小额信贷激励机制与微观信贷政策创新研究
|
摘要
本论文主要从国际小额信贷经典机构的历史发展和理论研究两个层面入手,剖析总结小额信贷的激励机制,构建小额信贷激励机制的核心支柱,并指出小额信贷激励机制的创新是其实现高还款率进而实现商业可持续的关键所在。在此研究框架基础上,着力分析中国微观信贷政策的实际执行情况以及在激励机制方面存在的缺陷,并分别提出微观信贷政策的改进和创新策略。
一、本文首先回顾了小额信贷机构在国际和国内发展的主要历程。提出以下观点：
1.国际小额信贷经历了对低收入人群的有效触及、实现高还款率、收益覆盖成本、寻找商业渠道资金实现金融可持续四个发展阶段。
2.国内小额信贷发展以扶贫为切入点,有许多有益的尝试,但缺乏对小额信贷核心激励机制的有效把握和借鉴,因此难以发展壮大。
3.格莱珉银行实现商业可持续运行的关键是其极高的贷款回收率,而高还款率的关键是格莱珉独创的小额信贷激励机制,今天在世界其他地方的成功小额信贷机构都或多或少受到格莱珉的影响,格莱珉银行的信贷激励机制是其最值得借鉴的地方。
4、格莱珉银行小额信贷的主要特征：主要针对乡村没有土地或土地极少的赤贫人口；反高利贷；合理的激励机制；垄断性的市场基础。
二、通过对经典案例的历史回顾总结以及对现有小额信贷激励机制理论文献的梳理,本文提出了构建小额信贷激励机制的四个核心支柱,即垄断性市场结构、团体(联保)贷款、动态激励机制以及信贷员模式。垄断性市场结构是其激励机制得以实现的基础和条件；信贷员模式则是其激励机制具体实施的组织形式；团体(联保)贷款和动态激励机制分别是早期和后期小额信贷激励机制的核心。
1.垄断性市场结构是小额信贷激励机制产生和维持的重要基础。
2.团体贷款(联保、小组贷款)机制是早期小额信贷机构的经典模式,而当小额信贷机构发展到一定阶段,特别是对市场的进入深度和覆盖面达到一定程度后,动态激励机制逐渐取代早期的团体贷款模式,成为实现商业可持续的小额信贷机构的核心激励机制。
3.信贷员模式是小额信贷机构在组织形态上与其他金融机构的最大区别,也是小额信贷激励机制得以建立的重要基础。
三、在完成了从理论上对于小额信贷激励机制的总结以后,本文着重就中国的微观信贷政策进行分析和反思。首先从总体上分析了中国当前信贷政策的总体格局以及微观信贷政策面临的困境,然后分五章对农村小额信贷、地震灾区农房重建贷款、助学贷款、促进就业小额担保贷款、扶贫贷款等五项重要的微观信贷政策进行了系统分析,并辅之以案例。
本文研究并提出以下观点：
1.我国微观信贷政策面临的现实困境是：社会期望度长期高于金融业可供给水平；传导渠道的行政化与作用机制的市场化之间存在冲突；分散化经营模式导致经营成本较高；微观信贷政策相关产品的贷款回收率普遍不高；金融机构普遍缺乏积极性,政策实施成本高；法律基础缺失导致其他行政力量的介入,政策激励机制出现扭曲；微观信贷政策效应难以评估。
2.中国微观信贷政策在具体金融业务形态上都表现为小额信贷；微观信贷政策最大的问题在于对应的贷款业务回收率过低,违约风险和贷款损失严重,难以实现商业可持续；导致微观信贷政策相关信贷业务违约严重、回收率低的重要原因是政策理念落后,缺乏有效的正向激励机制；改进和创新微观信贷政策的关键在于充分借鉴运用小额信贷激励原理,设计正向激励机制,实现相关业务的商业可持续。
3.完善激励机制、改进我国农村小额信贷政策的设想是：依托个人征信系统,建立完善农户征信体系；依托现代化支付工具,鼓励构建跨金融机构的小额信贷动态激励机制；充分借鉴国外成功小额信贷机构的激励机制,努力提升农村信用社小额信贷业务经营管理水平；逐步放松利率管制,稳妥推进利率市场化改革；坚持市场化运作原则,不断完善普惠农村金融服务体系；完善风险补偿机制,激励金融机构积极发展农户小额信贷
4.作为非独立经济主体的小额信贷,助学贷款创新政策、改进激励机制的设想是：借款人主体身份的完善——从非独立经济主体向独立经济主体的演变；从“一次性”政策到动态激励——构建非独立经济主体与独立经济主体之间连续行为的正向激励机制；财政补贴应防止对激励机制的扭曲和误导；完善对高校的正向激励机制。
5.重构和创新就业小额担保贷款政策的设想是：重新明确政策定位、重新明确借款主体和重新设计激励机制；在激励机制创新方面：明确借款人还款义务；明确贷款银行的风险管理责任；财政资金介入要充分考虑正向激励,尝试建立信贷信用保险机制；改变“一次性”政策做法,建立动态激励机制。
6.重构扶贫信贷政策框架的设想是：调整扶贫贴息贷款管理方式；改革信贷扶贫贴息模式；逐步放松利率管制；建立风险补偿机制；借鉴经典小额信贷机构的经验做法。
总体来看,借鉴国外经典小额信贷机构的成功经验,改造和创新微观信贷政策的激励机制,切实提高微观信贷政策相关信贷业务的资产质量,就成为提高中国微观信贷政策有效性的一个现实选择。而在充分履行金融业社会责任和积极探索现代金融运行规律之间寻求平衡,也就成为微观信贷政策创新的核心理念,这也就是本文希望得出的最终结论。
四、本文的主要创新之处
1.从激励机制角度对小额信贷进行研究和总结,提出小额信贷激励机制的核心支柱。
以往对小额信贷的研究更多集中在小额信贷机构的发展方面,即重点关注小额信贷机构如何实现可持续运行以及监管当局如何创造适宜的政策和制度环境。本文的创新之处在于,直接切入小额信贷机构可持续运行的关键因素进行研究,专门就其信贷激励机制进行总结分析,创造性地将市场结构和信贷员管理模式与信贷激励机制结合起来,提出小额信贷激励机制的核心支柱。
2.从激励机制角度对微观信贷政策进行系统反思,提出微观信贷政策相关信贷业务不可持续的关键在于激励机制的缺陷。借鉴小额信贷激励机制的成功经验,创新性地提出政策改进的建议。
3.从资料收集的角度,收集整理微观信贷政策的相关情况,特别是收集整理汶川地震灾后农房重建贷款的资料。
微观信贷政策的系统总结和反思是一个在金融管理部门内部一直在进行但尚未完成的课题。本文的研究以及观点也只是一家之言,但系统收集微观信贷政策的实施效应、面临的困境等资料用于研究,是本文的创新之处。另外,特别要提出的是,汶川地震灾区农房重建信贷政策的相关资料,作为学术研究,肯定是第一次,因为相关工作还没有最后完成,一些事关激励机制的完善与坚持,事关此项贷款业务能否实现较高还款率的重要工作仍在进行中。
4.在微观信贷政策的创新改进方面,提出要在遵循现代金融运行规律和履行金融业社会责任之间寻求平衡,这可能是今后中国微观信贷政策发展创新的主要方向,也是本文研究想要得出的结论。
In this thesis, the study starts with the analysis of the historical development and theoretical research of classic international micro-credit institutions, followed by the analysis of incentives mechanism of micro-credit and the construction of the key frameworks and pillars of micro-credit. It is pointed out that the innovation of incentive mechanism is the key for high repayment rates and thus achieving financial sustainability. On the basis of this research framework, emphasis is put on the analysis of the actual implementation of micro-credit policy in China and the defects in terms of incentive mechanisms. The improvement and innovation strategy for micro-credit policies are put forward.
First, this paper reviews the international and domestic development process of micro-credit institutions. The following views are put forward:
1. International micro-credit experienced the following four stages of development, which are effective touch with low-income groups, high repayment rates, profit covering cost, finding commercial channels for funds to achieve financial sustainability.
2. The development of domestic micro-credit starts with poverty reducing. There were many useful attempts. But because of the lack of possessing of or reference to any core incentive mechanism of micro-credit, it was difficult to grow and develop.
3. The key for Grameen Bank to achieve financial sustainability is its high repayment rate, while the key for high repayment rate is its innovative incentives mechanism. The successful micro-credit institutions elsewhere in the world today are more or less influenced by the Grameen Bank. Grameen Bank's credit incentive mechanism is key point most worthy learning.
4. Grameen Bank displays the following four features:Grameen micro-credit is provided mainly for extremely poor people who are landless or with very little land; Grameen micro-credit has been against usury from the very start; Grameen micro-credit Credit maintains sustainability because of high repayment rates, and the high repayment rates are based on rational incentive mechanism; the market for Grameen micro-credit is closer to monopolized market.
Second, through the historical review and summarization of the classical case as well as combing existing literature about the incentive mechanism of micro-credit, this paper proposes the four core pillars to construct incentive mechanism of micro-credit, namely, monopolized market structures, group lending, dynamic incentives and loan officer mode. Monopolistic market structure is the basis and condition to achieve effective incentives, while loan officer pattern is organization form to implement incentive mechanism, and group lending and dynamic incentives are the core for incentive mechanism in the early time and later period respectively.
1. Monopolized market structure is the important basis for the generation and maintenance of incentives mechanism.
2. Group lending was the classic mode of micro-credit institutions in early times. When the micro-credit institutions entered certain development stage, especially when access to and coverage of the market reached certain degree, the dynamic incentive mechanism gradually replaced the early group lending model as the core incentives for successfully sustainable micro-credit institutions.
3. Loan officer model is the major difference of micro-credit institutions from other financial institutions in term of organization pattern, and is an important foundation for the establishment of micro-credit incentives.
Third, after the theoretic summary of micro-credit incentives, this paper focuses on analysis and reflection of micro-credit policy in China. From a general analysis of China's current credit policy and difficulties faced by micro-credit policy, five chapters are followed to analyze micro-credit in rural areas, loans for reconstruction of rural houses in the earthquake zone, student loans, small secured loans to promote employment, poverty alleviation micro-loans. The analysis is supplemented by cases.
In this paper, the following viewpoints are put forward:
1. The dilemmas faced by micro-credit policy in China are that the social expectation has been higher in a long term than the supply of financial industry, the conflict between administrative transmission channels and market mechanism of effect, decentralized management mode leads to high operating costs, micro-credit Loan recovery rate policy-related products has low recovery rates, financial institutions generally lack of enthusiasm then the cost of policy implementation is high, the lack of legal basis leads to the involvement of other administrative then policy incentives are distorted, and it is difficult to assess the effects of micro-credit policy.
2. The micro-credit policies in China are all in the form of micro-credit. The prominent issue of micro-credit policies is the low recovery rate and high default risk and loan losses, which leads to the difficulty to achieve commercial sustainability. The important reason for high default risk and low recovery rate is the out-dated policy ideology and lack of effectively positive incentives. The key to improve and innovate micro-credit policy is to fully refer to and apply incentive principles of micro-credit and to design positive incentives to achieve commercial sustainable.
3. The methodology to improve the incentive mechanism to improve China's rural micro-credit should be that a sound credit system for farmers should be built on the basis of personal credit system, a dynamic incentive mechanism should be built cross financial institutions by using basis of modern payment tools, efforts should be made to improve the management level of RCCs in terms of operation micro-credit by learning from successful micro-credit institutions in other countries, interest rate controls should be gradually eased and a market-oriented interest rate reform should be pushed forward, the inclusive rural financial services system should be improved in the guidance of market principles, and a sound risk compensation mechanism should be established so that financial institutions will be encouraged to launch micro-credit operations.
4. The ideology to innovate policy and improve performance of student loans as micro-credit extended to dependent economic entities is that the status of the borrowers from dependent economic entities to independent ones should be improved, the process from "one-off" policy to the dynamic incentive should be in the relating phase with the said evolution of borrowers, financial subsidy incentives should be designed to prevent distortions and misleading, and perfect positive incentives to universities should be improved.
5. The proposal of reconstructing and innovating small secured credit policy for employment is that a re-clearing of policy orientation and borrowing principal should be implemented, a clear incentive mechanism should be re-designed, the obligation to repay should be cleared, the risk management responsibility undertaken by lending bank should be cleared, positive incentives should be taken into consideration when fiscal funds are to be involved into this business, the attempt to build credit insurance mechanisms should be encouraged, and the "one-off'policy approach should be replaced by dynamic incentives.
6. The suggestion to reconstruct poverty alleviation credit policy is that the management of poverty alleviation loans should be improved, poverty alleviation credit discount model should be reformed, interest rate controls should be gradually eased, risk compensation mechanism should be established, and the experience of the classic practice of micro-credit institutions should be referred.
Overall, the realistic choice for improving the effectiveness of the micro-credit policies in China is to fully refer to the successful experience of classic micro-credit institutions, reform and innovate incentive mechanism, and to effectively improve asset quality of micro-credit policy related business. The core of micro-credit innovation is to achieve balance between fully implementation of community responsibility and following financial sector operation principles, which is also the final conclusion the author wants to draw.
Fourth, the major innovation of this article
1. From the perspective of micro-credit incentives, studies are unfolded and summaries are drawn. The core pillars for micro-credit incentives are put forward.
