股权结构对企业R&D投资行为的影响及经济后果研究
|
摘要
在知识经济时代和市场竞争日趋激烈的今天,R&D投资已成为影响企业生存和发展的重要战略性投资决策行为。与西方发达国家相比,我国R&D投资水平还处于一个较低水平,这一现象已成为制约我国提高技术创新能力和提升国家综合国力的重要因素之一。目前关于R&D投资的研究,主要集中在利用国家统计年鉴获数据,从宏观层面研究R&D投资与一个国家或地区的区域经济、产业发展之间的关系,以及从技术经济的角度研究R&D投资的溢出效益、跨国公司在华投资现状及其对本土企业技术创新行为的影响,R&D投资所涉及的会计处理问题等。自1958年Modigliani和Miller提出著名的MM定理以来,财务学家开始关注企业内部公司治理及治理绩效等问题,并发现股权结构、负债水平、董事会结构等内部公司治理要素是影响企业R&D的重要因素。然而,由于受研究数据等因素的影响,现有相关研究还十分不足。
本文选择创新程度较高的制造业和信息业上市公司为研究对象,研究股权结构对企业R&D投资行为的影响。并试图从股权制度设计的角度,寻求激励企业加大R&D投资的政策和建议。
本文从结构上分为绪论、理论基础、制度背景、实证研究及政策建议几个部分。具体由七章构成,各章的研究内容和研究结论如下:
第1章:绪论。本章首先介绍本研究的选题背景和研究目的、然后介绍研究范围和研究过程中可能用到的研究方法,接着介绍论文的研究思路和结构安排,最后是论文的研究特色和创新之处。
第2章:相关概念及文献回顾。本章首先对从经济学和会计学两个方面介绍R&D投资的概念、内容及微观企业R&D支出的披露问题,然后介绍R&D投资的经济学分析的相关文献,接着从微观市场结构的角度,对公司治理与企业R&D投资的相关文献进行回顾,最后对股权结构与企业R&D投资的相关文献进行回顾,并对相关研究进行了必要的评述。
第3章:股权结构对企业R&D投资机理分析。本章首先分别运用委托代理理论、非对称信息理论和信号传递理论深入剖析股权结构影响企业R&D投资行为的理论基础,然后在此基础上,分析不同股权结构下的企业R&D投资行为机理。
第4章:我国企业股权结构及R&D投资现状分析。本章首先对我国股票市场的发展历程进行回顾,然后分别分析并介绍我国企业的股权结构及R&D投资的现状。
第5章:股权结构对企业R&D投资行为影响的实证研究。本章首先根据相关理论提出研究假设,然后建立相应的研究模型,最后以中国2004-2009年连续披露R&D支出信息的A股制造业和信息技术业上市公司为研究样本,实证检验股权结构与企业R&D投资行为之间的关系。研究发现:
①股权集中度与企业R&D投资行为。总体上看,企业R&D投资与第一大股东持股比例之间存在显著的先减弱再增强“U”型非线性关系,而不是“N”型非线性关系。这可能是由于不同股权集中度时的内部公司治理及代理成本不同,大股东追求控制权私有收益的表现形式随持股比例的变化而变化以及我国上市公司股权集中度普遍较高的事实有关。但是,二者之间的关系,在不同终极所有权性质的企业里,又有一定的差异。中央控股企业,第一大股东持股比例与企业R&D投资之间表现出不太显著的负相关关系,地方政府控股企业表现出显著的先减弱再增强“U”型非线性关系,非国有控股企业则表现出显著的正相关关系。
②股权制衡与企业R&D投资行为。第一大股东与第二至第五大股东持股比例之和与企业R&D投资之间关系没有通过显著性检验,说明总体上看,我国上市公司第二至第五大股东持股比例之和对第一大股东在企业R&D投资决策中的股权制衡效果是缺失的。这可能是上市公司R&D投资效果及R&D投资的投入产出比较低的原因之一。正因为R&D投资的效果较差,R&D投资的投入产出比较低,一些上市公司认为R&D投资是一项很不划算的投资,甚至认为R&D投资就是烧钱,因此,更不愿意进行R&D投资。但是,这种制衡效果,在不同终极所有权性质的企业里又有一定的差异。总的来看,在中央控股企业和地方政府控股企业里都不明显,非国有控股企业里是显著的。尽管目前国有企业的R&D支出绝对数比非国有企业要高一些,但国有企业进行R&D投资更多的是一种强制行为,而不是市场调节的自主行为。另外,统计数据也显示,国有企业R&D支出的相对数并不比非国有企业多。
第6章:企业R&D投资的经济后果分析。本章首先对经济后果进行了相应的界定,然后选择两到三个具有代表性的刻画指标,接着根据研究目的提出研究假设,并构建研究模型,最后仍然用中国2004-2009年连续披露R&D支出信息的A股制造业和信息技术业上市公司为研究样本进行实证检验。研究发现:
①总体上看,企业R&D(绝对和相对)支出与托宾Q正相关,与净资产营业利润率的关系不明确。由于托宾Q是公司市场价值与其重置成本的比值,反映的是一种预期和公司的长期发展方向和价值。而净资产营业利润率则是一种现实,反映的是企业短期投资价值。由此可见,公司进行R&D投资的长期价值是非常显著的;从长期看,R&D投资有利于提升企业价值。但是,R&D投资的短期价值并不明确,短期价值并不是很容易及时的反映出来并被投资者所认可,这也可能就是上市公司不愿进行R&D投资的原因所在。
②企业R&D(绝对和相对)支出与托宾Q之间的正相关关系,与最终控制人类型无关;但企业R&D(绝对和相对)支出与净资产营业利润率之间的关系,在不同终极所有权性质的企业里表现出显著的差异。具体表现为:中央控股企业的R&D支出与净资产营业利润率之间,随着第一大股东持股比例的增加表现为显著的负相关关系。地方控股企业的R&D支出与净资产营业利润率之间表现为,随着第一大股东持股比例的增加呈现出先增后减的“倒U”型关系。非国有控股企业的R&D支出与净资产营业利润率之间,随着第一大股东持股比例的增加表现出显著的正相关关系。这一研究结论又在一定程度上印证了不同性质的企业R&D投资,差异较大。
第7章:结论及建议。本章首先对第三章机理分析、第四章描述性分析和第五、第六章实证检验的研究结论进行归纳和总结,然后从股权制度设置机制的角度,并结合制度经济学、公司治理及内部控制的最新研究成果提出激励企业加大R&D投资的政策建议。具体如下:①改变部分企业的国有性质,引入市场竞争机制,激励企业进行R&D投资;②根据企业性质,选择不同的调整股权集中度策略;③合理利用股权制衡的治理作用。
另外,本文的研究还建议:①进一步转变政府职能,明晰投资主体,规范政府的投融资管理行为;②完善资本市场,创建一个公平的竞争市场;③加大政策扶持,实行免税和资金支持政策;④完善相应的法律和法规,保护知识产权;⑤放宽政策限制,引入竞争机制;⑥完善公司治理机制,实行股权期权制度等。综观全文,本文的研究特色有:
①“股权结构对企业R&D投资行为影响的研究”有如下特色:1)样本数据获取上,将充分考虑上市公司R&D投资披露特征和中国会计准则的变化,采用现金流量表中披露的R&D支出数据,以避免因会计准则变化的影响,使研究更具有中国特色;2)实证方法上,尽可能考虑企业内部富裕资源和外部制度环境等因素,并根据数据的自身特点,以第一大股东持股比例为门槛变量,采用汉森(hansen,1999)提出的门槛模型,利用Matlab和Stata软件,内生性的划分区间并回归分析,以避免人为划分股权集中度与制衡区间所带来的主观性与潜在偏误,使研究更具说服力,使研究结论更具有应用价值。
②“企业R&D投资经济后果的研究”有如下特色:1)为了保证数据的连续性,继续使用2004-2009年连续披露R&D支出的制造业和高新技术业上市公司的平行面板数据;2)沿用前一章求解出来的门槛值进行分组,并设定亚元变量,通过借助所设定的亚元变量与该企业的R&D支出的交叉项来检验第一大股东处于不同门槛区间时的企业R&D投资行为的经济后果;3)考虑到R&D产出滞后的特点,将刻画经济后果的因变量滞后一期;4)为了克服研究样本数据中可能存在的异方差和截面相关现象,采用Daniel Hoechle(2007)提出的、稳健的固定效应进行实证检验;5)尽量选择和前一章相同的控制变量。
本文的创新之处有:
①当前,国内外关于R&D投资行为的研究主要集中在宏观经济领域领域利用统计年鉴研究R&D投资与一个国家或地区的区域经济、产业发展之间的关系,微观层面的研究相对较少。本文基于转型期中国经济的特殊背景,从股权结构的特殊视角研究企业R&D投资行为及经济后果,为研究二者之间的关系构建了一个相对比较完善的研究框架,并在此框架下证实股权结构的确是影响上市公司R&D行为的重要因素之一。本文为研究企业R&D投资行为问题提供了一个相对较新颖的研究视角。
②结合中国经济转轨时期上市公司股权结构特征,分别对股权高度集中、股权高度分散和股权适度集中三种情况下的企业R&D投资机理进行分析,然后通过查阅制造业和信息业上市公司年报手工收集2004-2009年现金流量表中连续披露R&D支出信息的样本数据,并利用这些数据进行实证检验,以此探寻我国企业R&D投资不足的深层次原因,为政策建议提供理论依据。手工收集R&D支出数据有效的避免了新会计准则变化对研究结果可能存在的影响。
③采用汉森(hansen,1999)提出的门槛面板模型,利用Matlab和Stata软件,研究股权集中度与企业R&D投资行为之间的非线性关系,并用分组门槛回归的方法比较不同终极所有权性质下的上述非线性关系的不同表现,这不仅可以避免人为划分股权集中度带来的主观性和潜在的选择性偏误,还有利于缓解引入交叉变量所带来的较为严重的多重共线性问题,极大地提高了检验结果的稳定性和非线性关系的检验效率。在研究R&D投资的经济后果时,本文采用Daniel Hoechle(2007)提出的稳健的固定效应法,有效地克服了数据间可能存在的异方差和截面相关现象,研究中还沿用前一章求解出来的门槛值进行分组和样本数据,避免了两个实证分析之间不具有相关性的问题,使得R&D投资行为研究与其经济后果研究连为一体,从而保证论文的研究体系更加完整。
In the knowledge economy era and today with increasingly competitive market, R&D investment has becoming an important strategic investment decision-making behavior which affect's enterprise survival and development. Compared with Western countries, China's R&D investment level is still at a low level which has restricted our ability to innovate and improve technology to enhance the country's comprehensive national strength. Currently, the research on R&D investment is mostly focused on the relationship between regional economy in a country or district and industrial development at macro level by using National Statistical Yearbook, the overflow of R&D investment from Perspective of Technology and economics, multinational corporation’s investment in china and its impact on the national technological innovation, and the accounting treatment. Since 1958, Modigliani and Miller posed the famous MM theorem, finance experts began to focus on internal corporate governance and performance issues, and they found that ownership structure, debt levels, board structure and other factors have important influence on R&D investment behavior. However, due to the research data and other factors, current research has been inadequate.
