巴塞尔协议框架下的中国银行业监管
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摘要
中国银行业监督管理委员会(中国银监会)成立于2003年4月,《中华人民共和国银行业监督管理法》于2004年2月1日开始实施,我国银行业发展自此翻开了新的一页。中国银监会成立的八年,是我国银行业在实体经济带动下快速发展的八年,是中国银监会各项制度不断完善,符合我国实际的银行业监管理念框架体系得以构建的八年。
在新的历史时期,我国银行监管体系在制度上与国际银行监管框架的对接是关键内容。对接并不是全盘接受,而是在全面评估我国银行监管体系的有效性与效率水平的基础上,结合当前我国银行业发展的现实状况,根据国际银行监管框架的基础架构和新发展趋势,提高我国银行监管的科学性、规范性和制度化水平。对接也并不是目的,而是要通过对接这一过程,促进国际社会对我国银行监管的认识和认同的深入,更好地将我国银行业发展融入到国际金融发展的浪潮中,用好国内和国际两个市场资源,更好地服务于我国银行业金融自主创新能力的提高,更好地促进我国银行业金融服务水平的提高和整体竞争优势的培育。
本文《巴塞尔协议框架下的中国银行业监管》在银行监管理论研究和分析的基础上,按照以下两条主线展开。第一,巴塞尔协议的演变与国际银行监管框架的发展。这一主线主要描述国际银行监管框架变化的历史进程,勾勒国际银行监管当前发展的主要趋势,在此基础上,探讨国际银行监管实践发展与银行监管理论研究发展之间的相互关系。第二,中国银行监管发展的历史进程与现状分析。这一主线主要描述我国银行监管发展的历史进程,分析我国银行监管当前需要应对的主要问题,在此基础上,探讨我国银行监管在巴塞尔协议框架下需要进行的变革。
论文包括六个部分。各部分的主要内容如下。
第一部分,导言,简要介绍论文研究的背景、研究意义、研究方法、主要观点、创新点与不足之处、研究所涉及的关键词汇
第二部分,银行监管理论基础探讨。在简要回顾银行监管的发展历程之后,讨论其理论演进脉络,分析为什么要对银行监管,由谁来监管,怎样监管,监管要达到什么目的,监管的收益与成本等基本理论问题。主要观点包括：①银行监管先后经历了自由银行时期、从自由走向全面管制、放松管制到金融自由化时期,以及再管制等四个阶段。然而,尽管银行监管目标、具体内容、监管方式在不断变化,但银行监管的核心——管风险,始终未变,不论从宏观金融调控角度还是从微观金融管制角度看,均是如此。②风险,无论其分类如何,一定要认识到,它是一种波动性。这种波动性可能会带来收益,也可能会产生损失。因为追求可能的收益而放弃对可能的损失的防御固然是监管的重点,正如传统的银行监管所做的那样；因为防御可能的损失而放弃可能的收益同样也是现代银行监管必须为自身行为设定的必要界限。③尽管成本与收益分析方面存在一定的局限性,但成本与收益的比较和分析,是对银行监管制度必要性在实践中的不断验证,其有用性需要引起重视。④要控制系统风险,最根本的方法是创造一套激励相容的监管制度(Incentive-compatible Regulation),矫正消费者和银行之间的信息不对称,使得风险损失的承担与风险收益的享有对等,进而使得市场本身能够内在地衍生出低风险的银行资本结构从而最大化社会福利。控制系统风险和创造公平的竞争环境这两个监管目标在实现过程中均面临着较为尖锐的制度设计、政策决策和工具选用问题。⑤银行监管作为一种经济规制制度的目的,就在于控制银行业作为一个整体风险溢价的规模、变化趋势,银行监管内容的实质,就是要在银行业乃至金融业领域内,实现风险溢价的合理配置。⑥银行监管的手段,无论数量化到什么程度,其所要完成的一个基本功能,就是提供监管决策中权衡的基本依据。银行监管必须要权衡,在损失和利润之间的权衡、在宏观调控和微观规制中权衡。权衡就必然是一个动态的过程,对于风险溢价的估计应当贯穿于这一过程的始终。
第三部分,巴塞尔协议的演变及实施。本章对巴塞尔协议的实施、发展演变过程进行回顾、介绍、比较和分析。主要观点包括：①理解协议本身所针对的银行业风险、理解银行监管,是理解巴塞尔协议演进的关键所在。②风险为本的真实含义是风险损失,所有规则的设定都围绕如何防范风险损失的发生、提高银行机构和银行业自身提高风险的能力来展开。而银行对风险溢价的追求依然被放在了依靠市场机制自身调节来实现的位置,未能在监管的核心目标中加以体现,只是在对银行监管者的约束条文和自我评估方法中加以工具性地体现。这种设定对于市场经济发达的经济体系的银行监管可能是合适的,但对于市场经济不发达的经济体系而言,则存在根本性的矛盾。③风险本身就包括了两个方面,一个方面是监管所竭力要防范的损失,另一方面是风险本身所代表的银行业市场化运行的基本动力——不确定性,作为银行监管核心原则的基础或者说前置条件,应当体现这样一种思想,即在不断强化成熟的风险监管体系的同时,给予监管者在风险损失和风险溢价之间进行权衡的制度空间。④新旧资本协议相比,无论巴塞尔协议的具体内容发生了什么样的变化,作为巴塞尔协议本身所体现的银行监管理念、以及在相同的监管理念下对于监管实践的评价标准是始终如一的。⑤新资本协议所针对的,是过于简单化的旧资本协议不能对全球化进程作出恰当的反应这一系统性弱点；新资本协议所增加的,是旧资本协议没有涵盖的操作风险和资产证券化；新资本协议所强化的,是旧资本协议表达不充分的风险管理。尽管纵向来看,新资本协议确实是对旧资本协议的改进。但在核心的风险资产计量和定价方面,新旧资本协议所面临的问题实质是一样的。⑥对于风险价值(VaR)方法来决定银行资产组合所要求的最低资本额度能否在一定程度上解决银行监管资本套利的行为存在争议。
第四部分,全球金融危机下的银行监管争论与变革。本章对全球金融危机下的银行监管争论与变革进行描述、总结与分析。主要观点包括：①从风险分散的角度看,以证券化资产为基础再进行复杂的金融衍生品创造不仅技术上可能,而且也有着充分的激励。②在市场的作用下,金融体系能做什么,金融创新之所以要发展到特定的层次和水平,受经济活动规模、方向和结构的影响。金融体系与实体经济之间正向联系的建立,取决于金融作为工具主要被应用于实体经济的哪一个具体的方向。金融体系自身对处置系统运行中可能出现问题的能力,是金融体系能够更好地服务于实体经济的重要保证。强化监管未必是提高金融机构应对风险能力的正确手段,在特定的情况下,强化监管可能还会有反作用。③新资本协议中所涉及的风险,仅仅是在银行业发展实践中出现的、必须要加以重视和设定资本标准来加以监管的风险,并不是一个银行机构在其经营过程中所面临的所有风险。监管之所以如此选择有着现实的理由。④监管决不可能解决银行业发展所固有的内生矛盾,也绝不可能杜绝危机的发生。每一次的银行危机、每一次的监管失败,都为银行监管的进一步完善提供了教训与指向,银行监管所必须的中心内容就是在这样的实践基础之上逐步完善起来的,这就是巴塞尔协议演进所依赖的“危机刺激—制度调试”循环。⑤巴塞尔协议,无论是新资本协议还是旧资本协议,尽管说协议要达到的目标,是实现“风险为本”的监管,但就监管基础理论而言,很难在其中找到风险的影子。风险是监管的原因,但却不是监管的基础。⑥就风险而言,如果将其看作一个发生的过程,显然包括了风险源、风险类型、风险累积、风险传导等多个环节。作为对银行机构的监管,监管的重点应当放在组织和人方面；由于在风险类型监管中面临着这样的约束,未来银行监管的重点,应该放在有限的监管资源能够发挥最好效率的环节上；更多的监管资源应当放在风险累积和风险传导方面,作为更关注银行业整体发展和宏观经济稳定的监管机构而言,不能过分依赖银行自身来实现阻断。⑦在现时的风险交易操作中,例如抵押贷款的证券化和再证券化,所交易的对象并非都是风险。之所以如此,是因为作为风险交易主体的银行和非银行金融机构,当掌握了风险交易工具之后,在客观上存在着以风险替代成本的可能性和内在激励。如果不阻断风险—成本替代机制,风险分散就会扭曲为一个寻租过程,理论中合理的风险分散机制就会变成一个规模不断膨胀的恶性循环。从理论上看,这是未来银行监管变革的关键所在。⑧一个以风险为核心对象的银行监管必须要搞清楚风险的基本发展规律和趋势。按照实践的经验和教训来构建监管体制在监管初期是必要的,但当基本框架已经建立起来之后,就有必要为整个制度框架加上一个内核,使其成为制度调整和演进的一致性基础。
第五部分,中国银行业监管的现状。本章主要讨论新中国成立后银行业监管演变过程、现状及当前面临的主要问题。主要观点包括：①中国想要进一步在国际组织中拥有话语权和影响力,需要首先成为新资本协议的不折不扣的执行者,从短期看,实施新资本协议,包括巴塞尔协议Ⅲ,将对银行业乃至整个经济生活产生很大影响,但我们不能为短期利益忽视长期利益,不实施新资本协议,中国将付出巨大成本,包括银行和整个经济的影响。②中国实施新资本协议不仅要考虑中国银行业的实际情况,同时要考虑中国经济的发展,这是至关重要的,如果因实施新资本协议对经济发展产生了负面影响,那么就失去实施新资本协议的实际意义,这是监管当局在实施过程中必须考虑的问题。③随着新资本协议的逐步实施,中国银行业提升资本充足率和资本补充的压力将会很大。④中国银行业机构整体数据基础依然薄弱,可以说数据问题是当前制约中国银行业有效实施新资本协议的最大障碍之一⑤我国在风险管理领域与国际最佳实践相比有着极大的差距,无论在风险衡量模型的开发还是在运用金融衍生工具转移风险的实际操作中,都落后于国际上风险管理技术的发展。⑥新资本协议框架主要参考公司治理、风险管理水平相对较高的发达国家和地区的银行的做法,因而对于中国这样的新兴市场国家来说,商业银行在实施新资本协议过程中首先遇到的挑战是对现有的风险管理政策和流程、风险管理文化、组织架构、内部风险评级方法等形成重大冲击,需要对相关方面做出相应的调整。⑦监管当局的重要职责之一就是要维护银行业的公平竞争。然而,实施新资本协议却加剧了大中小银行间参与市场竞争的不公平性。实施新资本协议对银行机构信贷支持中小企业起着反向激励作用,无疑对中小企业的发展产生负面影响,这是监管当局必须考虑的现实问题。⑧当前我国银行监管面临五大问题：大而不倒与尾大不掉、存款隐性担保与市场约束弱化、信贷投放集中与风险积聚、混业经营与分业监管、市场化经营原则与金融支持经济薄弱环节。
