高考志愿填报与录取机制研究
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摘要
高考一直是社会各界高度关注的焦点话题。在高校招生录取这个庞大系统工程中,志愿填报和录取机制属于其中一个关键而复杂的子系统,同时也是高考制度改革的重点和难点。当前我国志愿填报和录取机制还是存在一些突出的弊端,比如考生志愿偏好表达不完全,信息不充分,博弈成分较大,“高分低录”和“高分落榜”现象无法避免,等等。本文基于经济学的效率和公平概念,试图从资源配置角度对这些问题进行梳理和分析,并结合国外相关文献的研究成果和实践经验,探索我国高考志愿填报和录取机制改革的方向。
概括而论,本文的学术贡献主要体现在三点：(1)研究视角新颖。与其他大部分文献不同,本文基于经济学的效率和公平概念,试图从资源配置角度研究志愿填报和录取机制。(2)研究方法独特。本文采用的方法主要包括文献资料法、博弈理论、蒙特卡洛模拟法、实证研究法和调查访谈法,是至今为止第一篇从经济学角度对该问题进行深刻分析的博士论文。(3)研究结论具有可实践性。通过严谨的理论推导和深入的数据挖掘,本文全面剖析了我国高考志愿填报和录取机制改革取得的成绩以及存在的弊端,并结合国外相关文献的研究成果和实践经验,为我国高考招生制度改革提出了一些切实可行的建议。
本文总共分为六章。第一章是绪论,主要阐述了选题的意义和研究的价值,概括了本文研究的方法和贡献。第二章主要回顾和总结了我国高考志愿填报和录取机制的历史变革,包括志愿填报和录取实现手段、志愿填报方式、投档方式和志愿设置情况。通过对高考制度恢复以后高考志愿填报和录取机制发展历程的梳理,探索其演变规律,分析各地采取不同政策的原因以及未来发展的方向。第三章从资源配置的角度分析考前填报、考后估分填报、考后知分填报和实时动态志愿等四种志愿填报方式的优劣。第四章讨论的内容围绕高考录取机制展开。首先,本文分析了传统梯度志愿固有的弊端,然后针对目前教育部拟在全国推行的平行志愿提出了改进的途径和方式。最后,本文根据国外文献在学校录取问题方面的研究成果以及实践经验提出了一种既能让考生真实表达其偏好,又能体现公平和效率,还能化解统一高考与自主招生之间矛盾的一种机制——Gale-Shapley学生最优机制。第五章首先通过对我校学生微观数据的计量分析,从高校人才培养和大学生就业与升学角度探讨了高校招生录取评价标准,为将来志愿填报和录取机制改革的必要性提供了实证支持。然后,本文还从受教育机会的公平性角度探讨了我国高考录取制度中另一个敏感问题——文理分科。最后一章是结论,综合前面的分析结果,归纳本文研究的基本结论,对高考志愿填报和录取机制改革的基本走向提出可行性建议。
本文主要的研究结论和政策建议如下：
(1)考前、估分和知分填报各有利弊,但都无法实现效率与公平的统一。
从整体考生的录取率考虑,知分填报优于估分填报,估分填报优于考前填报,从资源配置的效率考虑,随着分数信息的增多,整体考生的福利能够得到更大的改善,但其中一部分考生的福利改善是以其他一些考生的福利损失为代价。考前填报虽然在公平性和筛选人才效率方面具有优势,但资源浪费较大；知分填报的考生整体福利最高,但不公平现象严重；如果估分误差控制在一定范围之内,虽然能够提高公平性,但也只是一种中庸之道,它既不是资源利用率最高的,也不是公平程度最高的。因此,在不完全信息条件下,无法实现效率与公平的统一。
(2)实时动态志愿能够兼顾公平与效率,因此,它可能将成为我国志愿填报改革的方向和目标。
实时动态志愿消除了由于不完全信息所导致的志愿填报博弈。以考生成绩为衡量标准,这种方式能够提高所有上线考生的录取率,并且能够提高在知分填报时所有考生的效用。实时动态志愿虽然相较于估分填报和考前填报没有实现“帕累托改进”,但如果从维护大多数考生,尤其是好成绩考生的利益时,这种方式比前三种方式都更优。虽然如此,对于高质量考生而言,这种“光鲜亮丽”的志愿填报方式仍然不及考前填报,因为这部分考生的录取概率和效用在考前填报模式下依旧是最高的。
(3)实行多次高考制度,让考生高考成绩能够体现真实水平。
给予更多的考生偏好信息固然能够解决“高分低就”或“高分落榜”的弊端,但依然没有真正维护到好质量考生的利益。要实现这一终极目标,必须减少甚至消除考生质量与高考成绩之间的误差。解决办法可以考虑采取多次高考制度,或者将考生能力测评更加客观、科学、公平地体现在高考分数之上,让考生高考成绩能够体现其真实水平。
(4)梯度志愿弊端严重,应该逐步淘汰于高考录取机制。
梯度志愿投档方式(即波士顿机制)算法最简单,在计算机还未普及之前被广泛运用于解决学校录取问题。但是,波士顿机制既不是公平的,也不是帕累托最优。最重要的是,它不具有抗策略性。由于真实申报偏好会导致不公平的匹配结果,因此学生有很强的激励去“操纵”偏好。但对每个家长和考生来说,填好志愿并非易事,特别是在信息不充分的情况下。
(5)平行志愿推进了公平与效率,但还存在继续改进的空间。
如果每个学校都以分数来评价学生,平行志愿就是一个公平、无浪费、个人理性、抗策略,并且帕累托最优的录取机制。但是,当考生填报志愿的数目受到限制时,平行志愿就达不到这种理想效果,并且也不能完全解决填报志愿难的问题。不过,我们的模拟分析表明,在知分填报或者竞争增大时,志愿数目受限的平行志愿也优于梯度志愿,大大缓解了“高分低就”或“高分落榜”现象,而部分平行志愿收效甚微。从福利角度考虑,平行志愿相对于梯度志愿并非“帕累托改进”,不过从分数公平角度说,这就是一种进步。而增加考生填报志愿数目,减小高校投档比例,按大类招生或打破校际次序以专业志愿为准,这些措施可以进一步提高公平和效率。
(6)Gale-Shapley机制是一个更好的录取机制选择。
无偏好限制的平行志愿和实时动态志愿都能达成公平与效率,不过,其前提假设是高校都以分数评价考生。如果允许高校对考生有不同偏好,即高校不再“唯分论人”,都根据各自的评价标准录取考生,那么,Gale-Shapley机制就是一个很好的选择,因为这种算法既是公平的,也是抗策略的,并且其匹配结果相对于其他任何公平的匹配结果都是“帕累托改进”。它能够化解统一高考与自主招生之间的矛盾,赋予高校更充分的自主招生权力,促进“多元化评价”的实施与推行。
(7)取消文理分科能够提高文科考生录取概率,促进教育公平。
历年来,文科考生录取率都远远低于理科考生,这意味着文科考生没有享受到公平的受教育机会。取消分科之后上线文科考生的录取概率将增加,这是由于文科考生录取比例的增加(竞争程度的减少)以及整体排名上升的结果。因此,取消分科可以改善文理考生录取率差异较大的现象,这在维护考生利益、推进教育公平方面具有深刻的价值和意义。
(8)建立和完善科学、客观的综合评价机制,实行统一考试与自主招生制度。
通过对我校学生微观数据的计量分析发现,当前的高考分数在一定程度能反映出学生掌握和运用知识的能力,为高校选拔新生提供了比较科学的评价依据,但考生的综合素质也应成为评价体系中的一个重要组成部分,而且不同的院校应有不同的评价标准。这为将来志愿填报和录取机制改革的必要性提供了实证支持。
综上所述,在现行全国高考制度下,分数是评价考生能力、平等享有受高等教育机会的最客观的依据。在这种评价标准下,实时动态志愿和偏好不受限制的平行志愿最能体现公平与效率。随着“多元化评价”、“多样化选拔”成为高校招生考试制度改革的重要目标取向,纯粹“按分分配”的录取规则俨然已经不能跟上改革步伐。在这种大环境和大趋势下,必然要求推出一种崭新的录取机制。这种机制就是本文所建议的Gale-Shapley机制。
This paper discusses application and admission mechanism in the National College Entrance Exam. Application and admission mechanism is a key and difficult part during the NCEE reform. It is associcated closely with the populace interest, and plays an important role in promoting education fairness and education for all-around development.
