EVA对企业利益相关者博弈的影响分析
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摘要
本文主要是讨论企业各利益相关者在业绩评价指标的影响下的策略选择问题。现代企业的特点是资产所有权和控制权相分离，企业的各利益相关者之间形成了委托一代理关系。由于委托人和代理人之间的目标函数通常不一致，双方之间利益存在着冲突，因此就产生了各利益相关者之间的博弈行为。委托代理关系下，利益相关者之间的博弈行为会受到业绩评价指标的影响。业绩评价指标的设立是企业激励计划构建中的主要环节，是设计激励机制的基础环节。作为一种新型的业绩评价指标，经济增加值(EVA)可以被引入到企业的激励机制和激励合同中。
本文在吸收、归纳和消化国内外有关企业业绩评价方面研究成果的基础上，通过运用博弈分析、对比分析和案例分析的方法来探讨企业各利益相关者在引入经济增加值后策略选择的改变。以此来分析经济增加值对各个利益主体的策略选择行为的影响，从而能更好的解决委托代理问题，同时能对我国企业处理各利益相关者之间的冲突问题时能有所启示。本文介绍了相关理论基础，包括经济增加值绩效评价体系、利益相关者理论、博弈论和委托代理理论；探讨了经济增加值绩效评价体系利益相关者的分类及其之间的博弈问题；分析了EVA体系在企业相关利益者之间博弈中说起到的作用和影响，包括EVA在企业相关利益者股东与经理人相互博弈中所起到的作用和影响、在经理与员工相互博弈中所起到的作用和影响及EVA的引入对债权人与股东之间博弈的影响。同时引入EVA的案例分析，通过对案例进行分析来探讨经济增加值指标对利益相关者博弈的影响。
本文认为经济增加值激励体系对各利益相关者之间博弈的影响是积极的、有效的。在激励机制中引入经济增加值能使经理人在追求自身利益的同时也为股东创造了更多的财富；员工会成为努力工作者为企业创造价值间接的满足了经理的目标函数；有助于减少委托代理成本；进一步的保障了债权人和投资人的利益。因此EVA绩效评价体系的引入可以使企业各利益相关者从中获益。
This thesis mainly discusses that how the stakeholders choose their strategy when their gambling behavior is influenced by performance evaluation system. The modern enterprise's characteristic is the separation of ownership and control. Under such circumstances the trust-agency relation is formed between stakeholders. Because trustee and agent's objective function is usually inconsistent, and the existing conflict of their benefit, gambling behavior is inevitable among stakeholders. The gambling behavior of stakeholders is influenced by performance evaluation system which is the main section in the construction of enterprise incentive mechanism. Economic Value Added (EVA), as a new performance evaluation system, may introduce to the enterprise incentive schemes.
This thesis focuses on analysis the change of stakeholders' strategy after introduced EVA to the enterprise incentive schemes by game theory. Therefore we can prove the influence on different stakeholders' motivation and behavior, and further prove the correct views of former researcher. It goes on making suggestions on coping with the trust-agency issue and conflict among the stakeholders. It mainly introduces the fundamental theory and related theory; approach agency problem in stakeholders and the reason of game analysis; focuses on the game analysis of auditing pricing based existence and development of accounting firm. Meanwhile by using EVA in the cases, it approaches to analyze and evaluate its effects upon the stakeholders' game.
Through the utilization of trust-agency theory and the gambling analysis on various stakeholders, the conclusion shows that EVA's effects upon the stakeholders' game is positive and effective, it can cut down the agency cost and the stakeholders can benefit by EVA system.
本文在吸收、归纳和消化国内外有关企业业绩评价方面研究成果的基础上，通过运用博弈分析、对比分析和案例分析的方法来探讨企业各利益相关者在引入经济增加值后策略选择的改变。以此来分析经济增加值对各个利益主体的策略选择行为的影响，从而能更好的解决委托代理问题，同时能对我国企业处理各利益相关者之间的冲突问题时能有所启示。本文介绍了相关理论基础，包括经济增加值绩效评价体系、利益相关者理论、博弈论和委托代理理论；探讨了经济增加值绩效评价体系利益相关者的分类及其之间的博弈问题；分析了EVA体系在企业相关利益者之间博弈中说起到的作用和影响，包括EVA在企业相关利益者股东与经理人相互博弈中所起到的作用和影响、在经理与员工相互博弈中所起到的作用和影响及EVA的引入对债权人与股东之间博弈的影响。同时引入EVA的案例分析，通过对案例进行分析来探讨经济增加值指标对利益相关者博弈的影响。
本文认为经济增加值激励体系对各利益相关者之间博弈的影响是积极的、有效的。在激励机制中引入经济增加值能使经理人在追求自身利益的同时也为股东创造了更多的财富；员工会成为努力工作者为企业创造价值间接的满足了经理的目标函数；有助于减少委托代理成本；进一步的保障了债权人和投资人的利益。因此EVA绩效评价体系的引入可以使企业各利益相关者从中获益。
This thesis mainly discusses that how the stakeholders choose their strategy when their gambling behavior is influenced by performance evaluation system. The modern enterprise's characteristic is the separation of ownership and control. Under such circumstances the trust-agency relation is formed between stakeholders. Because trustee and agent's objective function is usually inconsistent, and the existing conflict of their benefit, gambling behavior is inevitable among stakeholders. The gambling behavior of stakeholders is influenced by performance evaluation system which is the main section in the construction of enterprise incentive mechanism. Economic Value Added (EVA), as a new performance evaluation system, may introduce to the enterprise incentive schemes.
