欧盟反倾销的“适当论”观照
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摘要
反倾销“反竞争优势”的本质造成反倾销法律供求的失衡,虽然欧盟采用了“欧共体利益”条款,试图通过自身的努力使得反倾销法律活动有所收益,但在经济全球化背景下很难得出欧盟反倾销收益大于成本这一结论。由于欧盟反倾销法律供给对需求的暂时和局部满足等原因,其存在仍然具有经济合理性。欧盟反倾销的价值取向既不是效率,也不是公平,而是一种利益上的“均衡”;但其实际功效却是因为对均衡的追求而导致的不确定性及原则的丧失,“非市场经济地位”问题在其中起着推波助澜的作用。欧盟自身也试图对现状有所改变,但收效甚微。源起于国际私法的“适当论”具体到反倾销领域可以细化为“适度和正当”,可以作为解决欧盟反倾销问题的原则、标准和方法。其在欧盟对华反倾销实践中渐渐得以实际应用,这彰显了“适当论”的理论力量和实践意义。
In the course of the establishment of China-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, the bilateral trade frictions never ceased, and the most typical example is the surging number of antidumping cases launched by the EU against China, and the discrimination and political manipulations in the investigation process of such cases. A correct, reasonable, thorough and deep analysis of EU antidumping laws and its practices versus China is thus of crucial importance. This thesis intends to conduct supply-demand analysis and cost-benefit analysis by applying the methodologies of economics, historical comparison and cases study. Its aim is to reveal the fact that the essence of EU antidumping is anti competitive advantage: because of the excessive flexibility in technical practices and rules, and the political compromises in decision making process, the antidumping investigation is inevitably unpredictable, compromises overrunning principles. Consequently, China shall use“Appropriateness doctrine”as the principle, standard and methodology in its defense against EU antidumping, so as to maximize its own interests.
Chapter 1 General Remarks
Researches in China up to now are mostly over the basic introduction of EU antidumping regulations, and are merely translation and interpretation of these regulations; researches in other countries are mainly theoretical explanations of antidumping legal system and case studies. Such endeavors are more often than not on how to cooperate in the antidumping investigations from the micro-economic angle, namely, from the perspective of individual economic operators, but not to discover the essence of antidumping itself with academic criticism, let alone to make constructive contributions to China’s defense against EU antidumping practices in a comprehensive and panoramic way.
The basic reasoning of this thesis is as follows: to review the history of dumping and antidumping through legal supply-demand analysis model, pointing out the essence of EU antidumping is anti competitive advantage; the legal cost-benefit analysis explains that in the backdrop of economic globalization, the marginal benefit of EU antidumping is diminishing, thus it is difficult to prove the benefits of EU antidumping outweighs its costs; however, due to reasons such as the legal supply of antidumping can partly and temporarily meet the demand, the antidumping practices of EU still has its rationale; its value orientation is not economic efficiency, nor fairness, but a balance of interests: which is hardly achieved in actual practices and frequently resulted in unpredictability and loss of principle in pursuit of this balance; the failure of TDI Green Paper movement of the European Commission and China’s plight in coping with EU antidumping tell us that China and the Europe must find a new theory to dissolve the problems in EU antidumping practices, particularly as against China. Originated from the international private law, the“Appropriateness doctrine”could be applied in the antidumping field as“moderate and justified”to be the principle, standard and methodology in coping with the EU antidumping. In terms of research methodology, besides those methods such as law-economics, historical comparison and case study, this thesis also proposes the“Appropriate”as not only an important law-economics concept, but a new angle for analyzing the issues in law-economics. The innovative contributions of this thesis can be summarized in 11 aspects, such as the essence of antidumping, and the“Appropriateness doctrine”and its significances in law-economics.
