国有企业改革与最优产权安排
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摘要
自1978年改革开放启动之后，有关国有企业产权改革的文献与日俱增，国内外经济学家为寻求一条适合我国国情的产权改革道路进行了坚持不懈地探索。现有的研究可以分为两类：第一类是竞争论，该理论强调市场竞争的重要性；第二类是产权论，这一理论强调了产权，尤其是私有产权的重要性。尽管市场竞争和私有产权都很重要，但是这两种理论既不能相互融合，也难以解释我国国有企业改革所取得的成效。纵观我国国有企业改革历程，有三个问题困扰着我们：(1)为什么在经典的产权理论中被视为最有效率的私有产权反而在改革初期难以发挥出应有的效率?(2)什么是国有企业的最优产权安排模式? (3)应该如何评价我国国有企业产权改革历程，为什么曾经推动过国有企业效率大幅提升的放权让利、承包制等产权制度会逐渐失去活力，成为制约企业发展的瓶颈?
本文综合使用了契约选择理论和交易费用分析法，将静态分析与动态分析相结合，在深入剖析我国国有企业产生的特殊背景和企业的特有性质的基础上，建立了一个基于交易费用视角的国有企业最优产权安排模型，并利用这个模型回答了困惑我们的三个问题。
新制度经济学将制度分为两个范畴：制度环境与制度安排。产权安排是最重要的经济制度安排，政治法律环境则是产权安排产生与变迁的制度环境。交易费用受到政治法律环境和产权安排的共同影响。一方面，最优产权安排能在既定的政治法律环境下，最大限度地节省交易费用。另一方面，政治法律环境的变迁取决于产权安排的变革，但政治法律环境具有“粘性”，其变化是渐进式的、缓慢的，最优产权安排会随着政治法律环境的变迁而演变。因此，分析国有企业最优产权安排必须立足于国有企业所处的具体环境和特殊的契约性质。
我国国有企业所处的政治法律环境具有特殊性，改革之前，国有企业是计划经济体制的组成部分之一。改革后，与市场经济相适应的政治法律制度的建立也不是一蹴而就，而是在改革中逐渐形成、完善。我国国有企业所处的特殊的政治法律环境决定了企业契约和交易费用的性质。企业是一系列契约的联结。作为一种特殊的企业形式，我国的国有企业也是一组契约的联结体，但我国国有企业中的契约存在特殊性。首先，作为国有企业初始委托人的全体人民缺乏行使权利的行为能力。其次，由于初始委托人的缺位，一种等级结构的委托-代理链就成为一种必然的选择。具体而言，这条委托-代理链包括三个层次：政治委托、行政委托和经济委托。第三，在这条等级结构的委托-代理链上，各级委托人的目标都是多元化的，既有经济目标，也有非经济目标。第四，国有企业经理不是市场选择的结果，而是行政任命的产物。因此，企业中的交易费用不同于私有范畴的企业。我国国有企业存在三种重要的交易费用：生产性代理成本、行政性代理成本和信息费用。生产性代理成本产生于国有企业的第三层委托-代理关系(经济委托)中，是由于这一层委托-代理关系上的代理人——企业“内部人”生产性努力和非生产性努力扭曲而导致的企业效率损失。行政性代理成本产生于第二层委托-代理关系(行政代理)中，是由于这一层委托-代理关系上的代理人——地方政府、国资管理机构和相关政府主管部门行为扭曲而导致的社会福利损失。信息费用是由于国有企业决策者缺乏必要的内部管理能力或外部管理能力而产生的成本。
国有企业的最优产权安排正是在具体的政治法律环境制约下，能够最大限度地节省交易费用的产权安排形式。国有企业最优产权安排模型显示：在与中央计划经济相适应的政治法律环境中，私有产权不具备发挥效率的现实条件，完全的国有产权反而能最大限度地节省交易费用。当与市场经济相适应的政治法律制度的完善程度处于中间状态时，两权分离是最优的产权安排模式。只有当与市场经济相适应的政治法律制度完全建立时，私有产权才能充分发挥其有效性。另一方面，产权制度变革改变了竞争的规则，直接推动着政治法律环境的变迁，然而，政治法律环境具有“粘性”，与市场经济相适应的政治法律制度的建立是一个渐进的变迁过程，企业最优产权安排也会随着政治法律环境的变迁而演变。
这个模型可以很好地回答困惑我们的三个问题。(1)在改革开放初期，与中央计划经济相适应的政治法律制度尚未根本破除，大部分经济活动仍要按照国家指令性计划完成。私有产权会产生高昂的信息费用和社会福利的损失，不具备发挥有效性的现实条件。(2)国有企业最优产权安排是在一定政治法律环境约束下，能够最大限度地节省交易费用的产权形式。而且最优产权安排是一个动态过程，会随着政治法律环境的变迁而演变。(3)随着改革的推进，与市场经济相适应的各项政治法律制度不断趋于完善，在竞争性领域内，国有企业产权改革也沿着两权分离、承包制、建立现代企业制度，再到民营化这个路径向前推进。在改革的每一个阶段，各项改革措施都是当时改革环境中的次优选择。此外，随着与市场经济相适应的政治法律制度的完善和国有企业产权改革的推进，企业的交易费用逐渐下降，社会总福利不断提高。
本文用交易费用的视角分析国有企业最优产权安排，并且不再将最优产权安排看作一个静态的制度安排，而是将其作为一个内生于政治法律环境中的动态过程，在这个过程中，最优产权安排既会随着政治法律环境的变迁而演变，也直接推动着政治法律环境的变迁，两者相辅相成，互为前提。因此，本文构建了一个有中国特色的国有企业产权改革模型，实现了分析范式和结论上的创新。
The literatures of the research on the reform of property rights in State-Owned-Enterprises (SOEs) have been increasing since 1978 when the reform and opening-up policy were implemented. Economists at home and abroad made unremitting efforts to explore a path of reform in line with China's national conditions. Existing research can be divided into two categories. One is the theory that puts emphasis on market competition. The other is the theory that stresses the importance of private property rights. Market competition and property rights are both important. However, these theories can neither be integrated with each other, nor make an explanation about the reality of property rights reform of SOEs. Three questions are raised in the research of property rights reform of China's SOEs. (1) Why private property rights does not work at the early stage of the reform, although it is regarded as the most effective form by classical property rights theory. (2) What is the optimal property rights arrangement in China's SOEs. (3) How to assess the property rights reform of China's SOEs. Why the property rights arrangement, such as the separation of ownership and control, and contracting system, which had ever improved the productivity of SOEs greatly became the bottleneck of future development at last.