Previous researches were more focused on the development of micro-credit institutions, in other words, on how to achieve sustainable operation how to create appropriate policy and institutional environment by regulatory authorities. Innovation of this paper is that it directly probes the key factors for sustainable operations, specifically studies the incentives mechanism, and creatively combines market structure and the loan officer model with incentive mechanism so as to develop the central pillars of micro-credit incentives.
2. From the perspective of incentive mechanism, refection is conducted on the micro-credit policies. The conclusion is drawn that the key factor of unsustainability of policy-related micro-credit business is the lack of incentive mechanism. In the light of the successful experience of the micro-credit incentive mechanism, proposals to improving policy-making are recommended innovatively.
3. From the perspective of data collection, relevant micro-credit policies specifically the material of reconstruction rural housing loans in earthquake areas are collected and combed.
This systemic summary and reflection of micro-credit policies has been an ongoing issue among authorities, but it is not completed. The study and views in this paper are only reflects the personal understanding of this issue. However, the systematic collection of the materials on implementation effects and difficulties faced by micro-credit policies is the innovation of this paper. In particular, the materials related to reconstruction of rural housing credit policy in areas hit by Wenchuan earthquake for academic research is certainly the first time, because the relevant work is not finalized and the important work relating to the improvement and continuity of incentive mechanism and the repayment rates of this credit is still m progress.
4. In the aspect of innovation and improvement of micro-credit policies, the paper proposes that the balance between fully implementation of community responsibility and following financial sector operation principles should be. achieved, which probably will be the major direction for the development of micro-credit policies in China, and also is the conclusion this paper trying to achieve.
一、本文首先回顾了小额信贷机构在国际和国内发展的主要历程。提出以下观点：
1.国际小额信贷经历了对低收入人群的有效触及、实现高还款率、收益覆盖成本、寻找商业渠道资金实现金融可持续四个发展阶段。
2.国内小额信贷发展以扶贫为切入点,有许多有益的尝试,但缺乏对小额信贷核心激励机制的有效把握和借鉴,因此难以发展壮大。
3.格莱珉银行实现商业可持续运行的关键是其极高的贷款回收率,而高还款率的关键是格莱珉独创的小额信贷激励机制,今天在世界其他地方的成功小额信贷机构都或多或少受到格莱珉的影响,格莱珉银行的信贷激励机制是其最值得借鉴的地方。
4、格莱珉银行小额信贷的主要特征：主要针对乡村没有土地或土地极少的赤贫人口；反高利贷；合理的激励机制；垄断性的市场基础。
二、通过对经典案例的历史回顾总结以及对现有小额信贷激励机制理论文献的梳理,本文提出了构建小额信贷激励机制的四个核心支柱,即垄断性市场结构、团体(联保)贷款、动态激励机制以及信贷员模式。垄断性市场结构是其激励机制得以实现的基础和条件；信贷员模式则是其激励机制具体实施的组织形式；团体(联保)贷款和动态激励机制分别是早期和后期小额信贷激励机制的核心。
1.垄断性市场结构是小额信贷激励机制产生和维持的重要基础。
2.团体贷款(联保、小组贷款)机制是早期小额信贷机构的经典模式,而当小额信贷机构发展到一定阶段,特别是对市场的进入深度和覆盖面达到一定程度后,动态激励机制逐渐取代早期的团体贷款模式,成为实现商业可持续的小额信贷机构的核心激励机制。
3.信贷员模式是小额信贷机构在组织形态上与其他金融机构的最大区别,也是小额信贷激励机制得以建立的重要基础。
三、在完成了从理论上对于小额信贷激励机制的总结以后,本文着重就中国的微观信贷政策进行分析和反思。首先从总体上分析了中国当前信贷政策的总体格局以及微观信贷政策面临的困境,然后分五章对农村小额信贷、地震灾区农房重建贷款、助学贷款、促进就业小额担保贷款、扶贫贷款等五项重要的微观信贷政策进行了系统分析,并辅之以案例。
本文研究并提出以下观点：
1.我国微观信贷政策面临的现实困境是：社会期望度长期高于金融业可供给水平；传导渠道的行政化与作用机制的市场化之间存在冲突；分散化经营模式导致经营成本较高；微观信贷政策相关产品的贷款回收率普遍不高；金融机构普遍缺乏积极性,政策实施成本高；法律基础缺失导致其他行政力量的介入,政策激励机制出现扭曲；微观信贷政策效应难以评估。
2.中国微观信贷政策在具体金融业务形态上都表现为小额信贷；微观信贷政策最大的问题在于对应的贷款业务回收率过低,违约风险和贷款损失严重,难以实现商业可持续；导致微观信贷政策相关信贷业务违约严重、回收率低的重要原因是政策理念落后,缺乏有效的正向激励机制；改进和创新微观信贷政策的关键在于充分借鉴运用小额信贷激励原理,设计正向激励机制,实现相关业务的商业可持续。
3.完善激励机制、改进我国农村小额信贷政策的设想是：依托个人征信系统,建立完善农户征信体系；依托现代化支付工具,鼓励构建跨金融机构的小额信贷动态激励机制；充分借鉴国外成功小额信贷机构的激励机制,努力提升农村信用社小额信贷业务经营管理水平；逐步放松利率管制,稳妥推进利率市场化改革；坚持市场化运作原则,不断完善普惠农村金融服务体系；完善风险补偿机制,激励金融机构积极发展农户小额信贷
4.作为非独立经济主体的小额信贷,助学贷款创新政策、改进激励机制的设想是：借款人主体身份的完善——从非独立经济主体向独立经济主体的演变；从“一次性”政策到动态激励——构建非独立经济主体与独立经济主体之间连续行为的正向激励机制；财政补贴应防止对激励机制的扭曲和误导；完善对高校的正向激励机制。
5.重构和创新就业小额担保贷款政策的设想是：重新明确政策定位、重新明确借款主体和重新设计激励机制；在激励机制创新方面：明确借款人还款义务；明确贷款银行的风险管理责任；财政资金介入要充分考虑正向激励,尝试建立信贷信用保险机制；改变“一次性”政策做法,建立动态激励机制。
6.重构扶贫信贷政策框架的设想是：调整扶贫贴息贷款管理方式；改革信贷扶贫贴息模式；逐步放松利率管制；建立风险补偿机制；借鉴经典小额信贷机构的经验做法。
总体来看,借鉴国外经典小额信贷机构的成功经验,改造和创新微观信贷政策的激励机制,切实提高微观信贷政策相关信贷业务的资产质量,就成为提高中国微观信贷政策有效性的一个现实选择。而在充分履行金融业社会责任和积极探索现代金融运行规律之间寻求平衡,也就成为微观信贷政策创新的核心理念,这也就是本文希望得出的最终结论。
四、本文的主要创新之处
1.从激励机制角度对小额信贷进行研究和总结,提出小额信贷激励机制的核心支柱。
以往对小额信贷的研究更多集中在小额信贷机构的发展方面,即重点关注小额信贷机构如何实现可持续运行以及监管当局如何创造适宜的政策和制度环境。本文的创新之处在于,直接切入小额信贷机构可持续运行的关键因素进行研究,专门就其信贷激励机制进行总结分析,创造性地将市场结构和信贷员管理模式与信贷激励机制结合起来,提出小额信贷激励机制的核心支柱。
2.从激励机制角度对微观信贷政策进行系统反思,提出微观信贷政策相关信贷业务不可持续的关键在于激励机制的缺陷。借鉴小额信贷激励机制的成功经验,创新性地提出政策改进的建议。
3.从资料收集的角度,收集整理微观信贷政策的相关情况,特别是收集整理汶川地震灾后农房重建贷款的资料。
微观信贷政策的系统总结和反思是一个在金融管理部门内部一直在进行但尚未完成的课题。本文的研究以及观点也只是一家之言,但系统收集微观信贷政策的实施效应、面临的困境等资料用于研究,是本文的创新之处。另外,特别要提出的是,汶川地震灾区农房重建信贷政策的相关资料,作为学术研究,肯定是第一次,因为相关工作还没有最后完成,一些事关激励机制的完善与坚持,事关此项贷款业务能否实现较高还款率的重要工作仍在进行中。
4.在微观信贷政策的创新改进方面,提出要在遵循现代金融运行规律和履行金融业社会责任之间寻求平衡,这可能是今后中国微观信贷政策发展创新的主要方向,也是本文研究想要得出的结论。
In this thesis, the study starts with the analysis of the historical development and theoretical research of classic international micro-credit institutions, followed by the analysis of incentives mechanism of micro-credit and the construction of the key frameworks and pillars of micro-credit. It is pointed out that the innovation of incentive mechanism is the key for high repayment rates and thus achieving financial sustainability. On the basis of this research framework, emphasis is put on the analysis of the actual implementation of micro-credit policy in China and the defects in terms of incentive mechanisms. The improvement and innovation strategy for micro-credit policies are put forward.
First, this paper reviews the international and domestic development process of micro-credit institutions. The following views are put forward:
1. International micro-credit experienced the following four stages of development, which are effective touch with low-income groups, high repayment rates, profit covering cost, finding commercial channels for funds to achieve financial sustainability.
2. The development of domestic micro-credit starts with poverty reducing. There were many useful attempts. But because of the lack of possessing of or reference to any core incentive mechanism of micro-credit, it was difficult to grow and develop.
3. The key for Grameen Bank to achieve financial sustainability is its high repayment rate, while the key for high repayment rate is its innovative incentives mechanism. The successful micro-credit institutions elsewhere in the world today are more or less influenced by the Grameen Bank. Grameen Bank's credit incentive mechanism is key point most worthy learning.
4. Grameen Bank displays the following four features:Grameen micro-credit is provided mainly for extremely poor people who are landless or with very little land; Grameen micro-credit has been against usury from the very start; Grameen micro-credit Credit maintains sustainability because of high repayment rates, and the high repayment rates are based on rational incentive mechanism; the market for Grameen micro-credit is closer to monopolized market.
Second, through the historical review and summarization of the classical case as well as combing existing literature about the incentive mechanism of micro-credit, this paper proposes the four core pillars to construct incentive mechanism of micro-credit, namely, monopolized market structures, group lending, dynamic incentives and loan officer mode. Monopolistic market structure is the basis and condition to achieve effective incentives, while loan officer pattern is organization form to implement incentive mechanism, and group lending and dynamic incentives are the core for incentive mechanism in the early time and later period respectively.
1. Monopolized market structure is the important basis for the generation and maintenance of incentives mechanism.
2. Group lending was the classic mode of micro-credit institutions in early times. When the micro-credit institutions entered certain development stage, especially when access to and coverage of the market reached certain degree, the dynamic incentive mechanism gradually replaced the early group lending model as the core incentives for successfully sustainable micro-credit institutions.
3. Loan officer model is the major difference of micro-credit institutions from other financial institutions in term of organization pattern, and is an important foundation for the establishment of micro-credit incentives.
Third, after the theoretic summary of micro-credit incentives, this paper focuses on analysis and reflection of micro-credit policy in China. From a general analysis of China's current credit policy and difficulties faced by micro-credit policy, five chapters are followed to analyze micro-credit in rural areas, loans for reconstruction of rural houses in the earthquake zone, student loans, small secured loans to promote employment, poverty alleviation micro-loans. The analysis is supplemented by cases.
In this paper, the following viewpoints are put forward:
1. The dilemmas faced by micro-credit policy in China are that the social expectation has been higher in a long term than the supply of financial industry, the conflict between administrative transmission channels and market mechanism of effect, decentralized management mode leads to high operating costs, micro-credit Loan recovery rate policy-related products has low recovery rates, financial institutions generally lack of enthusiasm then the cost of policy implementation is high, the lack of legal basis leads to the involvement of other administrative then policy incentives are distorted, and it is difficult to assess the effects of micro-credit policy.
2. The micro-credit policies in China are all in the form of micro-credit. The prominent issue of micro-credit policies is the low recovery rate and high default risk and loan losses, which leads to the difficulty to achieve commercial sustainability. The important reason for high default risk and low recovery rate is the out-dated policy ideology and lack of effectively positive incentives. The key to improve and innovate micro-credit policy is to fully refer to and apply incentive principles of micro-credit and to design positive incentives to achieve commercial sustainable.
3. The methodology to improve the incentive mechanism to improve China's rural micro-credit should be that a sound credit system for farmers should be built on the basis of personal credit system, a dynamic incentive mechanism should be built cross financial institutions by using basis of modern payment tools, efforts should be made to improve the management level of RCCs in terms of operation micro-credit by learning from successful micro-credit institutions in other countries, interest rate controls should be gradually eased and a market-oriented interest rate reform should be pushed forward, the inclusive rural financial services system should be improved in the guidance of market principles, and a sound risk compensation mechanism should be established so that financial institutions will be encouraged to launch micro-credit operations.
4. The ideology to innovate policy and improve performance of student loans as micro-credit extended to dependent economic entities is that the status of the borrowers from dependent economic entities to independent ones should be improved, the process from "one-off" policy to the dynamic incentive should be in the relating phase with the said evolution of borrowers, financial subsidy incentives should be designed to prevent distortions and misleading, and perfect positive incentives to universities should be improved.
5. The proposal of reconstructing and innovating small secured credit policy for employment is that a re-clearing of policy orientation and borrowing principal should be implemented, a clear incentive mechanism should be re-designed, the obligation to repay should be cleared, the risk management responsibility undertaken by lending bank should be cleared, positive incentives should be taken into consideration when fiscal funds are to be involved into this business, the attempt to build credit insurance mechanisms should be encouraged, and the "one-off'policy approach should be replaced by dynamic incentives.
