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全球绿色气候基金方案设计与影响评估
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摘要
作为国际气候融资的重大突破,2009年的哥本哈根气候大会提出建立全球绿色气候基金(Green Climate Fund, GCF)的设想,它要求发达国家在2010-2012年间提供300亿美元快速启动资金(Fast-Start Finance, FSF),并在2013-2020年间每年筹资不少于1000亿美元的长期基金,用于帮助发展中国家减缓和应对气候变化。GCF一经提出,就受到学术界和政界的广泛关注,并已经发展成为当今国际气候峰会谈判的核心议题之一。但是,由于诸多关键性问题未能获得实质性突破,GCF进展并不顺利。
     融资和分配是GCF的两大核心问题,其能否有效解决事关GCF成败。从资金供给层面来看,当前发达国家之间缺乏一套公平合理的融资责任分摊方案,气候基金融资面临巨大挑战。与之相对,关于分配问题,目前发展中国家间还未能形成公平有效的资金分配机制,GCF的使用同样悬而未决。本研究集中于GCF融资分配过程中的机制创新问题,提出了在发达国家间资金筹集方案,探讨了资金在发展中国家间的合理分配问题,并对GCF设计方案的经济环境影响进行量化评估。研究最后也讨论了不同资金使用方式对发达国家融资的积极性的影响。
     论文主体内容由五个部分组成:
     (1)对快速启动基金执行状况进行量化评估,相关经验可用来指导下一步GCF融资分摊机制设计。根据UNFCCC近期披露的国家融资报告,分析在快速启动基金阶段,发展中国家在获取资金、发达国家在提供资金以及资金公平分配等方面积累的经验、存在的主要障碍和面临的挑战。在此基础上,引出论文后续所要讨论的问题。
     (2)从GCF融资问题出发,讨论了气候基金融资责任如何在发达国家间进行分摊问题。提出一种偏好得分妥协法(Preference Score Compromises,PSC),该方案既考虑了融资时的历史责任,也兼顾了不同国家的能力水平。由于采用投票理论的设计思想,PSC能够综合权衡不同国家的利益取向,可以避免权重的主观分配问题。
     (3)从GCF使用层面出发,探讨了气候资金如何在发展中国家间进行公平有效分配问题。考虑到GCF设立的两个主要目标:气候变化适应(Climate Adaptation)和气候变化减缓(Climate Mitigation),提出一种兼顾适应性公平和减排效果的ANCC分配方案。其中,适应性公平不仅考虑了一国的气候损失,也考虑了不同国家经济实力的差异。而减排效果突出于GCF在使用过程中对发展中国家主动减排的激励效应,能够促使新兴经济体碳排放显著下降。
     (4)针对GCF融资和分配问题的PSC-ANCC的方案,采用了能源版全球贸易分析模型(GTAP-E),定量评估了该方案的环境经济影响。研究将全球划分为14个地区,每个地区包含13个行业部门。从居民福利、实际GDP和碳排放三个维度出发,探讨了PSC-ANCC方案对各地区影响的异质性。同时讨论了不同资金使用方式对发达国家筹资积极性的影响。
     (5)进入《京都议定书》第二履约期,发达国家既要实现哥本哈根气候大会所承诺的2020减排目标,也要为发展中国家提供GCF融资扶持。本文将发达国家2020年减排承诺纳入量化分析框架中。探讨了在此基础上实施气候基金融资和分配,对全球环境经济产生的影响。该内容是对论文第五章的一个补充和延伸。
As a major breakthrough in the international climate finance, an agreement to establish the Green Climate Fund (GCF) was achieved at the2009Copenhagen Summit of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It requires the developed countries to provide USD30billion of fast-start funding (FSF) between2010and2012, and they set a goal of mobilizing USD100billion per year by2020to address the needs of developing countries.The GCF proposal was then confirmed at the2010Cancun Summit, and rapidly became one of the core issues at the2011Durban Summit and the2012Doha Summit. However, the GCF has not progressed smoothly as it raises many concerns, the details of which remain unresolved.
     One of the most important reasons why the GCF has progressed slowly are the obstacles related to fund-raising and disbursement. As the benefactors, developed countries have no fund-raising schemes, and there is no satisfactory solution for enforcing the GCF among developed countries; thus, financing the GCF is a tremendous challenge. Furthermore, as the recipients, developing countries have no reasonable disbursement schemes, and there is no solution for distributing the GCF among these developing countries; thus, distributing the GCF is also causing enormous difficulties. This paper focuses on the schemes of the GCF design. By starting from the paying side, this paper discusses how to allocate the funds among developing countries, and followed by a quantitative evaluation with the energy version of global trade analysis model (GTAP-E). This research also studies how to ehance the enthusiasm of developed countries for financing the GCF. The schemes proposed in this research may be useful for the GCF design in the post-Kyoto era.
     This paper can be divided into five parts when removed the preface and the conclusion:
     (1) Part two provides a quantitative evaluation of the fast start finace (FSF). According to the most regional financing reports released by UNFCCC, we focus on the issue regarding how developing countries accessed the fund, how developed countries provided money and the GCF allocation between climate mitigation and climate adaptation in the fast-start funding period. The lessons will be useful for the GCF design in the future. The analysis is mainly used to propose the questions which will be discussed in the following parts.
     (2) Part three discusses the issue of how to enforce the GCF among developed countries. This study develops and introduces a scheme of burden sharing named preference score compromise (PSC) method, which is a combination of environmental responsibility and economic capacity. The respective weights assigned to the two factors are determined based on the Borda rule in voting theory, which avoids the arbitrary allocation of weights. The PSC approch will be useful for mobilising the GCF in the Post-Kyoto era.
     (3) Part four focuses on the issue of how to distribute the available resources among developing countries. As the twin purposes of the GCF are climate change mitigation and climate change adaptation, the ANCC approach is proposed by considering regional adaptation fairness as well as abatement efficiency. Among others, the design of regional adaptation fairness does not consider climate losses, but also embody the heterogeneity of economic strength. The purpose of abatement efficiency needs to design reasonable schemes to encourage developing countries to reduce their emissions as much as possible.
     (4) To investigate the environmental and economic impacts of PSC-ANCC, the energy version of global trade analysis model (GTAP-E) is used for the quantitative assessment. The world was divided into14regions with each region consists of13sectors. The results are elaborated from three aspects, including the social welfare, the real GDP and regional carbon emissions. With the framework, the cost and benefit of the GCF finance for developed countries was also studied.
     (5) In the Post-Kyoto era (2013-2020), developed countries face at least two tasks:achieving the2020emissions reduction targets pledged at the2009Copenhagen Summit and financing the GCF for developing countries. To solve this issue, the2020emissions reduction targets for developed countries were introduced into the framework, and we will investigate the effects of the GCF design while developed countries also undertake some carbon-pricing measures domesticly. This research is an improvement and the extension of those in section5.
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