By using the data of manufacturing and information industry listed companies this paper will study on the relationship between ownership structure and R&D investment behavior and then try to give relative suggestions to encourage enterprise s to increase R&D investment from the equity system design.
In this paper, the structure is divided into several parts such as introduction, theoretical foundation, institutional context, empirical research and policy suggetion.
The paper is composed of 7 chapters, the research contents and conclusions in each chapter are as follows:
Chapter 1: Introduction. This chapter firstly introduces the background of the study topics and research purposes. Secondly, defines the scope of the study and describes the research methods that may be used. Lastly but not least, introduces the features and innovations that writer tries to breakthrough.
Chapter 2: related concepts and literature review. This chapter firstly introduces the concept of R&D investment in economics and accounting the disclosure of R&D expenditures. Secondly, it describes the economics of R&D investment analysis of the relevant literature, and then introduces the literature related to R&D investment in economics. Thirdly it summarizes the literature about the relationship between corporate governance and R&D investment. Lastly but not least, it generalizes relationship between the ownership structure and R&D investment and gives a related essential comments.
Chapter 3: Mechanical analysis on the effect of ownership structure on corporate R&D investment. This chapter first studies deeply the theoretical basis of the affection of ownership structure on R&D investment behavior by using principal-agent theory, asymmetric information theory and signaling theory respectively. And then analyzes mechanism of R&D investment behavior under different ownership structure.
Chapter 4: Analysis existing state of china's ownership structure and R&D investment. This chapter firstly introduces and comments on Chinese stock market history, and then summarizes the ownership structure and R&D investment. Chapter 5: Empirical study of the relationship between ownership structure and R&D investment behavior. Firstly, this chapter proposes study hypotheses, secondly establishes the appropriate study model. Last, empirically studies on the relationship between ownership structure and R&D investment behavior by using the data of manufacturing and information industry listed companies from 2004 to 2009. The study found:
①The relationship between ownership concentration and corporate R&D investment behavior. Overall, there is the obvious weakening firstly and enhancing lastly "U"-type non-linear relationship rather than "N"-type non-linear relationship between corporate R&D investment and the proportion of stock holding of the largest shareholder. This may be due to the difference of internal corporate governance and agency costs when ownership concentration is different, the forms of large holders pursuing private benefits of control changing with the proportion of stock holding, and the facts that the ownership concentration of listed companies generally is higher. However, the relationship between them is different in different ownership companies. The unobvious negative correlation relationship exists in central state-controlled enterprises, the obvious weakening firstly and enhancing lastly "U"-type non-linear relationship between them exists in local state-controlled enterprises, and the obvious positive correlation relationship in non-state-controlled enterprises.
②The relationship between equity balance and corporate R&D investment behavior. There is an unobvious relationship exists in ratio of the largest shareholder to sum of the second to fifth largest shareholder and corporate R&D investment behavior which have not through significance examination. That to say, equity balance is null and void. Because R&D investment is not effective and its input-output is low, some listed companies do not think that R&D investment is a very good investment, even thinks that it is to burn money, therefore, they are not willing to carry on the R&D investment. However, the effect of check and balance is different in different of ultimate ownership corporate. Generally speaking, the effect of check balance is unobvious in central state-controlled and local state-controlled company and obvious in non-state-controlled company. Even though currently the absolute number of R&D expenditure in state-controlled company is higher than non-state-controlled company, it is more possible that R&D investment in state-controlled share company is enforcement rather than market-adjusted autonomy. In addition, statistics also shows that number of R&D expenditure state-controlled company is not even more than non-state-controlled company.
Chapter 6: Analysis on economic consequence of R&D investment. This chapter firstly gives the definitions to the economic consequence, secondly chooses two or three representative variable, thirdly comes up with the research hypothesis and builds research model according to the research goal. Lastly carries on empirical test by R&D sample that the preceding chapter of institute uses. The study found:
①Overall, corporate R&D (absolute and relative) expenditures are correlated positively with Tobin's Q. The relationship between R&D expenditures and the ratio of operating profit to net assets is not clear. Since Tobin's Q is equal to ratio of market value to book value which reflects a kind of anticipate and company's long-term development direction or value. However, the ratio of operating profit to net assets is a reality which reflects the short-term investment value. Thus, the company R&D investment long-term value is very significant; in a long term, R&D investment will help to enhance company value. However, in a short term, the R&D investment value is not clear, short-term value is not reflected easily and recognized by investors, which may be the reason why listed company do not want to invest in R&D. R&D investment will help enhance corporate long-term value. However, the R&D investment short-term value is not clear and not very easy to be recognized by investors, which maybe the reason why the investors don’t want to invest in R&D.
②The relationship of positive correlation between corporate R&D (absolute and relative) expenditures and Tobin's Q is not clear, but the relationship between corporate R&D (absolute and relative) expenditures and the ratio operating profit to net assets is Significant different in different ultimate ownership companies. Specific performance: the relationship between the R&D expenditure and ratio operating profit to net assets in central state-controlled company is significant negative correlation with the increase of the proportion of largest share holder holding share. The relationship between them in local state-controlled company is increased first and then decreased "inverted U" shape and in non-state-controlled company is significantly positve correlation. To some extent, this conclusion confirmed that different ownership companies are quite different R&D investment.
Chapter 7: Conclusions and recommendations. This chapter firstly reviews the contents of the previous chapter. Secondly draws a conclusion and gves the countermeasure and suggestion from angle of stockholder's rights institutional design. The suggestions are as follows:①To change the state-controlled properties of some companies, and introduce market competition mechanism, encourage enterprises to carry out R&D investment;②According to the nature of an enterprise to select a different strategy of adjusted ownership concentration;③Reasonably use governance role of equity check and balance.
Other recommendations are:①To further transform the government function, define subject of investment and regulate the investment and financing management behavior of government.②To perfect the capital market and create a fair competitive market.③To strengthen policy support and financial support policies, tax exemptions.④To improve relevant laws and regulations, protect intellectual property rights.⑤To relax the policy imitations and introduce competition mechanism.⑥To improve the corporate governance mechanism and implement stock option plan etc. Looking at the full, the features of this article are:
①There are the following characteristics at" the research on impact of ownership structure on corporate R&D investment behavior":1) For the receiving sample data. In order to fully consider characteristics of the disclosed information of listed company R&D investment, this chapter use the disclosed R&D expenditure data in cash flow statement to avoid the impact of changes in accounting standards with Chinese characteristics. 2) For the empirical method. In order to consider fully the factors such as the rich resource of company internal and external system environment, and according to the characteristics of data, by using the proportion of the largest shareholder as threshold variable, and using the threshold model which was proposed by Hansen, Matlab and Stata software, to divide interval and make regression analysis and to avoid subjectivity and potential bias which is caused by artificial dividing ownership concentration and the interval of checks and balances in order to make research convictive and research finding valuable.
②There are the following characteristics at"the economic consequences research of R&D investment":
1) In order to ensure continuity of data, this chapter continues to use the parallel panel data of manufacturing companies and high-tech industry which was disclosed continuously from 2004 to 2009. 2) In order to ensure continuity of methods, this chapter groups the sample using the threshold value which was counted in the previous chapter, set the sub-element variable, and tests the economic consequence of R&D investment behavior when the largest shareholder is under different threshold interval through the cross term of sub-element variable and R&D investment. 3) Considering the characteristics of the R&D lagged output, this chapter delays a period of the dependent variable to the independent variables. 4) In order to overcome the heteroscedasticity and section related phenomena in research sample data, this chapter Carries on an empirical test using the robust fixed effects proposed by Daniel Hoechle (2007). 5) To choose the same control variables in the previous chapter.
