of which is multi-standard competition; (5) the main shortcoming of Chinese high-technology industries is lacking of high-quality core technology. According to developing experiences, it is impossible to get the core technologies by international technology introduction so as that we have to rely on self-reliance innovation.
In order to improve the core competitive abilities of Chinese high-technology industries, we have to strengthen the self-innovation of local enterprises, of which the re-innovation of introduced technology and self-reliance innovation are two main methods. This dissertation suggests balancing profits between self-reliance technology and introduced technology, taking the optimal introduction strategy according to technology features, and dealing with the relationship between re-innovation based on introduced technology and self-reliance innovation, so as to prompt developments of self-reliance technology based on maintenance of the social welfare.
According to the choice standard of aimed consumers, this dissertation classifies high-technology industries as two kinds. One kind is the quality-standard competition industries, which will be outlined by the vertical differentiation model. The other kind is the multi-standard competition industries, which will be outlined by the multi-dimension differentiation model. There are four main parts. The first part introduces the backgrounds of research, theories and realities. The second part focuses on how to utilize the international technology introduction to improve social welfare and industry developments. The third part emphasizes on how to protect the innovation and developments of local self-reliance innovation enterprises. At last, the fourth part makes an overview and prospect. All of the contents are as below:
1. The first, second and third chapters do some researches on backgrounds, theories, and current situations of Chinese high-technology industries. The summarization of theories concentrates on the theory of strategic trade, the innovative incentive of enterprises and government innovation policies, the technology transfer and innovation in an open economy, the theory of network externality, etc. Furthermore, this dissertation points out limitations of existing conclusions to analyze technology introduction and self-reliance innovation of Chinese high-technology industries in the current situations. After a careful analysis of Chinese high-technology industries developments , this dissertation suggests that, although Chinese high-technology industries have gotten considerable achievements, there are still some problems, for example, lacking of core technologies.
2. The second part of this dissertation includes the fourth and fifth chapters, which focuses on analyzing the strategies of international technology introduction. By the multi-dimension differentiation model, the fourth chapter does some researches on the influence of some technology features on the laggard country’s social welfare and consecutive innovation in the multi-dimension difference market with network externality, such as the technology quality gap, technology compatibility, network externality, consumers’preference, the charge rate of international high-technology transfer, etc. Based on theoretic conclusions, the fourth chapter provides some suggestions of technology introduction and development for multi-standard competition industries, with different policies of the industry of digital TV, DVD and internet. Furthermore, by the vertical difference model, the fifth chapter analyzes the influence of some technology features on the laggard country social welfare in the market with network externality and scale economics, such as technology quality gap, scale economics gap, the charge rate of international high-technology transfer, etc, so as to provide some suggestions on technology introduction. Based on theoretic conclusions, the fifth chapter provides some suggestions of technology introduction for quality-standard industries, with developing experiences of the industry of telecommunication equipment, big airplane and high-speed railway.
3. Following the second part, the third part does some researches on how to prompt the innovation and development of native self-reliance enterprises. The third part includes the sixth chapter and the seventh chapter. Considering the technology spillovers, the sixth chapter compares the re-innovation incentive of product import mode and self-reliance mode in the quality-standard competition market, and gives some advice on the choice of Chinese innovation mode. After that, by reference of the successful experiences of other countries, the seventh chapter suggests that China should keep a period of technology protection to cultivate the international competitive abilities by the local market. The seventh chapter focuses on the feasibility of above measurements in the multi-standard competition market by the multi-dimension difference model. Furthermore, it also compares the innovation incentive of enterprises with that of the society to bring forward some suggestions to make them uniform. Furthermore, setting up the developments of Chinese telecommunication equipment industry and of Chinese and Korean digital television industries as examples, the third part summarizes their experiences, and testifies the practicability of theoretic conclusions.
4. The fourth part just makes an overview of the whole contents and points out the future researches.
Above all, this dissertation gets main conclusions as below:
1. For the high-technology industries with network externalities, if enterprises compete with multiple standards, the preference of technology introduction for different enterprises are similar just for the aim of enlarging profits and prompting consecutive innovation, but the preference between individual enterprise is quite different. While the quality gap between the self-reliance technology and available international ones is small compared with consumers’preference loss, Chinese should maintain the monopoly profits for local self-reliance enterprise, to boost the developments of self-reliance technology and social welfare. Furthermore, if enterprises make the quality-improving innovation continually, it becomes more possible that self-reliance enterprises will be extruded out the market by the high-quality enterprises.
