上市公司终极股东控制与剥夺机理研究
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摘要
亚洲金融危机及由此掀起的公司治理浪潮使第二类公司治理问题——终极股东控制与剥夺问题进入人们的视野,并逐渐成为学界实证研究的新焦点。1999年,LaPorta等人将公司控制权问题的研究引向深入,首次推出了终极股东控制权(Ultimate Control Right)的重要研究范畴,并引领形成了一种“股权控制链”分析范式,而且由此在全球范围内掀起一场关于公司治理研究的新高潮。可以说,关于终极股东控制与剥夺问题的研究为公司治理研究者开辟了一个新的研究领域,形成了一种新的研究范式,因此具有十分重要的理论价值。另外,关于终极股东控制与剥夺问题的系统研究与深入探讨,对于不断完善我国上市公司治理结构,提高上市公司治理效率,从而有效保护广大中小股东的利益,有着极为重要的现实意义。
上市公司终极股东控制与剥夺问题的规范性研究历史还不到十年。迄今为止,关于上市公司终极股东控制权的研究仍然仅仅局限于“股权控制链分析范式”。从实践来看,“股权控制链分析范式”对那些股权分散的上市公司具有较强的适用性和解释力,因此,得到学者们的广泛认可。然而,在那些股权相对集中的国家中,特别是对于那些具有东方文化背景的上市公司,这种分析范式存在着一个严重缺陷,那就是单单依靠股权控制链追溯上市公司终极股东并不能完全克服终极股东的隐蔽性,有时很难准确地揭示出那个深藏幕后的真正终极股东,相应地难以精确地度量终极股东对上市公司的实际控制程度。基于此,本文创造性地运用社会资本理论构建起上市公司“社会资本控制链分析范式”,用大股东的社会网络连带作为追溯上市公司终极股东及其控制权的逻辑起点,并利用这一分析范式解析上市公司终极股东控制与剥夺机理。可以说,这种新的分析框架能够更为精准地识别上市公司的终极股东,测量和分析终极股东控制权,有效地弥补股权控制链分析范式的不足,从而为上市公司终极股东控制权问题的研究开辟了一条崭新的道路。
本文共分为以下八章：第一章简要介绍论文的选题背景和意义、相关概念、研究内容和框架、研究方法及论文的创新之处等；第二章为文献综述,通过对“股权控制链分析范式”下终极股东控制与剥夺问题的相关研究进行回顾,揭示这种现有的主导研究范式的局限；接下来的三章是本文的核心内容,其中,第三章在对社会资本的概念和内涵及其作用作以清晰界定和阐述的基础上,提出了社会资本控制链的概念,并尝试性构建了一个“社会资本控制链”分析范式；第四章分别从对终极控制权的概念内涵的重新阐释、终极股东社会资本控制链的构造模型、终极股东控制类型和终极控制权的动态演变等角度,对终极股东对上市公司的控制机理作以全面系统地解析；第五章从“双重”控制链这一新的理论视角对终极股东的剥夺动因、剥夺路径、剥夺过程以及显性剥夺和隐性剥夺等问题展开深入系统的探讨,揭示了终极股东剥夺行为的一般规律,因而能够加深对终极股东剥夺问题的认识和理解；第六章以我国上市公司作为考察对象,通过对60家上市公司的其他主要大股东、董事和经理人员进行问卷调查,并对筛选后所得到的480份有效问卷数据进行相应的实证分析与检验,验证了我国上市公司的终极股东普遍存在动用社会资本控制链来获取并强化终极控制的现象；第七章通过对草原兴发这家具有代表性的上市公司进行案例剖析,全方位地展示了终极股东如何运用双重隐形控制链(股权控制链和社会资本控制链)对上市公司进行控制与剥夺,揭示出股权控制链与社会资本控制链交织使用的一般规律,为本文提出的“社会资本控制链”分析框架提供有力的证据。最后一章为结论部分,一方面总结论文的主要观点,给出相应的政策建议,另一方面指出本文的局限,探讨后续研究的方向。
通过深入系统分析与探讨,本文得到了以下几个重要结论：
(1)对上市公司终极股东及其控制权进行追寻的逻辑起点是大股东的社会网络连带。
(2)终极股东控制权的获取是通过分别对股东大会、董事会和经理层的剩余控制权、决策控制权和经营控制权的攫取实现的。
(3)上市公司终极股东剥夺行为的根本动因是被“控制权溢价”放大的“控制权私利”。
(4)通过实证分析验证了我国上市公司的终极股东普遍存在动用社会资本控制链来获取并强化终极控制的现象。
(5)通过案例分析证明我国上市公司的终极股东存在利用“双重”隐形控制链对上市公司进行控制与剥夺的现象,且危害较大。
Asian financial crisis and the resulting wave of corporate governance have made the corporate governance issueⅡ—ultimate shareholder control and deprivation appear, gradually becomes a new focus of empirical research. La Porta and other people have done research in the field of control right in depth and firstly introduce the ultimate shareholder control as an important research area. This has led the formation of analytical paradigm of equity control chain, which leads to new heights about the study on corporate governance. As it can be said, the research in the ultimate control and deprivation opens up a new study field and forms a new study paradigm, which is of great theoretical value as a result. In addition, the systematical research and further investigation have extremely important practical significance as to constant improvement of listed company's governance structure and enhancement of governance efficiency, thus it can effectively protect the interests of middle and small shareholders.
