双重属性财务契约论
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摘要
契约思想源远流长、博大精深,并已渗透到当代社会经济生活中的各个方面。与此相随,关于契约理论的研究也是延绵不断,星光璀璨,尤以现代契约理论为甚。财务契约理论作为现代契约理论的一支重要学派,是现代企业核心要素——财务与现代契约思想的有效结合,并日益成为当代理论界与实务界关注的焦点问题。多年来,在人们利用契约思想对企业财务问题进行大量研究的同时,现代企业理论与财务理论也正经历着一场深刻的变革。而财务契约所具有的财务特性决定了这种变革在财务契约理论中的重要作用,只有建立在财务理论上的财务契约理论才能保证其理论基础的完整性。遗憾的是,现有财务契约理论研究尚未充分关注到这一点。本文在已有研究成果的基础上,根据现代企业与财务研究的发展脉络,提出财务契约的双重本质属性,并对此展开系统深入地分析,力图构建基于双重属性的财务契约理论。
一个科学而完整的财务契约内涵是进行财务契约理论研究的基础。财务契约的契约特性决定了研究契约一般性特征与企业契约性质的重要性,而财务契约中的财务特性告诉我们,揭示现代财务的经济性质,全面掌握现代财务的本质与现象,是研究财务契约内涵绕不过去的“坎”。
如同企业理论的分化与整合道路,现代财务的研究范式从“价值至上”研究逻辑走到了“价值与权力融合”研究逻辑。财务的双重属性在理论上表现为价值与权力融合的财务基本理论体系,而在实践中表现为两大既有各自侧重点又相互融合的财务运行系统,即财务管理与财务治理。其中,财务管理是侧重价值处理的运行系统,而财务治理是侧重权力处理的运行系统,两者相互融合共筑现代财务运行体系。
财务的双重属性决定了建立在财务基础上的财务契约涵义与内容也必须基于这两个角度考虑,这对全面了解财务契约研究范畴,明晰财务契约与其他契约的关系是十分重要的。同时,财务的双重属性也决定了财务契约具有双重属性:“生产性”与“制度性”。财务契约的“生产性”是指财务契约对企业财务活动的直接规范与间接影响,从而发挥其财务管理功能;而财务契约的“制度性”是指财务契约对利益相关者之间财务关系的协调,从而发挥其财务治理效应。当然财务契约的双重属性不是截然分开的,而是统一在一个契约里,在学术研究中的地位更像是两个研究视角。
“制度性”的核心要素表现为财务契约对财权的配置,一方面是现存财务契约中对财权的初始配置,另一方面是通过对现存财务契约的优化设计来实现财权的再配置;“制度性”整体表现为财务契约的治理效应。而“生产性”要求我们在研究财务契约时除了考虑财务行为本身特征外,还要系统分析财务契约对投资、融资与收益分配等财务行为的重要影响。
研究财务契约问题必须以双重属性为逻辑起点,据此可以对整个财务契约运行系统进行审视。财务契约设计的思路可分为“制度性”思路与“生产性”思路,设计时既要考虑其“制度性”,又要考虑其“生产性”。如何保证契约的自我履行是契约实施的重点,有效的方法是提高契约参与者的违约损失,可以将违约损失分为“生产性”损失与“制度性”损失。实现或者提高违约损失需要满足一定的条件,对这些条件的分析会给财务契约的设计带来启示。当违约损失的提高受到限制时就需要第三方强制履行的存在。强制履行是提高违约损失的一种外在途径,通过这种途径来保障财务契约的自我履行。契约不完备会导致实施中的财务契约进入重谈,重谈的具体原因可分为“条件改变”与“自我提高”,而每种原因又可以分为“生产性”因素与“制度性”因素两部分,在对财务契约进行调整的时候要综合考虑这两种因素。
Thinking of contract is very extensive and profound. It has a long history, and has penetrated into all aspects of the contemporary social and economic live. Following with this, the research of contract theory is continuous; modern contract theory is the most excellent. As an important school of modern contract theory, financial contract theory is effective combination of modern contract theory and finance which is the core element of modern enterprise, and increasingly become focal problem in practical and theoretical circles. People use thinking of contract to research financial problem. At the same time modern enterprise theory and financial theory is undergoing a profound transformation. The financial characteristic of financial contract has decided that the transformation produce important effect in financial contract theory. Financial contract theory which based on financial theory can guarantee the integrity of its theoretical basis. Unfortunately, the existing research of financial contract theory has not pay attention to this point sufficiently. According to the development context of modern enterprises and financial research, this article proposes dual attributes of financial contract on the basis of research results, and has carried out an in-depth analysis, trying to build a system of financial contract theory which based on dual attributes.