第六部分,新资本协议下中国银行业监管改革的思考。本章结合当前我国银行监管的现实发展,对新资本协议下我国银行监管改革的主要趋势进行了探讨。主要观点包括：①目前的监管目标定位过分强调微观审慎性监管,未能体现风险为本原则,未能体现银行监管体系变革的趋势。②我国银行业监管重点应借鉴新资本协议的理念,逐渐向全面风险管理和宏观审慎角度转变,以提高银行的抗风险能力,保证整个银行体系的稳定和健康发展。③在监管目标定位上,可以考虑以下三个方面的调整。其一,充分考虑新资本协议的原则和宗旨,不拘泥于具体的条款和指标。其二,充分认识当前监管目标定位上存在的缺陷以及缺陷形成的原因,有针对性地、稳健地展开监管目标调整。其三,重视监管改革,充分认识监管目标的过渡性特征。必须认识到,银行业监管改革在一定程度上可以等同于宏观调控体系和机制的改革,不可轻动,但决不因此就不动,主动的改革一定比倒逼改革要好。④尽管规制导向监管向原则导向监管转变是发展的趋势,但在当前的约束条件下,合理的选择应当是：在当前的金融监管框架下,进一步加强规制导向监管；同时,在金融监管改革的进程中,逐步为原则导向监管的实现创造理论、技术和基础设施条件。⑤微观审慎性监管和宏观审慎性监管的有机结合在于：第一,微观审慎性监管应当致力于阻断银行的风险—成本替代机制,以减小风险规模和发生的频度。第二,宏观审慎性监管应当致力于培育各个层次的风险阻断机制,控制系统性风险的发生。
本文所采用的主要研究方法包括历史分析、制度分析、比较分析和文献分析等。
论文可能的创新之处包括以下几个方面：
1.观点创新之一：应当以包括风险损失和收益的风险溢价概念来替代当前在银行监管中采用的风险损失概念,进而构建银行监管的风险理论基础,在此基础上,促进“风险为本”的监管向“风险导向”的监管转变。
2.观点创新之二：控制系统风险,最根本的方法是创造一套激励相容的监管制度,矫正消费者和银行之间的信息不对称,使得风险损失的承担与风险收益的享有对等,进而使得市场本身能够内在地衍生出低风险的银行资本结构从而最大化社会福利。
3.观点创新之三：应当彻底反思巴塞尔协议演进所依赖的“危机刺激—制度调试”循环模式,通过银行监管的风险理论基础研究及其成果的应用,将更多的监管资源放在风险累积和风险传导的阻断方面,作为更关注银行业整体发展和宏观经济稳定的监管机构而言,不能过分依赖银行自身来实现阻断。
4.观点创新之四：作为风险交易主体的银行和非银行金融机构,当掌握了风险交易工具之后,在客观上存在着以风险替代成本的可能性和内在激励。如果不阻断风险—成本替代机制,风险分散就会扭曲为一个寻租过程,理论中合理的风险分散机制就会变成一个规模不断膨胀的恶性循环。从理论上看,这是未来银行监管变革的关键所在。
5.视角创新：银行监管是一个实践性很强的领域,在银行监管的研究中,更多的研究侧重于在实践进程中探讨监管体制的完善,是一个归纳过程。本文明确提出了银行监管需要培育以风险理论为核心的监管理论基础,在监管理论基础之上来系统探讨银行监管框架的变革,是一个演绎过程。
China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was founded at April,2003. Law of the People's Republic of China on Regulation of and Supervision over the Banking Industry was in application since01/02/2004. The new era began since then. During the8years after the foundation of CBRC, China's Banking industry has experienced the rapid growth driven by the development of economy, while the institution of CBRC been kept improving and the ideological framework of banking supervision which reflects the reality of banking industry in China.
It is the crucial issue to align China's banking supervision system with the principles of international banking supervision system."Aligning with" isn't equal to "Accepting all", but fulfilling the regulation and supervision scientifically, formally and institutionally under the evaluation on the effectiveness and efficiency of China's banking supervision system, considering both the present status of our banking industry and the basic framework of international banking supervision system and its trend."Aligning with" isn't the target, but conforming our banking industry with the international banking industry to serve the improvement on innovation, services and competitive advantage of our banking system on the support of both the domestic and international market.
On the foundation of reviewing on banking supervision theories, this dissertation,"Implementation of Banking Supervision in China In Framework of New Basel Accord——On the Perspective of Theoretical Changing On Banking Supervision", follows two paths:firstly, the narration of changing of the Basel Accord and the evolvement of international banking supervision system. The purpose of this path is displaying the historical outlook on the evolvement of international banking supervision system and framing its trends, and in advance, probing the correlation between the practices and theoretical research of international banking supervision. Secondly, displaying the historical outlook and present status on the evolvement of banking supervision in China. The purpose of this path is narrating the historical outlook, analyzing the key issues that is necessary to deal with seriously, and the possible reform which needs to be implemented for the purpose of aligning with Basel Ⅱ.
