司法认知论
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摘要
近年来，我国学术界和立法界都在努力进行各项证据规则的研究，以期构建一套我国完善的证据规则体系。司法认知作为英美传统证据规则之一，正在受到越来越多人的关注。但是，因为以往原始资料的缺乏，关于司法认知的理论研究较为薄弱，使得立法方面的努力也呈裹足不前之势。在这种情况下，分析和研究国外法制发达国家的立法、理论以及实践经验，剖析其运行机制，就具有了较高的理论和实践价值。基于此，笔者希望通过研究作为英美法系代表的英国和美国与司法认知相关的理论和司法实践经验，获取一些对我国的证据规则体系构建有益的借鉴，以完善我国的证据规则体制。
本文共分为七章。第一章至第六章是对英美两国司法认知理论、立法和司法实践的介绍和分析。第七章是对司法认知在我国应用的一些构想。
第一章是司法认知的概念和历史渊源。虽然已有的关于司法认知的定义莫衷一是，而且，也很少有英美法学者试图对司法认知进行简练定义，但是，我们还是可以从中总结出一些司法认知所具有的特征：司法认知是法庭的一种职务行为、司法认知的对象有一定的限制以及司法认知的直接结果之一是免除了对被司法认知事项的正式证明。同时，为了读者不至于混淆司法认知与相关概念，笔者对与司法认知相关的免证事实、自认、推定以及预决事实等概念以及与司法认知之间的联系一一进行了分析。为了更好地理解司法认知，对司法认知的历史渊源进行了深入探究，明确了司法认知源于中世纪关于法官的一项理念，而关于证据法上的司法认知最早可以追溯到罗马法上的“显著之事实，无需证明”这句古老法谚，英美法学者也普遍认为“已经知道的无需证明"这个谚语也许可以追溯到市民法和教会法，总而言之，司法认知历史悠久。并且，为了让读者对早期司法实践中运用司法认知有个大致的了解，笔者按照时间顺序，列举了一系列引用率较高的早期案件予以说明，同时，简要介绍了司法认知的早期理论研究状况。
第二章讨论的是司法认知的理论基础。笔者首先罗列了英美对抗制体系中存在的几个重要前提条件，作为进一步讨论的基础，并按照司法认知的对象，分别对司法认知法律和司法认知事实的理论基础进行了论述。两者的理论基础在某种程度上是共通的，一是法官被认为既有义务掌握法律也应该拥有任何常人都拥有的包括日常知识在内的知识，如果法官的这些必要知识有所欠缺的话，就应该具有获得这些知识的能力，法官在这方面的知识和能力称之为必要的职能装备和智力装备；二是，法官作为解决社会纷争的终极机构的具体执行者，既有维护法律统一的职责，也有维护社会对某些事实的认识统一的职责。
第三章论述的是司法认知的对象之一事实。这一章是本文的重点之一，所占的篇幅也最大，而且向来是司法认知领域中最为复杂，也是最为核心的一部分。在该章中，笔者不仅概述了司法认知适用对象的早期理论研究，而且讨论了司法认知事实的衡量标准，即传统的“众所周知”以及现代发展起来的“确定性可证实或者真实性能够得到确认的事实”两类，并且，论述了司法认知的对象是否应该具有确定性的前提条件。作为司法认知事实篇的重要组成部分，对英美现有的两类司法认知的事实——裁决性事实和立法性事实进行了详细论述，不仅论述了两者的概念、区别以及相互之间的联系，而且还论述了各自的衡量标准等。
第四章论述的法律是除事实之外的第二类司法认知对象。与第三章一样，该章也是本文的重点之一。笔者首先按照法律的地域将其划分为国内法和外国法律，然后根据法律渊源再将其划分为普通法、成文法以及公法、私法等分别进行论述。在英美法系，法官被认为有义务掌握法律，尤其是国内公共法，所以在很大程度上，对国内公共法的司法认知基本上意见一致，而且，由于英美属于普通法系国家，所以对国内普通法的司法认知意见也基本上统一，但是，对于其他法律种类，以及不属于诉讼地所属国的法律，在传统上并不在司法认知范畴之内。美国由于其特殊的联邦制政治体制，在相当长的一段时间内，甚至将外州法律也视为外国法律对待。
第五章集中讨论了与司法认知相关的一些程序。首先是司法认知程序的启动方式，根据法庭在司法认知方面所需承担的职责，分为强制性启动与任意性启动两种，在符合法律规定的条件下，任意性司法认知就会向强制性司法认知转换。其次，讨论了对司法认知的听证程序，并明确获取听证的机会是法律赋予当事人的一项权利。在英美由陪审团审理案件的情况下，还涉及到在司法认知之后法官应否向陪审团进行指示的问题，现在在美国较为普遍的做法是区分刑民事诉讼，决定对陪审团指示的效力问题。一般情况下，大家都认可对民事诉讼中的陪审团的指示具有强制效力，但是在刑事诉讼中的效力如何尚有争论。最后，讨论了在上诉审中法庭是否可以以及如何进行司法认知这个问题。上诉审法庭在司法认知时在理论上几乎不受初审法庭的影响，虽然在司法实践中有一些限制存在。
第六章对司法认知的性质、效力和作用进行了讨论。除了作用外，关于司法认知的性质和效力一直以来都争论不断，笔者对其中三类代表性学说进行了论述，分别是“非正式证明论”、“司法职能论”以及“特殊推定论”。司法认知的效力与性质密切相关，由于各位学者所持的关于司法认知的性质的观点不同，所以得出的司法认知的效力也就分为“终局性”和“初步为真”两种。立法界由于各种原因，选择了前者。司法认知具有多种作用，其中最为引人注目的就是由于省略了繁琐的正式证明程序所带来的巨大经济作用。
在最后一章，笔者在分析了我国目前关于司法认知的立法以及理论研究现状之后，提出了在我国确立司法认知体系的建议。以英美立法以及司法实践为参照，笔者从司法认知的对象、衡量标准、程序以及效力四个方面进行了司法认知体系构建。建议，将司法认知的对象分为法律和事实两类，并明确，至少在将司法认知应用到我国司法实践的初步阶段，被司法认知的事实应该“不具有争议性”或者“超出合理转移范畴”；参照美国相关法律规定，设定了两类司法认知的衡量标准；并在程序中明确了司法认知的启动方式、司法认知的审理、法庭在司法认知中的权限以及司法认知的时间；最后，笔者建议，司法认知应该具有终局性的，即在已经给当事人提供了对司法认知的适当性以及被司法认知的事项的确切含义进行审理的机会的情况下，一旦被法庭采取了司法认知，就不应该再允许对其进行反证明。
In recent years, people who are working in the academics and the jurisdictions are researching all kinds of evidence rules in order to establish a system of evidence rules. Judicial Notice has been highlighting with wide social concerns as one of traditional evidence rules in common law due to its several values. However, the research in this field in China is almost vacant because of the material not easily accessible. Under this situation, analyzing and studying the advanced theories and experiences abroad concerning legislation and legislative administration, and probing the mechanism of their judicial notice systems, are endowed with the great value in theory and practice. This is the reason that this dissertation is studying the procedures of judicial notice in England and the United States and tying to gain some beneficial insights for the perfection of our evidence rules system.
The dissertation divided into seven chapters. Chapters One to six are discussing theories, legal and practice of judicial notice in England and the U.S. Chapters seven is providing several suggestions for applying the judicial notice in our country.
Chapter one makes the definition and the origin of the term. In the common law, the definition of judicial notice seemed having the character of diversity other than uniformity. However, we will find that there are several fundamental factors that is uniform no matter what is the definition of judicial notice, that is, judicial notice is a authority of the court, there are some restrictions placed on the objects of judicial notice, and, as one of the direct results of judicial notice, the party releases, relatively or conclusively, from the bourdon of proof. To avoid the confusion, the author contrasts judicial notice with admission, presumption, ect. The maxim that what is know need not be proved, may be traced far back in the civil and the canon law. The author also illustrates a series of classical cases in the early practice according to chronology and introduces the conditions of theories about judicial notice in the early period.
Chapter two is related to the rationale of judicial notice. As the groundwork for a consideration of the nature and function of judicial notice several important premises must be observed firstly. And we found that there are some common rocks and policies about judicial notice facts and laws: first, the judge is charged with the duty of knowing the law and had knowledge what everyone knows, if he didn' t, he must acquire them. This capacity to have and acquire these knowledge is imperative for a judge; second, courts are agencies of society for the adjustment of disputes between litigants, and the judges also are responsible for the uniform of the law and to maintain any decision contrary to what is accepted as indisputable facts in that society cannot be justified.
Chapter three is stating one of the judicial notice objects-facts. The author put great emphasis on this chapter as a key part of the dissertation, because facts are the most difficult in the judicial notice field. The facts which be taken by the judge as judicial notice should be the matters of fact which are of common knowledge from accuracy sources, or are of official records. That is, judicially noticed fact must be one either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. The author introduces the concept and the difference of adjudicative' facts and legislative facts in detail, and to discuss the general tests of two kinds of facts.
Chapter four is another key part of the dissertation, discussing the second object of judicial notice-laws. In common law system, just as said, a judge has a duty to take charge with domestic law, especially public law. Thus in common law system' s traditional opinion, domestic public law and common law should be judicial noticed. But, foreign law should be proved as facts and not subject to the judicial notice. Generally, the courts of the U.S. refused to take judicial notice of the laws of other states jurisdictions because every state is an independent " country" . But now, most of states adopted that courts should also judicial notice of the law of other jurisdictions.
Chapter five is focusing on the procedure of judicial notice. According to the scope of the authorities of the courts, the procedure of judicial notice can be begun with compulsory or discretionary without request. However, if one of parties requests and furnishes the judge necessary information to enable him properly to comply with the request, the judge shall notice the matter. The parties also have been afforded reasonable opportunity to hearing and to present to the judge information to determine the propriety of judicial notice and the tenor of matter notices. In jury' s cases, the judge shall instruct the trier of the facts to accept as a fact the matter so notice or not. Now, as in the U.S., in a civil action, the court shall instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed, but in a criminal case, some agreed that it may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive, but some considered that there is no reasonable reason to deal with one topic differently. The time of taking notice is below this chapter too. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the proceeding, in concluding on appeal. The appellate tribunal is not concluded by the ruling of the trial court would seem clear, although there are some limits to the appellate courts.
Chapter six is the nature, effects and values of the judicial notice. There are three different opinions about the nature of the doctrine. One is the informality of proof; second is the exercise of the function of judicature; third is a special kind of presumption. Because the effect of the doctrine is closely related to the nature, we will find two effects: conclusive and not conclusive. The legislations widely accepted the former, at least in the civil cases. The values of judicial notice are the reason that the doctrine exists. The most received attention is the economy efficiency through avoiding unnecessary proof.
The last chapter is to state that how to set up a reasonably system of judicial notice in China. The first step of analysis is concerning legislations and practice at present, which can prove that it is necessity and feasibility to establish judicial notice in China. And then, the author takes suggestions how to establish a reasonably judicial notice system. Proposed: the rule governs judicial notice of laws and facts; a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute, at least at the beginning to apply judicial notice in China; facts shall be noticed only if they are generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the court or capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned; judicial notice can be taken by a court in discretionary or mandatory, and each party has a reasonable opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice of a matter or to the tenor of the matter to be noticed and to supply the court with the necessary information; judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the proceeding; finally, the facts be judicial noticed shall be accepted as conclusive.
本文共分为七章。第一章至第六章是对英美两国司法认知理论、立法和司法实践的介绍和分析。第七章是对司法认知在我国应用的一些构想。
第一章是司法认知的概念和历史渊源。虽然已有的关于司法认知的定义莫衷一是，而且，也很少有英美法学者试图对司法认知进行简练定义，但是，我们还是可以从中总结出一些司法认知所具有的特征：司法认知是法庭的一种职务行为、司法认知的对象有一定的限制以及司法认知的直接结果之一是免除了对被司法认知事项的正式证明。同时，为了读者不至于混淆司法认知与相关概念，笔者对与司法认知相关的免证事实、自认、推定以及预决事实等概念以及与司法认知之间的联系一一进行了分析。为了更好地理解司法认知，对司法认知的历史渊源进行了深入探究，明确了司法认知源于中世纪关于法官的一项理念，而关于证据法上的司法认知最早可以追溯到罗马法上的“显著之事实，无需证明”这句古老法谚，英美法学者也普遍认为“已经知道的无需证明"这个谚语也许可以追溯到市民法和教会法，总而言之，司法认知历史悠久。并且，为了让读者对早期司法实践中运用司法认知有个大致的了解，笔者按照时间顺序，列举了一系列引用率较高的早期案件予以说明，同时，简要介绍了司法认知的早期理论研究状况。
第二章讨论的是司法认知的理论基础。笔者首先罗列了英美对抗制体系中存在的几个重要前提条件，作为进一步讨论的基础，并按照司法认知的对象，分别对司法认知法律和司法认知事实的理论基础进行了论述。两者的理论基础在某种程度上是共通的，一是法官被认为既有义务掌握法律也应该拥有任何常人都拥有的包括日常知识在内的知识，如果法官的这些必要知识有所欠缺的话，就应该具有获得这些知识的能力，法官在这方面的知识和能力称之为必要的职能装备和智力装备；二是，法官作为解决社会纷争的终极机构的具体执行者，既有维护法律统一的职责，也有维护社会对某些事实的认识统一的职责。
第三章论述的是司法认知的对象之一事实。这一章是本文的重点之一，所占的篇幅也最大，而且向来是司法认知领域中最为复杂，也是最为核心的一部分。在该章中，笔者不仅概述了司法认知适用对象的早期理论研究，而且讨论了司法认知事实的衡量标准，即传统的“众所周知”以及现代发展起来的“确定性可证实或者真实性能够得到确认的事实”两类，并且，论述了司法认知的对象是否应该具有确定性的前提条件。作为司法认知事实篇的重要组成部分，对英美现有的两类司法认知的事实——裁决性事实和立法性事实进行了详细论述，不仅论述了两者的概念、区别以及相互之间的联系，而且还论述了各自的衡量标准等。
第四章论述的法律是除事实之外的第二类司法认知对象。与第三章一样，该章也是本文的重点之一。笔者首先按照法律的地域将其划分为国内法和外国法律，然后根据法律渊源再将其划分为普通法、成文法以及公法、私法等分别进行论述。在英美法系，法官被认为有义务掌握法律，尤其是国内公共法，所以在很大程度上，对国内公共法的司法认知基本上意见一致，而且，由于英美属于普通法系国家，所以对国内普通法的司法认知意见也基本上统一，但是，对于其他法律种类，以及不属于诉讼地所属国的法律，在传统上并不在司法认知范畴之内。美国由于其特殊的联邦制政治体制，在相当长的一段时间内，甚至将外州法律也视为外国法律对待。
第五章集中讨论了与司法认知相关的一些程序。首先是司法认知程序的启动方式，根据法庭在司法认知方面所需承担的职责，分为强制性启动与任意性启动两种，在符合法律规定的条件下，任意性司法认知就会向强制性司法认知转换。其次，讨论了对司法认知的听证程序，并明确获取听证的机会是法律赋予当事人的一项权利。在英美由陪审团审理案件的情况下，还涉及到在司法认知之后法官应否向陪审团进行指示的问题，现在在美国较为普遍的做法是区分刑民事诉讼，决定对陪审团指示的效力问题。一般情况下，大家都认可对民事诉讼中的陪审团的指示具有强制效力，但是在刑事诉讼中的效力如何尚有争论。最后，讨论了在上诉审中法庭是否可以以及如何进行司法认知这个问题。上诉审法庭在司法认知时在理论上几乎不受初审法庭的影响，虽然在司法实践中有一些限制存在。
第六章对司法认知的性质、效力和作用进行了讨论。除了作用外，关于司法认知的性质和效力一直以来都争论不断，笔者对其中三类代表性学说进行了论述，分别是“非正式证明论”、“司法职能论”以及“特殊推定论”。司法认知的效力与性质密切相关，由于各位学者所持的关于司法认知的性质的观点不同，所以得出的司法认知的效力也就分为“终局性”和“初步为真”两种。立法界由于各种原因，选择了前者。司法认知具有多种作用，其中最为引人注目的就是由于省略了繁琐的正式证明程序所带来的巨大经济作用。
在最后一章，笔者在分析了我国目前关于司法认知的立法以及理论研究现状之后，提出了在我国确立司法认知体系的建议。以英美立法以及司法实践为参照，笔者从司法认知的对象、衡量标准、程序以及效力四个方面进行了司法认知体系构建。建议，将司法认知的对象分为法律和事实两类，并明确，至少在将司法认知应用到我国司法实践的初步阶段，被司法认知的事实应该“不具有争议性”或者“超出合理转移范畴”；参照美国相关法律规定，设定了两类司法认知的衡量标准；并在程序中明确了司法认知的启动方式、司法认知的审理、法庭在司法认知中的权限以及司法认知的时间；最后，笔者建议，司法认知应该具有终局性的，即在已经给当事人提供了对司法认知的适当性以及被司法认知的事项的确切含义进行审理的机会的情况下，一旦被法庭采取了司法认知，就不应该再允许对其进行反证明。
In recent years, people who are working in the academics and the jurisdictions are researching all kinds of evidence rules in order to establish a system of evidence rules. Judicial Notice has been highlighting with wide social concerns as one of traditional evidence rules in common law due to its several values. However, the research in this field in China is almost vacant because of the material not easily accessible. Under this situation, analyzing and studying the advanced theories and experiences abroad concerning legislation and legislative administration, and probing the mechanism of their judicial notice systems, are endowed with the great value in theory and practice. This is the reason that this dissertation is studying the procedures of judicial notice in England and the United States and tying to gain some beneficial insights for the perfection of our evidence rules system.
The dissertation divided into seven chapters. Chapters One to six are discussing theories, legal and practice of judicial notice in England and the U.S. Chapters seven is providing several suggestions for applying the judicial notice in our country.
Chapter one makes the definition and the origin of the term. In the common law, the definition of judicial notice seemed having the character of diversity other than uniformity. However, we will find that there are several fundamental factors that is uniform no matter what is the definition of judicial notice, that is, judicial notice is a authority of the court, there are some restrictions placed on the objects of judicial notice, and, as one of the direct results of judicial notice, the party releases, relatively or conclusively, from the bourdon of proof. To avoid the confusion, the author contrasts judicial notice with admission, presumption, ect. The maxim that what is know need not be proved, may be traced far back in the civil and the canon law. The author also illustrates a series of classical cases in the early practice according to chronology and introduces the conditions of theories about judicial notice in the early period.
Chapter two is related to the rationale of judicial notice. As the groundwork for a consideration of the nature and function of judicial notice several important premises must be observed firstly. And we found that there are some common rocks and policies about judicial notice facts and laws: first, the judge is charged with the duty of knowing the law and had knowledge what everyone knows, if he didn' t, he must acquire them. This capacity to have and acquire these knowledge is imperative for a judge; second, courts are agencies of society for the adjustment of disputes between litigants, and the judges also are responsible for the uniform of the law and to maintain any decision contrary to what is accepted as indisputable facts in that society cannot be justified.
Chapter three is stating one of the judicial notice objects-facts. The author put great emphasis on this chapter as a key part of the dissertation, because facts are the most difficult in the judicial notice field. The facts which be taken by the judge as judicial notice should be the matters of fact which are of common knowledge from accuracy sources, or are of official records. That is, judicially noticed fact must be one either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. The author introduces the concept and the difference of adjudicative' facts and legislative facts in detail, and to discuss the general tests of two kinds of facts.
