稳健会计信息的信号传递作用研究
|
摘要
会计稳健主义作为会计信息系统确认和计量的传统原则已经存在于各国会计实务中几个世纪。一般认为,会计稳健原则在会计实务中广泛地运用对于解决现代公司机制设置中“天然”存在的信息非对称问题、保护投资者特别是债权人的利益以及提高契约的签订效率扮演了重要的角色。
鉴于会计稳健原则对会计理论和会计实务持续产生着深远和重要地影响,本文首先基于现代企业的委托代理理论分析框架及信息经济学中的信号传递思想,从公司治理的角度分析了公司治理的有效程度如何影响管理者关于稳健会计政策地选择。本文分析了资本市场中高质量(预期经营前景好)的上市公司主动地引入有成本的扭曲(会计信息稳健度),以此作为媒介间接地向外部投资者发送管理者关于上市公司预期经营状况的私人信息以区分于市场中质量差(预期经营业绩不好)的公司。国内学者以我国资本市场为背景的相关研究基本一致地表明我国上市公司披露的财务报告是具有一定会计稳健性特征的。因此,本文基于中国资本市场实证地研究了中国上市公司所披露的财务报告中会计信息整体的稳健程度与预期的资产盈利水平的相关关系,会计信息稳健程度的信息含量以及会计信息稳健度与预期盈利水平相关性的影响因素等一系列问题,实证结果基本支持了本文关于公司治理的有效程度对管理者稳健会计政策选择影响的理论分析结果。
具体而言,首先,本文借鉴Spence (1974)的信号传递模型的思想,在Bagnoli和watts (2005)提出的稳健会计信息信号传递的理论模型基础上进一步地拓展了关于稳健会计信息信号传递的分析,即本文考虑了公司治理机制对管理者信息披露行为的约束作用从而影响到管理者通过报告稳健地会计信息做为信号发送的行为。分析结果表明：若公司治理机制与会计稳健性间具有互补的关系,则在公司治理相对不健全时,那些预期经营业绩好的公司为降低信息非对称程度,管理者会相应地报告稳健的会计信息；但是,对于那些预期经营业绩差的公司选择模仿业绩好的公司报告过于稳健会计信息的成本巨大以至于不得不放弃模仿好公司,此时,市场存在分离均衡,即会计信息稳健度具有信息传递的作用。接着,本文实证地考察了会计信息稳健程度是否在公开披露的盈余信息的基础上向市场传递了增量的信息,研究结果显示上市公司管理者稳健地报告会计盈余并不会导致会计信息的扭曲,而是向外部投资者提供了更多关于公司当期和预期盈余的增量信息。然后,本文以2004-2011年期间在上海证券交易所和深圳证券交易所A股上市的公司作为主要研究样本。首先针对当期会计盈余信息的稳健程度与公司预期的资产收益率之间的相关关系进行了实证研究,研究结果表明,样本公司滞后一期的会计信息稳健程度与当期经营业绩间具有统计意义上显著的正相关关系。再接着,本文考察了公司治理与稳健会计信息的相关关系,研究发现在我国资本市场,管理者对于稳健会计信息、的披露的一个重要的原因来自于公司治理的约束作用,即公司治理综合水平越高的上市公司其披露的会计信息的稳健程度越高。最后,论文结合我国资本市场的法律、制度背景,主要从上市公司的产权性质、外部审计质量、高管持股等三个方面实证地检验了影响上市公司管理者通过会计信息稳健程度发送信号的因素。
全文共由七章构成：
第一章为绪论；包括研究背景与研究问题、研究内容、研究方法、技术路线以及论文的主要改进和创新之处：
第二章为研究所涉及到的主要概念的界定、文献评述与制度背景分析；主要针对稳健会计原则的起源、定义和理论解释进行了文献回顾。同时,结合我国资本市场的法律、制度背景分析了中国上市公司管理者通过间接媒介进行信号传递的动机和可能性。这为我们进一步地理解稳健会计原则长期存在于各国会计实务提供一种可能的理论解释。
第三章为基于公司治理视角的稳健会计信息信号传递的机理分析：本章基于经典的信号传递模型,参照Venugopalan (2001)、Gigler和Hemmer (2001)、 Kwon等(2001)的分析方法,进一步拓展了Bagnoli和Watts (2005)关于稳健会计信息的信号传递作用的分析。本章从公司治理的效果好、坏的角度分情况讨论了管理者的稳健会计报告均衡策略。
第四章为会计信息稳健度的信息含量研究；管理者最终披露的会计盈余是受其具体财务报告策略选择的影响的,管理者主观地具体会计政策选择有可能导致报告盈余信息地扭曲；也有可能向资本市场传递信息。本章基于中国上市公司的财务数据并使用Collins、Kothari等(1994)所提出的度量股票价格对预期盈余反映程度的预期盈余反应系数实证地对稳健会计信息的信息含量问题进行了实证检验。
第五章为上市公司会计信息稳健度与预期盈利能力的相关性研究；以往对稳健会计原则的研究主要关注了上市公司使用稳健的会计信息能够带给报告主体哪些潜在“收益”,而一定程度地忽略了过于稳健的财务报告策略对于公司是有“成本”(如：证券市场价格下跌的风险)的。本章认为不同上市公司的管理者在综合权衡稳健地报告会计信息可能带来的潜在“收益”与“成本”之后,理性选择最优的会计信息稳健度作为财务报告策略。本章的研究提供了会计信息稳健度与预期盈利能力相关关系的实证证据。
第六章是公司治理机制对会计信息稳健度的业绩预测作用的影响的实证研究；本章主要基于公司微观层面研究具体的公司治理机制的设置对企业管理者稳健会计处理方法选择的利益动机的约束作用。首先,本章基于中国资本市场实证地检验了稳健会计信息与公司治理的相关关系,接着借鉴Spence (1974)的信号传递模型的思想,从公司治理的角度实证地检验了产权性质、外部审计质量和高管持股比例等具体的公司治理机制对管理者利用稳健会计信息信号传递行为的影响。
第七章为全文的结论部分。本章总结了主要的研究结论与启示,针对研究的问题提出了相关的政策建议,最后对研究存在的不足和局限性进行了讨论。
As a traditional requirement of accounting information system, accounting conservatism principle has been existed in many countires'accounting practices for centuries. It was accepted by lots of countries in the world that the accounting conservatism was a fundamental accounting principle and dominated the formation of accounting standards. It was generally agreed that the application of conservatism in accounting practice may contribute to the decrease of the information asymmetry, to protect the investors especially the creditor or lenders and to promote the contract efficiency.
It is not difficult to predict that the conservatism principle will continue to influence the accounting theory and accounting practices. Theorefore, this paper is going to study the information sending role of the degree of accounting conservatism. To be a bit more concrete, this paper is conducted mainly based on the principle-agent theoretical framework of the corporation and the signal sending theory. Firstly, this paper analyzes the information sending role of accounting conservatism by considering the corporate governance mechanisms's influence on the information disclosure of managers. The conclusion seems to support that if there is complementary relationship between the corporate governance and accounting conservatism, when the company's corporate governance mechamism do not operate efficiently, there exists separate equilibrium. It can be interpreted as in such conditions companies with good future operating performance may have incentive to disclose information to investors by using the degree of accounting conservatism. At the same time, due to the high cost of conservative reporting to the companies with bad future operating performance, these companies may choose to not conservative report the finanicial statements. To test the ROA predictability of the accounting conservatism, this paper firstly investigates whether the degree of accounting conservatism has any incremental information content based on the current period ROA. The result seems to suppot the view that the degree of conservatism may convey incremental information in addition to the earings information. To further test whether the conservatism accounting information has the information sending role, this paper positively investigates the management signal sending behavior by using the degree of accounting conservatism with Chinese capital market background. Specifically, this paper uses the Chinese A shares listed companies during2004-2011as the major research samples, and firstly investigates the relationship between the degree of conservatism (C_Score) and the future performance (Return on asset, ROA) of company. The result suggests that the degree of conservatism is positively correlated with companies'future operation performance. Morever, from the corporate governance perspective, this paper positively investigates the relationship between the corporate governance mechiansm and the degree of accounting conservatism with the background of china capital market. The results seem to show that more efficient corporate governance may contribute to the more conservative accounting information. Based on the above researches, this paper finally tries to indentify several factors that might influence the management's incentive of signal sending behavior. The whole organization of this paper is as following:
This paper is mainly organized with seven parts:
The first chapter is the introduction of the research background, research questions, research content and the research design. There is also the discussion of the contribution of my research.
The second chapter is mainly about the conception, literature review and the analysis of the institutional background. This part detailed reviews the origin of the accounting conservatism and the definition of accounting conservatism both on accounting standards board perspective and on theory perspective. Moreover, this part reviews the analytical model of the Bagnoli and Watts (2005) to provide the theory framework for the further positive studies.
The third chapter is the analysis of the mechanism of the accounting conservatism information sending by considering the corporate governance mechanisms. Based on the Spence (1974) signaling framework and the Bagnoli and Watts (2005) theory model, this chapter mainly analyzes how the quality and efficiency of corporate governance mechanism influence management's information disclosure behavior.
The fourth chapter is mainly investigates whether conservative accounting information distorts the financial reporting or contains incremental information based on current ROA by using future earnings response coefficient model.
The fifth chapter is considering that if managers trade-off the benefits and the costs of accounting conservatism, then managers'expectation of the future performance of the company may be reflected in some extent on the degree of conservatism that managers choose to report. This part positively tested the hypothesis that whether the degree of accounting conservatism may predict company's future profitability.
The sixth chapter positively investigates the factors that might influence the predictability of the degree of accounting conservatism on the corporate governance perspective. And finally identifies the factors such as characteristics of ownership, independent auditing, and managers share holdings may nave effect on the incentive of managers information sending, thus influence the performance predictability of the degree of accounting conservatism.