This dissertation includes6sections. The main content of each section is as follows.
Section1, Preface. Brief introduction of the background, importance, methodology, main ideas, possible innovation and flaws, key words.
Section2, The changing of theoretical research on banking supervision. After brief reviewing the changing process of banking supervision, the changing logic is discussed, the topics of why, by who and how the bank should be supervised are analyzed. The literatures on objectives of supervision and CBA approach are reviewed.
Section3, The changing and implementation of Basel Accord. The implementation and changing of Basel Accord are reviewed, introduced, compared and analyzed.
Section4, The argument and reform of banking supervision on the backdrop of global financial crisis. The argument and reform of banking supervision on the backdrop of global financial crisis are narrated and analyzed.
Section5, The present status of banking supervision system in China. The evolvement, present status and key issues of banking supervision in China are discussed.
Section6, Reflection on the reform of banking supervision in China aligning with the Basel Accord Ⅱ. On the backdrop of development of banking supervision in China, the main trends of reform that would emerge in banking supervision according to the Basel Accord Ⅱ are discussed.
The main methodology applied in this dissertation includes historical analysis, institutional analysis, comparative analysis and literatures reviewing, etc.
This paper may be an important innovation in accordance with the degree of severity of light arranged mainly in the following aspects:
1. New viewpoints:Loss, the adopted meaning of risk, should be replaced by the risk premium that includes both the loss and the gain. And focusing on the risk theories, the foundation of banking supervision should be structured. The transformation of banking supervision mode from risk-based to risk-oriented is brought up.
2. New viewpoints:the essential approach of controlling systematic risk is developing incentive-compatible regulation, so that the correction of information asymmetric between consumer and banks could match the risk avenue and risk taking, push the low cost capital structure emerged endogenously, and consequently, maximize the social welfare.
3. New viewpoints. The cycle model of crisis-drove and institution-adjusted that is the usual track of changing of Basel Accord should be reconsidered. By the development of banking supervision research and the application of its fruits, invest more resources of banking supervision into the risk accumulation and cut-off mechanism of risk conduction. It is unwise choice to depend on the bank itself to cut off the risk conduction since the supervising authorities concern banking industry and marcoeconomy situation more than single bank.
4. New viewpoints:As the subjective of risk transaction, banks and non-bank institutes do have the incentive and possibility to replace cost ex post by risk ex ante when the tool of risk transaction is available. If the trade-off mechanism between risk ex ante and cost ex post couldn't cut off, the risk dispersing process would be twisted as a rent-seeking process, the risk dispersing mechanism, which is reasonable theoretically, would become the vicious cycle with scale expanding continuously. Theoretically, the reform of banking supervision should focus on this trade-off.
5. Perspective Innovation:The banking supervision is the field depending on practices. In the recent literatures, more researches focus on probing into the improvement of banking supervision system in the process of practices. In brief, it's a procedure of induction. In this dissertation, focusing on the risk theories, the foundation of banking supervision theory is emphasized. On this foundation, the reform of banking supervision is discussed systematically. It's a procedure of deduction rather than induction formerly.