Based on the research of special nature of China's SOEs and the environment in which they are developed, this paper uses the theory of transaction costs and contract choice to build a model about the optimal property rights arrangement of SOEs on the perspective of transaction costs. This model combines static analysis with dynamic analysis, and can give answers to three questions confusing us.
Institution is divided into two areas in New Institutional Economics. They are institutional environment and institutional arrangement. The property rights arrangement is the most critical economic institutional arrangement, while political and legal environment is the institutional environment in which property rights arrangement is built and develops. Property rights arrangement and political and legal environment have a combined effect on transaction costs. On the one hand, the optimal institutional arrangement can not only minimize transaction costs under the constraints of political and legal environment, but also evolves with the change of political and legal environment. On the other hand, the change of political and legal environment is depended on the evolvement of property rights arrangement. But political and legal environment is sticky, the change of which is gradual and slow. As a result, the special nature of China's SOEs as well as the political and legal environment in which they are built should be considered in order to analyze the optimal property rights arrangment.
The political and legal environment in which China's SOEs are embedded is special. SOEs were one part of centralized planning system before reform. During the reform, political and legal mechanism adaptive to market economy was formed and improved gradually. Because of the particularity of the environment in which China's SOEs are embedded, the nature of the contracts as well as transaction costs of China's SOEs is different from that in private enterprises. Firm is considered as a nexus of contracts. As a special form of enterprise, China's SOEs can also be regarded as a nexus of special contracts. The particularity was reflected in the following aspects. Firstly, the initial principal of SOEs is all the people in China who lack the capacity to sign contracts. Secondly, owing to the absent of the initial principal, it is inevitable to form a principal-agent chain based on administrative level. There are three levels in this chain, including political, administrative and economic principal-agency relationship. Thirdly, the objectives of principals at all levels in this principal-agent chain are multiple, including economic and non-economic objectives. Fourthly, it is by administrative appointment system that managers of SOEs are chosen. As a result, there are three types of transaction costs in China's SOEs, which include productive agency cost, administrative agency cost and information cost. Productive agency cost arises in the economic principal-agency relationship. It is the reduction of SOEs' efficiency caused by the distortion of productive and nonproductive action of enterprise managers. Administrative agency cost arises in the administrative principal-agency relationship. It is the reduction of social welfare caused by the distortion of the action of local government, state owned asset management organization and relevant government departments. Information cost is the reduction of enterprise efficiency owing to the lack of some essential internal and external management capability of decision-makers.