Chapter four is another key part of the dissertation, discussing the second object of judicial notice-laws. In common law system, just as said, a judge has a duty to take charge with domestic law, especially public law. Thus in common law system' s traditional opinion, domestic public law and common law should be judicial noticed. But, foreign law should be proved as facts and not subject to the judicial notice. Generally, the courts of the U.S. refused to take judicial notice of the laws of other states jurisdictions because every state is an independent " country" . But now, most of states adopted that courts should also judicial notice of the law of other jurisdictions.
Chapter five is focusing on the procedure of judicial notice. According to the scope of the authorities of the courts, the procedure of judicial notice can be begun with compulsory or discretionary without request. However, if one of parties requests and furnishes the judge necessary information to enable him properly to comply with the request, the judge shall notice the matter. The parties also have been afforded reasonable opportunity to hearing and to present to the judge information to determine the propriety of judicial notice and the tenor of matter notices. In jury' s cases, the judge shall instruct the trier of the facts to accept as a fact the matter so notice or not. Now, as in the U.S., in a civil action, the court shall instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed, but in a criminal case, some agreed that it may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive, but some considered that there is no reasonable reason to deal with one topic differently. The time of taking notice is below this chapter too. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the proceeding, in concluding on appeal. The appellate tribunal is not concluded by the ruling of the trial court would seem clear, although there are some limits to the appellate courts.
Chapter six is the nature, effects and values of the judicial notice. There are three different opinions about the nature of the doctrine. One is the informality of proof; second is the exercise of the function of judicature; third is a special kind of presumption. Because the effect of the doctrine is closely related to the nature, we will find two effects: conclusive and not conclusive. The legislations widely accepted the former, at least in the civil cases. The values of judicial notice are the reason that the doctrine exists. The most received attention is the economy efficiency through avoiding unnecessary proof.
The last chapter is to state that how to set up a reasonably system of judicial notice in China. The first step of analysis is concerning legislations and practice at present, which can prove that it is necessity and feasibility to establish judicial notice in China. And then, the author takes suggestions how to establish a reasonably judicial notice system. Proposed: the rule governs judicial notice of laws and facts; a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute, at least at the beginning to apply judicial notice in China; facts shall be noticed only if they are generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the court or capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned; judicial notice can be taken by a court in discretionary or mandatory, and each party has a reasonable opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice of a matter or to the tenor of the matter to be noticed and to supply the court with the necessary information; judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the proceeding; finally, the facts be judicial noticed shall be accepted as conclusive.
引文
① 《证据法学》，卞建林主编，中国政法大学出版社 2002年，第232页。
② Bouvier' s Law Dictionary, Vol. Ⅱ, p.1734.
③ United States v. Hammers, et al. 241 Fed. 542.
④ State v. Kelly, 71 Kan. 811, 81 Pac. 450.
⑤ BLACK' S LAW DICTIONARY (eighth edition), Judicial notice. A court' s acceptance, for purposes of convenience and without requiring a party' s proof, of a well-known and indisputable fact; the court' s power to accept such a fact: the trial court took judicial notice of the fact that water freezes at 32 degrees Fahrenheit.
① Judicial Notice: n. the authority of a judge to accept as facts certain matters which are of common knowledge from sources which guarantee accuracy or are a matter of official record, without the need for evidence establishing the fact. Examples of matters given judicial notice are public and court records, tides, times of sunset and sunrise, government rainfall and temperature records, known historic events or the fact that ice melts in the sun.
② John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law (1983), §2565．(下文脚注中简称为Wigmore，Evidence)．
③ 同上。
④ 参见Wigmore，Evidence的编排体制。
⑤ John S. Strahom Jr.,The Procedure of Judicial Notice, 14 Va.L.Rev.544,1927-1928．但是笔者认为这种定义更多的倾向于概括司法认知的功能性价值。
⑥ Graham C. Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence§7, at 13 (1978); McCormick on Evidence§328, at 919-20 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984); 9 Wigmore, Evidence§2565, at 694.
① Charles V. Laughlin, in Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 195,230, 1953
② 参见江伟主编：《证据法学》，法律出版社 1999年版，第124页。
① John Smith, Criminal Evidence, London Sweet & Maxwell 1995, p57.
② 参见第六章司法认知的性质、效力和作用。
③ 《最高人民法院关于民事诉讼证据若干规定》第九条第(四)款，第(五)款。
① Isaacs, The Law and the Facts, 22 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1922).
② James FitzJames Stephen (1829-1894), A Digest of the Law of the Evidence, 1st and 2d eds, ch. ⅶ. (下面脚注中为 Stephen, Evidence.)
③ John Keeffe, ect. Sense and Nonsense about judicial notice, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 664 1949-1950.(下面脚注中为Keeffe, J.N.); James Bradley Thayer, a Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, p278, fn1, London: Sweet and Maxwell, Limited, 3, Chancery Lane. 1898. (下面脚注中为Thayer, Evidence.)
④ Thayer, p277.
① 该谚语被引用在State v．Intoxicating Liquors，73 Maine，278．
② 引用在Y B．30&31 Edw．I(R．S．)256-59，具体案件参见本章第二节。
③ 科克(Coke)法官在一起诽谤案中引用了这个谚语。Crawford v．Blisse，2 Bul．150(1613)。
④ 塞耶认为这两个谚语正好组成了完整的司法认知规则，但依据现代的定义，司法认知规则的范围还要广泛，这 也许是与法学理论的发展相关。Thayer，Evidence，p297．
⑤ Thayer, Evidence, p278, fn1.
⑥ Dr. M. I. Clear, A Handy Treatise upon the Subject of Judicial Notice, 1 Marq. L. Rev. 106 1916-1917.
① 这些案件按时间顺序排列，这些案件中大部分包括塞耶、霍尔茨沃思等学者在论述司法认知的历史渊源时均有提及。
② Y.B. 30, 31 Ed. I. (R.S.) 256-259.
③ Thayer, Evidence, p280; Holdsworth, History, p 135.
④ Y.B. 7 Ed. Ⅲ. 4, 7.
⑤ Y.B. 35 Hy. Ⅵ. Mich. P1.35.
① Y.B. 27 H.Ⅷ., 27, 12.
② Partridge v. Strange, Plow. 77, 83-84.
① Marriot v. Pascall, 1 Leon. 159.
② Hewet v. Painter, 1 Bul. 174.
① Rolle' s Ab Court C. 6, 7.
② White v. Brough, 1 Rolle, 286.
③ Harvey v. Broad, 6 Mod. 159
① 2 Ventris,28
② 参见prof．Maitland’s，Slander in the Middle Age(中世纪的诽谤案)，in the Green Bag，ⅱ．4(January，1890)．
③ White v.Brough,1 Rolle,286.
④ 边沁是英国著名的哲学家，同时也是英国著名的证据学家。边沁着手撰写他著名的证据法学著作《司法证明的理论基础》是在十九世纪初叶，在英美证据法的发展史上这一时期仍然处在法官创造证据规则、学者对证据规则进行系统化研究和论述的早期阶段。边沁面临的现实是：法官造法频繁、大多数法律相对较新或者是新近才被承认具有法律效力、证据法相当支离破碎并充满了为应付不同时期不同形势所需要的各种例外、界限区分以及含糊的技术性。在这样的历史背景下，边沁开始了对证据规则和证据法学理论的研究，构建他的证据法学理论体系。
① 其他三种分别是：(1)对判决所涉及事实的观点的依据是法官自己获得的，而没有任何作为证人的其他人向他提供任何信息。证人和法官的职能和角色由同一个人行使和担当：没有宣誓作证的证人，既没有必要也没有空间让证人出庭；(2)对立双方没有任何人以宣誓证人的方式出庭，但是判决的依据是由双方当事人作出的对事实的明示或暗示地承认；(3)已经由一方当事人宣誓证明的事实，该证言被认为是可以相信的，而这些事实原本需要建立在证据之上；形成否定这些事实的判决的依据仅仅只能是不太可能发生的事。参见Jeremy Bentham，Rationale of Judicial Evidence，1827．
② Thomas Starkie, A Practical Treatise of the Law of Evidence and Digest of Proofs in Civil and Criminal Proceedings, (3d edition. London, 1842.), p400 v.Ⅱ.
③ Stephen, Evidence, p26.
④ W. P. Wade, Judicial Notice of Facts, 5 S. L. Rev. n.s. 214, 1879-1880.
① W. P. Wade, Judicial Notice of Facts, 5 S. L. Rev. n.s. 214, 1879-1880.
② 同上。
① W. P. Wade, Judicial Notice of Facts, 5 S. L. Rev. n.s. 214, 1879-1880.
② Thayer, Evidence, p278, fn1; Judicial Notice and The Law of Evidence, 7 Harvard L. Rev. 286 (1890), p288, fn1.
③ 同上。
④ 关于司法认知的性质参见第六章第一节司法认知的性质。
⑤ 同上。
⑥ Wigmore, Evidence, §2565, p694.
① Edmund M. Morgan, Judicial Notice, Harv. L. Rev. Vol. LVII, Jun. 1944 No.3, p270. (下面脚注中为Morgan,J.N.)
② 转引自McCormick on Evidence, Fifth Edition, by John W. Strong, General Editor, West Group ST. PAUL, MINN.,1999, p491. (下面简称为McCormick, Evidence.)
① Kenneth Culp Davis, A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience, p69, Perspectives of Law, Essays for Austin Wakeman Scott, Edited by Roscoe Pound ect., Little, Brown and Boston. Toronto, 1964. (下面脚注中简称为Davis, J.N. 1964)
② Morgan, J.N., 1944, p270.
① Thayer, Evidence, p277.
② 183 Va. 182,188, 31 S.E.2d 571,573 (1944).
① Morgan, J.N., 1944, p273.
① Thayer, Evidence, p278, fn1.
① Deybel's, 4 B.&AId. 243; Bumev. Thompson, 2 Q.B. 789.
② 8 C. & P. 103, at Nisi Prius.
③ Christian，1 Bl．Com．12th ed．74n．另外，如在Ford v．Hopkins(1 Salk，289．)案中，首席大法官霍尔特(Holt)说：“交易的方式和方法应该被认知”。
① Wikel v.Board, 120 N.C. 451, 27 S.E. 117 (1897).
② Douglass v. Kanawha & M.R. Co., 44 W. Va. 267, 28 S.E. 705 (1897).
① 69 Minn. 353,377, 72 N.W. 713, 716 (1897).
② 2 C. & P.223,225 (1825).
③ Udderzook v. Commonwealth, 76 Pa. 340 (1874).
① Code of the Rules of Evidence in Trials at Law (1942) 534.
② John S. Strahorn Jr., The Process of Judicial Notice, 14 Va. L. Rev. 544, 1927-1928.(下面脚注中为Strahorn，J．N．)
① 参见第二章司法认知的理论基础。
② Thayer, Evidence, p278.
③ Wynehamer v. The People, 13 N.Y. 378, 387(1855), per Comstock, J.
① Beebe v. The State, 6Ind. 510, 519(1855).
② 麦克德莫特(F McDermott)认为，从字面上理解“众所周知”就是意味着“只能对傻瓜都知道的事实才能进行司法认知”，而这是很荒谬的。但是他提出的这种异议并没有阻止法院继续使用“众所周知”之类的措辞。如“法庭被推定知道每个人都知道的事实，类似的事实应该被司法认知”(Layne v．Tribune Co．，146 so 234，237(Fla．1933)．)，“一般而言，法庭可以司法认知众所周知的事实”(Re Buszta’s Estate，186 N．Y．S．2d 192，193(Surr．1959))等。参见McCormick，Evidence，p493，
③ Johnson v. Cooper, 379 S.W.2d 396, 399 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1964, no writ).
④ Harper v. Killion, 345 S.W.2d 309, 311(Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana), aff' d 162 Tex. 481,348 S.W.2d 521 (1961).
① Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294, 305-06(Ky. 1987)
② State v. Armendariz, 449 N.W.2d 555, 558(Neb. 1989)
③ Apostolic Church v. American Honda Motor Co., 833 S.W.2d 553,555-56 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1992, writ requested)
① Judicial Notice, Commentary by Murl A. Larkin, 1993 Update by Cathleen C. Herasimchuk, 30 Hous. L. Rev. 193-239, 1993-1994, p 204. (下面简称为Larkin, J.N.)
① Briffitt v. The State, 58 Wis. 39.
② 180 Cal. 338, 341,181 P. 223,224 (1919).
① 612 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1981).
① McCormick, Evidence,§330, p496.
② Price v. Page, 24 Mo. 64.
③ Neaderhouser v. The State, 28 Ind. 257.
④ Corn. v. King, 150 Mass. 221.
⑤ Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray, 417, 424.
⑥ Strahorn, J.N. p545-7.
① Charles V. Laughlin, Judicial Notice, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 365-389, 1955-1956, p377.
② 72 Minn．200，75 N．W．210，215(1898)，，该案因为其他理由被推翻(179 U．S 223(190(1))。
③ 379 S.W.2d 396, 399(Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worty 1964, no writ)
④ 第一次工业革命发生于18世纪下半叶，发源于英国的工业革命，是世界上人类使用铁器后的第一次技术革命，以蒸汽机的广泛运用为主要标志。19世纪70年代起，发生了第二次技术革命，以电力的广泛运用为主要标志。
① 我们将专门讨论关于科技类事实的司法认知。
① 757 S.W.2d 909, 911 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1988, no writ).
② 26 Wis. 2d 366, 132 N.W.2d 565 (1965).
① 776 F.2d 797, 801-02 (9th Cir. 1985).
② 542 F.2d 246, 248 n.1 (5th Cir. 1976).
③ 570 ESupp.189, 197 n.11 (D.V.I. 1983).
④ 614 F.Supp.500, 504 n.4(W.D.N.Y. 1985).
⑤ 739 S.W.2d 409 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, pet. Ref' d).
① Larkin, J.N..
② 796 S.W.2d 695,696 (Tex. 1990).
③ 795 S.W.2d 775,776-77 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ).
④ 702 S.W.2d 760, 773 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
① 666 F.2d 235,237 (5th Cir. 1982).
② 748 S.W.2d 629, 630-31 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1988, no pet.).
③ 693 S.W.2d 638, 639 (Tex. App. —Houston [14th Dist.]1985, no writ).
① 739 S.W.2d 652, 656 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1987, pet. Ref' d).
② 762 E2d 454 (5th Cir. 1985).
③ Florida: Florida Statutes (1978) §90.202.
④ 500 S.W.2d 474, 475 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973)
① Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
② 745 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no pet.)
③ 由于司法认知事实的确定性与司法认知的效力密切相关，所以我们在本节不做展开论述，只对存在的学说以及现行立法进行一些较简单的介绍，目的是配合“司法认知的衡量标准”作一些相对必要的补充，更为详细的论述见第六章“司法认知的性质、效力和作用”。
④ Utah Constr. Co. v. Berg, 205 P.2d 367, 370 (Ariz. 1949); Varcoe v. Lee, 181 P. 223, 227(Cal. 1919).
① Strahorn, J.N.
② Johnson v. Cooper, 379 S.W.2d 396, 399 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1964, no writ).
③ Harper v. Killion, 345 S.W.2d 309, 311 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana), aff' d 162 Tex. 481,348 S.W.2d 521(1961).
① Thayer, Evidence.
① McCormick, Judicial Notice, 5 Vand. L. Rev., 1952.
② John Keeffe, William B. Landis, Jr., and Robert B. Shaad, Sense and nonsense about judicial notice, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 664-690, 1950. (下面简称为Keeffe, J.N.)
① Montana: Mont. R. Evid. 201 (1977), Advisor' s note.
② Larkin, J.N.
① Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 364, 402(1942)(下文简称为Davis，Approach，1942．)
① Kenneth Culp Davis, Official Notice, 62 Harv. L. Rev. p549 (1949).(下文简称为Davis，1949．)
② Morgan & Maguire, Evidence 36(3d ed. 1951).
③ 见麦考密克论证据，第687-712，1954年，英文版。
④ Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 Colum. L. Rev, 945,984, (1955).(下文简称为Davis，1955．)
⑤ Davis, 1955, p945, note 2.
① Davis, 1955, p952-3.
① Davis, 1955, p952.
① Davis, Approach, 1942, p407.
① 264U.S. 504 (1924).
① Lewis v. Rucker, 2 Burr. 1167, 1171, 97 Eng. Rep. 769, 772 (K. B. 1761).
② R．S．C．Ord．55，r．19，摘录自1852年的《衡平法院法》。
③ Wisconsin Ornamental Iron & Bronze Co. v. Tax Commission, 202 Wis. 355, 371,229 N. W. 646, 233 N. W. 72 75 (1930) (rehearing).
① Durham v. United States, 214 E2d 862 (D.C.Cir. 1954).
① Southern Class Rate Investigation, 100 I. C. 513, 603 (1925).
② H. W. Joynes v. Pennsylvania R. R., 17 I.C.C. 361,366 (1909).
① 参见第五章司法认知程序。
② 参见本章第六节立法性事实的司法认知。
① 149 Mass 68, per Knowlton, J.
② 91 U.S. 37.
③ 23 No. East. Rep. 9(Dec. 1889).
① McCormick, Evidence, §329.
① Radcliffe College v. City of Cambridge, Mass., 215 N.E.2d 892, 895 (1966).
② Richardson v. Wendel, 401 S.W.2d 455,458 (Mo. 1966).
③ Deybel' s, 4 B.&Ald. 243; Bumev. Thompson, 2 Q.B. 789.
④ 参见第六章第二节第六“英国学术界以及司法实践中的司法认知效力”中所举的Clinton v．Lyons & Co．，Ltd．，3 K．B．198(1912)，at pp．202，211，D．C．
⑤ 253 F.Supp. 251,255 (D.C.Ore. 1966).
① 234 P.2d 600, 603 (Utah 1951).
① 358 U.S. 74,79 S.Ct. 136, 3 L.Ed.2d 125 (1958).
① Larkin, J.N.
② North Dakota: N.D.R. Evid. 201 (1977) (like U.R.E.), Advisor' s Note.
③ Wisconsin: Wis. Stat.§902.01 (1975)(like U.R.E.), Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1974.
① 听证的相关内容参见第五章司法认知的程序。
② Montana: Mont. R. Evid. 201 (1977).
③ Michigan: Michigan Rules of Evidence (1978)Rule 201.
① Cleary, Foreword [to Symposium on Proposed Federal Rules of Evidencel, 1969 Law & the Social Order (now Ariz. St. L. J.)509-510. Copyright(?)1969 by Arizona State Law Journal. Reprinted by permission.
② McCormick, Evidence, §334.
③ 同上。
① McCormick, Evidence,§334.
② Idaho: Idaho Code (1979)§9-101.
③ Idaho: Idaho R. Civ. Proc. 44(d) (1979).
④ 357 E3d 119 (1st Cir. 2004).
⑤ 729 S.W.2d 723, 728 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
① 265 S.W.2d 261,267(Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1954, writ ref' d.).
② 767 S.W.2d 789, 798-800 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
③ 732 S.W.2d 306, 310-11 (Tex. 1987).
④ 529N.W.2d 155 (N.D. 1995).
⑤ 318 Or. 551,871 P.2d 106 (1994).
① 145 F.2d 27, 28 (D.C.Cir. 1944).
① 167 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1948).
② 396 U.S. 398,407 (1970).
③ 477 U.S. 399, 407-10 (1986).
④ 428 U.S. 153, 168-87 (1976).