在新的历史时期,我国银行监管体系在制度上与国际银行监管框架的对接是关键内容。对接并不是全盘接受,而是在全面评估我国银行监管体系的有效性与效率水平的基础上,结合当前我国银行业发展的现实状况,根据国际银行监管框架的基础架构和新发展趋势,提高我国银行监管的科学性、规范性和制度化水平。对接也并不是目的,而是要通过对接这一过程,促进国际社会对我国银行监管的认识和认同的深入,更好地将我国银行业发展融入到国际金融发展的浪潮中,用好国内和国际两个市场资源,更好地服务于我国银行业金融自主创新能力的提高,更好地促进我国银行业金融服务水平的提高和整体竞争优势的培育。
本文《巴塞尔协议框架下的中国银行业监管》在银行监管理论研究和分析的基础上,按照以下两条主线展开。第一,巴塞尔协议的演变与国际银行监管框架的发展。这一主线主要描述国际银行监管框架变化的历史进程,勾勒国际银行监管当前发展的主要趋势,在此基础上,探讨国际银行监管实践发展与银行监管理论研究发展之间的相互关系。第二,中国银行监管发展的历史进程与现状分析。这一主线主要描述我国银行监管发展的历史进程,分析我国银行监管当前需要应对的主要问题,在此基础上,探讨我国银行监管在巴塞尔协议框架下需要进行的变革。
论文包括六个部分。各部分的主要内容如下。
第一部分,导言,简要介绍论文研究的背景、研究意义、研究方法、主要观点、创新点与不足之处、研究所涉及的关键词汇
第二部分,银行监管理论基础探讨。在简要回顾银行监管的发展历程之后,讨论其理论演进脉络,分析为什么要对银行监管,由谁来监管,怎样监管,监管要达到什么目的,监管的收益与成本等基本理论问题。主要观点包括：①银行监管先后经历了自由银行时期、从自由走向全面管制、放松管制到金融自由化时期,以及再管制等四个阶段。然而,尽管银行监管目标、具体内容、监管方式在不断变化,但银行监管的核心——管风险,始终未变,不论从宏观金融调控角度还是从微观金融管制角度看,均是如此。②风险,无论其分类如何,一定要认识到,它是一种波动性。这种波动性可能会带来收益,也可能会产生损失。因为追求可能的收益而放弃对可能的损失的防御固然是监管的重点,正如传统的银行监管所做的那样；因为防御可能的损失而放弃可能的收益同样也是现代银行监管必须为自身行为设定的必要界限。③尽管成本与收益分析方面存在一定的局限性,但成本与收益的比较和分析,是对银行监管制度必要性在实践中的不断验证,其有用性需要引起重视。④要控制系统风险,最根本的方法是创造一套激励相容的监管制度(Incentive-compatible Regulation),矫正消费者和银行之间的信息不对称,使得风险损失的承担与风险收益的享有对等,进而使得市场本身能够内在地衍生出低风险的银行资本结构从而最大化社会福利。控制系统风险和创造公平的竞争环境这两个监管目标在实现过程中均面临着较为尖锐的制度设计、政策决策和工具选用问题。⑤银行监管作为一种经济规制制度的目的,就在于控制银行业作为一个整体风险溢价的规模、变化趋势,银行监管内容的实质,就是要在银行业乃至金融业领域内,实现风险溢价的合理配置。⑥银行监管的手段,无论数量化到什么程度,其所要完成的一个基本功能,就是提供监管决策中权衡的基本依据。银行监管必须要权衡,在损失和利润之间的权衡、在宏观调控和微观规制中权衡。权衡就必然是一个动态的过程,对于风险溢价的估计应当贯穿于这一过程的始终。
第三部分,巴塞尔协议的演变及实施。本章对巴塞尔协议的实施、发展演变过程进行回顾、介绍、比较和分析。主要观点包括：①理解协议本身所针对的银行业风险、理解银行监管,是理解巴塞尔协议演进的关键所在。②风险为本的真实含义是风险损失,所有规则的设定都围绕如何防范风险损失的发生、提高银行机构和银行业自身提高风险的能力来展开。而银行对风险溢价的追求依然被放在了依靠市场机制自身调节来实现的位置,未能在监管的核心目标中加以体现,只是在对银行监管者的约束条文和自我评估方法中加以工具性地体现。这种设定对于市场经济发达的经济体系的银行监管可能是合适的,但对于市场经济不发达的经济体系而言,则存在根本性的矛盾。③风险本身就包括了两个方面,一个方面是监管所竭力要防范的损失,另一方面是风险本身所代表的银行业市场化运行的基本动力——不确定性,作为银行监管核心原则的基础或者说前置条件,应当体现这样一种思想,即在不断强化成熟的风险监管体系的同时,给予监管者在风险损失和风险溢价之间进行权衡的制度空间。④新旧资本协议相比,无论巴塞尔协议的具体内容发生了什么样的变化,作为巴塞尔协议本身所体现的银行监管理念、以及在相同的监管理念下对于监管实践的评价标准是始终如一的。⑤新资本协议所针对的,是过于简单化的旧资本协议不能对全球化进程作出恰当的反应这一系统性弱点；新资本协议所增加的,是旧资本协议没有涵盖的操作风险和资产证券化；新资本协议所强化的,是旧资本协议表达不充分的风险管理。尽管纵向来看,新资本协议确实是对旧资本协议的改进。但在核心的风险资产计量和定价方面,新旧资本协议所面临的问题实质是一样的。⑥对于风险价值(VaR)方法来决定银行资产组合所要求的最低资本额度能否在一定程度上解决银行监管资本套利的行为存在争议。
第四部分,全球金融危机下的银行监管争论与变革。本章对全球金融危机下的银行监管争论与变革进行描述、总结与分析。主要观点包括：①从风险分散的角度看,以证券化资产为基础再进行复杂的金融衍生品创造不仅技术上可能,而且也有着充分的激励。②在市场的作用下,金融体系能做什么,金融创新之所以要发展到特定的层次和水平,受经济活动规模、方向和结构的影响。金融体系与实体经济之间正向联系的建立,取决于金融作为工具主要被应用于实体经济的哪一个具体的方向。金融体系自身对处置系统运行中可能出现问题的能力,是金融体系能够更好地服务于实体经济的重要保证。强化监管未必是提高金融机构应对风险能力的正确手段,在特定的情况下,强化监管可能还会有反作用。③新资本协议中所涉及的风险,仅仅是在银行业发展实践中出现的、必须要加以重视和设定资本标准来加以监管的风险,并不是一个银行机构在其经营过程中所面临的所有风险。监管之所以如此选择有着现实的理由。④监管决不可能解决银行业发展所固有的内生矛盾,也绝不可能杜绝危机的发生。每一次的银行危机、每一次的监管失败,都为银行监管的进一步完善提供了教训与指向,银行监管所必须的中心内容就是在这样的实践基础之上逐步完善起来的,这就是巴塞尔协议演进所依赖的“危机刺激—制度调试”循环。⑤巴塞尔协议,无论是新资本协议还是旧资本协议,尽管说协议要达到的目标,是实现“风险为本”的监管,但就监管基础理论而言,很难在其中找到风险的影子。风险是监管的原因,但却不是监管的基础。⑥就风险而言,如果将其看作一个发生的过程,显然包括了风险源、风险类型、风险累积、风险传导等多个环节。作为对银行机构的监管,监管的重点应当放在组织和人方面；由于在风险类型监管中面临着这样的约束,未来银行监管的重点,应该放在有限的监管资源能够发挥最好效率的环节上；更多的监管资源应当放在风险累积和风险传导方面,作为更关注银行业整体发展和宏观经济稳定的监管机构而言,不能过分依赖银行自身来实现阻断。⑦在现时的风险交易操作中,例如抵押贷款的证券化和再证券化,所交易的对象并非都是风险。之所以如此,是因为作为风险交易主体的银行和非银行金融机构,当掌握了风险交易工具之后,在客观上存在着以风险替代成本的可能性和内在激励。如果不阻断风险—成本替代机制,风险分散就会扭曲为一个寻租过程,理论中合理的风险分散机制就会变成一个规模不断膨胀的恶性循环。从理论上看,这是未来银行监管变革的关键所在。⑧一个以风险为核心对象的银行监管必须要搞清楚风险的基本发展规律和趋势。按照实践的经验和教训来构建监管体制在监管初期是必要的,但当基本框架已经建立起来之后,就有必要为整个制度框架加上一个内核,使其成为制度调整和演进的一致性基础。