The optimal property rights arrangement of SOEs is the form that can minimize transaction costs under the restraint of political and legal environment. A valuable conclusion can be drawn from the model of optimal property rights arrangement made in this paper. With the lack institution infrastructure adaptive to market economy, private property rights cannot run effectively. State-owned property rights can minimize transaction costs in this political and legal environment. When the political and legal mechanisms adaptive to market economy are developed gradually, the separation of ownership and control is the optimal property rights arrangement. When a perfect political and legal mechanism adaptive to market economy is built, private property rights will be the optimal form. On the other hand, the change of political and legal environment is depended on the evolvement of property rights arrangement, because property rights arrangement determines the rules of competition. However, political and legal environment is sticky. The buildup of political and legal mechanisms adaptive to market economy is a gradual process. The optimal property rights arrangement will evolve with the change of political and legal environment.
Three questions confused us can be answered by this model. (1) In the early stage of the reform, political and legal mechanisms are adapted to centrally planned economy, in which most economic activities had still been controlled by national mandatory plan. SOEs' privatization will produce high transaction costs. (2) The optimal property rights arrangement of SOEs is the form that can minimize transaction costs under the restraints of political and legal environment. In addition, this is a dynamic process, during which the optimal property rights will evolve with the change of political and legal environment. (3) With the gradual improvement of the political and legal mechanisms adaptive to market economy, the property rights reform of China's SOEs in general competitive sectors has gone through several stages, including the separation of ownership and control, contracting system, the setting up of modern enterprise system and privatization. The property rights arrangement at every stage is a second best choice under the political and legal environment at that time. Moreover, the transaction costs continued to decline with the establishment of socialist market economy system and the development of property rights reform of SOEs.
This paper analyzes the optimal property rights arrangement of SOEs based on the perspective of transaction costs, and no longer regards the optimal property rights arrangement as a static institutional arrangement, but a dynamic process endogenous in political and legal environment. During this process, the optimal property rights arrangement not only evolves with the change of political and legal environment, but also promotes the change of political and legal environment. These two aspects are functioning mutually. As a result, a model of property rights reform of SOEs in line with China's national conditions can be built, and the innovations on analysis paradigm and research conclusion are realized in this paper.
本文综合使用了契约选择理论和交易费用分析法，将静态分析与动态分析相结合，在深入剖析我国国有企业产生的特殊背景和企业的特有性质的基础上，建立了一个基于交易费用视角的国有企业最优产权安排模型，并利用这个模型回答了困惑我们的三个问题。
新制度经济学将制度分为两个范畴：制度环境与制度安排。产权安排是最重要的经济制度安排，政治法律环境则是产权安排产生与变迁的制度环境。交易费用受到政治法律环境和产权安排的共同影响。一方面，最优产权安排能在既定的政治法律环境下，最大限度地节省交易费用。另一方面，政治法律环境的变迁取决于产权安排的变革，但政治法律环境具有“粘性”，其变化是渐进式的、缓慢的，最优产权安排会随着政治法律环境的变迁而演变。因此，分析国有企业最优产权安排必须立足于国有企业所处的具体环境和特殊的契约性质。
我国国有企业所处的政治法律环境具有特殊性，改革之前，国有企业是计划经济体制的组成部分之一。改革后，与市场经济相适应的政治法律制度的建立也不是一蹴而就，而是在改革中逐渐形成、完善。我国国有企业所处的特殊的政治法律环境决定了企业契约和交易费用的性质。企业是一系列契约的联结。作为一种特殊的企业形式，我国的国有企业也是一组契约的联结体，但我国国有企业中的契约存在特殊性。首先，作为国有企业初始委托人的全体人民缺乏行使权利的行为能力。其次，由于初始委托人的缺位，一种等级结构的委托-代理链就成为一种必然的选择。具体而言，这条委托-代理链包括三个层次：政治委托、行政委托和经济委托。第三，在这条等级结构的委托-代理链上，各级委托人的目标都是多元化的，既有经济目标，也有非经济目标。第四，国有企业经理不是市场选择的结果，而是行政任命的产物。因此，企业中的交易费用不同于私有范畴的企业。我国国有企业存在三种重要的交易费用：生产性代理成本、行政性代理成本和信息费用。生产性代理成本产生于国有企业的第三层委托-代理关系(经济委托)中，是由于这一层委托-代理关系上的代理人——企业“内部人”生产性努力和非生产性努力扭曲而导致的企业效率损失。行政性代理成本产生于第二层委托-代理关系(行政代理)中，是由于这一层委托-代理关系上的代理人——地方政府、国资管理机构和相关政府主管部门行为扭曲而导致的社会福利损失。信息费用是由于国有企业决策者缺乏必要的内部管理能力或外部管理能力而产生的成本。
