电信运营商与服务提供商的上下游纵向关系研究
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摘要
随着移动互联网时代的到来和电信消费者对数据业务认知和需求的不断提升,电信产业正经历着深刻的变革,其中一个突出的特点就是由服务提供商、内容提供商和应用提供商组成的服务提供行业在电信产业中的比重不断提升,重要性逐渐突显。但与此同时,也有一些问题和困扰一直伴随着服务提供行业的快速发展且变得越来越突出,其中最为典型的就是电信运营商和服务提供商之间的上下游纵向关系问题。一些研究和实证显示,运营商和服务提供商之间的纵向关系复杂而独特,并且对于两个行业甚至整个电信产业的发展都具有重大的影响。
但是,通过对纵向关系理论和电信产业的分析,本论文认为以往研究在探讨电信运营商和服务提供商纵向关系上,还存在一些不足和有待改进之处,主要是：以往纵向关系研究主要在既定的结构下进行探讨,缺乏对纵向关系形成机制的探讨和数据验证；以往电信产业研究重点集中于单个行业的探讨,缺乏将上下游行业联系起来并针对纵向关系的研究；缺乏运营商与服务提供商纵向关系具体实现形式的针对性探讨和分析。
为了弥补以上不足,本论文设计了三个逐步深入的研究内容,以产业链纵向关系理论为主要理论基础,同时结合电信产业的特征,分析电信运营商和服务提供商的上下游纵向关系,力争在以下方向上进行创新和突破：第一,从理论角度,分析电信运营商与服务提供商的纵向关系,探索形成这种机制的原因,同时应用实证数据进行验证；第二,从理论角度,围绕电信运营商与服务提供商纵向关系,提出并建立包含上下游市场控制力、行业发展力等诸因素的控制力研究模型,并通过实证研究的方式进行验证,探索因素间的相互关系；第三,结合电信产业特征,归纳总结出具体的纵向关系实现形式,并通过经济学模型进行分析,探讨具体实现形式对于上下游行业利润的影响,以及纵向关系条件下行业利润与市场结构的关系。
通过研究,论文最终得到了以下结论：
(1)电信运营商和服务提供商之间的上下游纵向关系为前者对于后者的正向控制,形成这一纵向关系的主要原因是电信运营与服务提供两个行业在市场结构及控制力上的差异,相比于服务提供市场的垄断竞争结构,电信运营市场的寡头垄断结构具有更强的垄断性,电信运营商具有更强行业控制力和行动置信性。论文从经济学理论、纵向控制力指数、正向控制主要实现形式、以及电信运营商和服务提供商效率等诸角度的分析均支持了这一结论。
(2)提出并建立以正向控制力为核心,涵盖上下游行业市场控制力、发展力和产业发展力的完整“电信产业链正向控制力模型”并进行实证研究。最终证实运营商对服务提供商的正向控制力,分别受到电信运营市场控制力和服务提供市场控制力的正向和负向影响；运营商对服务提供商的正向控制对于上游电信运营行业的发展具有促进作用,对于下游服务提供行业发展具有负向影响；从电信产业角度,这种正向控制不利于产业整体的发展和进步。
(3)电信运营商对服务提供商的正向控制,主要有四种实现形式(纵向一体化、转售价格控制、独占交易、等级歧视)。其中,电信运营商通过控制最终产品收费权和结算权,进行价格范围界定实现转售价格控制,以及对于服务提供商进行等级划分进行分成比例和服务支持层面歧视性管理,是电信产业中比较代表性的形式。通过建立针对转售价格控制、独占交易与等级歧视的经济学模型并进行分析,证实了电信运营商实施正向控制,促进了电信运营行业利润的提升易造成服务提供行业利润的损失。此外,模型证实电信运营商正向控制的实施效果与电信服务提供市场结构有关,随着下游服务提供商数量的增多,电信运营商正向控制越容易,且实施后获得的利润也更多。
With the trend of mobile Internet, as well as the rising in acceptances and demands for data services of telecom consumers, telecommunication industry is enduring a profound and important change. One of the most prominent features of this change is the rapid development of telecom service provide industry, which is composited by service providers (SP), content providers (CP) and application providers (AP). At the same time, however, there are some problems have been associating with the development of telecom service provide industry all the time, and become much more serious. Among them, the vertical relationship of upper and lower stream between telecom operators and telecom service providers is the most typical one. Some researches and empirical evidences show that the vertical relationship between telecom operators and telecom service providers is complex but essential, and it has great influences on the development both telecom operation industry and telecom service provide industry, even as well as telecommunication industry.