This thesis focuses on analysis the change of stakeholders' strategy after introduced EVA to the enterprise incentive schemes by game theory. Therefore we can prove the influence on different stakeholders' motivation and behavior, and further prove the correct views of former researcher. It goes on making suggestions on coping with the trust-agency issue and conflict among the stakeholders. It mainly introduces the fundamental theory and related theory; approach agency problem in stakeholders and the reason of game analysis; focuses on the game analysis of auditing pricing based existence and development of accounting firm. Meanwhile by using EVA in the cases, it approaches to analyze and evaluate its effects upon the stakeholders' game.
Through the utilization of trust-agency theory and the gambling analysis on various stakeholders, the conclusion shows that EVA's effects upon the stakeholders' game is positive and effective, it can cut down the agency cost and the stakeholders can benefit by EVA system.
引文
[1] 王泰昌，刘嘉雯．经济增加值(EVA)的意义与价值[J]中华管理评论，2000(4)．15～31
[2] 黄卫伟，李春瑜．EVA对股东和经理人博弈的影响[J]天津：南开管理评论，2004(7)．66～71
[3] 刘海淼．风险投资中的委托代理关系与公司治理[J]北京：北京风险投资，2002(7)
[4] 朱丽，李启航．EVA激励机制：让管理者成为所有者[J]北京：商场现代化，2005(22)．39～40
[5] http://share.jrj.com.cn
[6] 谢识予．经济博弈论[M]．上海：复旦大学出版社，2001．48～54
[7] 张维迎．博弈论与经济信息学[M]上海：上海人民出版社，1996．397～431
[8] (美)罗杰B．迈尔森著；于寅，费剑平译．博弈论：矛盾冲突分析：analysis of conflict[M]．北京：中国经济出版社，2001．8～20
[9] AI．埃巴．经济增加值-如何为股东创造财富[M]．北京：中信出版社，2001．22～40
[10] 安德烈·A·得瓦尔．绩效管理的魔力[M]．上海：上海交通大学出版社，2002
[11] 周炜炜，华彬．谁在创造财富，谁在毁灭财富[J]．北京：财经杂志，2001(8)
[12] 王斌，李苹莉．关于企业预算目标确定及其分解的理论分析[J]．会计研究，2001(8)．80～81
[13] 茅宁．企业价值创造与管理者博弈——对EVA方法的若干反思[J]．外国经济与管理，2002(11)．11～17
[14] 米契而·耶何赫德．娄芳译．价值寻找——公司资本成本的衡量．[M]．上海：上海财经大学出版社 2004(5)
[15] 刘芍佳，丛树海．创值论及其对企业绩效的评估[J]．北京：经济研究，2002(7)
[16] 高晨，王斌编译．股东——管理者的利益冲突与公司价值[J]．会计研究，1998
[17] 刘胜军，陈玮．基于EVA的财务管理目标[J]商业经济2005(7)
[18] 张纯．EVA业绩评价体系研究．北京：中国财政经济出版社，2003．99～105
[19] 李春瑜．股东与经理人风险态度偏差所引发代理成本的抵减——EVA调整事项必要性的一个定量化解释[J]当代财经 2005(4)117～121
[20] 约尔·M．思腾恩，约翰·S．希利，欧文·罗斯著(Joel M．Stern，John S．Shiely，Irwin Ross)；曾嵘．孔宁宁译EVA挑战：实施经济增加值变革方案——implementing value-added change in an organization[M]．上海：上海交通大学出版社 2002
[21] 姚海鑫．经济政策的博弈论分析[M]．经济管理出版社 2001
[22] (美)S．戴维·扬，斯蒂芬·F．奥伯恩著(S．David Young，Stephen F．O'Byrne)李丽萍，史璐等译EVA与价值管理：实用指南[M]．北京：社会科学文献出版社 2002
[23] 王化成．企业业绩评价[M]北京：中国人民大学出版社 2004(3)135～164
[24] 雷霖．刘倩．现代企业经营决策：博弈论方法应用[M]北京：清华大学出版社 1999．65～67
[25] 曾宪文．企业业绩评价指标的分类比较及其内在价值联系辨析[J]．武汉：湖北社会科学 2005(10)64～67
[26] 廖小菲．冯俊文．业绩评价指标的选择与矛盾论[J]．武汉：统计与决策 2005(2)．116～117
[27] 陈新华．6S业绩评价体系的实施和效果评价[J]．北京：会计师 2005(5)
[28] 董志凌，刘伟．EVA薪酬激励应用的财务分析[J]．太原：山西财税 2005(8)．10～11
[29] 张强，杨淑娥．股权结构与公司业绩——来自中国上市公司的实证分析[J]南京：南京审计学院学报．2005(4)
[30] 高鸿桢，徐明生．连环“委托—代理”博弈模型[J]厦门：厦门大学学报(哲学社会科学版．2002(2)．92～98