第五部分,中国银行业监管的现状。本章主要讨论新中国成立后银行业监管演变过程、现状及当前面临的主要问题。主要观点包括：①中国想要进一步在国际组织中拥有话语权和影响力,需要首先成为新资本协议的不折不扣的执行者,从短期看,实施新资本协议,包括巴塞尔协议Ⅲ,将对银行业乃至整个经济生活产生很大影响,但我们不能为短期利益忽视长期利益,不实施新资本协议,中国将付出巨大成本,包括银行和整个经济的影响。②中国实施新资本协议不仅要考虑中国银行业的实际情况,同时要考虑中国经济的发展,这是至关重要的,如果因实施新资本协议对经济发展产生了负面影响,那么就失去实施新资本协议的实际意义,这是监管当局在实施过程中必须考虑的问题。③随着新资本协议的逐步实施,中国银行业提升资本充足率和资本补充的压力将会很大。④中国银行业机构整体数据基础依然薄弱,可以说数据问题是当前制约中国银行业有效实施新资本协议的最大障碍之一⑤我国在风险管理领域与国际最佳实践相比有着极大的差距,无论在风险衡量模型的开发还是在运用金融衍生工具转移风险的实际操作中,都落后于国际上风险管理技术的发展。⑥新资本协议框架主要参考公司治理、风险管理水平相对较高的发达国家和地区的银行的做法,因而对于中国这样的新兴市场国家来说,商业银行在实施新资本协议过程中首先遇到的挑战是对现有的风险管理政策和流程、风险管理文化、组织架构、内部风险评级方法等形成重大冲击,需要对相关方面做出相应的调整。⑦监管当局的重要职责之一就是要维护银行业的公平竞争。然而,实施新资本协议却加剧了大中小银行间参与市场竞争的不公平性。实施新资本协议对银行机构信贷支持中小企业起着反向激励作用,无疑对中小企业的发展产生负面影响,这是监管当局必须考虑的现实问题。⑧当前我国银行监管面临五大问题：大而不倒与尾大不掉、存款隐性担保与市场约束弱化、信贷投放集中与风险积聚、混业经营与分业监管、市场化经营原则与金融支持经济薄弱环节。
第六部分,新资本协议下中国银行业监管改革的思考。本章结合当前我国银行监管的现实发展,对新资本协议下我国银行监管改革的主要趋势进行了探讨。主要观点包括：①目前的监管目标定位过分强调微观审慎性监管,未能体现风险为本原则,未能体现银行监管体系变革的趋势。②我国银行业监管重点应借鉴新资本协议的理念,逐渐向全面风险管理和宏观审慎角度转变,以提高银行的抗风险能力,保证整个银行体系的稳定和健康发展。③在监管目标定位上,可以考虑以下三个方面的调整。其一,充分考虑新资本协议的原则和宗旨,不拘泥于具体的条款和指标。其二,充分认识当前监管目标定位上存在的缺陷以及缺陷形成的原因,有针对性地、稳健地展开监管目标调整。其三,重视监管改革,充分认识监管目标的过渡性特征。必须认识到,银行业监管改革在一定程度上可以等同于宏观调控体系和机制的改革,不可轻动,但决不因此就不动,主动的改革一定比倒逼改革要好。④尽管规制导向监管向原则导向监管转变是发展的趋势,但在当前的约束条件下,合理的选择应当是：在当前的金融监管框架下,进一步加强规制导向监管；同时,在金融监管改革的进程中,逐步为原则导向监管的实现创造理论、技术和基础设施条件。⑤微观审慎性监管和宏观审慎性监管的有机结合在于：第一,微观审慎性监管应当致力于阻断银行的风险—成本替代机制,以减小风险规模和发生的频度。第二,宏观审慎性监管应当致力于培育各个层次的风险阻断机制,控制系统性风险的发生。
本文所采用的主要研究方法包括历史分析、制度分析、比较分析和文献分析等。
论文可能的创新之处包括以下几个方面：
1.观点创新之一：应当以包括风险损失和收益的风险溢价概念来替代当前在银行监管中采用的风险损失概念,进而构建银行监管的风险理论基础,在此基础上,促进“风险为本”的监管向“风险导向”的监管转变。
2.观点创新之二：控制系统风险,最根本的方法是创造一套激励相容的监管制度,矫正消费者和银行之间的信息不对称,使得风险损失的承担与风险收益的享有对等,进而使得市场本身能够内在地衍生出低风险的银行资本结构从而最大化社会福利。
3.观点创新之三：应当彻底反思巴塞尔协议演进所依赖的“危机刺激—制度调试”循环模式,通过银行监管的风险理论基础研究及其成果的应用,将更多的监管资源放在风险累积和风险传导的阻断方面,作为更关注银行业整体发展和宏观经济稳定的监管机构而言,不能过分依赖银行自身来实现阻断。
4.观点创新之四：作为风险交易主体的银行和非银行金融机构,当掌握了风险交易工具之后,在客观上存在着以风险替代成本的可能性和内在激励。如果不阻断风险—成本替代机制,风险分散就会扭曲为一个寻租过程,理论中合理的风险分散机制就会变成一个规模不断膨胀的恶性循环。从理论上看,这是未来银行监管变革的关键所在。
5.视角创新：银行监管是一个实践性很强的领域,在银行监管的研究中,更多的研究侧重于在实践进程中探讨监管体制的完善,是一个归纳过程。本文明确提出了银行监管需要培育以风险理论为核心的监管理论基础,在监管理论基础之上来系统探讨银行监管框架的变革,是一个演绎过程。
China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was founded at April,2003. Law of the People's Republic of China on Regulation of and Supervision over the Banking Industry was in application since01/02/2004. The new era began since then. During the8years after the foundation of CBRC, China's Banking industry has experienced the rapid growth driven by the development of economy, while the institution of CBRC been kept improving and the ideological framework of banking supervision which reflects the reality of banking industry in China.