Chapter 2 Legal supply-demand analysis in EU antidumping
In theory, the economic behavior of dumping increases transaction costs of international market as a whole by injuring domestic production and international trade. It resulted in low efficiency of resources allocation, triggering the demand of legal means to regulate such behaviors, which is the antidumping system. However, dumping in its original sense does not exist in today’s world, the antidumping legal system is to achieve the objective of anti competitive advantages, merely borrowing the name of antidumping. The asymmetrical relation between legal supply and demand results in abuses of the system by interests groups (mainly domestic industries). Although by design the system is equipped with“lesser duty rule”,“community interests”and“undertaking”, these clauses are limited by the aforementioned asymmetry and cannot play its role. To some extent, they reduced the transparency of the investigation process and unpredictability of the result, risking violating the WTO rules. Such situation makes it difficult to predict the market, increasing excessive transaction costs.
Chapter 3 Cost-benefit analysis of EU antidumping
If only take the clauses of“community interests”clause into consideration, all antidumping measures are in the interests of the EU, its legal benefits outweighing the costs. But from a wider perspective, taking aside the European Parliament, customs of member states and European Court of Justice which have more or less balanced costs and benefits in this regard, over half of the member states of the EU are actually victim of EU antidumping; EU importers, users and consumers are all victims; EU industries (may also include suppliers) generally have legal benefit, but in the long run are also victims because the exporters of third countries may acquire further competitive advantages despite the huge legal costs. Even if the costs of third country government is not to be considered (EU does not calculate the same costs either), it is still difficult to allege that the legal benefits of the EU antidumping outweighs its legal costs.
Chapter 4 Law-economics analysis of the rationale of EU antidumping
It is difficult to allege that the legal benefits of the EU antidumping outweigh its legal costs, but it still exists in real life. There are four major reasons:
--such legal system can generate the result of anti competitive advantage, meeting the requirements of EU industries to a certain extent;
--such legal system is the“safety valve”for the EU and its member states to cope with trade pressure;
--such legal system is irreplaceable, for the lack of an international competition rule, the other relatively less-functional TDI tools, and the fact that third countries favor antidumping measures as well, etc;
--such legal system serves as the“catalyst”for EU to develop its trade relation with third countries, a partial economic cost for trade liberalization.
Chapter 5 Law-economic analysis of value orientation of EU antidumping
Fairness is not the value orientation of EU antidumping, because the WTO Antidumping Agreement does not pursue the goal of fairness, the Treaty Establishing the European Communities does not provide the principle of fairness, and in practice, EU antidumping may target at fair trade. Efficiency is not the value orientation of EU antidumping either, because all practices reflect the fact that antidumping results in reduced efficiency, the EU antidumping law and investigation authority do not consider the issue of efficiency, giving it only a very low position on the priority list of factors in case handling. The real value orientation of EU antidumping is balance, presented in the following five aspects:
--WTO Antidumping Agreement has a nature of balance in itself;
--EU antidumping regulation basically copied the content of WTO ADA, thus inevitably inherited the nature of balance;
--the unique decision making mechanism of the EU also gives the antidumping practice the hue of balance and equilibrium;
--the EU observes the principle of balance in its antidumping relations with other countries; and
--in fact, the EU has been inventing numerous new concepts for the sake of balance.
Chapter 6 Law-economics analysis of the real effects of EU antidumping
Although the value orientation of EU antidumping could be summarized as balance approach, its actual effect is the lack of efficiency, fairness and balance, wherein the issue of“Non-market economy status”gives notable impetus to the problem. The real effect of EU antidumping has two features.
The first is unpredictability, namely, from the assumed balance to the actual imbalance. To take the calculation of normal value and ways for case settling as an example, the EU antidumping is unpredictable in its substantial rules and procedures. The second feature is compromise overrides principle, which is a dangerous direction the EU antidumping is moving towards, the reasons are: in legislation, there are deficiencies in the legal supply and demand of EU antidumping law; in enforcement, the EU practices often neglect legal principles and rules.
Chapter 7“Appropriateness doctrine”: a new perspective for law-economics analysis of EU antidumping
The status quo of EU antidumping against China is quite disturbing, because the essence of anti competitive advantage of it results in unbalance of legal supply and demand, while China’s position in global economy makes it susceptible to the abuse of EU antidumping. It is fair to say that the EU made its efforts in solving problems in its antidumping system, but the fact that the movement of Antidumping Green Paper Review being aborted and the difficulties of China in defense against EU antidumping tell us there must be new theories to guide the practices between China and the EU.