⑤ Jack B. Weinston.
⑥ 491 U.S. 223,230(1990),
① Wisconsin:Wis.Stat.§902.01(1975)(like U.R.E.), Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1974.
① 10 Cl. & Fin. 198, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843)
② 291 U.S. 272, 283 (1934).
① Untied Stated ex rel. Yokinen v. Commissioner, 57 E2d 707 (2d Cir. 1932).
② Strecker v. Kessler, 95 F.2d 976, 978 (5th Cir. 1938).
③ Strecker v. Kessler, 95 F.2d 976, 978 (5th Cir. 1938).
④ 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
⑤ 同上。
① Davis, 1955.
② 341 U.S. 494, 498 (1951).
③ Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
④ Albertson v. Millard, 106 E Supp. 635, 642-43 (E.D.Mich. 1952).
⑤ Sweet v. United States, 211 F.2d 118, 120 (6th Cir. 1954).
① Appeal of Albert, 372 Pa. 13, 20-21, 92 A.2d 663 (1952).
② Spector v. United States, 193 F.2d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 1952).
① 比较United States v. Gould, 536 F.2d 216 (8th Cir. 1976)与United States v. Jones, 580 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1978).
② McCormick, Evidence, §328.
③ Bitterman, the Evaluation of Psychological Propositions, in Levin, Evidence and the Behavioral Sciences Ⅲ-A-16(mimeo. 1956).
① Com. v. Peckham, 2 Gray, 514.
② Head v. Hargrave, 105 U.S. 45.
① Bradford v. Cunard Co., 147 Mass. 55.
② 虽然陪审团在审理案件的过程中允许考虑常识类事项，但是，在司法实践中，许多司法管辖区主张，为了防止误导陪审员并不鼓励这种做法。德州就是其中之一。在Gillette Motor Transp．Co．v．Whitfield~②案中，法庭就主张，陪审团在评议时可以考虑常识性事项，但是最好不要指示陪审员考虑常识，因为这样的指示也许会让他们觉得困惑。
③ 4 M & S. 532.
④ 《麦考密克证据法手册》第329节，p762，Edward W．Cleary编，1972年第二版。
⑤ R.T.K., Annotation, Propriety of Instructions on Matters of Common Knowledge, 144 A.L.R. 932-933 (1943).
⑥ Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Woods, 167 S.W.2d 869, 871(Ark. 1943).
⑦ 71 Tex. 274, 279, 8 S.W. 679, 680 (1888).
⑧ 415 S.W.2d 489, 501 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1967,writ ref' d n.r.e
⑨ 277 S.W.2d 733, 735-36 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1955, no writ).
① 197 S.W.2d 157, 162(Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1946), aff' d on other grounds, 145 Tex. 571,200 S.W.2d 624(1947).
② 69 S.W.2d 228, 230 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1934, Writ dism' d). Thayer, Evidence, p280.
③ 732 S.W.2d 306, 311 (Tex. 1987).
① 160 Tex. 542, 546-47, 334 S.W.2d 283,286-87(1960).
② 307 S.W.2d 284, 288-89 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston 1957, no writ).
① 参见9wigmoer，§§2574-2577．
② 参见第四章司法认知对象之二法律。
③ 28 State Trials, 616 (1803).
① 576 N.W.2d 886 (S.D. 1998).
② Deybel's Case, 4 B. & Aid. 242, 246 (1821).
③ Cooke v. Wilson, 1 C.B.n.s. 153 (1856).
④ Young v. Califomia St. Bd., 273 F. 30 (9th Cir. 1921).
⑤ 89 Okla. Cr. 383, 388, 208 P.2d 584, 588 (1949).
⑥ 180 Cal．338，341，181 P．223，224(1919)．参见第三章第四节司法认知事实的衡量标准中关于该案的详细介绍。
① 参见约翰·W·斯特龙主编，汤维建等译，《麦考密克论证据》，中国政法大学出版社2003年版，第30页。
② 转引自乔恩·R·华尔兹著，《刑事证据大全》，何家弘等译，中国人民公安大学出版社1993年版，第323页。
① 25 Mich. 274 (1872).
② John Keeffe, William B. Landis, Jr., and Robert B. Shaad, Sense and nonsense about judicial notice, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 664-690, 1950.
① Beardsley v. Irving, 81 Conn. 489, 71 Atl. 580 (1908).
① 《联邦高等法院判例汇编》第293册，第1013页，哥伦比亚特区巡回法庭，1923年。参见《麦考密克论证据》第395页。
① 《美国联邦最高法院判例汇编》第509册，第579页，1993年。
② 62 S.D. 123,252 N.W. 7 (1933).
③ 62 S.D. at 136-37,252 N.W. at 12.
① 64 S.D. 309, 266 N.W. 667 (1936).
① 参见McCormick, Evidence, p497.
② 参见McCormick, Evidence, p308.
① 337 U.S. 241,246-47, 250 (1949).
① Davis, 1955, p963.
① Wyzanski, ATrial Judge' s Freedom and Responsibility, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1291-92 (1952).
① United State ex rel. Matranga v. Mackey, 115F.Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
② 180 F.2d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 1950).
③ 206 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1953).
④ 344 U.S. 344 (1953).
⑤ 148 F.2d 416, 446 (2d Cir. 1945).
① John T. McNaughton, Judicial Notice—Excerpts Relating to the Morgan-Wigmore Controversy;14 Vand. L. Rev. 779-805, 1960-1961.
② John T. McNaughton, Judicial Notice—Excerpts Relating to the Mergan-Wigmore Controversy,14 Vand. L. Rev.779-805, 1960-1961.
③ The Limits of Judicial Notice, by G D. Nokes, 59-75, the Law Quarterly Review, vol. 74 Jan. 1958.
① England, Brandao v. Barnett, (1846) 12 Cl. & F. 787.
② Edelstein v. Schuler & Co. (1902) 2 K. B. 144.
③ Parte Wallace, (1902) 2 K. B. 488, C. A.
④ Ex parte Powell (1875) 1 Ch. D. 501, C. A.
⑤ Blacquiere v. Hawkins (1780) 1 Doug. 378.
① Professor Sir John Smith, Criminal Evidence, London Sweet & Maxwell 1995, p54.
② 2 East 469, 103 Eng. Rep. 448 (1802).
③ McCormick, Evidence, p504.
① 5 S. L. Rev. n.s. 214, 1979-1880.
② Thayer, Evidence, p299.
③ Code of the Rules.of Evidence in Trials at Law (1942) 534.
④ G. D. Nokes, the Limits of Judicial Notice, the Law Quarterly Review 1958.
① Partridge v. Strange, Plow. 77, 83-84.
① Evidence Act, 1851, s14.
② Carter v. Cleypoole (1591) Moore K.B. 593.
③ (1829) M. & M. 416.
④ Interpretation Act, 1850, s.7.
① (1828) 7 B. & C. 783.
② Evidence Act, 1845, s2.
③ Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925, s224.
④ Companies Act, 1948, s.347.
① 205 Md. 274, 279, 107 A.2d 88, 90 (1954).
② Federal Farm Mort. Corp. v. Hughes, 137 Neb. 454, 289 N.W. 866, 869 (1940).
③ Regional Ag. Cred. Corp. v. Stewart, 69 N.D. 694, 698, 289 N.W. 801,803 (1940).
④ Ginter v. Ginter, 63 N.W.2d 394, 398 (N.D. 1954).
① 145 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1944).
② Great American Ins. Co. v. Glenwood Irrigation Co., 265 Fed. 594 (8th Cir. 1920).
③ 28 U.S.C.§§1738-39 (1948).
④ 138 F.2d 641 (2d Cir. 1943), rev' d per curiam, 322 U.S. 709 (1944).
① 182 Misx．328，45 N．Y．S．2d 251(Sup．Ct．1943)．参见第三节中该案的详细介绍。
② Baltimore & Ohio R.R.v. Reaux, 59 F. Supp. 969, 973 (N.D. Ohio 1945).
① 54 F. Supp. 926, 927 (S.D. Cal. 1944).
② 177 F. Supp. 588 (D.N.J. 1959).
③ 181 F. Supp. 361 (N.D. Ohio 1960).
④ Bear Brothers, Inc. v. Trammell, 279 Ala. 194, 197, 183 So.2d 790, 793 (1966).
⑤ Walker v. Moss, 246 N.C. 196, 197, 97 S.E.2d 836, 837 (1957).
① South Carolina: S.C.C. §15-13-750 (1976).
② Utah: Utah R. Civ. Proc. §9(ⅰ) (1977).
③ 86 Cal. App. 2d 596, 622, 195 P.2d 501,518 (2d Dist. 1948).
① Alaska: Alaska R. Civ. Proc. §43(a)(2)[a] (1978).
② Robertson v. City of Birmingham, 28 Ala. App. 393,394, 185 So. 190 (1938).
③ New Hampshire: Walsh v. Public Serv. Co., 92 N.H. 331, 334, 30 A.2d 494, 496 (1943).
④ Oklahoma: Firemen's Relief& Pension Bd. v. Lucas, 189 Okla. 328, 117 P.2d 112 (1941).
⑤ Puerto Rico: Matos v. Porto Rico Railway, Light & Power Co., 58 RR. 162 (1941).
① North Carolina: Wilson v. Kennedy, 248 N.C. 74, 79, 102 S.E.2d 459, 463 (1958).
② High Point Surplus Co. v. Pleasants, 263 N.C. 587,592, 139 S.E.2d 892, 896 (1965).
③ 291 Mich. 254, 289 N.W. 151 (1939).
④ Florida: Florida Statutes (1978)§90.202.
⑤ 200 Neb. 553, 556, 264 N.W.2d 434, 435 (1978).
① Succession of Scardino, 215 La. 472, 40 So.2d 923 (1949).
② 160 Tenn. 208, 215, 22 S.W.2d 356, 358 (1929).
③ Sheard v. Green, 219 La. 199, 52 So.2d 714 (1951).
④ Kentucky: Orendorfv. Hunt, 272 Ky. 334, 114 S.W.2d 86 (1938).
⑤ Allen v. Commonwealth, 272 Ky. 533, 114 S.W.2d 757(1938).
⑥ Collins v. Collins, 160 Fla. 732, 36 So.2d 417 (1948)
⑦ Perkins v. Perkins, 237 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1951, no writ).
① Michigan Rules of Evidence (1979) Rule 202.
② Arkansas: Ark. Stat. §28-109 (1962 replacement).
③ Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. §§52-163, 52-164 (1960).
④ Iowa: Iowa R. Civ. P.94 (1963).
⑤ Ohio R. Civ. Proc. 44.1 (1970).
① Idaho: Idaho R. Civ. Proc. 44(d) (1979).
② 144 Me. 263,278, 68 A.2d 241,251 (1949).
③ Plaster v. State, 567 S.W.2d 500, 502(Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978).
④ 650 S.W.2d 827, 836-37 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
⑤ 449 S.W.2d 458, 465 n.2 (Tex. 1969).
① Daugherty v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 772 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex. 1989).
② 721 S.W.2d 493,494 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no pet.).
③ 735 S.W.2d 522, 530 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1987, pet. ref' d).
④ Wigmore, Evidence, §2572.
⑤ New Hampshire: Walsh v. Public Serv. Co., 92 N.H. 331,334, 30 A.2d 494, 496 (1943).
① Morgan, J.N., p269.
② Charles Edward Suffling, Judicial Notice, 48 Miss. L.J. 919-934 1977.
③ Charles Edward Suffiing, Judicial Notice, 48 Miss. L.J. 919-934 1977.
④ M.C.L.A. §600.2114a.
① Boyd v. Geary, 126 Conn, 396, 12 A.(2d.) 644 (1940),
① Great American Ins. Co. v. Glenwood Irrigation Co., 265 Fed. 594, 597 (C.C.A. 8th, 1920).
48 Ohio St. 623, 30N.E 69 (1891).
① 222 U．S．473(1912)．Cuba R．R．V．Crosby案件一样。在这个案件中，一位铁路雇员在古巴操作机械时受伤，而这个机械存有缺陷的情况雇主是知道的。但是法庭却做出了一个“非正义”的判决，由此经常遭受批评。这种批评在许多罗马法系法律系统中也许并不能被证实为正当，因为在许多罗马法系法律系统中，雇员没有权利提起反对雇主的侵权诉讼does not have a cause of action in tort against his employer——这项原则Holmes法官很熟悉。
② Moe v. Shaffer, 150 Minn. 114, 184 N.W. 785 (1921).
① William B. Stem, Foreign Law in the Courts: Judicial Notice and Proof, 45 Cal. L. Rev. 23 1957.
② 9 Wigmore, Evidence§2558.
① Estate of Peters, 110 Cal. App. 2d 723, 244 P.2d 88 (1952).
② Estate of Arbulich, 41 Cal. 2d 86, 257 P.2d 433 (1953).
③ Estate of Schluttig, 36 Cal. 2d 416, 224 P.2d 695 (1950).
④ Henderson v. Drake, 118 Cal. App. 2d 777, 258 P.2d 879 (1953).
⑤ Estate of Leefers, 127 Cal. App. 2d 550,274 P.2d (1954).
⑥ McKenzie & Sarabia, the Pleading and Proof of Alien Law, 30 Tul. L. Rev. 353, 356 (1956).
① the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 44.1.
② M.C.L.A. §600.2114a.
① The Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act§5.
② People v. Tufts, 167 Cal. 266, 270, 139 Pac. 78, 80 (1914).
③ Electric Welding Co. v. Prince, 200 Mass. 386, 86 N.E. 947 (1909).
① 164 East Seventy-Second Street Corp. v. Ismay, 65 Cal. App. 2d 574, 151 P.2d 29 (1944).
② 144 Me. 263, 278, 68 A.2d 241, 251 (1949).
③ William B. Stern, 1957.
④ 254 N.Y. 488, 173 N.E. 835 (1930).
⑤ Keeffe, J.N.
① Nussbaum, 1941.
② 27, 177 S,W.2d 360 (1943).
③ Christ v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. 593, 296 Pac. 612 (1931).
④ Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 55 Cal. App.2d 720, 132 P.2d 70 (1st Dist. 1942).
⑤ Chambco, a Div. of Chamberlin Waterproofing & Roofing,Inc. v. Urban Masonry Co., 338 Md. 417, 659 A.2d 297 (1995).
⑥ 如, Rediker v, Rediker, 35 Cal. 2d 769, 221 P.2d 1 (1951).
⑦ Christ v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. 593,296 Pac. 612 (1931).
⑧ McCormick, Evidence.
⑨ Kales, Presumption of the Foreign Law, 19 Harv. L. Rev,. 401,407 (1906).
① 9 Wigmore, Evidence §2536.
② Murphy v. Murphy, 145 Cal. 482, 78 Pac. 1053 (1904).
③ Leafy v. Gledhill, 8 N.J. 260, 84 A.2d 725 (1951).
④ Nussbaum, the Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 Yale L. J. 1018, 1041 (1941).
⑤ William B. Stern, 1957.
⑥ William B. Stern, 1957.
⑦ Nussbaum, the Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 Yale L. J. 1018, 1041 (1941).
① 123 Cal. App, 2d 406, 266 E2d 910 (1954).
② Ryan v. North Alaska Salmon Co., 153 Cal. 438, 95 Pac. 862 (1908); Klaffki v. Kaufman, 52 Cal. App. 48 198 Pac. 36 (1921).
③ Cal. Prob. Code §§259-59.2.
④ Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1956).
⑤ 144 Me. 263, 278, 68 A.2d 241,251 (1949).
⑥ Wachtell, Proof of Foreign Law in American Courts, 69 U.S.L.Rev. 526, 580, 581 (1935).
⑦ Kales, Presumption of the Foreign Law, 19 Harv. L. Rev. 401 (1906).
① Story, Conflict of Laws §§641-42 (1834).
② William B. Stern, Foreign Lawin the Courts: Judicial Notice and Proof, 45 Cal. L. Rev. 23 1957
③ 同上。
④ 同上。
⑤ Cal. Code Civ. Proc.§§1900, 1901, 1918 (4).
① M.C.L.A. § 600.2118a(3)
② Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §1900.
③ William B. Stem, Foreign Law in the Courts: Judicial Notice and Proof, 45 Cal. L. Rev. 23 1957.
④ Cal. Const. Art. 4, §24.
⑤ William B. Stern, Foreign Law in the Courts: Judicial Notice and Proof, 45 Cal. L. Rev. 23 1957.
① Gutteridge, Comparative Law 49 (2d ed. 1949).
② William B. Stern, Foreign Law in the Courts: Judicial Notice and Proof, 45 Cal. L. Rev. 23 1957, note 69.
③ William B. Stern, 1957.
④ McKenzie & Sarabia, the Pleading and Proof of Alien Law, 30 Tul. L. Rev. 353, 367 (1956).
⑤ William B. Stem, 1957.
⑥ Szladits, Notes on Translations of Foreign Civil and Commercial Codes, 3 Am. J. Como. L. 67(1954).
① Model Expert Testimony Act §6 (1951).
② Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §1902.
① Cal. Code Civ. Proc.§1900.
② 6 Wigmore, Evidence §1703.
③ 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1697
④ Estate of Leefers, 127 Cal. App. 2d 550,274 P.2d (1954).
⑤ 136 Cal. App. 2d 615, 289 P.2d 53 (1955).
⑥ 127 Cal. App. 2d 550, 274 P. 2d 239 (1954).
① N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §344-a(C)
② 13 Halsbury, Laws of England 615 (2d ed. 1934).
③ Gutteridge, Comparative Law 49 (2d ed. 1949).
④ 136 Cal. App. 2d 615, 289 P.2d 53 (1955).
⑤ 65Cal. App. 2d 232, 150 P. 2d 567 (1944).
① 4 Wigmore, Evidence §1271.
② 36 Cal. 2d416, 224 P.2d 695 (1950).
③ William B. Stern, 1957.
① William B. Stern, 1957.
② 74 Semanario Judicial de la Federacion, 5 Epoca 6050 (1942).
③ William B. Stem, 1957.
④ 13 Halsbury, Laws of England 615 (2d ed. 1934).
⑤ 2 Wigmore, Evidence §564.
① Estate of Leefers, 127 Cal. App. 2d 550,274 P.2d (1954).
② Cal. Code Civ. Proc, § 1875(3),§ 1902.
① The Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act§5.
② United States v. Uhl, 137 F.2d 858, 86l (2d Cir. 1943).
③ Tsangarakis v. Panama S.S. Co., 197 F. Supp. 704, 705 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
④ Ohm v. San Francisco, 92 Cal. 437, 28 Pac. 580 (1891); Payne & Dewey v. Treadwell, 16 Cal. 220 (1860); Holliday v. West 6 Cal. 519 (1856).
⑤ Estate of Kennedy, 106 Cal. App. 2d 612, 235 R2d 837 (1951).
⑥ Sommerich & Busch, The Expert Witness and the Proof of Foreign Law, 38 Cornell L. Q. 125, 154 (1953).
⑦ 8 Beav. 527, 50 Eng. Rep. 207 (Ch. 1845).
① 104 Cal. 407, 38 Pac. 89 (1894).
① 参考William B. Stern, 1957; Sommerich & Busch, (1953)等。
② 同上。
① Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §1871.
② William B. Stern, 1957.
③ Michigan Rules of Evidence (1979).
① Calif. Law Revision Commission, Judicial Notice of the Law of Foreign Countries (1957).
② Pennsylvania Life Insurance Co v. Simoni, 641 N.W.2d 807 (Iowa 2002).
③ N.Y.Leg. Doc., 1943, No. 20, pp.267-303.