It is the crucial issue to align China's banking supervision system with the principles of international banking supervision system."Aligning with" isn't equal to "Accepting all", but fulfilling the regulation and supervision scientifically, formally and institutionally under the evaluation on the effectiveness and efficiency of China's banking supervision system, considering both the present status of our banking industry and the basic framework of international banking supervision system and its trend."Aligning with" isn't the target, but conforming our banking industry with the international banking industry to serve the improvement on innovation, services and competitive advantage of our banking system on the support of both the domestic and international market.
On the foundation of reviewing on banking supervision theories, this dissertation,"Implementation of Banking Supervision in China In Framework of New Basel Accord——On the Perspective of Theoretical Changing On Banking Supervision", follows two paths:firstly, the narration of changing of the Basel Accord and the evolvement of international banking supervision system. The purpose of this path is displaying the historical outlook on the evolvement of international banking supervision system and framing its trends, and in advance, probing the correlation between the practices and theoretical research of international banking supervision. Secondly, displaying the historical outlook and present status on the evolvement of banking supervision in China. The purpose of this path is narrating the historical outlook, analyzing the key issues that is necessary to deal with seriously, and the possible reform which needs to be implemented for the purpose of aligning with Basel Ⅱ.
This dissertation includes6sections. The main content of each section is as follows.
Section1, Preface. Brief introduction of the background, importance, methodology, main ideas, possible innovation and flaws, key words.
Section2, The changing of theoretical research on banking supervision. After brief reviewing the changing process of banking supervision, the changing logic is discussed, the topics of why, by who and how the bank should be supervised are analyzed. The literatures on objectives of supervision and CBA approach are reviewed.
Section3, The changing and implementation of Basel Accord. The implementation and changing of Basel Accord are reviewed, introduced, compared and analyzed.
Section4, The argument and reform of banking supervision on the backdrop of global financial crisis. The argument and reform of banking supervision on the backdrop of global financial crisis are narrated and analyzed.
Section5, The present status of banking supervision system in China. The evolvement, present status and key issues of banking supervision in China are discussed.
Section6, Reflection on the reform of banking supervision in China aligning with the Basel Accord Ⅱ. On the backdrop of development of banking supervision in China, the main trends of reform that would emerge in banking supervision according to the Basel Accord Ⅱ are discussed.
The main methodology applied in this dissertation includes historical analysis, institutional analysis, comparative analysis and literatures reviewing, etc.
This paper may be an important innovation in accordance with the degree of severity of light arranged mainly in the following aspects:
1. New viewpoints:Loss, the adopted meaning of risk, should be replaced by the risk premium that includes both the loss and the gain. And focusing on the risk theories, the foundation of banking supervision should be structured. The transformation of banking supervision mode from risk-based to risk-oriented is brought up.
2. New viewpoints:the essential approach of controlling systematic risk is developing incentive-compatible regulation, so that the correction of information asymmetric between consumer and banks could match the risk avenue and risk taking, push the low cost capital structure emerged endogenously, and consequently, maximize the social welfare.
3. New viewpoints. The cycle model of crisis-drove and institution-adjusted that is the usual track of changing of Basel Accord should be reconsidered. By the development of banking supervision research and the application of its fruits, invest more resources of banking supervision into the risk accumulation and cut-off mechanism of risk conduction. It is unwise choice to depend on the bank itself to cut off the risk conduction since the supervising authorities concern banking industry and marcoeconomy situation more than single bank.
4. New viewpoints:As the subjective of risk transaction, banks and non-bank institutes do have the incentive and possibility to replace cost ex post by risk ex ante when the tool of risk transaction is available. If the trade-off mechanism between risk ex ante and cost ex post couldn't cut off, the risk dispersing process would be twisted as a rent-seeking process, the risk dispersing mechanism, which is reasonable theoretically, would become the vicious cycle with scale expanding continuously. Theoretically, the reform of banking supervision should focus on this trade-off.
5. Perspective Innovation:The banking supervision is the field depending on practices. In the recent literatures, more researches focus on probing into the improvement of banking supervision system in the process of practices. In brief, it's a procedure of induction. In this dissertation, focusing on the risk theories, the foundation of banking supervision theory is emphasized. On this foundation, the reform of banking supervision is discussed systematically. It's a procedure of deduction rather than induction formerly.
引文
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①中国银行业监督管理委员会2010年报
①中国银行业监督管理委员会2006年报
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①中国银行业监督管理委员会2010年报
②中国银行业监督管理委员会2010年报
①中国银行业监督管理委员会2010年报
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①中国银行业监督管理委员会2010年年报.