The contributions this paper makes are summaried in three aspects:(1) the research perspective is new. Different from most other studies, this paper trys to analyze application and admission machenism from the perspective of resource allocation based on the efficiency and fairness concept in economics. (2) The study methods are unique. The methods used in this paper include literature review, game theory, montecarlo simulation, empirical study and interview.This is the first doctoral dissertation studying from the economics perpective. (3) The suggestions this paper proposes are practical. Through theory and impirical study, this paper analyzes deeply the achievement of application and admission mechanism reform and the disadvantages exist in it. Based on the research findings and practice experiences in developed contries, this paper gives some useful and practical advices on the application and admission mechanism reform.
This paper is arranged in six chapters, which are summaried as follows:
The first chapter discusses the importance, contribution and framework of this paper. The second chapter reviews the historical trend of application and admission mechanism in NCEE. (1) Application and admission methods. With the development of internet technology and educational informatization, application methods changed from 'application in paper form' to 'application on line'. As for the admission methods, it developed in three stages: 'manual operation','computer assistance' and 'admission on line'. (2) Application timing. There are three kinds of application timing:'application before exam (ABE)','application after exam and before scores (ABS)' and' application after scores (AAS)'. Each kind has its own advantages and disadvanteges, and different provinces adopt different timing. In general, more and more provinces began to apply AAS. No matter what kind of application timing, students are involved in an application game, and' real time dynamics application' could solve this dilemma. (3) Admission mechanism. Admission mechanism is divided into three modes:'tiers choices','patial parallel choices' and 'complete parallel choices'. More and more provinces would change its admission mechanism into the last one. The number of school choices and speciality choices are also different among provinces and admission stage. Anyway, 'the second time application' is a good way to protect student from failing.
The third chapter compares the application timing. We propose a theoretical model on the application and admission process in the NCEE, the parameter values of the model are calibrated based on the observed aggregate data and the model is solved by simulation. We find that AAS has the highest admission rate, and ABE has the lowest one. However, there will be more high-mark students failing under ABS or AAS, especially under more intense competition. If assessment error is controlled in a certain scope, ABS could relief the phenomenon of 'high-mark students failing'. As for the colleges, ABE would result in least number of admitted students, but the quality of admitted students is higher than the other two modes. With more information on score, students are better off in a whole, but some students are worse off, even including the high-mark students when competition becomes more intense. In general, AAS is the best way to protect most students' interest; however, it is not the best way to screen high-quality students. Using the student-level data from the NCEE, we find that the admission rate of their first choice is highest under AAS and lowest under ABE, which provides evidence for some theory conclusion.
'Real time dynamics application (RTDA) can be seen as a game with complete information. This mode solves application dilemma for students and elimites the phenomenon of 'high-mark students failing'. Though RTDA is fair and Pareto Efficient, this mode is also not the best one for high quality students. 'Multi-NCEE' system is one of the solutions to dispose of this conflict.
The fourth chapter discusses the admission methanism. Before 2008, nealy all provinces adopted 'tier choice', which is know as 'boston mechanism' in foreign literatures. The algorithm of Boston mechanism is simple and efficient, thus it is applied widely in school admission problem. However, Boston mechanism is neither fair nor Pareto Efficient. Most importantly, it is not strategy-proof. And finding a good school choice strategy is not an easy thing, especially with incomplete information.
In 2008, the Ministry of Education began to promote 'parellel choices', the admission rule was changed from 'choices first' into 'scores first, follow choices'. The algorithem efficient of this 'score absoluta mechanism' is also high, and it is a fair, strategy-proof and Pareto Efficient mechanism when college value students based on their scores. However, when the school choices are limited in number, 'parellel choices' would not achieve an ideal effect and the application game is also difficult for students and parents. Yet our analysis suggests that 'parellel choices' with constraint is better than 'tier choices' under AAS, especially under intense competition, because it protects high-mark students, but 'partial parallel choices' is not significantly different from 'tier choices'. Moreover, by increasing the choice number or decreasing the submission ratio or applying in speciality choice, we could improve education fairness and efficiency futher more.
If we allow colleges assess students according to their own standards other than scores,'parallel choices' is no longer a good way to sovle the admission problem. In that case, Gale-Shapley student optimal table mechasim (SOSM) is a good choice instead. SOSM is a fair, strategy-proof mechanism, and it is Perato Efficient than any other fair mechanism.
The fifth chapter contains two special topics. The first topic empirically analyzes the assessment standard in the NCEE. We find that the scores in current NCEE reflect students' academical ability in certain degree, but comprehensive quality should also be considered when assessing a student's all-around ability. We also find that different schools should take different assess standards to meet their own requirments. These conclusions provide an empirical support to the necessity of application and admission reform.
The second topic is about division of discipline. We analyze the consequence and the fairness of rescinding the discipline-dependent exam and admission system. We estimate an empirical model on college admissions. Based on this model, we find that rescinding the discipline-dependent testing and admission system would increase the admission rate of liberal arts students, largely because of an increase of liberal arts students' relative ranking comparing with the science students. And this would play an important role in protecting student interest and promting education fairness.
The last chapter makes a conclusion about the whole paper, and gives some advices on the reform of national college entrance exam.