The seventh chapter is mainly about the research conclusions, policy suggestions, the limitation of this study and posibble future research problems.
鉴于会计稳健原则对会计理论和会计实务持续产生着深远和重要地影响,本文首先基于现代企业的委托代理理论分析框架及信息经济学中的信号传递思想,从公司治理的角度分析了公司治理的有效程度如何影响管理者关于稳健会计政策地选择。本文分析了资本市场中高质量(预期经营前景好)的上市公司主动地引入有成本的扭曲(会计信息稳健度),以此作为媒介间接地向外部投资者发送管理者关于上市公司预期经营状况的私人信息以区分于市场中质量差(预期经营业绩不好)的公司。国内学者以我国资本市场为背景的相关研究基本一致地表明我国上市公司披露的财务报告是具有一定会计稳健性特征的。因此,本文基于中国资本市场实证地研究了中国上市公司所披露的财务报告中会计信息整体的稳健程度与预期的资产盈利水平的相关关系,会计信息稳健程度的信息含量以及会计信息稳健度与预期盈利水平相关性的影响因素等一系列问题,实证结果基本支持了本文关于公司治理的有效程度对管理者稳健会计政策选择影响的理论分析结果。
具体而言,首先,本文借鉴Spence (1974)的信号传递模型的思想,在Bagnoli和watts (2005)提出的稳健会计信息信号传递的理论模型基础上进一步地拓展了关于稳健会计信息信号传递的分析,即本文考虑了公司治理机制对管理者信息披露行为的约束作用从而影响到管理者通过报告稳健地会计信息做为信号发送的行为。分析结果表明：若公司治理机制与会计稳健性间具有互补的关系,则在公司治理相对不健全时,那些预期经营业绩好的公司为降低信息非对称程度,管理者会相应地报告稳健的会计信息；但是,对于那些预期经营业绩差的公司选择模仿业绩好的公司报告过于稳健会计信息的成本巨大以至于不得不放弃模仿好公司,此时,市场存在分离均衡,即会计信息稳健度具有信息传递的作用。接着,本文实证地考察了会计信息稳健程度是否在公开披露的盈余信息的基础上向市场传递了增量的信息,研究结果显示上市公司管理者稳健地报告会计盈余并不会导致会计信息的扭曲,而是向外部投资者提供了更多关于公司当期和预期盈余的增量信息。然后,本文以2004-2011年期间在上海证券交易所和深圳证券交易所A股上市的公司作为主要研究样本。首先针对当期会计盈余信息的稳健程度与公司预期的资产收益率之间的相关关系进行了实证研究,研究结果表明,样本公司滞后一期的会计信息稳健程度与当期经营业绩间具有统计意义上显著的正相关关系。再接着,本文考察了公司治理与稳健会计信息的相关关系,研究发现在我国资本市场,管理者对于稳健会计信息、的披露的一个重要的原因来自于公司治理的约束作用,即公司治理综合水平越高的上市公司其披露的会计信息的稳健程度越高。最后,论文结合我国资本市场的法律、制度背景,主要从上市公司的产权性质、外部审计质量、高管持股等三个方面实证地检验了影响上市公司管理者通过会计信息稳健程度发送信号的因素。
全文共由七章构成：
第一章为绪论；包括研究背景与研究问题、研究内容、研究方法、技术路线以及论文的主要改进和创新之处：
第二章为研究所涉及到的主要概念的界定、文献评述与制度背景分析；主要针对稳健会计原则的起源、定义和理论解释进行了文献回顾。同时,结合我国资本市场的法律、制度背景分析了中国上市公司管理者通过间接媒介进行信号传递的动机和可能性。这为我们进一步地理解稳健会计原则长期存在于各国会计实务提供一种可能的理论解释。
第三章为基于公司治理视角的稳健会计信息信号传递的机理分析：本章基于经典的信号传递模型,参照Venugopalan (2001)、Gigler和Hemmer (2001)、 Kwon等(2001)的分析方法,进一步拓展了Bagnoli和Watts (2005)关于稳健会计信息的信号传递作用的分析。本章从公司治理的效果好、坏的角度分情况讨论了管理者的稳健会计报告均衡策略。
第四章为会计信息稳健度的信息含量研究；管理者最终披露的会计盈余是受其具体财务报告策略选择的影响的,管理者主观地具体会计政策选择有可能导致报告盈余信息地扭曲；也有可能向资本市场传递信息。本章基于中国上市公司的财务数据并使用Collins、Kothari等(1994)所提出的度量股票价格对预期盈余反映程度的预期盈余反应系数实证地对稳健会计信息的信息含量问题进行了实证检验。
第五章为上市公司会计信息稳健度与预期盈利能力的相关性研究；以往对稳健会计原则的研究主要关注了上市公司使用稳健的会计信息能够带给报告主体哪些潜在“收益”,而一定程度地忽略了过于稳健的财务报告策略对于公司是有“成本”(如：证券市场价格下跌的风险)的。本章认为不同上市公司的管理者在综合权衡稳健地报告会计信息可能带来的潜在“收益”与“成本”之后,理性选择最优的会计信息稳健度作为财务报告策略。本章的研究提供了会计信息稳健度与预期盈利能力相关关系的实证证据。
第六章是公司治理机制对会计信息稳健度的业绩预测作用的影响的实证研究；本章主要基于公司微观层面研究具体的公司治理机制的设置对企业管理者稳健会计处理方法选择的利益动机的约束作用。首先,本章基于中国资本市场实证地检验了稳健会计信息与公司治理的相关关系,接着借鉴Spence (1974)的信号传递模型的思想,从公司治理的角度实证地检验了产权性质、外部审计质量和高管持股比例等具体的公司治理机制对管理者利用稳健会计信息信号传递行为的影响。
第七章为全文的结论部分。本章总结了主要的研究结论与启示,针对研究的问题提出了相关的政策建议,最后对研究存在的不足和局限性进行了讨论。
As a traditional requirement of accounting information system, accounting conservatism principle has been existed in many countires'accounting practices for centuries. It was accepted by lots of countries in the world that the accounting conservatism was a fundamental accounting principle and dominated the formation of accounting standards. It was generally agreed that the application of conservatism in accounting practice may contribute to the decrease of the information asymmetry, to protect the investors especially the creditor or lenders and to promote the contract efficiency.
It is not difficult to predict that the conservatism principle will continue to influence the accounting theory and accounting practices. Theorefore, this paper is going to study the information sending role of the degree of accounting conservatism. To be a bit more concrete, this paper is conducted mainly based on the principle-agent theoretical framework of the corporation and the signal sending theory. Firstly, this paper analyzes the information sending role of accounting conservatism by considering the corporate governance mechanisms's influence on the information disclosure of managers. The conclusion seems to support that if there is complementary relationship between the corporate governance and accounting conservatism, when the company's corporate governance mechamism do not operate efficiently, there exists separate equilibrium. It can be interpreted as in such conditions companies with good future operating performance may have incentive to disclose information to investors by using the degree of accounting conservatism. At the same time, due to the high cost of conservative reporting to the companies with bad future operating performance, these companies may choose to not conservative report the finanicial statements. To test the ROA predictability of the accounting conservatism, this paper firstly investigates whether the degree of accounting conservatism has any incremental information content based on the current period ROA. The result seems to suppot the view that the degree of conservatism may convey incremental information in addition to the earings information. To further test whether the conservatism accounting information has the information sending role, this paper positively investigates the management signal sending behavior by using the degree of accounting conservatism with Chinese capital market background. Specifically, this paper uses the Chinese A shares listed companies during2004-2011as the major research samples, and firstly investigates the relationship between the degree of conservatism (C_Score) and the future performance (Return on asset, ROA) of company. The result suggests that the degree of conservatism is positively correlated with companies'future operation performance. Morever, from the corporate governance perspective, this paper positively investigates the relationship between the corporate governance mechiansm and the degree of accounting conservatism with the background of china capital market. The results seem to show that more efficient corporate governance may contribute to the more conservative accounting information. Based on the above researches, this paper finally tries to indentify several factors that might influence the management's incentive of signal sending behavior. The whole organization of this paper is as following:
This paper is mainly organized with seven parts:
The first chapter is the introduction of the research background, research questions, research content and the research design. There is also the discussion of the contribution of my research.
The second chapter is mainly about the conception, literature review and the analysis of the institutional background. This part detailed reviews the origin of the accounting conservatism and the definition of accounting conservatism both on accounting standards board perspective and on theory perspective. Moreover, this part reviews the analytical model of the Bagnoli and Watts (2005) to provide the theory framework for the further positive studies.
The third chapter is the analysis of the mechanism of the accounting conservatism information sending by considering the corporate governance mechanisms. Based on the Spence (1974) signaling framework and the Bagnoli and Watts (2005) theory model, this chapter mainly analyzes how the quality and efficiency of corporate governance mechanism influence management's information disclosure behavior.
The fourth chapter is mainly investigates whether conservative accounting information distorts the financial reporting or contains incremental information based on current ROA by using future earnings response coefficient model.
The fifth chapter is considering that if managers trade-off the benefits and the costs of accounting conservatism, then managers'expectation of the future performance of the company may be reflected in some extent on the degree of conservatism that managers choose to report. This part positively tested the hypothesis that whether the degree of accounting conservatism may predict company's future profitability.
The sixth chapter positively investigates the factors that might influence the predictability of the degree of accounting conservatism on the corporate governance perspective. And finally identifies the factors such as characteristics of ownership, independent auditing, and managers share holdings may nave effect on the incentive of managers information sending, thus influence the performance predictability of the degree of accounting conservatism.
The seventh chapter is mainly about the research conclusions, policy suggestions, the limitation of this study and posibble future research problems.
引文
[1]Jensen, M. and W. Meckling. Theory of the firm, managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics[J],1976, 3:305-360.