①中国银监会.中国银行业实施新监管标准的指导意见.2011.4
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①中国银监会.中国银行业实施新监管标准的指导意见.2011.4
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②刘轶.金融监管模式的新发展及其启示—从规则到原则[J].法商研究.2009(2)
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①巴曙松,邢毓静,朱元倩.金融危机中的巴塞尔新资本协议：挑战与改进fMl.中国金融出版社.2010。
② BIS. Marrying The Macro-and Micro-prudential Dimensions of Financial Stability[J]. March 2001. Working Papers Nol.
① Goodhart, Charles, Pojanart Sunirand and Dimitrios Tsomocos, A Model To Analyse Financial Fragility[J]. Economic Theory. Vol.27.2006. pp107-142.
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[1]《中国银行业监督管理委员会2006年报》
[2]《中国银行业监督管理委员会2007年报》
[3]《中国银行业监督管理委员会2008年报》
[4]《中国银行业监督管理委员会2009年报》
[5]《中国银行业监督管理委员会2010年报》
[6]《坚定信心扎实工作科学发展我国银行业——刘明康主席在CEO组织峰会上的讲话》
[7]中国银监会.《中国银行业实施新监管标准的指导意见》.2011.4.
[8]中国银行业监督管理委员会.统一资本计量和资本监管标准的国际协议：修订框架.中国金融出版社.2004.
[9]中国银监会.商业银行资本充足率信息披露指引.2009.11.
[10]中国银监会.商业银行杠杆率管理办法.2011.6.
[11]中国银监会.中国银行业实施新资本协议指导意见.2007.2.
①定义整理自：词条"Banking Supervision (银行监管)”.载于[美]彼得·纽曼,默里·米尔盖特,[英]约翰·伊特韦尔.新帕尔格雷夫货币金融大辞典(第1卷)[M].北京：经济科学出版社.2000.150-152.
②[美]肯尼思·斯朋.中国银行业监督管理委员会译.美国银行监管制度(第五版)[M].复旦大学出版社.2000.P4.
③ Stigler, G. J. The Theory of Economic Regulation[J]. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science. 1971 2(1). Spring:pp3-21.
①黄达.金融学[M].北京：中国人民大学出版社.2003.247.
②[美]米歇尔·科罗赫,丹·加莱,罗伯特·马克.曾刚等译.风险管理[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社.2005.21-22.
①(澳)克里斯·马腾著,王洪,漆艰明等泽.银行资本管理[M].北京：机械工业出版社.
①关于2007年以后的银行监管发展,将放在以后的章节进行探讨。
①[美]米什金.货币金融学(第六版)[M]中国人民大学出版社.2006.P265-267.
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①菲利普·乔瑞.金融风险管理师手册(第2版)[M].中国人民大学出版社.2004.501
①Veron, N. Is Europe Ready for A Major Banking Crisis?[J]. Mimeo. Bruegel Policy Brief.2007
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①Johnson, R. The Costs and Benefits of Regulation in a Market with Consumer Confusion[J]. FSA Occasional Paper.2009. Apr. pp.1.
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①Bank Failures in Mature Economies[J]. BCBS. Working paper No.13.2004. pp.1.
①Bank Failures in Mature Economies[J]. BCBS. Working paper No.13.2004. pp.68.
①关于这一部分内容的讨论,将放在第五章加以讨论。
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③Sahajwala, R., den Bergh, P. V., Supervisory Risk Assessment And Early Warning Systems[J]. BCBS Working Paper.2000. pp.2.
④Core Principles Methodology[J]. BCBS.1999. pp.1.
①Core Priciples for Effective Banking Supervision[J]. BCBS. Working Paper.2006. pp.2.
① International Convergence of Capital Measurment and Capital Standards(Updated to April 1998)[J].BCBS. 1998.
② International Convergence of Capital Measurment and Capital Standards:A Revised Framework (Comperhensive Version)[J]. BCBS.2006.
①A New Capital Adequacy Framework [J]. BCBS. Consultative Paper.2000. pp.8-9.
①Supervisiory Risk Assessment And Early Warning Systems[J]. BCBS Working Paper.2000. pp.6.
①Illing, M., Paulin, G. Basel II and the Cyclicality of Bank Capital[J]. Canadian Public Policy. Vol.31, No.2(Jun.,2005), pp.161-180.
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①Johnston, M. Extending the Basel Ⅱ Approach to Estimate Capital Requirements for Equity Investments[J]. Journal of Banking & Finance.33 (2009). pp.1177-1185.
②Implementation of Basel Ⅱ:Practical Considerations[J]. Working Paper. BCBS.2004. pp.2.
①Implementation of The New Capital Adequacy Framework In Non-Basel Committee Member Countries[J]. BCBS. Occasional Paper.2006.
②Progress Report on Basel III implementation[J]. BCBS.2011.10.
①Australia:Basel Ⅱ Implementation Assessment[J]. IMF. Washington, D.C.2009.
① Letter to CEOs of Singapore-incorporated Banks:Appendix 4-Summary of National Discretions[EB/OL]. Monetary Authority of Singapore. Update on Basel Ⅱ Implementation in Singapore. March 2006.
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①以下内容摘自2007年至2010年国际金融危机大事记[J].中国银行业协会.http://www.china-cba.net/list.php?fid=134.
①When Fortune Frowned[J]. Economist. Special Report.2008.10.9.
①Bordo, M, B Eichengreen, D Klingbiel and M Martinez-Peria. Financial Cisis:Lssons From The Last 120 Years[J]. Economic Policy, April(2001).p 53-82.
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①Krugman, P.. Revenge of the Glut[J]. New York Times.2009..March 1.
②Akerlof, G A., & Shiller, R. J. Animal Spirits, How Human Psychology Drives The Economy, and Why It Matters For Global Capitalism[M]. Princeton University Press.2009.
③Reinhart, C. M., Rogoff, K. S.. This Time Is Different:Eight Centuries of Financial Folly[M]. Princeton Press.2009.
④Claessens, S., Kose, M. A., Terrones, M. E. The Global Financial Crisis:How Similar? How Different? How Costly?[J]. Journal of Asian Economics.21(2010):pp.247-264.
①Duffie, D. Innovations In Credit Risk Transfer:Implications For Financial Stability[J]. Working Paper. Bank for International Settlements.2007.
②Breitenfellner, B., Wagner, N. Government Intervention in Response to the Subpeime Financial Crisis:The Good into the Pot, the Bad into the Crop[J]. International Review of Financial Analysis.19(2010):pp. 289-297.
③Mills, P., Kiff, J. Money For Nothing And Checks For Free:Recent Developments. U.S. Subprime Mortgage Markets[J], Working Paper. International Monetary Fund.2007.