“Appropriateness doctrine”is a pragmatic response of law-economy theory to EU antidumping. We are able to locate the terms and wordings of“Appropriate”in WTO ADA and EU basic regulations. This thesis believes that:
--“Appropriateness doctrine”should be and is the only guiding principle for China and EU to solve the antidumping plight;
--the standards provided by“Appropriateness doctrine”is the criteria to test whether the problems are solved, and to what extent they are solved; and
--“Appropriateness doctrine”provides specific means to solve the problems. A soothing fact is that“Appropriateness doctrine”has already begun to demonstrate its power in practices.
In the course of the establishment of China-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, the bilateral trade frictions never ceased, and the most typical example is the surging number of antidumping cases launched by the EU against China, and the discrimination and political manipulations in the investigation process of such cases. A correct, reasonable, thorough and deep analysis of EU antidumping laws and its practices versus China is thus of crucial importance. This thesis intends to conduct supply-demand analysis and cost-benefit analysis by applying the methodologies of economics, historical comparison and cases study. Its aim is to reveal the fact that the essence of EU antidumping is anti competitive advantage: because of the excessive flexibility in technical practices and rules, and the political compromises in decision making process, the antidumping investigation is inevitably unpredictable, compromises overrunning principles. Consequently, China shall use“Appropriateness doctrine”as the principle, standard and methodology in its defense against EU antidumping, so as to maximize its own interests.
Chapter 1 General Remarks
Researches in China up to now are mostly over the basic introduction of EU antidumping regulations, and are merely translation and interpretation of these regulations; researches in other countries are mainly theoretical explanations of antidumping legal system and case studies. Such endeavors are more often than not on how to cooperate in the antidumping investigations from the micro-economic angle, namely, from the perspective of individual economic operators, but not to discover the essence of antidumping itself with academic criticism, let alone to make constructive contributions to China’s defense against EU antidumping practices in a comprehensive and panoramic way.
The basic reasoning of this thesis is as follows: to review the history of dumping and antidumping through legal supply-demand analysis model, pointing out the essence of EU antidumping is anti competitive advantage; the legal cost-benefit analysis explains that in the backdrop of economic globalization, the marginal benefit of EU antidumping is diminishing, thus it is difficult to prove the benefits of EU antidumping outweighs its costs; however, due to reasons such as the legal supply of antidumping can partly and temporarily meet the demand, the antidumping practices of EU still has its rationale; its value orientation is not economic efficiency, nor fairness, but a balance of interests: which is hardly achieved in actual practices and frequently resulted in unpredictability and loss of principle in pursuit of this balance; the failure of TDI Green Paper movement of the European Commission and China’s plight in coping with EU antidumping tell us that China and the Europe must find a new theory to dissolve the problems in EU antidumping practices, particularly as against China. Originated from the international private law, the“Appropriateness doctrine”could be applied in the antidumping field as“moderate and justified”to be the principle, standard and methodology in coping with the EU antidumping. In terms of research methodology, besides those methods such as law-economics, historical comparison and case study, this thesis also proposes the“Appropriate”as not only an important law-economics concept, but a new angle for analyzing the issues in law-economics. The innovative contributions of this thesis can be summarized in 11 aspects, such as the essence of antidumping, and the“Appropriateness doctrine”and its significances in law-economics.
Chapter 2 Legal supply-demand analysis in EU antidumping
In theory, the economic behavior of dumping increases transaction costs of international market as a whole by injuring domestic production and international trade. It resulted in low efficiency of resources allocation, triggering the demand of legal means to regulate such behaviors, which is the antidumping system. However, dumping in its original sense does not exist in today’s world, the antidumping legal system is to achieve the objective of anti competitive advantages, merely borrowing the name of antidumping. The asymmetrical relation between legal supply and demand results in abuses of the system by interests groups (mainly domestic industries). Although by design the system is equipped with“lesser duty rule”,“community interests”and“undertaking”, these clauses are limited by the aforementioned asymmetry and cannot play its role. To some extent, they reduced the transparency of the investigation process and unpredictability of the result, risking violating the WTO rules. Such situation makes it difficult to predict the market, increasing excessive transaction costs.
