基于回收竞争的闭环供应链契约协调研究
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摘要
包括正向供应链和逆向供应链两个组成部分的闭环供应链是未来经济发展的重要经营和管理模式，对于解决我国当前日益严峻的经济发展和社会、环境间的矛盾，有着重要的意义。闭环供应链由于其影响因素众多，系统的不确定性远超正向供应链，从而给具体的闭环供应链管理实践带来了困难。当前的理论研究中，研究者往往将闭环供应链结构假设为单链条的简单模式，与现实经济中每个环节有多个参与方，且彼此相互竞争、相互影响的实际情况有较大的差距，从而限制了理论研究成果的应用。
本文从闭环供应链核心企业——再制造企业的视角出发，对两个相互竞争的回收商和一个再制造商的闭环供应链契约协调模型和多个相互竞争的回收商和一个再制造商的闭环供应链契约协调模型进行了探讨。由于回收商彼此相互竞争，因此回收商面向消费者的EOL产品回收价格（设为pr1和pr2）彼此相互影响，而回收商的回收价格和再制造商向回收商提供的收购价格（设为prm）之间也存在着相互的影响关系。由此，作为最为常见的由竞争性回收商和再制造商构成的逆向环节闭环供应链的协调变量——pr1、pr2和prm之间，就形成了一个复杂的互动关系，任何一方的决策都会影响另外两方，任何一方的决策都会受另外两方的影响。
为了解决上述问题，本文首先采用价格契约和回收数量契约对信息对称和不对称的情况下，闭环供应链回收商间的竞争规律进行了研究，得出了在不同契约和信息情况下，两回收商的最优回收价格关系。在此基础上，本文对由两个竞争性回收商和一个再制造商组成的闭环供应链面临的两种再制造市场环境，分别进行了模型研究，得出了在不同市场环境下的闭环供应链协调方案。
回收商间的竞争除了两个寡头的情况较为常见外，多个竞争性回收商和一个再制造商组成的闭环供应链也是当前非常典型的闭环供应链结构。本文采用多Agent模型，对该种闭环供应链的运行模式进行了研究，并得出对竞争性回收商回收成本改进活动进行补贴的契约设计，对闭环供应链协调影响最明显、也最为有效的结论。
为了减少闭环供应链各环节由于信息不对称和流程不确定性带来的高额成本，本文还讨论了闭环供应链信息共享协调体系的构建问题，并以工程机械行业为例，对其闭环供应链管理体系进行了初步的设计。本文的主要结论主要可总结为以下几方面：
（1）在两个竞争性回收商和一个再制造构成的闭环供应链中，信息不对称对于回收商有利，但对于劣势回收商利益更为明显。因此，在回收市场上，推动进行信息共享的都是优势回收商。对于信息是否共享的回收商博弈为“智猪博弈”，即均衡情况为：优势回收商共享回收信息，劣势回收商不共享。
（2）当新旧产品市场相互独立或市场能够容纳所有再制造产品时，无论信息对称与否，再制造企业向回收商提供的契约均衡值为：（劣势回收商，优势回收商）=（价格契约，数量契约）。其中在新旧产品市场相互影响，但再制造产品市场容量足够大时，上述契约组合不但能够实现闭环供应链的协调，而且给予再制造最大的市场权力。
（3）当新旧产品市场相关，且市场不能够容纳所有再制造产品时，制造企业为两回收商提供集中性价格契约为最优选择。此时闭环供应链再制造产品略有盈余，较好地实现了闭环供应链协调。
（4）在多个竞争性回收商和一个再制造商组成的闭环供应链中，再制造商或政府为增加回收量而提高某个回收商回收价格的行为难以影响到整个闭环供应链中其他回收商。最佳闭环供应链均衡契约为再制造商或政府对回收商的价格改进措施进行补贴，同时再制造商提供数量和价格两种契约，回收商采取针对部分竞争对手的自身利益最大化定价策略。
（5）闭环供应链各参与方的成本对于闭环供应链协调意义重大。除了再制造商和政府对于参与方的降低成本措施予以补贴外，构建一个闭环供应链管理信息系统，也能够有效减少因闭环供应链不确定性而给各参与方带来的大量成本支出，从而实现闭环供应链的均衡。
信息协调和契约协调的结合，将是闭环供应链协调最有效的手段。本文的研究结果对于再制造企业的闭环供应链管理和闭环供应链协调，以及对政府制定促进闭环供应链实践发展的产业政策都有重要的理论参考意义。
Including the forward supply chain and reverse supply chain two components ofclosed-loop supply chain is an important operation and management mode of thefuture economic development and has an important significance to solve the currentincreasingly serious contradictions between economic development and the society,environment. Closed-loop supply chain affected by many factors has more systemuncertainty than forward supply chain that brought difficulties to closed-loop supplychain management practice. In the current theoretical research literature, researcherstend to assumes a simple model with a single closed loop supply chain structure thathave larger gap with the realistic economy comprised multiple participants ofcompetition and influence each other each other in each link. This shortcoming limitsthe application of the theory research.