[2]楼继伟.中国企业会计准则建设的可贵实践和崭新突破[J].会计研究,2006(2).
[3]Bagnoli, M. and S.G. Watts. Conservative accounting choices. Management Science[J],2005,51(5):786-801.
[4]Guay, W. and R. Verrecchia. Discussion of an economic framework for conservative accounting and Bushman and Piotroski (2006). Journal of Accounting and Economics[J],2006,42(1-2):149-165.
[5]LaFond, W. and R. L. Watts. The information role of conservatism. The Accounting Review[J],2008,83:447-478.
[6]Francis, J. and X. Martin. Acquisition profitability and timely loss recognition. Journal of Accounting and Economics[J],2010,49(1-2):161-178.
[7]IASB(2008). Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements. International Accounting Standards Board.
[8]FASB(1980). Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No.2:Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information. Norwalk, Connecticut:Financial Accounting Standards Board.
[9]Givoly, D., Hayn, C The changing time-series properties of earnings, cash flows and accruals:has financial reporting become more conservative? Journal of Accounting and Economics[J],2000,29:287-320.
[10]《企业会计准则》[M),中华人民共和国财政部.2006.经济科学出版社.
[11]Beaver, W. H. The information content of annual earnings announcements, empirical research in accounting:selected studies. Journal of Accounting Research[J],1968,6:67-92.
[12]Basu, S. The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics[J],1997,24(1):3-37.
[13]R. L. Watts,. A Proposal for Research on Conservatis[C],1993,Unpublished Working Paper, University of Rochester (Presented at the AAA meetings, San Francisco, CA).
[14]Watts, R. Conservatism in accounting part I:explanations and implications. Accounting Horizons[J],2003a,17:207-221.
[15]Ohlson J. Earnings, Book value and dividends in equity valuation. Contemporary Accounting Research [J],1995,11:661-687.
[16]Ball, R. and Shivakumar, L.. Earnings quality in U.K. private firm: comparative loss recognition timeliness. Journal of Accounting and Economics[J],2005,30 (1-3):235-270.
[17]Watts, R.. Conservatism in accounting Part II:evidence and research opportunities. Accounting Horizons[J],2003b,17:287-301.
[18]Lin H. J. Accounting Discretion and Managerial conservatism:An intertemporal analysis. Contemprary Accounting research[J],2006,23; 1071-1041.
[19]Wang, Ogartaigh, Zijl. A signaling theory of accounting conservatism. Working paper,2009,Victoria University of Wellington.
[20]Kwon, Y., D.P. Newman, and Y.S. Suh. The demand for accounting conservatism for management control. Review of Accounting Studies [J],2001, (6): 29-51.
[21]Ball, R., S.P. Kothari and A. Robbin. Accounting standards, the institutional environment and issuer incentives:effect on timely loss recognition in China. Asia Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics [J],2000,7:71-96.
[22]Pope, P.E.and M. Walker. International differences in the timeliness, conservatism and classification of earnings. Journal of Accounting Research[J],1997,37(Supplement):53-87.
[23]Ball, R., A. Robin, and J.S. Wu. Accounting Standards, the Institutional Environment and Issurer Incentives:Effect on Timely Loss Recognition in China. Asia Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics,2000,7(1):71-96.
[24]李增泉,卢文彬.会计盈余的稳健性：发现与启示[J].会计研究,2003(2).
[25]赵春光.中国会计改革与谨慎性的提高[J].世界经济,2004(4).
[26]陈旭东,黄登仕.上市公司会计稳健性的时序演进与行业特征研究[J].证券 市场导报,2006(4).
[27]Qiang Xingrong. The effects of contracting, litigation, regulation, and tax costs on conditional and unconditional conservatism:cross-sectional evidence at the firm level. Accounting Review[J],2007,,82(3):759-796.
[28]Ahmed, A.S., K.B. Bruce, R.M. Morton, and M. Stanford-Harris. The role of accounting conservatism in mitigating bondholder-shareholder conflicts over dividends policy and in reducing debt costs. The Accounting revie[J],2002, 77(4):867-890.
[29]Zhang J.Y.. The contracting benefits of accounting conservatism to lenders and borrowers. Journal of Accounting and Economics[J],2008,45:27-54.
[30]Wittenberg-Moerman, R.. The role of information asymmetry and financial reporting quality in debt contracting:Evidence from the secondary loan market. Journal ofAccounting & Economics[J],2008,46:240-260-
[31]Khan, M. and R.L.Watts. Estimation and empirical properties of a firm-year measure of accounting conservatism. Journal of Accounting and Economics[j],2009, 48:132-150.
[32]Garcia Lara, J., B. Garcia Osma and F. Penalva. Conditional Conservatism and Cost of Capital. Review of Accounting Studies[J],2011, Forthcoming.
[33]孙铮、刘风委、汪辉.债务、公司治理与会计稳健性.中国会计与财务研究[J],2005,7(2)：112-173.
[34]刘凤委,汪扬.公司治理机制对会计稳健性影响之实证研究.上海立信会计学院学报[J],2006,(3).
[35]王毅春,孙林岩.银企关系,股权特征与会计稳健性—来自中国上市公司的经验证据.财政研究[J],2006(7).
[36]朱茶芬.会计管制和盈余质量关系的实证研究.财贸经济[J],2006(5).
[37]曲晓辉,邱月华.强制性制度变迁与盈余稳健性—来自深沪证券市场的经验证据.会计研究[J],2007(7).
[38]毛新述,戴德明.会计制度改革、盈余稳健性与盈余管理.会计研究[J],2009(12).
[39]Bushman, R. and J. Piotroski. Financial reporting incentives for conservative accounting:the influence of legal and political institutions. Journal of Accounting and Economics[J],2006,42:107-148.
[40]Blair, Margaret M.. Ownership and control.1995.The Bookings Institution.
[41]Shleifer, A. and Vishney, R.. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance[J],1997,52(2):737-783.
[42]张维迎,2001.《企业的企业家—契约理论》[M],上海人民出版社.
[43]吴敬琏,1994.《现代公司与企业改革》[M),天津人民出版社.
[44]朱松,夏冬林.制度环境、经济发展水平与会计稳健性[J].审计与经济研究.2009(6)
[451杜兴强、周泽将、修宗峰.政治联系与会计稳健性：基于中国民营上市公司的经验证据.经济管理[J],2009,(7)：115-121.
[46]曹宇李琳孙铮.公司控制权对会计盈余稳健性影响的实证研究.经济管理[J,2005,(14).
[47]王鹏,张俊瑞.董事会独立性与会计稳健性关系研究.山西财经大学学报[J]，2009,(5).
[48]朱茶芬,李志文.国家控股对会计稳健性的影响研究.会计研究[J],2008(5).
[49]王建新.债务约束与自由现金流的过度投资问题研究.财政研究[J],2008，11：65-69.
[50]刘运国、吴小蒙、蒋涛.产权性质、债务融资与会计稳健性-来自中国上市公司的经验证据.会计研究[J],2010(1)：45-52.
[51]周晓苏、杨忠海.控股股东行为、特征与财务报告稳健性—中国A股市场上市公司的经验证据.审计与经济研究[J],2010(3).
[52]吴联生.投资者对上市公司会计信息需求的调查分析.经济研究[J],2000(4)
[53]李玲、陈任武.上市公司盈利预测信息披露：动因、质量与监管.山西财经大学学报[J],2004(2).
[54]N. Gonedes, N.Dopuch and S. Penman. Disclosure rules, information production and capital market equilibrium:The case of forecast disclosure rules. Journal of Accounting Research[J],1976, Sping:89-137.
[55]Basi,B.A., K.J. Carey, and R.D. Twark. A comparison of the accuracy of corporate and security analysts' forecasts of earnings. The Accounting Review[J], 1976,51:244-254.
[56]Grundy, B., McNichols, M.. Trade and the revelation of information through prices and direct disclosure. Review of Financial studies[J],1989, (2):495-526.
[57]Lee, P., Taylor, S.,Yee, C.and Yee, M.. Prospectus earnings forecasts: Evidence and explanations. Australian Accounting review[J],1993, May:21-32.
[58]Pedwell, K.. The accuracy of Canadian and New Zealand earnings forecasts: A comparison of voluntary versus compulsory disclosures. Journal of International Accounting Auditing and Taxation[J],1994, (2):221-236.
[59]Firth, Michael and Andrew Smith. The accuracy of profits forecasts in initial public offering prospectuses. Accounting and Business Research[J],1991, (22):239-247.
[60]S. Penman. An empirical investigation of the voluntary disclosure of corporate earnings forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research[J],1980, Sping:132-160.
[61]Waymire, G.. Additional evidence on the information content of management earning forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research[J],1984, (22): 703-718.
[62]Gaber, M.(1995). Management incentives to report forecasts of corporate earnings.[D]. The City University of New York. PH.D. Dissertation.
[63]徐宗宇.上市公司盈利预测可靠性的实证研究[M).2000年,上海三联书店
[64]王培欣、乔芸.我国IPO公司盈利预测可靠性实证分析.管理科学[J],2003,(6).
[65]邓海燕、高东峰.制度变迁与上市公司盈利预测偏差实证研究.沈阳工业大学学报[J],2005年03期.
[66]张雁翎、彭浩然.盈利预测误差的契约性与上市公司盈余管理研究,财经研究[J],2004(11).
[67]周到.修正公告不能没完没了.中国证券报[J],2004.12.28第006版.
[68]徐效鸿.业绩预告缘何“变脸”.上海经济报[J],2004年7月24日第009版.
[69]蔡祥、李志文、张为国.中国实证会计研究评述.中国会计与财务研究[J],2003(2)：155-183.