2. For the high-technology industries with network externalities and scale economics, if the competition of enterprises is vertical one, the quality gap and scale economics gap between self-reliance technology and available ones just outline the choice space for Chinese high-technology industries. If the international high-quality technology has obvious efficiency advantage, Chinese government should control the quality of introduced technology, to keep the essential market competition and balanced market structure, and avoid enterprises’collusion to hurt consumers’surplus. As the self-reliance technology has advantages of efficiency and the quality gap is not obvious, and the charge rate of introduced technology is a bit high, we should control the quality of introduced one to protect the profits of self-reliance enterprise.
3. In the mode of import innovation, if the quality advantage of import products is remarkable (or the technology spillovers of import products is strong), forced by fierce competition, the innovation incentive of self-reliance enterprises is improved, and Chinese government should open the local market and insists on the mode of import innovation. If the quality advantage of import products is not remarkable and import products do not cause strong spillovers, Chinese government should support local enterprise to choose the self-reliance innovation mode to improve the quality of new products greatly. Based on above analysis, this chapter summarizes the developing experiences of Chinese telecommunication equipment industry. Starting from the“re-innovation of imports”to innovate the international 3G technology standard, their experiences are a good example of high-technology self-reliance innovation.
4. By the reference of experiences of Japan, Korean and other countries, this dissertation does some researches on the rationality of technology protection period in multi standard competition market. All consequences indicate that, as the discount rate is small, it is possible for Chinese government to take use of the strategy of“time changing for space”to improve products quality and competitive abilities of local self-reliance enterprises. Meanwhile, the duration of technology protection should be appropriate. Chinese government should use R&D subsidy and R&D tax to consolidate the innovation incentive of enterprise with that of society.
The main points of innovation for this dissertation are as below:
1. This dissertation analyzes the marginal market conditions for all kinds of technology introduction policies, in view of the choice power of Chinese high-technology industries. Different from most of the theoretic researches, this dissertation emphasizes the feasibility and necessity of taking the optimal technology introduction. This dissertation indicates that, while facing the diversifying developing tendency of international high-technology industries, Chinese enterprises should selectively introduce the high-quality technology with suitable features, on the basis of existing low-quality self-reliance technology and the features of international technologies. By use of the vertical differentiation model and multi-dimension differentiation model, this dissertation analyzes the marginal market conditions of different technology introduction strategies for Chinese high-technology industries. Furthermore, by the theoretic certification, it is not suitable to pursue the most advanced technology in some special situations.
2. Based on the existing low-quality technology, this dissertation does some researches on the sustainable developments of Chinese self-reliance technology, and also proves the rationality of self-reliance innovation in some special market. Different from other researches, in this dissertation, the theoretic researches on the sustainable development strategies of Chinese self-reliance technology is based on the existing technology resources, which makes the conclusions more closed to realities. Above all, the researches on sustainable developments of self-reliance technology mainly focus on two aspects, one of which is to analyze the preference of international technology introduction from the point of performance profits, and the other one of which is to analyze the suitable innovation mode for self-reliance enterprises from the point of innovation profits. As a result, the conclusions not only get the marginal market conditions of all kinds of self-reliance innovation strategies, but also suggest that if the existing technology with some extent of competitive abilities, it is reasonable to use the local market to protect the self-reliance innovation.
3. This dissertation testifies the practicability of strategy“time changing for space”in the multi-standard competition market. By the reference of experiences of Japan, Korean, this dissertation testifies the practicability that Chinese government takes use of technology protection period to maintain the developments of self-reliance technologies, in some special market by the multi-dimension differentiation model. Furthermore, this dissertation also points out that, in the duration of technology protection, the government should adjust the innovation incentive of enterprise according to the social ones in order to achieve the optimal social welfare. After that, the above theoretic analysis has testified a new way to protect the developments of self-reliance technology for Chinese high-technology industries in the new international market.