The innovations of this article are:
①Currently, the research on R&D investment is mostly focused on the relationship between regional economy in a country or district and industrial development at macro level by using National Statistical Yearbook, The micro-level studies are relatively few. Based on the special background of China's economic transition, from the perspective of ownership structure, this article studies the corporate R&D investment behavior and its economic consequences, and constructs a relatively quite perfect research frame for the relationship between ownership structure and R&D investment behavior, and confirms that ownership structure really is one of the important factors that influences the R&D investment behavior of listed companies under this framework. This article provides a relatively novel research perspective for for the study of corporate R&D investment behavior.
②With the characteristics of listed company’s ownership structure in the period of China economic transition, this article analyzes the mechanisms of enterprise investment R&D respectively under the situations that Ownership structure in high concentration or in highly dispersed or in moderate concentration And then collects R&D information by hand from Cash flow statement in the manufacturing and industry annual reports of listed companies who disclosure R&D expenditures information consequently from 2004 to 2009 and then use the data for empirical test in order to explore the deep-seated reasons that Chinese enterprise R&D investment is insufficient and provide a theoretical basis for policy and recommendations. Collecting R&D information by hand can be avoid the impact from the new accounting standards changes
③By using the threshold panel model that Hansen (hansen,1999) proposed, this article studies the non-linear relationships between the Ownership concentration and enterprise R&D investment behaviors and manifests the different non-linear relationships under different ultimate ownership by threshold regression analysis which not only can be avoid the subjectivity from the artificial division of the ownership concentration and the bias of selectivity, but also can alleviate multicollinearity that the introduced cross-cutting variable brought about. This greatly improves the stability of test results and the efficiency of non-linear relationship. In the study of economic consequences from R&D investment, this article uses the steady fixed effect law that Daniel Hoechle(2007) proposed to overcome the heteroscedasticity and cross-section related phenomenon that among the data possibly had effectively. By using the data and the threshold value that counted in previous chapter the article effectively avoids the embarrassment for no relevance of two empirical test and makes the research of R&D investment behavior and economic consequences continually as an organic whole and makes the research system more complete.
本文选择创新程度较高的制造业和信息业上市公司为研究对象,研究股权结构对企业R&D投资行为的影响。并试图从股权制度设计的角度,寻求激励企业加大R&D投资的政策和建议。
本文从结构上分为绪论、理论基础、制度背景、实证研究及政策建议几个部分。具体由七章构成,各章的研究内容和研究结论如下:
第1章:绪论。本章首先介绍本研究的选题背景和研究目的、然后介绍研究范围和研究过程中可能用到的研究方法,接着介绍论文的研究思路和结构安排,最后是论文的研究特色和创新之处。
第2章:相关概念及文献回顾。本章首先对从经济学和会计学两个方面介绍R&D投资的概念、内容及微观企业R&D支出的披露问题,然后介绍R&D投资的经济学分析的相关文献,接着从微观市场结构的角度,对公司治理与企业R&D投资的相关文献进行回顾,最后对股权结构与企业R&D投资的相关文献进行回顾,并对相关研究进行了必要的评述。
第3章:股权结构对企业R&D投资机理分析。本章首先分别运用委托代理理论、非对称信息理论和信号传递理论深入剖析股权结构影响企业R&D投资行为的理论基础,然后在此基础上,分析不同股权结构下的企业R&D投资行为机理。
第4章:我国企业股权结构及R&D投资现状分析。本章首先对我国股票市场的发展历程进行回顾,然后分别分析并介绍我国企业的股权结构及R&D投资的现状。
第5章:股权结构对企业R&D投资行为影响的实证研究。本章首先根据相关理论提出研究假设,然后建立相应的研究模型,最后以中国2004-2009年连续披露R&D支出信息的A股制造业和信息技术业上市公司为研究样本,实证检验股权结构与企业R&D投资行为之间的关系。研究发现:
①股权集中度与企业R&D投资行为。总体上看,企业R&D投资与第一大股东持股比例之间存在显著的先减弱再增强“U”型非线性关系,而不是“N”型非线性关系。这可能是由于不同股权集中度时的内部公司治理及代理成本不同,大股东追求控制权私有收益的表现形式随持股比例的变化而变化以及我国上市公司股权集中度普遍较高的事实有关。但是,二者之间的关系,在不同终极所有权性质的企业里,又有一定的差异。中央控股企业,第一大股东持股比例与企业R&D投资之间表现出不太显著的负相关关系,地方政府控股企业表现出显著的先减弱再增强“U”型非线性关系,非国有控股企业则表现出显著的正相关关系。
②股权制衡与企业R&D投资行为。第一大股东与第二至第五大股东持股比例之和与企业R&D投资之间关系没有通过显著性检验,说明总体上看,我国上市公司第二至第五大股东持股比例之和对第一大股东在企业R&D投资决策中的股权制衡效果是缺失的。这可能是上市公司R&D投资效果及R&D投资的投入产出比较低的原因之一。正因为R&D投资的效果较差,R&D投资的投入产出比较低,一些上市公司认为R&D投资是一项很不划算的投资,甚至认为R&D投资就是烧钱,因此,更不愿意进行R&D投资。但是,这种制衡效果,在不同终极所有权性质的企业里又有一定的差异。总的来看,在中央控股企业和地方政府控股企业里都不明显,非国有控股企业里是显著的。尽管目前国有企业的R&D支出绝对数比非国有企业要高一些,但国有企业进行R&D投资更多的是一种强制行为,而不是市场调节的自主行为。另外,统计数据也显示,国有企业R&D支出的相对数并不比非国有企业多。
第6章:企业R&D投资的经济后果分析。本章首先对经济后果进行了相应的界定,然后选择两到三个具有代表性的刻画指标,接着根据研究目的提出研究假设,并构建研究模型,最后仍然用中国2004-2009年连续披露R&D支出信息的A股制造业和信息技术业上市公司为研究样本进行实证检验。研究发现:
①总体上看,企业R&D(绝对和相对)支出与托宾Q正相关,与净资产营业利润率的关系不明确。由于托宾Q是公司市场价值与其重置成本的比值,反映的是一种预期和公司的长期发展方向和价值。而净资产营业利润率则是一种现实,反映的是企业短期投资价值。由此可见,公司进行R&D投资的长期价值是非常显著的;从长期看,R&D投资有利于提升企业价值。但是,R&D投资的短期价值并不明确,短期价值并不是很容易及时的反映出来并被投资者所认可,这也可能就是上市公司不愿进行R&D投资的原因所在。
②企业R&D(绝对和相对)支出与托宾Q之间的正相关关系,与最终控制人类型无关;但企业R&D(绝对和相对)支出与净资产营业利润率之间的关系,在不同终极所有权性质的企业里表现出显著的差异。具体表现为:中央控股企业的R&D支出与净资产营业利润率之间,随着第一大股东持股比例的增加表现为显著的负相关关系。地方控股企业的R&D支出与净资产营业利润率之间表现为,随着第一大股东持股比例的增加呈现出先增后减的“倒U”型关系。非国有控股企业的R&D支出与净资产营业利润率之间,随着第一大股东持股比例的增加表现出显著的正相关关系。这一研究结论又在一定程度上印证了不同性质的企业R&D投资,差异较大。
第7章:结论及建议。本章首先对第三章机理分析、第四章描述性分析和第五、第六章实证检验的研究结论进行归纳和总结,然后从股权制度设置机制的角度,并结合制度经济学、公司治理及内部控制的最新研究成果提出激励企业加大R&D投资的政策建议。具体如下:①改变部分企业的国有性质,引入市场竞争机制,激励企业进行R&D投资;②根据企业性质,选择不同的调整股权集中度策略;③合理利用股权制衡的治理作用。
另外,本文的研究还建议:①进一步转变政府职能,明晰投资主体,规范政府的投融资管理行为;②完善资本市场,创建一个公平的竞争市场;③加大政策扶持,实行免税和资金支持政策;④完善相应的法律和法规,保护知识产权;⑤放宽政策限制,引入竞争机制;⑥完善公司治理机制,实行股权期权制度等。综观全文,本文的研究特色有:
①“股权结构对企业R&D投资行为影响的研究”有如下特色:1)样本数据获取上,将充分考虑上市公司R&D投资披露特征和中国会计准则的变化,采用现金流量表中披露的R&D支出数据,以避免因会计准则变化的影响,使研究更具有中国特色;2)实证方法上,尽可能考虑企业内部富裕资源和外部制度环境等因素,并根据数据的自身特点,以第一大股东持股比例为门槛变量,采用汉森(hansen,1999)提出的门槛模型,利用Matlab和Stata软件,内生性的划分区间并回归分析,以避免人为划分股权集中度与制衡区间所带来的主观性与潜在偏误,使研究更具说服力,使研究结论更具有应用价值。
②“企业R&D投资经济后果的研究”有如下特色:1)为了保证数据的连续性,继续使用2004-2009年连续披露R&D支出的制造业和高新技术业上市公司的平行面板数据;2)沿用前一章求解出来的门槛值进行分组,并设定亚元变量,通过借助所设定的亚元变量与该企业的R&D支出的交叉项来检验第一大股东处于不同门槛区间时的企业R&D投资行为的经济后果;3)考虑到R&D产出滞后的特点,将刻画经济后果的因变量滞后一期;4)为了克服研究样本数据中可能存在的异方差和截面相关现象,采用Daniel Hoechle(2007)提出的、稳健的固定效应进行实证检验;5)尽量选择和前一章相同的控制变量。
本文的创新之处有:
①当前,国内外关于R&D投资行为的研究主要集中在宏观经济领域领域利用统计年鉴研究R&D投资与一个国家或地区的区域经济、产业发展之间的关系,微观层面的研究相对较少。本文基于转型期中国经济的特殊背景,从股权结构的特殊视角研究企业R&D投资行为及经济后果,为研究二者之间的关系构建了一个相对比较完善的研究框架,并在此框架下证实股权结构的确是影响上市公司R&D行为的重要因素之一。本文为研究企业R&D投资行为问题提供了一个相对较新颖的研究视角。
②结合中国经济转轨时期上市公司股权结构特征,分别对股权高度集中、股权高度分散和股权适度集中三种情况下的企业R&D投资机理进行分析,然后通过查阅制造业和信息业上市公司年报手工收集2004-2009年现金流量表中连续披露R&D支出信息的样本数据,并利用这些数据进行实证检验,以此探寻我国企业R&D投资不足的深层次原因,为政策建议提供理论依据。手工收集R&D支出数据有效的避免了新会计准则变化对研究结果可能存在的影响。
③采用汉森(hansen,1999)提出的门槛面板模型,利用Matlab和Stata软件,研究股权集中度与企业R&D投资行为之间的非线性关系,并用分组门槛回归的方法比较不同终极所有权性质下的上述非线性关系的不同表现,这不仅可以避免人为划分股权集中度带来的主观性和潜在的选择性偏误,还有利于缓解引入交叉变量所带来的较为严重的多重共线性问题,极大地提高了检验结果的稳定性和非线性关系的检验效率。在研究R&D投资的经济后果时,本文采用Daniel Hoechle(2007)提出的稳健的固定效应法,有效地克服了数据间可能存在的异方差和截面相关现象,研究中还沿用前一章求解出来的门槛值进行分组和样本数据,避免了两个实证分析之间不具有相关性的问题,使得R&D投资行为研究与其经济后果研究连为一体,从而保证论文的研究体系更加完整。
In the knowledge economy era and today with increasingly competitive market, R&D investment has becoming an important strategic investment decision-making behavior which affect's enterprise survival and development. Compared with Western countries, China's R&D investment level is still at a low level which has restricted our ability to innovate and improve technology to enhance the country's comprehensive national strength. Currently, the research on R&D investment is mostly focused on the relationship between regional economy in a country or district and industrial development at macro level by using National Statistical Yearbook, the overflow of R&D investment from Perspective of Technology and economics, multinational corporation’s investment in china and its impact on the national technological innovation, and the accounting treatment. Since 1958, Modigliani and Miller posed the famous MM theorem, finance experts began to focus on internal corporate governance and performance issues, and they found that ownership structure, debt levels, board structure and other factors have important influence on R&D investment behavior. However, due to the research data and other factors, current research has been inadequate.