[70]吴东辉、薛祖云.财务分析师盈利预测的投资价值：来自沪深A股市场的证据.会计研究[J],2005(5)
[71]肖斌卿、郑莉莉、李心丹、朱文俊.会计稳健性是否会影响分析师盈余预测行为—来自中国证券市场的证据.管理评论[J],2012,VOI.24(2).
[72]Ou, J.A. and S.H. Penman. Financial statement analysis and the prediction of stock returns, Journal of Accounting and Economics,1989a,11,295-330.
[73]Ou, J.A. and S.H. Penman,1989b. Accounting measurement, priceearnings ratios, and the informa-tion content of security prices, Supplement of Journal of Accounting Research,1989b,26,111-14.
[74]Lev, B., and S. R. Thiagarajan. Fundamental Information Analysis. Journal of Accounting Research,1993, Vol.31, No.2,pp.190-215.
[75]Abarbanell J.,Bushee B.J.,Fundamental analysis,future earnings,and stock prices.Journal of Accounting Research[J],1997,1:1-24.
[76]陆璇,陈小悦,张岭松,刘慧霞.中国上市公司财务基本信息对未来收益的预测能力,经济科学[J],2001年06期.
[77]王军.行业财务信息的业绩预测能力研究.北京航空航天大学学报(社会科学版)[J],2007年第4期.
[78]Kirschenheiter, M. and N. Melumad. Can big bath and earnings smoothing co-exist as equilibrium financial reporting strategies? Journal of Accounting Research[J],2002,40(3):761-796.
[79]Sankar, M. and K.R. Subramanyam. Reporting discretion and private information communication through earnings. Journal of Accounting research[J],2001,39(2):365-386.
[80]Subramanyam K. R.. The Pricing of Discretionary Accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics[J],1996,22:249-282.
[81]Fundenberg, D. and J. Tirole. A theory of income and dividend smoothing based on incumbency rents. Journal of Political Economy[J],1995,103(1):75-93.
[82]DeFond, M., Park, C.. Smoothing income in anticipation of future earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1997,23,115-139.
[83]杜兴强.会计信息的产权问题研究.会计研究[J],1998(7).
[84]陈晓、陈小悦、刘钊.A股盈余报告的有用性研究—来自上海、深圳股市的实证证据.经济研究[J]，1999(6).
[85]蒋义宏、陈高才.会计信息相关性研究—来自年报的证据.当代财[J]，2006.[5].
[86]蒋义宏、魏刚.中国上市公司会计与财务问题研究.东北财经大学出版社,2001年版.
[87]吴联生、薄仙慧、王亚平.避免亏损的盈余管理程度：上市公司与非上市公司的比较.会计研究[J]，2007(2).
[88]林舒、魏明海.中国A股发行公司首次公开募股过程中的盈余管理,中国会计与财务研究[J],2000(2).
[89]张宗益、黄新建,我国上市公司首次公开发行股票中的盈余管理实证研究.中国软科学[J],2003(110)：37-39.
[90]王志强、刘星.上市公司IPO盈余管理与其后期市场表现的实证分析.经济管理[J],2003,(18)：78-81.
[91]陈共荣、李琳.IPO前盈余管理与抑价现象的实证研究.系统工程[J]，2006年09期.
[92]陈小悦、肖星、过晓艳.配股权和上市公司利润操纵.经济研究[J],2000(1).
[93]阎达五、耿建新、刘文鹏.我国上市公司配股融资行为的实证研究.会计研究[J],2001年09期.
[94]Spence, M.. Market signaling.1974, Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press.
[95]Rothschild, M. and J. Stiglitz. Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: an essay in the economics of imperfect information. Quarterly Journal of Financial Economics [J],1976,90:629-650.
[96]Wilson, C.. A model of insurance markets with incomplete information. Journal of Economics Theory[J],1977,16:167-207.
[97]Chen, Q., T. Hemmer and Y. Zhang. On the relation between conservatism in accounting standards and incentives for earnings management. Journal of Accounting Research [J],2007.
[98]Kwon, Y., D. Newman, Y. Suh. The demand for accounting conservatism for management control. Review of Accounting Studies[J],2001,6(1):29-51.
[99]帕特里克·博尔顿,马赛厄斯·德瓦特里庞.《合同理论》(M),2008年,上海人民出版社.
[100]Burgstahler, David and llya Dichev. Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics [J],1997,24: 99-126.
[101]Degeorge Francois, Jayendu Patel and Richard Zeckhauser. Earnings management to exceed thresholds. Journal of Business[J],1999,72,1-33.
[102]Ayers, B, J. Jiang, and P. Yeung. Discretionary accruals and earnings management:An analysis of pseudo earning targets. The Accounting Review [J],2006,81:617-653.
[103]Brown, Lawrence D.. A temporal analysis of earnings surprises:profits versus losses. Journal of Accounting Research[J],2001,39(2):221-241.
[104]Matsumoto, Dawn. Management's incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises. Accounting Review[J],2002,77:483-514.
[105]Bartov, Eli, Dan Givoly, and Carla Hayn. The rewards to meeting or beating earnings expectations, Journal of Accounting and Economics[J],2002,33: 173-204.
[106]Kasznik, Ron and Maureen McNichols. Does meeting earnings expectations matter? Evidence from analyst forecast revisions and share prices. Journal of Accounting Research[J],2002,40:727-759.
[107]Berle, A.A., Means, G.C.. The modern corporation and private property.1932, New York:McMillan Publishing Co.
[108]M.C.Jensen. Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance and takeovers.The American Economic Review[J],1986,Volume 76, Issue2,323-329.
[109]Coles, J.L., Daniel, N.D., Naveen, L.. Boards:does one size fit all? Journal of Financial Economics[J],2008,87(2):329-356.
[110]Fich, E.M., Shivdasani, A.. Are busy boards effective monitors? Journal of Finance [J],2006,61(2):689-724.
[111]Anderson, R.C., Mansi, S.A., Reeb, D.M.. Founding family ownership and the agency cost of debt. Journal of Financial Economics[J],2003,68:263-285.
[112]Fan, J.P.H.,Wong, T.J.. Do external auditors perform a corporate governance role in emerging markets:evidence from East Asia. Journal of Accounting Research[J],2005,43(1):35-72.
[113]Wang, D.. Founding family ownership and earnings quality. Journal of Accounting Research [J],2006,44 (3):619-656.
[114]Ahmed, A.S., Duellman, S.. Evidence on the role of accounting conservatism in corporate governance. Journal of Accounting and Economics[J],2007,43:411-437.
[115]Juan M.G.Lara, F. Penalva. Accounting conservatism and corporate governance. Review of Accounting Studies[J],2009,14:161-201.
[116]Lobo, G., Zhou, J.. Did conservatism in financial reporting increase after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act? Initial evidence. Accounitng Horizons[J],2006,20(1):57-73.
[117]Beekes, W., Pope, P., Young,S.. The link between warnings timeliness, earnings conservatism and board composition:evidence from the UK. Corporate Governance:An International Review [J],2004,12 (1):47-59.
[118]Venugopalan, R.. Conservatism in accounting:Good or bad. Working paper,2001, university of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN.
[119]Gigler, F., T. Hemmer. Conservatism, optimal disclosure policy, and the timeliness of financial reports. Accounting Review[J],2001,76(4):471-493.
[120]Vafeas.Boardstructureandtheinformativenessofearnings.Journal of Accounting and PublicPolicy[J],2000,19:139-160.
[121]Dey A.. Cporporate governance and Financial Report ng Credibility. Working paper,2005, The University of Chicago.
[122]Ajinkya, B., Bhojraj, S., and Sengupta, P.. The Association between Outside Directors, Institutional Investors and the Properties of Management Earnings Forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research [J],2005,43(3),343-376.
[123]Kanagaretnam, K., Lobo, G.J.,&Whalen, D.J.. Does good corporate governance reduce information asymmetry around quarterly earnings announcements? Journal of Accounting & Public Policy[J],2007,26(4),497-522.
[124]Collins, D. W., S.P. Kothari, J. Shanken and R. Sloan. Lack of timeliness and noise as explanations for the low contemporaneous return-earnings association. Journal of Accounting and Economics[J],1994,(18):289-324.
[125]J.W. Tucker, P. A. Zarowin. Does income smoothing improve earnings informativeness? The Accounting Review,2006, (81):251-270.
[126]Dechow, P. M., W. Ge and C. Schrand. Understanding earnings quality:A review of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences.2010, Working paper.
[127]Ball. R. J. and P. Brown. An empirical evaluation of accounting income numbers. Journal of Accounting research [J],1968,(autumn):159-178.
[128]赵宇龙.会计盈余披露的信息含量—来自上海股市的经验证据.经济研究[J],1998(7).
[129]陈晓、陈小悦、刘钊.A股盈余报告的有用性研究—来自上海、深圳股市的实证证据.经济研究[J]，1999(6).
[130]陆宇峰.净资产倍率和市盈率的投资决策有用性：基于奥森-奥尔森估值模型的实证研究[D].上海财大博士学位论文,1999年.
[131]陈信元、陈东华、朱红军.净资产、剩余收益与市场定价：会计信息的价值相关性.金融研究[J],2002(4).
[132]Demski, J.S.. Performance measure manipulation. Contemporary Accounting Research[J],1998,15 (3):261-285.
[133]王群勇,STATA在统计与计量分析中的应用[M],2007年,南开大学出版社
[134]Kasznik, R. and B. Lev. To warn or not to warn:Management disclosures in the face of an earnings surprise. The Accounting Review[J],1995,70 (1):113-134.
[135]Johnson, M. F., R. Kasznik, and K.K. Nelson. The impact of securities litigation reform on the disclosure of forward-looking information by high technology firms. Journal of Accounting research[J],2001,39(2):297-327.
[136]Frankel, R., M. McNichols and G. Wilson. Discretionary disclosure and external financing. The Accounting Review[J],1995,70 (1):135-150.
