公司治理与会计稳健性
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摘要
会计稳健性作为财务会计中的一项重要的惯例和会计理论中最有影响力的计量准则,对于降低委托-代理关系中委托方与受托方之间的信息不对称、提高契约运行的效率,降低代理成本具有重要作用。公司治理作为使公司资产能够得到有效使用、确保向公司融资者取得其投资收益的一系列机制,可以有效限制将本属于公司股东的资产不恰当地分配给公司管理层。为了能够更好的监督公司管理层,有效的公司治理机制会促使稳健的会计政策得到应用,因为稳健的会计政策能够及时的向董事会等治理机构传递有关损失的信息,使其能够尽早的调查形成损失的原因。
目前国内文献只对公司治理的某个方面与会计稳健性的关系进行了研究,比如从董事会、股权结构、注册会计师审计等角度,本文认为公司治理作为减少企业利益各方代理成本的制度安排,其涵盖的范围相当广泛,从宏观上的法律体系、市场竞争到微观上的公司高管薪酬,都属于公司治理的范围。因此,为了全面的研究公司治理与会计稳健性的关系,本文拟从公司治理环境和公司治理机制两个方面考虑对会计稳健性的影响。公司治理环境至少包括产权保护、法治水平、市场竞争、信用体系、契约文化等方面。公司治理机制分为内部治理机制和外部治理机制,内部治理机制包括股权结构、董事会、高管薪酬与所有权,外部治理机制包括注册会计师审计和债务治理。在研究具体的治理机制对会计稳健性的影响时,本文试图从更深层次来考虑治理机制对会计稳健性的影响,比如考虑企业所拥有的政治关系、独立董事所具有的背景等。另外,国内文献基本上都是从静态角度研究公司治理机制对会计稳健性的影响,实际上有些治理机制是随着时间而变化的,比如企业会以各种原因变更会计师事务所,这样不同的会计师事务所对企业会计稳健性的影响也是不同的,需要考虑治理机制发生变化的情况,即从动态角度研究治理机制对会计稳健性的影响。
全文共分9章：
第1章为导论。本章主要介绍论文的研究动机、研究方法与意义、研究路径与结构安排。
第2章为文献回顾。本章在相关文献的基础上,对会计稳健性的内涵与发展、公司治理的结构与机制进行了分析,并阐明了两者之间的关系。通过文献回顾,发现以前研究的不足,找出本文的研究方向与角度。
第3章为理论分析。本章对会计稳健性与公司治理的相关理论进行了梳理,运用契约理论、神经经济学等相关理论对会计稳健性的产生进行了阐释,分析了我国上市公司治理的特征及其对会计稳健性的影响,为后面的实证研究奠定基础。
第4章为公司治理环境与会计稳健性。本章利用樊纲、王小鲁(2010)编制的各地区市场化指数、政府与市场关系指数、市场中介发育与法律制度环境指数刻画各地区的市场化程度、政府干预程度和法治化程度,检验公司治理环境对会计稳健性的影响。
第5章为产权关系、股权结构与会计稳健性。对于产权关系,本章从上市公司与政府之间的关系出发,考察国有上市公司受到不同级别政府的政治干预对其会计稳健性的影响,非国有上市公司所拥有的政治联系对其会计稳健性的影响；对于股权结构,除了检验控股股东比例和股权制衡程度对会计稳健性的影响外,考虑到机构投资者在我国证券市场上的影响力越来越大,对上市公司的经营管理也会产生影响,因此检验了机构投资者对上市公司会计稳健性的影响。
第6章为董事会独立性、管理层持股与会计稳健性。本章除了从独立董事在董事会中所占比例、董事长和总经理是否两职分离两方面检验对会计稳健性的影响外,还从深层次出发,检验了独立董事具有的背景对企业会计稳健性的影响。本文认为在我国“一股独大”的股权结构下的企业管理层持股与股权分散情况下存在明显的差别,检验了企业管理层持股对会计稳健性的影响。
第7章为注册会计师审计与会计稳健性。本章将会计师事务所划分为“国际四大”所、国内十大所和国内中小所,检验了不同规模的会计师事务所对会计稳健性的影响,这是从静态的角度进行的研究；从动态角度进行的研究主要表现在以下两方面：一是从会计师事务所变更的角度检验了不同规模的会计师事务所对会计稳健性影响的差异,二是从会计师事务所合并的角度检验了会计师事务所合并前后对会计稳健性影响的差异。
第8章为负债与会计稳健性。本章检验了债务比例、债务期限对不同性质企业的会计稳健性的影响,并利用因子分析法全面考虑公司治理各项因素对会计稳健性的影响。
第9章为结语。本章着重概括本文研究的基本结论、提出一些提高会计稳健性的建议、本文的创新点、本文研究的局限性以及进一步的研究方向。
本文的主要贡献有三：一是通过从公司治理环境、内部公司治理机制和外部公司治理机制三个方面研究对会计稳健性的影响,丰富了公司治理与会计稳健性的相关研究；二是通过考虑企业所拥有的政治关系、独立董事所具有的背景等,从更深层次探讨了公司治理对会计稳健性的影响；三是通过考察会计师事务所变更前后、合并前后对会计稳健性影响的差异,从动态角度研究了公司治理与会计稳健性的关系。
Accounting conservatism is regarded as an important tradition in financial accountingand the most influential measurement in accounting theory, reducing the information asymmetry between client and trusteeand improving the contract efficient and lessening the agency costs. Corporate governance is a series mechanisms in place to ensure that the assets of the firm are used efficiently, guaranteeing the suppliers of finance a return on their investment, must restrict the actions which the assets owned stockholders are inappropriate assigned to management. In order to supervise the management, effective governance mechanism induces using conservative accounting policies because they can provide early warning signals to governance bodies such as the board of directors, promoting early investigation into the reasons for bad news.
