我国上市公司大股东资产注入动因及经济后果研究
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摘要
我国证券市场创建初期,由于股市容量小,不能承受大公司上市带来的冲击和压力,许多企业采取分拆上市,分拆上市使得大量与上市公司业务相关的资产留在了母公司,导致上市公司与大股东之间的产业链被人为地分离,带来了很多弊端。大股东资产注入通常被认为对解决分拆上市的弊端和完善上市公司产业链有积极作用,国家颁布了一系列政策法规鼓励大股东资产注入,许多大股东也纷纷将原分拆上市时剥离的资产注入到其控制的上市公司。但是,由于我国大多数上市公司的股权集中度较高,大股东可能凭借控制权优势注入劣质资产或虚增注入资产价值以获取私人收益,并对上市公司产生不利影响。因此,研究大股东资产注入的动机及其可能带来的经济后果,对于认识大股东资产注入的本质和规范大股东资产注入的发展具有重要意义。文章运用产业链整合理论和代理理论并结合我国的制度背景,系统分析了大股东资产注入行为及其对上市公司产生的影响,得出大股东资产注入具有多面性的结论。既可能对上市公司可能产生积极作用,即大股东资产注入有利于完善上市公司产业链、降低上市公司与大股东之间的关联交易并产生一系列协同效应;也有消极的一面,即大股东可能会凭借控制权优势注入劣质资产或虚增注入资产价值或降低定向增发价格以获取私利进而侵害上市公司和中小股东的利益;同时大股东资产注入也可能是一种机会主义行为,即注入资产的目的是对上市公司进行盈余操纵以使其达到扭亏或避亏的需要。据此将大股东资产注入的动机分为三类,即产业链整合动机、利益侵占动机和达标需求动机。在理论分析的基础上,文章以2006-2008年我国成功实施大股东资产注入的上市公司为样本,对上述三种动机进行了实证检验。研究发现:资产注入规模与盈余管理程度正相关,并且这种正相关关系在具有扭亏或避亏需要的资产注入公司中表现尤为显著。大股东注入的资产大多与上市公司产业相关,相比资产注入前一年,资产注入后一年大股东与上市公司之间的关联交易金额占总资产的比例以及非公允关联交易量均出现了显著下降,并且在相关资产注入中表现尤为明显。大股东注入资产的评估增值率普遍较高,并且市场反应与资产评估增值程度显著负相关;当资产注入与定向增发结合进行时,大股东认购比例越高定向增发价格相对市场价格的折价程度越高,并且市场反应与定向增发折价率显著负相关。以上研究发现分别验证了大股东资产注入中达标需求动机、产业链整合动机和利益侵占动机的存在。最后,论文实证检验了大股东资产注入后上市公司的绩效表现及其影响因素,研究发现:大股东资产注入具有正的短期宣告效应;但从长期来看,上市公司的长期绩效表现不佳,资产注入后第14个月购买并持有超额收益率和长期累计超额收益率开始为负并持续下降,净资产营业利润率、净资产收益率和总资产收益率到资产注入后第二年也都低于资产注入前一年的水平。另外,还发现上市公司的长期市场绩效与注入资产类型有关,注入相关资产时的长期市场绩效好于注入不相关资产时的长期市场绩效;长期经营绩效指标在资产注入当年均有显著提高,而后开始下降,呈现先上升后下降的趋势。以上研究结果表明,在各种动机中利益侵占行为占据了主导作用,大股东可能注入了劣质资产或虚增了注入资产价值,但短期内投资者并没有完全识别;另外,注入资产类型是影响产业整合效果的重要因素,注入相关资产的产业整合效果好于注入不相关资产;同时也为达标动机提供了进一步证据,即有些大股东资产注入的目的只是为了帮助公司达到扭亏或避亏所需要的会计利润,由于这种资产注入通常都是机会主义的,在长期内不会改善上市公司的经营业绩,因此业绩指标呈现先暂时性上升后下降的趋势。基于上述研究,应进一步鼓励大股东将与上市公司产业相关的优质资产注入公司,同时为防范大股东资产注入中的利益侵占行为发生应加强对注入资产质量的监督力度,具体建议如下:建立资产注入的分类审核制度和股东分类表决制度,完善注入资产的信息披露制度,明确注入资产的过户手续及后续责任。
该论文共有图13幅,表60个,参考文献165篇。
At the beginning of establishing the securities market, many companies took segmental listing because the limited stock can’t bear the shocks and pressures from the large listed companies. While segmental listing has made large assets related to the listed company business remained in their parent companies, which cuts off the chains of between listed companies and large shareholders, and brings a lot of problems. Usually, large shareholders’asset injection can deal with defects of segmental listing, and it is good for perfecting the listed companies’industrial chain. The government has promulgated a serious of policies and regulations to support asset injection. Lots of large shareholders have injected the stripping asset to the listed companies which they controlled. However, the large stockholders may inject inferior assets or inflate the value of injecting assets with control advantage because of the high concentration of shareholding, which will make adverse impact on listed companies. Therefore, studying the motivation and economic consequences of large stockholders’asset injection has important significances to realize the essence of asset injection and regulate the development of large shareholders’asset injection. By making use of integration theory of industrial chain and agency theory,combining with China's institutional background, the dissertation analyses the action of large stockholders’asset injection and the impact on listed companies, and reaches the conclusion that is large stockholders’asset injection with multifaceted nature. On the one hand, large stockholders’asset injection has a positive effect on listed companies, which can improve industrial chain, and reduce related party transaction between the listed company and its large shareholders and horizontal competition, and produce a series of synergy effect. On the other hand, it also has a negative side, which is that large stockholders may inject inferior assets or inflate the value of injecting assets or reduce private placement price by controlling advantage to obtain private interest, and then expropriate the interest of listed companies and minority shareholders. In addition, large shareholders’asset injection may be an opportunism behavior, which the purpose of asset