[137]解保华、高荣兴.中国股票市场有效性实证检验.数量经济技术经济研究[J],2002(5).
[138]李兴绪、郑树明.上海股票市场有效性的实证研究.云南财贸学院学报[J],2004(12).
[139]谢晓霞.有效市场假设理论在上海股市的实证检验.经济体制改革[J],2007(2].
[140]陈立新.上海股票市场有效性实证研究.中国软件科学[J],2002(5).
[141]冉茂盛.中国股票市场有效性实证分析.重庆大学学报[J],2002(11).
[142]李晓静.中国股票市场有效性实证检验.企业文化[J],2006(10).
[143]明隆.中国资本市场有效性实证研究—以上证A股为例.统计科学与实践[J],2011年第9期.
[144]Lambert, R.. Income smoothing as rational equilibrium behavior. The Accounting Review[J],1984,41(4):604-618.
[145]Demski, J.S. and H. Frimor. Performance measure garbling under renegotiation in multi-period agencies. Journal of Accounting Research[J],1999, 37(Supplement):187-214.
[146]Healy, P.. The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics[J],1985,7 (1-3):85-107.
[147]Arya, A., J. Glover, and S. Sunder. Earnings management and the revelation principle. Review of Accounting Studies[J],1998,3:7-34.
[148]Ronen, J. and S.Sadan. Smoothing income numbers:objectives, means, and implications.1981,Boston, MA:Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.
[149]Kasznik, Ron and Maureen McNichols. Does meeting earnings expectations matter? Evidence from analyst forecast revisions and share prices. Journal of Accounting Research[J],2002,40:727-759.
[150]张长海、胡国柳、吴顺祥.公司年度会计稳健性计量方法适应性研究.统计与信息论坛[J],2012(2).
[151]Fan J.,WongT.J.,and ZhangT..Politically Connected CEOs,Corporate Governance,and Post IPO Performance of China's Newly Partially Privatized Firms.Journal of Financial Economics,2007,84:265-590.
[152]Fama, E.F. and French, K. R.. Forecasting profitability and earnings. Journal of Business[J],2000,73(2):161-75.
[153]Roodman, David. How to Do Xtabond2:An Introduction to Difference and System Gmm in Stata. STATA JOURNAL,2009,9(1), pp.86-136.
[154]Blundell, R. and S. Bond.. GMM Estimation with Persistent Panel Data:An plication to Production Functions, Econometric Reviews,2000,19 (3), pp.321-340.
[155]Juha-pekka kallunki, Minna Martikainen. Earnings management as a predictor of future profitability of Finnish firms. European Accounting Review[J],2003,12(2):311-325.
[156]Houthausen R. W.. Testing the relative power of accounting standards versus incentives and other institutional features to influence the outcome of financial reporting in an international setting. Journal of Accounting and Economics[J],2003, (36).
[157]Morck, R., B. Yeung and Wayne Yu. The information content of stock markets:Why do merging markets have synchronous stock price movement? Journal of Financial Economics[J],2000,58(1-2):215-260.
[158]Imhoff, B.N.. Comments on income smoothing:a review by J. Ronen, S.Sadan and C. Snow. Accounting Journal[J],1977,Spring:23-42.
[159]Jones, Jennifer J..Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal of Accounting Research[J],1991,29:193-228.
[160]Defond, M. L., and J. Jiambalvo. Debt Covenant Violation and Manipulation of Accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1994,17:145-176.
[161]Dechow,P.M., Sloan, R.,Sweeney, A.. Detecting earnings management.The Accounting Review[J],1995,70(2):193-225.
[162]陆建桥.中国亏损上市公司盈余管理实证研究.会计研究[J]，1999(9).
[163]Eckel,N..The income smoothing hypothesis visited. Abacus[J],1981,17(1): 28-40.
[164]Juha-Pekka Kallunki and Martikainen, Minna. Earnings Management as a Predictor of Future Profitability of Finnish Firms. European Accounting Review[J], 2003,12:2.
[165]Healy, P.M., K.G. Palepu and R.S. Ruback. Does corporate performance improve after mergers? Journal of Financial Economics[J],1992,135-156.
[166]Hyan,S..Identifying conditional conservatism.European Accounting Review[J],2006,15:511-525.
[167]Dietrich,R.,Muller,K.,Riedl,E..Asymmetric timeliness tests of accounting conservatism. Review of Accounting Studies[J],2007,12,95-124.
[168]Beaver, W.H., Ryan, S.G.. Conditional and unconditional conservatism: Concepts and modeling. Review of Accounting Studies[J],2005,10:269-309.
[169]Beatty, A., J. Weber, and J. J. Yu. Conservatism and debt. Journal of Accounting and Economics[J],2008,45(2-3):154-174.
[170]Bathala,C.T.,Rao.R.P..The Determinants of Board Composition:A Agency Theory perspective. Managerial and Decision Economics[J],16(1):161-190.
[171]顾鸣润、杨继伟、余怒涛.产权性质、公司治理与真实盈余管理.中国会计评论[J],2012,10(3)
[172]顾鸣润.信息非对称、稳健会计信息与业绩预测.经济问题[J],2012,第4期.
[173]Bai Chong-En, Liu Qiao, Lu Joe Zhou et al..Corporate governance and market valuation in China. Journal of Comparative Economics[J],2004,32(4):599-825.
[174]Klein, A.. Audit committees, board of director characteristics and earnings management. Journal of Accounting and Economics[J],2002b,33:375-400.
[175]E.Fama, M. Jensen. Agency problems and residual claims. Journal of Law and Economics[J],1983,26(2).
[176]施东晖、司徒大年.中国上市公司治理水平及对绩效影响的经验研究.世界经济[J],2004,(5)：P69.
[177]周建波、孙菊生.经营者股权激励的治理效应研究—来自中国上市公司的经验证据.经济研究[J],2003,第5期,第74-93页.
[178]王克敏、陈井勇.股权结构、投资者保护与公司绩效.管理世界[J],2004,第7期,第127-148页.
[1791黄之骏、王华.经营者股权激励与企业价值—基于内生性视角的理论分析与经验证据.中国会计评论[J],2006,4(1)：29-56.
[180]陈东华、陈信元、万华林.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费,经济研究[J],2005(2)：92-102.
[181]夏立军,方轶强.政府控制、治理环境与公司价值—来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J1.经济研究,2005(5).
[182]郑国坚.市场化改革的微观作用机制：关联交易视角.中国会计评论[J],2011,(9).
[183]徐晓东、陈小悦.第一大股东对公司治理、企业业绩的影响分析.经济研 究[J],2003,(2).
[184]孙亮、刘春.公司治理对盈余管理程度的制约作用.金融评论[J],2010,(9).
[185]Dennis, D.. Twenty-five years of corporate governance and counting. Review of Financial Economics[J],2001,10(3):191-212.
[186]Jiang, G., Lee, C. and Yue, H.. Tunneling through intercorporate loans:The China experience. Journal of Financial Economics[J],2010,98(1):1-20.
[187]Aharony, Joseph, Jiwei Wang, and Hongqi Yuan. Tunneling as an incentive for earnings management during the IPO process in China. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy[J],2010,Vol(29):1-26.
[188]Jian, M. and T.J. Wong. Propping through related party transactions. Review of Accounting Studies[J],2008,15(1):70-105.
[189]刘峰、贺建刚.股权结构与大股东利益实现方式的选择—中国资本市场利益输送的初步研究.中国会计评论[J],2004,2(1)
[190]马忠、吴翔宇.金子塔结构对自愿性信息披露程度的影响：来自家族控股上市公司的经验验证.会计研究[J],2007,(1).
[191]Faccio, M., Politically connected firms. American Economic Review[J], 2006,(96):369-386.
[192]Lin, J., F. Cai, and Z. Li. Competition, policy burdens and state-owned enterprise reform. American Economic Review[J],1998, (88):422-427.
[193]Chong-En Bai, David Li, Zhigang Tao et al.. A Multi-Task Theory of the State Enterprise Reform. Journal of Comparative Economics[J],2000,28(4):716-738.
[194]Becker, C., M. DeFond, J. Jiambalvo and K.R. Subramanyam. The effect of audit quality on earnings management. Contemporary Accounting Research[J],1998, 15(1):1-24.
[195]蔡春、黄益建、赵莎.关于审计质量对盈余管理影响的实证研究.审计研究[J],2005(2).
[196]王艳艳、陈汉文.审计质量与会计信息透明度—来自中国上市公司的经验数据.会计研究[J]，2006(4).
[197]顾鸣润.制度变迁、审计任期与会计稳健性的实证研究.工作论文,2011.
[198]LaFond, R. and Roychowdhury. Managerial Ownership and Accounting Conservatism. Journal ofAccounting Research[J],2008,46,101-135.
[199]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司绩效.经济研究[J],2000(3).
[200]李增泉、余谦、王晓坤.掏空、支持与并购重组—来自我国上市公司的经验证据.经济研究[J],2005(1).
[201]张然、张鹏.中国上市公司自愿业绩预告动机研究.中国会计评论[J],2011(3).
[202]孙永祥、黄祖辉.上市公司的股权结构与绩效.经济研究[J], 1999(12).
[203]La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes. Corporate Ownership Around the World.Journal of Finance[J],1999.
[204]Bhattacharya, U., H Daouk, M Welker. The world price of earnings opacity. The Accounting Review[J],2003,78(3):641-678.
[205]H.W. Chen, J. Z. Chen, Gerald J. Lobo and Y.Y. Wang. Association between borrower and lender state ownership and accounting conservatism. Journal of Accounting Research,2010,Vol-48 No.5.
[206]Ball, R., A. Robin and G. SaDKA. "Is financial reporting shaped by equity markets or by debt markets? An international study of timeliness and conservatism". Review of Accounting Studies 13 (2008):168-205.
[2]楼继伟.中国企业会计准则建设的可贵实践和崭新突破[J].会计研究,2006(2).