The normative study history of ultimate shareholder control rights of listed company is less than a decade. So far, it has been still merely limited to the "analytical paradigm of equity control chain". From the practical experiences, analytical paradigm of equity control chain can strongly apply to and explain the listed companies whose equity is separate, therefore it has been widely recognized by scholars. However, this analytical paradigm has a serious deficiency that it could not conquer the confidentiality of ultimate shareholders, merely by using the equity control chain to trace the ultimate shareholder of listed company in those countries whose equity are relatively concentrated, especially for those with an oriental background, so it is hard to accurately reveal the real ultimate shareholder hidden behind the scenes and correspondingly measure the ultimate shareholder's actual control extent accurately. Based on this, this article creatively uses the social capital theory to construct "an analytic paradigm of social capital control chain ", namely starting from the social network ties of the ultimate shareholders and their control rights, and uses this analytic paradigm to find out the control and deprivation mechanism of ultimate shareholders of listed company. This is to say, the new analytic framework can help us find out the real ultimate shareholder, accurately measure and analyze their control right, and it can supply the gap of the analytic paradigm of equity control chain, So our study creates a new perspective for the research in ultimate control right in listed companies.
This article consists of eight chapters: the first chapter simply introduces the topic background and significance, relative concepts, study contents and framework, research methods, innovations and so on; the second chapter is a literature review, looking back to the relative researches on the ultimate shareholder control and deprivation under equity control chain so as to reveal the limitation of this existing dominant study paradigm; The following three chapters are core parts of this paper, the third chapter, on the basis of clearly defining and illustrating the definition, contents and function of social capital, comes up with the conception of social capital control chain and tries to build a analytical paradigm of "social capital control chain"; the forth chapter comprehensively and systematically analyze the mechanism that the ultimate shareholders control the listed company from the re-interpreting the concept of ultimate control right, constructing the model of ultimate shareholder social capital control chain, controlling type and dynamic evolving of ultimate shareholder. The fifth chapter, from the new theoretical perspective of "double" control chain, systematically investigates in depth the depriving motivation, depriving path, depriving process and explicit and implicit deprivation, then reveals the general law of ultimate shareholder depriving behaviors, so it can deepen the awareness and understanding of ultimate shareholder's depriving issues. The sixth chapter, as assessed our listed companies, by questionnaire investigation to other main major shareholders, directors and managers of 60 listed companies and empirical analysis and test to 480 valid questionnaire data, verifies it is a widespread phenomenon for the ultimate shareholders of listed companies to use social capital control chain to obtain the ultimate control; The seventh chapter analyze the representative listed company case-Prairie Xingfa Co., LTD, to comprehensively reveal the ultimate shareholder how to use the double invisible control chain (equity control chain and social capital control chain) to control and deprive the listed company and reflect the general rule of mixed use of these two control chains, which provides strong evidence for the analytic framework of "social capital control chain". The last chapter is the conclusion, which on one hand sums up the main points of the paper and gives the accordingly appropriate policy recommendations, on the other hand points out the limitations and explores the direction for further research.
This paper has come to the following conclusions through the systematically analysis and investigation in depth:
(1)The logical starting of tracing the ultimate shareholder and its control right of listed company is the social network ties of major shareholders.
(2)The acquisition of ultimate shareholder control right has been achieved by grabbing the residual control rights, decision-making control and operational control that general meeting of shareholders, board of directors and managers have.