By using the data of manufacturing and information industry listed companies this paper will study on the relationship between ownership structure and R&D investment behavior and then try to give relative suggestions to encourage enterprise s to increase R&D investment from the equity system design.
In this paper, the structure is divided into several parts such as introduction, theoretical foundation, institutional context, empirical research and policy suggetion.
The paper is composed of 7 chapters, the research contents and conclusions in each chapter are as follows:
Chapter 1: Introduction. This chapter firstly introduces the background of the study topics and research purposes. Secondly, defines the scope of the study and describes the research methods that may be used. Lastly but not least, introduces the features and innovations that writer tries to breakthrough.
Chapter 2: related concepts and literature review. This chapter firstly introduces the concept of R&D investment in economics and accounting the disclosure of R&D expenditures. Secondly, it describes the economics of R&D investment analysis of the relevant literature, and then introduces the literature related to R&D investment in economics. Thirdly it summarizes the literature about the relationship between corporate governance and R&D investment. Lastly but not least, it generalizes relationship between the ownership structure and R&D investment and gives a related essential comments.
Chapter 3: Mechanical analysis on the effect of ownership structure on corporate R&D investment. This chapter first studies deeply the theoretical basis of the affection of ownership structure on R&D investment behavior by using principal-agent theory, asymmetric information theory and signaling theory respectively. And then analyzes mechanism of R&D investment behavior under different ownership structure.
Chapter 4: Analysis existing state of china's ownership structure and R&D investment. This chapter firstly introduces and comments on Chinese stock market history, and then summarizes the ownership structure and R&D investment. Chapter 5: Empirical study of the relationship between ownership structure and R&D investment behavior. Firstly, this chapter proposes study hypotheses, secondly establishes the appropriate study model. Last, empirically studies on the relationship between ownership structure and R&D investment behavior by using the data of manufacturing and information industry listed companies from 2004 to 2009. The study found:
①The relationship between ownership concentration and corporate R&D investment behavior. Overall, there is the obvious weakening firstly and enhancing lastly "U"-type non-linear relationship rather than "N"-type non-linear relationship between corporate R&D investment and the proportion of stock holding of the largest shareholder. This may be due to the difference of internal corporate governance and agency costs when ownership concentration is different, the forms of large holders pursuing private benefits of control changing with the proportion of stock holding, and the facts that the ownership concentration of listed companies generally is higher. However, the relationship between them is different in different ownership companies. The unobvious negative correlation relationship exists in central state-controlled enterprises, the obvious weakening firstly and enhancing lastly "U"-type non-linear relationship between them exists in local state-controlled enterprises, and the obvious positive correlation relationship in non-state-controlled enterprises.
②The relationship between equity balance and corporate R&D investment behavior. There is an unobvious relationship exists in ratio of the largest shareholder to sum of the second to fifth largest shareholder and corporate R&D investment behavior which have not through significance examination. That to say, equity balance is null and void. Because R&D investment is not effective and its input-output is low, some listed companies do not think that R&D investment is a very good investment, even thinks that it is to burn money, therefore, they are not willing to carry on the R&D investment. However, the effect of check and balance is different in different of ultimate ownership corporate. Generally speaking, the effect of check balance is unobvious in central state-controlled and local state-controlled company and obvious in non-state-controlled company. Even though currently the absolute number of R&D expenditure in state-controlled company is higher than non-state-controlled company, it is more possible that R&D investment in state-controlled share company is enforcement rather than market-adjusted autonomy. In addition, statistics also shows that number of R&D expenditure state-controlled company is not even more than non-state-controlled company.
Chapter 6: Analysis on economic consequence of R&D investment. This chapter firstly gives the definitions to the economic consequence, secondly chooses two or three representative variable, thirdly comes up with the research hypothesis and builds research model according to the research goal. Lastly carries on empirical test by R&D sample that the preceding chapter of institute uses. The study found:
①Overall, corporate R&D (absolute and relative) expenditures are correlated positively with Tobin's Q. The relationship between R&D expenditures and the ratio of operating profit to net assets is not clear. Since Tobin's Q is equal to ratio of market value to book value which reflects a kind of anticipate and company's long-term development direction or value. However, the ratio of operating profit to net assets is a reality which reflects the short-term investment value. Thus, the company R&D investment long-term value is very significant; in a long term, R&D investment will help to enhance company value. However, in a short term, the R&D investment value is not clear, short-term value is not reflected easily and recognized by investors, which may be the reason why listed company do not want to invest in R&D. R&D investment will help enhance corporate long-term value. However, the R&D investment short-term value is not clear and not very easy to be recognized by investors, which maybe the reason why the investors don’t want to invest in R&D.
②The relationship of positive correlation between corporate R&D (absolute and relative) expenditures and Tobin's Q is not clear, but the relationship between corporate R&D (absolute and relative) expenditures and the ratio operating profit to net assets is Significant different in different ultimate ownership companies. Specific performance: the relationship between the R&D expenditure and ratio operating profit to net assets in central state-controlled company is significant negative correlation with the increase of the proportion of largest share holder holding share. The relationship between them in local state-controlled company is increased first and then decreased "inverted U" shape and in non-state-controlled company is significantly positve correlation. To some extent, this conclusion confirmed that different ownership companies are quite different R&D investment.
Chapter 7: Conclusions and recommendations. This chapter firstly reviews the contents of the previous chapter. Secondly draws a conclusion and gves the countermeasure and suggestion from angle of stockholder's rights institutional design. The suggestions are as follows:①To change the state-controlled properties of some companies, and introduce market competition mechanism, encourage enterprises to carry out R&D investment;②According to the nature of an enterprise to select a different strategy of adjusted ownership concentration;③Reasonably use governance role of equity check and balance.
Other recommendations are:①To further transform the government function, define subject of investment and regulate the investment and financing management behavior of government.②To perfect the capital market and create a fair competitive market.③To strengthen policy support and financial support policies, tax exemptions.④To improve relevant laws and regulations, protect intellectual property rights.⑤To relax the policy imitations and introduce competition mechanism.⑥To improve the corporate governance mechanism and implement stock option plan etc. Looking at the full, the features of this article are:
①There are the following characteristics at" the research on impact of ownership structure on corporate R&D investment behavior":1) For the receiving sample data. In order to fully consider characteristics of the disclosed information of listed company R&D investment, this chapter use the disclosed R&D expenditure data in cash flow statement to avoid the impact of changes in accounting standards with Chinese characteristics. 2) For the empirical method. In order to consider fully the factors such as the rich resource of company internal and external system environment, and according to the characteristics of data, by using the proportion of the largest shareholder as threshold variable, and using the threshold model which was proposed by Hansen, Matlab and Stata software, to divide interval and make regression analysis and to avoid subjectivity and potential bias which is caused by artificial dividing ownership concentration and the interval of checks and balances in order to make research convictive and research finding valuable.