However, based on the review and in-depth analysis of previous studies in both vertical relationship theory and telecommunication industry, this paper found there are still some deficiencies and fields which can be improved in the vertical relationship between telecom operators and telecom services providers. The deficiencies are: previous studies tend to discuss vertical relationship in established structure, lack of the explore of formation mechanism; previous researches usually studied telecom operators or telecom service providers separately, lack of the discuss of connections and relationship between them; the studies which reflect the specific forms of vertical control between telecom operators and telecom service providers is limited.
In order to limit those deficiencies, this study designed three researches that aim at reflecting and investigating the vertical relationship between telecom operators and telecom service providers. These researches based on the vertical relationship theory that belongs to theory of the industrial chain, and combined with the specific features of telecommunication industry in analysis. This study makes innovations and breakthroughs in the following directions:First, analyzes vertical relationship between telecom operators and telecom services providers from theoretical view, explores the internal reason and mechanism in formation of this relationship, verified by empirical data. Second, provides a theoretical positive control model which reflecting the control of telecom operators to telecom service providers. This model includes vertical relationship influencing factors, such as telecom operation industry control force, telecom service provide industry control force, telecommunication development force, and verified by empirical data in the final. Third, combined with the features of telecommunication industry, this study defines the typical forms of vertical control between telecom operators and telecom service providers, explores the influences of vertical control to prifits of upper and lower stream industries by constructing economic model.
The conclusions of this study are:
(1) The vertical relationship of upper and lower stream between telecom operators and telecom service providers is the positive control of telecom operators to telecom service providers. The reason for this formation is the differences of telecom operation markets and telecom service provide markets in structure and control force. Compared to the Monopolistic Competition structure of telecom service provide market, the Oligopoly structure of telecom operation market gives the telecom operators much more force and confidence in control and action. The investigations from view of economic theory, the vertical control index, the specific forms of vertical control, as well as the differences of efficiency between telecom operators and telecom service providers, all proved the conclusion above.
(2) Constructed "Positive control model of telecom industry chain", and finished verification by empirical data. The results show that the positive control that telecom operators to telecom service providers is influences by upper telecom operation market control force and lower telecom service provide market control force. The positive control would improve the development of telecom operation industry, and have negative effects to the development of telecom service provide industry and telecommunication industry.
(3) There are four specific forms of vertical control between telecom operators and telecom service providers, and they are:Vertical Integration, Resale Price Maintenance, Exclusive Dealing, Class Discrimination. Among them, Resale Price Maintenance, which is reflected by controlling of telecom operators in the charging rights of the final product, and Class Discrimination, which is reflected by managing of telecom operators in different scale telecom service providers, are the typical and specific ones. The results of economic model show the positive control of telecom operators to telecom service providers would improve the profit of telecom operation industry, make loss of telecom service provide industry commonly. Besides, the structure of upper and lower markets influences the positive control, with the increase in the number of telecom service providers, telecom operators have more power in implementation of the positive control, and thus obtain much more profits.
但是,通过对纵向关系理论和电信产业的分析,本论文认为以往研究在探讨电信运营商和服务提供商纵向关系上,还存在一些不足和有待改进之处,主要是：以往纵向关系研究主要在既定的结构下进行探讨,缺乏对纵向关系形成机制的探讨和数据验证；以往电信产业研究重点集中于单个行业的探讨,缺乏将上下游行业联系起来并针对纵向关系的研究；缺乏运营商与服务提供商纵向关系具体实现形式的针对性探讨和分析。
为了弥补以上不足,本论文设计了三个逐步深入的研究内容,以产业链纵向关系理论为主要理论基础,同时结合电信产业的特征,分析电信运营商和服务提供商的上下游纵向关系,力争在以下方向上进行创新和突破：第一,从理论角度,分析电信运营商与服务提供商的纵向关系,探索形成这种机制的原因,同时应用实证数据进行验证；第二,从理论角度,围绕电信运营商与服务提供商纵向关系,提出并建立包含上下游市场控制力、行业发展力等诸因素的控制力研究模型,并通过实证研究的方式进行验证,探索因素间的相互关系；第三,结合电信产业特征,归纳总结出具体的纵向关系实现形式,并通过经济学模型进行分析,探讨具体实现形式对于上下游行业利润的影响,以及纵向关系条件下行业利润与市场结构的关系。
通过研究,论文最终得到了以下结论：
(1)电信运营商和服务提供商之间的上下游纵向关系为前者对于后者的正向控制,形成这一纵向关系的主要原因是电信运营与服务提供两个行业在市场结构及控制力上的差异,相比于服务提供市场的垄断竞争结构,电信运营市场的寡头垄断结构具有更强的垄断性,电信运营商具有更强行业控制力和行动置信性。论文从经济学理论、纵向控制力指数、正向控制主要实现形式、以及电信运营商和服务提供商效率等诸角度的分析均支持了这一结论。
(2)提出并建立以正向控制力为核心,涵盖上下游行业市场控制力、发展力和产业发展力的完整“电信产业链正向控制力模型”并进行实证研究。最终证实运营商对服务提供商的正向控制力,分别受到电信运营市场控制力和服务提供市场控制力的正向和负向影响；运营商对服务提供商的正向控制对于上游电信运营行业的发展具有促进作用,对于下游服务提供行业发展具有负向影响；从电信产业角度,这种正向控制不利于产业整体的发展和进步。
(3)电信运营商对服务提供商的正向控制,主要有四种实现形式(纵向一体化、转售价格控制、独占交易、等级歧视)。其中,电信运营商通过控制最终产品收费权和结算权,进行价格范围界定实现转售价格控制,以及对于服务提供商进行等级划分进行分成比例和服务支持层面歧视性管理,是电信产业中比较代表性的形式。通过建立针对转售价格控制、独占交易与等级歧视的经济学模型并进行分析,证实了电信运营商实施正向控制,促进了电信运营行业利润的提升易造成服务提供行业利润的损失。此外,模型证实电信运营商正向控制的实施效果与电信服务提供市场结构有关,随着下游服务提供商数量的增多,电信运营商正向控制越容易,且实施后获得的利润也更多。