From the core remanufacturing enterprise perspective of closed-loop supplychain core remanufacturing, this paper discusses two kinds of closed-loop supplychain contract coordination model based on competing recycler assume: the twocompeting recycler with a manufacturer and multiple competing recycler with amanufacturer. Because of recyclers’ competition each other, recycling price (set as pr1,pr2) of recycling businesses purchase consumer’s EOL product influence each other,and recycling prices of the two recyclers and purchase price of remanufacturer (as theprm) also influence each other. Thus, there is a complex interactive relationshipbetween pr1, pr2and prmas the most common coordination variables of closed-loopsupply chain including competitive recyclers and remanufacturers. Any one party'sdecision will affect the other two parties; any one party's decision will be affected bythe other two parties.
In order to solve the above problem, this paper studies the rules of closed-loopsupply chain with competitive recyclers by price contract and the recovery quantitycontract of symmetric and asymmetric information situation and puts forward theoptimal recovery price relationship between two recyclers under different contract andinformation. On the basis of above study, this paper studies two kinds ofremanufacturing market environment model respectively and obtain differentclosed-loop supply chain coordination schemes in different market environment of theclosed-loop supply chain composed by two competing recyclers and a manufacturer.
Except the two oligarchs recyclers competition, more competitive recycler and a manufacturer of closed-loop supply chain is the very typical closed-loop supply chainstructure. This paper studies the closed-loop supply chain operation mode composedby multi-competitive recycler and a manufacturer by multi-Agent model theory anddraw a conclusion that contract design of competitive recyclers cost improvementactivities subsidy is the most obvious, is also the most effective on the closed-loopsupply chain coordination.
In order to reduce the high cost of closed-loop supply chain with asymmetricinformation and process uncertainty, this paper also discusses the constructionproblem of closed-loop supply chain information sharing and coordination system anddesigns a closed-loop supply chain management system for construction machineryindustry.
The main conclusions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
(1) Information asymmetry is advantage to recycling business and more obviousto the disadvantages recycling business in the closed-loop supply chain composed bytwo competitive recyclers and a remanufacturing. Therefore, to promote informationsharing is advantage recyclers in the recycling market. The game of the two recyclersshare information is a “Boxed Pigs Game” which equilibrium condition is: theadvantage recycler shares recovery information and disadvantage recycler don’t shareitself information.
(2) When the markets of remanufacture and new product are independent ormarket can accommodate all of remanufacturing products, remanufacturing enterpriseprovides balanced recovery contract value is:(disadvantage recyclers, advantagerecycler)=(the contract price, contract number) whether information symmetry or not.And when the markets of remanufacture and new product influence each other andremanufacturing product market capacity is large enough, the contract combinationcan not only realize the closed loop supply chain contract coordination, but also togive the remanufacturing largest market power.
(3) When the markets of remanufacture and new product influence each otherand remanufacturing product market capacity is not able to accommodate all ofremanufacturing products, to provide centralized price contract is the optimal choicewhich provided by manufacturing enterprises to two recyclers. Remanufacturingproduct in closed-loop supply chain slightly surplus and the closed-loop supply chainachieves coordination.
(4) In the closed-loop supply chain of multiple competitive recyclers and a manufacturer, the behavior of the manufacturer or the government improve a recyclerprice to increase the recovery rate doesn’t affects other recyclers price in theclosed-loop supply chain. The optimal closed-loop supply chain equilibrium contractis manufacturers or the government provides some subsidies to improvementmeasures of recycling business and recyclers take the pricing strategy of maximizetheir own interests and competition with the partial competitors.
(5) The cost of closed-loop supply chain participants has great significance toclosed-loop supply chain coordination. Except manufacturers and governmentsubsidies for participants to reduce cost measures, to build a closed-loop supply chainmanagement information system can effectively reduce a lot of cost because ofclosed-loop supply chain uncertainty, so as to realize the equilibrium of closed-loopsupply chain.