A scientific and complete financial contract connotation is the basis of financial contract theory research. The contract characteristic of financial contract has decided that it is important to research the general characteristics of contract and the nature of enterprise contract. The financial characteristic of financial contract, when we research the connotation of financial contract, we must reveal the economic nature of modern finance, master the nature and phenomenon of modern finance comprehensively.
Like the division and integration of enterprise theory, modern financial research paradigm has gone to the logic of "integration of value and power" from the logic of "value supreme". Dual attributes of finance performance the financial basic theory system of the integration of value and power in theory. In practice it performance two financial operating systems that is financial management and financial governance. Financial management is the operating system which focuses on dealing with the value; financial governance is the operating system which focuses on dealing with the power. The integration of financial management and financial governance composes of modern financial operating system.
Dual attributes of finance have decided that the meaning and content of financial contracts which based on the financial basis must be considered on the two angles, which are very important for understanding the study scope of financial contract comprehensively and making the relation of financial contract and other contracts clear. At the same time, dual attributes of finance have also decided financial contract having double attributes: "production attribute" and "system attribute". "Production attribute" of financial contract refers to financial contract affecting financial activities of enterprises directly and indirectly, so as to play its function of financial management; "system attribute" of financial contract refers to financial contract coordinating relations between stakeholders, so as to play its financial governance effect. However, dual attributes of financial contract are not separated completely, but unified in a contract; they status more like two research perspectives in the status of academic study.
The core elements of "system attribute" performance financial contract allocating financial rights, on one hand, it is initial configuration of financial rights from the existing financial contract, on the other hand, it is through optimal design of existing financial contracts to achieve the re-allocation of financial rights; "system attribute" performance the governance effect of financial contract. "Production attribute" requires that when we research the financial contracts, except considering the characteristics of financial behaviors, we have to analysis the effect of financial contract to financial behavior, such as investment behavior, financing behavior and income distribution behavior.
Researching financial contracts must take dual attributes as logical starting point, accordingly structuring operating system of financial contract. The thought of financial contract design can be divided into "system attribute" thought and "production attribute" thought, we not only consider its "system attribute", but also consider its "production attribute". How to ensure the self-fulfillment of contract of is the focus of the implementation of contract, effective way is to improve the loss of the participants in contract, the loss of breaching contract can be divided into "production attribute" loss and "system attribute" loss. Realizing and increasing the loss of breaching contract must satisfy certain conditions, analysis of those conditions will brings enlightenment for designing financial contract. When raising the loss of breaching contract is limited we need mandatory fulfill from third-party. Incomplete contract would result in the renegotiation on financial contract. The concrete reasons of renegotiation can be divided into "conditions change" and "self-improvement"; each reason can be divided into "production attribute" factor and "system attribute" factor, we must consider two factors comprehensively to adjust financial contracts.
一个科学而完整的财务契约内涵是进行财务契约理论研究的基础。财务契约的契约特性决定了研究契约一般性特征与企业契约性质的重要性,而财务契约中的财务特性告诉我们,揭示现代财务的经济性质,全面掌握现代财务的本质与现象,是研究财务契约内涵绕不过去的“坎”。
如同企业理论的分化与整合道路,现代财务的研究范式从“价值至上”研究逻辑走到了“价值与权力融合”研究逻辑。财务的双重属性在理论上表现为价值与权力融合的财务基本理论体系,而在实践中表现为两大既有各自侧重点又相互融合的财务运行系统,即财务管理与财务治理。其中,财务管理是侧重价值处理的运行系统,而财务治理是侧重权力处理的运行系统,两者相互融合共筑现代财务运行体系。
财务的双重属性决定了建立在财务基础上的财务契约涵义与内容也必须基于这两个角度考虑,这对全面了解财务契约研究范畴,明晰财务契约与其他契约的关系是十分重要的。同时,财务的双重属性也决定了财务契约具有双重属性:“生产性”与“制度性”。财务契约的“生产性”是指财务契约对企业财务活动的直接规范与间接影响,从而发挥其财务管理功能;而财务契约的“制度性”是指财务契约对利益相关者之间财务关系的协调,从而发挥其财务治理效应。当然财务契约的双重属性不是截然分开的,而是统一在一个契约里,在学术研究中的地位更像是两个研究视角。
“制度性”的核心要素表现为财务契约对财权的配置,一方面是现存财务契约中对财权的初始配置,另一方面是通过对现存财务契约的优化设计来实现财权的再配置;“制度性”整体表现为财务契约的治理效应。而“生产性”要求我们在研究财务契约时除了考虑财务行为本身特征外,还要系统分析财务契约对投资、融资与收益分配等财务行为的重要影响。
研究财务契约问题必须以双重属性为逻辑起点,据此可以对整个财务契约运行系统进行审视。财务契约设计的思路可分为“制度性”思路与“生产性”思路,设计时既要考虑其“制度性”,又要考虑其“生产性”。如何保证契约的自我履行是契约实施的重点,有效的方法是提高契约参与者的违约损失,可以将违约损失分为“生产性”损失与“制度性”损失。实现或者提高违约损失需要满足一定的条件,对这些条件的分析会给财务契约的设计带来启示。当违约损失的提高受到限制时就需要第三方强制履行的存在。强制履行是提高违约损失的一种外在途径,通过这种途径来保障财务契约的自我履行。契约不完备会导致实施中的财务契约进入重谈,重谈的具体原因可分为“条件改变”与“自我提高”,而每种原因又可以分为“生产性”因素与“制度性”因素两部分,在对财务契约进行调整的时候要综合考虑这两种因素。
