基于盈利预测的机构投资者非理性自利行为研究
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摘要
客观可靠的信息是资本市场企业价值评判的基础,是资本市场价格机制正常运转和实现有效资源配置的前提。而盈利预测信息是关于企业价值最核心的信息,因此是资本市场最重要的信息内容之一,有助于指引普通投资者进行投资,进而引导市场市场实现资源优化配置。机构投资者作为维护市场运行的金融中介,具有规模、信息和知识的优势,是资本市场天然的信息“权威”,是市场上普通投资者最重要的信息源。理性的机构投资者发布客观可靠的盈利预测,指引普通投资者进行投资,可以实现市场资源配置的优化,维护资本市场的秩序。但如果机构投资者表现出非理性自利行为,发布错误的或误导性的盈利预测,则会影响普通投资者的投资决策,误导资本市场的资源流向,从而严重地损害资本市场的运行秩序。
以往的学者对于机构投资者盈利预测的研究大多遵循技术范式的研究思路,考察影响机构投资者盈利预测准确性的技术因素,而缺乏对其内在利益关系的探究。国外部分学者检验了承销业务利益对机构投资者盈利预测的影响,发现为了承销业务利益,机构投资者会采取非理性的自利行为,发布乐观的盈利预测以追逐承销业务利益。这说明当存在自身利益与市场利益的冲突时,非理性自利的机构投资者可能会以牺牲盈利预测的客观性为代价而换取自身的现实利益。
“经济人”的理性自利是以集体理性为目标的。经济个体在追求自身利益时,能实现集体的利益和自身的长期利益,这样才能保证自身利益的安全性和可持续性。因此,个体理性与集体理性是否一致是自利的理性判断标准。但现实中,个体理性与集体理性之间往往存在矛盾,过度的追求个体利益会导致个体理性对集体理性的损害。非理性自利实质为个体理性对集体理性的背离,其内涵是牺牲集体利益以谋求自身的利益,放弃长期利益来换取短期利益。非理性自利行为发生的条件在于市场伦理和声誉机制的缺失、信息的不对称、市场地位的失衡、市场监管的失效。我国的资本市场逐利氛围浓厚、机构投资者盈利压力巨大,这样会诱发机构投资者的非理性自利动机。而由于我国机构投资者在信息知识上的主导地位、市场声誉机制的不健全、市场监管和内部控制低效等方面的原因,机构投资者很可能会在利益诱导下产生非理性自利行为。
由于机构投资者主要利益在于承销、自营和经纪三类业务,因此本文重点考察了在这三类业务利益的诱导下,机构投资者在盈利预测中所表现出的各种非理性自利行为。在承销业务方面,通过选取我国资本市场相关样本数据说进行检验,发现我国机构投资者会因为追逐承销业务利益而在盈利预测中表现出乐观倾向,以提升拟上市公司的市场认可度,增加承销利益；同时维护与上市公司管理层的良好关系,争取未来的承销业务机会；而这种乐观倾向会影响其盈利预测的准确性,并且会导致短期市场超额报酬上升,但中期却下降,因而会损害普通投资者的利益,影响市场资源配置。在自营业务方面,机构投资者为了保护自营业务利益,可能会有选择性地隐瞒自己的真实盈利预测,而发布非客观真实的盈利预测报告；通过相关数据分析,发现机构投资者的盈利预测调整方向与其自营业务的投资方向并不相关,表明机构投资者没有采纳其他机构投资者和自己的盈利预测报告进行投资,也即机构投资者发布的盈利预测选择性地隐瞒了其真实意图。在经纪业务方面,通过经纪业务利益和盈利预测关系的考察,发现机构投资者存在发布显著偏离市场前期盈利预测的倾向,而且这种偏离激发了市场交易量,最终会引致其经纪业务利益的增加。根据机构投资者非理性自利行为的影响因素和条件,本文最后提出从个体理性走向集体理性的实现路径,并据此从我国市场伦理环境的改善、市场监管与机构投资者内部控制的提升、市场声誉机制的建立等多个方面提出了对策建议。
本文对自利的理性标准和非理性自利的内涵及产生条件进行了分析界定,并以此为基础对机构投资者盈利预测中的非理性自利行为机理和表现形式进行了系统性研究,既是对本领域文献的重要补充,也是对经济组织在利益冲突环境下的行为分析范式的贡献。对机构投资者在三类业务利益驱动下的盈利预测非理性自利行为进行了实证检验,这些研究结论对普通投资者理解机构投资者的盈利预测行为,对监管部门规范和引导机构投资者的发展都具有重要的理论和现实意义。
Objective and reliable information is the basis for the normal operation of the capital market price mechanism, is fundamental to realize the allocation of resources and market the premise of sustainable development. And profit forecast information is about the assessment of enterprise value of the core information, so is the most important capital market of the contents of the information. Because investors have the scale, the information and the advantage of knowledge is capital market information "authority", also is the market average investors the most important source of information. People expected rational institutional investors issued a profit forecast of the objective and reliable, and guide ordinary investors for investment, so as to realize the optimization of the market resources allocation, maintain the order of the capital market. But the reality of institutional investors but appears abnormal behavior. In reality there institutional investors issued by misleading profit forecast and stock recommended case, thus to ordinary investors to bring the huge loss and severe damage to the operation of the capital market order. Therefore, the influence of institutional investors, released profit forecast accuracy factors is of important theoretical and practical significance.
Previous scholars for institutional investors profit forecast of most studies of thought for studying the paradigm follow technology, the research on the influencing the accuracy of the profit forecast institutional investors technical factors, lack of its internal benefit relations explored. Although some scholars abroad the main test in underwriting business interests to institutional investors profit forecast, the effects of the underwriting business interests to find, institutional investors will release a optimistic earnings, but did not comprehensive study on the institutional investors in earnings forecasts from the connotation of irrational behavior, and the mechanism, not related to its business and brokerage business interests to the influence of the profit forecast.