概括而论,本文的学术贡献主要体现在三点：(1)研究视角新颖。与其他大部分文献不同,本文基于经济学的效率和公平概念,试图从资源配置角度研究志愿填报和录取机制。(2)研究方法独特。本文采用的方法主要包括文献资料法、博弈理论、蒙特卡洛模拟法、实证研究法和调查访谈法,是至今为止第一篇从经济学角度对该问题进行深刻分析的博士论文。(3)研究结论具有可实践性。通过严谨的理论推导和深入的数据挖掘,本文全面剖析了我国高考志愿填报和录取机制改革取得的成绩以及存在的弊端,并结合国外相关文献的研究成果和实践经验,为我国高考招生制度改革提出了一些切实可行的建议。
本文总共分为六章。第一章是绪论,主要阐述了选题的意义和研究的价值,概括了本文研究的方法和贡献。第二章主要回顾和总结了我国高考志愿填报和录取机制的历史变革,包括志愿填报和录取实现手段、志愿填报方式、投档方式和志愿设置情况。通过对高考制度恢复以后高考志愿填报和录取机制发展历程的梳理,探索其演变规律,分析各地采取不同政策的原因以及未来发展的方向。第三章从资源配置的角度分析考前填报、考后估分填报、考后知分填报和实时动态志愿等四种志愿填报方式的优劣。第四章讨论的内容围绕高考录取机制展开。首先,本文分析了传统梯度志愿固有的弊端,然后针对目前教育部拟在全国推行的平行志愿提出了改进的途径和方式。最后,本文根据国外文献在学校录取问题方面的研究成果以及实践经验提出了一种既能让考生真实表达其偏好,又能体现公平和效率,还能化解统一高考与自主招生之间矛盾的一种机制——Gale-Shapley学生最优机制。第五章首先通过对我校学生微观数据的计量分析,从高校人才培养和大学生就业与升学角度探讨了高校招生录取评价标准,为将来志愿填报和录取机制改革的必要性提供了实证支持。然后,本文还从受教育机会的公平性角度探讨了我国高考录取制度中另一个敏感问题——文理分科。最后一章是结论,综合前面的分析结果,归纳本文研究的基本结论,对高考志愿填报和录取机制改革的基本走向提出可行性建议。
本文主要的研究结论和政策建议如下：
(1)考前、估分和知分填报各有利弊,但都无法实现效率与公平的统一。
从整体考生的录取率考虑,知分填报优于估分填报,估分填报优于考前填报,从资源配置的效率考虑,随着分数信息的增多,整体考生的福利能够得到更大的改善,但其中一部分考生的福利改善是以其他一些考生的福利损失为代价。考前填报虽然在公平性和筛选人才效率方面具有优势,但资源浪费较大；知分填报的考生整体福利最高,但不公平现象严重；如果估分误差控制在一定范围之内,虽然能够提高公平性,但也只是一种中庸之道,它既不是资源利用率最高的,也不是公平程度最高的。因此,在不完全信息条件下,无法实现效率与公平的统一。
(2)实时动态志愿能够兼顾公平与效率,因此,它可能将成为我国志愿填报改革的方向和目标。
实时动态志愿消除了由于不完全信息所导致的志愿填报博弈。以考生成绩为衡量标准,这种方式能够提高所有上线考生的录取率,并且能够提高在知分填报时所有考生的效用。实时动态志愿虽然相较于估分填报和考前填报没有实现“帕累托改进”,但如果从维护大多数考生,尤其是好成绩考生的利益时,这种方式比前三种方式都更优。虽然如此,对于高质量考生而言,这种“光鲜亮丽”的志愿填报方式仍然不及考前填报,因为这部分考生的录取概率和效用在考前填报模式下依旧是最高的。
(3)实行多次高考制度,让考生高考成绩能够体现真实水平。
给予更多的考生偏好信息固然能够解决“高分低就”或“高分落榜”的弊端,但依然没有真正维护到好质量考生的利益。要实现这一终极目标,必须减少甚至消除考生质量与高考成绩之间的误差。解决办法可以考虑采取多次高考制度,或者将考生能力测评更加客观、科学、公平地体现在高考分数之上,让考生高考成绩能够体现其真实水平。
(4)梯度志愿弊端严重,应该逐步淘汰于高考录取机制。
梯度志愿投档方式(即波士顿机制)算法最简单,在计算机还未普及之前被广泛运用于解决学校录取问题。但是,波士顿机制既不是公平的,也不是帕累托最优。最重要的是,它不具有抗策略性。由于真实申报偏好会导致不公平的匹配结果,因此学生有很强的激励去“操纵”偏好。但对每个家长和考生来说,填好志愿并非易事,特别是在信息不充分的情况下。
(5)平行志愿推进了公平与效率,但还存在继续改进的空间。
如果每个学校都以分数来评价学生,平行志愿就是一个公平、无浪费、个人理性、抗策略,并且帕累托最优的录取机制。但是,当考生填报志愿的数目受到限制时,平行志愿就达不到这种理想效果,并且也不能完全解决填报志愿难的问题。不过,我们的模拟分析表明,在知分填报或者竞争增大时,志愿数目受限的平行志愿也优于梯度志愿,大大缓解了“高分低就”或“高分落榜”现象,而部分平行志愿收效甚微。从福利角度考虑,平行志愿相对于梯度志愿并非“帕累托改进”,不过从分数公平角度说,这就是一种进步。而增加考生填报志愿数目,减小高校投档比例,按大类招生或打破校际次序以专业志愿为准,这些措施可以进一步提高公平和效率。
(6)Gale-Shapley机制是一个更好的录取机制选择。
无偏好限制的平行志愿和实时动态志愿都能达成公平与效率,不过,其前提假设是高校都以分数评价考生。如果允许高校对考生有不同偏好,即高校不再“唯分论人”,都根据各自的评价标准录取考生,那么,Gale-Shapley机制就是一个很好的选择,因为这种算法既是公平的,也是抗策略的,并且其匹配结果相对于其他任何公平的匹配结果都是“帕累托改进”。它能够化解统一高考与自主招生之间的矛盾,赋予高校更充分的自主招生权力,促进“多元化评价”的实施与推行。
(7)取消文理分科能够提高文科考生录取概率,促进教育公平。
历年来,文科考生录取率都远远低于理科考生,这意味着文科考生没有享受到公平的受教育机会。取消分科之后上线文科考生的录取概率将增加,这是由于文科考生录取比例的增加(竞争程度的减少)以及整体排名上升的结果。因此,取消分科可以改善文理考生录取率差异较大的现象,这在维护考生利益、推进教育公平方面具有深刻的价值和意义。
(8)建立和完善科学、客观的综合评价机制,实行统一考试与自主招生制度。
通过对我校学生微观数据的计量分析发现,当前的高考分数在一定程度能反映出学生掌握和运用知识的能力,为高校选拔新生提供了比较科学的评价依据,但考生的综合素质也应成为评价体系中的一个重要组成部分,而且不同的院校应有不同的评价标准。这为将来志愿填报和录取机制改革的必要性提供了实证支持。
综上所述,在现行全国高考制度下,分数是评价考生能力、平等享有受高等教育机会的最客观的依据。在这种评价标准下,实时动态志愿和偏好不受限制的平行志愿最能体现公平与效率。随着“多元化评价”、“多样化选拔”成为高校招生考试制度改革的重要目标取向,纯粹“按分分配”的录取规则俨然已经不能跟上改革步伐。在这种大环境和大趋势下,必然要求推出一种崭新的录取机制。这种机制就是本文所建议的Gale-Shapley机制。
This paper discusses application and admission mechanism in the National College Entrance Exam. Application and admission mechanism is a key and difficult part during the NCEE reform. It is associcated closely with the populace interest, and plays an important role in promoting education fairness and education for all-around development.
The contributions this paper makes are summaried in three aspects:(1) the research perspective is new. Different from most other studies, this paper trys to analyze application and admission machenism from the perspective of resource allocation based on the efficiency and fairness concept in economics. (2) The study methods are unique. The methods used in this paper include literature review, game theory, montecarlo simulation, empirical study and interview.This is the first doctoral dissertation studying from the economics perpective. (3) The suggestions this paper proposes are practical. Through theory and impirical study, this paper analyzes deeply the achievement of application and admission mechanism reform and the disadvantages exist in it. Based on the research findings and practice experiences in developed contries, this paper gives some useful and practical advices on the application and admission mechanism reform.
This paper is arranged in six chapters, which are summaried as follows:
The first chapter discusses the importance, contribution and framework of this paper. The second chapter reviews the historical trend of application and admission mechanism in NCEE. (1) Application and admission methods. With the development of internet technology and educational informatization, application methods changed from 'application in paper form' to 'application on line'. As for the admission methods, it developed in three stages: 'manual operation','computer assistance' and 'admission on line'. (2) Application timing. There are three kinds of application timing:'application before exam (ABE)','application after exam and before scores (ABS)' and' application after scores (AAS)'. Each kind has its own advantages and disadvanteges, and different provinces adopt different timing. In general, more and more provinces began to apply AAS. No matter what kind of application timing, students are involved in an application game, and' real time dynamics application' could solve this dilemma. (3) Admission mechanism. Admission mechanism is divided into three modes:'tiers choices','patial parallel choices' and 'complete parallel choices'. More and more provinces would change its admission mechanism into the last one. The number of school choices and speciality choices are also different among provinces and admission stage. Anyway, 'the second time application' is a good way to protect student from failing.
The third chapter compares the application timing. We propose a theoretical model on the application and admission process in the NCEE, the parameter values of the model are calibrated based on the observed aggregate data and the model is solved by simulation. We find that AAS has the highest admission rate, and ABE has the lowest one. However, there will be more high-mark students failing under ABS or AAS, especially under more intense competition. If assessment error is controlled in a certain scope, ABS could relief the phenomenon of 'high-mark students failing'. As for the colleges, ABE would result in least number of admitted students, but the quality of admitted students is higher than the other two modes. With more information on score, students are better off in a whole, but some students are worse off, even including the high-mark students when competition becomes more intense. In general, AAS is the best way to protect most students' interest; however, it is not the best way to screen high-quality students. Using the student-level data from the NCEE, we find that the admission rate of their first choice is highest under AAS and lowest under ABE, which provides evidence for some theory conclusion.
'Real time dynamics application (RTDA) can be seen as a game with complete information. This mode solves application dilemma for students and elimites the phenomenon of 'high-mark students failing'. Though RTDA is fair and Pareto Efficient, this mode is also not the best one for high quality students. 'Multi-NCEE' system is one of the solutions to dispose of this conflict.