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①Goodhart, C.A.E. The Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis[J]. Journal of Financial Stability. 4(2008):pp.351-358.
②Blundell-Wignall, A., Atkinson, P. Origins of The Fnancial Crisis And Requirements For Reform[J]. Journal of Asian Economics.20 (2009):pp.536-548.
①Breitenfellner, B., Wagner, N. Government Intervention in Response to the Subpeime Financial Crisis:The Good into the Pot, the Bad into the Crop[J]. International Review of Financial Analysis.19(2010):pp. 289-297.
②Flannery, M.J., Market Discipline In Bank Supervision[J]. In:Berger, A.N., Molyneux, P., Wilson, J.O.S(Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Banking[M]. Oxford University Press, Oxford,2009.pp.377-404.
③Boot, A. W. A. Banking At The Crossroads:How To Deal With Marketability And Complexity?[J]. Review of Development Finance.1 (2011):167-183.
①Dabrowski. M. The Global Fnancial Crisis:Lessons For European Integration[J]. Economic Systems.34 (2010):pp.38-54.
①Jackson, P., Furfine, C., Groenveld, H., Hancock, D., Jones, D., Perraudin, W., et al.. Capital Requirements And Bank Behaviour:The Impact of the Basle Accord[J]. BCBS. Working Paper Number I.1999.
②全球金融稳定报告：金融压力和去杠杆化·宏观金融影响和政策[J].IMF.2008.10：pp.10
③McCauley, R., et al. After The Global Financial Crisis:From International To Multinational Banking?[J]. Journal of Economics and Business.2011. doi:10.1016/j.jeconbus.2011.06.004.
①Blundell-Wignall, A., Atkinson, P. Origins of The Fnancial Crisis And Requirements For Reform[J]. Journal of Asian Economics.20 (2009):pp.536-548.
①Levine, R. The Governance of Financial Regulation:Refonn Lessons From the Recent Crisis[J]. BIS Working Paper No.329.2010.
①Cecchetti, S.G, Kohler, M., Upper, C. Financial Crises and Economic Activity[J]. BIS Working Paper. 2009.
②Goodhart, C.A.E. & D. Schoenmaker. Fiscal Burden Sharing in Cross-Border Banking Crises[J]. International Journal of Central Banking,5(1) (2009). pp.141-165.
③Cecchetti, S. G. Kohler, M., Upper, C. Financial Crises and Economic Activity[J]. BIS Working Paper. 2009.
④Cecchetti, S. G., King, M. R., Yetman, J. Weathering The Financial Crisis:Good Policy or Good Luck?[J]. BIS Working Paper No.351.2011.
①Progress Report on Basel Ⅲ implementation[J]. BCBS.2011.10.
①Progress Report on Basel III implementation[J]. BCBS.2011.10.
①中国银行业监督管理委员会2005年报
①数据来源：中国银行业监督管理委员会2010年报
②谢平.巴塞尔新协议对中国银行业监管的启示和影响[J].浙江金融.2011(2)
①巴塞尔银行监管委员会.中国银行业监督管理委员会翻译.统一资本计量和资本标准的国际协议：修订框架[M].中国金融出版社.2004
②巴塞尔银行监管委员会.中国银行业监督管理委员会翻译.统一资本计量和资本标准的国际协议：修订框架.[M]中国金融出版社.2004
①中国银监会.中国银行业实施新资本协议指导意见.2011.4
①中国银监会网站.坚定信心 扎实工作科学发展我国银行业——刘明康主席在CEO组织峰会上的讲话
①中国银行业监督管理委员会2010年报
①中国银行业监督管理委员会2006年报
①巴曙松,金玲玲,朱元倩.BaselⅢ下的资本监管对中国银行业的影响[J].农村金融研究.2011(6)
①王建华.中国银行业监管问题研究[D].青岛：中国海洋大学.2004.
①“三个办法一个指引”是指《固定资产贷款管理暂行办法》、《流动资金贷款管理暂行办法》、《个人贷款管理暂行办法》和《项目融资业务指引》
②尹朝霞.我国银行业风险分析[D].北京：对外经济贸易大学,2007
①李玲英.新巴塞尔协议与我国银行风险监管制度之完善[J].中国金融家,2006(9).
①孟建波.把握监管重点促进银行业审慎经营[J].南方金融,2004(7)
①刘明康.中国特色银行业监管的理论与实践.中国金融.2011(13)
①中国银行业监督管理委员会2010年报
②中国银行业监督管理委员会2010年报
①中国银行业监督管理委员会2010年报
②颜新秀.王睿.银行业集中度风险的计量与监管—国际经验及对我国的启示.中国金融.2010(3)
①中国银行业监督管理委员会2010年年报.
①中国银监会.中国银行业实施新监管标准的指导意见.2011.4
①中国银监会.中国银行业实施新监管标准的指导意见.2011.4
②中国银监会.中国银行业实施新监管标准的指导意见.2011.4
①中国银监会.中国银行业实施新监管标准的指导意见.2011.4
②方智添.规则导向与原则导向—当代金融监管模式的缺陷与解决对策[J].甘肃政法学院学报.2010.
③FSA. Principles-based Regulation—Focusing on Outcomes That Matter[J].2007.
④时辰宙.英国式金融监管的悖论与启示[J].上海经济研究.2010(2)
①刘轶.金融监管模式的新发展及其启示—从规则到原则[J].法商研究.2009(2)
②刘轶.金融监管模式的新发展及其启示—从规则到原则[J].法商研究.2009(2)
①方智添.规则导向与原则导向—当代金融监管模式的缺陷与解决对策[J].甘肃政法学院学报.2010.
①巴曙松,邢毓静,朱元倩.金融危机中的巴塞尔新资本协议：挑战与改进fMl.中国金融出版社.2010。
② BIS. Marrying The Macro-and Micro-prudential Dimensions of Financial Stability[J]. March 2001. Working Papers Nol.
① Goodhart, Charles, Pojanart Sunirand and Dimitrios Tsomocos, A Model To Analyse Financial Fragility[J]. Economic Theory. Vol.27.2006. pp107-142.
①转引自张雪兰,何德旭.西方宏观审慎监管若干重要问题的研究进展[J].外国社会科学.2011(5)
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[2]《中国银行业监督管理委员会2007年报》
[3]《中国银行业监督管理委员会2008年报》
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