[3]Bagnoli, M. and S.G. Watts. Conservative accounting choices. Management Science[J],2005,51(5):786-801.
[4]Guay, W. and R. Verrecchia. Discussion of an economic framework for conservative accounting and Bushman and Piotroski (2006). Journal of Accounting and Economics[J],2006,42(1-2):149-165.
[5]LaFond, W. and R. L. Watts. The information role of conservatism. The Accounting Review[J],2008,83:447-478.
[6]Francis, J. and X. Martin. Acquisition profitability and timely loss recognition. Journal of Accounting and Economics[J],2010,49(1-2):161-178.
[7]IASB(2008). Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements. International Accounting Standards Board.
[8]FASB(1980). Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No.2:Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information. Norwalk, Connecticut:Financial Accounting Standards Board.
[9]Givoly, D., Hayn, C The changing time-series properties of earnings, cash flows and accruals:has financial reporting become more conservative? Journal of Accounting and Economics[J],2000,29:287-320.
[10]《企业会计准则》[M),中华人民共和国财政部.2006.经济科学出版社.
[11]Beaver, W. H. The information content of annual earnings announcements, empirical research in accounting:selected studies. Journal of Accounting Research[J],1968,6:67-92.
[12]Basu, S. The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics[J],1997,24(1):3-37.
[13]R. L. Watts,. A Proposal for Research on Conservatis[C],1993,Unpublished Working Paper, University of Rochester (Presented at the AAA meetings, San Francisco, CA).
[14]Watts, R. Conservatism in accounting part I:explanations and implications. Accounting Horizons[J],2003a,17:207-221.
[15]Ohlson J. Earnings, Book value and dividends in equity valuation. Contemporary Accounting Research [J],1995,11:661-687.
[16]Ball, R. and Shivakumar, L.. Earnings quality in U.K. private firm: comparative loss recognition timeliness. Journal of Accounting and Economics[J],2005,30 (1-3):235-270.
[17]Watts, R.. Conservatism in accounting Part II:evidence and research opportunities. Accounting Horizons[J],2003b,17:287-301.
[18]Lin H. J. Accounting Discretion and Managerial conservatism:An intertemporal analysis. Contemprary Accounting research[J],2006,23; 1071-1041.
[19]Wang, Ogartaigh, Zijl. A signaling theory of accounting conservatism. Working paper,2009,Victoria University of Wellington.
[20]Kwon, Y., D.P. Newman, and Y.S. Suh. The demand for accounting conservatism for management control. Review of Accounting Studies [J],2001, (6): 29-51.
[21]Ball, R., S.P. Kothari and A. Robbin. Accounting standards, the institutional environment and issuer incentives:effect on timely loss recognition in China. Asia Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics [J],2000,7:71-96.
[22]Pope, P.E.and M. Walker. International differences in the timeliness, conservatism and classification of earnings. Journal of Accounting Research[J],1997,37(Supplement):53-87.
[23]Ball, R., A. Robin, and J.S. Wu. Accounting Standards, the Institutional Environment and Issurer Incentives:Effect on Timely Loss Recognition in China. Asia Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics,2000,7(1):71-96.
[24]李增泉,卢文彬.会计盈余的稳健性：发现与启示[J].会计研究,2003(2).
[25]赵春光.中国会计改革与谨慎性的提高[J].世界经济,2004(4).
[26]陈旭东,黄登仕.上市公司会计稳健性的时序演进与行业特征研究[J].证券 市场导报,2006(4).
[27]Qiang Xingrong. The effects of contracting, litigation, regulation, and tax costs on conditional and unconditional conservatism:cross-sectional evidence at the firm level. Accounting Review[J],2007,,82(3):759-796.
[28]Ahmed, A.S., K.B. Bruce, R.M. Morton, and M. Stanford-Harris. The role of accounting conservatism in mitigating bondholder-shareholder conflicts over dividends policy and in reducing debt costs. The Accounting revie[J],2002, 77(4):867-890.
[29]Zhang J.Y.. The contracting benefits of accounting conservatism to lenders and borrowers. Journal of Accounting and Economics[J],2008,45:27-54.
[30]Wittenberg-Moerman, R.. The role of information asymmetry and financial reporting quality in debt contracting:Evidence from the secondary loan market. Journal ofAccounting & Economics[J],2008,46:240-260-
[31]Khan, M. and R.L.Watts. Estimation and empirical properties of a firm-year measure of accounting conservatism. Journal of Accounting and Economics[j],2009, 48:132-150.
[32]Garcia Lara, J., B. Garcia Osma and F. Penalva. Conditional Conservatism and Cost of Capital. Review of Accounting Studies[J],2011, Forthcoming.
[33]孙铮、刘风委、汪辉.债务、公司治理与会计稳健性.中国会计与财务研究[J],2005,7(2)：112-173.
[34]刘凤委,汪扬.公司治理机制对会计稳健性影响之实证研究.上海立信会计学院学报[J],2006,(3).
[35]王毅春,孙林岩.银企关系,股权特征与会计稳健性—来自中国上市公司的经验证据.财政研究[J],2006(7).
[36]朱茶芬.会计管制和盈余质量关系的实证研究.财贸经济[J],2006(5).
[37]曲晓辉,邱月华.强制性制度变迁与盈余稳健性—来自深沪证券市场的经验证据.会计研究[J],2007(7).
[38]毛新述,戴德明.会计制度改革、盈余稳健性与盈余管理.会计研究[J],2009(12).
[39]Bushman, R. and J. Piotroski. Financial reporting incentives for conservative accounting:the influence of legal and political institutions. Journal of Accounting and Economics[J],2006,42:107-148.
[40]Blair, Margaret M.. Ownership and control.1995.The Bookings Institution.
[41]Shleifer, A. and Vishney, R.. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance[J],1997,52(2):737-783.
[42]张维迎,2001.《企业的企业家—契约理论》[M],上海人民出版社.
[43]吴敬琏,1994.《现代公司与企业改革》[M),天津人民出版社.
[44]朱松,夏冬林.制度环境、经济发展水平与会计稳健性[J].审计与经济研究.2009(6)
[451杜兴强、周泽将、修宗峰.政治联系与会计稳健性：基于中国民营上市公司的经验证据.经济管理[J],2009,(7)：115-121.
[46]曹宇李琳孙铮.公司控制权对会计盈余稳健性影响的实证研究.经济管理[J,2005,(14).
[47]王鹏,张俊瑞.董事会独立性与会计稳健性关系研究.山西财经大学学报[J]，2009,(5).
[48]朱茶芬,李志文.国家控股对会计稳健性的影响研究.会计研究[J],2008(5).
[49]王建新.债务约束与自由现金流的过度投资问题研究.财政研究[J],2008，11：65-69.
[50]刘运国、吴小蒙、蒋涛.产权性质、债务融资与会计稳健性-来自中国上市公司的经验证据.会计研究[J],2010(1)：45-52.
[51]周晓苏、杨忠海.控股股东行为、特征与财务报告稳健性—中国A股市场上市公司的经验证据.审计与经济研究[J],2010(3).
[52]吴联生.投资者对上市公司会计信息需求的调查分析.经济研究[J],2000(4)
[53]李玲、陈任武.上市公司盈利预测信息披露：动因、质量与监管.山西财经大学学报[J],2004(2).
[54]N. Gonedes, N.Dopuch and S. Penman. Disclosure rules, information production and capital market equilibrium:The case of forecast disclosure rules. Journal of Accounting Research[J],1976, Sping:89-137.
[55]Basi,B.A., K.J. Carey, and R.D. Twark. A comparison of the accuracy of corporate and security analysts' forecasts of earnings. The Accounting Review[J], 1976,51:244-254.
[56]Grundy, B., McNichols, M.. Trade and the revelation of information through prices and direct disclosure. Review of Financial studies[J],1989, (2):495-526.
[57]Lee, P., Taylor, S.,Yee, C.and Yee, M.. Prospectus earnings forecasts: Evidence and explanations. Australian Accounting review[J],1993, May:21-32.
[58]Pedwell, K.. The accuracy of Canadian and New Zealand earnings forecasts: A comparison of voluntary versus compulsory disclosures. Journal of International Accounting Auditing and Taxation[J],1994, (2):221-236.
[59]Firth, Michael and Andrew Smith. The accuracy of profits forecasts in initial public offering prospectuses. Accounting and Business Research[J],1991, (22):239-247.
[60]S. Penman. An empirical investigation of the voluntary disclosure of corporate earnings forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research[J],1980, Sping:132-160.
[61]Waymire, G.. Additional evidence on the information content of management earning forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research[J],1984, (22): 703-718.
[62]Gaber, M.(1995). Management incentives to report forecasts of corporate earnings.[D]. The City University of New York. PH.D. Dissertation.
[63]徐宗宇.上市公司盈利预测可靠性的实证研究[M).2000年,上海三联书店
[64]王培欣、乔芸.我国IPO公司盈利预测可靠性实证分析.管理科学[J],2003,(6).
[65]邓海燕、高东峰.制度变迁与上市公司盈利预测偏差实证研究.沈阳工业大学学报[J],2005年03期.
[66]张雁翎、彭浩然.盈利预测误差的契约性与上市公司盈余管理研究,财经研究[J],2004(11).
[67]周到.修正公告不能没完没了.中国证券报[J],2004.12.28第006版.
[68]徐效鸿.业绩预告缘何“变脸”.上海经济报[J],2004年7月24日第009版.
[69]蔡祥、李志文、张为国.中国实证会计研究评述.中国会计与财务研究[J],2003(2)：155-183.
[70]吴东辉、薛祖云.财务分析师盈利预测的投资价值：来自沪深A股市场的证据.会计研究[J],2005(5)
[71]肖斌卿、郑莉莉、李心丹、朱文俊.会计稳健性是否会影响分析师盈余预测行为—来自中国证券市场的证据.管理评论[J],2012,VOI.24(2).
