新疆食品经营主体信用监管研究
摘要
随着我国市场经济的发展和不断深入,市场经营主体信用缺失问题越来越严重,食品领域经营主体缺乏信用尤显突出和严重。食品安全和食品经营者的失信问题已经引发了政府信任危机和消费信任危机,严重影响了食品消费和食品加工业的健康发展。本文旨在通过对新疆食品经营主体信用监管问题的研究,建立能有效制约食品经营主体违法或失信行为,保证食品安全的监管模式,以期减少食品安全问题的发生,促进以农业为主的新疆食品工业的健康发展。
建立有效的监管模式是研究食品经营主体信用监管的一个主要目标。本文第一部分提出了研究的问题、目的、研究思路、方法以及国内外相关研究成果,并介绍了与本文研究相关的理论。第二部分(第三、四、五章)从新疆食品经营主体信用现状、交易博弈、制度约束、管理机制等方面分析食品经营主体信用缺失的成因,从而提出建立食品经营主体信用监管体系的问题所在。并依据公共行政学原理分析食品市场主体(食品经营者、食品消费者、政府、信用中介机构等)在食品经营市场主体信用监管体系中的地位和作用。本文第三章对新疆食品经营主体的特点进行分析,提出了食品经营主体监管的难点。第四章运用博弈论方法建立完全信息和不完全信息条件下食品市场主体分区域的一次性和重复性交易博弈模型以及政府和食品经营者的博弈模型,并分析提出了食品经营主体信用缺失在交易和监管中存在消费者信息不完全、政府监管不力等原因,通过对比分析,提出了信用缺失的制度原因。在第五章中,分析与市场主体信用紧密相关的各类市场主体—政府、消费者、市场经营主体、媒体等在食品经营主体信用监管中所起的作用和担当的角色。第六章通过比较分析等方法筛选建立基于监管的食品市场主体信用评价指标体系,分析信用信息数据库内容以及信息采集、信息共享的措施。通过系统分析,在第七章中提出了本文的结论,即建立在全社会监督下的以政府为主导、全社会参与的食品经营主体信用监管模式,并在第八章中提出建立市场主体信用监管模式运行机制的政策建议。
本研究选择信用问题突出的食品经营主体作为信用监管的研究对象,提出了新疆食品经营主体信用监管模式、运行机制和对策建议,以期能为建立合理合法、运转顺畅、监管有力的市场主体信用长效监管机制和完善社会信用监管体系提供借鉴与参考。
With the development and gradually deepening of China's market economy, the problem of lack of credit in proprietor become more and more serious, especially in the food market. The problem of food safety and food operators’losing credit has triggered the crisis of government confidence and consumer confidence, which has seriously affected the healthy development of food consumption and food processing industry. This paper aims to establish the supervision mode which could effectively constraint illegal or dishonesty actions of food proprietor and ensure food safety or reduce the food safety problem and promote the healthy development of agriculture-based food industry in Xinjiang through studying on credit supervision of food proprietor in Xinjiang.
The establishment of an effective supervision approach is a major goal for studying on supervision of food proprietor credit. The first part of this paper put forward problems, purpose, ideas, methods of study and relevant research results at home and abroad, and introduce the relevant theories that are related to research. The second part of this paper (chapter III, IV and V) analyze the main causes of credit loss of food proprietor in Xinjiang from the credit status, game analysis, regulation constraints, public administration mechanism, the main problems of the establishment of food proprietor credit supervision system are put forward. And the status and role of food markets players (food proprietor, food consumers, the Government, the credit intermediary institutions, etc.) in the system of food proprietor credit supervision is analyzed according to the theory of Public Administration. The main characteristics of the food proprietor in Xinjiang are analyzed and the main difficulties of supervision are put forward in the Chapter III of this paper. In chapter IV the one-time and repetitive transaction model and the game model between government and food operators of the main food market under the sub-region on the condition of information and incomplete information is established through using the method of game theory, the existing causes and impact factors which are the incomplete information of consumer and inadequate government supervision are analyzed and put forward in the transactions of the lack of credit of the main food proprietor and the supervision of government. By comparing and analyzing, the regulation cause of loss of credit is put forward. In chapter V, the roles and functions of market players-government, consumers, market operators are analyzed, which is closely related to the credit supervision of food proprietor. In chapter VI, by comparing and analyzing, the index system of credit evaluation basing on supervision is filtered and established. It is studied that the content of credit information databases and the measure of information-collection and information-sharing. The above analysis and conclusions are summed up in Chapter VII. The conclusions of this paper is put forward, which the supervision mode of food proprietor credit is established under the government-led and full community participation. In Chapter VIII, some policy proposals are put forward to promote the operating mechanism of the mode of food proprietor credit supervision.