6. The suggestion to reconstruct poverty alleviation credit policy is that the management of poverty alleviation loans should be improved, poverty alleviation credit discount model should be reformed, interest rate controls should be gradually eased, risk compensation mechanism should be established, and the experience of the classic practice of micro-credit institutions should be referred.
Overall, the realistic choice for improving the effectiveness of the micro-credit policies in China is to fully refer to the successful experience of classic micro-credit institutions, reform and innovate incentive mechanism, and to effectively improve asset quality of micro-credit policy related business. The core of micro-credit innovation is to achieve balance between fully implementation of community responsibility and following financial sector operation principles, which is also the final conclusion the author wants to draw.
Fourth, the major innovation of this article
1. From the perspective of micro-credit incentives, studies are unfolded and summaries are drawn. The core pillars for micro-credit incentives are put forward.
Previous researches were more focused on the development of micro-credit institutions, in other words, on how to achieve sustainable operation how to create appropriate policy and institutional environment by regulatory authorities. Innovation of this paper is that it directly probes the key factors for sustainable operations, specifically studies the incentives mechanism, and creatively combines market structure and the loan officer model with incentive mechanism so as to develop the central pillars of micro-credit incentives.
2. From the perspective of incentive mechanism, refection is conducted on the micro-credit policies. The conclusion is drawn that the key factor of unsustainability of policy-related micro-credit business is the lack of incentive mechanism. In the light of the successful experience of the micro-credit incentive mechanism, proposals to improving policy-making are recommended innovatively.
3. From the perspective of data collection, relevant micro-credit policies specifically the material of reconstruction rural housing loans in earthquake areas are collected and combed.
This systemic summary and reflection of micro-credit policies has been an ongoing issue among authorities, but it is not completed. The study and views in this paper are only reflects the personal understanding of this issue. However, the systematic collection of the materials on implementation effects and difficulties faced by micro-credit policies is the innovation of this paper. In particular, the materials related to reconstruction of rural housing credit policy in areas hit by Wenchuan earthquake for academic research is certainly the first time, because the relevant work is not finalized and the important work relating to the improvement and continuity of incentive mechanism and the repayment rates of this credit is still m progress.
4. In the aspect of innovation and improvement of micro-credit policies, the paper proposes that the balance between fully implementation of community responsibility and following financial sector operation principles should be. achieved, which probably will be the major direction for the development of micro-credit policies in China, and also is the conclusion this paper trying to achieve.
引文
1.Besley T, S Coate.Group Lending, Repayment Incentives, and Social Collateral[J]·Journal of Development Economics,1995,(46):1-18.
2.Abdulla, T, Rutherford, S and Hossain, I.Mid Term Review of BURO Tangail's Rural Savings and Credit Pro-gram[J].Mimeo,1995.
3.Aghion B. A. and Christian Gollier. Peer group formation in an Adverse Selection Model. The Economic Journal [J],2000(110):632-643.
4.Armendariz de Aghion Beatriz.On the Design of A Credit with Peer Monitoring. Journal of Development Economics[J],1999,(60):79-104.
5.B-Armenda riz de Aghion, J · Morduch. Microfinance beyond Group Lending [J]. Economics of Transition,2000,(8).
6.Beatriz Armenda riz de Aghion, Jonathan Morduch-The Economics of Microfinance [M].MIT Press, Cambridge,MA,2005.
7.BERGER A, UDELL GSmall business credit availability and relationship lending:the importance ofbank organizational structure[J].The Economic Journal, 2002,112 (477):32-53.
8.Bernasek Alexandra and James Ronald Stainfield. The Grameen Bank as Progressive institutional adjustment. Journal of Economic Issues [J],1997, 31(2):359-366.
9.Besanko, D. and Thakor, A. Collateral and Rationing:Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets [J]. International Economic Review, 1987,(28):671-689.
10.Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate. Group Lending, Repayment incentives and social collateral. Journal of Development-Economics [J],1995, (46):1-18.
11.Besley Timothy.Nonmarket Institutions for Credit and Risk Sharing in Low-Income countries. Journal of Economic Perspectives [J],1995,9(3):115-127.
12.Bester, H. Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information [J]. American Economic Review,1985, (75):850-855.
13.Brigitte Klein, Richard Meyer,Alfred Hanning, Jill Burnett, Michael Fiebig. Better Practices in Agricultural Lending [J].1999,(9).
14. Conning J.Outreach Sustainability and Leverage in Monitored and Peer-Monitored Lending[J].Journal of Development Economics,1998,(60):51-77.
15.David De Meza and David C-Webb. Too Much Investment:A Problem of Asymmetric Information. [J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1987,(5):281-292.
16.De Meza D. and Webb D.Too Much Investment:A Problem of Asymmetric Information. Quarterly Journal of Economics [J], 1987,102(2):281-292.
17.Denotes Vigenina, Alexander S · Kritikos.The Individual Micro-lending Contract:Is It a Better Design than Joint-liability? Evidence from Georgia [J].Economic Systems,2004, (28).
18.Eric Van Tassel·Group Lending under Asymmetric Information [J].Journal of Development Economics,1999,(60).
19.G-Impavido-Credit Rationing, Group Lending and Optimal Group Size [J].Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics,1998,69 (2).
20.Ghatak Maitreesh and Timothy W. Guinnane. The Economics of Lending with Joint Liability:Theory and Practice. Journal of Development Economics [J], 1999, (60):196-228.
21.Ghatak Maitreesh. Group Lending and the Peer Selection Effect[C].Harvard University Unpublished Paper,1995.
22.Ghatak Maitreesh. Group Lending, Local Information and Peer Selection. Journal of Development Economics[J],1999,(60):27-50.
23.Ghatak Maitresh.Screening by The Company You Keep:Joint Liability Lending and The Peer Selection Effect.The Economic Journal [J],2000, (110):601-631.
24.GhatakM, TWGuinnane-The Economics of Lending with Joint Liability: Theory and Practice[J].Journal of Development Economics,1999,(60):195-228.
25.Giancarlo Spagnolo.Social Relations and Cooperation in Organizations[J] JEBO,1999, (38/1):1-26.
26.GoldbergM. Pricing of the Prime Rate [J]. Journal of Banking and Finance.1982, (6):277-96.
27. Greif,Avner.Cultural Beliefs and the organization of Society:A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectiyist and Individualist Societies[J].Journal of Political Economy,1994,102(5):912-950.
28.Grief,Avner.Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade:The MaghribiTraders'Coalition[M]. Amer. Econ.Rev,1993,83(3):525-548.
29. Gwendolyn Alexander Tedeschi.Here Today, Gone Tomorrow:Can Dynamic Incentives Make Microfinance More Flexible? [J] Journal of Development Economics,2006, (80).
30.Hart,O.,and J.,Moore. Foundations of Incomplete Contracts[J].Review of Economic Studies,1999, (66):115-138
31.Helmut Bester. Screening vs. · Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information [J].the American Economic Review,1985,75(4):850-855.
32.J-Conning-Group Lending, Moral Hazard, and the Creation of Social Collateral [Z].IRIS Working Paper,1996,(195).
33.J-E-Stiglitz, A-Weiss-Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information [J].The American Economic Review.1981,71 (3).
34. Joel M Guttman.Assortative Matching, Adverse Selection and Group Lending [J].Journal of Development Economics,2008, (87).
35.Joseph E-Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss. Credit Rationing in Market with Imperfect Information [J].The American Economic Review,1981, (71):393-410.
36.Joseph Stiglitz-Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets [J].World Bank Economic Review,1990, (4).
37.Kandel E P E Lazear.Peer Pressure and Partnerships [J].Journal of Political Economy,1992,100(4):801-817.
38.Krahnen, Jan Pieter, and Reinhard H-Schmidt. Development Finance as Institution Building:A New Approach to Poverty-Oriented Lending[J].Boulder, Colo:Wesrview Press,1994.
39.Kreps,David.Corporate Culture and Economic Theory[M]. In Perspective on Political Economy, Cambridge University Press,1990.
40.Ledgerwood, Joanna, and Jill Burnett. Individual Micro-Lending Research Project:A Case Study Review-ADEMI. Calmeadow, Toronto, Canada,1995.
41.Linxiu Zhang, Scott Rozelle-Assessing the Impact of Poverty Alleviation through Micro-credit Program:A Case Study of Yilong County, Sichuan Province[J]. A Report provided to UNDP,2000,(3).
42.M-Ghatak, Timothy W-Guinnane-The Economic of Lending with Joint Liability:Theory and Practice [J].Journal of Development Economics,1999, (60).
43.M-Ghatak-Group Lending, Local Information and Peer Selection [J].Journal of Development Economics,1999,60 (1).
44.M-Ghatak-Joint Liability Group-Lending Contracts and the Peer Selection Effects [Z].University of Chicago:Department of Economics,1997.
45.M-Ghatak-Screening by the Company You Keep:Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect [J].The Economic Journal,2000, (110).
46.Milde H. and J. Riley. Signalling Credit Markets. Quarterly Journal of Economics.1988, (2):101-29.
47.Morduch Jonathan.The Microfinance Promise. Journal of Economic Literature [J],1999,37(4):1569-1614.
48.Nageeb Sumar.Poverty Alleviation through Credit:Catapulting Micro finance to Wall Street[J]. Submitted to the Department of Finance in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Science,2002,(8).
49.Park, A and Ren. Microfinance with Chinese Characteristics [J]. World Development,2000,28(6).
50.Prabal Roy Chowdhury. Group-lending with Sequential Financing, Contingent Renewal and Social Capital [J].Journal of Development Economics, 2007, (84).
51.Remenyi, Joe and Quinones, Benjamin. Microfinance and Poverty Alleviation:Case studies from Asia and the Pacific[J]. New York,2000, (79):131-134,253-263.
52.Sanjay Jaina, Ghazala Mansuri.A Little at a Time:The Use of Regularly Scheduled Repayments in Microfinance Programs [J]·Journal of Development Economics,2003, (72).
53.Stiglitz J. and Weiss A. credit rationing in markets with imperfect information. A.E.R [J].1981,21(2):265-293.
54.Stiglitz J. Peer monitoring and Credit Markets [J].World Bank Economic Review,1990,4(3):351-366
55.T·Besley, S·Coate-Group Lending, Repayment Incentives and Social Collateral [J].Journal of Development Economics,1995, (46).
56. The World Bank. A Worldwide Inventory of Microfinance Institutions, 1996.
57. Van Tassel Eric. Group lending under asymmetric information. Journal of Development Economics [J],1999, (60):3-25.
58.Varian, Hal R.. Monitoring agents with other agents. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics [J],1990, (146):153-174.
59.Wenner Mark D. Group Credit:A Means to Improve Information Transfer and Loan Repayment Performance. Journal of Development Studies [J],1995, (32):263-281.
60.Woolcock Michael J. V. Learning from Failures in Microfinance:What Unsuccessful Cases Tell Us About How Group-Based Programs work. American Journal of Economics and Sociology [J],1999,(58):17-42.
61. Wright, Graham A-N. Microfinance Systems:Designing Quality Financial Services for the Poor[M].Zed Books Ltd London & New York, and The University Press Limited, Dhaka,2000.
62.Wydick Bruce.Credit Access for Household Enterprises in Developing Countries under Asymmetric Information.Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California at Berkeley.1996.
63.X. Freixas and J. Laffont. Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement [J]. The Review of Economic Studies,1990,(57):597-625.
64.Zwingle E.Women and Population[J].National Geographic,1998,198(4):36-55.
1.[孟]穆罕默德.尤努斯著,吴士宏译,穷人的银行家[M],三联书店,2006.
2.[孟]阿西夫.道拉,迪帕尔.巴鲁阿著,朱民等译,穷人的诚信——第二代格莱珉银行的故事[M],中信出版社,2007.
3.[孟]穆罕默德.尤努斯著,鲍小佳译,新的企业模式——创造没有贫困的世界[M],中信出版社,2008.
4.安国涛.基于博弈论模型的小额信贷利率分析[J].广西经济管理干部 学院学报,2008,(1)49-53.
5.安文波.中国小额信贷利率—案例研究[D].对外经济贸易大学,2007.
6.巴曙松.小额信贷与农村金融空白的填补——在“首届甘肃金融论坛”上的演讲[J].甘肃金融,2006,(4).
7.蔡贇,谢元态.论我国农户小额信贷业务的可持续性发展[J].海南金融,2004,(10).
8.曹子娟,中国小额信贷发展研究[M],中国时代经济出版社,2006.
9.曹亚楠.农信社小额信贷业务对农户的金融支持研究[D].中央民族大学,2007.
10.曹媛媛.小额信贷对贫困妇女脱贫的影响及风险规避的研究[D].西北大学,2008.
11.陈娟.我国小额信贷监管法律问题研究[D].对外经济贸易大学,2007.
12.陈浪南,谢清河.我国小额信贷研究[J].农业经济问题,2002,(3).
13.陈娴婷.关系型借贷对农户小额信贷的风险化解作用[J].现代农业科技.2008,(14)：250-254.
14.陈颖,王胜邦.小额信贷机构监管的国际经验和中国实践[J].新金融,2006,(7).
15.陈中.规范小额信贷组织发展的几点思考[J].中国金融,2006,(5).