[31] 郑君君，谭旭，范文涛．基于委托-代理理论的股权激励模型的研究[J]．管理科学学报．2005(2)．24～29
[32] S.David Young, Stephen F.O'Byrne. EVA and Value-Based Management: A Practical Guide to Implementation.[M]. Business & Economics.2000
[33] Aswath Damodaran. Valuation: Tools and Techniques for Determining the Value of Any Asset [M]. Business & Economics. 2002
[34] David M Kreps.Game Theory and Economic Modelling [M].Business & Economics. 1990
[35] Brewer, Peter.C.Chanddra, Gyan.EVA: It's Uses and Limitations [J].Advanced Management Journal. 1999
[36] James L. Grant. Foundations of Economic Value Added[M].Business & Economics. 2003
[37] Joel M. Stem, John S. Shiely, Irwin Ross.The EVA Challenge: Implementing Value-added Change In an Organization [M] Business & Economics. 2003.
[38] Frank J. Fabozzi, James L. Grant. Value-Based Metrics: Foundations and Practice [M]. Business & Economics. 2001
[39] James S.Wallace.Adopting Residual Income-based Compensation Plans: Do You Get What You Pay for? [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 1997 (24)
[40] K.V.Peasnell.Some Formal Connections between Economic Values and Yields and Accounting Numbers.Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 1982(9)
[41] William P.Rogerson.Intertemporal Cost Allocation and Managerial Investment Incentives: A Theory Explaining the Use of EVA as A Performance Measure. Journal of Political Economy, 1997(4).
[42] Biddle.G, R.Bowen&J.Wallace.Evidence on EVA [J]. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 1999(12)
[43] Damodaran, A. Value Creation and Enhancement: Back to the Future[R ].Working Paper, Stern Business School, NewYork University,2001.
[44] Keinman, R. Some New Evidence on EVA Companies[J] .Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 1999(12)
[45] O'HanlonJ.&K.Peasnell. WallStreet's Contribution to Management Accounting: the Stern Stewart EVA Financial Management System [J]. Management Accounting Research, 1998(9)
[2] 黄卫伟，李春瑜．EVA对股东和经理人博弈的影响[J]天津：南开管理评论，2004(7)．66～71
[3] 刘海淼．风险投资中的委托代理关系与公司治理[J]北京：北京风险投资，2002(7)
[4] 朱丽，李启航．EVA激励机制：让管理者成为所有者[J]北京：商场现代化，2005(22)．39～40
[5] http://share.jrj.com.cn
[6] 谢识予．经济博弈论[M]．上海：复旦大学出版社，2001．48～54
[7] 张维迎．博弈论与经济信息学[M]上海：上海人民出版社，1996．397～431
[8] (美)罗杰B．迈尔森著；于寅，费剑平译．博弈论：矛盾冲突分析：analysis of conflict[M]．北京：中国经济出版社，2001．8～20
[9] AI．埃巴．经济增加值-如何为股东创造财富[M]．北京：中信出版社，2001．22～40
[10] 安德烈·A·得瓦尔．绩效管理的魔力[M]．上海：上海交通大学出版社，2002
[11] 周炜炜，华彬．谁在创造财富，谁在毁灭财富[J]．北京：财经杂志，2001(8)
[12] 王斌，李苹莉．关于企业预算目标确定及其分解的理论分析[J]．会计研究，2001(8)．80～81
[13] 茅宁．企业价值创造与管理者博弈——对EVA方法的若干反思[J]．外国经济与管理，2002(11)．11～17
[14] 米契而·耶何赫德．娄芳译．价值寻找——公司资本成本的衡量．[M]．上海：上海财经大学出版社 2004(5)
[15] 刘芍佳，丛树海．创值论及其对企业绩效的评估[J]．北京：经济研究，2002(7)
[16] 高晨，王斌编译．股东——管理者的利益冲突与公司价值[J]．会计研究，1998
[17] 刘胜军，陈玮．基于EVA的财务管理目标[J]商业经济2005(7)
[18] 张纯．EVA业绩评价体系研究．北京：中国财政经济出版社，2003．99～105