[72]Ou, J.A. and S.H. Penman. Financial statement analysis and the prediction of stock returns, Journal of Accounting and Economics,1989a,11,295-330.
[73]Ou, J.A. and S.H. Penman,1989b. Accounting measurement, priceearnings ratios, and the informa-tion content of security prices, Supplement of Journal of Accounting Research,1989b,26,111-14.
[74]Lev, B., and S. R. Thiagarajan. Fundamental Information Analysis. Journal of Accounting Research,1993, Vol.31, No.2,pp.190-215.
[75]Abarbanell J.,Bushee B.J.,Fundamental analysis,future earnings,and stock prices.Journal of Accounting Research[J],1997,1:1-24.
[76]陆璇,陈小悦,张岭松,刘慧霞.中国上市公司财务基本信息对未来收益的预测能力,经济科学[J],2001年06期.
[77]王军.行业财务信息的业绩预测能力研究.北京航空航天大学学报(社会科学版)[J],2007年第4期.
[78]Kirschenheiter, M. and N. Melumad. Can big bath and earnings smoothing co-exist as equilibrium financial reporting strategies? Journal of Accounting Research[J],2002,40(3):761-796.
[79]Sankar, M. and K.R. Subramanyam. Reporting discretion and private information communication through earnings. Journal of Accounting research[J],2001,39(2):365-386.
[80]Subramanyam K. R.. The Pricing of Discretionary Accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics[J],1996,22:249-282.
[81]Fundenberg, D. and J. Tirole. A theory of income and dividend smoothing based on incumbency rents. Journal of Political Economy[J],1995,103(1):75-93.
[82]DeFond, M., Park, C.. Smoothing income in anticipation of future earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1997,23,115-139.
[83]杜兴强.会计信息的产权问题研究.会计研究[J],1998(7).
[84]陈晓、陈小悦、刘钊.A股盈余报告的有用性研究—来自上海、深圳股市的实证证据.经济研究[J]，1999(6).
[85]蒋义宏、陈高才.会计信息相关性研究—来自年报的证据.当代财[J]，2006.[5].
[86]蒋义宏、魏刚.中国上市公司会计与财务问题研究.东北财经大学出版社,2001年版.
[87]吴联生、薄仙慧、王亚平.避免亏损的盈余管理程度：上市公司与非上市公司的比较.会计研究[J]，2007(2).
[88]林舒、魏明海.中国A股发行公司首次公开募股过程中的盈余管理,中国会计与财务研究[J],2000(2).
[89]张宗益、黄新建,我国上市公司首次公开发行股票中的盈余管理实证研究.中国软科学[J],2003(110)：37-39.
[90]王志强、刘星.上市公司IPO盈余管理与其后期市场表现的实证分析.经济管理[J],2003,(18)：78-81.
[91]陈共荣、李琳.IPO前盈余管理与抑价现象的实证研究.系统工程[J]，2006年09期.
[92]陈小悦、肖星、过晓艳.配股权和上市公司利润操纵.经济研究[J],2000(1).
[93]阎达五、耿建新、刘文鹏.我国上市公司配股融资行为的实证研究.会计研究[J],2001年09期.
[94]Spence, M.. Market signaling.1974, Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press.
[95]Rothschild, M. and J. Stiglitz. Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: an essay in the economics of imperfect information. Quarterly Journal of Financial Economics [J],1976,90:629-650.
[96]Wilson, C.. A model of insurance markets with incomplete information. Journal of Economics Theory[J],1977,16:167-207.
[97]Chen, Q., T. Hemmer and Y. Zhang. On the relation between conservatism in accounting standards and incentives for earnings management. Journal of Accounting Research [J],2007.
[98]Kwon, Y., D. Newman, Y. Suh. The demand for accounting conservatism for management control. Review of Accounting Studies[J],2001,6(1):29-51.
[99]帕特里克·博尔顿,马赛厄斯·德瓦特里庞.《合同理论》(M),2008年,上海人民出版社.
[100]Burgstahler, David and llya Dichev. Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics [J],1997,24: 99-126.
[101]Degeorge Francois, Jayendu Patel and Richard Zeckhauser. Earnings management to exceed thresholds. Journal of Business[J],1999,72,1-33.
[102]Ayers, B, J. Jiang, and P. Yeung. Discretionary accruals and earnings management:An analysis of pseudo earning targets. The Accounting Review [J],2006,81:617-653.
[103]Brown, Lawrence D.. A temporal analysis of earnings surprises:profits versus losses. Journal of Accounting Research[J],2001,39(2):221-241.
[104]Matsumoto, Dawn. Management's incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises. Accounting Review[J],2002,77:483-514.
[105]Bartov, Eli, Dan Givoly, and Carla Hayn. The rewards to meeting or beating earnings expectations, Journal of Accounting and Economics[J],2002,33: 173-204.
[106]Kasznik, Ron and Maureen McNichols. Does meeting earnings expectations matter? Evidence from analyst forecast revisions and share prices. Journal of Accounting Research[J],2002,40:727-759.
[107]Berle, A.A., Means, G.C.. The modern corporation and private property.1932, New York:McMillan Publishing Co.
[108]M.C.Jensen. Agency costs of free cash flow,corporate finance and takeovers.The American Economic Review[J],1986,Volume 76, Issue2,323-329.
[109]Coles, J.L., Daniel, N.D., Naveen, L.. Boards:does one size fit all? Journal of Financial Economics[J],2008,87(2):329-356.
[110]Fich, E.M., Shivdasani, A.. Are busy boards effective monitors? Journal of Finance [J],2006,61(2):689-724.
[111]Anderson, R.C., Mansi, S.A., Reeb, D.M.. Founding family ownership and the agency cost of debt. Journal of Financial Economics[J],2003,68:263-285.
[112]Fan, J.P.H.,Wong, T.J.. Do external auditors perform a corporate governance role in emerging markets:evidence from East Asia. Journal of Accounting Research[J],2005,43(1):35-72.
[113]Wang, D.. Founding family ownership and earnings quality. Journal of Accounting Research [J],2006,44 (3):619-656.
[114]Ahmed, A.S., Duellman, S.. Evidence on the role of accounting conservatism in corporate governance. Journal of Accounting and Economics[J],2007,43:411-437.
[115]Juan M.G.Lara, F. Penalva. Accounting conservatism and corporate governance. Review of Accounting Studies[J],2009,14:161-201.
[116]Lobo, G., Zhou, J.. Did conservatism in financial reporting increase after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act? Initial evidence. Accounitng Horizons[J],2006,20(1):57-73.
[117]Beekes, W., Pope, P., Young,S.. The link between warnings timeliness, earnings conservatism and board composition:evidence from the UK. Corporate Governance:An International Review [J],2004,12 (1):47-59.
[118]Venugopalan, R.. Conservatism in accounting:Good or bad. Working paper,2001, university of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN.
[119]Gigler, F., T. Hemmer. Conservatism, optimal disclosure policy, and the timeliness of financial reports. Accounting Review[J],2001,76(4):471-493.
[120]Vafeas.Boardstructureandtheinformativenessofearnings.Journal of Accounting and PublicPolicy[J],2000,19:139-160.
[121]Dey A.. Cporporate governance and Financial Report ng Credibility. Working paper,2005, The University of Chicago.
[122]Ajinkya, B., Bhojraj, S., and Sengupta, P.. The Association between Outside Directors, Institutional Investors and the Properties of Management Earnings Forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research [J],2005,43(3),343-376.
[123]Kanagaretnam, K., Lobo, G.J.,&Whalen, D.J.. Does good corporate governance reduce information asymmetry around quarterly earnings announcements? Journal of Accounting & Public Policy[J],2007,26(4),497-522.
[124]Collins, D. W., S.P. Kothari, J. Shanken and R. Sloan. Lack of timeliness and noise as explanations for the low contemporaneous return-earnings association. Journal of Accounting and Economics[J],1994,(18):289-324.
[125]J.W. Tucker, P. A. Zarowin. Does income smoothing improve earnings informativeness? The Accounting Review,2006, (81):251-270.
[126]Dechow, P. M., W. Ge and C. Schrand. Understanding earnings quality:A review of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences.2010, Working paper.
[127]Ball. R. J. and P. Brown. An empirical evaluation of accounting income numbers. Journal of Accounting research [J],1968,(autumn):159-178.
[128]赵宇龙.会计盈余披露的信息含量—来自上海股市的经验证据.经济研究[J],1998(7).
[129]陈晓、陈小悦、刘钊.A股盈余报告的有用性研究—来自上海、深圳股市的实证证据.经济研究[J]，1999(6).
[130]陆宇峰.净资产倍率和市盈率的投资决策有用性：基于奥森-奥尔森估值模型的实证研究[D].上海财大博士学位论文,1999年.
[131]陈信元、陈东华、朱红军.净资产、剩余收益与市场定价：会计信息的价值相关性.金融研究[J],2002(4).
[132]Demski, J.S.. Performance measure manipulation. Contemporary Accounting Research[J],1998,15 (3):261-285.
[133]王群勇,STATA在统计与计量分析中的应用[M],2007年,南开大学出版社
[134]Kasznik, R. and B. Lev. To warn or not to warn:Management disclosures in the face of an earnings surprise. The Accounting Review[J],1995,70 (1):113-134.
[135]Johnson, M. F., R. Kasznik, and K.K. Nelson. The impact of securities litigation reform on the disclosure of forward-looking information by high technology firms. Journal of Accounting research[J],2001,39(2):297-327.
[136]Frankel, R., M. McNichols and G. Wilson. Discretionary disclosure and external financing. The Accounting Review[J],1995,70 (1):135-150.
[137]解保华、高荣兴.中国股票市场有效性实证检验.数量经济技术经济研究[J],2002(5).