In this paper, the rational economic man hypothesis from the start, to limited rational self-interest, and then to irrational self-interest, according to its logical development of the concept of clues, from the irrational the connotation, namely the sacrifice collective interests to seek their own interests, and give up long-term interest in exchange for short-term interests. And points out from the irrational behavior happens conditions in the information asymmetry, market position imbalances, market supervision of the loss of market of the ethics of decay. For this analysis framework of Chinese institutional investors on the analysis, the results showed that as the market for profit, earnings atmosphere pressure, institutional investors may have irrational from the motive. And institutional investors in the information knowledge dominance of the market reputation agency, supervision and internal control, lack of failure and other reasons, the institutional investors are likely to benefit by the irrational produce from the behavior.
Because the main interest lies in institutional investors underwriting, self-supporting and brokerage three kinds of business, so the paper focuses on the three kinds of business in the interests of the induction, institutional investors would profit forecast to show from the irrational behavior. China's capital market through choosing relevant sample data for inspection, the results found that Chinese institutional investors will also be for underwriting business interests and in profit forecast to show optimistic tendencies, this optimism tend to affect its profit forecast accuracy, and can lead to short-term market excess pay rise, but but down the middle, and may damage the interests of ordinary investors that affect the market allocation of resources. This shows that the Chinese institutional investors from the irrational behavior of existing evidence. Further, found that institutional investors profit forecast of the adjustment of its business with the direction in investment direction not related, institutional investors won't adopt other institutional investors the profit forecast report, also not the color of the profit forecast report on their investment. Institutional investors that the profit forecast is not released its real intentions of expression, it shows that the subjective also exist irrational from the motive. Through the brokerage business interests and profit forecast relations, the author finds that the existing institutional investors issued by the market average earnings significantly from the tendency of prediction, and this can lead to deviate from the brokerage business interests of the increase, this is our country institutional investors through the profit forecast to reach the irrational from the objective evidence. According to institutional investors from the irrational behavior of the influence factors and conditions, this paper finally from the market ethics the improvement of the environment, market supervision and internal control the ascension of the institutional investors, the market reputation mechanism and so on many aspects put forward the countermeasures.