④ Walton v. Arabian American Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1956).
⑤ 244 App. Div. 814, 279 N.Y.Supp. 553 (2d Dept. 1935), aft' d, 272 N.Y. 165, 5 N.E.2d 185 (1936).
① 182 Misx. 328, 45 N.Y.S.2d 251 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
① 194 Misc. 308, 86 N.Y.S.2d 232 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
② John Keeffe, William B. Landis, Jr., and Robert B. Shaad, Sense and nonsense about judicial notice, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 664-690, 1950.
③ 9 N.Y. Judicial Council Rep. 271,282 (1934).
④ 182 Misc. 328, 331, 45 N.Y.S.2d 251,253 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
① the Uniform Act. Md. Ann. Code Gen. Laws art. 35, §56 (1939).
② 164 East 72nd Street Corp. v. Ismay, 65 Cal. App. 2d 574, 151 P.2d 29 (4th Dist. 1944).
③ Man. Rev. Stat. c. E150§§31-32(2) (1970)
① Nussbaum, the Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 Yale L. J. 1018, 1041 (1941).
② Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 1(1801).
③ 336 U.S. 386, 396 (1949).
④ Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397; Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Cranch 1, 38; The Scotia, 14 Wall. 170, 188.
⑤ 66 N.M. 64, 343 P.2d 654 (1958).
⑥ 70 P.R. 475,481 (1949).
① 9 Wigmore, Evidence, p767-8.
② M.C.L.A.§600.2114a
① 见Michigan: Michigan Rules of Evidence (1979) Rule 202等。
② Tex. R. Evid. 202 and 203 (1984)
③ Montana: Mont. R. Evid. 202 (1977).
① M.C.L.A.§600.2114a.
② Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1969) Rule 44.1
③ Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.1 (as amended 1972)
① John S. Strahom Jr., Process of Judicial Notice, 14 Va. L. Rev. 544 1927-1928.
① Larkin, J.N.
① 1 Roy R. Ray, Texas Law of Evidence: Civil and Criminal, §153 at 197.
② 328 S.W.2d 823 824 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1959).
③ 1 Roy R. Ray, Texas Law of Evidence: Civil and Criminal, §153 at 197.
④ 546 S.W.2d 306, 310 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
⑤ 498 S.W.2d 708,711 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1973).
① 757 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1988, no writ).
② 807 S.W.2d 635, 638 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no pet.).
① 21 Charles A. Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure §5107, at 510 (1977).
② 762 F.2d 454 (5th Cir. 1985).
① I David W. Louisell & Christopher B. Mueller, Federal Evidence §58, at 454.
② 162 Tex. 481,485, 384 S.W.2d 521,523 (Tex. 1961).
③ Government of Canal Zone v. Burjan, 596 E2d 690, 694 (5th Cir. 1979).
④ Judicial Notice, Commentary by Murl A. Larkin, 1993 Update by Cathleen C. Herasimchuk, 30 Hous. L. Rev. 193 1993-1994.
⑤ 78 Cal.App.2d 124, 130,144 Cal.Rptr. 95, 98 (1978).
① 783 S.W.2d 648, 653 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989).
② 763 S.W.2d 864, 867 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1988, no writ).
③ 739 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1987, no writ).
④ Idaho: Idaho R. Civ. Proc. 44(d) (1979).
① 301 U.S. 292, 302-03 (1937).
② 490A.2d 68, 70-71 (Conn. 1985).
① I Jace B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence Ⅱ 201[05], at 201-51-52, (1990).
② 同上, at201-53-54.
③ 1 Ray,§152, at 195.
① 498 S.W.2d 708,711-12 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1973, no writ).
② 760 F.2d 580, 587 (5th Cir. 1985).
① 498 S.W.2d 708, 711-12 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1973, no writ).
② Higginbotham v. General Life & Accident Ins. Co., 796 S.W.2d 695,696 (Tex. 1990).
③ 740 S.W.2d 37, 38 (Tex. App.—E1 Paso 1987).
④ 846 F.2d 274, 276-77 (5th Cir, 1988).
① 571 So. 2d 926, 928-29 (Miss. 1990).
① Minnesota: Minn. R. Evid. 201 (1977)Advisers; Note.
② 参见本章第一节相关讨论。
③ 612 S.W.2d 503,506 (Tex. 1981).
① 113 Cal. 618, 626, 45 P. 860, 862 (1896).
① 被司法认知的事实是否应该局限于“不具有争议”的事实的相关讨论见“司法认知事实的确定性之争”以及“司法认知的效力”。
② 见U.S. Const. Amends. Ⅵ, Ⅶ.
③ 参见Kohn v. Untied States, 91 U.S. 367 (1876).
④ 参见Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 176, 288 (1930).
⑤ United States v. Standard Oil Co., 24 F.Supp. 575 (W.D.Wis. 1938), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
① the Advisory Committee's Note is from the 1969 Preliminary Draft, 46 F.R.D. 161,204.
② the Report of House Committee on the Judiciary.
① 840 F.2d 315, 322-23 (6th Cir. 1988).
② 816 F.2d 426, 428(8th Cir. 1987).
③ Minnesota: Minn. R. Evid. 201 (1977).
④ Montana: Mont. R. Evid. 201 (1977), Adviser' s Note.
⑤ R.C.M.1947, Section 93-2501-2.
⑥ 56 Mont. 230, 236, 182 P. 270 (1919).
① 122 Mon. 279, 282, 202 P.2d 245 (1949).
② 130 Mont. 476, 491,305 R2d 325 (1956).
③ 146 Mont. 188, 198,405 E2d 642 (1965).
④ Thomas Black, The Texas Rules of Evidence—A Proposed Codification, 31 Sw. L.J. 969, 974 (1977).
① Maine: Me. R. Evid. 201 (1976), Advisers' Note.
② 158 Me. 109, 116, 179A.2d 812, 816 (1962).
③ 12 Me. 8, 149A. 153 (1930).
④ Larkin, J.N.
⑤ 234 E2d 600, 603 (Utah 1951).
① 519 F.2d 1133, 1135 (5th Cir. 1975).
② 378 F.2d 588, 593 (9th Cir. 1967).
③ John H. Wood, Jr., A Brief Outline and Commentary: The Federal Rules of Evidence, 38 Tex. B.J. 535, 536 (1975).
④ Thomas Black, The Texas Rules of Evidence—A Proposed Codification, 31 Sw. L.J. 969, 974 (1977).
⑤ 见Generally Alan W. Scheflin，Jury Nullification：the Right to Say No．，45 S．Cal．L．Rev．168(1972)：讨论了陪审团决定法律和事实问题的权力。
① 254 U.S. 135, 138 (1920).
② 417 F.2d 1002, 1006 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 910 (1970).
③ 416 K2d 165, 182 (1st Cir. 1969).
④ 622 E2d 486,488 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 863 (1980).
⑤ Goverment of Canal Zone v. Burjan, 596 F.2d 690, 694 (5th Cir. 1979).
⑥ 536 K2d 216, 218-21 (8th Cir. 1976).
⑦ Tex. Penal Code Ann.§ 1.07 (a)(11)(A)(Vernon 1974).
① Wigmore, Evidence; §2567.
② McCormick on Evidence;§333, at 935.
① McRae v. Hogen, 576 F.2d 615,616 n.2 (5th Cir. 1978).
② Continental Oil Co. v. Simpson, 604 S.W.2d 530, 535 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
③ 463 S.W.2d 263,265 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1971, no writ).
④ 604 S.W.2d at 535.
① 519 S.W.2d 852, 855 (Tex. 1975).
② Inc., 686 S.W.2d 351,353 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
③ 126 Ind. App.113, 117, 126 N.E.2d 18, 20 (1955).
④ 155 E2d 808 (10th Cir. 1946).
① 这个原则适用于原告对被告疏忽大意的产生有过错的情况下，但是原告的这种过错可以通过被告的行为抵消，如果被告有最后的机会防止伤害的发生但却没有使用合理的注意去这么做。
② Generally Hobart Taylor, Jr., Comment, Evidence—Judicial Notice by Appellate Courts of Facts and Foreign Law Not Bought to the Attention of the Trial Court, 42 Mich. L. Rev. 509, 512-13 (1943).
③ 809 S.W.2d 593,595-96 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1991, no pet.).
① 800 S.W.2d 617 619 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, no writ).
② 604 S.W.2d 530 535 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1980).
③ 735 S.W.2d 522 530 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1987).
④ 768 S.W.2d 911 915 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1989).
⑤ 519 S.W.2d 852 855 (Tex. 1975).
⑥ 740 S.W.2d 74 75-76(Tex. App.—Fort worth 1987, pet. ref' d). rev'd on other grounds, 691 S..W.2d 603 (Tex. 1985).
① 1 David W. Louisell & Christopher B. Mueller, Federal Evidence §58, at 482-83.
② 580 E2d 219 (6th Cir. 1978).
③ 580 E2d 219, 223-24 (6th Cir. 1978).
④ 18 U.S.C. §2510(1)(1988).
① 501 E2d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.969(1974).
② 374 F.2d 97, 103 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 882 (1967).
③ Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence §201.7, at 83-84 & n.13 (3ed. 1991); I Weinstein & Berger, II201[06], at 201-62.
④ Judicial Notice,Commentary by Murl A. Larkin, 1993 Update by Cathleen C. Herasimchuk, 30 Hous. L. Rev. 193 1993-1994.
① Olin G Wellborn Ⅲ, Judicial Notice Under Article Ⅱ of the Texas Rules of Evidence, 19 ST. MARY' S L.J. 1, 14 (1987).
② Stephen A. Saltzburg & Kenneth R. Redden, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 61 (14th ed. 1986).
③ McCormick on Evidence, §331.
④ Jay Bums Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 517 (1924).
⑤ Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711,720, 198 P.2d 17, 22 (1948).
⑥ Potts v. Cole, 140 E2d 470, 476-77 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
⑦ Massey Motor, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92 (1960).
⑧ Durham v. Untied States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
⑨ Mills v. Denver Tramway Corp., 155 E2d 808 (10th Cir. 1946).
⑩ Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960).
① Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
② DeBaker v. Southern Cal. Ry., 106 Cal. 257, 39 R610 (1895).
③ 参见Note, Social and Economic Facts—Appraisal of Suggested Techniques for Presenting Them to the Courts, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 692, 696 (1948).
④ Currie, Appellate Court' s Use of Facts Outside of the Record by Resort to Judicial Notice and Independent Investigation, Wis. L. Rev. 39, 1960.
⑤ McCormick on Evidence, §331.
⑥ Fortunata Giudice, C. William Kraft, Comments: The Presently Expanding Concept of Judicial.Notice, 13 Vill. L. Rev. 563 1936.
① Fortunata Giudice, C. William Kraft, Comments: The Presently Expanding Concept of Judicial Notice, 13 Vill. L. Rev. 563 1936.
② 参见Note, Social and Economic Facts—Appraisal of Suggested Techniques for Presenting Them to the Courts, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 692, 696 (1948).
③ Currie, Appellate Court' s Use of Facts Outside of the Record by Resort to Judicial Notice and Independent Investigation, Wis. L. Rev. 39, 1960.
④ Wigmore, Evidence, §2567.
⑤ 14 Cal.2d 617, 620, 96 P.2d 941,942 (1939).
⑥ 899 F.2d 151 (2d Cir. 1990).
① 299 U.S. 468, (1936).
① 本章关于斯蒂芬的观点都来自Stephen，Evidence，不再逐一注明。
① Woodson D. Scott, the Doctrine of Judicial Notice, 14 Ky. L.J. 237 1925-1926.
② G D. Nokes, the Limits of Judicial Notice, the Law Quarterly Review 1958等。
③ Beardsley v. Irving, 81 Conn. 489,491, 71 Atl. 580, 581 (1909).
④ In Halsbury, The Laws of England, xv(1956) 333; Phipson, Manual of the law of evidence (1950) 12; Morgan, some problems of proof under the Anglo-American System of Litigation (1956)36.
① Edmund M. Morgan, Judicial Notice, Harv. L. Rev. Vol. LVII, Jun. 1944 No.3, p269. 1944.
② 参见中文版《麦考密克论证据》体例编排。
③ McCormick, Evidence, 712.
④ 资料与证据的区别参见第五章司法认知程序第二节听证机会。
⑤ 本章关于塞耶的观点都来自于Thayer，Evidence，不再逐一注明。
① 28 Ind.272(1867).
① John T. McNaughton, Judicial Notice—Excepts Relating to the Morgan-Wigmore Controversy,14 Vand. L. Rev. 779-805, 1960-1961; John S. Strahorn Jr., Process of Judicial Notice, 14 Va. L. Rev. 5,44 1927-1928.
② John S. Strahorn Jr., Process of Judicial Notice, 14 Va. L. Rev, 544 1927-1928.
① 本章关于威格莫尔的观点来自9Wigmore，Evidence，§2565，2567，不再逐一注明。
② Thayer,Evidence,p308-9.
① Timson v. Manufacturers Coal & Coke Co., 220 Mo. 580,598, 119 S.W. 565,569 (1909).
② 本章关于摩根的观点都来自于Morgan，J．N．，不再逐一注明。
① John T. McNaughton, Judicial Notice—Excerpts Relating to the Morgan-Wigmore Cont-roversy,14 Vand. L. Rev. 779-805, 1960-1961.
① Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, 1827.
② Y.B. 35 Hy. VI. Mich. P1.35.
① 1330r. 95,285 P. 1105 (1930).
① Mills v. Denver Tramway Corp., 155 F.2d 808 (10th Cir. 1946).
② McCormick, Judicial Notice, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 296, 321-322 (1952).
① Edie v. East-India Co. (1761) 2 Burr. 1216, at pp 1222-1224.
② Neeves v. Burrage (1894) 14 Q.B. 504.
③ Camden v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1914) 1 K.B. 641, at pp. 647-650, C.A.
④ Foster v. Globe Venture Syndicate, Ltd. (1900) 1 Ch. 811.
⑤ Davey v Harrow Corporation [[195712W.L.R. 941; [1957] 2 All E.R. 305].
① the Law of Evidence (1921) 19; (1952) 19.
② 同上。
③ L.R. 9Q.B. 374 (1874).
④ G D. Nokes, the Limits of Judicial Notice, the Law Quarterly Review 1958.
⑤ 4J.P. 155 (1840).
① 3 K.B. 198(1912),atpp. 202,211, D.C.
② 如在司法认知的效力一节中曾经引用过的Timson v．Manufacturers Coal & Coke Co．[220 Mo．580，598，119S．W． 565，569(1909)]案件。格雷夫斯(Graves)法官代表密苏里州最高院的大部分意见说：“司法认知事实，像许多由法庭采取的推定一样，仅仅是一项证据规则，如果议题是一个有争议的事项，或是能被争议的事项，那么质疑的证据就必须具有效力并且应该予以采纳。”
① Stephen A. Saltzburg & Kenneth R. Redden, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 61 (4th ed. 1986).
② Strahorn J.N.
③ Keeffe, J.N.
④ 513 S.W.2d 131,134 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1974, writ of ref'd n.r.e.) cert. denied, 421 U.S. 913 (1975).
⑤ 463 S.W.2d 263,265 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1971, no wirt).
⑥ 162 Tex. 481,484, 384 S.W.2d 521,522 (1961).
① 参见《刑事证据大全》，乔恩．R．华尔兹著，伺家弘译，中国人民公安大学出版社1993年版。
① 江伟主编：《证据法学》，法律出版社1999年版，第151页。
① 参见第三章第二节司法认知事实的衡量标准，二、(三)资料的种类。
② 毕玉谦：《民事证据法判例实务研究》，法律出版社1999年版，第399页。
③ Thayer, Evidence, p278-279.
④ Montana: Mont. R. Evid. 202 (1977), Rule 202. Judicial Notice of Law.
⑤ Montana: Mont. R. Evid. 202 (1977), Advisor's Comment.
① 参见毕玉谦，《试论民事诉讼中的司法认知》，《中外法学》1999年第一期。
② 李晓梅《试论民事案件中司法认知的扩张》，http://www.ncclj.com/Article_Show.asp?ArticleID=510
③ 方清伟《民事诉讼证明过程中的司法认知》http://lunwen.dudul63.net/html/63/19700101/13564_html
① 参见卞建林主编，《证据法学》，中国政法大学出舨社2005年版。
② 参见陈卫东、谢佑平主编，《证据法学》，复旦大学出版社2005年版。
③ 参见陈光中主编，《中华人民共和国刑事证据法专家拟制稿》，中国法制出版社2004年版。
④ 毕玉谦等著，《中国证据法草案建议稿及论证》，法律出版社2003年版。
⑤ 陈卫东主编，《模范刑事诉讼法典》，中国人民大学出版社2005年。
① 转引自李晓梅《试论民事案件中司法认知的扩张》。
② 转引自李晓梅《试论民事案件中司法认知的扩张》。
① 参见毕玉谦《试论民事诉讼中的司法认知》，李晓梅《试论民事案件中司法认知的扩张》。
② 李学灯著，《证据法比较研究》，五南图书出版公司1995年版，第44页。
③ 同上，第12页。
④ 同上第13页。
① 参见《行政诉讼法》第5条、第52条、第54条等。
② 参见《宪法》第5条第2款关于宪法最高效力的规定以及第62条第(2)项、第67条第(1)项关于宪法实施的监督的规定，2000年制定的立法法第90条、91条为全国人大常委会审查和判断行政法规和地方性法规的合宪性提供了具体的程序。
① Pastrick v. S. S. Kresge Co., 288 Mass. 194, 192 N. E. 485.; Welch v. Rollman & Sons Co., 70 Ohio App. 515, 44 N. E. 2d. 726.