The combination of information coordination and contract coordination will bethe most effective means of closed-loop supply chain coordination. The results of thispaper have important theoretical significance to manufacturing enterprise closed-loopsupply chain management and to the governments take industrial policy to promotethe development of closed-loop supply chain practice.
本文从闭环供应链核心企业——再制造企业的视角出发，对两个相互竞争的回收商和一个再制造商的闭环供应链契约协调模型和多个相互竞争的回收商和一个再制造商的闭环供应链契约协调模型进行了探讨。由于回收商彼此相互竞争，因此回收商面向消费者的EOL产品回收价格（设为pr1和pr2）彼此相互影响，而回收商的回收价格和再制造商向回收商提供的收购价格（设为prm）之间也存在着相互的影响关系。由此，作为最为常见的由竞争性回收商和再制造商构成的逆向环节闭环供应链的协调变量——pr1、pr2和prm之间，就形成了一个复杂的互动关系，任何一方的决策都会影响另外两方，任何一方的决策都会受另外两方的影响。
为了解决上述问题，本文首先采用价格契约和回收数量契约对信息对称和不对称的情况下，闭环供应链回收商间的竞争规律进行了研究，得出了在不同契约和信息情况下，两回收商的最优回收价格关系。在此基础上，本文对由两个竞争性回收商和一个再制造商组成的闭环供应链面临的两种再制造市场环境，分别进行了模型研究，得出了在不同市场环境下的闭环供应链协调方案。
回收商间的竞争除了两个寡头的情况较为常见外，多个竞争性回收商和一个再制造商组成的闭环供应链也是当前非常典型的闭环供应链结构。本文采用多Agent模型，对该种闭环供应链的运行模式进行了研究，并得出对竞争性回收商回收成本改进活动进行补贴的契约设计，对闭环供应链协调影响最明显、也最为有效的结论。
为了减少闭环供应链各环节由于信息不对称和流程不确定性带来的高额成本，本文还讨论了闭环供应链信息共享协调体系的构建问题，并以工程机械行业为例，对其闭环供应链管理体系进行了初步的设计。本文的主要结论主要可总结为以下几方面：
（1）在两个竞争性回收商和一个再制造构成的闭环供应链中，信息不对称对于回收商有利，但对于劣势回收商利益更为明显。因此，在回收市场上，推动进行信息共享的都是优势回收商。对于信息是否共享的回收商博弈为“智猪博弈”，即均衡情况为：优势回收商共享回收信息，劣势回收商不共享。
（2）当新旧产品市场相互独立或市场能够容纳所有再制造产品时，无论信息对称与否，再制造企业向回收商提供的契约均衡值为：（劣势回收商，优势回收商）=（价格契约，数量契约）。其中在新旧产品市场相互影响，但再制造产品市场容量足够大时，上述契约组合不但能够实现闭环供应链的协调，而且给予再制造最大的市场权力。
（3）当新旧产品市场相关，且市场不能够容纳所有再制造产品时，制造企业为两回收商提供集中性价格契约为最优选择。此时闭环供应链再制造产品略有盈余，较好地实现了闭环供应链协调。
（4）在多个竞争性回收商和一个再制造商组成的闭环供应链中，再制造商或政府为增加回收量而提高某个回收商回收价格的行为难以影响到整个闭环供应链中其他回收商。最佳闭环供应链均衡契约为再制造商或政府对回收商的价格改进措施进行补贴，同时再制造商提供数量和价格两种契约，回收商采取针对部分竞争对手的自身利益最大化定价策略。
（5）闭环供应链各参与方的成本对于闭环供应链协调意义重大。除了再制造商和政府对于参与方的降低成本措施予以补贴外，构建一个闭环供应链管理信息系统，也能够有效减少因闭环供应链不确定性而给各参与方带来的大量成本支出，从而实现闭环供应链的均衡。
信息协调和契约协调的结合，将是闭环供应链协调最有效的手段。本文的研究结果对于再制造企业的闭环供应链管理和闭环供应链协调，以及对政府制定促进闭环供应链实践发展的产业政策都有重要的理论参考意义。
Including the forward supply chain and reverse supply chain two components ofclosed-loop supply chain is an important operation and management mode of thefuture economic development and has an important significance to solve the currentincreasingly serious contradictions between economic development and the society,environment. Closed-loop supply chain affected by many factors has more systemuncertainty than forward supply chain that brought difficulties to closed-loop supplychain management practice. In the current theoretical research literature, researcherstend to assumes a simple model with a single closed loop supply chain structure thathave larger gap with the realistic economy comprised multiple participants ofcompetition and influence each other each other in each link. This shortcoming limitsthe application of the theory research.