Domestic papers only studies the relations between the aspect of corporate governance and accounting conservatism, including the board of directors, ownership structure and CPA audit. We think corporate governance which is regarded as institutional arrangement relieving the agency costs covers the wide area from macroscopical legal system and competition to microscopical senior managers'compensation. We want to consider from governance environment and mechanism for studying the relations between corporate governance and accounting conservatism comprehensively. Corporate governance environment is at least including property protection, legal level, competition, credit system and contract culture(Xia lijun et al,2005). Corporate governance mechanisms are divided into interior and exterior mechanisms, interior mechanisms are including ownership structure, board of director, senior managers'compensation and ownership, exterior mechanisms are including CPA audit and the governance effect of debt. We try to study the relations between corporate governance and accounging conservatism deeply, for example the political relation owned by corporate, the background of independent director. In addition domestic papers study the relations in statics, in fact some governance mechanisms change over time, for example corporate can change accounting office by all kinds of reasons, so different accounting office can bring different effect to accounting conservatism. So we consider the relations in dynamics for the change of governance mechanisms. From the research perspective, the dissertation has been divided into nine chapters as follows:
Chapter 1 Introduction. In the introduction, we present the research motive, research methodology and significance, research framework.
Chapter 2 Literature Review. In this chapter, we analyse the emergence and development of accounting conservatism and corporate governance on the basis of literature review, clarify the relations between corporate governance and accounting conservatism. We find the defects of former research by reviewing literature and locate the research direction and perspective.
Chapter 3 Theoretical analysis. In this chapter, we card the theory of accounting conservatism and corporate governance, use contract theory and neuroeconomics studies to explain accounting conservatism. We analysis the feature of our listed companies and influence to accounting conservatism, lay the foundation for the latter empirical research.
Chapter 4 Corporate Governance Environment and Accounting Conservatism. In this chapter, using the marketization index, the relation index of government and market, legal regime environment index designed by Fan Gang et al(2010) decribing the marketization process, government intervention and legal level of different provinces, we test the effect of corporate governance to accounting conservatism.
Chapter 5 Equity, Ownership structure and Accounting Conservatism. For equity, we test the effect of listed state-owned enterprises interfered by different government to accounting conservatism, the effect of non-state-owned enterprises'political connection to accounting conservatism. For ownership structure, except for testing the effect of controlling shareholder and closely held ownership structure to accounting conservatism, we test the effect of institutional investors to accounting conservatism because institutional investors have developped rapidly and become the important part of security market which can influence the listed enterprises.
Chapter 6 The Independence of the Board of Directors, Management Ownership and Accounting Conservatism. In this chapter, except for testing the effect of proportion of independent directors and separation of chairman CEO duality to accounting conservatism, we test the effect of the background of independent directors to accounting conservatism from deep level, this is an unique field which available literatures don't mention. We think management ownership in the structure of one big share is different with that in the structure of decentralization of shares, so we test the effect of management ownership to accounting conservatism in the structure of one big share.
Chapter 7 CPA Audit and Accounting Conservatism. In this chapter, we have divided accounting firms into three parts:international big 4, national top 10 and national minor firms, test the effect of different accounting firms to accounting conservatism, this is in statics. We study the effect of different accounting firms to accounting conservatism in dynamics from two ways, one is the change of accounting firms, the other is the merger of accounting firms.
Chapter 8 Debt and Accounting Conservatism. In this chapter, we test the effect of debt ratio and debt maturities to accounting conservatism of different enterprises and adopt factor analysis to test the comprehensive effects of corporate governance on accounting conservatism.
Chapter 9 Conclusion. The chapter generalizes the basic conclusions, puts forword some suggestion of improving accounting conservatism, research innovation, the limitations of the study and the further research directions.