② 参见[日]高桥宏志著，林剑锋译，《民事诉讼法制度与理论的深层分析》，法律出版社2003年版，第401页。
1．陈光中主编：《中华人民共和国刑事证据法专家拟制稿》，中国法制出版社2004年版。
2．江伟主编：《证据法学》，法律出版社1999年版。
3．樊崇义主编：《证据法学》，法律出版社2004年版。
4．卞建林主编：《证据法学》，中国政法大学出版社2005年版。
5．宋英辉、孙长永、刘新魁等著：《外国刑事诉讼法》，法律出版社2006年版。
6．刘金友主编：《证据法学》，中国政法大学出版社2003年版。
7．陈卫东、谢佑平主编：《证据法学》，复旦大学出版社2005年版。
8．陈卫东主编：《模范刑事诉讼法典》，中国人民大学出版社2005年。
9．毕玉谦、郑旭、刘善春著：《中国证据法草案建议稿及论证》，法律出版社2003年版。
10．毕玉谦主编：《民事证据法判例实务研究》，法律出版社1999年版。
11．何家弘主编：《新编证据法学》，法律出版社2000年版。
12．刘善春、毕玉谦、郑旭著：《诉讼证据规则研究》，中国法制出版社2000年版。
13．李国光主编：《最高人民法院<关于民事诉讼证据的若干规定>的理解与适用》中国法制出版社2002年版。
14．乔宪志主编：《中国证据制度与司法适用》，法律出版社2002年版。
15．叶自强著：《民事证据研究》，法律出版社1999年版。
16．罗玉珍、高委主编：《民事证明制度与理论》法律出版社2003年版。
17．梁慧星主编，叶自强著：《民事证据研究》，法律出版社1999年版。
18．吕利秋著：《行政诉讼举证责任》，中国政法大学出版社2001年版。
19．[台]李学灯著：《证据法比较研究》，五南图书出版公司1995年版。
20．王永挺、王鲁峰：《论司法认知》，《科学经济社会》2002年第1期。
21．方清伟：《民事诉讼证明过程中的司法认知》http://lunwen.dudu163.net/html/63/19700101/13564.html
22．李晓梅：《试论民事案件中司法认知的扩张》，http://www.ncclj.com/Article_Show.asp?ArticleID=510
23．陈成见、斯根成：《司法认知规则的特征》，《人民法院报》2002年7月30日 理论版。
24．毕玉谦：《试论民事诉讼中的司法认知》，《中外法学》1999年第一期。
25．潘文壮：《司法认知的理论以及立法思考》，http://www.hicourt.gov.cn/theory/artilce_list.asp?id= 1872&l_class=2
26．叶自强：《司法认知论》，《法学研究》1996年第4期。
27．李红军：《论我国司法解释上的司法认知》，http://www.law-lib.com/lw/lw_view.asp?no=6883
28．梁玉超：《司法认知：问题与前瞻》，http://www.dffy.com
29．白绿铉、卞建林译：《美国联邦刑事诉讼规则和证据规则》，中国法制出版社2000年版。
30．[美]乔恩·R·华尔兹著，何家弘译：《刑事证据大全》，中国人民公安大学出版社1993年版。
31．[美]罗纳德·J·艾伦、理查德·B·库恩斯、埃莉诺·斯威夫特著，张保生、王进喜、赵滢译：《证据法：文本、问题和案例》，高等教育出版社2006年版。
32．约翰·W·斯特龙主编，汤维建等译：《麦考密克论证据》，中国政法大学2004年版。
33．约瑟夫·斯托里著，毛国权译：《美国宪法评注》，上海三联书店2006年版。
34．伟恩·R·拉费弗、杰罗德·H·伊斯雷尔、南西·J·金著，卞建林、沙丽金等译：《刑事诉讼法》(上下册)，中国政法大学出版社2003年版。
35．[日]高桥宏志著，林剑锋译：《民事诉讼法制度与理论的深层分析》，法律出版社2003年版，第401页。
1. Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, 1827.
2. Thomas Starkie, A Practical Treatise of the Law of Evidence and Digest of Proofs in Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 3d edition. London, 1842.
3. James FitzJames Stephen, A Digest of the Law of the Evidence, 3rd, 1874.
4. James Bradley Thayer, a Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, London: Sweet and Maxwell, Limited, 3, Chancery Lane, 1898.
5. Halsbury, Laws of England 615, 2d ed. 1934.
6. Graham C. Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence, 1978.
7. John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law, 1983.
8. John Smith, Criminal Evidence, London Sweet & Maxwell, 1995.
9. Cross, Cross on Evidence(Third Austrilian Edition), Butterworths, 1986.
10. Peter Murphy, Murphy on Evidence, Blackstone Press Limited, 1997.
11. McCormick on Evidence, Fifth Edition, by John W. Strong, General Editor, West Group ST. PAUL, MINN, 1999.
12. Jon R. Waltz, Introduction to Criminal Evidence, fourth edition, Nelson-Hall Publishers/Chicago, 1995.
13. W. P. Wade, Judicial Notice of Facts, 5 S. L. Rev, 1879-1880.
14. E. W. Metcalfe, Matters Requiring Judicial Notice, 37 Am. L. Reg, 1889.
15. Ballade of Judicial Notice, 9 L. Q. Rev, 1893.
16. Arthur M. Alger, Conclusivness of a Domestic Judgement as Affected by the Rank of the Court Which Rendered it, 33 Am. L. Rev, 1899.
17. James Bradley Thayer, Judicial Notice and The Law of Evidence, 7 Harvard L. Rev, 1890.
18. William Trickett, Judicial Notice, 9 F. Forum 67,1904-1905.
19. Dr. M. I. Clear, A Handy Treatise upon the Subject of Judicial Notice, 1 Marq. L. Rev, 1916-1917.
20. Note, 30 Yale L.J., 1921.
21. Isaacs, The Law and the Facts, 22 Colum. L. Rev, 1922.
22. Huggins, Just What Has the Supreme Court Done to the Kansas Industrial Act (1925)II A.B.A.J. 363.
23. John S. Strahorn Jr., The Procedure of Judicial Notice, 14 Va. L. Rev. 544, 1927-1928.
24. Kenneth Culp Davis, A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience, p69, Perspectives of Law, Essays for Austin Wakeman Scott, Edited by Roscoe Pound ect. Little, Brown and Boston. Toronto, 1964.
25. Kales, Presumption of the Foreign Law, 19 Harv. L. Rev, 1906.
26. Woodson D. Scott, the Doctrine of Judicial Notice, 14 Ky. L.J, 1925-1926.
27. York, Unjudicial Notes on Judicial Notice, 13 Rocky Mtn. L. Rev, 1941.
28. Nussbaum, the Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 Yale L. J, 1941.
29. Fred B. Patton, Evidence: Judicial Notice not Taken of Statutory Agent for Service of Process, 6 Miss. L. J, 1933-1934.
30. Wachtell, Proof of Foreign Law in American Courts, 69 U. S. L. Rev, 1935.
31. Hobart Taylor, Jr., Comment, Evidence—Judicial Notice by Appellate Courts of Facts and Foreign Law Not Bought to the Attention of the Trial Court, 42 Mich. L. Rev., 1943.
32. Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 Harv. L. Rev., 1942.
33. R.T.K., Annotation, Propriety of Instructions on Matters of Common Knowledge, 144 A.L.R., 1943.
34. Edmund M. Morgan, Judicial Notice, 3 Harv. L. Rev. Vol. LVII., 1944.
35. Kathryn H. Baldwin and Emily P. Dodge, a Code of Evidenxe for Wisconsin-Judicial Notice and the Model Code of Evidence, Wis. L. Rev., 1945.
36. Kenneth Culp Davis, Official Notice, 62 Harv. L. Rev., 1949.
37. John Keeffe, William B. Landis, and Robert B. Shaad, Sense and Nonsense about judicial notice, 2 Stan. L. Rev., 1949-1950.
38. Note, the Hearsay Rule in Civil Antitrust Suits, 60 Yale L.J., 1951.
39. McCormick, Judicial Notice, 5 Vand. L. Rev., 1952.
40. Charels R. Jones, Judicial Notice, 5 Okla. L. Rev., 1952.
41. Charles V. Laughlin, in Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 Mich. L. Rev., 1953.
42. Donald J. Prebenda, Judicial Notice and the Communist Party, 29 Notre Dame L., 1953-1954.
43. Szladits, Notes on Translations of Foreign Civil and Commercial Codes, 3 Am. J. Como. L., 1954.
44. Report of the Committee on the Revision of the Law of Evidence to the Supreme Court of New Jersey 6, May 25,1955.
45. Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 Colum. L. Rev., 1955.
46. Edmund M. Morgan, Some problems of proof under the Anglo-American System of Litigation, 1956.
47. McKenzie & Sarabia, the Pleading and Proof of Alien Law, 30 Tul. L. Rev., 1956.
48. McKenzie & Sarabia, the Pleading and Proof of Alien Law, 30 Tul. L. Rev., 1956.
49. Calif. Law Revision Commission, Judicial Notice of the Law of Foreign Countries, 1957.
50. William B. Stern, Foreign Law in the Courts: Judicial Notice and Proof, 45 Cal. L. Rev., 1957.
51. G. D. Nokes, the Limits of Judicial Notice, the Law Quarterly Review 1958.
52. George R. Currie, Appellate Court Use of Facts Outside of the Record to Judicial Notice and Independent Investigation, Wis. L. Rev., 1960.
53. John T. McNaughton, Judicial Notice—Excerpts Relating to the Morgan-Wigmore Controversy, 14 Vand. L. Rev., 1960-1961.
54. Kleri, Judicial Notice of Scientific Facts, 15 Clev. -Mar. L. Rev., 1966.
55. Warren F. Schwaritz, Suggestion for the Demise of Judicial Notice of Judicial Facts, 45 Tex. L. Rev., 1966-1967.
56. E. F. Roberts, Preliminary Notes Toward a Study of Judicial Notice, 52 Comell L. Rev., 1966-1967.
57. Cleary, Foreword [to Symposium on Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence], Law & the Social Order (now Ariz. St. L. J.), 1969.
58. Richard Jackson, Comments: the Binding Effect of Judicial Notice under the Common Knowledge Test, 21 Baylor L. Rev., 1969.
59. Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial Notice, Law &Soc. order, 1969.
60. Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: the Right to Say No, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev., 1972.
61. John Rolfe Eldridge, Judicial Notice, 27 Ark. L. Rev., 1973.
62. Harry G. Fins,. Judicial Notice--The Illinois Anomaly, 7 J. Marshall J. Prac., 1973-1974.
63. E. F. Roberts, Judicial Notice: an Exercise in Exorcism, 19 N. Y. L. F., 1973-1974.
64. John H. Wood, Jr., A Brief Outline and Commentary: The Federal Rules of Evidence, 38 Tex. B. J., 1975.
65. Charles Edward Suffling, Judicial Notice, 48 Miss. L. J., 1977.
66. Thomas Black, The Texas Rules of Evidence—A Proposed 'Codification, 31 Sw. L. J., 1977.
67. Bitterman, the Evaluation of Psychological Propositions, in Levin, Evidence and the Behavioral Sciences Ⅲ-A-16 (mimeo. 1956).
68. William J. Flittie, Judicial Notice in the Trial of Complex Cases -the Sherman Act §1 Per Se as a Testing Ground, 31 Sw. L. J., 1977.
69. D. W. Elliott, Elloitt and Phipson: Manual of the Law of Evidence, 1980.
70. Allan R. Flanz, Judicial Notice, 18 Alta. L. Rev., 1980.
71. Roger Wm. Bennett, Church Property Disputes in the Age of "Common-Core Protestantism": A Legislative Facts Rationale for Neutral Principles of Law, 57 Ind. L. J., 1981-1982.
72. Dennis J. Tumer, Judicial Notice and Federal Rules of Evidence 201-A Rule Ready for Change, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev., 1983-1984.
73. Stephen A. Saltzburg & Kenneth R. Redden, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual, 4th ed. 1986.
74. John. Van Der Berg, Judicial Notice or Racial Claptrap - A Footnote, 104 S. African L. J., 1987.
75. Robert E. Keeton, Legislative Facts and Similar Things- Deciding Disputed Premise Facts, 73 Minn. L. Rev., 1988-1989.
76. Anita Cava, Taking Judicial Notice of Sexual Stereotyping, 43 Ark. L, Rev., 1990.
77. Robert Banks and Elizabeth T. Collins, Judicial Notice in Tennessee, 21 Mem. St. U. L. Rev., 1990-1991.
78. Judicial Notice, Commentary by Murl A. Larkin, 1993 Update by Cathleen C. Herasimchuk, 30 Hous. L. Rev., 1993-1994.
79. Susan G. Drummond, Judicial Notice- The Very Texture of Legal Reasoning, 15 Can. J. L. & Soc., 2000.
80. Richard B. Cappalli, Bringing Internet Information to Court: of "Legislative Facts" , 75 Temp. L. Rev., 2002.
② Bouvier' s Law Dictionary, Vol. Ⅱ, p.1734.
③ United States v. Hammers, et al. 241 Fed. 542.
④ State v. Kelly, 71 Kan. 811, 81 Pac. 450.
⑤ BLACK' S LAW DICTIONARY (eighth edition), Judicial notice. A court' s acceptance, for purposes of convenience and without requiring a party' s proof, of a well-known and indisputable fact; the court' s power to accept such a fact: the trial court took judicial notice of the fact that water freezes at 32 degrees Fahrenheit.
① Judicial Notice: n. the authority of a judge to accept as facts certain matters which are of common knowledge from sources which guarantee accuracy or are a matter of official record, without the need for evidence establishing the fact. Examples of matters given judicial notice are public and court records, tides, times of sunset and sunrise, government rainfall and temperature records, known historic events or the fact that ice melts in the sun.
② John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law (1983), §2565．(下文脚注中简称为Wigmore，Evidence)．
③ 同上。
④ 参见Wigmore，Evidence的编排体制。
⑤ John S. Strahom Jr.,The Procedure of Judicial Notice, 14 Va.L.Rev.544,1927-1928．但是笔者认为这种定义更多的倾向于概括司法认知的功能性价值。
⑥ Graham C. Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence§7, at 13 (1978); McCormick on Evidence§328, at 919-20 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984); 9 Wigmore, Evidence§2565, at 694.
① Charles V. Laughlin, in Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 195,230, 1953
② 参见江伟主编：《证据法学》，法律出版社 1999年版，第124页。
① John Smith, Criminal Evidence, London Sweet & Maxwell 1995, p57.
② 参见第六章司法认知的性质、效力和作用。
③ 《最高人民法院关于民事诉讼证据若干规定》第九条第(四)款，第(五)款。
① Isaacs, The Law and the Facts, 22 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 1 (1922).
② James FitzJames Stephen (1829-1894), A Digest of the Law of the Evidence, 1st and 2d eds, ch. ⅶ. (下面脚注中为 Stephen, Evidence.)
③ John Keeffe, ect. Sense and Nonsense about judicial notice, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 664 1949-1950.(下面脚注中为Keeffe, J.N.); James Bradley Thayer, a Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, p278, fn1, London: Sweet and Maxwell, Limited, 3, Chancery Lane. 1898. (下面脚注中为Thayer, Evidence.)
④ Thayer, p277.
① 该谚语被引用在State v．Intoxicating Liquors，73 Maine，278．
② 引用在Y B．30&31 Edw．I(R．S．)256-59，具体案件参见本章第二节。
③ 科克(Coke)法官在一起诽谤案中引用了这个谚语。Crawford v．Blisse，2 Bul．150(1613)。
④ 塞耶认为这两个谚语正好组成了完整的司法认知规则，但依据现代的定义，司法认知规则的范围还要广泛，这 也许是与法学理论的发展相关。Thayer，Evidence，p297．
⑤ Thayer, Evidence, p278, fn1.
⑥ Dr. M. I. Clear, A Handy Treatise upon the Subject of Judicial Notice, 1 Marq. L. Rev. 106 1916-1917.
① 这些案件按时间顺序排列，这些案件中大部分包括塞耶、霍尔茨沃思等学者在论述司法认知的历史渊源时均有提及。
② Y.B. 30, 31 Ed. I. (R.S.) 256-259.
③ Thayer, Evidence, p280; Holdsworth, History, p 135.
④ Y.B. 7 Ed. Ⅲ. 4, 7.
⑤ Y.B. 35 Hy. Ⅵ. Mich. P1.35.
① Y.B. 27 H.Ⅷ., 27, 12.
② Partridge v. Strange, Plow. 77, 83-84.
① Marriot v. Pascall, 1 Leon. 159.
② Hewet v. Painter, 1 Bul. 174.
① Rolle' s Ab Court C. 6, 7.
② White v. Brough, 1 Rolle, 286.
③ Harvey v. Broad, 6 Mod. 159
① 2 Ventris,28
② 参见prof．Maitland’s，Slander in the Middle Age(中世纪的诽谤案)，in the Green Bag，ⅱ．4(January，1890)．
③ White v.Brough,1 Rolle,286.
④ 边沁是英国著名的哲学家，同时也是英国著名的证据学家。边沁着手撰写他著名的证据法学著作《司法证明的理论基础》是在十九世纪初叶，在英美证据法的发展史上这一时期仍然处在法官创造证据规则、学者对证据规则进行系统化研究和论述的早期阶段。边沁面临的现实是：法官造法频繁、大多数法律相对较新或者是新近才被承认具有法律效力、证据法相当支离破碎并充满了为应付不同时期不同形势所需要的各种例外、界限区分以及含糊的技术性。在这样的历史背景下，边沁开始了对证据规则和证据法学理论的研究，构建他的证据法学理论体系。
① 其他三种分别是：(1)对判决所涉及事实的观点的依据是法官自己获得的，而没有任何作为证人的其他人向他提供任何信息。证人和法官的职能和角色由同一个人行使和担当：没有宣誓作证的证人，既没有必要也没有空间让证人出庭；(2)对立双方没有任何人以宣誓证人的方式出庭，但是判决的依据是由双方当事人作出的对事实的明示或暗示地承认；(3)已经由一方当事人宣誓证明的事实，该证言被认为是可以相信的，而这些事实原本需要建立在证据之上；形成否定这些事实的判决的依据仅仅只能是不太可能发生的事。参见Jeremy Bentham，Rationale of Judicial Evidence，1827．
② Thomas Starkie, A Practical Treatise of the Law of Evidence and Digest of Proofs in Civil and Criminal Proceedings, (3d edition. London, 1842.), p400 v.Ⅱ.
③ Stephen, Evidence, p26.
④ W. P. Wade, Judicial Notice of Facts, 5 S. L. Rev. n.s. 214, 1879-1880.
① W. P. Wade, Judicial Notice of Facts, 5 S. L. Rev. n.s. 214, 1879-1880.
② 同上。
① W. P. Wade, Judicial Notice of Facts, 5 S. L. Rev. n.s. 214, 1879-1880.
② Thayer, Evidence, p278, fn1; Judicial Notice and The Law of Evidence, 7 Harvard L. Rev. 286 (1890), p288, fn1.
③ 同上。
④ 关于司法认知的性质参见第六章第一节司法认知的性质。
⑤ 同上。
⑥ Wigmore, Evidence, §2565, p694.
① Edmund M. Morgan, Judicial Notice, Harv. L. Rev. Vol. LVII, Jun. 1944 No.3, p270. (下面脚注中为Morgan,J.N.)
② 转引自McCormick on Evidence, Fifth Edition, by John W. Strong, General Editor, West Group ST. PAUL, MINN.,1999, p491. (下面简称为McCormick, Evidence.)
① Kenneth Culp Davis, A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience, p69, Perspectives of Law, Essays for Austin Wakeman Scott, Edited by Roscoe Pound ect., Little, Brown and Boston. Toronto, 1964. (下面脚注中简称为Davis, J.N. 1964)
② Morgan, J.N., 1944, p270.
① Thayer, Evidence, p277.
② 183 Va. 182,188, 31 S.E.2d 571,573 (1944).
① Morgan, J.N., 1944, p273.
① Thayer, Evidence, p278, fn1.
① Deybel's, 4 B.&AId. 243; Bumev. Thompson, 2 Q.B. 789.
② 8 C. & P. 103, at Nisi Prius.
③ Christian，1 Bl．Com．12th ed．74n．另外，如在Ford v．Hopkins(1 Salk，289．)案中，首席大法官霍尔特(Holt)说：“交易的方式和方法应该被认知”。
① Wikel v.Board, 120 N.C. 451, 27 S.E. 117 (1897).
② Douglass v. Kanawha & M.R. Co., 44 W. Va. 267, 28 S.E. 705 (1897).
① 69 Minn. 353,377, 72 N.W. 713, 716 (1897).
② 2 C. & P.223,225 (1825).
③ Udderzook v. Commonwealth, 76 Pa. 340 (1874).
① Code of the Rules of Evidence in Trials at Law (1942) 534.
② John S. Strahorn Jr., The Process of Judicial Notice, 14 Va. L. Rev. 544, 1927-1928.(下面脚注中为Strahorn，J．N．)
① 参见第二章司法认知的理论基础。
② Thayer, Evidence, p278.
③ Wynehamer v. The People, 13 N.Y. 378, 387(1855), per Comstock, J.
① Beebe v. The State, 6Ind. 510, 519(1855).