16.程恩江.农户小额信贷：配置与还款机制[J].数字财富,2004,(11).
17.程恩江.刘西川,中国非政府小额信贷和农村金融[M],浙江大学出版社,2007.
18.程民选.信誉从社会资本视角分析[J].财经科学,2005,(12)：73-75.
19.程民选.信誉与产权制度[M].成都：西南财大出社,2006.
20.程晓敏.西部欠发达地区农村小额信贷可持续发展研究[D].兰州大学,2007.
21.党玺,刘京莲.农村小额信贷风险的法律规制[J].法制与社会,2007,(1).
22.丁业震.农村小额信贷风险及其防范[J].农村经济,2006,(12).
23.董少林.论我国农村信用社小额信贷的可持续发展[D].安徽大学,2004.
24.董志勇,黄迈,刘文忻.农村小额信贷的激励理论述评[J].经济理论与经济管理,2008,(10)：27-31.
25.杜晓山,刘文璞.小额信贷原理及运作[M].上海：上海财经大学出版社,2001.
26.杜晓山,孙若梅.中国小额信贷的实践和政策思考[J].财贸经济,2000,(7).
27.杜晓山,张保民,中国小额信贷十年[M],社会科学文献出版社,2003.
28.杜晓山.非政府组织小额信贷机构可能的发展前景[J].中国农村经济,2008,(5).
29.杜晓山.进一步完善小额信贷扶贫管理体制[J].中国经贸导刊,2002,(18).
30.杜晓山.孟加拉国的乡村银行及对我国的启示[J].中国农村经济,1994,(2).
31.杜晓山.农村金融体系框架、农村信用社改革和小额信贷[J].中国农村经济,2002,(8).
32.杜晓山.商业化、可持续小额信贷的新发展——德国、阿尔巴尼亚和乌克兰小额信贷的研讨和考察[J].中国农村经济,2003,(10).
33.杜晓山.小额信贷的发展与普惠性金融体系框架[J].中国农村经济,2006,(8).
34.杜晓山.印度小额信贷的发展及借鉴[J].现代经济探讨,2005,(5).
35.杜晓山.中国农村小额信贷的实践尝试[J].中国农村经济,2004,(8)：9-19.
36.杜晓山.中国小额信贷的发展和政策[J].学术动态,2005,(27).
37.杜晓山等,中国公益性小额信贷[M].社会科学文献出版社,2008.
38.杜志雄,唐建华.有关小额信贷几个主要问题的讨论综述[J].中国农村观察,2001,(2).
39.段泽宇.促进我国农户小额信贷发展的财政政策研究[D].湖南大学,2008.
40.范合君等.农村团体贷款的博弈分析[J].首都经济贸易大学学报,2006,(5)：93-96.
41.范香梅,彭建刚.国际小额信贷模式运作机制比较研究[J].国际经贸探索,2007,(6).
42.高灵芝,胡旭昌.中国小额信贷扶贫实践模式的综述与反思[J].济南大学学报(社会科学版),2005,(6).
43.高霞.关于我国城市小额信贷扶贫问题的研究[D].天津财经学院,2004.
44.郭宏斌.商业化小额信贷在我国的实现路径分析[D].对外经济贸易大学,2007.
45.郭培清.“尤努斯小额信贷模式”引发的思考[J].西部金融,2007,(8).
46.韩红.中国农村小额信贷制度模式与管理体系研究[D].西北农林科技大学,2008.
47.韩学红.小额信贷的国际经验[J].银行家,2006,(12).
48.郝彬.江苏省扶贫小额贷款研究[D].南京农业大学,2007.
49.郝同武,袁桂启,许国永.一条投资小见效快的扶贫新路——河北省易县借鉴孟加拉GB模式开展小额信贷扶贫的调查与思考[J].经济社会体制比较,1998,(2).
50.何广文,冯兴元,李莉莉.农村信用社制度创新模式评析[J].香港中文大学中国研究服务中心资料库,2003.
51.何广文,李莉莉.农村小额信贷市场空间分析[J].银行家,2006,(5)：108-111.
52.何广文,李莉莉.正规金融机构小额信贷运行机制及其绩效评价[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社,2005.
53.何建苹.农村信用社小额农贷存在的问题及建议[J].农村经营管理,2006,(1).
54.何剑伟.中国农村小额信贷发展研究[D].西北农林科技大学,2008.
55.何志明.农村小额信贷模式的研究[D].吉林农业大学,2007.
56.河北省农村小额信用贷款课题组.农村小额信贷可持续发展的思考[J].经济与管理,2004,(10).
57.侯祖戎,朱乾宇.我国农户小额信贷市场非均衡与帕累托改进[J].江西财经大学学报,2006,(4)：15-17.
58.胡金焱,李永平.正规金融与非正规金融：比较成本优势与制度互补[J].东岳论丛,2006(2)：115-119.
59.胡金焱,张乐.非正规金融与小额信贷：一个理论述评[J].金融研究,2004,(7)：123-131.
60.胡宜朝,雷明.信任的研究方法综述[J].山西财经大学学报,2005,(12)：5-8.
61.胡育专.小额信贷法律问题研究[D].中南大学,2007.
62.胡愈,许红莲,王雄.农户小额信用贷款信用评级探究[J].财经理论与实践,2007,(1).
63.黄成莲,温智良.从农户融资看农村金融制度安排的取向[J].武汉金融,2006,(12)：47-48.
64.黄继峰,崔霞丽.中国小额信贷发展有关问题的研究[J].内蒙古财经学院学报,2004,(2).
65.黄心田,易法海.小额信贷的制度核心类型及启示[J].中国软科学,1999,(4).
66.黄毅.小额信贷问题研究(上)[J].银行家,2005,(12)：20-25.
67.黄宗元,沈小燕.ARCH模型在我国金融市场的应用情况研究[J].广西师范大学学报,2007,(1).
68.姜杰凡,张永升,刘军霞.河北省农村小额信贷发展报告及经验总结[J].农业经济,2006,(4).
69.姜艳灵.我国农村小额信贷运行机制研究[D].湖南大学,2007.
70.姜蕴华.吉林省农村妇女小额信贷政策析论[D].吉林大学,2008.
71.蒋永穆、纪志耿.农户借贷过程中信任机制的构建[J].四川大学学报,2006,(1)：5-9.
72.焦瑾璞,杨骏.小额信贷和农村金融[M].北京：中国金融出版社,2006.
73.焦瑾璞.探索发展小额信贷的有效模式[J].中国金融,2007,(2).
74.金媛媛.浅析农村信用社农户小额信贷[J].科技创业月刊,2006,(3).
75.金媛媛.我国欠发达地区农户小额信贷研究[D].华中农业大学,2007.
76.康笑.小额信贷及其在我国的发展情况研究[D].北京语言大学,2007.
77.旷宗仁,鲁静芳,左停.创新与小额信贷的可持续发展[J].农村金融研 究,2006,(2).
78.李东亮.普惠性可持续农村小额信贷体系的构建路径研究[D].山东大学,2007.
79.李海嘉,张照涓.对发展农村小额信贷的探索：模式与制度[J].西南金融,2006,(12).
80.李辉.实现小额信贷可持续发展的思考[J].辽宁大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2004,(5).
81.李静.农村金融发展情况[M].中国农村经济形势分析与预测.北京：社会科学文献出版社,2002：158-170.
82.李军林.声誉理论及其近期进展.经济学动态[J].2004,(2).
83.李军培.小额信贷的金融创新性分析[D].中国社会科学院研究生院,2003.
84.李莉莉.小额信贷正规化演变[J].银行家,2006,(1).
85.李莉莉.正规金融机构小额信贷运行机制及其绩效评价[D].中国农业大学,2005.
86.李猛.小额信贷的经济学原理[J].贵州社会科学,2007,(7)：22-26.
87.李敏.农村信用社农户小额信贷运作模式研究[D].吉林大学,2007.
88.李明贤,李学文.孟加拉国小额信贷发展的宏观经济基础及中国小额信贷的发展[J].农业经济问题,2008,(9).
89.李鹏亮.团体贷款发展态势及博弈分析[J].沈阳建筑大学报,2005,(4).
90.李树杰.标准小额信贷防范金融风险的经济学分析[J].生产力研究,2008,(21)：39-41.
91.李树杰.孟加拉格莱珉小额信贷银行二次创业的经验[J].金融经济,2007,(3下)：56-57.
92.李文.新农村建设中小额信贷供给模式研究[D].广西大学,2008.
93.李宪忠.小额信贷发展路径探悉[J].金融理论与实践,2006,(9).
94.李湘宁,姜子叶.评析我国小额信贷实践的若干争论[J].金融纵横,2006,(12).
95.李晓文.印尼小额信贷的发展[J].中国金融,2006,(14).
96.李星君.小额信用农户贷款存在的问题及对策[J].南方金融,2002,(6).
97.李裕鸿,秦斌.小额信贷探析[J].科技创业月刊,2004,(16).
98.李韫.我国农村小额信贷政策风险研究[D].兰州大学,2008.
99.梁慧玲.我国农户小额信贷商业化问题研究[D].湖南大学,2007.
100.梁立波.我国农村小额信贷发展问题研究[D].广西大学,2008.
101.梁山.对农户小额信贷需求、安全性、盈利性和信用状况的实证研究[J].金融研究,2003,(6)：128-134.
102.梁山.对农户小额信贷需求、安全性、盈利性和信用状况的实证研究[J].金融研究,2003,(6).
103.林超群.我国农村信用社小额信贷问题研究[D].四川师范大学,2008.
104.林丽琼.小额信贷：近期文献述评[J]福建教育学院学报,2007,(4).
105.林毅夫、孙希芳.信息、非正规金融与中小企业融资[J].北京大学中国经济研究中心讨论稿,2003.
106.林毅夫.金触改革和农村经济发展[J].北京大学中国经济研究中心工作论文,No.C2003026.
107.刘峰.标准小额信贷的制度缺陷与行为扭曲：黑龙江个案[J].金融研究,2006,(9)：171-178.
108.刘菲.浅析我国农村小额信贷发展现状及对策[D].安徽大学,2007.
109.刘华.中国小额信贷可持续发展分析[J].江西金融职工大学学报,2006,(4).
110.刘梅.小额信贷产品设计研究[D].西南财经大学,2004.
111.刘明越.呼伦贝尔市农村牧区小额信贷的发展：绩效、问题与对策[D].内蒙古大学,2007.
112.刘庆娜.农户小额信贷绩效评价与可持续发展[D].山东大学,2008.
113.刘苇.小额信贷法律问题研究[D].西南大学,2008.
114.刘卫红.农村小额信贷的风险分析及对策[J].现代农业科技,2008(6)：205,207.
115.刘文璞等.中国农村小额信贷扶贫的理论与实践[M].北京：中国财经 出版社,1996.
116.刘西川,黄祖辉,程恩江.小额信贷的目标上移：现象描述与理论解释——基于三省(区)小额信贷项目区的农户调查[J].中国农村经济,2007,(8).
117.刘西川,金铃,程恩江.推进农村金融改革 扩展穷人信贷市场——中国非政府小额信贷和农村金融国际研讨会综述[J].中国农村经济,2006,(8).
118.刘锡良,洪正.多机构共存下的小额信贷市场均衡[J].金融研究,2005,(3)：68-79.
119.刘晓昀,叶敬忠.小额信贷的小组贷款与信贷机制创新[J].农业经济问题,2002,(3).
120.刘燕.论小额信贷风险的法律控制[D].北方工业大学,2008.
121.刘钟钦,陈驰,曲桂颖.小额信贷及在我国的实践综述[J].农业经济,2000,(6).
122.龙文博.我国小额信贷问题研究[D].苏州大学,2006.
123.陆磊,丁俊峰.中国农村合作金融转型的理论分析[J].金融研究,2001,(1).
124.吕德宏.西部小额信贷模式及转型措施[J].农村经济,2003,(4).
125.罗杰.基于关联博弈和声誉的私人契约执行机制：特殊信任主义条件下的民间信用研究[J].商业现代化,2005,(6)：24-25.
126.罗平,陈颖.小额信贷机构的监管[J].中国金融,2005,(20).
127.罗绒战堆.西藏的贫困与反贫困问题研究[M].拉萨：中国藏学出版社,2002.
128.麦金农.经济发展中的货币与资本[M].上海：上海三联出版社,1973.
129.梅迪.农村小额信贷发展问题与对策研究[J].社会科学辑刊,2006,(3).
130.蒙永亨.广西欠发达地区农村经济发展的金融支持研究[J].经济与管理,2007,(7)：143-145.
131.穆罕默德·尤努斯.穷人的银行家[M].生活、读书、新知三联书店,2006.
132.牛建高.对小额信贷及其在我国的引进与发展问题的理性思考[J]. 开发研究,1999,(3).
133.欧永生.孟加拉国小额信贷对我国的启示[J].北方经济,2007,(2).
134.潘秀红.对农村经济发展中小额信贷问题的探讨[J].经济问题,2004,(12).
135.钱水土,乐韵.中国小额信贷商业化可持续发展的经济学分析[J],金融理论与实践,2007,(3)：3-6.
136.乔安娜·雷格伍德.小额金融信贷手册[M].北京：中国工商联合出版社,2000.
137.乔瑜华,韩更章.我国小额信贷持续发展的政策建议[J].理论导刊,2005,(11).
138.青木昌彦.比较制度分析[M].上海：上海远东出版社,2002.