国有企业的最优产权安排正是在具体的政治法律环境制约下，能够最大限度地节省交易费用的产权安排形式。国有企业最优产权安排模型显示：在与中央计划经济相适应的政治法律环境中，私有产权不具备发挥效率的现实条件，完全的国有产权反而能最大限度地节省交易费用。当与市场经济相适应的政治法律制度的完善程度处于中间状态时，两权分离是最优的产权安排模式。只有当与市场经济相适应的政治法律制度完全建立时，私有产权才能充分发挥其有效性。另一方面，产权制度变革改变了竞争的规则，直接推动着政治法律环境的变迁，然而，政治法律环境具有“粘性”，与市场经济相适应的政治法律制度的建立是一个渐进的变迁过程，企业最优产权安排也会随着政治法律环境的变迁而演变。
这个模型可以很好地回答困惑我们的三个问题。(1)在改革开放初期，与中央计划经济相适应的政治法律制度尚未根本破除，大部分经济活动仍要按照国家指令性计划完成。私有产权会产生高昂的信息费用和社会福利的损失，不具备发挥有效性的现实条件。(2)国有企业最优产权安排是在一定政治法律环境约束下，能够最大限度地节省交易费用的产权形式。而且最优产权安排是一个动态过程，会随着政治法律环境的变迁而演变。(3)随着改革的推进，与市场经济相适应的各项政治法律制度不断趋于完善，在竞争性领域内，国有企业产权改革也沿着两权分离、承包制、建立现代企业制度，再到民营化这个路径向前推进。在改革的每一个阶段，各项改革措施都是当时改革环境中的次优选择。此外，随着与市场经济相适应的政治法律制度的完善和国有企业产权改革的推进，企业的交易费用逐渐下降，社会总福利不断提高。
本文用交易费用的视角分析国有企业最优产权安排，并且不再将最优产权安排看作一个静态的制度安排，而是将其作为一个内生于政治法律环境中的动态过程，在这个过程中，最优产权安排既会随着政治法律环境的变迁而演变，也直接推动着政治法律环境的变迁，两者相辅相成，互为前提。因此，本文构建了一个有中国特色的国有企业产权改革模型，实现了分析范式和结论上的创新。
The literatures of the research on the reform of property rights in State-Owned-Enterprises (SOEs) have been increasing since 1978 when the reform and opening-up policy were implemented. Economists at home and abroad made unremitting efforts to explore a path of reform in line with China's national conditions. Existing research can be divided into two categories. One is the theory that puts emphasis on market competition. The other is the theory that stresses the importance of private property rights. Market competition and property rights are both important. However, these theories can neither be integrated with each other, nor make an explanation about the reality of property rights reform of SOEs. Three questions are raised in the research of property rights reform of China's SOEs. (1) Why private property rights does not work at the early stage of the reform, although it is regarded as the most effective form by classical property rights theory. (2) What is the optimal property rights arrangement in China's SOEs. (3) How to assess the property rights reform of China's SOEs. Why the property rights arrangement, such as the separation of ownership and control, and contracting system, which had ever improved the productivity of SOEs greatly became the bottleneck of future development at last.
Based on the research of special nature of China's SOEs and the environment in which they are developed, this paper uses the theory of transaction costs and contract choice to build a model about the optimal property rights arrangement of SOEs on the perspective of transaction costs. This model combines static analysis with dynamic analysis, and can give answers to three questions confusing us.
Institution is divided into two areas in New Institutional Economics. They are institutional environment and institutional arrangement. The property rights arrangement is the most critical economic institutional arrangement, while political and legal environment is the institutional environment in which property rights arrangement is built and develops. Property rights arrangement and political and legal environment have a combined effect on transaction costs. On the one hand, the optimal institutional arrangement can not only minimize transaction costs under the constraints of political and legal environment, but also evolves with the change of political and legal environment. On the other hand, the change of political and legal environment is depended on the evolvement of property rights arrangement. But political and legal environment is sticky, the change of which is gradual and slow. As a result, the special nature of China's SOEs as well as the political and legal environment in which they are built should be considered in order to analyze the optimal property rights arrangment.