② 麦克德莫特(F McDermott)认为，从字面上理解“众所周知”就是意味着“只能对傻瓜都知道的事实才能进行司法认知”，而这是很荒谬的。但是他提出的这种异议并没有阻止法院继续使用“众所周知”之类的措辞。如“法庭被推定知道每个人都知道的事实，类似的事实应该被司法认知”(Layne v．Tribune Co．，146 so 234，237(Fla．1933)．)，“一般而言，法庭可以司法认知众所周知的事实”(Re Buszta’s Estate，186 N．Y．S．2d 192，193(Surr．1959))等。参见McCormick，Evidence，p493，
③ Johnson v. Cooper, 379 S.W.2d 396, 399 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1964, no writ).
④ Harper v. Killion, 345 S.W.2d 309, 311(Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana), aff' d 162 Tex. 481,348 S.W.2d 521 (1961).
① Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294, 305-06(Ky. 1987)
② State v. Armendariz, 449 N.W.2d 555, 558(Neb. 1989)
③ Apostolic Church v. American Honda Motor Co., 833 S.W.2d 553,555-56 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1992, writ requested)
① Judicial Notice, Commentary by Murl A. Larkin, 1993 Update by Cathleen C. Herasimchuk, 30 Hous. L. Rev. 193-239, 1993-1994, p 204. (下面简称为Larkin, J.N.)
① Briffitt v. The State, 58 Wis. 39.
② 180 Cal. 338, 341,181 P. 223,224 (1919).
① 612 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1981).
① McCormick, Evidence,§330, p496.
② Price v. Page, 24 Mo. 64.
③ Neaderhouser v. The State, 28 Ind. 257.
④ Corn. v. King, 150 Mass. 221.
⑤ Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray, 417, 424.
⑥ Strahorn, J.N. p545-7.
① Charles V. Laughlin, Judicial Notice, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 365-389, 1955-1956, p377.
② 72 Minn．200，75 N．W．210，215(1898)，，该案因为其他理由被推翻(179 U．S 223(190(1))。
③ 379 S.W.2d 396, 399(Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worty 1964, no writ)
④ 第一次工业革命发生于18世纪下半叶，发源于英国的工业革命，是世界上人类使用铁器后的第一次技术革命，以蒸汽机的广泛运用为主要标志。19世纪70年代起，发生了第二次技术革命，以电力的广泛运用为主要标志。
① 我们将专门讨论关于科技类事实的司法认知。
① 757 S.W.2d 909, 911 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1988, no writ).
② 26 Wis. 2d 366, 132 N.W.2d 565 (1965).
① 776 F.2d 797, 801-02 (9th Cir. 1985).
② 542 F.2d 246, 248 n.1 (5th Cir. 1976).
③ 570 ESupp.189, 197 n.11 (D.V.I. 1983).
④ 614 F.Supp.500, 504 n.4(W.D.N.Y. 1985).
⑤ 739 S.W.2d 409 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, pet. Ref' d).
① Larkin, J.N..
② 796 S.W.2d 695,696 (Tex. 1990).
③ 795 S.W.2d 775,776-77 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ).
④ 702 S.W.2d 760, 773 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
① 666 F.2d 235,237 (5th Cir. 1982).
② 748 S.W.2d 629, 630-31 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1988, no pet.).
③ 693 S.W.2d 638, 639 (Tex. App. —Houston [14th Dist.]1985, no writ).
① 739 S.W.2d 652, 656 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1987, pet. Ref' d).
② 762 E2d 454 (5th Cir. 1985).
③ Florida: Florida Statutes (1978) §90.202.
④ 500 S.W.2d 474, 475 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973)
① Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
② 745 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no pet.)
③ 由于司法认知事实的确定性与司法认知的效力密切相关，所以我们在本节不做展开论述，只对存在的学说以及现行立法进行一些较简单的介绍，目的是配合“司法认知的衡量标准”作一些相对必要的补充，更为详细的论述见第六章“司法认知的性质、效力和作用”。
④ Utah Constr. Co. v. Berg, 205 P.2d 367, 370 (Ariz. 1949); Varcoe v. Lee, 181 P. 223, 227(Cal. 1919).
① Strahorn, J.N.
② Johnson v. Cooper, 379 S.W.2d 396, 399 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1964, no writ).
③ Harper v. Killion, 345 S.W.2d 309, 311 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana), aff' d 162 Tex. 481,348 S.W.2d 521(1961).
① Thayer, Evidence.
① McCormick, Judicial Notice, 5 Vand. L. Rev., 1952.
② John Keeffe, William B. Landis, Jr., and Robert B. Shaad, Sense and nonsense about judicial notice, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 664-690, 1950. (下面简称为Keeffe, J.N.)
① Montana: Mont. R. Evid. 201 (1977), Advisor' s note.
② Larkin, J.N.
① Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 364, 402(1942)(下文简称为Davis，Approach，1942．)
① Kenneth Culp Davis, Official Notice, 62 Harv. L. Rev. p549 (1949).(下文简称为Davis，1949．)
② Morgan & Maguire, Evidence 36(3d ed. 1951).
③ 见麦考密克论证据，第687-712，1954年，英文版。
④ Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 Colum. L. Rev, 945,984, (1955).(下文简称为Davis，1955．)
⑤ Davis, 1955, p945, note 2.
① Davis, 1955, p952-3.
① Davis, 1955, p952.
① Davis, Approach, 1942, p407.
① 264U.S. 504 (1924).
① Lewis v. Rucker, 2 Burr. 1167, 1171, 97 Eng. Rep. 769, 772 (K. B. 1761).
② R．S．C．Ord．55，r．19，摘录自1852年的《衡平法院法》。
③ Wisconsin Ornamental Iron & Bronze Co. v. Tax Commission, 202 Wis. 355, 371,229 N. W. 646, 233 N. W. 72 75 (1930) (rehearing).
① Durham v. United States, 214 E2d 862 (D.C.Cir. 1954).
① Southern Class Rate Investigation, 100 I. C. 513, 603 (1925).
② H. W. Joynes v. Pennsylvania R. R., 17 I.C.C. 361,366 (1909).
① 参见第五章司法认知程序。
② 参见本章第六节立法性事实的司法认知。
① 149 Mass 68, per Knowlton, J.
② 91 U.S. 37.
③ 23 No. East. Rep. 9(Dec. 1889).
① McCormick, Evidence, §329.
① Radcliffe College v. City of Cambridge, Mass., 215 N.E.2d 892, 895 (1966).
② Richardson v. Wendel, 401 S.W.2d 455,458 (Mo. 1966).
③ Deybel' s, 4 B.&Ald. 243; Bumev. Thompson, 2 Q.B. 789.
④ 参见第六章第二节第六“英国学术界以及司法实践中的司法认知效力”中所举的Clinton v．Lyons & Co．，Ltd．，3 K．B．198(1912)，at pp．202，211，D．C．
⑤ 253 F.Supp. 251,255 (D.C.Ore. 1966).
① 234 P.2d 600, 603 (Utah 1951).
① 358 U.S. 74,79 S.Ct. 136, 3 L.Ed.2d 125 (1958).
① Larkin, J.N.
② North Dakota: N.D.R. Evid. 201 (1977) (like U.R.E.), Advisor' s Note.
③ Wisconsin: Wis. Stat.§902.01 (1975)(like U.R.E.), Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1974.
① 听证的相关内容参见第五章司法认知的程序。
② Montana: Mont. R. Evid. 201 (1977).
③ Michigan: Michigan Rules of Evidence (1978)Rule 201.
① Cleary, Foreword [to Symposium on Proposed Federal Rules of Evidencel, 1969 Law & the Social Order (now Ariz. St. L. J.)509-510. Copyright(?)1969 by Arizona State Law Journal. Reprinted by permission.
② McCormick, Evidence, §334.
③ 同上。
① McCormick, Evidence,§334.
② Idaho: Idaho Code (1979)§9-101.
③ Idaho: Idaho R. Civ. Proc. 44(d) (1979).
④ 357 E3d 119 (1st Cir. 2004).
⑤ 729 S.W.2d 723, 728 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
① 265 S.W.2d 261,267(Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1954, writ ref' d.).
② 767 S.W.2d 789, 798-800 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
③ 732 S.W.2d 306, 310-11 (Tex. 1987).
④ 529N.W.2d 155 (N.D. 1995).
⑤ 318 Or. 551,871 P.2d 106 (1994).
① 145 F.2d 27, 28 (D.C.Cir. 1944).
① 167 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1948).
② 396 U.S. 398,407 (1970).
③ 477 U.S. 399, 407-10 (1986).
④ 428 U.S. 153, 168-87 (1976).
⑤ Jack B. Weinston.
⑥ 491 U.S. 223,230(1990),
① Wisconsin:Wis.Stat.§902.01(1975)(like U.R.E.), Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1974.
① 10 Cl. & Fin. 198, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843)
② 291 U.S. 272, 283 (1934).
① Untied Stated ex rel. Yokinen v. Commissioner, 57 E2d 707 (2d Cir. 1932).
② Strecker v. Kessler, 95 F.2d 976, 978 (5th Cir. 1938).
③ Strecker v. Kessler, 95 F.2d 976, 978 (5th Cir. 1938).
④ 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
⑤ 同上。
① Davis, 1955.
② 341 U.S. 494, 498 (1951).
③ Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
④ Albertson v. Millard, 106 E Supp. 635, 642-43 (E.D.Mich. 1952).
⑤ Sweet v. United States, 211 F.2d 118, 120 (6th Cir. 1954).
① Appeal of Albert, 372 Pa. 13, 20-21, 92 A.2d 663 (1952).
② Spector v. United States, 193 F.2d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 1952).
① 比较United States v. Gould, 536 F.2d 216 (8th Cir. 1976)与United States v. Jones, 580 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1978).
② McCormick, Evidence, §328.
③ Bitterman, the Evaluation of Psychological Propositions, in Levin, Evidence and the Behavioral Sciences Ⅲ-A-16(mimeo. 1956).
① Com. v. Peckham, 2 Gray, 514.
② Head v. Hargrave, 105 U.S. 45.
① Bradford v. Cunard Co., 147 Mass. 55.
② 虽然陪审团在审理案件的过程中允许考虑常识类事项，但是，在司法实践中，许多司法管辖区主张，为了防止误导陪审员并不鼓励这种做法。德州就是其中之一。在Gillette Motor Transp．Co．v．Whitfield~②案中，法庭就主张，陪审团在评议时可以考虑常识性事项，但是最好不要指示陪审员考虑常识，因为这样的指示也许会让他们觉得困惑。
③ 4 M & S. 532.
④ 《麦考密克证据法手册》第329节，p762，Edward W．Cleary编，1972年第二版。
⑤ R.T.K., Annotation, Propriety of Instructions on Matters of Common Knowledge, 144 A.L.R. 932-933 (1943).
⑥ Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Woods, 167 S.W.2d 869, 871(Ark. 1943).
⑦ 71 Tex. 274, 279, 8 S.W. 679, 680 (1888).
⑧ 415 S.W.2d 489, 501 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1967,writ ref' d n.r.e
⑨ 277 S.W.2d 733, 735-36 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1955, no writ).
① 197 S.W.2d 157, 162(Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1946), aff' d on other grounds, 145 Tex. 571,200 S.W.2d 624(1947).
② 69 S.W.2d 228, 230 (Tex. Civ. App.—San Antonio 1934, Writ dism' d). Thayer, Evidence, p280.
③ 732 S.W.2d 306, 311 (Tex. 1987).
① 160 Tex. 542, 546-47, 334 S.W.2d 283,286-87(1960).
② 307 S.W.2d 284, 288-89 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston 1957, no writ).
① 参见9wigmoer，§§2574-2577．
② 参见第四章司法认知对象之二法律。
③ 28 State Trials, 616 (1803).
① 576 N.W.2d 886 (S.D. 1998).
② Deybel's Case, 4 B. & Aid. 242, 246 (1821).
③ Cooke v. Wilson, 1 C.B.n.s. 153 (1856).
④ Young v. Califomia St. Bd., 273 F. 30 (9th Cir. 1921).
⑤ 89 Okla. Cr. 383, 388, 208 P.2d 584, 588 (1949).
⑥ 180 Cal．338，341，181 P．223，224(1919)．参见第三章第四节司法认知事实的衡量标准中关于该案的详细介绍。
① 参见约翰·W·斯特龙主编，汤维建等译，《麦考密克论证据》，中国政法大学出版社2003年版，第30页。
② 转引自乔恩·R·华尔兹著，《刑事证据大全》，何家弘等译，中国人民公安大学出版社1993年版，第323页。
① 25 Mich. 274 (1872).
② John Keeffe, William B. Landis, Jr., and Robert B. Shaad, Sense and nonsense about judicial notice, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 664-690, 1950.
① Beardsley v. Irving, 81 Conn. 489, 71 Atl. 580 (1908).
① 《联邦高等法院判例汇编》第293册，第1013页，哥伦比亚特区巡回法庭，1923年。参见《麦考密克论证据》第395页。
① 《美国联邦最高法院判例汇编》第509册，第579页，1993年。
② 62 S.D. 123,252 N.W. 7 (1933).
③ 62 S.D. at 136-37,252 N.W. at 12.
① 64 S.D. 309, 266 N.W. 667 (1936).
① 参见McCormick, Evidence, p497.
② 参见McCormick, Evidence, p308.
① 337 U.S. 241,246-47, 250 (1949).
① Davis, 1955, p963.
① Wyzanski, ATrial Judge' s Freedom and Responsibility, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1291-92 (1952).
① United State ex rel. Matranga v. Mackey, 115F.Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
② 180 F.2d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 1950).
③ 206 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1953).
④ 344 U.S. 344 (1953).
⑤ 148 F.2d 416, 446 (2d Cir. 1945).
① John T. McNaughton, Judicial Notice—Excerpts Relating to the Morgan-Wigmore Controversy;14 Vand. L. Rev. 779-805, 1960-1961.
② John T. McNaughton, Judicial Notice—Excerpts Relating to the Mergan-Wigmore Controversy,14 Vand. L. Rev.779-805, 1960-1961.
③ The Limits of Judicial Notice, by G D. Nokes, 59-75, the Law Quarterly Review, vol. 74 Jan. 1958.
① England, Brandao v. Barnett, (1846) 12 Cl. & F. 787.
② Edelstein v. Schuler & Co. (1902) 2 K. B. 144.
③ Parte Wallace, (1902) 2 K. B. 488, C. A.
④ Ex parte Powell (1875) 1 Ch. D. 501, C. A.
⑤ Blacquiere v. Hawkins (1780) 1 Doug. 378.
① Professor Sir John Smith, Criminal Evidence, London Sweet & Maxwell 1995, p54.
② 2 East 469, 103 Eng. Rep. 448 (1802).
③ McCormick, Evidence, p504.
① 5 S. L. Rev. n.s. 214, 1979-1880.
② Thayer, Evidence, p299.
③ Code of the Rules.of Evidence in Trials at Law (1942) 534.
④ G. D. Nokes, the Limits of Judicial Notice, the Law Quarterly Review 1958.
① Partridge v. Strange, Plow. 77, 83-84.
① Evidence Act, 1851, s14.
② Carter v. Cleypoole (1591) Moore K.B. 593.
③ (1829) M. & M. 416.
④ Interpretation Act, 1850, s.7.
① (1828) 7 B. & C. 783.
② Evidence Act, 1845, s2.
③ Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925, s224.
④ Companies Act, 1948, s.347.
① 205 Md. 274, 279, 107 A.2d 88, 90 (1954).
② Federal Farm Mort. Corp. v. Hughes, 137 Neb. 454, 289 N.W. 866, 869 (1940).
③ Regional Ag. Cred. Corp. v. Stewart, 69 N.D. 694, 698, 289 N.W. 801,803 (1940).
④ Ginter v. Ginter, 63 N.W.2d 394, 398 (N.D. 1954).
① 145 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1944).
② Great American Ins. Co. v. Glenwood Irrigation Co., 265 Fed. 594 (8th Cir. 1920).
③ 28 U.S.C.§§1738-39 (1948).
④ 138 F.2d 641 (2d Cir. 1943), rev' d per curiam, 322 U.S. 709 (1944).
① 182 Misx．328，45 N．Y．S．2d 251(Sup．Ct．1943)．参见第三节中该案的详细介绍。
② Baltimore & Ohio R.R.v. Reaux, 59 F. Supp. 969, 973 (N.D. Ohio 1945).
① 54 F. Supp. 926, 927 (S.D. Cal. 1944).
② 177 F. Supp. 588 (D.N.J. 1959).
③ 181 F. Supp. 361 (N.D. Ohio 1960).
④ Bear Brothers, Inc. v. Trammell, 279 Ala. 194, 197, 183 So.2d 790, 793 (1966).
⑤ Walker v. Moss, 246 N.C. 196, 197, 97 S.E.2d 836, 837 (1957).
① South Carolina: S.C.C. §15-13-750 (1976).
② Utah: Utah R. Civ. Proc. §9(ⅰ) (1977).
③ 86 Cal. App. 2d 596, 622, 195 P.2d 501,518 (2d Dist. 1948).
① Alaska: Alaska R. Civ. Proc. §43(a)(2)[a] (1978).
② Robertson v. City of Birmingham, 28 Ala. App. 393,394, 185 So. 190 (1938).
③ New Hampshire: Walsh v. Public Serv. Co., 92 N.H. 331, 334, 30 A.2d 494, 496 (1943).
④ Oklahoma: Firemen's Relief& Pension Bd. v. Lucas, 189 Okla. 328, 117 P.2d 112 (1941).
⑤ Puerto Rico: Matos v. Porto Rico Railway, Light & Power Co., 58 RR. 162 (1941).
① North Carolina: Wilson v. Kennedy, 248 N.C. 74, 79, 102 S.E.2d 459, 463 (1958).
② High Point Surplus Co. v. Pleasants, 263 N.C. 587,592, 139 S.E.2d 892, 896 (1965).
③ 291 Mich. 254, 289 N.W. 151 (1939).
④ Florida: Florida Statutes (1978)§90.202.
⑤ 200 Neb. 553, 556, 264 N.W.2d 434, 435 (1978).
① Succession of Scardino, 215 La. 472, 40 So.2d 923 (1949).
② 160 Tenn. 208, 215, 22 S.W.2d 356, 358 (1929).
③ Sheard v. Green, 219 La. 199, 52 So.2d 714 (1951).
④ Kentucky: Orendorfv. Hunt, 272 Ky. 334, 114 S.W.2d 86 (1938).
⑤ Allen v. Commonwealth, 272 Ky. 533, 114 S.W.2d 757(1938).
⑥ Collins v. Collins, 160 Fla. 732, 36 So.2d 417 (1948)
⑦ Perkins v. Perkins, 237 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1951, no writ).
① Michigan Rules of Evidence (1979) Rule 202.
② Arkansas: Ark. Stat. §28-109 (1962 replacement).
③ Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. §§52-163, 52-164 (1960).
④ Iowa: Iowa R. Civ. P.94 (1963).
⑤ Ohio R. Civ. Proc. 44.1 (1970).
① Idaho: Idaho R. Civ. Proc. 44(d) (1979).
② 144 Me. 263,278, 68 A.2d 241,251 (1949).
③ Plaster v. State, 567 S.W.2d 500, 502(Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978).
④ 650 S.W.2d 827, 836-37 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
⑤ 449 S.W.2d 458, 465 n.2 (Tex. 1969).
① Daugherty v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 772 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex. 1989).
② 721 S.W.2d 493,494 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no pet.).
③ 735 S.W.2d 522, 530 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1987, pet. ref' d).
④ Wigmore, Evidence, §2572.