139.人行西宁中支课题组.青藏地区小额信贷实证研究[J].青海金融,2005,(12).
140.任鑫鹏.农户小额信贷问题研究[D].东北农业大学,2007.
141.邵兴忠.共生原理与社会资本的对接：小额信贷运营的新语境[J].浙江金融2008,(8)：25-26.
142.沈久相.我国农村小额信贷发展研究[D].新疆财经大学,2007.
143.石俊志.小额信贷发展模式的国际比较及其对我国启示[J].国际金融研究,2007,(10)：4-9.
144.石骏,魏灿秋.信合保险在信用社小额信贷及农村金融中的作用[J].中国农学通报,2006,(1).
145.斯蒂格利茨,格林沃尔德.通往货币经济学的新范式[M].中信出版社,2005.
146.宋惠荣.发展我国农村“只贷不存”小额信贷机构问题研究[D].河海大学,2007.
147.苏静.杜子平.银行信用风险管理机制：“硬”信息对“软”信息[J].安徽农业科学,2007(29)：9370-9372,9382.
148.孙琳.关于发展我国农户小额信贷的思考[J].世界经济情况,2006,(14).
149.孙若梅.小额信贷与农民收入[M].北京：中国经济出版社,2006.
150.孙若梅.小额信贷在农村信贷市场中的作用探讨[J].中国农村经济,2006,(8).
151.孙天琦.小额信贷扶贫成功的商洛模式及对农村金融发展的启示[J].农业经济问题,2001,(4).
152.孙天琦.制度竞争、制度均衡与制度的本土化创新——商洛小额信贷扶贫模式变迁研究[J].经济研究,2001,(6).
153.孙同全.扶贫小额信贷与公益信托制度研究[M],经济科学出版社,2006.
154.孙同全.农村金融新政中非政府小额信贷的发展方向探析[J].农业经济问题,2007,(5).
155.孙艳艳.小额信贷与个人发展账户的比较研究[J].山东大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2005,(1).
156.谭民俊.农村小额信贷效率改进的微观基础研究[D].中南大学,2007.
157.汤灏.我国小额信贷面临的突出问题研究[D].上海社会科学院,2007.
158.汤敏,姚先斌.孟加拉“乡村银行”的小额信贷扶贫模式[J].改革,1996,(4).
159.汤敏.小额信贷为什么要有高利率[J].新浪财经网,2007年3月1日.
160.汤小青,经济结构转型中的信贷理论与信贷政策[M],中国金融出版社,2000.
161.唐学鹏.用生态学眼光解决小额信贷难题[N].21纪经济报道,2006-09-27.
162.滕向丽.促进农村小额信贷良性发展[J].理论学刊,2007,(1).
163.田甜,万江红.孟加拉乡村银行小额信贷模式及其启示[J].时代经贸(理论版),2007,(2).
164.汪三贵,李莹星.印尼小额信贷的商业运作[J].银行家,2006,(3).
165.汪三贵.中国小额信贷可持续发展的障碍和前景[J].农业经济问题,2000,(12)：18-20.
166.汪轶.小额信贷机构可持续发展问题研究[D].西南财经大学,2004.
167.王保成.扶贫小额信贷对农村贫困妇女的影响[D].中国农业大学,2005.
168.王彩峰.小额信贷机构的信贷员激励薪酬体系设计[D].北京交通大学,2007.
169.王川.小额信贷问题依旧[J].银行家,2005,(3).
170.王传言.我国小额信贷项目运作中的政府角色研究[D].苏州大学,2008.
171.王辉、蒋常虹.信贷市场中的声誉效应研究[J].浙江金融,2005,(12)：49-50.
172.王健康.农村小额信贷自组织制度缺陷及完善[J].财经理论与实践,2006,(11)：35-38.
173.王景富..农村信用社推广农户小额信用贷款的实证研究[J].金融研究,2002,(9).
174.王九龙,王锡平.中国农村小额信贷问题及对策研究[J].农村经济,2006,(6).
175.王丽萍,霍学喜.西部地区农户借贷行为及其制约因素分析[J].商业研究,2007(1)：25-30.
176.王群琳.论中国农村小额信贷的可持续发展[J].湖南农业大学学报(社会科学版),2004,(5).
177.王曙光.发展小额信贷需要良好的制度环境[J].新财经,2006,(12).
178.王曙光.农村金融与新农村建设[M].北京：华夏版社,2006.
179.王曙光.小额信贷：民间力量唱主角[J].中国经济周刊,2006,(16).
180.王双正.我国农村小额信贷问题研讨述评[J].现代经济探讨,2005,(11).
181.王晔.国内外成功的商业化小额信贷模式案例分析[D].对外经济贸易大学,2007.
182.王瑜.扶贫小额信贷：理论与中国农村的实践[D].华东师范大学,2008.
183.王卓,李小雨,吴,迪.中国农村民间金融的社会性别分析——以西部小额信贷组织为例[J].社会科学研究,2008,(2)：124-132.
184.王卓.农村小额信贷利率及其需求弹性[J].中国农村经济,2007,(6).
185.温铁军.农户信用与民间借贷研究：农户信用与民间借贷课题主报告[J].中经网50人论坛,2001年6月7日.
186.温智良.制度创新与环境优化：农户小额信贷帕累托改进[J].金融与经济,2005,(3).
187.乌云.农村小额信贷问题研究[D].内蒙古师范大学,2008.
188.吴国宝.对小额信贷的反思及中国开展小额信贷试验和推广的建议[J].贫困和发展,1997.
189.吴晓灵.为小额信贷发展创造良好的社会环境[J].银行家,2006,(5).
190.吴循.小额信贷对我国经济发展的作用机制研究[D].西南财经大学,2007.
191.武翔宇,高凌云.印度的小额信贷：自助小组—银行联结[J].农业经济问题,2009,(1)：104-109.
192.武翔宇,吴东立,张英.小额信贷监管的国际经验及对我国的启示[J].金融经济,2006,(22).
193.项英玲.论UNDP小额信贷扶贫项目的示范效应及对我国的影响[D].对外经济贸易大学,2003.
194.肖望新.对中国农业利用世界银行贷款项目进行小额信贷的实证研究[D].对外经济贸易大学,2007.
195.谢海.浅析小额信贷的理论与实践[J].农村经济,2005,(12).
196.谢洪军.小额信贷扶贫项目的理论与实践研究[D].西南农业大学,2001.
197.谢平.中国农村信用合作制改革的争论[J].金融研究.2001,(1).
198.谢清河.我国小额信贷模式研究[D].厦门大学,2001.
199.谢玉梅,格莱明银行模式：基于关联博弈的分析[J].经济问题2008,(8)：91-93.
200.谢玉梅.国外小额信贷发展对我国的启示[J].经济问题,2007,(5).
201.谢云山.我国小额信贷组织的现状与出路——以山西省临县湍水头 镇扶贫基金会为例[J].中国金融,2005,(24).
202.谢云山.小额信贷的山西湍水头镇模式[J].农村金融研究,2006,(2).
203.熊德平.农村小额信贷：模式、经验与启示[J].财经论与实践,2005,(3)：39-43.
204.熊惠平.基于共生原理的小额信贷的社会资本效应探析[J].农村经济,2008,(1)：23-25.
205.熊学萍,易法海.农户小额信贷风险：表现、成因与应对策略[J].华东经济管理,2005,(11).
206.熊学萍.我国农村小额信贷的实践与相关问题探讨[J].湖北社会科学,2005,(6).
207.徐珺.从凉山农户小额信贷看国家对西部民族地区农村的金融支持[J].金融研究,2003,(6).
208.徐鲜梅.中国小额信贷发展问题报告[J].经济理论与经济管理,1999,(4).
209.徐振春,任大鹏.我国农村小额信贷立法问题研究[J].农村经济,2007,(1).
210.徐忠.小额信贷：国际经验及其对我国启示[J].上海金融,2006,(8).
211.许芳.企业共生论[M].北京：中国财政经济出社,2006.
212.亚行专家组.关于天津市下岗女工“小额贷款”项目的报告[EB/OL].社会政策网：http://www.social-policy.Info.
213.严盛虎.中国小额信贷可持续发展研究[D].北京林业大学,2004.
214.杨大楷.小额信贷可持续发展：困境和出路[J].上海金融,2007,(1).
215.杨坚.建立市场化运作的农村小额信贷扶贫模式[J].生产力研究,2005,(5).
216.杨林娟.农村信用社农户小额信贷存在的问题与对策——以甘肃省肃州区为例[J].甘肃农业大学学报,2005,(4).
217.杨琳.农村小额信贷：国际比较与中国的实践[D].厦门大学,2007.
218.杨鸥.我国小额信贷可持续性发展问题研究[D].吉林大学,2008.
219.杨生莱.中国小额信贷的发展研究[D].武汉理工大学,007.
220.杨喜孙,薛瑞鑫,叶华.农村信用社小额信贷可持续发展面临的问题及对策[J].农村经济,2007,(5).
221.杨晓丽.对农户小额信贷的调查与思考[J].农村经济,2006,(5)：74-76.
222.杨序琴.小额信贷发展的占优均衡：福利主义宗旨与制度主义机制的有机融合[J].金融理论与实践,2007,(2).
223.杨艳红.文化、伦理与社会制序：以山西票号为例.世界经济文汇[J].2002,(1).
224.杨远军.我国小额信贷问题浅析[J].济南金融,2006,(9).
225.叶初升、孙永平.信任问题经济学研究的最新进展与实践启示[J].国外社会科学,2005,(3)：9-16.
226.叶谦等.金融合约中贷款规模及其金融合约特征[J].财经论丛.2005,(4)：30-34.
227.殷红霞.农村小额信贷的政策效应及风险防范[J].理论导刊,2004,(9).
228.余红莲.我国农村小额信贷若干问题研究[D].安徽大学,2003.
229.余利民.我国农村小额信贷发展研究[J].华东经济管理,2006,(5).
230.喻国华.谈农户小额信贷[J].经营与管理,2005,(7).
231.詹芸芸.中国农村反贫困：民间小额信贷模式选择的理性思考[D].厦门大学,2007.
232.张风帆.小额贷款对我国城市弱势群体再就业的扶持作用研究[D].西北大学,2008.
233.张杰,尚长风.我国农村正式与非正式金融的分离与融合[J].经济体制改革2006(4)：86-90.
234.张洁,.农村小额信贷的风险防范与管理[J].价格月刊,2007,(11).
235.张立军,湛泳.金融发展与降低贫困——基于中国1994-2004年小额信贷的分析[J].当代经济科学,2006,(6).
236.张立军,湛泳.小额信贷降低贫困效应的国际经验及其启示[J].新金融,2006,(11).
237.张丽敏.我国农村小额信贷的研究和探索[D].东北财经大学,2007.
238.张丽霞.我国农村小额信贷的可持续发展研究[D].华中师范大学,2006.
239.张平,高林海.山西临县湍水头镇小额信贷基金调研及经验分析[J].中国农村经济,2007,(S1).
240.张韶华.农村小额信贷制度安排与农户信用[J].西安金融,2004,(3).
241.张天从.福建省农村妇女小额信贷研究[D].福建农林大学,2008.
242.张维迎,柯荣柱.信任及其解释——来自中国的跨省调查分析[J].经济研究,2002,(10)：58-70.
243.张维迎.法律的信誉基础经济研究[J].2002,(1).
244.张维迎.法律制度的信誉基础[J].经济研究,2002,(1)：3-13.
245.张莹.亚太四国小额信贷——泰国·孟加拉·菲律宾·日本[J].数字财富,2004,(12).
246.张莹.亚洲四国小额信贷模式及启示[J].中国劳动,2005,(3).
247.张永青.我国小额信贷商业化发展研究[D].西南财经大学,2006.
248.张勇.拉丁美洲小额信贷初探[J].拉丁美洲研究,2004,(4).
249.张勇.孟加拉小额信贷模式的最新发展[J].中国农村经济,2003,(6).
250.张勇.小额信贷扶贫的创新研究[D].中国社会科学院研究生院,2003.
251.张志峰.“小额信贷机构”呼之欲出[J].中国金融家,2005,(8).
252.章元,李全.论产出分布对团体贷款还款率的影响[J].经济研究,2003,(2).
253.章元.对团体贷款高还款率的解释：一个社会担保模型[J].世界经济,2005,(2)：67-72.
254.章元.非对称信息下的团体贷款研究[M].上海人民出版社,2005.
255.章元.论团体贷款对信贷市场低效率的可能改进[J].经济研究,2005,(1).
256.赵利梅.中国和孟加拉国小额信贷模式比较[J].农村经济,2004,(S1).
257.赵岩青,何广文.声誉机制、信任机制与小额信贷[J].金融论丛,2008,(1)：33-40.
258.郑振东,杨智斌.农户小额信贷可持续发展的经济学分析[J].河北经贸大学学报,2005,(1)：48-51.
259.郑振东,杨智斌.农户小额信贷可持续发展的经济学分析[J].金融研究2005,(1).
260.中国人民银行西宁中心支行课题组,胡安舜,王海平.青藏地区小额信贷实证研究[J].金融研究,2006,(2).
261.中国人民银行西宁中心支行课题组.青藏地区小额信贷实证研究[J].金融研究,2006,(2).
262.中国人民银行肇庆市中心支行课题组.农户小额信贷保险实践[J].银行家,2006,(10).