From the core remanufacturing enterprise perspective of closed-loop supplychain core remanufacturing, this paper discusses two kinds of closed-loop supplychain contract coordination model based on competing recycler assume: the twocompeting recycler with a manufacturer and multiple competing recycler with amanufacturer. Because of recyclers’ competition each other, recycling price (set as pr1,pr2) of recycling businesses purchase consumer’s EOL product influence each other,and recycling prices of the two recyclers and purchase price of remanufacturer (as theprm) also influence each other. Thus, there is a complex interactive relationshipbetween pr1, pr2and prmas the most common coordination variables of closed-loopsupply chain including competitive recyclers and remanufacturers. Any one party'sdecision will affect the other two parties; any one party's decision will be affected bythe other two parties.
In order to solve the above problem, this paper studies the rules of closed-loopsupply chain with competitive recyclers by price contract and the recovery quantitycontract of symmetric and asymmetric information situation and puts forward theoptimal recovery price relationship between two recyclers under different contract andinformation. On the basis of above study, this paper studies two kinds ofremanufacturing market environment model respectively and obtain differentclosed-loop supply chain coordination schemes in different market environment of theclosed-loop supply chain composed by two competing recyclers and a manufacturer.
Except the two oligarchs recyclers competition, more competitive recycler and a manufacturer of closed-loop supply chain is the very typical closed-loop supply chainstructure. This paper studies the closed-loop supply chain operation mode composedby multi-competitive recycler and a manufacturer by multi-Agent model theory anddraw a conclusion that contract design of competitive recyclers cost improvementactivities subsidy is the most obvious, is also the most effective on the closed-loopsupply chain coordination.
In order to reduce the high cost of closed-loop supply chain with asymmetricinformation and process uncertainty, this paper also discusses the constructionproblem of closed-loop supply chain information sharing and coordination system anddesigns a closed-loop supply chain management system for construction machineryindustry.
The main conclusions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
(1) Information asymmetry is advantage to recycling business and more obviousto the disadvantages recycling business in the closed-loop supply chain composed bytwo competitive recyclers and a remanufacturing. Therefore, to promote informationsharing is advantage recyclers in the recycling market. The game of the two recyclersshare information is a “Boxed Pigs Game” which equilibrium condition is: theadvantage recycler shares recovery information and disadvantage recycler don’t shareitself information.
(2) When the markets of remanufacture and new product are independent ormarket can accommodate all of remanufacturing products, remanufacturing enterpriseprovides balanced recovery contract value is:(disadvantage recyclers, advantagerecycler)=(the contract price, contract number) whether information symmetry or not.And when the markets of remanufacture and new product influence each other andremanufacturing product market capacity is large enough, the contract combinationcan not only realize the closed loop supply chain contract coordination, but also togive the remanufacturing largest market power.
(3) When the markets of remanufacture and new product influence each otherand remanufacturing product market capacity is not able to accommodate all ofremanufacturing products, to provide centralized price contract is the optimal choicewhich provided by manufacturing enterprises to two recyclers. Remanufacturingproduct in closed-loop supply chain slightly surplus and the closed-loop supply chainachieves coordination.
(4) In the closed-loop supply chain of multiple competitive recyclers and a manufacturer, the behavior of the manufacturer or the government improve a recyclerprice to increase the recovery rate doesn’t affects other recyclers price in theclosed-loop supply chain. The optimal closed-loop supply chain equilibrium contractis manufacturers or the government provides some subsidies to improvementmeasures of recycling business and recyclers take the pricing strategy of maximizetheir own interests and competition with the partial competitors.
(5) The cost of closed-loop supply chain participants has great significance toclosed-loop supply chain coordination. Except manufacturers and governmentsubsidies for participants to reduce cost measures, to build a closed-loop supply chainmanagement information system can effectively reduce a lot of cost because ofclosed-loop supply chain uncertainty, so as to realize the equilibrium of closed-loopsupply chain.
The combination of information coordination and contract coordination will bethe most effective means of closed-loop supply chain coordination. The results of thispaper have important theoretical significance to manufacturing enterprise closed-loopsupply chain management and to the governments take industrial policy to promotethe development of closed-loop supply chain practice.
引文
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