⑤ New Hampshire: Walsh v. Public Serv. Co., 92 N.H. 331,334, 30 A.2d 494, 496 (1943).
① Morgan, J.N., p269.
② Charles Edward Suffling, Judicial Notice, 48 Miss. L.J. 919-934 1977.
③ Charles Edward Suffiing, Judicial Notice, 48 Miss. L.J. 919-934 1977.
④ M.C.L.A. §600.2114a.
① Boyd v. Geary, 126 Conn, 396, 12 A.(2d.) 644 (1940),
① Great American Ins. Co. v. Glenwood Irrigation Co., 265 Fed. 594, 597 (C.C.A. 8th, 1920).
48 Ohio St. 623, 30N.E 69 (1891).
① 222 U．S．473(1912)．Cuba R．R．V．Crosby案件一样。在这个案件中，一位铁路雇员在古巴操作机械时受伤，而这个机械存有缺陷的情况雇主是知道的。但是法庭却做出了一个“非正义”的判决，由此经常遭受批评。这种批评在许多罗马法系法律系统中也许并不能被证实为正当，因为在许多罗马法系法律系统中，雇员没有权利提起反对雇主的侵权诉讼does not have a cause of action in tort against his employer——这项原则Holmes法官很熟悉。
② Moe v. Shaffer, 150 Minn. 114, 184 N.W. 785 (1921).
① William B. Stem, Foreign Law in the Courts: Judicial Notice and Proof, 45 Cal. L. Rev. 23 1957.
② 9 Wigmore, Evidence§2558.
① Estate of Peters, 110 Cal. App. 2d 723, 244 P.2d 88 (1952).
② Estate of Arbulich, 41 Cal. 2d 86, 257 P.2d 433 (1953).
③ Estate of Schluttig, 36 Cal. 2d 416, 224 P.2d 695 (1950).
④ Henderson v. Drake, 118 Cal. App. 2d 777, 258 P.2d 879 (1953).
⑤ Estate of Leefers, 127 Cal. App. 2d 550,274 P.2d (1954).
⑥ McKenzie & Sarabia, the Pleading and Proof of Alien Law, 30 Tul. L. Rev. 353, 356 (1956).
① the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 44.1.
② M.C.L.A. §600.2114a.
① The Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act§5.
② People v. Tufts, 167 Cal. 266, 270, 139 Pac. 78, 80 (1914).
③ Electric Welding Co. v. Prince, 200 Mass. 386, 86 N.E. 947 (1909).
① 164 East Seventy-Second Street Corp. v. Ismay, 65 Cal. App. 2d 574, 151 P.2d 29 (1944).
② 144 Me. 263, 278, 68 A.2d 241, 251 (1949).
③ William B. Stern, 1957.
④ 254 N.Y. 488, 173 N.E. 835 (1930).
⑤ Keeffe, J.N.
① Nussbaum, 1941.
② 27, 177 S,W.2d 360 (1943).
③ Christ v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. 593, 296 Pac. 612 (1931).
④ Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 55 Cal. App.2d 720, 132 P.2d 70 (1st Dist. 1942).
⑤ Chambco, a Div. of Chamberlin Waterproofing & Roofing,Inc. v. Urban Masonry Co., 338 Md. 417, 659 A.2d 297 (1995).
⑥ 如, Rediker v, Rediker, 35 Cal. 2d 769, 221 P.2d 1 (1951).
⑦ Christ v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. 593,296 Pac. 612 (1931).
⑧ McCormick, Evidence.
⑨ Kales, Presumption of the Foreign Law, 19 Harv. L. Rev,. 401,407 (1906).
① 9 Wigmore, Evidence §2536.
② Murphy v. Murphy, 145 Cal. 482, 78 Pac. 1053 (1904).
③ Leafy v. Gledhill, 8 N.J. 260, 84 A.2d 725 (1951).
④ Nussbaum, the Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 Yale L. J. 1018, 1041 (1941).
⑤ William B. Stern, 1957.
⑥ William B. Stern, 1957.
⑦ Nussbaum, the Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 Yale L. J. 1018, 1041 (1941).
① 123 Cal. App, 2d 406, 266 E2d 910 (1954).
② Ryan v. North Alaska Salmon Co., 153 Cal. 438, 95 Pac. 862 (1908); Klaffki v. Kaufman, 52 Cal. App. 48 198 Pac. 36 (1921).
③ Cal. Prob. Code §§259-59.2.
④ Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1956).
⑤ 144 Me. 263, 278, 68 A.2d 241,251 (1949).
⑥ Wachtell, Proof of Foreign Law in American Courts, 69 U.S.L.Rev. 526, 580, 581 (1935).
⑦ Kales, Presumption of the Foreign Law, 19 Harv. L. Rev. 401 (1906).
① Story, Conflict of Laws §§641-42 (1834).
② William B. Stern, Foreign Lawin the Courts: Judicial Notice and Proof, 45 Cal. L. Rev. 23 1957
③ 同上。
④ 同上。
⑤ Cal. Code Civ. Proc.§§1900, 1901, 1918 (4).
① M.C.L.A. § 600.2118a(3)
② Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §1900.
③ William B. Stem, Foreign Law in the Courts: Judicial Notice and Proof, 45 Cal. L. Rev. 23 1957.
④ Cal. Const. Art. 4, §24.
⑤ William B. Stern, Foreign Law in the Courts: Judicial Notice and Proof, 45 Cal. L. Rev. 23 1957.
① Gutteridge, Comparative Law 49 (2d ed. 1949).
② William B. Stern, Foreign Law in the Courts: Judicial Notice and Proof, 45 Cal. L. Rev. 23 1957, note 69.
③ William B. Stern, 1957.
④ McKenzie & Sarabia, the Pleading and Proof of Alien Law, 30 Tul. L. Rev. 353, 367 (1956).
⑤ William B. Stem, 1957.
⑥ Szladits, Notes on Translations of Foreign Civil and Commercial Codes, 3 Am. J. Como. L. 67(1954).
① Model Expert Testimony Act §6 (1951).
② Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §1902.
① Cal. Code Civ. Proc.§1900.
② 6 Wigmore, Evidence §1703.
③ 6 Wigmore, Evidence § 1697
④ Estate of Leefers, 127 Cal. App. 2d 550,274 P.2d (1954).
⑤ 136 Cal. App. 2d 615, 289 P.2d 53 (1955).
⑥ 127 Cal. App. 2d 550, 274 P. 2d 239 (1954).
① N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §344-a(C)
② 13 Halsbury, Laws of England 615 (2d ed. 1934).
③ Gutteridge, Comparative Law 49 (2d ed. 1949).
④ 136 Cal. App. 2d 615, 289 P.2d 53 (1955).
⑤ 65Cal. App. 2d 232, 150 P. 2d 567 (1944).
① 4 Wigmore, Evidence §1271.
② 36 Cal. 2d416, 224 P.2d 695 (1950).
③ William B. Stern, 1957.
① William B. Stern, 1957.
② 74 Semanario Judicial de la Federacion, 5 Epoca 6050 (1942).
③ William B. Stem, 1957.
④ 13 Halsbury, Laws of England 615 (2d ed. 1934).
⑤ 2 Wigmore, Evidence §564.
① Estate of Leefers, 127 Cal. App. 2d 550,274 P.2d (1954).
② Cal. Code Civ. Proc, § 1875(3),§ 1902.
① The Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act§5.
② United States v. Uhl, 137 F.2d 858, 86l (2d Cir. 1943).
③ Tsangarakis v. Panama S.S. Co., 197 F. Supp. 704, 705 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
④ Ohm v. San Francisco, 92 Cal. 437, 28 Pac. 580 (1891); Payne & Dewey v. Treadwell, 16 Cal. 220 (1860); Holliday v. West 6 Cal. 519 (1856).
⑤ Estate of Kennedy, 106 Cal. App. 2d 612, 235 R2d 837 (1951).
⑥ Sommerich & Busch, The Expert Witness and the Proof of Foreign Law, 38 Cornell L. Q. 125, 154 (1953).
⑦ 8 Beav. 527, 50 Eng. Rep. 207 (Ch. 1845).
① 104 Cal. 407, 38 Pac. 89 (1894).
① 参考William B. Stern, 1957; Sommerich & Busch, (1953)等。
② 同上。
① Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §1871.
② William B. Stern, 1957.
③ Michigan Rules of Evidence (1979).
① Calif. Law Revision Commission, Judicial Notice of the Law of Foreign Countries (1957).
② Pennsylvania Life Insurance Co v. Simoni, 641 N.W.2d 807 (Iowa 2002).
③ N.Y.Leg. Doc., 1943, No. 20, pp.267-303.
④ Walton v. Arabian American Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1956).
⑤ 244 App. Div. 814, 279 N.Y.Supp. 553 (2d Dept. 1935), aft' d, 272 N.Y. 165, 5 N.E.2d 185 (1936).
① 182 Misx. 328, 45 N.Y.S.2d 251 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
① 194 Misc. 308, 86 N.Y.S.2d 232 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
② John Keeffe, William B. Landis, Jr., and Robert B. Shaad, Sense and nonsense about judicial notice, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 664-690, 1950.
③ 9 N.Y. Judicial Council Rep. 271,282 (1934).
④ 182 Misc. 328, 331, 45 N.Y.S.2d 251,253 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
① the Uniform Act. Md. Ann. Code Gen. Laws art. 35, §56 (1939).
② 164 East 72nd Street Corp. v. Ismay, 65 Cal. App. 2d 574, 151 P.2d 29 (4th Dist. 1944).
③ Man. Rev. Stat. c. E150§§31-32(2) (1970)
① Nussbaum, the Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 Yale L. J. 1018, 1041 (1941).
② Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 1(1801).
③ 336 U.S. 386, 396 (1949).
④ Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397; Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Cranch 1, 38; The Scotia, 14 Wall. 170, 188.
⑤ 66 N.M. 64, 343 P.2d 654 (1958).
⑥ 70 P.R. 475,481 (1949).
① 9 Wigmore, Evidence, p767-8.
② M.C.L.A.§600.2114a
① 见Michigan: Michigan Rules of Evidence (1979) Rule 202等。
② Tex. R. Evid. 202 and 203 (1984)
③ Montana: Mont. R. Evid. 202 (1977).
① M.C.L.A.§600.2114a.
② Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1969) Rule 44.1
③ Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.1 (as amended 1972)
① John S. Strahom Jr., Process of Judicial Notice, 14 Va. L. Rev. 544 1927-1928.
① Larkin, J.N.
① 1 Roy R. Ray, Texas Law of Evidence: Civil and Criminal, §153 at 197.
② 328 S.W.2d 823 824 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1959).
③ 1 Roy R. Ray, Texas Law of Evidence: Civil and Criminal, §153 at 197.
④ 546 S.W.2d 306, 310 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
⑤ 498 S.W.2d 708,711 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1973).
① 757 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1988, no writ).
② 807 S.W.2d 635, 638 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no pet.).
① 21 Charles A. Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure §5107, at 510 (1977).
② 762 F.2d 454 (5th Cir. 1985).
① I David W. Louisell & Christopher B. Mueller, Federal Evidence §58, at 454.
② 162 Tex. 481,485, 384 S.W.2d 521,523 (Tex. 1961).
③ Government of Canal Zone v. Burjan, 596 E2d 690, 694 (5th Cir. 1979).
④ Judicial Notice, Commentary by Murl A. Larkin, 1993 Update by Cathleen C. Herasimchuk, 30 Hous. L. Rev. 193 1993-1994.
⑤ 78 Cal.App.2d 124, 130,144 Cal.Rptr. 95, 98 (1978).
① 783 S.W.2d 648, 653 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989).
② 763 S.W.2d 864, 867 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1988, no writ).
③ 739 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1987, no writ).
④ Idaho: Idaho R. Civ. Proc. 44(d) (1979).
① 301 U.S. 292, 302-03 (1937).
② 490A.2d 68, 70-71 (Conn. 1985).
① I Jace B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence Ⅱ 201[05], at 201-51-52, (1990).
② 同上, at201-53-54.
③ 1 Ray,§152, at 195.
① 498 S.W.2d 708,711-12 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1973, no writ).
② 760 F.2d 580, 587 (5th Cir. 1985).
① 498 S.W.2d 708, 711-12 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1973, no writ).
② Higginbotham v. General Life & Accident Ins. Co., 796 S.W.2d 695,696 (Tex. 1990).
③ 740 S.W.2d 37, 38 (Tex. App.—E1 Paso 1987).
④ 846 F.2d 274, 276-77 (5th Cir, 1988).
① 571 So. 2d 926, 928-29 (Miss. 1990).
① Minnesota: Minn. R. Evid. 201 (1977)Advisers; Note.
② 参见本章第一节相关讨论。
③ 612 S.W.2d 503,506 (Tex. 1981).
① 113 Cal. 618, 626, 45 P. 860, 862 (1896).
① 被司法认知的事实是否应该局限于“不具有争议”的事实的相关讨论见“司法认知事实的确定性之争”以及“司法认知的效力”。
② 见U.S. Const. Amends. Ⅵ, Ⅶ.
③ 参见Kohn v. Untied States, 91 U.S. 367 (1876).
④ 参见Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 176, 288 (1930).
⑤ United States v. Standard Oil Co., 24 F.Supp. 575 (W.D.Wis. 1938), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
① the Advisory Committee's Note is from the 1969 Preliminary Draft, 46 F.R.D. 161,204.
② the Report of House Committee on the Judiciary.
① 840 F.2d 315, 322-23 (6th Cir. 1988).
② 816 F.2d 426, 428(8th Cir. 1987).
③ Minnesota: Minn. R. Evid. 201 (1977).
④ Montana: Mont. R. Evid. 201 (1977), Adviser' s Note.
⑤ R.C.M.1947, Section 93-2501-2.
⑥ 56 Mont. 230, 236, 182 P. 270 (1919).
① 122 Mon. 279, 282, 202 P.2d 245 (1949).
② 130 Mont. 476, 491,305 R2d 325 (1956).
③ 146 Mont. 188, 198,405 E2d 642 (1965).
④ Thomas Black, The Texas Rules of Evidence—A Proposed Codification, 31 Sw. L.J. 969, 974 (1977).
① Maine: Me. R. Evid. 201 (1976), Advisers' Note.
② 158 Me. 109, 116, 179A.2d 812, 816 (1962).
③ 12 Me. 8, 149A. 153 (1930).
④ Larkin, J.N.
⑤ 234 E2d 600, 603 (Utah 1951).
① 519 F.2d 1133, 1135 (5th Cir. 1975).
② 378 F.2d 588, 593 (9th Cir. 1967).
③ John H. Wood, Jr., A Brief Outline and Commentary: The Federal Rules of Evidence, 38 Tex. B.J. 535, 536 (1975).
④ Thomas Black, The Texas Rules of Evidence—A Proposed Codification, 31 Sw. L.J. 969, 974 (1977).
⑤ 见Generally Alan W. Scheflin，Jury Nullification：the Right to Say No．，45 S．Cal．L．Rev．168(1972)：讨论了陪审团决定法律和事实问题的权力。
① 254 U.S. 135, 138 (1920).
② 417 F.2d 1002, 1006 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 910 (1970).
③ 416 K2d 165, 182 (1st Cir. 1969).
④ 622 E2d 486,488 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 863 (1980).
⑤ Goverment of Canal Zone v. Burjan, 596 F.2d 690, 694 (5th Cir. 1979).
⑥ 536 K2d 216, 218-21 (8th Cir. 1976).
⑦ Tex. Penal Code Ann.§ 1.07 (a)(11)(A)(Vernon 1974).
① Wigmore, Evidence; §2567.
② McCormick on Evidence;§333, at 935.
① McRae v. Hogen, 576 F.2d 615,616 n.2 (5th Cir. 1978).
② Continental Oil Co. v. Simpson, 604 S.W.2d 530, 535 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
③ 463 S.W.2d 263,265 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1971, no writ).
④ 604 S.W.2d at 535.
① 519 S.W.2d 852, 855 (Tex. 1975).
② Inc., 686 S.W.2d 351,353 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
③ 126 Ind. App.113, 117, 126 N.E.2d 18, 20 (1955).
④ 155 E2d 808 (10th Cir. 1946).
① 这个原则适用于原告对被告疏忽大意的产生有过错的情况下，但是原告的这种过错可以通过被告的行为抵消，如果被告有最后的机会防止伤害的发生但却没有使用合理的注意去这么做。
② Generally Hobart Taylor, Jr., Comment, Evidence—Judicial Notice by Appellate Courts of Facts and Foreign Law Not Bought to the Attention of the Trial Court, 42 Mich. L. Rev. 509, 512-13 (1943).
③ 809 S.W.2d 593,595-96 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1991, no pet.).
① 800 S.W.2d 617 619 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, no writ).
② 604 S.W.2d 530 535 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1980).
③ 735 S.W.2d 522 530 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1987).
④ 768 S.W.2d 911 915 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1989).
⑤ 519 S.W.2d 852 855 (Tex. 1975).
⑥ 740 S.W.2d 74 75-76(Tex. App.—Fort worth 1987, pet. ref' d). rev'd on other grounds, 691 S..W.2d 603 (Tex. 1985).
① 1 David W. Louisell & Christopher B. Mueller, Federal Evidence §58, at 482-83.
② 580 E2d 219 (6th Cir. 1978).
③ 580 E2d 219, 223-24 (6th Cir. 1978).
④ 18 U.S.C. §2510(1)(1988).
① 501 E2d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.969(1974).
② 374 F.2d 97, 103 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 882 (1967).
③ Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence §201.7, at 83-84 & n.13 (3ed. 1991); I Weinstein & Berger, II201[06], at 201-62.
④ Judicial Notice,Commentary by Murl A. Larkin, 1993 Update by Cathleen C. Herasimchuk, 30 Hous. L. Rev. 193 1993-1994.
① Olin G Wellborn Ⅲ, Judicial Notice Under Article Ⅱ of the Texas Rules of Evidence, 19 ST. MARY' S L.J. 1, 14 (1987).
② Stephen A. Saltzburg & Kenneth R. Redden, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 61 (14th ed. 1986).
③ McCormick on Evidence, §331.
④ Jay Bums Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 517 (1924).
⑤ Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711,720, 198 P.2d 17, 22 (1948).
⑥ Potts v. Cole, 140 E2d 470, 476-77 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
⑦ Massey Motor, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92 (1960).
⑧ Durham v. Untied States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
⑨ Mills v. Denver Tramway Corp., 155 E2d 808 (10th Cir. 1946).
⑩ Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960).
① Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
② DeBaker v. Southern Cal. Ry., 106 Cal. 257, 39 R610 (1895).
③ 参见Note, Social and Economic Facts—Appraisal of Suggested Techniques for Presenting Them to the Courts, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 692, 696 (1948).
④ Currie, Appellate Court' s Use of Facts Outside of the Record by Resort to Judicial Notice and Independent Investigation, Wis. L. Rev. 39, 1960.
⑤ McCormick on Evidence, §331.
⑥ Fortunata Giudice, C. William Kraft, Comments: The Presently Expanding Concept of Judicial.Notice, 13 Vill. L. Rev. 563 1936.
① Fortunata Giudice, C. William Kraft, Comments: The Presently Expanding Concept of Judicial Notice, 13 Vill. L. Rev. 563 1936.
② 参见Note, Social and Economic Facts—Appraisal of Suggested Techniques for Presenting Them to the Courts, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 692, 696 (1948).
③ Currie, Appellate Court' s Use of Facts Outside of the Record by Resort to Judicial Notice and Independent Investigation, Wis. L. Rev. 39, 1960.
④ Wigmore, Evidence, §2567.