263.中国社会科学院贫困问题研究中心小额信贷管理体制课题组.关于改进和完善政府实施小额信贷扶贫管理体制的研究报告[J].2001.
264.周美萍.陕西农村小额信贷发展模式与对策研究[D].西北农林科技大学,2008.
265.周其仁.农民收入是一系列问题[J].北京大学中国经济研究中心工作论文,No.C2001012.
266.周小付.中国农村小额信贷发展模式探索[D].福建师范大学,2008.
267.周晓丽.新农村建设中的小额信贷问题研究[D].对外经济贸易大学,2007.
268.周勇.规范我国小额信贷若干法律问题研究[D].上海社会科学院,2008.
269.周宇.小额信贷业务的偏差与规范[J].乡镇经济,2006,(1).
270.周振海.基于垄断和价格管制条件下的中国农村小额信贷市场分析[J].金融研究,2007,(8)：182-190.
271.邹瑾.小额信贷风险浅析[J].商场现代化,2005,(29).
①[孟]穆罕默德.尤努斯著,鲍小佳译,新的企业模式——创造没有贫困的世界[M],中信出版社,2008.
①杜晓山,刘文璞.小额信贷原理及运作[M].上海：上海财经大学出版社,2001.
2.Abdulla, T, Rutherford, S and Hossain, I.Mid Term Review of BURO Tangail's Rural Savings and Credit Pro-gram[J].Mimeo,1995.
3.Aghion B. A. and Christian Gollier. Peer group formation in an Adverse Selection Model. The Economic Journal [J],2000(110):632-643.
4.Armendariz de Aghion Beatriz.On the Design of A Credit with Peer Monitoring. Journal of Development Economics[J],1999,(60):79-104.
5.B-Armenda riz de Aghion, J · Morduch. Microfinance beyond Group Lending [J]. Economics of Transition,2000,(8).
6.Beatriz Armenda riz de Aghion, Jonathan Morduch-The Economics of Microfinance [M].MIT Press, Cambridge,MA,2005.
7.BERGER A, UDELL GSmall business credit availability and relationship lending:the importance ofbank organizational structure[J].The Economic Journal, 2002,112 (477):32-53.
8.Bernasek Alexandra and James Ronald Stainfield. The Grameen Bank as Progressive institutional adjustment. Journal of Economic Issues [J],1997, 31(2):359-366.
9.Besanko, D. and Thakor, A. Collateral and Rationing:Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets [J]. International Economic Review, 1987,(28):671-689.
10.Besley Timothy and Stephen Coate. Group Lending, Repayment incentives and social collateral. Journal of Development-Economics [J],1995, (46):1-18.
11.Besley Timothy.Nonmarket Institutions for Credit and Risk Sharing in Low-Income countries. Journal of Economic Perspectives [J],1995,9(3):115-127.
12.Bester, H. Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information [J]. American Economic Review,1985, (75):850-855.
13.Brigitte Klein, Richard Meyer,Alfred Hanning, Jill Burnett, Michael Fiebig. Better Practices in Agricultural Lending [J].1999,(9).
14. Conning J.Outreach Sustainability and Leverage in Monitored and Peer-Monitored Lending[J].Journal of Development Economics,1998,(60):51-77.
15.David De Meza and David C-Webb. Too Much Investment:A Problem of Asymmetric Information. [J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1987,(5):281-292.
16.De Meza D. and Webb D.Too Much Investment:A Problem of Asymmetric Information. Quarterly Journal of Economics [J], 1987,102(2):281-292.
17.Denotes Vigenina, Alexander S · Kritikos.The Individual Micro-lending Contract:Is It a Better Design than Joint-liability? Evidence from Georgia [J].Economic Systems,2004, (28).
18.Eric Van Tassel·Group Lending under Asymmetric Information [J].Journal of Development Economics,1999,(60).
19.G-Impavido-Credit Rationing, Group Lending and Optimal Group Size [J].Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics,1998,69 (2).
20.Ghatak Maitreesh and Timothy W. Guinnane. The Economics of Lending with Joint Liability:Theory and Practice. Journal of Development Economics [J], 1999, (60):196-228.
21.Ghatak Maitreesh. Group Lending and the Peer Selection Effect[C].Harvard University Unpublished Paper,1995.
22.Ghatak Maitreesh. Group Lending, Local Information and Peer Selection. Journal of Development Economics[J],1999,(60):27-50.
23.Ghatak Maitresh.Screening by The Company You Keep:Joint Liability Lending and The Peer Selection Effect.The Economic Journal [J],2000, (110):601-631.
24.GhatakM, TWGuinnane-The Economics of Lending with Joint Liability: Theory and Practice[J].Journal of Development Economics,1999,(60):195-228.
25.Giancarlo Spagnolo.Social Relations and Cooperation in Organizations[J] JEBO,1999, (38/1):1-26.
26.GoldbergM. Pricing of the Prime Rate [J]. Journal of Banking and Finance.1982, (6):277-96.
27. Greif,Avner.Cultural Beliefs and the organization of Society:A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectiyist and Individualist Societies[J].Journal of Political Economy,1994,102(5):912-950.
28.Grief,Avner.Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade:The MaghribiTraders'Coalition[M]. Amer. Econ.Rev,1993,83(3):525-548.
29. Gwendolyn Alexander Tedeschi.Here Today, Gone Tomorrow:Can Dynamic Incentives Make Microfinance More Flexible? [J] Journal of Development Economics,2006, (80).
30.Hart,O.,and J.,Moore. Foundations of Incomplete Contracts[J].Review of Economic Studies,1999, (66):115-138
31.Helmut Bester. Screening vs. · Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information [J].the American Economic Review,1985,75(4):850-855.
32.J-Conning-Group Lending, Moral Hazard, and the Creation of Social Collateral [Z].IRIS Working Paper,1996,(195).
33.J-E-Stiglitz, A-Weiss-Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information [J].The American Economic Review.1981,71 (3).
34. Joel M Guttman.Assortative Matching, Adverse Selection and Group Lending [J].Journal of Development Economics,2008, (87).
35.Joseph E-Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss. Credit Rationing in Market with Imperfect Information [J].The American Economic Review,1981, (71):393-410.
36.Joseph Stiglitz-Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets [J].World Bank Economic Review,1990, (4).
37.Kandel E P E Lazear.Peer Pressure and Partnerships [J].Journal of Political Economy,1992,100(4):801-817.
38.Krahnen, Jan Pieter, and Reinhard H-Schmidt. Development Finance as Institution Building:A New Approach to Poverty-Oriented Lending[J].Boulder, Colo:Wesrview Press,1994.
39.Kreps,David.Corporate Culture and Economic Theory[M]. In Perspective on Political Economy, Cambridge University Press,1990.
40.Ledgerwood, Joanna, and Jill Burnett. Individual Micro-Lending Research Project:A Case Study Review-ADEMI. Calmeadow, Toronto, Canada,1995.
41.Linxiu Zhang, Scott Rozelle-Assessing the Impact of Poverty Alleviation through Micro-credit Program:A Case Study of Yilong County, Sichuan Province[J]. A Report provided to UNDP,2000,(3).
42.M-Ghatak, Timothy W-Guinnane-The Economic of Lending with Joint Liability:Theory and Practice [J].Journal of Development Economics,1999, (60).
43.M-Ghatak-Group Lending, Local Information and Peer Selection [J].Journal of Development Economics,1999,60 (1).
44.M-Ghatak-Joint Liability Group-Lending Contracts and the Peer Selection Effects [Z].University of Chicago:Department of Economics,1997.
45.M-Ghatak-Screening by the Company You Keep:Joint Liability Lending and the Peer Selection Effect [J].The Economic Journal,2000, (110).
46.Milde H. and J. Riley. Signalling Credit Markets. Quarterly Journal of Economics.1988, (2):101-29.
47.Morduch Jonathan.The Microfinance Promise. Journal of Economic Literature [J],1999,37(4):1569-1614.
48.Nageeb Sumar.Poverty Alleviation through Credit:Catapulting Micro finance to Wall Street[J]. Submitted to the Department of Finance in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Science,2002,(8).
49.Park, A and Ren. Microfinance with Chinese Characteristics [J]. World Development,2000,28(6).
50.Prabal Roy Chowdhury. Group-lending with Sequential Financing, Contingent Renewal and Social Capital [J].Journal of Development Economics, 2007, (84).
51.Remenyi, Joe and Quinones, Benjamin. Microfinance and Poverty Alleviation:Case studies from Asia and the Pacific[J]. New York,2000, (79):131-134,253-263.
52.Sanjay Jaina, Ghazala Mansuri.A Little at a Time:The Use of Regularly Scheduled Repayments in Microfinance Programs [J]·Journal of Development Economics,2003, (72).
53.Stiglitz J. and Weiss A. credit rationing in markets with imperfect information. A.E.R [J].1981,21(2):265-293.
54.Stiglitz J. Peer monitoring and Credit Markets [J].World Bank Economic Review,1990,4(3):351-366
55.T·Besley, S·Coate-Group Lending, Repayment Incentives and Social Collateral [J].Journal of Development Economics,1995, (46).
56. The World Bank. A Worldwide Inventory of Microfinance Institutions, 1996.
57. Van Tassel Eric. Group lending under asymmetric information. Journal of Development Economics [J],1999, (60):3-25.
58.Varian, Hal R.. Monitoring agents with other agents. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics [J],1990, (146):153-174.
59.Wenner Mark D. Group Credit:A Means to Improve Information Transfer and Loan Repayment Performance. Journal of Development Studies [J],1995, (32):263-281.
60.Woolcock Michael J. V. Learning from Failures in Microfinance:What Unsuccessful Cases Tell Us About How Group-Based Programs work. American Journal of Economics and Sociology [J],1999,(58):17-42.
61. Wright, Graham A-N. Microfinance Systems:Designing Quality Financial Services for the Poor[M].Zed Books Ltd London & New York, and The University Press Limited, Dhaka,2000.
62.Wydick Bruce.Credit Access for Household Enterprises in Developing Countries under Asymmetric Information.Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California at Berkeley.1996.
63.X. Freixas and J. Laffont. Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement [J]. The Review of Economic Studies,1990,(57):597-625.
64.Zwingle E.Women and Population[J].National Geographic,1998,198(4):36-55.
1.[孟]穆罕默德.尤努斯著,吴士宏译,穷人的银行家[M],三联书店,2006.
2.[孟]阿西夫.道拉,迪帕尔.巴鲁阿著,朱民等译,穷人的诚信——第二代格莱珉银行的故事[M],中信出版社,2007.
3.[孟]穆罕默德.尤努斯著,鲍小佳译,新的企业模式——创造没有贫困的世界[M],中信出版社,2008.
4.安国涛.基于博弈论模型的小额信贷利率分析[J].广西经济管理干部 学院学报,2008,(1)49-53.
5.安文波.中国小额信贷利率—案例研究[D].对外经济贸易大学,2007.
6.巴曙松.小额信贷与农村金融空白的填补——在“首届甘肃金融论坛”上的演讲[J].甘肃金融,2006,(4).
7.蔡贇,谢元态.论我国农户小额信贷业务的可持续性发展[J].海南金融,2004,(10).
8.曹子娟,中国小额信贷发展研究[M],中国时代经济出版社,2006.
9.曹亚楠.农信社小额信贷业务对农户的金融支持研究[D].中央民族大学,2007.
10.曹媛媛.小额信贷对贫困妇女脱贫的影响及风险规避的研究[D].西北大学,2008.
11.陈娟.我国小额信贷监管法律问题研究[D].对外经济贸易大学,2007.
12.陈浪南,谢清河.我国小额信贷研究[J].农业经济问题,2002,(3).
13.陈娴婷.关系型借贷对农户小额信贷的风险化解作用[J].现代农业科技.2008,(14)：250-254.
14.陈颖,王胜邦.小额信贷机构监管的国际经验和中国实践[J].新金融,2006,(7).
15.陈中.规范小额信贷组织发展的几点思考[J].中国金融,2006,(5).
16.程恩江.农户小额信贷：配置与还款机制[J].数字财富,2004,(11).
17.程恩江.刘西川,中国非政府小额信贷和农村金融[M],浙江大学出版社,2007.
18.程民选.信誉从社会资本视角分析[J].财经科学,2005,(12)：73-75.
19.程民选.信誉与产权制度[M].成都：西南财大出社,2006.
20.程晓敏.西部欠发达地区农村小额信贷可持续发展研究[D].兰州大学,2007.
21.党玺,刘京莲.农村小额信贷风险的法律规制[J].法制与社会,2007,(1).
22.丁业震.农村小额信贷风险及其防范[J].农村经济,2006,(12).
23.董少林.论我国农村信用社小额信贷的可持续发展[D].安徽大学,2004.
24.董志勇,黄迈,刘文忻.农村小额信贷的激励理论述评[J].经济理论与经济管理,2008,(10)：27-31.
25.杜晓山,刘文璞.小额信贷原理及运作[M].上海：上海财经大学出版社,2001.
26.杜晓山,孙若梅.中国小额信贷的实践和政策思考[J].财贸经济,2000,(7).
27.杜晓山,张保民,中国小额信贷十年[M],社会科学文献出版社,2003.
28.杜晓山.非政府组织小额信贷机构可能的发展前景[J].中国农村经济,2008,(5).
29.杜晓山.进一步完善小额信贷扶贫管理体制[J].中国经贸导刊,2002,(18).