[138]李兴绪、郑树明.上海股票市场有效性的实证研究.云南财贸学院学报[J],2004(12).
[139]谢晓霞.有效市场假设理论在上海股市的实证检验.经济体制改革[J],2007(2].
[140]陈立新.上海股票市场有效性实证研究.中国软件科学[J],2002(5).
[141]冉茂盛.中国股票市场有效性实证分析.重庆大学学报[J],2002(11).
[142]李晓静.中国股票市场有效性实证检验.企业文化[J],2006(10).
[143]明隆.中国资本市场有效性实证研究—以上证A股为例.统计科学与实践[J],2011年第9期.
[144]Lambert, R.. Income smoothing as rational equilibrium behavior. The Accounting Review[J],1984,41(4):604-618.
[145]Demski, J.S. and H. Frimor. Performance measure garbling under renegotiation in multi-period agencies. Journal of Accounting Research[J],1999, 37(Supplement):187-214.
[146]Healy, P.. The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions. Journal of Accounting and Economics[J],1985,7 (1-3):85-107.
[147]Arya, A., J. Glover, and S. Sunder. Earnings management and the revelation principle. Review of Accounting Studies[J],1998,3:7-34.
[148]Ronen, J. and S.Sadan. Smoothing income numbers:objectives, means, and implications.1981,Boston, MA:Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.
[149]Kasznik, Ron and Maureen McNichols. Does meeting earnings expectations matter? Evidence from analyst forecast revisions and share prices. Journal of Accounting Research[J],2002,40:727-759.
[150]张长海、胡国柳、吴顺祥.公司年度会计稳健性计量方法适应性研究.统计与信息论坛[J],2012(2).
[151]Fan J.,WongT.J.,and ZhangT..Politically Connected CEOs,Corporate Governance,and Post IPO Performance of China's Newly Partially Privatized Firms.Journal of Financial Economics,2007,84:265-590.
[152]Fama, E.F. and French, K. R.. Forecasting profitability and earnings. Journal of Business[J],2000,73(2):161-75.
[153]Roodman, David. How to Do Xtabond2:An Introduction to Difference and System Gmm in Stata. STATA JOURNAL,2009,9(1), pp.86-136.
[154]Blundell, R. and S. Bond.. GMM Estimation with Persistent Panel Data:An plication to Production Functions, Econometric Reviews,2000,19 (3), pp.321-340.
[155]Juha-pekka kallunki, Minna Martikainen. Earnings management as a predictor of future profitability of Finnish firms. European Accounting Review[J],2003,12(2):311-325.
[156]Houthausen R. W.. Testing the relative power of accounting standards versus incentives and other institutional features to influence the outcome of financial reporting in an international setting. Journal of Accounting and Economics[J],2003, (36).
[157]Morck, R., B. Yeung and Wayne Yu. The information content of stock markets:Why do merging markets have synchronous stock price movement? Journal of Financial Economics[J],2000,58(1-2):215-260.
[158]Imhoff, B.N.. Comments on income smoothing:a review by J. Ronen, S.Sadan and C. Snow. Accounting Journal[J],1977,Spring:23-42.
[159]Jones, Jennifer J..Earnings management during import relief investigations. Journal of Accounting Research[J],1991,29:193-228.
[160]Defond, M. L., and J. Jiambalvo. Debt Covenant Violation and Manipulation of Accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1994,17:145-176.
[161]Dechow,P.M., Sloan, R.,Sweeney, A.. Detecting earnings management.The Accounting Review[J],1995,70(2):193-225.
[162]陆建桥.中国亏损上市公司盈余管理实证研究.会计研究[J]，1999(9).
[163]Eckel,N..The income smoothing hypothesis visited. Abacus[J],1981,17(1): 28-40.
[164]Juha-Pekka Kallunki and Martikainen, Minna. Earnings Management as a Predictor of Future Profitability of Finnish Firms. European Accounting Review[J], 2003,12:2.
[165]Healy, P.M., K.G. Palepu and R.S. Ruback. Does corporate performance improve after mergers? Journal of Financial Economics[J],1992,135-156.
[166]Hyan,S..Identifying conditional conservatism.European Accounting Review[J],2006,15:511-525.
[167]Dietrich,R.,Muller,K.,Riedl,E..Asymmetric timeliness tests of accounting conservatism. Review of Accounting Studies[J],2007,12,95-124.
[168]Beaver, W.H., Ryan, S.G.. Conditional and unconditional conservatism: Concepts and modeling. Review of Accounting Studies[J],2005,10:269-309.
[169]Beatty, A., J. Weber, and J. J. Yu. Conservatism and debt. Journal of Accounting and Economics[J],2008,45(2-3):154-174.
[170]Bathala,C.T.,Rao.R.P..The Determinants of Board Composition:A Agency Theory perspective. Managerial and Decision Economics[J],16(1):161-190.
[171]顾鸣润、杨继伟、余怒涛.产权性质、公司治理与真实盈余管理.中国会计评论[J],2012,10(3)
[172]顾鸣润.信息非对称、稳健会计信息与业绩预测.经济问题[J],2012,第4期.
[173]Bai Chong-En, Liu Qiao, Lu Joe Zhou et al..Corporate governance and market valuation in China. Journal of Comparative Economics[J],2004,32(4):599-825.
[174]Klein, A.. Audit committees, board of director characteristics and earnings management. Journal of Accounting and Economics[J],2002b,33:375-400.
[175]E.Fama, M. Jensen. Agency problems and residual claims. Journal of Law and Economics[J],1983,26(2).
[176]施东晖、司徒大年.中国上市公司治理水平及对绩效影响的经验研究.世界经济[J],2004,(5)：P69.
[177]周建波、孙菊生.经营者股权激励的治理效应研究—来自中国上市公司的经验证据.经济研究[J],2003,第5期,第74-93页.
[178]王克敏、陈井勇.股权结构、投资者保护与公司绩效.管理世界[J],2004,第7期,第127-148页.
[1791黄之骏、王华.经营者股权激励与企业价值—基于内生性视角的理论分析与经验证据.中国会计评论[J],2006,4(1)：29-56.
[180]陈东华、陈信元、万华林.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费,经济研究[J],2005(2)：92-102.
[181]夏立军,方轶强.政府控制、治理环境与公司价值—来自中国证券市场的经验证据[J1.经济研究,2005(5).
[182]郑国坚.市场化改革的微观作用机制：关联交易视角.中国会计评论[J],2011,(9).
[183]徐晓东、陈小悦.第一大股东对公司治理、企业业绩的影响分析.经济研 究[J],2003,(2).
[184]孙亮、刘春.公司治理对盈余管理程度的制约作用.金融评论[J],2010,(9).
[185]Dennis, D.. Twenty-five years of corporate governance and counting. Review of Financial Economics[J],2001,10(3):191-212.
[186]Jiang, G., Lee, C. and Yue, H.. Tunneling through intercorporate loans:The China experience. Journal of Financial Economics[J],2010,98(1):1-20.
[187]Aharony, Joseph, Jiwei Wang, and Hongqi Yuan. Tunneling as an incentive for earnings management during the IPO process in China. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy[J],2010,Vol(29):1-26.
[188]Jian, M. and T.J. Wong. Propping through related party transactions. Review of Accounting Studies[J],2008,15(1):70-105.
[189]刘峰、贺建刚.股权结构与大股东利益实现方式的选择—中国资本市场利益输送的初步研究.中国会计评论[J],2004,2(1)
[190]马忠、吴翔宇.金子塔结构对自愿性信息披露程度的影响：来自家族控股上市公司的经验验证.会计研究[J],2007,(1).
[191]Faccio, M., Politically connected firms. American Economic Review[J], 2006,(96):369-386.
[192]Lin, J., F. Cai, and Z. Li. Competition, policy burdens and state-owned enterprise reform. American Economic Review[J],1998, (88):422-427.
[193]Chong-En Bai, David Li, Zhigang Tao et al.. A Multi-Task Theory of the State Enterprise Reform. Journal of Comparative Economics[J],2000,28(4):716-738.
[194]Becker, C., M. DeFond, J. Jiambalvo and K.R. Subramanyam. The effect of audit quality on earnings management. Contemporary Accounting Research[J],1998, 15(1):1-24.
[195]蔡春、黄益建、赵莎.关于审计质量对盈余管理影响的实证研究.审计研究[J],2005(2).
[196]王艳艳、陈汉文.审计质量与会计信息透明度—来自中国上市公司的经验数据.会计研究[J]，2006(4).
[197]顾鸣润.制度变迁、审计任期与会计稳健性的实证研究.工作论文,2011.
[198]LaFond, R. and Roychowdhury. Managerial Ownership and Accounting Conservatism. Journal ofAccounting Research[J],2008,46,101-135.
[199]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司绩效.经济研究[J],2000(3).
[200]李增泉、余谦、王晓坤.掏空、支持与并购重组—来自我国上市公司的经验证据.经济研究[J],2005(1).
[201]张然、张鹏.中国上市公司自愿业绩预告动机研究.中国会计评论[J],2011(3).
[202]孙永祥、黄祖辉.上市公司的股权结构与绩效.经济研究[J], 1999(12).
[203]La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes. Corporate Ownership Around the World.Journal of Finance[J],1999.
[204]Bhattacharya, U., H Daouk, M Welker. The world price of earnings opacity. The Accounting Review[J],2003,78(3):641-678.
[205]H.W. Chen, J. Z. Chen, Gerald J. Lobo and Y.Y. Wang. Association between borrower and lender state ownership and accounting conservatism. Journal of Accounting Research,2010,Vol-48 No.5.
[206]Ball, R., A. Robin and G. SaDKA. "Is financial reporting shaped by equity markets or by debt markets? An international study of timeliness and conservatism". Review of Accounting Studies 13 (2008):168-205.