Chapter 3 Cost-benefit analysis of EU antidumping
If only take the clauses of“community interests”clause into consideration, all antidumping measures are in the interests of the EU, its legal benefits outweighing the costs. But from a wider perspective, taking aside the European Parliament, customs of member states and European Court of Justice which have more or less balanced costs and benefits in this regard, over half of the member states of the EU are actually victim of EU antidumping; EU importers, users and consumers are all victims; EU industries (may also include suppliers) generally have legal benefit, but in the long run are also victims because the exporters of third countries may acquire further competitive advantages despite the huge legal costs. Even if the costs of third country government is not to be considered (EU does not calculate the same costs either), it is still difficult to allege that the legal benefits of the EU antidumping outweighs its legal costs.
Chapter 4 Law-economics analysis of the rationale of EU antidumping
It is difficult to allege that the legal benefits of the EU antidumping outweigh its legal costs, but it still exists in real life. There are four major reasons:
--such legal system can generate the result of anti competitive advantage, meeting the requirements of EU industries to a certain extent;
--such legal system is the“safety valve”for the EU and its member states to cope with trade pressure;
--such legal system is irreplaceable, for the lack of an international competition rule, the other relatively less-functional TDI tools, and the fact that third countries favor antidumping measures as well, etc;
--such legal system serves as the“catalyst”for EU to develop its trade relation with third countries, a partial economic cost for trade liberalization.
Chapter 5 Law-economic analysis of value orientation of EU antidumping
Fairness is not the value orientation of EU antidumping, because the WTO Antidumping Agreement does not pursue the goal of fairness, the Treaty Establishing the European Communities does not provide the principle of fairness, and in practice, EU antidumping may target at fair trade. Efficiency is not the value orientation of EU antidumping either, because all practices reflect the fact that antidumping results in reduced efficiency, the EU antidumping law and investigation authority do not consider the issue of efficiency, giving it only a very low position on the priority list of factors in case handling. The real value orientation of EU antidumping is balance, presented in the following five aspects:
--WTO Antidumping Agreement has a nature of balance in itself;
--EU antidumping regulation basically copied the content of WTO ADA, thus inevitably inherited the nature of balance;
--the unique decision making mechanism of the EU also gives the antidumping practice the hue of balance and equilibrium;
--the EU observes the principle of balance in its antidumping relations with other countries; and
--in fact, the EU has been inventing numerous new concepts for the sake of balance.
Chapter 6 Law-economics analysis of the real effects of EU antidumping
Although the value orientation of EU antidumping could be summarized as balance approach, its actual effect is the lack of efficiency, fairness and balance, wherein the issue of“Non-market economy status”gives notable impetus to the problem. The real effect of EU antidumping has two features.
The first is unpredictability, namely, from the assumed balance to the actual imbalance. To take the calculation of normal value and ways for case settling as an example, the EU antidumping is unpredictable in its substantial rules and procedures. The second feature is compromise overrides principle, which is a dangerous direction the EU antidumping is moving towards, the reasons are: in legislation, there are deficiencies in the legal supply and demand of EU antidumping law; in enforcement, the EU practices often neglect legal principles and rules.
Chapter 7“Appropriateness doctrine”: a new perspective for law-economics analysis of EU antidumping
The status quo of EU antidumping against China is quite disturbing, because the essence of anti competitive advantage of it results in unbalance of legal supply and demand, while China’s position in global economy makes it susceptible to the abuse of EU antidumping. It is fair to say that the EU made its efforts in solving problems in its antidumping system, but the fact that the movement of Antidumping Green Paper Review being aborted and the difficulties of China in defense against EU antidumping tell us there must be new theories to guide the practices between China and the EU.