injection is to achieve the aim of turning or avoiding loss by earnings manipulation. Thus, the motivations of large shareholders’asset injection can fall into three categories, which include integration motivation of industrial chain, tunneling motivation and target hitting motivation. On the basis of theoretical analysis, the dissertation has empirically tested three motivations by using the samples of 2006-2008 listed companies, which carry out large shareholders’asset injection successfully. It is found that asset injection scale is related to earnings management degree, and it is remarkable in the listed companies which are in need of turning or avoiding loss. Injected assets most are related to the areas of listed companies. Comparing with one year before asset injection, both related the ratio of transaction amounts to total assets and non-fair related transaction volume between large shareholders and listed company dropped significantly one year after asset injection, and it is particularly obvious in related asset injections. The value-added ratio of injected assets appraisal is overall high, it appears a significantly negative correlation between market response and value-added ratio; When combining asset injection with private placement, the shareholders subscribe for higher proportion, private placement price has more discount relatively market price, it appears a significantly negative correlation between market response and private placement discount. These findings separately verify the existence of integration motivation of industrial chain, tunneling motivation and target hitting motivation. Finally, the dissertation has empirically tested the listed companies’performances after large shareholders’asset injection. It is found that asset injection has a positive short-term declared effect. But in the long term, market performance is poor. Purchasing & holding abnormal return and long-term cumulative abnormal in 14th month after asset injection are negative and continue to decline, and CROA, ROE and ROA are all lower in the second year after asset injection than before asset injection. In addition, it is also found that long-term market performance of the listed companies is associated with the type of asset injection; long-term market performance of injecting related assets is better than the one of injecting unrelated assets. Financial performance indexes increase firstly and then decline, that is to say, they significantly increase in the year of asset injection and then begin to decline. The above findings indicate that, the tunneling may take a leading role in three motivations, large shareholders may inject inferior assets, investors don’t fully identify the quality of injected asset in short-term; the type of asset injection is an important factor of influencing integration result of industrial chain, integration result of injecting related assets is better than integration result of injecting unrelated assets; at the same time, it also provides further evidence on target hitting motivation, the purpose of some asset injections is just to help the listed companies achieve the accounting profit of regulation requirement, that is to say, large shareholders’asset injection is sometime opportunism, which can not improve the financial performance of listed companies in long term, so financial indexes increase firstly and then decline. Based on the above study, the author suggests that the government should further encourage large shareholders to inject related & superior assets into listed companies, at the same time strengthen supervision on the quality of injecting assets to prevent the tunneling. Then the author gives some specific proposals: firstly, establishing classified Examination systems of asset injection and voting system of shareholders; secondly, perfecting the information disclosure system of asset injection; finally, clearing the transfer procedures and follow-up responsibilities of injected assets.