Thinking of contract is very extensive and profound. It has a long history, and has penetrated into all aspects of the contemporary social and economic live. Following with this, the research of contract theory is continuous; modern contract theory is the most excellent. As an important school of modern contract theory, financial contract theory is effective combination of modern contract theory and finance which is the core element of modern enterprise, and increasingly become focal problem in practical and theoretical circles. People use thinking of contract to research financial problem. At the same time modern enterprise theory and financial theory is undergoing a profound transformation. The financial characteristic of financial contract has decided that the transformation produce important effect in financial contract theory. Financial contract theory which based on financial theory can guarantee the integrity of its theoretical basis. Unfortunately, the existing research of financial contract theory has not pay attention to this point sufficiently. According to the development context of modern enterprises and financial research, this article proposes dual attributes of financial contract on the basis of research results, and has carried out an in-depth analysis, trying to build a system of financial contract theory which based on dual attributes.
A scientific and complete financial contract connotation is the basis of financial contract theory research. The contract characteristic of financial contract has decided that it is important to research the general characteristics of contract and the nature of enterprise contract. The financial characteristic of financial contract, when we research the connotation of financial contract, we must reveal the economic nature of modern finance, master the nature and phenomenon of modern finance comprehensively.
Like the division and integration of enterprise theory, modern financial research paradigm has gone to the logic of "integration of value and power" from the logic of "value supreme". Dual attributes of finance performance the financial basic theory system of the integration of value and power in theory. In practice it performance two financial operating systems that is financial management and financial governance. Financial management is the operating system which focuses on dealing with the value; financial governance is the operating system which focuses on dealing with the power. The integration of financial management and financial governance composes of modern financial operating system.
Dual attributes of finance have decided that the meaning and content of financial contracts which based on the financial basis must be considered on the two angles, which are very important for understanding the study scope of financial contract comprehensively and making the relation of financial contract and other contracts clear. At the same time, dual attributes of finance have also decided financial contract having double attributes: "production attribute" and "system attribute". "Production attribute" of financial contract refers to financial contract affecting financial activities of enterprises directly and indirectly, so as to play its function of financial management; "system attribute" of financial contract refers to financial contract coordinating relations between stakeholders, so as to play its financial governance effect. However, dual attributes of financial contract are not separated completely, but unified in a contract; they status more like two research perspectives in the status of academic study.
The core elements of "system attribute" performance financial contract allocating financial rights, on one hand, it is initial configuration of financial rights from the existing financial contract, on the other hand, it is through optimal design of existing financial contracts to achieve the re-allocation of financial rights; "system attribute" performance the governance effect of financial contract. "Production attribute" requires that when we research the financial contracts, except considering the characteristics of financial behaviors, we have to analysis the effect of financial contract to financial behavior, such as investment behavior, financing behavior and income distribution behavior.
Researching financial contracts must take dual attributes as logical starting point, accordingly structuring operating system of financial contract. The thought of financial contract design can be divided into "system attribute" thought and "production attribute" thought, we not only consider its "system attribute", but also consider its "production attribute". How to ensure the self-fulfillment of contract of is the focus of the implementation of contract, effective way is to improve the loss of the participants in contract, the loss of breaching contract can be divided into "production attribute" loss and "system attribute" loss. Realizing and increasing the loss of breaching contract must satisfy certain conditions, analysis of those conditions will brings enlightenment for designing financial contract. When raising the loss of breaching contract is limited we need mandatory fulfill from third-party. Incomplete contract would result in the renegotiation on financial contract. The concrete reasons of renegotiation can be divided into "conditions change" and "self-improvement"; each reason can be divided into "production attribute" factor and "system attribute" factor, we must consider two factors comprehensively to adjust financial contracts.
引文
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