“Appropriateness doctrine”is a pragmatic response of law-economy theory to EU antidumping. We are able to locate the terms and wordings of“Appropriate”in WTO ADA and EU basic regulations. This thesis believes that:
--“Appropriateness doctrine”should be and is the only guiding principle for China and EU to solve the antidumping plight;
--the standards provided by“Appropriateness doctrine”is the criteria to test whether the problems are solved, and to what extent they are solved; and
--“Appropriateness doctrine”provides specific means to solve the problems. A soothing fact is that“Appropriateness doctrine”has already begun to demonstrate its power in practices.
引文
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④但到1968年,加拿大废止了1904年的反倾销法,在新的反倾销法中增加了损害的要求,从此加拿大反倾销法也走上了产业保护的道路。引自勇.WTO反倾销协定研究[M].厦门:厦门大学出版社,2005:20.
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②在后面由专门章节来论述这一制度的“反竞争优势”的本质。
①截至目前为止,共有4个案件是以不符合共同体利益而无措施结案的。
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②在实践中,经常是欧盟产业组织出面组织申诉,如如欧盟鞋类联合会、欧盟化工理事会、欧盟钢铁协会等。
①详见欧盟2005年5月25日1091/2000号官方公报。
②详见欧盟1997年3月7日169/97号官方公报。
①吴喜梅.WTO反倾销立法与各国实践[M].郑州:郑州大学出版社,2003:10.
①屈广清.反倾销法律问题研究[M].北京:法律出版社,2004:10.
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②刘勇.WTO反倾销协定研究[M].厦门:厦门大学出版社,2005:18.
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②Bernard M. Hoekman and Petros C. Mavroidis. Antidumping and Antitrust[J],London :Journal of World Trade, No1, 1996:11.
③《关于履行1994年关税与贸易总协定第六条的协议》第6条第12款。
④颜延.反倾销司法会计[M].北京:中信出版社,2003:323.
⑤刘勇.WTO反倾销协定研究[M].厦门:厦门大学出版社,2005:30.
①钱弘道.经济分析法学[M].北京:法律出版社,2003:170.
①彼得-托比亚斯·施托尔,弗兰克·朔尔科普夫.世界贸易制度和世界贸易法[M].南京大学中德法学研究所译.北京:法律出版社,2004:48-49.
②刘勇.WTO反倾销协定研究[M].厦门:厦门大学出版社,2005:33.
①如果按照笔者的观点,这种价格优势实际上是俄罗斯企业的竞争优势,是正常经济现象,欧盟反倾销基本条例针对俄罗斯这一竞争优势进行法律修改,更反映了反倾销的本质是“反竞争优势”。
②参见2005年11月19日L302号欧盟官方公报,第14页。
③参见2006年1月31日L26号欧盟官方公报,第1页。
④参见2008年3月18日L75号欧盟官方公报,第14页。
①赵晓霞.欧盟对华反倾销不公平性的研究[J].经济问题,2004(10):70-72
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③吕岩峰.论国际物权关系的适当法――物之所在地法原则之理析[J].吉林大学社会科学学报,2007(1):108.
①简资修.经济推理与法律[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2006:7.
①分别通过(EC)2331/96号法规、(EC)905/98号法规、(EC)2238/2000号法规、(EC)1972/2002号法规、(EC)461/2004号法规、(EC)2117/2005号法规进行修改。
②魏建.理性选择理论与法经济学的发展[J].中国社会科学,2002(1):101-112.
③魏建,黄立君,李振宇.法经济学:基础与比较[M].北京:人民出版社,2004:154.
①钱弘道.经济分析法学[M].北京:法律出版社,2003:227-238.
②钱弘道.经济分析法学[M].北京:法律出版社,2003:207.
③张宇雁.经济发展与制度选择[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,1993:292.
④钱弘道.经济分析法学[M].北京:法律出版社,2003:212-217.
①潘悦,高文书.迎战“反倾销”-国际经验与中国对策[M].北京:中共中央党校出版社,2005:7-9.
②刘重.反倾销[M].天津:天津社会科学院出版社,2003:5.
③覃红,潘毅华.反倾销制度的法律经济分析[J].国际经贸探索,2006(3):48-49.