该论文共有图13幅,表60个,参考文献165篇。
At the beginning of establishing the securities market, many companies took segmental listing because the limited stock can’t bear the shocks and pressures from the large listed companies. While segmental listing has made large assets related to the listed company business remained in their parent companies, which cuts off the chains of between listed companies and large shareholders, and brings a lot of problems. Usually, large shareholders’asset injection can deal with defects of segmental listing, and it is good for perfecting the listed companies’industrial chain. The government has promulgated a serious of policies and regulations to support asset injection. Lots of large shareholders have injected the stripping asset to the listed companies which they controlled. However, the large stockholders may inject inferior assets or inflate the value of injecting assets with control advantage because of the high concentration of shareholding, which will make adverse impact on listed companies. Therefore, studying the motivation and economic consequences of large stockholders’asset injection has important significances to realize the essence of asset injection and regulate the development of large shareholders’asset injection. By making use of integration theory of industrial chain and agency theory,combining with China's institutional background, the dissertation analyses the action of large stockholders’asset injection and the impact on listed companies, and reaches the conclusion that is large stockholders’asset injection with multifaceted nature. On the one hand, large stockholders’asset injection has a positive effect on listed companies, which can improve industrial chain, and reduce related party transaction between the listed company and its large shareholders and horizontal competition, and produce a series of synergy effect. On the other hand, it also has a negative side, which is that large stockholders may inject inferior assets or inflate the value of injecting assets or reduce private placement price by controlling advantage to obtain private interest, and then expropriate the interest of listed companies and minority shareholders. In addition, large shareholders’asset injection may be an opportunism behavior, which the purpose of asset injection is to achieve the aim of turning or avoiding loss by earnings manipulation. Thus, the motivations of large shareholders’asset injection can fall into three categories, which include integration motivation of industrial chain, tunneling motivation and target hitting motivation. On the basis of theoretical analysis, the dissertation has empirically tested three motivations by using the samples of 2006-2008 listed companies, which carry out large shareholders’asset injection successfully. It is found that asset injection scale is related to earnings management degree, and it is remarkable in the listed companies which are in need of turning or avoiding loss. Injected assets most are related to the areas of listed companies. Comparing with one year before asset injection, both related the ratio of transaction amounts to total assets and non-fair related transaction volume between large shareholders and listed company dropped significantly one year after asset injection, and it is particularly obvious in related asset injections. The value-added ratio of injected assets appraisal is overall high, it appears a significantly negative correlation between market response and value-added ratio; When combining asset injection with private placement, the shareholders subscribe for higher proportion, private placement price has more discount relatively market price, it appears a significantly negative correlation between market response and private placement discount. These findings separately verify the existence of integration motivation of industrial chain, tunneling motivation and target hitting motivation. Finally, the dissertation has empirically tested the listed companies’performances after large shareholders’asset injection. It is found that asset injection has a positive short-term declared effect. But in the long term, market performance is poor. Purchasing & holding abnormal return and long-term cumulative abnormal in 14th month after asset injection are negative and continue to decline, and CROA, ROE and ROA are all lower in the second year after asset injection than before asset injection. In addition, it is also found that long-term market performance of the listed companies is associated with the type of asset injection; long-term market performance of injecting related assets is better than the one of injecting unrelated assets. Financial performance indexes increase firstly and then decline, that is to say, they significantly increase in the year of asset injection and then begin to decline. The above findings indicate that, the tunneling may take a leading role in three motivations, large shareholders may inject inferior assets, investors don’t fully identify the quality of injected asset in short-term; the type of asset injection is an important factor of influencing integration result of industrial chain, integration result of injecting related assets is better than integration result of injecting unrelated assets; at the same time, it also provides further evidence on target hitting motivation, the purpose of some asset injections is just to help the listed companies achieve the accounting profit of regulation requirement, that is to say, large shareholders’asset injection is sometime opportunism, which can not improve the financial performance of listed companies in long term, so financial indexes increase firstly and then decline. Based on the above study, the author suggests that the government should further encourage large shareholders to inject related & superior assets into listed companies, at the same time strengthen supervision on the quality of injecting assets to prevent the tunneling. Then the author gives some specific proposals: firstly, establishing classified Examination systems of asset injection and voting system of shareholders; secondly, perfecting the information disclosure system of asset injection; finally, clearing the transfer procedures and follow-up responsibilities of injected assets.
引文
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