为了提高我国高技术产业的核心竞争力,本文认为应加强我国企业自主创新,而技术引进消化吸收再创新和自力更生创新是自主创新两种最主要的途径。为此,在未来的发展中,我国高技术产业应解决好自主研发技术与国际引进技术之间的利益分配,利用当前国际高技术产业技术发展多元化的趋势,根据技术特性进行引进技术的优化选择,处理好引进技术创新与自立更生创新之间的关系,在维护社会福利的基础上,促进自主研发技术的发展。
根据高技术产品目标消费者产品选择标准,本文将高技术产业划分为两种类型:一类为质量标准竞争型产业,将选用纵向差异化模型对其进行刻画;另一类为多维标准竞争型产业,将选用多维差异化模型对其进行刻画。本文主要内容大致可分为四个部分:第一部分介绍了文章的研究背景、理论背景和现实背景;第二部分重点分析了如何利用国际高质量技术引进提升我国社会福利,促进产业发展;第三部分重点分析了如何在开放环境下,维护我国自主研发企业的创新与发展;第四部分对全文进行了总结与展望。具体内容如下:
1、第一部分主要包括本文的第一、二、三章,对全文的研究背景、理论基础和现实产业情况进行深入研究,为后续理论分析展开奠定基础。其中,理论综述主要集中于战略性贸易理论、技术创新经济学中企业创新动机和政府创新政策、开放经济中技术转移和技术创新问题以及网络外部性的相关研究等问题,同时指出现有研究对我国高技术产业的技术引进和自主研发技术创新等问题的分析中存在的不足。在对我国高技术产业发展现状、技术引进现状以及发展问题等进行深入剖析之后,本文提出尽管经过多年努力我国高技术产业已经取得一定的发展成绩,但仍面临缺少核心技术等问题。
2、文章的第二部分主要包括第四、五章,重点分析了我国高技术产业的国际技术引进策略。第四章利用多维差异化模型,研究了在具有网络外部性特征的多维标准竞争型市场中,技术质量差距、技术兼容性、产品网络外部性强度、消费者消费偏好损失、国际高技术企业技术转移收费比例等技术特性对技术后进国社会福利和后续技术创新的影响,从维护社会福利的角度出发,提出不同市场条件下我国高技术产业技术引进优化策略。在此分析基础上,本章结合我国在数字电视产业、DVD产业、互联网产业等所采取的差异化政策,对多维标准竞争型产业的技术引进策略和技术发展策略提出建议。第五章利用纵向差异化竞争模型,研究了在具有网络外部性特征和规模经济性特征的质量标准竞争型市场中,技术质量差距、生产规模经济性差距、国际高技术企业技术转移收费比例等技术特性对技术后进国社会福利的影响,为我国质量标准竞争型高技术产业技术引进策略提出建议。文章结合我国第三代移动通信设备产业、大飞机产业、高速铁路产业等发展情况,针对质量标准竞争型高技术产业的技术引进问题提出策略建议。
3、第三部分围绕如何维护本国自主研发企业创新与发展展开深入分析,主要包括第六章和第七章。第六章利用纵向差异化竞争模型,比较分析了在存在技术溢出的质量标准竞争型市场中,技术后进国高技术自主研发企业在产品进口创新模式和自立更生创新模式中的创新动机,为我国高技术产业自主研发技术的创新模式选择提出策略建议。第七章提出我国政府可借鉴日本、韩国等发展中国家成功经验,采用设置技术保护期的方式,为我国高技术自主研发技术留出一定的技术开发期,利用本国市场培育我国自主研发企业的国际竞争力。第七章利用多维差异化模型对上述措施在多维标准竞争型市场中的可行性进行深入研究,同时比较了企业创新动机与社会创新动机之间的差异,以提出促进企业动机与政府动机统一的策略建议。在第三部分中,分别以我国移动通信设备制造业、我国和韩国数字电视产业的技术发展为案例,对各行业的发展经验进行总结和点评,验证了理论分析结果的实际应用价值。
4、第四部分即第八章,对全文的研究内容进行全面总结,并提出研究展望。通过上述研究,本文得到以下主要结论:
1、对于具有网络外部性特征高技术产业而言,若企业之间进行多维标准竞争,则各企业出于扩大企业经营利润和推进后续技术创新的目的,自身所偏好的引进技术特性相类似,具有一定的连贯性,但企业之间的技术选择偏好完全不同。若我国自主研发技术与国际先进技术之间质量差距相对于消费者消费偏好损失较小,应维护自主研发企业在我国市场上的垄断利润,以促进自主研发技术的发展和社会福利的提高。若市场竞争企业不断开展质量提高型技术研发,高质量的引进企业利用逐步增强的技术优势将自主研发企业挤出市场的可能性会不断加大。
2、对于消费中具有网络外部性特征,生产中具有规模经济性特征的高技术产业而言,企业之间进行纵向差异化竞争,则自主研发技术与国际高质量技术之间所存在的质量差距和规模经济性差距,构成了我国高技术企业的技术特性选择空间。在国际高质量技术具有较强生产效率的情况下,我国政府应控制引进技术的质量,以维护市场竞争均衡结构,防止技术引进企业利用竞争优势,形成企业共谋,损害消费者剩余。在我国自主研发企业具有生产效率优势的情况下,若可引进的国际技术相对于自主研发技术的质量优势较小,且国际技术转移收费比例较高时,应适当控制引进技术的质量,以维护我国自主研发企业经营利益。
3、在质量标准竞争型市场中,若进口产品相对于自主研发技术的质量优势较大(或产品进口产生较强的技术溢出作用),迫于进口产品所带来的竞争,我国自主研发企业创新动力会有所提高,此时我国政府应开放市场,坚持走产品进口创新路线。如果进口产品相对于自主研发技术质量优势较小且产品进口所带来的技术溢出作用较小,则我国政府应支持本国自主研发企业选择自力更生创新模式,以便更加有效地促进自主研发企业的创新动力。本文对我国移动通信设备制造业的技术发展经验进行了总结,指出其从进口产品反求工程到模仿创新到自主研发的发展历程,为我国高技术企业自主研发树立了良好的榜样。
4、借鉴日本、韩国等国家高技术产业发展经验,本文研究了在多维标准竞争市场中,技术保护期限措施的合理性。研究结果表明,在市场贴现因子较大的情况下,我国政府采用“时间换空间”的策略,利用设置技术保护期的方式提高高技术产品自主研发企业的产品质量和市场竞争能力的预期目标能够实现,但政府应控制保护期限时长。我国政府应该根据实际的市场情况,灵活利用R&D补贴、R&D税收等措施,协调企业利益与社会利益矛盾,实现社会创新动机与企业创新动机的统一。