(3)The fundamental motivation of ultimate shareholders of listed company's deprivation behavior is the private benefits brought by control premium enlargement.
(4)Validated by empirical analysis, it is a common phenomenon existing in ultimate shareholder of listed companies in China widespread using social capital control chain to gain and strengthen ultimate control.
(5)Through case study, we discover the phenomenon that ultimate shareholders of listed companies in China usually control and deprive the listed company by using "double" invisible control chain, which have great harm.
上市公司终极股东控制与剥夺问题的规范性研究历史还不到十年。迄今为止,关于上市公司终极股东控制权的研究仍然仅仅局限于“股权控制链分析范式”。从实践来看,“股权控制链分析范式”对那些股权分散的上市公司具有较强的适用性和解释力,因此,得到学者们的广泛认可。然而,在那些股权相对集中的国家中,特别是对于那些具有东方文化背景的上市公司,这种分析范式存在着一个严重缺陷,那就是单单依靠股权控制链追溯上市公司终极股东并不能完全克服终极股东的隐蔽性,有时很难准确地揭示出那个深藏幕后的真正终极股东,相应地难以精确地度量终极股东对上市公司的实际控制程度。基于此,本文创造性地运用社会资本理论构建起上市公司“社会资本控制链分析范式”,用大股东的社会网络连带作为追溯上市公司终极股东及其控制权的逻辑起点,并利用这一分析范式解析上市公司终极股东控制与剥夺机理。可以说,这种新的分析框架能够更为精准地识别上市公司的终极股东,测量和分析终极股东控制权,有效地弥补股权控制链分析范式的不足,从而为上市公司终极股东控制权问题的研究开辟了一条崭新的道路。
本文共分为以下八章：第一章简要介绍论文的选题背景和意义、相关概念、研究内容和框架、研究方法及论文的创新之处等；第二章为文献综述,通过对“股权控制链分析范式”下终极股东控制与剥夺问题的相关研究进行回顾,揭示这种现有的主导研究范式的局限；接下来的三章是本文的核心内容,其中,第三章在对社会资本的概念和内涵及其作用作以清晰界定和阐述的基础上,提出了社会资本控制链的概念,并尝试性构建了一个“社会资本控制链”分析范式；第四章分别从对终极控制权的概念内涵的重新阐释、终极股东社会资本控制链的构造模型、终极股东控制类型和终极控制权的动态演变等角度,对终极股东对上市公司的控制机理作以全面系统地解析；第五章从“双重”控制链这一新的理论视角对终极股东的剥夺动因、剥夺路径、剥夺过程以及显性剥夺和隐性剥夺等问题展开深入系统的探讨,揭示了终极股东剥夺行为的一般规律,因而能够加深对终极股东剥夺问题的认识和理解；第六章以我国上市公司作为考察对象,通过对60家上市公司的其他主要大股东、董事和经理人员进行问卷调查,并对筛选后所得到的480份有效问卷数据进行相应的实证分析与检验,验证了我国上市公司的终极股东普遍存在动用社会资本控制链来获取并强化终极控制的现象；第七章通过对草原兴发这家具有代表性的上市公司进行案例剖析,全方位地展示了终极股东如何运用双重隐形控制链(股权控制链和社会资本控制链)对上市公司进行控制与剥夺,揭示出股权控制链与社会资本控制链交织使用的一般规律,为本文提出的“社会资本控制链”分析框架提供有力的证据。最后一章为结论部分,一方面总结论文的主要观点,给出相应的政策建议,另一方面指出本文的局限,探讨后续研究的方向。
通过深入系统分析与探讨,本文得到了以下几个重要结论：
(1)对上市公司终极股东及其控制权进行追寻的逻辑起点是大股东的社会网络连带。
(2)终极股东控制权的获取是通过分别对股东大会、董事会和经理层的剩余控制权、决策控制权和经营控制权的攫取实现的。
(3)上市公司终极股东剥夺行为的根本动因是被“控制权溢价”放大的“控制权私利”。
(4)通过实证分析验证了我国上市公司的终极股东普遍存在动用社会资本控制链来获取并强化终极控制的现象。
(5)通过案例分析证明我国上市公司的终极股东存在利用“双重”隐形控制链对上市公司进行控制与剥夺的现象,且危害较大。
Asian financial crisis and the resulting wave of corporate governance have made the corporate governance issueⅡ—ultimate shareholder control and deprivation appear, gradually becomes a new focus of empirical research. La Porta and other people have done research in the field of control right in depth and firstly introduce the ultimate shareholder control as an important research area. This has led the formation of analytical paradigm of equity control chain, which leads to new heights about the study on corporate governance. As it can be said, the research in the ultimate control and deprivation opens up a new study field and forms a new study paradigm, which is of great theoretical value as a result. In addition, the systematical research and further investigation have extremely important practical significance as to constant improvement of listed company's governance structure and enhancement of governance efficiency, thus it can effectively protect the interests of middle and small shareholders.