②There are the following characteristics at"the economic consequences research of R&D investment":
1) In order to ensure continuity of data, this chapter continues to use the parallel panel data of manufacturing companies and high-tech industry which was disclosed continuously from 2004 to 2009. 2) In order to ensure continuity of methods, this chapter groups the sample using the threshold value which was counted in the previous chapter, set the sub-element variable, and tests the economic consequence of R&D investment behavior when the largest shareholder is under different threshold interval through the cross term of sub-element variable and R&D investment. 3) Considering the characteristics of the R&D lagged output, this chapter delays a period of the dependent variable to the independent variables. 4) In order to overcome the heteroscedasticity and section related phenomena in research sample data, this chapter Carries on an empirical test using the robust fixed effects proposed by Daniel Hoechle (2007). 5) To choose the same control variables in the previous chapter.
The innovations of this article are:
①Currently, the research on R&D investment is mostly focused on the relationship between regional economy in a country or district and industrial development at macro level by using National Statistical Yearbook, The micro-level studies are relatively few. Based on the special background of China's economic transition, from the perspective of ownership structure, this article studies the corporate R&D investment behavior and its economic consequences, and constructs a relatively quite perfect research frame for the relationship between ownership structure and R&D investment behavior, and confirms that ownership structure really is one of the important factors that influences the R&D investment behavior of listed companies under this framework. This article provides a relatively novel research perspective for for the study of corporate R&D investment behavior.
②With the characteristics of listed company’s ownership structure in the period of China economic transition, this article analyzes the mechanisms of enterprise investment R&D respectively under the situations that Ownership structure in high concentration or in highly dispersed or in moderate concentration And then collects R&D information by hand from Cash flow statement in the manufacturing and industry annual reports of listed companies who disclosure R&D expenditures information consequently from 2004 to 2009 and then use the data for empirical test in order to explore the deep-seated reasons that Chinese enterprise R&D investment is insufficient and provide a theoretical basis for policy and recommendations. Collecting R&D information by hand can be avoid the impact from the new accounting standards changes
③By using the threshold panel model that Hansen (hansen,1999) proposed, this article studies the non-linear relationships between the Ownership concentration and enterprise R&D investment behaviors and manifests the different non-linear relationships under different ultimate ownership by threshold regression analysis which not only can be avoid the subjectivity from the artificial division of the ownership concentration and the bias of selectivity, but also can alleviate multicollinearity that the introduced cross-cutting variable brought about. This greatly improves the stability of test results and the efficiency of non-linear relationship. In the study of economic consequences from R&D investment, this article uses the steady fixed effect law that Daniel Hoechle(2007) proposed to overcome the heteroscedasticity and cross-section related phenomenon that among the data possibly had effectively. By using the data and the threshold value that counted in previous chapter the article effectively avoids the embarrassment for no relevance of two empirical test and makes the research of R&D investment behavior and economic consequences continually as an organic whole and makes the research system more complete.
引文
吴延兵.2007.企业规模布场力量与创新:一个文献综述[J].经济研究,5:125-138.
于东智,池国华.2004.董事会规模,稳定性与公司绩效:理论与经验分析[J].经济研究,4:70-79.
刘运国,刘雯,2007.我国上市公司的高管任期与R&D支出[J].管理世界,1:128-136.
焦少飞,张炜,杨选良.2010.技术体制,研发努力与创新绩效:来自中国制造业的证据[J].中
国软科学,5:37-44.任海云.2010.股权结构与企业R&D投入关系的实证研究——基于A股制造业上市公司的数据分析[J].中国软科学,5:126-135.
唐清泉,夏芸,徐欣.2011.我国企业高管股权激励与研发投资——基于内生性视角的研究[J].中国会计评论,3:21-42.
罗婷,朱青,李丹.2009.解析R&D投人和公司价值之间的关系[J].金融研究,6:100-110.
安灵,刘星,白艺昕.2008.股权制衡,终极所有权性质与上市企业非效率投资[J].管理工程学报,2:122-129.
徐磊,黄凌云.2009.FDI技术溢出及其区域创新能力门槛效应研究[J].科研管理,3:16-25.
余怒涛,沈中华等.2008.董事会规模与公司价值关系的进一步检验——基于公司规模门槛效应的分析[J].中国会计评论,9:237-254.
徐金发,刘翌.2002.企业治理结构与技术创新[J].科研管理,4:11-15.
宋小保,刘星.2007.股东冲突对技术创新投资选择的影响分析[J].管理科学,1:59-63.
刘伟,刘星.2007.高管持股对企业R&D支出的影响研究——来自2002-2004年A股上市公司的经验证据[J].科学学与科学技术管理,10:172-175.
王昌林,蒲勇健.2005.公司治理,技术创新路径与产业专业化[J].管理工程学报,3:10-14.
文芳.2008.股权集中度,股权制衡与公司R&D投资——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].南方经济,4:41-52.
谢凤华,姚先国,古家军.2008.高层管理团队异质性与企业技术创新绩效关的实证研究[J].科研管理,6:65-73.
杨勇,达庆利,周勤.2007.公司治理对企业技术创新投资影响的实证研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,11:61-65.
肖利.2008.日本著名企业的技术与管理创新及对我国现代企业的启示[J].科研管理,5:29-34.
冯根福,温军.2008.中国上市公司治理与企业技术创新关系的实证分析[J].中国工业经济,7:91-101.
张宗益,张湄.2007.关于高新技术企业公司治理与R&D投资行为的实证研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,5:23-26.
邢源源.2006.技术与企业治理结构:K模型修正及实证检验[J].中国软科学,5:73-79.
梁莱歆.2007.企业研发预算管理:现状·问题·出路[J].会计研究,10:67-72.
李丹蒙,夏立军.2008.股权性质,制度环境与上市公司R&D强度[J].财经研究,4:93-105.
杨建君,盛锁.2007.股权结构对企业技术创新投入影响的实证研究[J].科学学研究,4:787-792.
王任飞.2005.企业R&D支出的内部影响因素研究——基于中国电子信息百强企业之实证[J].科学学研究,2:225-231.
皮永华,宝贡敏.2005.我国企业多角化战略与研发强度之间关系的实证研究——以浙江省为例[J].科研管理,2:76-82.
李华晶,张玉利.2006.高管团队特征与企业创新关系的实证研究---以科技型中小企业为例[J].商业经济与管理,5:9-13.
陈剑峰,朱毅.2002.基于技术创新的虚拟企业治理结构分析[J].科研管理,4:34-39.
朱平芳,徐伟民.2003.政府的科技激励政策对大中型工业企业R&D投入及其专利产出的影响——上海市的实证研究[J].经济研究,6:45-53.
古利平,张宗益,康继军.2006.专利与R&D资源:中国创新的投入产出分析[J].管理工程学报,1:147-151.
何玮.2003.我国大中型工业企业研究与开发费用支出对产出的影响——1990-2000年大中型工业企业数据的实证分析[J].经济科学,3:5-11.
罗婷,朱青,李丹.2009.解析R&D投入和公司价值之间的关系[J].金融研究,6:100-110.
郝颖,刘星.2010.市场化进程与上市公司R&D投资:基于产权特征视角[J].科研管理,4:81-90.
郝颖,刘星.2010.基于控制权私有收益的资本投资效率及其挤占效应研究[J].科研管理,5:165-175.
刘伟,刘星.2010.股权集中,股权制衡对大股东侵占行为的影响研究[J].中国会计与财务研究,2:58-74.
程华,赵祥.2008.企业规模,研发强度,资助强度与政府科技资助的绩效关系研究——基于浙江民营科技企业的实证研究[J].科研管理,2:37-43.
赵洪江,陈学华,夏晖.2008.公司自主创新投入与治理结构特征实证研究[J].中国软科学,7:145-149.
赵洪江,王志刚,吴文旭.2008.我国股票市场对公司创新信息发布短期反应的实证研究——以信息产业和生物制药产业为例[J].中国软科学,12:83-89.
魏后凯.2002.企业规模,产业集中与技术创新能力[J].经济管理,4:4-10.
陈仲常,余翔.2007.企业研发投入的外部环境影响因素研究——基于产业层面的面板数据分析[J].科研管理,3:78-84.
吴延兵.2007.市场结构,产权结构与R&D——中国制造业的实证分析[J].统计研究,5:67-75.
李青原,陈晓,王永海.2007.产品市场竞争,资产专用性与资本结构来自中国制造业上市公司的经验证据[J].金融研究,4:100-113.
谢凤华,姚先国等.2008.高层管理团队异质性与企业技术创新绩效关系的实证研究[J].科
研管理,11:65-73. 张纯,段逆.2008.我国民营上市公司董事会规模与绩效的实证研究[J].审计研究,6:71-78.
文芳,胡玉明.2009.中国上市公司高管个人特征与R&D投资[J].管理评论,11:84-91.
孟祥霞.2008.大股东控制:利益协同效应还是壕沟防御效应——基于中国上市公司的实证分析[J].经济理论与经济管理,4:37-43.
罗富碧,冉茂盛,杜家廷.2008.高管人员股权激励与投资决策关系的实证研究[J].会计研究,8:69-76.
姚明安,孔莹.2008.财务杠杆对企业投资的影——股权集中背景下的经验研究[J].会计研究,4:33-40.
戴跃强,达庆利.2007.企业技术创新投资与其资本结构,规模之间关系的实证研究[J].科研管理,5:38-42.
程小可,蒋顺才,孙健.2010.上市公司开发支出对市场绩效的影响——基于中国资本市场的实证研究[J].系统工程,9:2-24.
刘伟,李丹.2010.青岛市高新技术企业R&D投入与产出绩效研究[J].科技进步与对策,3:26-29.
陈海声,卢丹.2010.股权性质,资本结构,现金流量与研发强度[J].科技管理研究,21:230-232.