本文主要创新点如下:
1、从我国高技术产业所具有的选择权出发,通过理论研究获得各类技术引进策略的市场边界条件。区别于大部分的理论研究,本文强调了我国高技术产业开展优化技术引进的可行性和必要性,指出面对多元化的国际高技术产业发展趋势,我国企业应以已掌握的自主研发技术为基础,结合国际高质量技术的技术特性,选择性地开展国际技术引进工作。本文利用纵向差异化模型和多维差异化模型,分析了我国高技术产业各类技术引进策略适用的市场边界条件,从理论上证明了在部分市场条件下,不应该过度追求高精尖引进技术。
2、以我国高技术产业已掌握的低质量技术为基础,研究了我国自主研发技术的可持续性发展策略,证明了在部分市场条件下自立更生创新的合理性。与以往研究有别,本文对我国自主研发技术可持续性发展策略的研究,是建立在充分强调我国现有技术资源的基础之上的,使全文的研究结论更加符合现实情况。本研究对自主研发技术可持续性发展策略的研究主要集中于以下两个方面:从经营利益出发,分析了自主研发企业对国际技术引进的技术选择偏好;从技术创新利益出发,分析了自主研发企业的创新模式选择。通过模型研究,不但求证出各种技术创新策略所适用的市场边际条件,而且研究结果表明,若我国现有技术已具有一定竞争能力,则利用国内市场开展自力更生创新是符合长远发展利益的。
3、在多维标准竞争型产业中验证了“时间换空间”策略的可行性。借鉴日本、韩国等国家高技术产业的发展经验,本文利用多维标准差异化模型,验证了在一定的市场条件下,我国政府利用技术保护期措施维护高技术产业自主研发技术发展的可行性,同时指出在技术保护期内,政府应调整企业创新动机,以实现社会福利最大化。通过上述理论分析,在新的国际竞争环境中,为我国政府求证出一种维护高技术产业自主研发技术发展的新思路。
China firstly set self-innovation as a nation’s strategy in 2005, and put“to set up an innovation-independent country in 2020”as a strategic aim in 2006. In order to achieve this strategic aim, we have to improve the abilities of international competition and self-innovation for high-technology industries. According to the regulations of OECD, high-technology industries include the industry of aerospace and aircraft, electronics and communication equipments, computers and office equipments, medicine and medical equipments and instruments. In terms of current situations, this dissertation suggests Chinese high-technology industries to focus on below features in future developments: (1) there are some low-quality high-technology products in China; (2) the developing tendency of high-technologies is diversifying, which provides a choice space for Chinese technology introduction; (3) methods of international technology introduction have expanded from commodity trade to licensing, FDI, and other deep cooperation; (4) high-technology industries have features, such as network externalities, scale economics, high entry barrier of technology, low marginal producing cost. And according to different choice standard of consumers, the competition can be classified as two kinds, one of which is quality-standard competition and the other of which is multi-standard competition; (5) the main shortcoming of Chinese high-technology industries is lacking of high-quality core technology. According to developing experiences, it is impossible to get the core technologies by international technology introduction so as that we have to rely on self-reliance innovation.