With the trend of mobile Internet, as well as the rising in acceptances and demands for data services of telecom consumers, telecommunication industry is enduring a profound and important change. One of the most prominent features of this change is the rapid development of telecom service provide industry, which is composited by service providers (SP), content providers (CP) and application providers (AP). At the same time, however, there are some problems have been associating with the development of telecom service provide industry all the time, and become much more serious. Among them, the vertical relationship of upper and lower stream between telecom operators and telecom service providers is the most typical one. Some researches and empirical evidences show that the vertical relationship between telecom operators and telecom service providers is complex but essential, and it has great influences on the development both telecom operation industry and telecom service provide industry, even as well as telecommunication industry.
However, based on the review and in-depth analysis of previous studies in both vertical relationship theory and telecommunication industry, this paper found there are still some deficiencies and fields which can be improved in the vertical relationship between telecom operators and telecom services providers. The deficiencies are: previous studies tend to discuss vertical relationship in established structure, lack of the explore of formation mechanism; previous researches usually studied telecom operators or telecom service providers separately, lack of the discuss of connections and relationship between them; the studies which reflect the specific forms of vertical control between telecom operators and telecom service providers is limited.
In order to limit those deficiencies, this study designed three researches that aim at reflecting and investigating the vertical relationship between telecom operators and telecom service providers. These researches based on the vertical relationship theory that belongs to theory of the industrial chain, and combined with the specific features of telecommunication industry in analysis. This study makes innovations and breakthroughs in the following directions:First, analyzes vertical relationship between telecom operators and telecom services providers from theoretical view, explores the internal reason and mechanism in formation of this relationship, verified by empirical data. Second, provides a theoretical positive control model which reflecting the control of telecom operators to telecom service providers. This model includes vertical relationship influencing factors, such as telecom operation industry control force, telecom service provide industry control force, telecommunication development force, and verified by empirical data in the final. Third, combined with the features of telecommunication industry, this study defines the typical forms of vertical control between telecom operators and telecom service providers, explores the influences of vertical control to prifits of upper and lower stream industries by constructing economic model.
The conclusions of this study are:
(1) The vertical relationship of upper and lower stream between telecom operators and telecom service providers is the positive control of telecom operators to telecom service providers. The reason for this formation is the differences of telecom operation markets and telecom service provide markets in structure and control force. Compared to the Monopolistic Competition structure of telecom service provide market, the Oligopoly structure of telecom operation market gives the telecom operators much more force and confidence in control and action. The investigations from view of economic theory, the vertical control index, the specific forms of vertical control, as well as the differences of efficiency between telecom operators and telecom service providers, all proved the conclusion above.
(2) Constructed "Positive control model of telecom industry chain", and finished verification by empirical data. The results show that the positive control that telecom operators to telecom service providers is influences by upper telecom operation market control force and lower telecom service provide market control force. The positive control would improve the development of telecom operation industry, and have negative effects to the development of telecom service provide industry and telecommunication industry.
(3) There are four specific forms of vertical control between telecom operators and telecom service providers, and they are:Vertical Integration, Resale Price Maintenance, Exclusive Dealing, Class Discrimination. Among them, Resale Price Maintenance, which is reflected by controlling of telecom operators in the charging rights of the final product, and Class Discrimination, which is reflected by managing of telecom operators in different scale telecom service providers, are the typical and specific ones. The results of economic model show the positive control of telecom operators to telecom service providers would improve the profit of telecom operation industry, make loss of telecom service provide industry commonly. Besides, the structure of upper and lower markets influences the positive control, with the increase in the number of telecom service providers, telecom operators have more power in implementation of the positive control, and thus obtain much more profits.
引文
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