夏芸,唐清泉.2008.我国高科技企业的股权激励与研发支出分析[J].证券市场导报,10:29-34.
连玉君,程建.2006.不同成长机会下资本结构与经营绩效之关系研究[J].当代经济科学,3:97-103.
冉茂盛,刘先福,黄凌云.2008.高新企业股权激励与R&D支出的契约模型研究[J].软科学,11:27-30.
陈隆,张宗益,杨雪松.2005.上市企业公司治理结构对技术创新的影响[J].科技管理研究,9:137-141.
周杰,薛有志.2008.公司内部治理机制对R&D投入的影响——基于总经理持股与董事会结构的实证研究[J].研究与发展管理,3:1-9.
毕克新,高岩.2008.美日公司治理模式对技术创新的影响及对我国的启示[J].科技进步与对策,6:185-189.
杨建君,刘刃,2007.外部董事数量与企业技术创新决策关系[J].科学学与科学技术管理,6:45-48.
华锦阳.2002.试论公司治理对企业技术创新的影响[J].自然辩证法通讯,1:52-57.
沈涤清.2008.我国专利申请量与R&D投入关系研究[J].江西农业学报,7:147-149.
李慧,黄静,吴和成.2010.基于面板数据的我国制造业R&D投入对专利产出的影响实证分析[J].价值工程,4:27-29.
梁莱歆,张焕凤.2005.高科技上市公司R&D投入绩效的实证研究[J].中南大学学报社会科学版,2:232-236.
程宏伟,张永海,常勇.2006.公司R&D投入与业绩相关性的实证研究[J].科学管理研究,3:110-113.
张国安,王铁明.2000.R&D投资对企业价值的影响[J].科技进步与对策,10:90-92.
李春红.2008.上市公司投资行为与控制权配置研究[D].重庆大学博士论文,12:10-15.
欧阳凌,欧阳令南等.2005.股权“市场结构”,最优负债和非效率投资行为[J].财经研究,6:107-119.
叶生明.2006.委托代理框架下的企业投资行为研究[D].复旦大学博士论文,4:56-63.
刘凤朝,孙玉涛.2008.基于过程的政府R&D投入绩效分析[J].研究与发展管理,5:90-95.
安灵.2008.中国上市公司所有权结构与投资行为研究:基于控制权私有收益视角[D].重庆大学博士论文,12:104-110.
任海云,师萍.2009.公司R&D投入与绩效关系的实证研究——基于沪市A股制造业上市公司的数据分析[J].科技进步与对策,12:89-93.
陈岱松.2009.回望中国资本市场的发展历程——纪念改革开放30年[J].科技与经济,2:70-73.
董红星.2010.公司治理与技术创新:一个文献综述[J].科技进步与对策,6:157-160.
李辉,马悦.2009.高技术产业融资结构对R&D绩效的影响研究[J].吉林大学社会科学学报,7:111-116.
曾富全,朱丽俊.2008.资本结构影响企业研发投资决策吗——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].会计之友,9下:84-88.
张国强.2007.市场结构与R&D投资:基于知识产权保护和交易结构的视角[J].科学管理研究,8:108-122.
游春.2010.我国中小企业研发投入与财务绩效关系的实证研究——基于中小企业板上市公司的面板数据[J].南方金融,1:52-59.
刘胜强,刘星.2010.董事会规模对企业R&D投资行为的门槛效应分析——基于制造业和信息业面板数据的经验证据[J].预测,11:32-37.
刘胜强,刘星.2011.上市公司负债水平对企业R&D投资的影响[J].科技进步于对策,6:87-90.
刘胜强,刘星.2010.股权结构对企业R&D投资的影响——来自制造业上市公司2002—2008年的经验证据[J].软科学,7:32-36.
刘胜强,刘星.2010.董事会规模对企业R&D投资行为的影响研究[J].科学管理研究,6:82-86.
刘胜强,刘星.2010.市场结构与企业R&D投资研究综述[J].华东经济管理,7:142-145.
刘胜强,刘星.2010.公司治理对企业R&D投资行为的影响研究综述[J].科技管理研究,1:121-124.
刘胜强,刘星.2008.基于价值运动的企业R&D管理研究[J].科技管理研究,3:162-163.
刘胜强,刘星.2007.企业技术创新的“原动力”分析[J].科技管理研究,10:205-207.
A. B. Jaffe.1988. Demand and supply influence in R&D intensity and productivity growth[J]. Review of Economics and Statistics, 70 (3): 431-437.
Berle,A.,G. Means. 1932. The modern corporation and private property[M] . Macmillan, New York.
Acs Z J, Audretsch D B. 1987. Innovation, market structure, and firm size[J]. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 69(4): 567-574.
Aghion, P. and Tirole, J. 1997. Form a land real authority in organizations[J]. Journal Political Economy, 105(1):1-29.
A.G. Hu. 2001. Ownership, government R&D, private R&D, and productivity in Chinese industry[J]. Journal of Comparative Economics, (29): 136-157.
A. Heiko, W. Gerlach, T. Rndez. S. M. Konrad. 2003. Project choice and risk in R&D[J]. The Financial Review, (38): 77-101.
A. Zhang, Y. Zhang, R. Zhao. 2003. A study of the R&D efficiency and productivity of Chinese firms[J]. Journal of Comparative Economics, (31): 444-464.
Bacon, J. 1973. Corporate directorship practice: member and committees of the board[M], New York: The Conference Board. B. D. Baysinger, R.D. Kosnik, T. A. Turk. 1991. Effects of board and ownership structure on
corporate R&D strategy[J]. Academy of Management Journal, (34): 205 -214.
Bhagat and Welch. 1995. Corporate research & development investments, international comparisons[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 19: 443-670. B. J. Surroca, J. A. Tribò. 2005. The influence of blockholders on R&D investments intensity:evidence from Spain. Working Paper.
Bruce E. Hansen. 2000. Sample splitting and threshold estimation[J]. Econometrica,68(3): 575-603. Bruce E. Hansen. 1999. Threshold effects in non-dynamic panels: estimation, testing, and inference[J]. Journal of Econometrics,93(2): 345-368.
C. Hill, S. Snell. 1988. External control, corporate strategy, and firm performance in research intensive industries[J]. Strategic Management Journal, (9): 591-603.
Comanor, W.S. and Scherer, F.M. 1977, Patent statistics as a measure of technical change[J], Journal of Political Economy,(3):392-398.
Dyck,A., L. Zingales. 2004. Private benefits of control: an international comparison[J]. Journal of Finance,59(4):537-600.
Fazzari, S.M., R.G. 1988. Hubbard and B.C. Petersen. Financing constraints and corporateinvestment[J]. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,1:141-195.
G. Clinch. 1991. Employee compensation and firms’research and development activity[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, (29):59-78.
Harley E. Ryan, Jr., Roy A, N. 2002, The interactions between R&D investment decisions and compensation policy[J]. Financial Management,(3): 5-29.
Hiroyuki Okamuro, Jian Xiong Zhang. 2006. Ownership structure and R&D investment of Japanese start-up dirms[R]. Working Paper Series of Hitotsubashi University.
H. Kaoru, M. Tomiyama, T. Miyagawa. 2004. Corporate governance and research and development: evidence from Japan[J]. Economic Innovation & New Technology, 13(2): 141-164.
H.Z. Huang, C.G. Xu. 1998. Soft budget constraint and the optimal choices of research and development projects financing[J]. Journal of Comparative Economics, 62 (1): 62-79.
J. Bernard, S. Leroy. 2004. Managers and productive investment decisions: the impact of uncertainty and risk aversion[J]. Journal of Small Business Management, 42 (1): 1-18.
Jensen, M.C. 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,48: 831-880.
Jensen,M., Meckling,W.H. 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency cost and ownership structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4):305-360
Jensen, M.C. 2002. Value maximization, stakeholder theory, and the corporate objective function[J]. Business Ethics Quarterly,12(2):235-256.
J. Francis, A. Smith. 1995. Agency costs and innovation: some empirical evidence[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, (19): 383-409. Jianfeng Wu, Rungting Tu. 2007. CEO stock option pay and R&D spending: a behavior agency explanation[J]. Journal of Business Research, 60: 482-492.
J. R. Baldwin, G. Gellatly, V. Gaudreault. 2002. Financing innovation in new small firms----new evidence from Canada[J]. Research Paper Series.
Kee H.Chung, Peter Wright, Ben Kedia. 2003. Corporate governance and R&D investment[J]. Review of Financial Economics,12:161-172.
K. Kelmvk, G. E. Narayanan. 1995. Shareholder value creation during R&D innovation and commercialization stages[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 38(3): 770-786.
L. Chan, J. Lakonishok, T. Sougiannis. 2001. The stock market valuation of research and development expenditures[J]. Journal of Finance, (56): 2431-2456.
M. Lipton, J.A. Llorsch. 1992. Modest proposal for improved corporate governance[J]. Business
Lawyer, 48(1):59-77
M. Marcela, D. Paul. 2002. Building competitive advantage: innovation and corporate governance inEuropean construction[J]. Research Policy, 31 (6): 989-1008.
N. R. E. Ottoo, J. Thornton Jr. 2003. The effect of managerial incentives to bear risk on corporate capital structure and R&D investment[J]. Financial Review (38): 77-101.
Peggy M.Lee, Hugh M.O’neill. 2003. Ownership structures and R&D investments of U.S. and Japanese firms: agency and stewardship perspectives[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 46(2): 85-92.
P. David, A.M. Hitt, J. Gimeno. 2001. The influence of activism by institutional investors on R&D[J]. The Academy of Management Journal, 44 (1):144-157.