Because the issue of credit of food proprietor is more highlight in current, food proprietor are choosed as the object of study in this paper. The mode of credit supervision, the operation mechanisms and the countermeasure of food proprietor in Xinjiang are put forward in order to give some advices and provide reference for establishing the long effective supervision mechanism of credit proprietor which is reasonable, legitimate and functioning smoothly and for improving the social credit system.
建立有效的监管模式是研究食品经营主体信用监管的一个主要目标。本文第一部分提出了研究的问题、目的、研究思路、方法以及国内外相关研究成果,并介绍了与本文研究相关的理论。第二部分(第三、四、五章)从新疆食品经营主体信用现状、交易博弈、制度约束、管理机制等方面分析食品经营主体信用缺失的成因,从而提出建立食品经营主体信用监管体系的问题所在。并依据公共行政学原理分析食品市场主体(食品经营者、食品消费者、政府、信用中介机构等)在食品经营市场主体信用监管体系中的地位和作用。本文第三章对新疆食品经营主体的特点进行分析,提出了食品经营主体监管的难点。第四章运用博弈论方法建立完全信息和不完全信息条件下食品市场主体分区域的一次性和重复性交易博弈模型以及政府和食品经营者的博弈模型,并分析提出了食品经营主体信用缺失在交易和监管中存在消费者信息不完全、政府监管不力等原因,通过对比分析,提出了信用缺失的制度原因。在第五章中,分析与市场主体信用紧密相关的各类市场主体—政府、消费者、市场经营主体、媒体等在食品经营主体信用监管中所起的作用和担当的角色。第六章通过比较分析等方法筛选建立基于监管的食品市场主体信用评价指标体系,分析信用信息数据库内容以及信息采集、信息共享的措施。通过系统分析,在第七章中提出了本文的结论,即建立在全社会监督下的以政府为主导、全社会参与的食品经营主体信用监管模式,并在第八章中提出建立市场主体信用监管模式运行机制的政策建议。
本研究选择信用问题突出的食品经营主体作为信用监管的研究对象,提出了新疆食品经营主体信用监管模式、运行机制和对策建议,以期能为建立合理合法、运转顺畅、监管有力的市场主体信用长效监管机制和完善社会信用监管体系提供借鉴与参考。
With the development and gradually deepening of China's market economy, the problem of lack of credit in proprietor become more and more serious, especially in the food market. The problem of food safety and food operators’losing credit has triggered the crisis of government confidence and consumer confidence, which has seriously affected the healthy development of food consumption and food processing industry. This paper aims to establish the supervision mode which could effectively constraint illegal or dishonesty actions of food proprietor and ensure food safety or reduce the food safety problem and promote the healthy development of agriculture-based food industry in Xinjiang through studying on credit supervision of food proprietor in Xinjiang.
The establishment of an effective supervision approach is a major goal for studying on supervision of food proprietor credit. The first part of this paper put forward problems, purpose, ideas, methods of study and relevant research results at home and abroad, and introduce the relevant theories that are related to research. The second part of this paper (chapter III, IV and V) analyze the main causes of credit loss of food proprietor in Xinjiang from the credit status, game analysis, regulation constraints, public administration mechanism, the main problems of the establishment of food proprietor credit supervision system are put forward. And the status and role of food markets players (food proprietor, food consumers, the Government, the credit intermediary institutions, etc.) in the system of food proprietor credit supervision is analyzed according to the theory of Public Administration. The main characteristics of the food proprietor in Xinjiang are analyzed and the main difficulties of supervision are put forward in the Chapter III of this paper. In chapter IV the one-time and repetitive transaction model and the game model between government and food operators of the main food market under the sub-region on the condition of information and incomplete information is established through using the method of game theory, the existing causes and impact factors which are the incomplete information of consumer and inadequate government supervision are analyzed and put forward in the transactions of the lack of credit of the main food proprietor and the supervision of government. By comparing and analyzing, the regulation cause of loss of credit is put forward. In chapter V, the roles and functions of market players-government, consumers, market operators are analyzed, which is closely related to the credit supervision of food proprietor. In chapter VI, by comparing and analyzing, the index system of credit evaluation basing on supervision is filtered and established. It is studied that the content of credit information databases and the measure of information-collection and information-sharing. The above analysis and conclusions are summed up in Chapter VII. The conclusions of this paper is put forward, which the supervision mode of food proprietor credit is established under the government-led and full community participation. In Chapter VIII, some policy proposals are put forward to promote the operating mechanism of the mode of food proprietor credit supervision.
Because the issue of credit of food proprietor is more highlight in current, food proprietor are choosed as the object of study in this paper. The mode of credit supervision, the operation mechanisms and the countermeasure of food proprietor in Xinjiang are put forward in order to give some advices and provide reference for establishing the long effective supervision mechanism of credit proprietor which is reasonable, legitimate and functioning smoothly and for improving the social credit system.
引文
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