30.杜晓山.孟加拉国的乡村银行及对我国的启示[J].中国农村经济,1994,(2).
31.杜晓山.农村金融体系框架、农村信用社改革和小额信贷[J].中国农村经济,2002,(8).
32.杜晓山.商业化、可持续小额信贷的新发展——德国、阿尔巴尼亚和乌克兰小额信贷的研讨和考察[J].中国农村经济,2003,(10).
33.杜晓山.小额信贷的发展与普惠性金融体系框架[J].中国农村经济,2006,(8).
34.杜晓山.印度小额信贷的发展及借鉴[J].现代经济探讨,2005,(5).
35.杜晓山.中国农村小额信贷的实践尝试[J].中国农村经济,2004,(8)：9-19.
36.杜晓山.中国小额信贷的发展和政策[J].学术动态,2005,(27).
37.杜晓山等,中国公益性小额信贷[M].社会科学文献出版社,2008.
38.杜志雄,唐建华.有关小额信贷几个主要问题的讨论综述[J].中国农村观察,2001,(2).
39.段泽宇.促进我国农户小额信贷发展的财政政策研究[D].湖南大学,2008.
40.范合君等.农村团体贷款的博弈分析[J].首都经济贸易大学学报,2006,(5)：93-96.
41.范香梅,彭建刚.国际小额信贷模式运作机制比较研究[J].国际经贸探索,2007,(6).
42.高灵芝,胡旭昌.中国小额信贷扶贫实践模式的综述与反思[J].济南大学学报(社会科学版),2005,(6).
43.高霞.关于我国城市小额信贷扶贫问题的研究[D].天津财经学院,2004.
44.郭宏斌.商业化小额信贷在我国的实现路径分析[D].对外经济贸易大学,2007.
45.郭培清.“尤努斯小额信贷模式”引发的思考[J].西部金融,2007,(8).
46.韩红.中国农村小额信贷制度模式与管理体系研究[D].西北农林科技大学,2008.
47.韩学红.小额信贷的国际经验[J].银行家,2006,(12).
48.郝彬.江苏省扶贫小额贷款研究[D].南京农业大学,2007.
49.郝同武,袁桂启,许国永.一条投资小见效快的扶贫新路——河北省易县借鉴孟加拉GB模式开展小额信贷扶贫的调查与思考[J].经济社会体制比较,1998,(2).
50.何广文,冯兴元,李莉莉.农村信用社制度创新模式评析[J].香港中文大学中国研究服务中心资料库,2003.
51.何广文,李莉莉.农村小额信贷市场空间分析[J].银行家,2006,(5)：108-111.
52.何广文,李莉莉.正规金融机构小额信贷运行机制及其绩效评价[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社,2005.
53.何建苹.农村信用社小额农贷存在的问题及建议[J].农村经营管理,2006,(1).
54.何剑伟.中国农村小额信贷发展研究[D].西北农林科技大学,2008.
55.何志明.农村小额信贷模式的研究[D].吉林农业大学,2007.
56.河北省农村小额信用贷款课题组.农村小额信贷可持续发展的思考[J].经济与管理,2004,(10).
57.侯祖戎,朱乾宇.我国农户小额信贷市场非均衡与帕累托改进[J].江西财经大学学报,2006,(4)：15-17.
58.胡金焱,李永平.正规金融与非正规金融：比较成本优势与制度互补[J].东岳论丛,2006(2)：115-119.
59.胡金焱,张乐.非正规金融与小额信贷：一个理论述评[J].金融研究,2004,(7)：123-131.
60.胡宜朝,雷明.信任的研究方法综述[J].山西财经大学学报,2005,(12)：5-8.
61.胡育专.小额信贷法律问题研究[D].中南大学,2007.
62.胡愈,许红莲,王雄.农户小额信用贷款信用评级探究[J].财经理论与实践,2007,(1).
63.黄成莲,温智良.从农户融资看农村金融制度安排的取向[J].武汉金融,2006,(12)：47-48.
64.黄继峰,崔霞丽.中国小额信贷发展有关问题的研究[J].内蒙古财经学院学报,2004,(2).
65.黄心田,易法海.小额信贷的制度核心类型及启示[J].中国软科学,1999,(4).
66.黄毅.小额信贷问题研究(上)[J].银行家,2005,(12)：20-25.
67.黄宗元,沈小燕.ARCH模型在我国金融市场的应用情况研究[J].广西师范大学学报,2007,(1).
68.姜杰凡,张永升,刘军霞.河北省农村小额信贷发展报告及经验总结[J].农业经济,2006,(4).
69.姜艳灵.我国农村小额信贷运行机制研究[D].湖南大学,2007.
70.姜蕴华.吉林省农村妇女小额信贷政策析论[D].吉林大学,2008.
71.蒋永穆、纪志耿.农户借贷过程中信任机制的构建[J].四川大学学报,2006,(1)：5-9.
72.焦瑾璞,杨骏.小额信贷和农村金融[M].北京：中国金融出版社,2006.
73.焦瑾璞.探索发展小额信贷的有效模式[J].中国金融,2007,(2).
74.金媛媛.浅析农村信用社农户小额信贷[J].科技创业月刊,2006,(3).
75.金媛媛.我国欠发达地区农户小额信贷研究[D].华中农业大学,2007.
76.康笑.小额信贷及其在我国的发展情况研究[D].北京语言大学,2007.
77.旷宗仁,鲁静芳,左停.创新与小额信贷的可持续发展[J].农村金融研 究,2006,(2).
78.李东亮.普惠性可持续农村小额信贷体系的构建路径研究[D].山东大学,2007.
79.李海嘉,张照涓.对发展农村小额信贷的探索：模式与制度[J].西南金融,2006,(12).
80.李辉.实现小额信贷可持续发展的思考[J].辽宁大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2004,(5).
81.李静.农村金融发展情况[M].中国农村经济形势分析与预测.北京：社会科学文献出版社,2002：158-170.
82.李军林.声誉理论及其近期进展.经济学动态[J].2004,(2).
83.李军培.小额信贷的金融创新性分析[D].中国社会科学院研究生院,2003.
84.李莉莉.小额信贷正规化演变[J].银行家,2006,(1).
85.李莉莉.正规金融机构小额信贷运行机制及其绩效评价[D].中国农业大学,2005.
86.李猛.小额信贷的经济学原理[J].贵州社会科学,2007,(7)：22-26.
87.李敏.农村信用社农户小额信贷运作模式研究[D].吉林大学,2007.
88.李明贤,李学文.孟加拉国小额信贷发展的宏观经济基础及中国小额信贷的发展[J].农业经济问题,2008,(9).
89.李鹏亮.团体贷款发展态势及博弈分析[J].沈阳建筑大学报,2005,(4).
90.李树杰.标准小额信贷防范金融风险的经济学分析[J].生产力研究,2008,(21)：39-41.
91.李树杰.孟加拉格莱珉小额信贷银行二次创业的经验[J].金融经济,2007,(3下)：56-57.
92.李文.新农村建设中小额信贷供给模式研究[D].广西大学,2008.
93.李宪忠.小额信贷发展路径探悉[J].金融理论与实践,2006,(9).
94.李湘宁,姜子叶.评析我国小额信贷实践的若干争论[J].金融纵横,2006,(12).
95.李晓文.印尼小额信贷的发展[J].中国金融,2006,(14).
96.李星君.小额信用农户贷款存在的问题及对策[J].南方金融,2002,(6).
97.李裕鸿,秦斌.小额信贷探析[J].科技创业月刊,2004,(16).
98.李韫.我国农村小额信贷政策风险研究[D].兰州大学,2008.
99.梁慧玲.我国农户小额信贷商业化问题研究[D].湖南大学,2007.
100.梁立波.我国农村小额信贷发展问题研究[D].广西大学,2008.
101.梁山.对农户小额信贷需求、安全性、盈利性和信用状况的实证研究[J].金融研究,2003,(6)：128-134.
102.梁山.对农户小额信贷需求、安全性、盈利性和信用状况的实证研究[J].金融研究,2003,(6).
103.林超群.我国农村信用社小额信贷问题研究[D].四川师范大学,2008.
104.林丽琼.小额信贷：近期文献述评[J]福建教育学院学报,2007,(4).
105.林毅夫、孙希芳.信息、非正规金融与中小企业融资[J].北京大学中国经济研究中心讨论稿,2003.
106.林毅夫.金触改革和农村经济发展[J].北京大学中国经济研究中心工作论文,No.C2003026.
107.刘峰.标准小额信贷的制度缺陷与行为扭曲：黑龙江个案[J].金融研究,2006,(9)：171-178.
108.刘菲.浅析我国农村小额信贷发展现状及对策[D].安徽大学,2007.
109.刘华.中国小额信贷可持续发展分析[J].江西金融职工大学学报,2006,(4).
110.刘梅.小额信贷产品设计研究[D].西南财经大学,2004.
111.刘明越.呼伦贝尔市农村牧区小额信贷的发展：绩效、问题与对策[D].内蒙古大学,2007.
112.刘庆娜.农户小额信贷绩效评价与可持续发展[D].山东大学,2008.
113.刘苇.小额信贷法律问题研究[D].西南大学,2008.
114.刘卫红.农村小额信贷的风险分析及对策[J].现代农业科技,2008(6)：205,207.
115.刘文璞等.中国农村小额信贷扶贫的理论与实践[M].北京：中国财经 出版社,1996.
116.刘西川,黄祖辉,程恩江.小额信贷的目标上移：现象描述与理论解释——基于三省(区)小额信贷项目区的农户调查[J].中国农村经济,2007,(8).
117.刘西川,金铃,程恩江.推进农村金融改革 扩展穷人信贷市场——中国非政府小额信贷和农村金融国际研讨会综述[J].中国农村经济,2006,(8).
118.刘锡良,洪正.多机构共存下的小额信贷市场均衡[J].金融研究,2005,(3)：68-79.
119.刘晓昀,叶敬忠.小额信贷的小组贷款与信贷机制创新[J].农业经济问题,2002,(3).
120.刘燕.论小额信贷风险的法律控制[D].北方工业大学,2008.
121.刘钟钦,陈驰,曲桂颖.小额信贷及在我国的实践综述[J].农业经济,2000,(6).
122.龙文博.我国小额信贷问题研究[D].苏州大学,2006.
123.陆磊,丁俊峰.中国农村合作金融转型的理论分析[J].金融研究,2001,(1).
124.吕德宏.西部小额信贷模式及转型措施[J].农村经济,2003,(4).
125.罗杰.基于关联博弈和声誉的私人契约执行机制：特殊信任主义条件下的民间信用研究[J].商业现代化,2005,(6)：24-25.
126.罗平,陈颖.小额信贷机构的监管[J].中国金融,2005,(20).
127.罗绒战堆.西藏的贫困与反贫困问题研究[M].拉萨：中国藏学出版社,2002.
128.麦金农.经济发展中的货币与资本[M].上海：上海三联出版社,1973.
129.梅迪.农村小额信贷发展问题与对策研究[J].社会科学辑刊,2006,(3).
130.蒙永亨.广西欠发达地区农村经济发展的金融支持研究[J].经济与管理,2007,(7)：143-145.
131.穆罕默德·尤努斯.穷人的银行家[M].生活、读书、新知三联书店,2006.
132.牛建高.对小额信贷及其在我国的引进与发展问题的理性思考[J]. 开发研究,1999,(3).
133.欧永生.孟加拉国小额信贷对我国的启示[J].北方经济,2007,(2).
134.潘秀红.对农村经济发展中小额信贷问题的探讨[J].经济问题,2004,(12).
135.钱水土,乐韵.中国小额信贷商业化可持续发展的经济学分析[J],金融理论与实践,2007,(3)：3-6.
136.乔安娜·雷格伍德.小额金融信贷手册[M].北京：中国工商联合出版社,2000.
137.乔瑜华,韩更章.我国小额信贷持续发展的政策建议[J].理论导刊,2005,(11).
138.青木昌彦.比较制度分析[M].上海：上海远东出版社,2002.
139.人行西宁中支课题组.青藏地区小额信贷实证研究[J].青海金融,2005,(12).
140.任鑫鹏.农户小额信贷问题研究[D].东北农业大学,2007.
141.邵兴忠.共生原理与社会资本的对接：小额信贷运营的新语境[J].浙江金融2008,(8)：25-26.
142.沈久相.我国农村小额信贷发展研究[D].新疆财经大学,2007.
143.石俊志.小额信贷发展模式的国际比较及其对我国启示[J].国际金融研究,2007,(10)：4-9.
144.石骏,魏灿秋.信合保险在信用社小额信贷及农村金融中的作用[J].中国农学通报,2006,(1).
145.斯蒂格利茨,格林沃尔德.通往货币经济学的新范式[M].中信出版社,2005.
146.宋惠荣.发展我国农村“只贷不存”小额信贷机构问题研究[D].河海大学,2007.
147.苏静.杜子平.银行信用风险管理机制：“硬”信息对“软”信息[J].安徽农业科学,2007(29)：9370-9372,9382.
148.孙琳.关于发展我国农户小额信贷的思考[J].世界经济情况,2006,(14).
149.孙若梅.小额信贷与农民收入[M].北京：中国经济出版社,2006.
150.孙若梅.小额信贷在农村信贷市场中的作用探讨[J].中国农村经济,2006,(8).
151.孙天琦.小额信贷扶贫成功的商洛模式及对农村金融发展的启示[J].农业经济问题,2001,(4).