①张为付.倾销与反倾销的历史演变和时代特征[EB/OL].(2003-11-29)[2008-06-01]. http://www.cacs.gov.cn/.
①李文玺.世贸组织/关贸总协定反倾销法[M].北京:中国政法大学出版社,2006:15.
②理查德·A·波斯纳.法律的经济分析[M].蒋兆康译.北京:中国大百科全书出版社,1997:405.
①李文玺.世贸组织/关贸总协定反倾销法[M].北京:中国政法大学出版社,2006:17.
②吴喜梅.WTO反倾销立法与各国实践[M].郑州:郑州大学出版社,2003:124.
③屈广清.反倾销法律问题研究[M].北京:法律出版社,2004:23.
④但到1968年,加拿大废止了1904年的反倾销法,在新的反倾销法中增加了损害的要求,从此加拿大反倾销法也走上了产业保护的道路。引自勇.WTO反倾销协定研究[M].厦门:厦门大学出版社,2005:20.
①G.Horlick. Time for Coherence Among WTO Escape Clause.May 14, 2004[C].London.
②在后面由专门章节来论述这一制度的“反竞争优势”的本质。
①截至目前为止,共有4个案件是以不符合共同体利益而无措施结案的。
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④陈桂明.诉讼公正与程序保障[M].北京:中国法制出版社,1996:8-9.
①钱弘道.经济分析法学[M].北京:法律出版社,2003:260-261.
②沈宗灵.法理学[M].北京:高等教育出版社,1994:46.
①钱弘道.经济分析法学[M].北京:法律出版社,2003:271-282.
②在实践中,经常是欧盟产业组织出面组织申诉,如如欧盟鞋类联合会、欧盟化工理事会、欧盟钢铁协会等。
①详见欧盟2005年5月25日1091/2000号官方公报。
②详见欧盟1997年3月7日169/97号官方公报。
①吴喜梅.WTO反倾销立法与各国实践[M].郑州:郑州大学出版社,2003:10.
①屈广清.反倾销法律问题研究[M].北京:法律出版社,2004:10.
①王世春.论公平贸易[M].北京:商务印书馆,2006:168-171.
①易佳琳.反倾销对相关国家经济及对外贸易的影响[J].宁夏大学学报(哲学社会科学版),1998(3):205
②刘勇.WTO反倾销协定研究[M].厦门:厦门大学出版社,2005:18.
③保罗·A·萨缪尔森,威廉·D·诺德豪斯.经济学[M].高鸿业等译.北京:中国发展出版社,1992:1440.
①保罗·A·萨缪尔森,威廉·D·诺德豪斯.经济学[M].高鸿业等译.北京:中国发展出版社,1992:1439.
②Bernard M. Hoekman and Petros C. Mavroidis. Antidumping and Antitrust[J],London :Journal of World Trade, No1, 1996:11.
③《关于履行1994年关税与贸易总协定第六条的协议》第6条第12款。
④颜延.反倾销司法会计[M].北京:中信出版社,2003:323.
⑤刘勇.WTO反倾销协定研究[M].厦门:厦门大学出版社,2005:30.
①钱弘道.经济分析法学[M].北京:法律出版社,2003:170.
①彼得-托比亚斯·施托尔,弗兰克·朔尔科普夫.世界贸易制度和世界贸易法[M].南京大学中德法学研究所译.北京:法律出版社,2004:48-49.
②刘勇.WTO反倾销协定研究[M].厦门:厦门大学出版社,2005:33.
①如果按照笔者的观点,这种价格优势实际上是俄罗斯企业的竞争优势,是正常经济现象,欧盟反倾销基本条例针对俄罗斯这一竞争优势进行法律修改,更反映了反倾销的本质是“反竞争优势”。
②参见2005年11月19日L302号欧盟官方公报,第14页。
③参见2006年1月31日L26号欧盟官方公报,第1页。
④参见2008年3月18日L75号欧盟官方公报,第14页。
①赵晓霞.欧盟对华反倾销不公平性的研究[J].经济问题,2004(10):70-72
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