The fourth chapter discusses the admission methanism. Before 2008, nealy all provinces adopted 'tier choice', which is know as 'boston mechanism' in foreign literatures. The algorithm of Boston mechanism is simple and efficient, thus it is applied widely in school admission problem. However, Boston mechanism is neither fair nor Pareto Efficient. Most importantly, it is not strategy-proof. And finding a good school choice strategy is not an easy thing, especially with incomplete information.
In 2008, the Ministry of Education began to promote 'parellel choices', the admission rule was changed from 'choices first' into 'scores first, follow choices'. The algorithem efficient of this 'score absoluta mechanism' is also high, and it is a fair, strategy-proof and Pareto Efficient mechanism when college value students based on their scores. However, when the school choices are limited in number, 'parellel choices' would not achieve an ideal effect and the application game is also difficult for students and parents. Yet our analysis suggests that 'parellel choices' with constraint is better than 'tier choices' under AAS, especially under intense competition, because it protects high-mark students, but 'partial parallel choices' is not significantly different from 'tier choices'. Moreover, by increasing the choice number or decreasing the submission ratio or applying in speciality choice, we could improve education fairness and efficiency futher more.
If we allow colleges assess students according to their own standards other than scores,'parallel choices' is no longer a good way to sovle the admission problem. In that case, Gale-Shapley student optimal table mechasim (SOSM) is a good choice instead. SOSM is a fair, strategy-proof mechanism, and it is Perato Efficient than any other fair mechanism.
The fifth chapter contains two special topics. The first topic empirically analyzes the assessment standard in the NCEE. We find that the scores in current NCEE reflect students' academical ability in certain degree, but comprehensive quality should also be considered when assessing a student's all-around ability. We also find that different schools should take different assess standards to meet their own requirments. These conclusions provide an empirical support to the necessity of application and admission reform.
The second topic is about division of discipline. We analyze the consequence and the fairness of rescinding the discipline-dependent exam and admission system. We estimate an empirical model on college admissions. Based on this model, we find that rescinding the discipline-dependent testing and admission system would increase the admission rate of liberal arts students, largely because of an increase of liberal arts students' relative ranking comparing with the science students. And this would play an important role in protecting student interest and promting education fairness.
The last chapter makes a conclusion about the whole paper, and gives some advices on the reform of national college entrance exam.
引文
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②在上一小节,我们经过参数校准,已经将k设定为1。
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①聂海峰,高考录取机制的博弈分析[J],经济学(季刊),2007(4)
②冯科、聂海峰,高考录取机制的帕累托效率分析[J],经济科学,2007(3)
③聂海峰、张琥,“平行志愿”录取机制研究[J],工作论文,2008年
①D. Gale and L. S.Shapley,1962. "College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage," American Mathematical Monthly,69(1962):9-15.
② A. E. Roth,1985. "The College Admissions Problem is Not Equivalent to the Marriage Problem," Journal of Economic Theory,36(1985):277-288.
③ A. E. Roth and M. A. Oliveira Sotomayor,1990. Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. London/New York: Cambridge Univ. Press,1990.
④ A. E. Roth,1991. "A Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry Level Labor Markets: RegionalMarkets for New Physicians and Surgeons in the U.K," American Economic Review,1991,81 (3), 415-440.
⑤ A. E. Roth and E. Peranson,1997. "The Effects of a Change in the NRMP Matching Algorithm," Journal of American Medical Association,1997, (278),729-732.
⑥ A. E. Roth and E. Peranson,1999."The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians:Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design," American Economic Review,1999,89(4),784-870.
⑦ L.E.Dubins. and D.A.Freedman,1981. "Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm," American Mathematical Monthly,1981,88(7),485-494.
① A. E. Roth,1982. "The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives," Mathematics of Operations Research,1982,7:617-628.
② L. S. Shapley and S. Herbert,1974. "On Cores and Indivisible Goods," Journal of Mathematical Economics, March 1974,1(1),23-37.
③ A. E. Roth and P. Andrew,1977. "Weak versus Strong Domination in a Market with Indivisible Goods," Journal of Mathematical Economics,1977,4(2),131-137.
①M. Balinski and T. Sonmez,1999. "A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement," Journal of Economic Theory,1999,84(1),73-94.
② A. Abdulkadiroglu and T.Sonmez,2003. "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Review,93, (2003):729-747.
③ H. Ergin and T. Sonmez,2006. "Games of School Choice Under the Boston Mechanism," Journal of Public Economics,90 (2006):215-237
④ A. Abdulkadiroglu, P. A. Pathak, and A. E. Roth,2005. "The New York City High School Match," American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, (2005):364-367
⑤ A. Abdulkadiroglu, P. A. Pathak, A. E. Roth, and T. Sonmez,2005. "The Boston Public School Match," American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings,2005:368-371
⑥ A. Abdulkadiroglu, P. A. Pathak, A. E. Roth, and T. Sonmez,2006. "Changing The Boston School Choice Machenism," NBER Working Paper,2006,11965
① Y. Chen and T. Sonmez,2006. "School Choice: An Experimental Study," Journal of Economic Theory,127 (2006):202-231
② A.Abdulkadiroglu,Y.Che and Y.Yasuda. "Expanding'Choice' in school choice," Working Paper, Duke University, Columbia University, and Princeton University,2007
③ O.Kesten,2004." Student Placement to Public Schools in US: Two New Solutions," working paper, University of Rochester,2004
①学校录取机制一般只需满足公平性即满足了无浪费性(魏立佳,2008)。
①魏立佳,高考、博士生录取和应届毕业生就业市场的机制设计[J],工作论文,2008年。
①聂海峰,填报高考志愿哪种方式对考生有利?[J],南方经济,2006(6)
②聂海峰,考得好不如报得好么?——高考志愿填报博弈研究[J],南方经济,2007(7)
③ H. Ergin and T. Sonmez,2006. "Games of School Choice Under the Boston Mechanism," Journal of Public Economics,90 (2006):215-237
④聂海峰,高考录取机制的博弈分析[J],经济学季刊,2007(4)
⑤冯科、聂海峰,高考录取机制的帕累托效率分析[J],经济科学,2007(3)
①杨明方、倪光辉,平行志愿保护考生利益[N],人民日报,2008-02-21
①Zhou Lin,1990."On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems," [J] Journal of Economic Theory,1990, Vol.52,123-135.
②冯科、聂海峰,高考录取机制的帕累托效率分析[J],经济科学,2007(3)
③聂海峰,填报高考志愿哪种方式对考生有利[J],南方经济2006(6)
①聂海峰,平行志愿录取机制研究[J],工作论文,2008年
②聂海峰,平行志愿录取机制研究[J],工作论文,2008年
③钱国良、劳国强,杭城四百考生放弃补报,第2批投档分数线22日公布[EB/01],浙江在线,2007-07-17http://gaokao.chsi.com.cn/gkxx/zj/200707/20070717/1024404.html
④张峰,高考志愿填报指导：从“志愿优先”到“分数优先”[N],中国青年报,2007-04-04
①杨德广,评“名校统揽高分者,高分者统统进名校”——对“平行志愿投档”的深层次思考[J],北京大学教育评论,2009(1)
②在这里,学校对考生的评价不再基于考生成绩,而是根据学校自己的评价标准。虽然考生i3的成绩不如i2,但或许是因为考生i3的某一门学科特别优秀,或者因为考生i3的综合素质更高,学校c2对考生i3的评价高于考生i2。在本文的第四章,我们会专门分析目前我国的高考分数制度是否可以客观衡量学生的能力。结果显示,目前的高考分数尚不能完全反映考生的能力,因此,考生的电子信息档案(考生综合信息,可以体现考生的综合能力)在录取标准中起到了越来越重要的作用。
① D. Gale and L. S.Shapley,1962. "College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage," American Mathematical Monthly,69(1962):9-15.