In order to improve the core competitive abilities of Chinese high-technology industries, we have to strengthen the self-innovation of local enterprises, of which the re-innovation of introduced technology and self-reliance innovation are two main methods. This dissertation suggests balancing profits between self-reliance technology and introduced technology, taking the optimal introduction strategy according to technology features, and dealing with the relationship between re-innovation based on introduced technology and self-reliance innovation, so as to prompt developments of self-reliance technology based on maintenance of the social welfare.
According to the choice standard of aimed consumers, this dissertation classifies high-technology industries as two kinds. One kind is the quality-standard competition industries, which will be outlined by the vertical differentiation model. The other kind is the multi-standard competition industries, which will be outlined by the multi-dimension differentiation model. There are four main parts. The first part introduces the backgrounds of research, theories and realities. The second part focuses on how to utilize the international technology introduction to improve social welfare and industry developments. The third part emphasizes on how to protect the innovation and developments of local self-reliance innovation enterprises. At last, the fourth part makes an overview and prospect. All of the contents are as below:
1. The first, second and third chapters do some researches on backgrounds, theories, and current situations of Chinese high-technology industries. The summarization of theories concentrates on the theory of strategic trade, the innovative incentive of enterprises and government innovation policies, the technology transfer and innovation in an open economy, the theory of network externality, etc. Furthermore, this dissertation points out limitations of existing conclusions to analyze technology introduction and self-reliance innovation of Chinese high-technology industries in the current situations. After a careful analysis of Chinese high-technology industries developments , this dissertation suggests that, although Chinese high-technology industries have gotten considerable achievements, there are still some problems, for example, lacking of core technologies.
2. The second part of this dissertation includes the fourth and fifth chapters, which focuses on analyzing the strategies of international technology introduction. By the multi-dimension differentiation model, the fourth chapter does some researches on the influence of some technology features on the laggard country’s social welfare and consecutive innovation in the multi-dimension difference market with network externality, such as the technology quality gap, technology compatibility, network externality, consumers’preference, the charge rate of international high-technology transfer, etc. Based on theoretic conclusions, the fourth chapter provides some suggestions of technology introduction and development for multi-standard competition industries, with different policies of the industry of digital TV, DVD and internet. Furthermore, by the vertical difference model, the fifth chapter analyzes the influence of some technology features on the laggard country social welfare in the market with network externality and scale economics, such as technology quality gap, scale economics gap, the charge rate of international high-technology transfer, etc, so as to provide some suggestions on technology introduction. Based on theoretic conclusions, the fifth chapter provides some suggestions of technology introduction for quality-standard industries, with developing experiences of the industry of telecommunication equipment, big airplane and high-speed railway.
3. Following the second part, the third part does some researches on how to prompt the innovation and development of native self-reliance enterprises. The third part includes the sixth chapter and the seventh chapter. Considering the technology spillovers, the sixth chapter compares the re-innovation incentive of product import mode and self-reliance mode in the quality-standard competition market, and gives some advice on the choice of Chinese innovation mode. After that, by reference of the successful experiences of other countries, the seventh chapter suggests that China should keep a period of technology protection to cultivate the international competitive abilities by the local market. The seventh chapter focuses on the feasibility of above measurements in the multi-standard competition market by the multi-dimension difference model. Furthermore, it also compares the innovation incentive of enterprises with that of the society to bring forward some suggestions to make them uniform. Furthermore, setting up the developments of Chinese telecommunication equipment industry and of Chinese and Korean digital television industries as examples, the third part summarizes their experiences, and testifies the practicability of theoretic conclusions.