The political and legal environment in which China's SOEs are embedded is special. SOEs were one part of centralized planning system before reform. During the reform, political and legal mechanism adaptive to market economy was formed and improved gradually. Because of the particularity of the environment in which China's SOEs are embedded, the nature of the contracts as well as transaction costs of China's SOEs is different from that in private enterprises. Firm is considered as a nexus of contracts. As a special form of enterprise, China's SOEs can also be regarded as a nexus of special contracts. The particularity was reflected in the following aspects. Firstly, the initial principal of SOEs is all the people in China who lack the capacity to sign contracts. Secondly, owing to the absent of the initial principal, it is inevitable to form a principal-agent chain based on administrative level. There are three levels in this chain, including political, administrative and economic principal-agency relationship. Thirdly, the objectives of principals at all levels in this principal-agent chain are multiple, including economic and non-economic objectives. Fourthly, it is by administrative appointment system that managers of SOEs are chosen. As a result, there are three types of transaction costs in China's SOEs, which include productive agency cost, administrative agency cost and information cost. Productive agency cost arises in the economic principal-agency relationship. It is the reduction of SOEs' efficiency caused by the distortion of productive and nonproductive action of enterprise managers. Administrative agency cost arises in the administrative principal-agency relationship. It is the reduction of social welfare caused by the distortion of the action of local government, state owned asset management organization and relevant government departments. Information cost is the reduction of enterprise efficiency owing to the lack of some essential internal and external management capability of decision-makers.
The optimal property rights arrangement of SOEs is the form that can minimize transaction costs under the restraint of political and legal environment. A valuable conclusion can be drawn from the model of optimal property rights arrangement made in this paper. With the lack institution infrastructure adaptive to market economy, private property rights cannot run effectively. State-owned property rights can minimize transaction costs in this political and legal environment. When the political and legal mechanisms adaptive to market economy are developed gradually, the separation of ownership and control is the optimal property rights arrangement. When a perfect political and legal mechanism adaptive to market economy is built, private property rights will be the optimal form. On the other hand, the change of political and legal environment is depended on the evolvement of property rights arrangement, because property rights arrangement determines the rules of competition. However, political and legal environment is sticky. The buildup of political and legal mechanisms adaptive to market economy is a gradual process. The optimal property rights arrangement will evolve with the change of political and legal environment.
Three questions confused us can be answered by this model. (1) In the early stage of the reform, political and legal mechanisms are adapted to centrally planned economy, in which most economic activities had still been controlled by national mandatory plan. SOEs' privatization will produce high transaction costs. (2) The optimal property rights arrangement of SOEs is the form that can minimize transaction costs under the restraints of political and legal environment. In addition, this is a dynamic process, during which the optimal property rights will evolve with the change of political and legal environment. (3) With the gradual improvement of the political and legal mechanisms adaptive to market economy, the property rights reform of China's SOEs in general competitive sectors has gone through several stages, including the separation of ownership and control, contracting system, the setting up of modern enterprise system and privatization. The property rights arrangement at every stage is a second best choice under the political and legal environment at that time. Moreover, the transaction costs continued to decline with the establishment of socialist market economy system and the development of property rights reform of SOEs.
This paper analyzes the optimal property rights arrangement of SOEs based on the perspective of transaction costs, and no longer regards the optimal property rights arrangement as a static institutional arrangement, but a dynamic process endogenous in political and legal environment. During this process, the optimal property rights arrangement not only evolves with the change of political and legal environment, but also promotes the change of political and legal environment. These two aspects are functioning mutually. As a result, a model of property rights reform of SOEs in line with China's national conditions can be built, and the innovations on analysis paradigm and research conclusion are realized in this paper.
引文
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[19]Chueng Stenven. Rent Control and Housing Reconstruction: The Postwar Experience of Prewar Premises in Hong Kong. Journal of Law and Economics,1979, 22(1): 27-53
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[22]Demsetz, H. Toward a Theory of Property Rights. American Economic Review,1967, 57(2): 347-359
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[26]Dewatripont M, Jewitt L, Tirole J. Multitask Agency Problems: Focus and Task Clustering. European Economic Review, 2000, 44(6): 869-877
[27]DiMaggio and Powell. The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Field. In Powell and DiMaggio eds. The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. The University of Chicago Press:63-82
[28]Fama Eugene F. Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. Journal of Political Economy, 1980, 88(2): 288-307
[29]Fama Eugene F., Michael C. Jensen. Separation of Ownership and Control. The Journal of Law & Economics, 1983,26(2): 301-325
[30]Friedman E., Simon Johnson, Todd Mitton. Propping and Tunneling. Journal of Comparative Economics, 2003, 31(4): 732-750
[31]Furubotn E. G, S. Pejovich. Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature. Journal of Economic Literature, 1972, 10(4): 1137-1162
[32]Granovetter Mark. Economic Action and Social Structure: the Problem of Embededness. The American Journal of Sociology, 1985, 3: 481-510
[33]Grossman, S., Oliver Hart. The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral Integration. Journal of Political economy, 1986, 94(4): 691-719
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