① H. Ergin and T. Sonmez,2006. "Games of School Choice Under the Boston Mechanism," Journal of Public Economics,90 (2006):215-237
② D. Gale and L. S.Shapley,1962. "College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage," American Mathematical Monthly,69(1962):9-15.
① M.Balinski and T.Sonmez,1999."A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement," Journal of Economic Theory,1999, Vol.84(1):73-94.
② L.E.Dubins. and D.A.Freedman,1981. "Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm," American Mathematical Monthly,1981,88(7),485-494.
③ Roth, A. "The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives,"Mathematical Operation Research,1982, 7(4):617-628.
④ J. Alcalde and S. Barbera,1994."Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems," Economic Theory,1994,4(3):417-435.
⑤关于坚持统一高考必要性的讨论参见刘海峰,论坚持统一高考的必要性[J],中国考试,1997(5)刘海峰,高考改革的独统之争[J],教育发展研究,2006(11)张亚群,高校自主招生不等于自行考试[J],教育研究,2005(3)等。
⑥刘海峰,高考改革中的效率与公平[J],教育研究,2002(12)
①刘海峰,高考改革中的全局观[J],教育研究,2002(2)
② A. Abdulkadiroglu and T. Sonmez,2003."School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach,"Ameri-can Economic Review,2003,93(3):729-747.
③ L. Shapley and H.Scarf,1974. "On Cores and Indivisibility,"Journal of Mathematical Economics 1, 1974:23-37.
① A.E.Roth, "The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives,"Mathematical Operation Research,1982, 7(4):617-628.
②刘海峰,高考改革中的公平与效率问题[J],教育研究,2002(12)
③ A. Abdulkadiroglu, P. A. Pathak, A. E. Roth, and T. Sonmez,2006. "Changing The Boston School Choice Machenism," NBER Working Paper,2006,11965.
③胡启迪,多元化评价的实施留出革的空间——兼议平行志愿推行的得失[J],考试研究,2009(1)
⑤谈琦婧、张万朋,公共经济学视野下高考“平行志愿”改革的思考[J],教育与考试,2009(5)
①刘海峰,高考改革中的公平与效率问题[J],教育研究,2002(12)
②张亚群,高考改革中的综合评价问题[J],湖北招生考试,2006(20).
①由于各省高考科目不完全一致,这里的综合成绩为除语文、数学和外语三科外其他所有科目的平均成绩。
①在各高校的自主招生过程以及在试行的综合素质评价机制中,这些表现也是重要的录取标准之一
②例如,高考语文相对分数每增加1分,大学期间平均成绩则会增加3.5分,而高考英语相对分数每增加1分,大学期间平均成绩增加9.8分。
①基本能力测试已于2009年在山东省取得试点,总分为120分,以考生实际得分的60%计入高考总分。
②张亚群,高考改革中的综合评价问题[J],湖北招生考试,2006(20)
③刘海峰,高考改革的统独之争[J],教育发展研究,2006(21)
①张亚群,高校自主招生不等于自行考试[J],教育研究,2005(03)
②康翠萍,高中阶段不宜文理分科[J],教育研究,2009(4)
③张亚群、刘毳,高中取消文理分科为时太早[J],考试研究,2009(4)
④邓晖、宋文,从教育评价制度中看文理分科问题[J],科学教育,2009(3)
[1]A. Abdulkadiroglu and T.Sonmez.2003."School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Review,93, (2003):129-747.
[2]A. Abdulkadiroglu, P. A. Pathak, A. E. Roth, and T. Sonmez.2006. "Changing The Boston School Choice Machenism," NBER Working Paper,2006, 11965
[3]A. Abdulkadiroglu, P. A. Pathak, A. E. Roth, and T. Sonmez.2005."The Boston Public School Match," American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings,2005:368-371
[4]A. Abdulkadiroglu, P. A. Pathak, and A. E. Roth.2005 "The New York City High School Match," American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, (2005):364-367
[7]A. Abdulkadiroglu and T. Sonmez.2003. "School Choice:A Mechanism Design Approach,"Ameri-can Economic Review,2003,93(3):729-747.
[8]A. Abdulkadiroglu, Y.Che, and Y.Yasuda.2007 "Expanding'Choice' in school choice," Working Paper, Duke University, Columbia University, and Princeton University,2007
[5]A. E. Roth.1985. "The College Admissions Problem is Not Equivalent to the Marriage Problem," Journal of Economic Theory,36(1985):277-288.
[6]A. E. Roth.1982. "The Economics of Matching:Stability and Incentives," Mathematics of Operations Research,1982,7:617-628.
[7]A. E. Roth.1991. "A Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry Level Labor Markets: RegionalMarkets for New Physicians and Surgeons in the U.K," American Economic Review,1991,81 (3),415-440.
[8]A. E. Roth.1982. "The Economics of Matching:Stability and Incentives," Mathematical Operation Research,1982,7(4):617-628.
[9]A. E. Roth and E. Peranson.1997. "The Effects of a Change in the NRMP Matching Algorithm," Journal of American Medical Association,1997, (278), 729-732.
[10]A. E. Roth and E. Peranson.1999. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians:Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design," American Economic Review,1999,89(4),784-870.
[11]A. E. Roth and M. Sotomayor.1990. "Two-Sided Matching:A Study in Game Theoretic Modeling and Analysis." London/New York: Cambridge Univ. Press,1990.
[12]A.E.Roth and P. Andrew.1977. "Weak versus Strong Domination in a Market with Indivisible Goods," Journal of Mathematical Economics,1977,4(2), 131-137.
[13]D. Gale and L. Shapley.1962. "College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage," American Mathematical Monthly,69(1962):9-15.
[14]F. Don and Gan Li.2004. "A Simulation-Based Welfare Loss Calculation for Labor Taxes with Piecewise- Linear Budgets," Journal of Public Economics 88, (2004):2339-59.
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[17]H. Ergin and T. Sonmez.2006. "Games of School Choice Under the Boston Mechanism," Journal of Public Economics 90, (2006):215-237.
[18]J. Alcalde and S. Barbera.1994 "Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems," Economic Theory,1994, 4(3):417-435.
[19]L. E. Dubins and D. A.Freedman.1981. "Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm," American Mathematical Monthly,1981,88(7), 485-494.
[20]L. S. Shapley and H. Scarf.1974. "On Cores and Indivisibility,"Journal of Mathematical Economics 1,1974:23-37.
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[22]L. Yuan chuan.2008. "Application Choices and College Rankings," Job Market Paper,August 12,2008.
[23]M. Balinski and T. Sonmez.1999. "A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement," Journal of Economic Theory,1999,84(1),73-94.
[24]Y. Chen and T. Sonmez.2006. "School Choice:An Experimental Study," Journal of Economic Theory,127 (2006):202-231
[25]Zhou Lin.1990. "On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems,"[J] Journal of Economic Theory,1990, Vol.52,123-135.