So we study the relations between corporate governance and accounting conservatism from governance environment and interior and exterior mechanisms, enrich the papers of corporate governance and accounting conservatism. We study the relations between corporate governance and accounging conservatism deeply from the political relation owned by corporate and the background of independent director. We study the relations in dynamics by considering the different effect which different accounting firms(including before and after the merger of accounting firms and the change of accounting firms) bring to accounting conservatism.
目前国内文献只对公司治理的某个方面与会计稳健性的关系进行了研究,比如从董事会、股权结构、注册会计师审计等角度,本文认为公司治理作为减少企业利益各方代理成本的制度安排,其涵盖的范围相当广泛,从宏观上的法律体系、市场竞争到微观上的公司高管薪酬,都属于公司治理的范围。因此,为了全面的研究公司治理与会计稳健性的关系,本文拟从公司治理环境和公司治理机制两个方面考虑对会计稳健性的影响。公司治理环境至少包括产权保护、法治水平、市场竞争、信用体系、契约文化等方面。公司治理机制分为内部治理机制和外部治理机制,内部治理机制包括股权结构、董事会、高管薪酬与所有权,外部治理机制包括注册会计师审计和债务治理。在研究具体的治理机制对会计稳健性的影响时,本文试图从更深层次来考虑治理机制对会计稳健性的影响,比如考虑企业所拥有的政治关系、独立董事所具有的背景等。另外,国内文献基本上都是从静态角度研究公司治理机制对会计稳健性的影响,实际上有些治理机制是随着时间而变化的,比如企业会以各种原因变更会计师事务所,这样不同的会计师事务所对企业会计稳健性的影响也是不同的,需要考虑治理机制发生变化的情况,即从动态角度研究治理机制对会计稳健性的影响。
全文共分9章：
第1章为导论。本章主要介绍论文的研究动机、研究方法与意义、研究路径与结构安排。
第2章为文献回顾。本章在相关文献的基础上,对会计稳健性的内涵与发展、公司治理的结构与机制进行了分析,并阐明了两者之间的关系。通过文献回顾,发现以前研究的不足,找出本文的研究方向与角度。
第3章为理论分析。本章对会计稳健性与公司治理的相关理论进行了梳理,运用契约理论、神经经济学等相关理论对会计稳健性的产生进行了阐释,分析了我国上市公司治理的特征及其对会计稳健性的影响,为后面的实证研究奠定基础。
第4章为公司治理环境与会计稳健性。本章利用樊纲、王小鲁(2010)编制的各地区市场化指数、政府与市场关系指数、市场中介发育与法律制度环境指数刻画各地区的市场化程度、政府干预程度和法治化程度,检验公司治理环境对会计稳健性的影响。
第5章为产权关系、股权结构与会计稳健性。对于产权关系,本章从上市公司与政府之间的关系出发,考察国有上市公司受到不同级别政府的政治干预对其会计稳健性的影响,非国有上市公司所拥有的政治联系对其会计稳健性的影响；对于股权结构,除了检验控股股东比例和股权制衡程度对会计稳健性的影响外,考虑到机构投资者在我国证券市场上的影响力越来越大,对上市公司的经营管理也会产生影响,因此检验了机构投资者对上市公司会计稳健性的影响。
第6章为董事会独立性、管理层持股与会计稳健性。本章除了从独立董事在董事会中所占比例、董事长和总经理是否两职分离两方面检验对会计稳健性的影响外,还从深层次出发,检验了独立董事具有的背景对企业会计稳健性的影响。本文认为在我国“一股独大”的股权结构下的企业管理层持股与股权分散情况下存在明显的差别,检验了企业管理层持股对会计稳健性的影响。
第7章为注册会计师审计与会计稳健性。本章将会计师事务所划分为“国际四大”所、国内十大所和国内中小所,检验了不同规模的会计师事务所对会计稳健性的影响,这是从静态的角度进行的研究；从动态角度进行的研究主要表现在以下两方面：一是从会计师事务所变更的角度检验了不同规模的会计师事务所对会计稳健性影响的差异,二是从会计师事务所合并的角度检验了会计师事务所合并前后对会计稳健性影响的差异。
第8章为负债与会计稳健性。本章检验了债务比例、债务期限对不同性质企业的会计稳健性的影响,并利用因子分析法全面考虑公司治理各项因素对会计稳健性的影响。
第9章为结语。本章着重概括本文研究的基本结论、提出一些提高会计稳健性的建议、本文的创新点、本文研究的局限性以及进一步的研究方向。
本文的主要贡献有三：一是通过从公司治理环境、内部公司治理机制和外部公司治理机制三个方面研究对会计稳健性的影响,丰富了公司治理与会计稳健性的相关研究；二是通过考虑企业所拥有的政治关系、独立董事所具有的背景等,从更深层次探讨了公司治理对会计稳健性的影响；三是通过考察会计师事务所变更前后、合并前后对会计稳健性影响的差异,从动态角度研究了公司治理与会计稳健性的关系。
Accounting conservatism is regarded as an important tradition in financial accountingand the most influential measurement in accounting theory, reducing the information asymmetry between client and trusteeand improving the contract efficient and lessening the agency costs. Corporate governance is a series mechanisms in place to ensure that the assets of the firm are used efficiently, guaranteeing the suppliers of finance a return on their investment, must restrict the actions which the assets owned stockholders are inappropriate assigned to management. In order to supervise the management, effective governance mechanism induces using conservative accounting policies because they can provide early warning signals to governance bodies such as the board of directors, promoting early investigation into the reasons for bad news.