This paper from the irrational and connotation of the generation condition are analyzed, and based on this institution investors to the profit forecast the irrational behavior from the behavior mechanism and may form of analysis. This field is not only an important supplement literature, but also of the economic organizations conflict of interest in the environment of behavior analysis model of the contribution. And three business interests for institutional investors with an analysis of the relationship between the profit forecast, inspection results and countermeasures for ordinary investors understand institutional investors profit forecast of the behavior, regulators to strengthen institutional investors in investment profit forecast from the irrational behavior of the supervision and guidance is of important theoretical and practical significance.
以往的学者对于机构投资者盈利预测的研究大多遵循技术范式的研究思路,考察影响机构投资者盈利预测准确性的技术因素,而缺乏对其内在利益关系的探究。国外部分学者检验了承销业务利益对机构投资者盈利预测的影响,发现为了承销业务利益,机构投资者会采取非理性的自利行为,发布乐观的盈利预测以追逐承销业务利益。这说明当存在自身利益与市场利益的冲突时,非理性自利的机构投资者可能会以牺牲盈利预测的客观性为代价而换取自身的现实利益。
“经济人”的理性自利是以集体理性为目标的。经济个体在追求自身利益时,能实现集体的利益和自身的长期利益,这样才能保证自身利益的安全性和可持续性。因此,个体理性与集体理性是否一致是自利的理性判断标准。但现实中,个体理性与集体理性之间往往存在矛盾,过度的追求个体利益会导致个体理性对集体理性的损害。非理性自利实质为个体理性对集体理性的背离,其内涵是牺牲集体利益以谋求自身的利益,放弃长期利益来换取短期利益。非理性自利行为发生的条件在于市场伦理和声誉机制的缺失、信息的不对称、市场地位的失衡、市场监管的失效。我国的资本市场逐利氛围浓厚、机构投资者盈利压力巨大,这样会诱发机构投资者的非理性自利动机。而由于我国机构投资者在信息知识上的主导地位、市场声誉机制的不健全、市场监管和内部控制低效等方面的原因,机构投资者很可能会在利益诱导下产生非理性自利行为。
由于机构投资者主要利益在于承销、自营和经纪三类业务,因此本文重点考察了在这三类业务利益的诱导下,机构投资者在盈利预测中所表现出的各种非理性自利行为。在承销业务方面,通过选取我国资本市场相关样本数据说进行检验,发现我国机构投资者会因为追逐承销业务利益而在盈利预测中表现出乐观倾向,以提升拟上市公司的市场认可度,增加承销利益；同时维护与上市公司管理层的良好关系,争取未来的承销业务机会；而这种乐观倾向会影响其盈利预测的准确性,并且会导致短期市场超额报酬上升,但中期却下降,因而会损害普通投资者的利益,影响市场资源配置。在自营业务方面,机构投资者为了保护自营业务利益,可能会有选择性地隐瞒自己的真实盈利预测,而发布非客观真实的盈利预测报告；通过相关数据分析,发现机构投资者的盈利预测调整方向与其自营业务的投资方向并不相关,表明机构投资者没有采纳其他机构投资者和自己的盈利预测报告进行投资,也即机构投资者发布的盈利预测选择性地隐瞒了其真实意图。在经纪业务方面,通过经纪业务利益和盈利预测关系的考察,发现机构投资者存在发布显著偏离市场前期盈利预测的倾向,而且这种偏离激发了市场交易量,最终会引致其经纪业务利益的增加。根据机构投资者非理性自利行为的影响因素和条件,本文最后提出从个体理性走向集体理性的实现路径,并据此从我国市场伦理环境的改善、市场监管与机构投资者内部控制的提升、市场声誉机制的建立等多个方面提出了对策建议。
本文对自利的理性标准和非理性自利的内涵及产生条件进行了分析界定,并以此为基础对机构投资者盈利预测中的非理性自利行为机理和表现形式进行了系统性研究,既是对本领域文献的重要补充,也是对经济组织在利益冲突环境下的行为分析范式的贡献。对机构投资者在三类业务利益驱动下的盈利预测非理性自利行为进行了实证检验,这些研究结论对普通投资者理解机构投资者的盈利预测行为,对监管部门规范和引导机构投资者的发展都具有重要的理论和现实意义。
Objective and reliable information is the basis for the normal operation of the capital market price mechanism, is fundamental to realize the allocation of resources and market the premise of sustainable development. And profit forecast information is about the assessment of enterprise value of the core information, so is the most important capital market of the contents of the information. Because investors have the scale, the information and the advantage of knowledge is capital market information "authority", also is the market average investors the most important source of information. People expected rational institutional investors issued a profit forecast of the objective and reliable, and guide ordinary investors for investment, so as to realize the optimization of the market resources allocation, maintain the order of the capital market. But the reality of institutional investors but appears abnormal behavior. In reality there institutional investors issued by misleading profit forecast and stock recommended case, thus to ordinary investors to bring the huge loss and severe damage to the operation of the capital market order. Therefore, the influence of institutional investors, released profit forecast accuracy factors is of important theoretical and practical significance.