[26]曾莉,2002,浅析高校网上远程录取招生[J],曲靖师范学院学报,2002(5)
[27]邓晖、宋文,2009,从教育评价制度中看文理分科问题[J],科学教育,2009(3)
[28]房惠玲、孟亚飞,2008,2008年甘肃高考政策“大变脸”,改考后填报志愿[N],甘肃日报,2008-03-31
[29]冯科、聂海峰,2007,高考录取机制的帕累托效率分析[J],经济科学,2007(3)
[30]甘肃省2010年普通高校招生考生网上填报志愿问答[EB/01],甘肃省高等学校招生办公室官方网站,ttp://www.gszs.edu.cn/Html/wenda/248396037.html
[31]高福勤,2009,普通高等学校招生录取中的几个要素——兼论平行志愿改革[J],考试研究,2009(1)
[32]高翔,2007,现行高考填报志愿方式的优劣分析[J],现代教育科学,2007(2)
[33]高翔、张广,2006,“网上竞价”式填报高考志愿的必要性与可行性分析[J],吉林省教育学院学报,2006(11)
[34]郭培彦,2005,高考填报志愿三方式比较研究[J],山东教育学院学报,2005(4)
[35]郝文婷,2008,实时网报志愿——内蒙古高招之非常变革[N],中国教育报,2008-07-27
[36]何颖,2008,更好的公平与更高的效率——高考“平行志愿”录取机制改革的政策分析[J],教育科学,2008(6)
[37]胡启迪,2009,多元化评价的实施留出革的空间——兼议平行志愿推行的得失[J],考试研究,2009(1)
[38]黄蔚,2010,网上录取实施10周年：高招信息化推进教育公平[N],中国教育报,2010-01-24
[39]江南,2007,浙江首推“平行志愿”,有效避免了“高分落榜”[N],人民日报,2007-08-14
[40]康翠萍,2009,高中阶段不宜文理分科[J],教育研究,2009(4)
[41]康荣平,2009,普通高考志愿填报方式的公平性研究[J],黑龙江生态工程职业学院学报,2009(9)
[42]兰晨,2005,甘肃：800多名高分考生不服调配而落榜[EB/01],新华网,2005-07-25http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005-07/25/content_3265378.htm
[43]李德铭,2009,“热浪”中的“冷”思考[J],甘肃教育,2009(12)
[44]李林霞,2009,山西为何不知分填报志愿?[N],山西日报,2009-07-21
[45]李生金、芮执俭,2005,估分填报志愿符合甘肃省情[J],人大研究,2005(6)
[46]李生金、芮执俭,2005,估分填报志愿符合甘肃省情——甘肃省高考填报志愿问卷调查与分析[J],人大研究,2005(6)
[47]李雪萍,2008,甘肃高考志愿填报形式是否需要改革[N],兰州晨报,2008-01-18
[48]厉浩,2009,高考平行志愿改革研究[J],教育发展研究,2009(7)
[49]林其天,2009,普通高考“平行志愿”的现实意义及其历史定位[J],教育与考试,2009(2)
[50]刘海峰,2006,高考改革的独统之争[J],教育发展研究,2006(11)
[51]刘海峰,2007,高考改革的回顾与展望[J],教育研究,2007(11)
[52]刘海峰,2002,高考改革中的全局观[J],教育研究,2002(2)
[53]刘海峰,1997,论坚持统一高考的必要性[J],中国考试,1997(5)
[54]刘红军、尉明宇,2001,关于成绩公布后利用网络准动态填报高考志愿系统的可行性分析[J],中国高校招生,2001(2)
[55]刘仪,2010,江苏：2010年高考网上填报志愿五大优势分析[N],都市晨报,2010-05-04
[56]刘占山,2008,高考平行志愿的利弊分析[J],中国校外教育下旬刊,2008(10)
[57]芦京昌,2008,“平行志愿”改革对高校招生的影响[J],教育发展研究,2008(11)
[58]马涛,2006,广西：网上录取需要全局观念[J],中国教育网络,2006(11)
[59]内蒙古：2008年普通高校招生本科录取结束[EB/01],内蒙古招生考试信息网,2008-08-02http://www.huaue.com/gkao/200882190756.htm
[60]内蒙古：全程提供院校和专业实时排名[EB/01],内蒙古招生考试信息网,2010-07-12http://www.nm.zsks.cn/newspic/t20100712_3731.htm
[61]倪彬,203,网上录取的优势与不足[J],中南民族大学学报,2003(8)
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[76]王泽来,2009,平行志愿投档模式的发展趋势探讨[J],天津农学院学报,2009(6)
[77]魏国东、付玉旺,2008,社会公平与高考志愿填报方式的改革——以河北省为例[J],河北学刊,2008(5)
[78]魏立佳,2008,高考、博士生录取和应届毕业生就业市场的机制设计[J],工作论文,2008年
[79]谢静娴,2005,平行志愿让考生院校双赢,2005年江苏高招得失盘点[EB/01],新华网江苏频道,2005-08-22http://www.js.xinhuanet.com/xin_wen_zhong_xin/2005-08/22/content 4936375.htm
[80]辛彬,2008,高考平行志愿利弊探析[J],集美大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2008(10)
[81]熊丙奇,2009,平行志愿的改革与出路[J],考试研究,2009(1)
[82]辛彬,2008,高考平行志愿利弊探析[J],集美大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2008(10)
[83]杨德广,2009,评“名校统揽高分者,高分者统统进名校”——对“平行志愿投档”的深层次思考[J],北京大学教育评论,2009(1)
[84]阳光录取：四川3000高分落榜生重圆大学梦[EB/01],四川新闻网,2006-07-31http://edu.newssc.org/system/2006/07/31/010073108.shtml
[85]杨明方、倪光辉,2008,平行志愿保护考生利益[N],人民日报,2008-02-21
[86]叶志坚,2008,“平行志愿”改革的理性审视[J],教育发展研究,2008(11)
[87]原春琳,2001,今年北京恢复考前填报志愿[N],中国青年报,2001-04-11
[88]袁亚平,2007,浙江高考招生政策作出重大调整[N],人民日报,2007-04-31
[89]张峰,2007,高考志愿填报指导：从“志愿优先”到“分数优先”[N],中国青年报,2007-04-04
[90]张和生,2007,尊重和满足考生的选择权——湖南推行高考并列志愿的调查与思考[N],中国教育报,2007-11-08
[91]张恒亮,2010,各类高考志愿填报模式解析及改革趋势[EB/01],人民网教育频道,2010-04-02http://edu.people.com.cn/GB/116076/11284811.html
[92]张恒亮,2009,瞄准就业填志愿[M],四川师范大学电子出版社,2009年
[93]张隆、刘健,2008,估分填报志愿应该改革了[N],兰州晨报,2008-01-17
[94]张亚群,2006,高考改革中的综合评价问题[J],湖北招生考试,2006(20)
[95]张亚群,2005,高校自主招生不等于自行考试[J],教育研究,2005(03)
[96]张亚群、刘毳,2009,高中取消文理分科为时太早[J],考试研究,2009(4)
[97]郑天虹,2007,广东2008年高考再次启用“考后填报志愿”[EB/01],新华网,2007-11-27http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-11/28/content_7157293.htm
[98]钟笑寒、程娜、何云帆,2004,花落谁家——高考志愿填报机制的博弈模型[J],经济学季刊,2004(4)
[99]左翔,2003,高考录取方式经济学模型的初探与分析[J],怀化学院学报,2003(2)
①兰晨,甘肃：800多名高分考生不服调配而落榜[EB/01],新华网,2005-07-25http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005-07/25/content_3265378.htm
②谢静娴,平行志愿让考生院校双赢,2005年江苏高招得失盘点[EB/01],新华网江苏频道,2005-08-22http://www.js.xinhuanet.com/xin_wen_zhong_xin/2005-08/22/content_4936375.htm
③阳光录取：四川3000高分落榜生重圆大学梦[EB/01],四川新闻网,2006-07-31http://edu.newssc.org/system/2006/07/31/010073108.shtml
①张大红、张彩虹、骆耀峰,高考志愿填报中的偏好与公平研究——我国高考全志愿填报模式设计[J],教育科学,2009(8)
①刘海峰,高考改革的回顾与展望[J],教育研究,2007(11)
①甘肃省2010年普通高校招生考生网上填报志愿问答[EB/01],甘肃省高等学校招生办公室官方网站,http://www.gszs.edu.cn/Html/wenda/248396037.html
②刘仪,江苏：2010年高考网上填报志愿五大优势分析[N],都市晨报,2010-05-04
①马涛,广西：网上录取需要全局观念[J],中国教育网络,2006(11)
②黄蔚,网上录取实施10周年：高招信息化推进教育公平[N],中国教育报,2010-01-24
①曾莉,浅析高校网上远程录取招生[J],曲靖师范学院学报,2002(5)
②倪彬,网上录取的优势与不足[J],中南民族大学学报,2003(8)