Domestic papers only studies the relations between the aspect of corporate governance and accounting conservatism, including the board of directors, ownership structure and CPA audit. We think corporate governance which is regarded as institutional arrangement relieving the agency costs covers the wide area from macroscopical legal system and competition to microscopical senior managers'compensation. We want to consider from governance environment and mechanism for studying the relations between corporate governance and accounting conservatism comprehensively. Corporate governance environment is at least including property protection, legal level, competition, credit system and contract culture(Xia lijun et al,2005). Corporate governance mechanisms are divided into interior and exterior mechanisms, interior mechanisms are including ownership structure, board of director, senior managers'compensation and ownership, exterior mechanisms are including CPA audit and the governance effect of debt. We try to study the relations between corporate governance and accounging conservatism deeply, for example the political relation owned by corporate, the background of independent director. In addition domestic papers study the relations in statics, in fact some governance mechanisms change over time, for example corporate can change accounting office by all kinds of reasons, so different accounting office can bring different effect to accounting conservatism. So we consider the relations in dynamics for the change of governance mechanisms. From the research perspective, the dissertation has been divided into nine chapters as follows:
Chapter 1 Introduction. In the introduction, we present the research motive, research methodology and significance, research framework.
Chapter 2 Literature Review. In this chapter, we analyse the emergence and development of accounting conservatism and corporate governance on the basis of literature review, clarify the relations between corporate governance and accounting conservatism. We find the defects of former research by reviewing literature and locate the research direction and perspective.
Chapter 3 Theoretical analysis. In this chapter, we card the theory of accounting conservatism and corporate governance, use contract theory and neuroeconomics studies to explain accounting conservatism. We analysis the feature of our listed companies and influence to accounting conservatism, lay the foundation for the latter empirical research.
Chapter 4 Corporate Governance Environment and Accounting Conservatism. In this chapter, using the marketization index, the relation index of government and market, legal regime environment index designed by Fan Gang et al(2010) decribing the marketization process, government intervention and legal level of different provinces, we test the effect of corporate governance to accounting conservatism.
Chapter 5 Equity, Ownership structure and Accounting Conservatism. For equity, we test the effect of listed state-owned enterprises interfered by different government to accounting conservatism, the effect of non-state-owned enterprises'political connection to accounting conservatism. For ownership structure, except for testing the effect of controlling shareholder and closely held ownership structure to accounting conservatism, we test the effect of institutional investors to accounting conservatism because institutional investors have developped rapidly and become the important part of security market which can influence the listed enterprises.
Chapter 6 The Independence of the Board of Directors, Management Ownership and Accounting Conservatism. In this chapter, except for testing the effect of proportion of independent directors and separation of chairman CEO duality to accounting conservatism, we test the effect of the background of independent directors to accounting conservatism from deep level, this is an unique field which available literatures don't mention. We think management ownership in the structure of one big share is different with that in the structure of decentralization of shares, so we test the effect of management ownership to accounting conservatism in the structure of one big share.
Chapter 7 CPA Audit and Accounting Conservatism. In this chapter, we have divided accounting firms into three parts:international big 4, national top 10 and national minor firms, test the effect of different accounting firms to accounting conservatism, this is in statics. We study the effect of different accounting firms to accounting conservatism in dynamics from two ways, one is the change of accounting firms, the other is the merger of accounting firms.
Chapter 8 Debt and Accounting Conservatism. In this chapter, we test the effect of debt ratio and debt maturities to accounting conservatism of different enterprises and adopt factor analysis to test the comprehensive effects of corporate governance on accounting conservatism.
Chapter 9 Conclusion. The chapter generalizes the basic conclusions, puts forword some suggestion of improving accounting conservatism, research innovation, the limitations of the study and the further research directions.
So we study the relations between corporate governance and accounting conservatism from governance environment and interior and exterior mechanisms, enrich the papers of corporate governance and accounting conservatism. We study the relations between corporate governance and accounging conservatism deeply from the political relation owned by corporate and the background of independent director. We study the relations in dynamics by considering the different effect which different accounting firms(including before and after the merger of accounting firms and the change of accounting firms) bring to accounting conservatism.
引文
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