⑤ 14 Cal.2d 617, 620, 96 P.2d 941,942 (1939).
⑥ 899 F.2d 151 (2d Cir. 1990).
① 299 U.S. 468, (1936).
① 本章关于斯蒂芬的观点都来自Stephen，Evidence，不再逐一注明。
① Woodson D. Scott, the Doctrine of Judicial Notice, 14 Ky. L.J. 237 1925-1926.
② G D. Nokes, the Limits of Judicial Notice, the Law Quarterly Review 1958等。
③ Beardsley v. Irving, 81 Conn. 489,491, 71 Atl. 580, 581 (1909).
④ In Halsbury, The Laws of England, xv(1956) 333; Phipson, Manual of the law of evidence (1950) 12; Morgan, some problems of proof under the Anglo-American System of Litigation (1956)36.
① Edmund M. Morgan, Judicial Notice, Harv. L. Rev. Vol. LVII, Jun. 1944 No.3, p269. 1944.
② 参见中文版《麦考密克论证据》体例编排。
③ McCormick, Evidence, 712.
④ 资料与证据的区别参见第五章司法认知程序第二节听证机会。
⑤ 本章关于塞耶的观点都来自于Thayer，Evidence，不再逐一注明。
① 28 Ind.272(1867).
① John T. McNaughton, Judicial Notice—Excepts Relating to the Morgan-Wigmore Controversy,14 Vand. L. Rev. 779-805, 1960-1961; John S. Strahorn Jr., Process of Judicial Notice, 14 Va. L. Rev. 5,44 1927-1928.
② John S. Strahorn Jr., Process of Judicial Notice, 14 Va. L. Rev, 544 1927-1928.
① 本章关于威格莫尔的观点来自9Wigmore，Evidence，§2565，2567，不再逐一注明。
② Thayer,Evidence,p308-9.
① Timson v. Manufacturers Coal & Coke Co., 220 Mo. 580,598, 119 S.W. 565,569 (1909).
② 本章关于摩根的观点都来自于Morgan，J．N．，不再逐一注明。
① John T. McNaughton, Judicial Notice—Excerpts Relating to the Morgan-Wigmore Cont-roversy,14 Vand. L. Rev. 779-805, 1960-1961.
① Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, 1827.
② Y.B. 35 Hy. VI. Mich. P1.35.
① 1330r. 95,285 P. 1105 (1930).
① Mills v. Denver Tramway Corp., 155 F.2d 808 (10th Cir. 1946).
② McCormick, Judicial Notice, 5 Vand. L. Rev. 296, 321-322 (1952).
① Edie v. East-India Co. (1761) 2 Burr. 1216, at pp 1222-1224.
② Neeves v. Burrage (1894) 14 Q.B. 504.
③ Camden v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1914) 1 K.B. 641, at pp. 647-650, C.A.
④ Foster v. Globe Venture Syndicate, Ltd. (1900) 1 Ch. 811.
⑤ Davey v Harrow Corporation [[195712W.L.R. 941; [1957] 2 All E.R. 305].
① the Law of Evidence (1921) 19; (1952) 19.
② 同上。
③ L.R. 9Q.B. 374 (1874).
④ G D. Nokes, the Limits of Judicial Notice, the Law Quarterly Review 1958.
⑤ 4J.P. 155 (1840).
① 3 K.B. 198(1912),atpp. 202,211, D.C.
② 如在司法认知的效力一节中曾经引用过的Timson v．Manufacturers Coal & Coke Co．[220 Mo．580，598，119S．W． 565，569(1909)]案件。格雷夫斯(Graves)法官代表密苏里州最高院的大部分意见说：“司法认知事实，像许多由法庭采取的推定一样，仅仅是一项证据规则，如果议题是一个有争议的事项，或是能被争议的事项，那么质疑的证据就必须具有效力并且应该予以采纳。”
① Stephen A. Saltzburg & Kenneth R. Redden, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 61 (4th ed. 1986).
② Strahorn J.N.
③ Keeffe, J.N.
④ 513 S.W.2d 131,134 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1974, writ of ref'd n.r.e.) cert. denied, 421 U.S. 913 (1975).
⑤ 463 S.W.2d 263,265 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1971, no wirt).
⑥ 162 Tex. 481,484, 384 S.W.2d 521,522 (1961).
① 参见《刑事证据大全》，乔恩．R．华尔兹著，伺家弘译，中国人民公安大学出版社1993年版。
① 江伟主编：《证据法学》，法律出版社1999年版，第151页。
① 参见第三章第二节司法认知事实的衡量标准，二、(三)资料的种类。
② 毕玉谦：《民事证据法判例实务研究》，法律出版社1999年版，第399页。
③ Thayer, Evidence, p278-279.
④ Montana: Mont. R. Evid. 202 (1977), Rule 202. Judicial Notice of Law.
⑤ Montana: Mont. R. Evid. 202 (1977), Advisor's Comment.
① 参见毕玉谦，《试论民事诉讼中的司法认知》，《中外法学》1999年第一期。
② 李晓梅《试论民事案件中司法认知的扩张》，http://www.ncclj.com/Article_Show.asp?ArticleID=510
③ 方清伟《民事诉讼证明过程中的司法认知》http://lunwen.dudul63.net/html/63/19700101/13564_html
① 参见卞建林主编，《证据法学》，中国政法大学出舨社2005年版。
② 参见陈卫东、谢佑平主编，《证据法学》，复旦大学出版社2005年版。
③ 参见陈光中主编，《中华人民共和国刑事证据法专家拟制稿》，中国法制出版社2004年版。
④ 毕玉谦等著，《中国证据法草案建议稿及论证》，法律出版社2003年版。
⑤ 陈卫东主编，《模范刑事诉讼法典》，中国人民大学出版社2005年。
① 转引自李晓梅《试论民事案件中司法认知的扩张》。
② 转引自李晓梅《试论民事案件中司法认知的扩张》。
① 参见毕玉谦《试论民事诉讼中的司法认知》，李晓梅《试论民事案件中司法认知的扩张》。
② 李学灯著，《证据法比较研究》，五南图书出版公司1995年版，第44页。
③ 同上，第12页。
④ 同上第13页。
① 参见《行政诉讼法》第5条、第52条、第54条等。
② 参见《宪法》第5条第2款关于宪法最高效力的规定以及第62条第(2)项、第67条第(1)项关于宪法实施的监督的规定，2000年制定的立法法第90条、91条为全国人大常委会审查和判断行政法规和地方性法规的合宪性提供了具体的程序。
① Pastrick v. S. S. Kresge Co., 288 Mass. 194, 192 N. E. 485.; Welch v. Rollman & Sons Co., 70 Ohio App. 515, 44 N. E. 2d. 726.
② 参见[日]高桥宏志著，林剑锋译，《民事诉讼法制度与理论的深层分析》，法律出版社2003年版，第401页。
1．陈光中主编：《中华人民共和国刑事证据法专家拟制稿》，中国法制出版社2004年版。
2．江伟主编：《证据法学》，法律出版社1999年版。
3．樊崇义主编：《证据法学》，法律出版社2004年版。
4．卞建林主编：《证据法学》，中国政法大学出版社2005年版。
5．宋英辉、孙长永、刘新魁等著：《外国刑事诉讼法》，法律出版社2006年版。
6．刘金友主编：《证据法学》，中国政法大学出版社2003年版。
7．陈卫东、谢佑平主编：《证据法学》，复旦大学出版社2005年版。
8．陈卫东主编：《模范刑事诉讼法典》，中国人民大学出版社2005年。
9．毕玉谦、郑旭、刘善春著：《中国证据法草案建议稿及论证》，法律出版社2003年版。
10．毕玉谦主编：《民事证据法判例实务研究》，法律出版社1999年版。
11．何家弘主编：《新编证据法学》，法律出版社2000年版。
12．刘善春、毕玉谦、郑旭著：《诉讼证据规则研究》，中国法制出版社2000年版。
13．李国光主编：《最高人民法院<关于民事诉讼证据的若干规定>的理解与适用》中国法制出版社2002年版。
14．乔宪志主编：《中国证据制度与司法适用》，法律出版社2002年版。
15．叶自强著：《民事证据研究》，法律出版社1999年版。
16．罗玉珍、高委主编：《民事证明制度与理论》法律出版社2003年版。
17．梁慧星主编，叶自强著：《民事证据研究》，法律出版社1999年版。
18．吕利秋著：《行政诉讼举证责任》，中国政法大学出版社2001年版。
19．[台]李学灯著：《证据法比较研究》，五南图书出版公司1995年版。
20．王永挺、王鲁峰：《论司法认知》，《科学经济社会》2002年第1期。
21．方清伟：《民事诉讼证明过程中的司法认知》http://lunwen.dudu163.net/html/63/19700101/13564.html
22．李晓梅：《试论民事案件中司法认知的扩张》，http://www.ncclj.com/Article_Show.asp?ArticleID=510
23．陈成见、斯根成：《司法认知规则的特征》，《人民法院报》2002年7月30日 理论版。
24．毕玉谦：《试论民事诉讼中的司法认知》，《中外法学》1999年第一期。
25．潘文壮：《司法认知的理论以及立法思考》，http://www.hicourt.gov.cn/theory/artilce_list.asp?id= 1872&l_class=2
26．叶自强：《司法认知论》，《法学研究》1996年第4期。
27．李红军：《论我国司法解释上的司法认知》，http://www.law-lib.com/lw/lw_view.asp?no=6883
28．梁玉超：《司法认知：问题与前瞻》，http://www.dffy.com
29．白绿铉、卞建林译：《美国联邦刑事诉讼规则和证据规则》，中国法制出版社2000年版。
30．[美]乔恩·R·华尔兹著，何家弘译：《刑事证据大全》，中国人民公安大学出版社1993年版。
31．[美]罗纳德·J·艾伦、理查德·B·库恩斯、埃莉诺·斯威夫特著，张保生、王进喜、赵滢译：《证据法：文本、问题和案例》，高等教育出版社2006年版。
32．约翰·W·斯特龙主编，汤维建等译：《麦考密克论证据》，中国政法大学2004年版。
33．约瑟夫·斯托里著，毛国权译：《美国宪法评注》，上海三联书店2006年版。
34．伟恩·R·拉费弗、杰罗德·H·伊斯雷尔、南西·J·金著，卞建林、沙丽金等译：《刑事诉讼法》(上下册)，中国政法大学出版社2003年版。
35．[日]高桥宏志著，林剑锋译：《民事诉讼法制度与理论的深层分析》，法律出版社2003年版，第401页。
1. Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, 1827.
2. Thomas Starkie, A Practical Treatise of the Law of Evidence and Digest of Proofs in Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 3d edition. London, 1842.
3. James FitzJames Stephen, A Digest of the Law of the Evidence, 3rd, 1874.
4. James Bradley Thayer, a Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law, London: Sweet and Maxwell, Limited, 3, Chancery Lane, 1898.
5. Halsbury, Laws of England 615, 2d ed. 1934.
6. Graham C. Lilly, An Introduction to the Law of Evidence, 1978.
7. John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law, 1983.
8. John Smith, Criminal Evidence, London Sweet & Maxwell, 1995.
9. Cross, Cross on Evidence(Third Austrilian Edition), Butterworths, 1986.
10. Peter Murphy, Murphy on Evidence, Blackstone Press Limited, 1997.
11. McCormick on Evidence, Fifth Edition, by John W. Strong, General Editor, West Group ST. PAUL, MINN, 1999.
12. Jon R. Waltz, Introduction to Criminal Evidence, fourth edition, Nelson-Hall Publishers/Chicago, 1995.
13. W. P. Wade, Judicial Notice of Facts, 5 S. L. Rev, 1879-1880.
14. E. W. Metcalfe, Matters Requiring Judicial Notice, 37 Am. L. Reg, 1889.
15. Ballade of Judicial Notice, 9 L. Q. Rev, 1893.
16. Arthur M. Alger, Conclusivness of a Domestic Judgement as Affected by the Rank of the Court Which Rendered it, 33 Am. L. Rev, 1899.
17. James Bradley Thayer, Judicial Notice and The Law of Evidence, 7 Harvard L. Rev, 1890.
18. William Trickett, Judicial Notice, 9 F. Forum 67,1904-1905.
19. Dr. M. I. Clear, A Handy Treatise upon the Subject of Judicial Notice, 1 Marq. L. Rev, 1916-1917.
20. Note, 30 Yale L.J., 1921.
21. Isaacs, The Law and the Facts, 22 Colum. L. Rev, 1922.
22. Huggins, Just What Has the Supreme Court Done to the Kansas Industrial Act (1925)II A.B.A.J. 363.
23. John S. Strahorn Jr., The Procedure of Judicial Notice, 14 Va. L. Rev. 544, 1927-1928.
24. Kenneth Culp Davis, A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience, p69, Perspectives of Law, Essays for Austin Wakeman Scott, Edited by Roscoe Pound ect. Little, Brown and Boston. Toronto, 1964.
25. Kales, Presumption of the Foreign Law, 19 Harv. L. Rev, 1906.
26. Woodson D. Scott, the Doctrine of Judicial Notice, 14 Ky. L.J, 1925-1926.
27. York, Unjudicial Notes on Judicial Notice, 13 Rocky Mtn. L. Rev, 1941.
28. Nussbaum, the Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 Yale L. J, 1941.
29. Fred B. Patton, Evidence: Judicial Notice not Taken of Statutory Agent for Service of Process, 6 Miss. L. J, 1933-1934.
30. Wachtell, Proof of Foreign Law in American Courts, 69 U. S. L. Rev, 1935.
31. Hobart Taylor, Jr., Comment, Evidence—Judicial Notice by Appellate Courts of Facts and Foreign Law Not Bought to the Attention of the Trial Court, 42 Mich. L. Rev., 1943.
32. Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 Harv. L. Rev., 1942.
33. R.T.K., Annotation, Propriety of Instructions on Matters of Common Knowledge, 144 A.L.R., 1943.
34. Edmund M. Morgan, Judicial Notice, 3 Harv. L. Rev. Vol. LVII., 1944.
35. Kathryn H. Baldwin and Emily P. Dodge, a Code of Evidenxe for Wisconsin-Judicial Notice and the Model Code of Evidence, Wis. L. Rev., 1945.
36. Kenneth Culp Davis, Official Notice, 62 Harv. L. Rev., 1949.
37. John Keeffe, William B. Landis, and Robert B. Shaad, Sense and Nonsense about judicial notice, 2 Stan. L. Rev., 1949-1950.
38. Note, the Hearsay Rule in Civil Antitrust Suits, 60 Yale L.J., 1951.
39. McCormick, Judicial Notice, 5 Vand. L. Rev., 1952.
40. Charels R. Jones, Judicial Notice, 5 Okla. L. Rev., 1952.
41. Charles V. Laughlin, in Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 Mich. L. Rev., 1953.
42. Donald J. Prebenda, Judicial Notice and the Communist Party, 29 Notre Dame L., 1953-1954.
43. Szladits, Notes on Translations of Foreign Civil and Commercial Codes, 3 Am. J. Como. L., 1954.
44. Report of the Committee on the Revision of the Law of Evidence to the Supreme Court of New Jersey 6, May 25,1955.
45. Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 Colum. L. Rev., 1955.
46. Edmund M. Morgan, Some problems of proof under the Anglo-American System of Litigation, 1956.
47. McKenzie & Sarabia, the Pleading and Proof of Alien Law, 30 Tul. L. Rev., 1956.
48. McKenzie & Sarabia, the Pleading and Proof of Alien Law, 30 Tul. L. Rev., 1956.
49. Calif. Law Revision Commission, Judicial Notice of the Law of Foreign Countries, 1957.
50. William B. Stern, Foreign Law in the Courts: Judicial Notice and Proof, 45 Cal. L. Rev., 1957.
51. G. D. Nokes, the Limits of Judicial Notice, the Law Quarterly Review 1958.
52. George R. Currie, Appellate Court Use of Facts Outside of the Record to Judicial Notice and Independent Investigation, Wis. L. Rev., 1960.
53. John T. McNaughton, Judicial Notice—Excerpts Relating to the Morgan-Wigmore Controversy, 14 Vand. L. Rev., 1960-1961.
54. Kleri, Judicial Notice of Scientific Facts, 15 Clev. -Mar. L. Rev., 1966.
55. Warren F. Schwaritz, Suggestion for the Demise of Judicial Notice of Judicial Facts, 45 Tex. L. Rev., 1966-1967.
56. E. F. Roberts, Preliminary Notes Toward a Study of Judicial Notice, 52 Comell L. Rev., 1966-1967.
57. Cleary, Foreword [to Symposium on Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence], Law & the Social Order (now Ariz. St. L. J.), 1969.
58. Richard Jackson, Comments: the Binding Effect of Judicial Notice under the Common Knowledge Test, 21 Baylor L. Rev., 1969.
59. Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial Notice, Law &Soc. order, 1969.
60. Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: the Right to Say No, 45 S. Cal. L. Rev., 1972.
61. John Rolfe Eldridge, Judicial Notice, 27 Ark. L. Rev., 1973.
62. Harry G. Fins,. Judicial Notice--The Illinois Anomaly, 7 J. Marshall J. Prac., 1973-1974.
63. E. F. Roberts, Judicial Notice: an Exercise in Exorcism, 19 N. Y. L. F., 1973-1974.
64. John H. Wood, Jr., A Brief Outline and Commentary: The Federal Rules of Evidence, 38 Tex. B. J., 1975.
65. Charles Edward Suffling, Judicial Notice, 48 Miss. L. J., 1977.
66. Thomas Black, The Texas Rules of Evidence—A Proposed 'Codification, 31 Sw. L. J., 1977.
67. Bitterman, the Evaluation of Psychological Propositions, in Levin, Evidence and the Behavioral Sciences Ⅲ-A-16 (mimeo. 1956).
68. William J. Flittie, Judicial Notice in the Trial of Complex Cases -the Sherman Act §1 Per Se as a Testing Ground, 31 Sw. L. J., 1977.
69. D. W. Elliott, Elloitt and Phipson: Manual of the Law of Evidence, 1980.
70. Allan R. Flanz, Judicial Notice, 18 Alta. L. Rev., 1980.
71. Roger Wm. Bennett, Church Property Disputes in the Age of "Common-Core Protestantism": A Legislative Facts Rationale for Neutral Principles of Law, 57 Ind. L. J., 1981-1982.
72. Dennis J. Tumer, Judicial Notice and Federal Rules of Evidence 201-A Rule Ready for Change, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev., 1983-1984.
73. Stephen A. Saltzburg & Kenneth R. Redden, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual, 4th ed. 1986.
74. John. Van Der Berg, Judicial Notice or Racial Claptrap - A Footnote, 104 S. African L. J., 1987.
75. Robert E. Keeton, Legislative Facts and Similar Things- Deciding Disputed Premise Facts, 73 Minn. L. Rev., 1988-1989.
76. Anita Cava, Taking Judicial Notice of Sexual Stereotyping, 43 Ark. L, Rev., 1990.
77. Robert Banks and Elizabeth T. Collins, Judicial Notice in Tennessee, 21 Mem. St. U. L. Rev., 1990-1991.
78. Judicial Notice, Commentary by Murl A. Larkin, 1993 Update by Cathleen C. Herasimchuk, 30 Hous. L. Rev., 1993-1994.
79. Susan G. Drummond, Judicial Notice- The Very Texture of Legal Reasoning, 15 Can. J. L. & Soc., 2000.
80. Richard B. Cappalli, Bringing Internet Information to Court: of "Legislative Facts" , 75 Temp. L. Rev., 2002.