③宋艳芳,网上录取工作在招生工作中的公平性表现[J],辽宁工程技术大学学报,2007(3)
①原春琳,今年北京恢复考前填报志愿[N],中国青年报,2001-04-11
②李林霞,山西为何不知分填报志愿?[N],山西日报,2009-07-21
①郑天虹,广东2008年高考再次启用“考后填报志愿”[EB/01],新华网,2007-11-27http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-11/28/content_7157293.htm
②李生金、芮执俭,估分填报志愿符合甘肃省情[J],人大研究,2005(6)
①张隆、刘健,估分填报志愿应该改革了[N],兰州晨报,2008-01-17
②李雪萍,甘肃高考志愿填报形式是否需要改革[N],兰州晨报,2008-01-18
③房惠玲、孟亚飞,2008年甘肃高考政策“大变脸”,改考后填报志愿[N],甘肃日报,2008-03-31
①郝文婷,实时网报志愿——内蒙古高招之非常变革[N],中国教育报,2008-07-27
①内蒙古：全程提供院校和专业实时排名[EB/01],内蒙古招生考试信息网,2010-07-12http://www.nm.zsks.cn/newspic/t20100712_3731.htm
②张恒亮,各类高考志愿填报模式解析及改革趋势[EB/01],人民网教育频道,2010-04-02http://edu.people.com.cn/GB/116076/11284811.html
①高福勤,普通高等学校招生录取中的几个要素——兼论平行志愿改革[J],考试研究,2009(1)
②兰晨,甘肃：800多名高分考生不服调配而落榜[EB/01],新华网,2005-07-25 http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005-07/25/content_3265378.htm
①谢静娴,平行志愿让考生院校双赢,2005年江苏高招得失盘点[EB/01],新华网江苏频道,2005-08-22http://www.js.xinhuanet.com/xinwenzhong_xin/2005-08/22/content_4936375.htm
②阳光录取：四川3000高分落榜生重圆大学梦[EB/01],四川新闻网,2006-07-31http://edu.newssc.org/system/2006/07/31/010073108.shtml
③杨明方、倪光辉,平行志愿保护考生利益[N],人民日报,2008-02-21
④由于对录取程序不熟悉,考生和家长不科学地填报志愿可能导致非分数原因落榜。
①张和生,尊重和满足考生的选择权——湖南推行高考并列志愿的调查与思考[N],中国教育报,2007-11-08
②王俊勇,江苏高招政策作重大调整,实行“平行志愿模式”[EB/01],新华网,2005-03-09http://news.xinhuanet.com/edu/2005-03/09/content_2673830.htm
③袁亚平,浙江高考招生政策作出重大调整[N],人民日报,2007-04-31
④谢静娴,平行志愿让考生院校双赢,2005年江苏高招得失盘点[EB/01],新华网江苏频道,2005-08-22http://www.js.xinhuanet.com/xin_wen_zhong_xin/2005-08/22/content_4936375.htm
①张和生,尊重和满足考生的选择权——湖南推行高考并列志愿的调查与思考[N],中国教育报,2007-11-08
②江南,浙江首推“平行志愿”,有效避免了“高分落榜”[N],人民日报,2007-08-14
①王锡宇,对填报高考志愿时间问题的探讨[J],中国教育研究,1984(8)
②左翔,高考录取方式经济学模型的初探与分析[J],怀化学院学报,2003(2)
③郭培彦,高考填报志愿三方式比较研究[J],山东教育学院学报,2005(4)
①李生金、芮执俭,估分填报志愿符合甘肃省情——甘肃省高考填报志愿问卷调查与分析[J],人大研究,2005(6)
②高翔,现行高考填报志愿方式的优劣分析[J],现代教育科学,2007(2)
①魏国东、付玉旺,社会公平与高考志愿填报方式的改革—以河北省为例[J],河北学刊,2008(5)
②李德铭,“热浪”中的“冷”思考[J],甘肃教育,2009(12)
③康荣平,普通高考志愿填报方式的公平性研究[J],黑龙江生态工程职业学院学报,2009(9)
①钟笑寒、程娜、何云帆,花落谁家——高考志愿填报机制的博弈模型[J],经济学季刊,2004(4)
②聂海峰,填报高考志愿哪种方式对考生有利?[J],南方经济,2006(6)
①聂海峰,考得好不如报得好么?——高考志愿填报博弈研究[J],南方经济,2007(7)
②钟笑寒、程娜、何云帆,花落谁家——高考志愿填报机制的博弈模型[J],经济学季刊,2004(4
③聂海峰,填报高考志愿哪种方式对考生有利?[J],南方经济,2006(6)
④聂海峰,考得好不如报得好么?——高考志愿填报博弈研究[J],南方经济,2007(7)
①模拟法的运用可参见F. Don and Gan, Li,2004. "A Simulation-Based Welfare Loss Calculation for Labor Taxes with Piecewise- Linear Budgets," Journal of Public Economics 88, (2004):2339-59.
②关于校准法的早期运用可参见F. E. Kydland and E. C. Prescott,1982. "Time to build and aggregate fluctuations." Econometrica 50,(1982):1345-1371.
③成绩分段统计表反映的是每个分位段下考生的人数,通过这张表考生们可以大概清楚自己在全省(区市)的排名。
④聂海峰,填报高考志愿哪种方式对考生有利?[J],南方经济,2006(6)
⑤聂海峰,考得好不如报得好么?——高考志愿填报博弈研究[J],南方经济,2007(7)
①H. Ergin and T. Sonmez,2005. "Games of School Choice Under the Boston Mechanism," Journal of Public Economics 90, (2006):215-237.
② Gan, Li and Li,Qi,2004."Efficiency of Thin and Thick Market," NBER Working Paper 10815, September 2004.
①聂海峰,考得好不如报得好么?——高考志愿填报博弈研究[J],南方经济2007(7)
①L. Yuan chuan,2008. "Application Choices and College Rankings," Job Market Paper,August 12,2008.
②L. Yuan chuan,2008."Application Choices and College Rankings," Job Market Paper,August 12,2008.
①高翔、张广,“网上竞价”式填报高考志愿的必要性与可行性分析[J],吉林省教育学院学报,2006(11)
①张恒亮,瞄准就业填志愿[M],四川师范大学电子出版社,2009年
②聂海峰,巨大的协调博弈一中国高考招生博弈[J],工作论文,2005年
③聂海峰,高考录取机制的博弈分析[J],经济学季刊,2007(4)
④聂海峰,高考录取机制的帕累托效率[J],经济科学,2007(3)
①钟笑寒、程娜、何云帆,花落谁家——高考志愿填报机制的博弈模型[J],经济学季刊,2004(4)
②在上一小节,我们经过参数校准,已经将k设定为1。
①叶志坚,“平行志愿”改革的理性审视[J],教育发展研究,2008(11)
②芦京昌,“平行志愿”改革对高校招生的影响[J],教育发展研究,2008(11)
③沈本良、汪成辉、卢致杰,促进高考公平公正的一次成功尝试——上海市高校招生实施平行志愿首战告捷[J],中国高等教育,2008(19)
①王泽来,平行志愿投档模式的发展趋势探讨[J],天津农学院学报,2009(6)
②高福勤,普通高等学校招生录取中的几个因素——兼论平行志愿改革[J],考试研究,2009(1)
③林其天,普通高考“平行志愿”的现实意义及其历史定位[J],教育与考试,2009(2)
①刘占山,高考平行志愿的利弊分析[J],中国校外教育下旬刊,2008(10)
②厉浩,高考平行志愿改革研究[J],教育发展研究,2009(7)
①辛彬,高考平行志愿利弊探析[J],集美大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2008(10)
②石函玉、魏卓、杨悦新、温克利,高校报考平行志愿下大类招生的发展趋势[J],科技信息,2009(35)
③胡启迪,多元化评价的实施留出革的空间——兼议平行志愿推行的得失[J],考试研究,2009(1)
①何颖,更好的公平与更高的效率——高考“平行志愿”录取机制改革的政策分析[J],教育科学,2008(6)
②谈琦婧、张万朋,公共经济学视野下高考“平行志愿”改革的思考[J],教育与考试,2009(5)
③杨德广,评“名校统揽高分者,高分者统统进名校”——对“平行志愿投档”的深层次思考[J],北京大学教育评论,2009(1)
①熊丙奇,平行志愿的改革与出路[J],考试研究,2009(1)
②魏立佳,高考、博士生录取和应届毕业生就业市场的机制设计[J],工作论文,2008年
①聂海峰,高考录取机制的博弈分析[J],经济学(季刊),2007(4)
②冯科、聂海峰,高考录取机制的帕累托效率分析[J],经济科学,2007(3)
③聂海峰、张琥,“平行志愿”录取机制研究[J],工作论文,2008年
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② A. E. Roth,1985. "The College Admissions Problem is Not Equivalent to the Marriage Problem," Journal of Economic Theory,36(1985):277-288.