[19] 李春瑜．股东与经理人风险态度偏差所引发代理成本的抵减——EVA调整事项必要性的一个定量化解释[J]当代财经 2005(4)117～121
[20] 约尔·M．思腾恩，约翰·S．希利，欧文·罗斯著(Joel M．Stern，John S．Shiely，Irwin Ross)；曾嵘．孔宁宁译EVA挑战：实施经济增加值变革方案——implementing value-added change in an organization[M]．上海：上海交通大学出版社 2002
[21] 姚海鑫．经济政策的博弈论分析[M]．经济管理出版社 2001
[22] (美)S．戴维·扬，斯蒂芬·F．奥伯恩著(S．David Young，Stephen F．O'Byrne)李丽萍，史璐等译EVA与价值管理：实用指南[M]．北京：社会科学文献出版社 2002
[23] 王化成．企业业绩评价[M]北京：中国人民大学出版社 2004(3)135～164
[24] 雷霖．刘倩．现代企业经营决策：博弈论方法应用[M]北京：清华大学出版社 1999．65～67
[25] 曾宪文．企业业绩评价指标的分类比较及其内在价值联系辨析[J]．武汉：湖北社会科学 2005(10)64～67
[26] 廖小菲．冯俊文．业绩评价指标的选择与矛盾论[J]．武汉：统计与决策 2005(2)．116～117
[27] 陈新华．6S业绩评价体系的实施和效果评价[J]．北京：会计师 2005(5)
[28] 董志凌，刘伟．EVA薪酬激励应用的财务分析[J]．太原：山西财税 2005(8)．10～11
[29] 张强，杨淑娥．股权结构与公司业绩——来自中国上市公司的实证分析[J]南京：南京审计学院学报．2005(4)
[30] 高鸿桢，徐明生．连环“委托—代理”博弈模型[J]厦门：厦门大学学报(哲学社会科学版．2002(2)．92～98
[31] 郑君君，谭旭，范文涛．基于委托-代理理论的股权激励模型的研究[J]．管理科学学报．2005(2)．24～29
[32] S.David Young, Stephen F.O'Byrne. EVA and Value-Based Management: A Practical Guide to Implementation.[M]. Business & Economics.2000
[33] Aswath Damodaran. Valuation: Tools and Techniques for Determining the Value of Any Asset [M]. Business & Economics. 2002
[34] David M Kreps.Game Theory and Economic Modelling [M].Business & Economics. 1990
[35] Brewer, Peter.C.Chanddra, Gyan.EVA: It's Uses and Limitations [J].Advanced Management Journal. 1999
[36] James L. Grant. Foundations of Economic Value Added[M].Business & Economics. 2003
[37] Joel M. Stem, John S. Shiely, Irwin Ross.The EVA Challenge: Implementing Value-added Change In an Organization [M] Business & Economics. 2003.
[38] Frank J. Fabozzi, James L. Grant. Value-Based Metrics: Foundations and Practice [M]. Business & Economics. 2001
[39] James S.Wallace.Adopting Residual Income-based Compensation Plans: Do You Get What You Pay for? [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 1997 (24)
[40] K.V.Peasnell.Some Formal Connections between Economic Values and Yields and Accounting Numbers.Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 1982(9)
[41] William P.Rogerson.Intertemporal Cost Allocation and Managerial Investment Incentives: A Theory Explaining the Use of EVA as A Performance Measure. Journal of Political Economy, 1997(4).
[42] Biddle.G, R.Bowen&J.Wallace.Evidence on EVA [J]. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 1999(12)
[43] Damodaran, A. Value Creation and Enhancement: Back to the Future[R ].Working Paper, Stern Business School, NewYork University,2001.
[44] Keinman, R. Some New Evidence on EVA Companies[J] .Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 1999(12)
[45] O'HanlonJ.&K.Peasnell. WallStreet's Contribution to Management Accounting: the Stern Stewart EVA Financial Management System [J]. Management Accounting Research, 1998(9)