基于期权博弈理论的企业并购决策研究
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摘要
并购是企业增强竞争力与可持续发展的重要手段,因而企业并购投资的成功与否显得非常重要。传统的并购投资决策方法不能很好地处理企业并购投资的不确定性、不可逆性及竞争性,因而常常导致错误的决策。期权博弈理论与方法将并购项目所面临的不确定性、不可逆性与竞争性纳入到同一分析框架下来进行项目评价与决策,克服了传统并购决策方法的局限与不足,是一种更科学的现代并购决策方法。因而企业的并购项目更适合于用期权博弈理论与方法来进行评价与决策。
本文首先对并购投资决策方法进行了综述与总结,指出了传统并购决策方法的局限与不足,并进行了改进,简述了并购概念与动因及博弈论及其应用现状,对实物期权理论从种类、定价方法到其应用进行了全面的综述,同时,对期权博弈理论及其应用亦进行了较为详尽的述评。
由于并购中存在产业的不确定性、信息的不确定性、市场的不确定性、法律的不确定性、政府行为的不确定性以及财务的不确定性,而企业的并购决策是在这些动态不确定的环境下进行的,这使得并购的收益并不确定。进行并购会产生不可逆的成本,因此进行并购的决策方需要寻找最优的决策时机,以使并购产生的收益最大。并购的上述特性使其具有了实物期权投资的特点。同时,企业并购受到并购参与各方竞争因素的影响,使得企业的并购期权具有共享性,从而使企业并购活动具有博弈的特性。传统的并购决策方法建立在确定的、完全信息的基础之上,并忽视竞争的影响。基于此,本文运用期权博弈理论研究企业并购决策问题,其核心内容包括：
本文运用期权博弈方法对并购中的各部分价值进行估算,并建立了主并企业与目标企业之间和主并企业之间并购价格竞争的博弈模型,定量分析了竞争对并购价格的影响。
运用期权博弈理论分析建立了各种信息条件下企业并购决策临界点模型。在不考虑竞争对手的条件下,企业的并购决策临界点取决于并购者和被并购者之间的期权博弈,即并购价值增加和成本增加之间的权衡；在考虑竞争对手的条件下,企业的并购决策临界点取决于并购企业与被并购企业之间、并购者之间的期权博弈,即价值增加、成本增加和风险率三者间的权衡。通过案例对以上各种分析结果进行了验证。
本文所提出的基于期权博弈理论的企业并购决策理论与方法为企业的并购投资决策提供了一种全新的理论视角与应用框架,对企业并购管理活动具有重要的理论意义与实用价值。
M & A is the important way of enterprises to enhance competitiveness and gain sustainable development, thus, whether mergers and acquisitions investment is success or not is very mportant to the enterprise. The traditional M & A investment decision-making methods couldn't handle the uncertainty of M & A investment, irreversibility and competition, which often leads to wrong decisions. Intergrating the uncertainty, irreversibility and competition into the same analytical framework, the option-game theory, which is a more scientific modern M & A decision-making method, evaluate the project and make decision in the way which could overcome the limitations and shortcomings of traditional M & A decision-making methods.Therefore, the option-game theory is more suitable to carry out evaluation and decision-making of the M&A project.
In this paper, we review and sum up the methods of M&A investment decision-making, point out the limitations and shortcomings of the traditional M&A decision-making methods and make the counterpart improvement.Then, outline the concept and motivation of the M&A and the application status of game theory and make a comprehensive rerview of the types of real option theory, the pricing method and its application, at the same time, conducted a more detailed commentary of the option-game theory and its application
Becouse of the M&A activities exsit the industrial uncertainty, the information uncertainty, the market uncertainty, the legal uncertainty, the uncertainty of government behavior and financial uncertainty, and the corporate M & A decision-making is under the dynamic uncertain environments, which makes the revenue of M & A is uncertain. The M & A activities will produce irreversible costs, so the decision-making side of M&A need to find the optimal decision-making opportunity to make the largest revenue that generated by the M&A activities. The above-mentioned characteristics of mergers and acquisitions to make it a real option investment characteristics. At the same time, the M&A activities is influeced by the the competitive factors from the parties involved, making the M&A option become a share option, thereby make mergers and acquisitions activities has a game character. The traditional M & A decision-making methods is based on certain, complete information and the ignorance of the competition. Based on this, this paper use option-game theory to study M&A decision-making, its core content includes:
This paper use option-game methods to estimate the value of each part of mergers and acquisitions, and establish the price competition game model of M&A between the mergers and the objective enterprise, the merger and other mergers, and then, analyze the impact of the competition on acquisition prices in a quantitative way.
Use game theory to analyze and establish the Threshold decision-making model of mergers and acquisitions under the condition of different information condition. Without concerning the competitor, enterprise's M&A threshold depend on the option game activities between the mergers with the objective enterprise, that is, the balance between the increase of the M&A's value and the increase of cost, while considering the conditions of competition, M&A threshold depend on the option game activities between the mergers with the objective enterprise and the merger with other mergers, namely, the trade-offs among the value increased, the increase of costs and risk rate. Verify the above analytical results through a case.