③ A. E. Roth and M. A. Oliveira Sotomayor,1990. Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. London/New York: Cambridge Univ. Press,1990.
④ A. E. Roth,1991. "A Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry Level Labor Markets: RegionalMarkets for New Physicians and Surgeons in the U.K," American Economic Review,1991,81 (3), 415-440.
⑤ A. E. Roth and E. Peranson,1997. "The Effects of a Change in the NRMP Matching Algorithm," Journal of American Medical Association,1997, (278),729-732.
⑥ A. E. Roth and E. Peranson,1999."The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians:Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design," American Economic Review,1999,89(4),784-870.
⑦ L.E.Dubins. and D.A.Freedman,1981. "Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm," American Mathematical Monthly,1981,88(7),485-494.
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② A. Abdulkadiroglu and T.Sonmez,2003. "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Review,93, (2003):729-747.
③ H. Ergin and T. Sonmez,2006. "Games of School Choice Under the Boston Mechanism," Journal of Public Economics,90 (2006):215-237
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⑤ A. Abdulkadiroglu, P. A. Pathak, A. E. Roth, and T. Sonmez,2005. "The Boston Public School Match," American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings,2005:368-371
⑥ A. Abdulkadiroglu, P. A. Pathak, A. E. Roth, and T. Sonmez,2006. "Changing The Boston School Choice Machenism," NBER Working Paper,2006,11965
① Y. Chen and T. Sonmez,2006. "School Choice: An Experimental Study," Journal of Economic Theory,127 (2006):202-231
② A.Abdulkadiroglu,Y.Che and Y.Yasuda. "Expanding'Choice' in school choice," Working Paper, Duke University, Columbia University, and Princeton University,2007
③ O.Kesten,2004." Student Placement to Public Schools in US: Two New Solutions," working paper, University of Rochester,2004
①学校录取机制一般只需满足公平性即满足了无浪费性(魏立佳,2008)。
①魏立佳,高考、博士生录取和应届毕业生就业市场的机制设计[J],工作论文,2008年。
①聂海峰,填报高考志愿哪种方式对考生有利?[J],南方经济,2006(6)
②聂海峰,考得好不如报得好么?——高考志愿填报博弈研究[J],南方经济,2007(7)
③ H. Ergin and T. Sonmez,2006. "Games of School Choice Under the Boston Mechanism," Journal of Public Economics,90 (2006):215-237
④聂海峰,高考录取机制的博弈分析[J],经济学季刊,2007(4)
⑤冯科、聂海峰,高考录取机制的帕累托效率分析[J],经济科学,2007(3)
①杨明方、倪光辉,平行志愿保护考生利益[N],人民日报,2008-02-21
①Zhou Lin,1990."On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems," [J] Journal of Economic Theory,1990, Vol.52,123-135.
②冯科、聂海峰,高考录取机制的帕累托效率分析[J],经济科学,2007(3)
③聂海峰,填报高考志愿哪种方式对考生有利[J],南方经济2006(6)
①聂海峰,平行志愿录取机制研究[J],工作论文,2008年
②聂海峰,平行志愿录取机制研究[J],工作论文,2008年
③钱国良、劳国强,杭城四百考生放弃补报,第2批投档分数线22日公布[EB/01],浙江在线,2007-07-17http://gaokao.chsi.com.cn/gkxx/zj/200707/20070717/1024404.html
④张峰,高考志愿填报指导：从“志愿优先”到“分数优先”[N],中国青年报,2007-04-04
①杨德广,评“名校统揽高分者,高分者统统进名校”——对“平行志愿投档”的深层次思考[J],北京大学教育评论,2009(1)
②在这里,学校对考生的评价不再基于考生成绩,而是根据学校自己的评价标准。虽然考生i3的成绩不如i2,但或许是因为考生i3的某一门学科特别优秀,或者因为考生i3的综合素质更高,学校c2对考生i3的评价高于考生i2。在本文的第四章,我们会专门分析目前我国的高考分数制度是否可以客观衡量学生的能力。结果显示,目前的高考分数尚不能完全反映考生的能力,因此,考生的电子信息档案(考生综合信息,可以体现考生的综合能力)在录取标准中起到了越来越重要的作用。
① D. Gale and L. S.Shapley,1962. "College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage," American Mathematical Monthly,69(1962):9-15.
① H. Ergin and T. Sonmez,2006. "Games of School Choice Under the Boston Mechanism," Journal of Public Economics,90 (2006):215-237
② D. Gale and L. S.Shapley,1962. "College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage," American Mathematical Monthly,69(1962):9-15.
① M.Balinski and T.Sonmez,1999."A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement," Journal of Economic Theory,1999, Vol.84(1):73-94.
② L.E.Dubins. and D.A.Freedman,1981. "Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm," American Mathematical Monthly,1981,88(7),485-494.
③ Roth, A. "The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives,"Mathematical Operation Research,1982, 7(4):617-628.
④ J. Alcalde and S. Barbera,1994."Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems," Economic Theory,1994,4(3):417-435.
⑤关于坚持统一高考必要性的讨论参见刘海峰,论坚持统一高考的必要性[J],中国考试,1997(5)刘海峰,高考改革的独统之争[J],教育发展研究,2006(11)张亚群,高校自主招生不等于自行考试[J],教育研究,2005(3)等。
⑥刘海峰,高考改革中的效率与公平[J],教育研究,2002(12)
①刘海峰,高考改革中的全局观[J],教育研究,2002(2)
② A. Abdulkadiroglu and T. Sonmez,2003."School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach,"Ameri-can Economic Review,2003,93(3):729-747.
③ L. Shapley and H.Scarf,1974. "On Cores and Indivisibility,"Journal of Mathematical Economics 1, 1974:23-37.
① A.E.Roth, "The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives,"Mathematical Operation Research,1982, 7(4):617-628.
②刘海峰,高考改革中的公平与效率问题[J],教育研究,2002(12)
③ A. Abdulkadiroglu, P. A. Pathak, A. E. Roth, and T. Sonmez,2006. "Changing The Boston School Choice Machenism," NBER Working Paper,2006,11965.
③胡启迪,多元化评价的实施留出革的空间——兼议平行志愿推行的得失[J],考试研究,2009(1)
⑤谈琦婧、张万朋,公共经济学视野下高考“平行志愿”改革的思考[J],教育与考试,2009(5)
①刘海峰,高考改革中的公平与效率问题[J],教育研究,2002(12)
②张亚群,高考改革中的综合评价问题[J],湖北招生考试,2006(20).
①由于各省高考科目不完全一致,这里的综合成绩为除语文、数学和外语三科外其他所有科目的平均成绩。
①在各高校的自主招生过程以及在试行的综合素质评价机制中,这些表现也是重要的录取标准之一
②例如,高考语文相对分数每增加1分,大学期间平均成绩则会增加3.5分,而高考英语相对分数每增加1分,大学期间平均成绩增加9.8分。
①基本能力测试已于2009年在山东省取得试点,总分为120分,以考生实际得分的60%计入高考总分。
②张亚群,高考改革中的综合评价问题[J],湖北招生考试,2006(20)
③刘海峰,高考改革的统独之争[J],教育发展研究,2006(21)
①张亚群,高校自主招生不等于自行考试[J],教育研究,2005(03)
②康翠萍,高中阶段不宜文理分科[J],教育研究,2009(4)
③张亚群、刘毳,高中取消文理分科为时太早[J],考试研究,2009(4)
④邓晖、宋文,从教育评价制度中看文理分科问题[J],科学教育,2009(3)
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