152.孙天琦.制度竞争、制度均衡与制度的本土化创新——商洛小额信贷扶贫模式变迁研究[J].经济研究,2001,(6).
153.孙同全.扶贫小额信贷与公益信托制度研究[M],经济科学出版社,2006.
154.孙同全.农村金融新政中非政府小额信贷的发展方向探析[J].农业经济问题,2007,(5).
155.孙艳艳.小额信贷与个人发展账户的比较研究[J].山东大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2005,(1).
156.谭民俊.农村小额信贷效率改进的微观基础研究[D].中南大学,2007.
157.汤灏.我国小额信贷面临的突出问题研究[D].上海社会科学院,2007.
158.汤敏,姚先斌.孟加拉“乡村银行”的小额信贷扶贫模式[J].改革,1996,(4).
159.汤敏.小额信贷为什么要有高利率[J].新浪财经网,2007年3月1日.
160.汤小青,经济结构转型中的信贷理论与信贷政策[M],中国金融出版社,2000.
161.唐学鹏.用生态学眼光解决小额信贷难题[N].21纪经济报道,2006-09-27.
162.滕向丽.促进农村小额信贷良性发展[J].理论学刊,2007,(1).
163.田甜,万江红.孟加拉乡村银行小额信贷模式及其启示[J].时代经贸(理论版),2007,(2).
164.汪三贵,李莹星.印尼小额信贷的商业运作[J].银行家,2006,(3).
165.汪三贵.中国小额信贷可持续发展的障碍和前景[J].农业经济问题,2000,(12)：18-20.
166.汪轶.小额信贷机构可持续发展问题研究[D].西南财经大学,2004.
167.王保成.扶贫小额信贷对农村贫困妇女的影响[D].中国农业大学,2005.
168.王彩峰.小额信贷机构的信贷员激励薪酬体系设计[D].北京交通大学,2007.
169.王川.小额信贷问题依旧[J].银行家,2005,(3).
170.王传言.我国小额信贷项目运作中的政府角色研究[D].苏州大学,2008.
171.王辉、蒋常虹.信贷市场中的声誉效应研究[J].浙江金融,2005,(12)：49-50.
172.王健康.农村小额信贷自组织制度缺陷及完善[J].财经理论与实践,2006,(11)：35-38.
173.王景富..农村信用社推广农户小额信用贷款的实证研究[J].金融研究,2002,(9).
174.王九龙,王锡平.中国农村小额信贷问题及对策研究[J].农村经济,2006,(6).
175.王丽萍,霍学喜.西部地区农户借贷行为及其制约因素分析[J].商业研究,2007(1)：25-30.
176.王群琳.论中国农村小额信贷的可持续发展[J].湖南农业大学学报(社会科学版),2004,(5).
177.王曙光.发展小额信贷需要良好的制度环境[J].新财经,2006,(12).
178.王曙光.农村金融与新农村建设[M].北京：华夏版社,2006.
179.王曙光.小额信贷：民间力量唱主角[J].中国经济周刊,2006,(16).
180.王双正.我国农村小额信贷问题研讨述评[J].现代经济探讨,2005,(11).
181.王晔.国内外成功的商业化小额信贷模式案例分析[D].对外经济贸易大学,2007.
182.王瑜.扶贫小额信贷：理论与中国农村的实践[D].华东师范大学,2008.
183.王卓,李小雨,吴,迪.中国农村民间金融的社会性别分析——以西部小额信贷组织为例[J].社会科学研究,2008,(2)：124-132.
184.王卓.农村小额信贷利率及其需求弹性[J].中国农村经济,2007,(6).
185.温铁军.农户信用与民间借贷研究：农户信用与民间借贷课题主报告[J].中经网50人论坛,2001年6月7日.
186.温智良.制度创新与环境优化：农户小额信贷帕累托改进[J].金融与经济,2005,(3).
187.乌云.农村小额信贷问题研究[D].内蒙古师范大学,2008.
188.吴国宝.对小额信贷的反思及中国开展小额信贷试验和推广的建议[J].贫困和发展,1997.
189.吴晓灵.为小额信贷发展创造良好的社会环境[J].银行家,2006,(5).
190.吴循.小额信贷对我国经济发展的作用机制研究[D].西南财经大学,2007.
191.武翔宇,高凌云.印度的小额信贷：自助小组—银行联结[J].农业经济问题,2009,(1)：104-109.
192.武翔宇,吴东立,张英.小额信贷监管的国际经验及对我国的启示[J].金融经济,2006,(22).
193.项英玲.论UNDP小额信贷扶贫项目的示范效应及对我国的影响[D].对外经济贸易大学,2003.
194.肖望新.对中国农业利用世界银行贷款项目进行小额信贷的实证研究[D].对外经济贸易大学,2007.
195.谢海.浅析小额信贷的理论与实践[J].农村经济,2005,(12).
196.谢洪军.小额信贷扶贫项目的理论与实践研究[D].西南农业大学,2001.
197.谢平.中国农村信用合作制改革的争论[J].金融研究.2001,(1).
198.谢清河.我国小额信贷模式研究[D].厦门大学,2001.
199.谢玉梅,格莱明银行模式：基于关联博弈的分析[J].经济问题2008,(8)：91-93.
200.谢玉梅.国外小额信贷发展对我国的启示[J].经济问题,2007,(5).
201.谢云山.我国小额信贷组织的现状与出路——以山西省临县湍水头 镇扶贫基金会为例[J].中国金融,2005,(24).
202.谢云山.小额信贷的山西湍水头镇模式[J].农村金融研究,2006,(2).
203.熊德平.农村小额信贷：模式、经验与启示[J].财经论与实践,2005,(3)：39-43.
204.熊惠平.基于共生原理的小额信贷的社会资本效应探析[J].农村经济,2008,(1)：23-25.
205.熊学萍,易法海.农户小额信贷风险：表现、成因与应对策略[J].华东经济管理,2005,(11).
206.熊学萍.我国农村小额信贷的实践与相关问题探讨[J].湖北社会科学,2005,(6).
207.徐珺.从凉山农户小额信贷看国家对西部民族地区农村的金融支持[J].金融研究,2003,(6).
208.徐鲜梅.中国小额信贷发展问题报告[J].经济理论与经济管理,1999,(4).
209.徐振春,任大鹏.我国农村小额信贷立法问题研究[J].农村经济,2007,(1).
210.徐忠.小额信贷：国际经验及其对我国启示[J].上海金融,2006,(8).
211.许芳.企业共生论[M].北京：中国财政经济出社,2006.
212.亚行专家组.关于天津市下岗女工“小额贷款”项目的报告[EB/OL].社会政策网：http://www.social-policy.Info.
213.严盛虎.中国小额信贷可持续发展研究[D].北京林业大学,2004.
214.杨大楷.小额信贷可持续发展：困境和出路[J].上海金融,2007,(1).
215.杨坚.建立市场化运作的农村小额信贷扶贫模式[J].生产力研究,2005,(5).
216.杨林娟.农村信用社农户小额信贷存在的问题与对策——以甘肃省肃州区为例[J].甘肃农业大学学报,2005,(4).
217.杨琳.农村小额信贷：国际比较与中国的实践[D].厦门大学,2007.
218.杨鸥.我国小额信贷可持续性发展问题研究[D].吉林大学,2008.
219.杨生莱.中国小额信贷的发展研究[D].武汉理工大学,007.
220.杨喜孙,薛瑞鑫,叶华.农村信用社小额信贷可持续发展面临的问题及对策[J].农村经济,2007,(5).
221.杨晓丽.对农户小额信贷的调查与思考[J].农村经济,2006,(5)：74-76.
222.杨序琴.小额信贷发展的占优均衡：福利主义宗旨与制度主义机制的有机融合[J].金融理论与实践,2007,(2).
223.杨艳红.文化、伦理与社会制序：以山西票号为例.世界经济文汇[J].2002,(1).
224.杨远军.我国小额信贷问题浅析[J].济南金融,2006,(9).
225.叶初升、孙永平.信任问题经济学研究的最新进展与实践启示[J].国外社会科学,2005,(3)：9-16.
226.叶谦等.金融合约中贷款规模及其金融合约特征[J].财经论丛.2005,(4)：30-34.
227.殷红霞.农村小额信贷的政策效应及风险防范[J].理论导刊,2004,(9).
228.余红莲.我国农村小额信贷若干问题研究[D].安徽大学,2003.
229.余利民.我国农村小额信贷发展研究[J].华东经济管理,2006,(5).
230.喻国华.谈农户小额信贷[J].经营与管理,2005,(7).
231.詹芸芸.中国农村反贫困：民间小额信贷模式选择的理性思考[D].厦门大学,2007.
232.张风帆.小额贷款对我国城市弱势群体再就业的扶持作用研究[D].西北大学,2008.
233.张杰,尚长风.我国农村正式与非正式金融的分离与融合[J].经济体制改革2006(4)：86-90.
234.张洁,.农村小额信贷的风险防范与管理[J].价格月刊,2007,(11).
235.张立军,湛泳.金融发展与降低贫困——基于中国1994-2004年小额信贷的分析[J].当代经济科学,2006,(6).
236.张立军,湛泳.小额信贷降低贫困效应的国际经验及其启示[J].新金融,2006,(11).
237.张丽敏.我国农村小额信贷的研究和探索[D].东北财经大学,2007.
238.张丽霞.我国农村小额信贷的可持续发展研究[D].华中师范大学,2006.
239.张平,高林海.山西临县湍水头镇小额信贷基金调研及经验分析[J].中国农村经济,2007,(S1).
240.张韶华.农村小额信贷制度安排与农户信用[J].西安金融,2004,(3).
241.张天从.福建省农村妇女小额信贷研究[D].福建农林大学,2008.
242.张维迎,柯荣柱.信任及其解释——来自中国的跨省调查分析[J].经济研究,2002,(10)：58-70.
243.张维迎.法律的信誉基础经济研究[J].2002,(1).
244.张维迎.法律制度的信誉基础[J].经济研究,2002,(1)：3-13.
245.张莹.亚太四国小额信贷——泰国·孟加拉·菲律宾·日本[J].数字财富,2004,(12).
246.张莹.亚洲四国小额信贷模式及启示[J].中国劳动,2005,(3).
247.张永青.我国小额信贷商业化发展研究[D].西南财经大学,2006.
248.张勇.拉丁美洲小额信贷初探[J].拉丁美洲研究,2004,(4).
249.张勇.孟加拉小额信贷模式的最新发展[J].中国农村经济,2003,(6).
250.张勇.小额信贷扶贫的创新研究[D].中国社会科学院研究生院,2003.
251.张志峰.“小额信贷机构”呼之欲出[J].中国金融家,2005,(8).
252.章元,李全.论产出分布对团体贷款还款率的影响[J].经济研究,2003,(2).
253.章元.对团体贷款高还款率的解释：一个社会担保模型[J].世界经济,2005,(2)：67-72.
254.章元.非对称信息下的团体贷款研究[M].上海人民出版社,2005.
255.章元.论团体贷款对信贷市场低效率的可能改进[J].经济研究,2005,(1).
256.赵利梅.中国和孟加拉国小额信贷模式比较[J].农村经济,2004,(S1).
257.赵岩青,何广文.声誉机制、信任机制与小额信贷[J].金融论丛,2008,(1)：33-40.
258.郑振东,杨智斌.农户小额信贷可持续发展的经济学分析[J].河北经贸大学学报,2005,(1)：48-51.
259.郑振东,杨智斌.农户小额信贷可持续发展的经济学分析[J].金融研究2005,(1).
260.中国人民银行西宁中心支行课题组,胡安舜,王海平.青藏地区小额信贷实证研究[J].金融研究,2006,(2).
261.中国人民银行西宁中心支行课题组.青藏地区小额信贷实证研究[J].金融研究,2006,(2).
262.中国人民银行肇庆市中心支行课题组.农户小额信贷保险实践[J].银行家,2006,(10).
263.中国社会科学院贫困问题研究中心小额信贷管理体制课题组.关于改进和完善政府实施小额信贷扶贫管理体制的研究报告[J].2001.
264.周美萍.陕西农村小额信贷发展模式与对策研究[D].西北农林科技大学,2008.
265.周其仁.农民收入是一系列问题[J].北京大学中国经济研究中心工作论文,No.C2001012.
266.周小付.中国农村小额信贷发展模式探索[D].福建师范大学,2008.
267.周晓丽.新农村建设中的小额信贷问题研究[D].对外经济贸易大学,2007.
268.周勇.规范我国小额信贷若干法律问题研究[D].上海社会科学院,2008.
269.周宇.小额信贷业务的偏差与规范[J].乡镇经济,2006,(1).
270.周振海.基于垄断和价格管制条件下的中国农村小额信贷市场分析[J].金融研究,2007,(8)：182-190.
271.邹瑾.小额信贷风险浅析[J].商场现代化,2005,(29).
①[孟]穆罕默德.尤努斯著,鲍小佳译,新的企业模式——创造没有贫困的世界[M],中信出版社,2008.
①杜晓山,刘文璞.小额信贷原理及运作[M].上海：上海财经大学出版社,2001.
© 2004-2018 中国地质图书馆版权所有 京ICP备05064691号 京公网安备11010802017129号 地址：北京市海淀区学院路29号 邮编：100083 电话：办公室：(+86 10)66554848；文献借阅、咨询服务、科技查新：66554700 |