Previous scholars for institutional investors profit forecast of most studies of thought for studying the paradigm follow technology, the research on the influencing the accuracy of the profit forecast institutional investors technical factors, lack of its internal benefit relations explored. Although some scholars abroad the main test in underwriting business interests to institutional investors profit forecast, the effects of the underwriting business interests to find, institutional investors will release a optimistic earnings, but did not comprehensive study on the institutional investors in earnings forecasts from the connotation of irrational behavior, and the mechanism, not related to its business and brokerage business interests to the influence of the profit forecast.
In this paper, the rational economic man hypothesis from the start, to limited rational self-interest, and then to irrational self-interest, according to its logical development of the concept of clues, from the irrational the connotation, namely the sacrifice collective interests to seek their own interests, and give up long-term interest in exchange for short-term interests. And points out from the irrational behavior happens conditions in the information asymmetry, market position imbalances, market supervision of the loss of market of the ethics of decay. For this analysis framework of Chinese institutional investors on the analysis, the results showed that as the market for profit, earnings atmosphere pressure, institutional investors may have irrational from the motive. And institutional investors in the information knowledge dominance of the market reputation agency, supervision and internal control, lack of failure and other reasons, the institutional investors are likely to benefit by the irrational produce from the behavior.
Because the main interest lies in institutional investors underwriting, self-supporting and brokerage three kinds of business, so the paper focuses on the three kinds of business in the interests of the induction, institutional investors would profit forecast to show from the irrational behavior. China's capital market through choosing relevant sample data for inspection, the results found that Chinese institutional investors will also be for underwriting business interests and in profit forecast to show optimistic tendencies, this optimism tend to affect its profit forecast accuracy, and can lead to short-term market excess pay rise, but but down the middle, and may damage the interests of ordinary investors that affect the market allocation of resources. This shows that the Chinese institutional investors from the irrational behavior of existing evidence. Further, found that institutional investors profit forecast of the adjustment of its business with the direction in investment direction not related, institutional investors won't adopt other institutional investors the profit forecast report, also not the color of the profit forecast report on their investment. Institutional investors that the profit forecast is not released its real intentions of expression, it shows that the subjective also exist irrational from the motive. Through the brokerage business interests and profit forecast relations, the author finds that the existing institutional investors issued by the market average earnings significantly from the tendency of prediction, and this can lead to deviate from the brokerage business interests of the increase, this is our country institutional investors through the profit forecast to reach the irrational from the objective evidence. According to institutional investors from the irrational behavior of the influence factors and conditions, this paper finally from the market ethics the improvement of the environment, market supervision and internal control the ascension of the institutional investors, the market reputation mechanism and so on many aspects put forward the countermeasures.
This paper from the irrational and connotation of the generation condition are analyzed, and based on this institution investors to the profit forecast the irrational behavior from the behavior mechanism and may form of analysis. This field is not only an important supplement literature, but also of the economic organizations conflict of interest in the environment of behavior analysis model of the contribution. And three business interests for institutional investors with an analysis of the relationship between the profit forecast, inspection results and countermeasures for ordinary investors understand institutional investors profit forecast of the behavior, regulators to strengthen institutional investors in investment profit forecast from the irrational behavior of the supervision and guidance is of important theoretical and practical significance.
引文
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