R. Argilés, Rosina Moreno and J. Caralt. 2005. Ownership structure and innovation: is there a real link?[J]. Ann Reg Sci, 39(11)38-45.
R. Kochhar, P. David. 1996. Institutional investors and firm innovation: a test of competing hypothesis[J]. Strategic Management Journal, (17): 73-84.
Shlerfer, A., Vishny, R. W. 1997, A survey of corporate governance[J]. Journal of Finance,52: 737-783.
Stulz 1990. Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies[J]. Journal of Financial Ecomomics,26:3-27.
Tylecote, Andrew. 1999, Emmanuelle Conesa. Corporate governance, innovation systems and industrial performance[J]. Industry and Innovation,6:25- 50.
Vogt S.C. 1994.The cash flow/investment relationship: evidence from U.S. manufacturing firms[J]. Financial Management, 23(2):3-20.
Xie, B., Davidson III, W.N., and DaDatt, P.J. 2003. Earnings management and corporate governance: the role of the board and the audit committee[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,9:295-316.
Xueping Wu, Zheng Wang. 2005. Equity financing in a Myers-Majluf framework with private benefits of control[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,11:915-945.
Zahra. S. A. and Pearce II. J. A. 1989. Boards of directors and corporate financial performance, a review and integrated model[J]. Journal of Management,291-334.
于东智,池国华.2004.董事会规模,稳定性与公司绩效:理论与经验分析[J].经济研究,4:70-79.
刘运国,刘雯,2007.我国上市公司的高管任期与R&D支出[J].管理世界,1:128-136.
焦少飞,张炜,杨选良.2010.技术体制,研发努力与创新绩效:来自中国制造业的证据[J].中
国软科学,5:37-44.任海云.2010.股权结构与企业R&D投入关系的实证研究——基于A股制造业上市公司的数据分析[J].中国软科学,5:126-135.
唐清泉,夏芸,徐欣.2011.我国企业高管股权激励与研发投资——基于内生性视角的研究[J].中国会计评论,3:21-42.
罗婷,朱青,李丹.2009.解析R&D投人和公司价值之间的关系[J].金融研究,6:100-110.
安灵,刘星,白艺昕.2008.股权制衡,终极所有权性质与上市企业非效率投资[J].管理工程学报,2:122-129.
徐磊,黄凌云.2009.FDI技术溢出及其区域创新能力门槛效应研究[J].科研管理,3:16-25.
余怒涛,沈中华等.2008.董事会规模与公司价值关系的进一步检验——基于公司规模门槛效应的分析[J].中国会计评论,9:237-254.
徐金发,刘翌.2002.企业治理结构与技术创新[J].科研管理,4:11-15.
宋小保,刘星.2007.股东冲突对技术创新投资选择的影响分析[J].管理科学,1:59-63.
刘伟,刘星.2007.高管持股对企业R&D支出的影响研究——来自2002-2004年A股上市公司的经验证据[J].科学学与科学技术管理,10:172-175.
王昌林,蒲勇健.2005.公司治理,技术创新路径与产业专业化[J].管理工程学报,3:10-14.
文芳.2008.股权集中度,股权制衡与公司R&D投资——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].南方经济,4:41-52.
谢凤华,姚先国,古家军.2008.高层管理团队异质性与企业技术创新绩效关的实证研究[J].科研管理,6:65-73.
杨勇,达庆利,周勤.2007.公司治理对企业技术创新投资影响的实证研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,11:61-65.
肖利.2008.日本著名企业的技术与管理创新及对我国现代企业的启示[J].科研管理,5:29-34.
冯根福,温军.2008.中国上市公司治理与企业技术创新关系的实证分析[J].中国工业经济,7:91-101.
张宗益,张湄.2007.关于高新技术企业公司治理与R&D投资行为的实证研究[J].科学学与科学技术管理,5:23-26.
邢源源.2006.技术与企业治理结构:K模型修正及实证检验[J].中国软科学,5:73-79.
梁莱歆.2007.企业研发预算管理:现状·问题·出路[J].会计研究,10:67-72.
李丹蒙,夏立军.2008.股权性质,制度环境与上市公司R&D强度[J].财经研究,4:93-105.
杨建君,盛锁.2007.股权结构对企业技术创新投入影响的实证研究[J].科学学研究,4:787-792.
王任飞.2005.企业R&D支出的内部影响因素研究——基于中国电子信息百强企业之实证[J].科学学研究,2:225-231.
皮永华,宝贡敏.2005.我国企业多角化战略与研发强度之间关系的实证研究——以浙江省为例[J].科研管理,2:76-82.
李华晶,张玉利.2006.高管团队特征与企业创新关系的实证研究---以科技型中小企业为例[J].商业经济与管理,5:9-13.
陈剑峰,朱毅.2002.基于技术创新的虚拟企业治理结构分析[J].科研管理,4:34-39.
朱平芳,徐伟民.2003.政府的科技激励政策对大中型工业企业R&D投入及其专利产出的影响——上海市的实证研究[J].经济研究,6:45-53.
古利平,张宗益,康继军.2006.专利与R&D资源:中国创新的投入产出分析[J].管理工程学报,1:147-151.
何玮.2003.我国大中型工业企业研究与开发费用支出对产出的影响——1990-2000年大中型工业企业数据的实证分析[J].经济科学,3:5-11.
罗婷,朱青,李丹.2009.解析R&D投入和公司价值之间的关系[J].金融研究,6:100-110.
郝颖,刘星.2010.市场化进程与上市公司R&D投资:基于产权特征视角[J].科研管理,4:81-90.
郝颖,刘星.2010.基于控制权私有收益的资本投资效率及其挤占效应研究[J].科研管理,5:165-175.
刘伟,刘星.2010.股权集中,股权制衡对大股东侵占行为的影响研究[J].中国会计与财务研究,2:58-74.
程华,赵祥.2008.企业规模,研发强度,资助强度与政府科技资助的绩效关系研究——基于浙江民营科技企业的实证研究[J].科研管理,2:37-43.
赵洪江,陈学华,夏晖.2008.公司自主创新投入与治理结构特征实证研究[J].中国软科学,7:145-149.
赵洪江,王志刚,吴文旭.2008.我国股票市场对公司创新信息发布短期反应的实证研究——以信息产业和生物制药产业为例[J].中国软科学,12:83-89.
魏后凯.2002.企业规模,产业集中与技术创新能力[J].经济管理,4:4-10.
陈仲常,余翔.2007.企业研发投入的外部环境影响因素研究——基于产业层面的面板数据分析[J].科研管理,3:78-84.
吴延兵.2007.市场结构,产权结构与R&D——中国制造业的实证分析[J].统计研究,5:67-75.
李青原,陈晓,王永海.2007.产品市场竞争,资产专用性与资本结构来自中国制造业上市公司的经验证据[J].金融研究,4:100-113.
谢凤华,姚先国等.2008.高层管理团队异质性与企业技术创新绩效关系的实证研究[J].科
研管理,11:65-73. 张纯,段逆.2008.我国民营上市公司董事会规模与绩效的实证研究[J].审计研究,6:71-78.
文芳,胡玉明.2009.中国上市公司高管个人特征与R&D投资[J].管理评论,11:84-91.
孟祥霞.2008.大股东控制:利益协同效应还是壕沟防御效应——基于中国上市公司的实证分析[J].经济理论与经济管理,4:37-43.
罗富碧,冉茂盛,杜家廷.2008.高管人员股权激励与投资决策关系的实证研究[J].会计研究,8:69-76.
姚明安,孔莹.2008.财务杠杆对企业投资的影——股权集中背景下的经验研究[J].会计研究,4:33-40.
戴跃强,达庆利.2007.企业技术创新投资与其资本结构,规模之间关系的实证研究[J].科研管理,5:38-42.
程小可,蒋顺才,孙健.2010.上市公司开发支出对市场绩效的影响——基于中国资本市场的实证研究[J].系统工程,9:2-24.
刘伟,李丹.2010.青岛市高新技术企业R&D投入与产出绩效研究[J].科技进步与对策,3:26-29.
陈海声,卢丹.2010.股权性质,资本结构,现金流量与研发强度[J].科技管理研究,21:230-232.
夏芸,唐清泉.2008.我国高科技企业的股权激励与研发支出分析[J].证券市场导报,10:29-34.
连玉君,程建.2006.不同成长机会下资本结构与经营绩效之关系研究[J].当代经济科学,3:97-103.
冉茂盛,刘先福,黄凌云.2008.高新企业股权激励与R&D支出的契约模型研究[J].软科学,11:27-30.
陈隆,张宗益,杨雪松.2005.上市企业公司治理结构对技术创新的影响[J].科技管理研究,9:137-141.
周杰,薛有志.2008.公司内部治理机制对R&D投入的影响——基于总经理持股与董事会结构的实证研究[J].研究与发展管理,3:1-9.
毕克新,高岩.2008.美日公司治理模式对技术创新的影响及对我国的启示[J].科技进步与对策,6:185-189.
杨建君,刘刃,2007.外部董事数量与企业技术创新决策关系[J].科学学与科学技术管理,6:45-48.
华锦阳.2002.试论公司治理对企业技术创新的影响[J].自然辩证法通讯,1:52-57.
沈涤清.2008.我国专利申请量与R&D投入关系研究[J].江西农业学报,7:147-149.
李慧,黄静,吴和成.2010.基于面板数据的我国制造业R&D投入对专利产出的影响实证分析[J].价值工程,4:27-29.