The normative study history of ultimate shareholder control rights of listed company is less than a decade. So far, it has been still merely limited to the "analytical paradigm of equity control chain". From the practical experiences, analytical paradigm of equity control chain can strongly apply to and explain the listed companies whose equity is separate, therefore it has been widely recognized by scholars. However, this analytical paradigm has a serious deficiency that it could not conquer the confidentiality of ultimate shareholders, merely by using the equity control chain to trace the ultimate shareholder of listed company in those countries whose equity are relatively concentrated, especially for those with an oriental background, so it is hard to accurately reveal the real ultimate shareholder hidden behind the scenes and correspondingly measure the ultimate shareholder's actual control extent accurately. Based on this, this article creatively uses the social capital theory to construct "an analytic paradigm of social capital control chain ", namely starting from the social network ties of the ultimate shareholders and their control rights, and uses this analytic paradigm to find out the control and deprivation mechanism of ultimate shareholders of listed company. This is to say, the new analytic framework can help us find out the real ultimate shareholder, accurately measure and analyze their control right, and it can supply the gap of the analytic paradigm of equity control chain, So our study creates a new perspective for the research in ultimate control right in listed companies.
This article consists of eight chapters: the first chapter simply introduces the topic background and significance, relative concepts, study contents and framework, research methods, innovations and so on; the second chapter is a literature review, looking back to the relative researches on the ultimate shareholder control and deprivation under equity control chain so as to reveal the limitation of this existing dominant study paradigm; The following three chapters are core parts of this paper, the third chapter, on the basis of clearly defining and illustrating the definition, contents and function of social capital, comes up with the conception of social capital control chain and tries to build a analytical paradigm of "social capital control chain"; the forth chapter comprehensively and systematically analyze the mechanism that the ultimate shareholders control the listed company from the re-interpreting the concept of ultimate control right, constructing the model of ultimate shareholder social capital control chain, controlling type and dynamic evolving of ultimate shareholder. The fifth chapter, from the new theoretical perspective of "double" control chain, systematically investigates in depth the depriving motivation, depriving path, depriving process and explicit and implicit deprivation, then reveals the general law of ultimate shareholder depriving behaviors, so it can deepen the awareness and understanding of ultimate shareholder's depriving issues. The sixth chapter, as assessed our listed companies, by questionnaire investigation to other main major shareholders, directors and managers of 60 listed companies and empirical analysis and test to 480 valid questionnaire data, verifies it is a widespread phenomenon for the ultimate shareholders of listed companies to use social capital control chain to obtain the ultimate control; The seventh chapter analyze the representative listed company case-Prairie Xingfa Co., LTD, to comprehensively reveal the ultimate shareholder how to use the double invisible control chain (equity control chain and social capital control chain) to control and deprive the listed company and reflect the general rule of mixed use of these two control chains, which provides strong evidence for the analytic framework of "social capital control chain". The last chapter is the conclusion, which on one hand sums up the main points of the paper and gives the accordingly appropriate policy recommendations, on the other hand points out the limitations and explores the direction for further research.
This paper has come to the following conclusions through the systematically analysis and investigation in depth:
(1)The logical starting of tracing the ultimate shareholder and its control right of listed company is the social network ties of major shareholders.
(2)The acquisition of ultimate shareholder control right has been achieved by grabbing the residual control rights, decision-making control and operational control that general meeting of shareholders, board of directors and managers have.
(3)The fundamental motivation of ultimate shareholders of listed company's deprivation behavior is the private benefits brought by control premium enlargement.
(4)Validated by empirical analysis, it is a common phenomenon existing in ultimate shareholder of listed companies in China widespread using social capital control chain to gain and strengthen ultimate control.
(5)Through case study, we discover the phenomenon that ultimate shareholders of listed companies in China usually control and deprive the listed company by using "double" invisible control chain, which have great harm.
引文
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