4. The fourth part just makes an overview of the whole contents and points out the future researches.
Above all, this dissertation gets main conclusions as below:
1. For the high-technology industries with network externalities, if enterprises compete with multiple standards, the preference of technology introduction for different enterprises are similar just for the aim of enlarging profits and prompting consecutive innovation, but the preference between individual enterprise is quite different. While the quality gap between the self-reliance technology and available international ones is small compared with consumers’preference loss, Chinese should maintain the monopoly profits for local self-reliance enterprise, to boost the developments of self-reliance technology and social welfare. Furthermore, if enterprises make the quality-improving innovation continually, it becomes more possible that self-reliance enterprises will be extruded out the market by the high-quality enterprises.
2. For the high-technology industries with network externalities and scale economics, if the competition of enterprises is vertical one, the quality gap and scale economics gap between self-reliance technology and available ones just outline the choice space for Chinese high-technology industries. If the international high-quality technology has obvious efficiency advantage, Chinese government should control the quality of introduced technology, to keep the essential market competition and balanced market structure, and avoid enterprises’collusion to hurt consumers’surplus. As the self-reliance technology has advantages of efficiency and the quality gap is not obvious, and the charge rate of introduced technology is a bit high, we should control the quality of introduced one to protect the profits of self-reliance enterprise.
3. In the mode of import innovation, if the quality advantage of import products is remarkable (or the technology spillovers of import products is strong), forced by fierce competition, the innovation incentive of self-reliance enterprises is improved, and Chinese government should open the local market and insists on the mode of import innovation. If the quality advantage of import products is not remarkable and import products do not cause strong spillovers, Chinese government should support local enterprise to choose the self-reliance innovation mode to improve the quality of new products greatly. Based on above analysis, this chapter summarizes the developing experiences of Chinese telecommunication equipment industry. Starting from the“re-innovation of imports”to innovate the international 3G technology standard, their experiences are a good example of high-technology self-reliance innovation.
4. By the reference of experiences of Japan, Korean and other countries, this dissertation does some researches on the rationality of technology protection period in multi standard competition market. All consequences indicate that, as the discount rate is small, it is possible for Chinese government to take use of the strategy of“time changing for space”to improve products quality and competitive abilities of local self-reliance enterprises. Meanwhile, the duration of technology protection should be appropriate. Chinese government should use R&D subsidy and R&D tax to consolidate the innovation incentive of enterprise with that of society.
The main points of innovation for this dissertation are as below:
1. This dissertation analyzes the marginal market conditions for all kinds of technology introduction policies, in view of the choice power of Chinese high-technology industries. Different from most of the theoretic researches, this dissertation emphasizes the feasibility and necessity of taking the optimal technology introduction. This dissertation indicates that, while facing the diversifying developing tendency of international high-technology industries, Chinese enterprises should selectively introduce the high-quality technology with suitable features, on the basis of existing low-quality self-reliance technology and the features of international technologies. By use of the vertical differentiation model and multi-dimension differentiation model, this dissertation analyzes the marginal market conditions of different technology introduction strategies for Chinese high-technology industries. Furthermore, by the theoretic certification, it is not suitable to pursue the most advanced technology in some special situations.
2. Based on the existing low-quality technology, this dissertation does some researches on the sustainable developments of Chinese self-reliance technology, and also proves the rationality of self-reliance innovation in some special market. Different from other researches, in this dissertation, the theoretic researches on the sustainable development strategies of Chinese self-reliance technology is based on the existing technology resources, which makes the conclusions more closed to realities. Above all, the researches on sustainable developments of self-reliance technology mainly focus on two aspects, one of which is to analyze the preference of international technology introduction from the point of performance profits, and the other one of which is to analyze the suitable innovation mode for self-reliance enterprises from the point of innovation profits. As a result, the conclusions not only get the marginal market conditions of all kinds of self-reliance innovation strategies, but also suggest that if the existing technology with some extent of competitive abilities, it is reasonable to use the local market to protect the self-reliance innovation.
3. This dissertation testifies the practicability of strategy“time changing for space”in the multi-standard competition market. By the reference of experiences of Japan, Korean, this dissertation testifies the practicability that Chinese government takes use of technology protection period to maintain the developments of self-reliance technologies, in some special market by the multi-dimension differentiation model. Furthermore, this dissertation also points out that, in the duration of technology protection, the government should adjust the innovation incentive of enterprise according to the social ones in order to achieve the optimal social welfare. After that, the above theoretic analysis has testified a new way to protect the developments of self-reliance technology for Chinese high-technology industries in the new international market.
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