梁莱歆,张焕凤.2005.高科技上市公司R&D投入绩效的实证研究[J].中南大学学报社会科学版,2:232-236.
程宏伟,张永海,常勇.2006.公司R&D投入与业绩相关性的实证研究[J].科学管理研究,3:110-113.
张国安,王铁明.2000.R&D投资对企业价值的影响[J].科技进步与对策,10:90-92.
李春红.2008.上市公司投资行为与控制权配置研究[D].重庆大学博士论文,12:10-15.
欧阳凌,欧阳令南等.2005.股权“市场结构”,最优负债和非效率投资行为[J].财经研究,6:107-119.
叶生明.2006.委托代理框架下的企业投资行为研究[D].复旦大学博士论文,4:56-63.
刘凤朝,孙玉涛.2008.基于过程的政府R&D投入绩效分析[J].研究与发展管理,5:90-95.
安灵.2008.中国上市公司所有权结构与投资行为研究:基于控制权私有收益视角[D].重庆大学博士论文,12:104-110.
任海云,师萍.2009.公司R&D投入与绩效关系的实证研究——基于沪市A股制造业上市公司的数据分析[J].科技进步与对策,12:89-93.
陈岱松.2009.回望中国资本市场的发展历程——纪念改革开放30年[J].科技与经济,2:70-73.
董红星.2010.公司治理与技术创新:一个文献综述[J].科技进步与对策,6:157-160.
李辉,马悦.2009.高技术产业融资结构对R&D绩效的影响研究[J].吉林大学社会科学学报,7:111-116.
曾富全,朱丽俊.2008.资本结构影响企业研发投资决策吗——来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J].会计之友,9下:84-88.
张国强.2007.市场结构与R&D投资:基于知识产权保护和交易结构的视角[J].科学管理研究,8:108-122.
游春.2010.我国中小企业研发投入与财务绩效关系的实证研究——基于中小企业板上市公司的面板数据[J].南方金融,1:52-59.
刘胜强,刘星.2010.董事会规模对企业R&D投资行为的门槛效应分析——基于制造业和信息业面板数据的经验证据[J].预测,11:32-37.
刘胜强,刘星.2011.上市公司负债水平对企业R&D投资的影响[J].科技进步于对策,6:87-90.
刘胜强,刘星.2010.股权结构对企业R&D投资的影响——来自制造业上市公司2002—2008年的经验证据[J].软科学,7:32-36.
刘胜强,刘星.2010.董事会规模对企业R&D投资行为的影响研究[J].科学管理研究,6:82-86.
刘胜强,刘星.2010.市场结构与企业R&D投资研究综述[J].华东经济管理,7:142-145.
刘胜强,刘星.2010.公司治理对企业R&D投资行为的影响研究综述[J].科技管理研究,1:121-124.
刘胜强,刘星.2008.基于价值运动的企业R&D管理研究[J].科技管理研究,3:162-163.
刘胜强,刘星.2007.企业技术创新的“原动力”分析[J].科技管理研究,10:205-207.
A. B. Jaffe.1988. Demand and supply influence in R&D intensity and productivity growth[J]. Review of Economics and Statistics, 70 (3): 431-437.
Berle,A.,G. Means. 1932. The modern corporation and private property[M] . Macmillan, New York.
Acs Z J, Audretsch D B. 1987. Innovation, market structure, and firm size[J]. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 69(4): 567-574.
Aghion, P. and Tirole, J. 1997. Form a land real authority in organizations[J]. Journal Political Economy, 105(1):1-29.
A.G. Hu. 2001. Ownership, government R&D, private R&D, and productivity in Chinese industry[J]. Journal of Comparative Economics, (29): 136-157.
A. Heiko, W. Gerlach, T. Rndez. S. M. Konrad. 2003. Project choice and risk in R&D[J]. The Financial Review, (38): 77-101.
A. Zhang, Y. Zhang, R. Zhao. 2003. A study of the R&D efficiency and productivity of Chinese firms[J]. Journal of Comparative Economics, (31): 444-464.
Bacon, J. 1973. Corporate directorship practice: member and committees of the board[M], New York: The Conference Board. B. D. Baysinger, R.D. Kosnik, T. A. Turk. 1991. Effects of board and ownership structure on
corporate R&D strategy[J]. Academy of Management Journal, (34): 205 -214.
Bhagat and Welch. 1995. Corporate research & development investments, international comparisons[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 19: 443-670. B. J. Surroca, J. A. Tribò. 2005. The influence of blockholders on R&D investments intensity:evidence from Spain. Working Paper.
Bruce E. Hansen. 2000. Sample splitting and threshold estimation[J]. Econometrica,68(3): 575-603. Bruce E. Hansen. 1999. Threshold effects in non-dynamic panels: estimation, testing, and inference[J]. Journal of Econometrics,93(2): 345-368.
C. Hill, S. Snell. 1988. External control, corporate strategy, and firm performance in research intensive industries[J]. Strategic Management Journal, (9): 591-603.
Comanor, W.S. and Scherer, F.M. 1977, Patent statistics as a measure of technical change[J], Journal of Political Economy,(3):392-398.
Dyck,A., L. Zingales. 2004. Private benefits of control: an international comparison[J]. Journal of Finance,59(4):537-600.
Fazzari, S.M., R.G. 1988. Hubbard and B.C. Petersen. Financing constraints and corporateinvestment[J]. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,1:141-195.
G. Clinch. 1991. Employee compensation and firms’research and development activity[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, (29):59-78.
Harley E. Ryan, Jr., Roy A, N. 2002, The interactions between R&D investment decisions and compensation policy[J]. Financial Management,(3): 5-29.
Hiroyuki Okamuro, Jian Xiong Zhang. 2006. Ownership structure and R&D investment of Japanese start-up dirms[R]. Working Paper Series of Hitotsubashi University.
H. Kaoru, M. Tomiyama, T. Miyagawa. 2004. Corporate governance and research and development: evidence from Japan[J]. Economic Innovation & New Technology, 13(2): 141-164.
H.Z. Huang, C.G. Xu. 1998. Soft budget constraint and the optimal choices of research and development projects financing[J]. Journal of Comparative Economics, 62 (1): 62-79.
J. Bernard, S. Leroy. 2004. Managers and productive investment decisions: the impact of uncertainty and risk aversion[J]. Journal of Small Business Management, 42 (1): 1-18.
Jensen, M.C. 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,48: 831-880.
Jensen,M., Meckling,W.H. 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency cost and ownership structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4):305-360
Jensen, M.C. 2002. Value maximization, stakeholder theory, and the corporate objective function[J]. Business Ethics Quarterly,12(2):235-256.
J. Francis, A. Smith. 1995. Agency costs and innovation: some empirical evidence[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, (19): 383-409. Jianfeng Wu, Rungting Tu. 2007. CEO stock option pay and R&D spending: a behavior agency explanation[J]. Journal of Business Research, 60: 482-492.
J. R. Baldwin, G. Gellatly, V. Gaudreault. 2002. Financing innovation in new small firms----new evidence from Canada[J]. Research Paper Series.
Kee H.Chung, Peter Wright, Ben Kedia. 2003. Corporate governance and R&D investment[J]. Review of Financial Economics,12:161-172.
K. Kelmvk, G. E. Narayanan. 1995. Shareholder value creation during R&D innovation and commercialization stages[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 38(3): 770-786.
L. Chan, J. Lakonishok, T. Sougiannis. 2001. The stock market valuation of research and development expenditures[J]. Journal of Finance, (56): 2431-2456.
M. Lipton, J.A. Llorsch. 1992. Modest proposal for improved corporate governance[J]. Business
Lawyer, 48(1):59-77
M. Marcela, D. Paul. 2002. Building competitive advantage: innovation and corporate governance inEuropean construction[J]. Research Policy, 31 (6): 989-1008.
N. R. E. Ottoo, J. Thornton Jr. 2003. The effect of managerial incentives to bear risk on corporate capital structure and R&D investment[J]. Financial Review (38): 77-101.
Peggy M.Lee, Hugh M.O’neill. 2003. Ownership structures and R&D investments of U.S. and Japanese firms: agency and stewardship perspectives[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 46(2): 85-92.
P. David, A.M. Hitt, J. Gimeno. 2001. The influence of activism by institutional investors on R&D[J]. The Academy of Management Journal, 44 (1):144-157.
R. Argilés, Rosina Moreno and J. Caralt. 2005. Ownership structure and innovation: is there a real link?[J]. Ann Reg Sci, 39(11)38-45.
R. Kochhar, P. David. 1996. Institutional investors and firm innovation: a test of competing hypothesis[J]. Strategic Management Journal, (17): 73-84.
Shlerfer, A., Vishny, R. W. 1997, A survey of corporate governance[J]. Journal of Finance,52: 737-783.
Stulz 1990. Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies[J]. Journal of Financial Ecomomics,26:3-27.
Tylecote, Andrew. 1999, Emmanuelle Conesa. Corporate governance, innovation systems and industrial performance[J]. Industry and Innovation,6:25- 50.
Vogt S.C. 1994.The cash flow/investment relationship: evidence from U.S. manufacturing firms[J]. Financial Management, 23(2):3-20.
Xie, B., Davidson III, W.N., and DaDatt, P.J. 2003. Earnings management and corporate governance: the role of the board and the audit committee[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,9:295-316.
Xueping Wu, Zheng Wang. 2005. Equity financing in a Myers-Majluf framework with private benefits of control[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,11:915-945.
Zahra. S. A. and Pearce II. J. A. 1989. Boards of directors and corporate financial performance, a review and integrated model[J]. Journal of Management,291-334.