The decision-making theory and methods of M&A based on the option game theory, which is proposed in this paper, provides a new theoretical perspective and application framework for enterprise mergers and acquisitions activities, has important theoretical meaning and practical value in the management of M&A.
本文首先对并购投资决策方法进行了综述与总结,指出了传统并购决策方法的局限与不足,并进行了改进,简述了并购概念与动因及博弈论及其应用现状,对实物期权理论从种类、定价方法到其应用进行了全面的综述,同时,对期权博弈理论及其应用亦进行了较为详尽的述评。
由于并购中存在产业的不确定性、信息的不确定性、市场的不确定性、法律的不确定性、政府行为的不确定性以及财务的不确定性,而企业的并购决策是在这些动态不确定的环境下进行的,这使得并购的收益并不确定。进行并购会产生不可逆的成本,因此进行并购的决策方需要寻找最优的决策时机,以使并购产生的收益最大。并购的上述特性使其具有了实物期权投资的特点。同时,企业并购受到并购参与各方竞争因素的影响,使得企业的并购期权具有共享性,从而使企业并购活动具有博弈的特性。传统的并购决策方法建立在确定的、完全信息的基础之上,并忽视竞争的影响。基于此,本文运用期权博弈理论研究企业并购决策问题,其核心内容包括：
本文运用期权博弈方法对并购中的各部分价值进行估算,并建立了主并企业与目标企业之间和主并企业之间并购价格竞争的博弈模型,定量分析了竞争对并购价格的影响。
运用期权博弈理论分析建立了各种信息条件下企业并购决策临界点模型。在不考虑竞争对手的条件下,企业的并购决策临界点取决于并购者和被并购者之间的期权博弈,即并购价值增加和成本增加之间的权衡；在考虑竞争对手的条件下,企业的并购决策临界点取决于并购企业与被并购企业之间、并购者之间的期权博弈,即价值增加、成本增加和风险率三者间的权衡。通过案例对以上各种分析结果进行了验证。
本文所提出的基于期权博弈理论的企业并购决策理论与方法为企业的并购投资决策提供了一种全新的理论视角与应用框架,对企业并购管理活动具有重要的理论意义与实用价值。
M & A is the important way of enterprises to enhance competitiveness and gain sustainable development, thus, whether mergers and acquisitions investment is success or not is very mportant to the enterprise. The traditional M & A investment decision-making methods couldn't handle the uncertainty of M & A investment, irreversibility and competition, which often leads to wrong decisions. Intergrating the uncertainty, irreversibility and competition into the same analytical framework, the option-game theory, which is a more scientific modern M & A decision-making method, evaluate the project and make decision in the way which could overcome the limitations and shortcomings of traditional M & A decision-making methods.Therefore, the option-game theory is more suitable to carry out evaluation and decision-making of the M&A project.
In this paper, we review and sum up the methods of M&A investment decision-making, point out the limitations and shortcomings of the traditional M&A decision-making methods and make the counterpart improvement.Then, outline the concept and motivation of the M&A and the application status of game theory and make a comprehensive rerview of the types of real option theory, the pricing method and its application, at the same time, conducted a more detailed commentary of the option-game theory and its application
Becouse of the M&A activities exsit the industrial uncertainty, the information uncertainty, the market uncertainty, the legal uncertainty, the uncertainty of government behavior and financial uncertainty, and the corporate M & A decision-making is under the dynamic uncertain environments, which makes the revenue of M & A is uncertain. The M & A activities will produce irreversible costs, so the decision-making side of M&A need to find the optimal decision-making opportunity to make the largest revenue that generated by the M&A activities. The above-mentioned characteristics of mergers and acquisitions to make it a real option investment characteristics. At the same time, the M&A activities is influeced by the the competitive factors from the parties involved, making the M&A option become a share option, thereby make mergers and acquisitions activities has a game character. The traditional M & A decision-making methods is based on certain, complete information and the ignorance of the competition. Based on this, this paper use option-game theory to study M&A decision-making, its core content includes:
This paper use option-game methods to estimate the value of each part of mergers and acquisitions, and establish the price competition game model of M&A between the mergers and the objective enterprise, the merger and other mergers, and then, analyze the impact of the competition on acquisition prices in a quantitative way.
Use game theory to analyze and establish the Threshold decision-making model of mergers and acquisitions under the condition of different information condition. Without concerning the competitor, enterprise's M&A threshold depend on the option game activities between the mergers with the objective enterprise, that is, the balance between the increase of the M&A's value and the increase of cost, while considering the conditions of competition, M&A threshold depend on the option game activities between the mergers with the objective enterprise and the merger with other mergers, namely, the trade-offs among the value increased, the increase of costs and risk rate. Verify the above analytical results through a case.
The decision-making theory and methods of M&A based on the option game theory, which is proposed in this paper, provides a new theoretical perspective and application framework for enterprise mergers and acquisitions activities, has important theoretical meaning and practical value in the management of M&A.
引文
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