国有商业银行运营中的寻租问题研究
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摘要
人类追求自身经济利益的行为大致可分为两类：一类是生产性的增进社会福利的活动，如生产活动以及正常市场条件下的公平交易等；另一类是非生产性的有损于社会的活动，如偷盗、权钱交易等。寻租理论(rent-seeking theory)就是以研究非生产性竞争活动为主的经济理论。寻租活动是指维护既得的经济利益或是对既得利益进行再分配的非生产性活动。
寻租活动存在于经济社会各个领域。其扭曲经济资源配置，阻止更有效的生产方式的实施，浪费社会资源，降低经济效率，并会导致其它层次的寻租活动或“避租活动”，有恶性循环的趋势，阻碍市场机制有效发挥作用。
金融是现代经济的核心，银行在现代金融体系中仍居于核心地位。国有商业银行在中国银行体系中处于主体地位。在特定的改革和发展背景下，国有商业银行运营中仍存在着较为普遍的寻租现象。寻租活动在不同层次上发挥作用，影响着国有商业银行的资源配置和运营效率，并会导致诸多问题，是国有商业银行竞争力相对低下，风险和危机形成的重要潜在原因。
本文旨在研究国有商业银行运营中的寻租问题，及其对国有商业银行竞争力和风险的影响。文章共分为六个部分：
第一部分为导言，主要对论文的写作背景和意义、理论基础和研究方法、研究思路和框架、主要观点和结论进行概要介绍。第二部分介绍寻租理论。在研究寻租理论文献基础上，作者根据对寻租活动规律及该理论在中国适应性的认识，对寻租的特征进行分析，对寻租的概念进行界定，分析寻租产生的原因和机制，并提出对寻租治理的一般性认识。第三部分探讨国有商业银行运营中的寻租现象，指出在银行监管领域、国有企业与国有商业银行之间、政府与国有商业银行之间、国有商业银行内部等领域存在层次不同形式各异的寻租现象，并对寻租的主体、主体之间的相互关系、寻租的产生机制、寻租成本及租金来源、寻租过程中租金的流向进行分析。第四部分主要研究寻租对国有商业银行竞争力、银行风险乃至中国金融脆弱性的影响。第五部分试图对国有商业银行运营中的寻租现象进行实证分析，实证的对象主要包括两个方面：1．国有商业银行运营中寻租现象的存在性；2．国有商业银行运营中寻租问题的效应。文章第六部分为论文研究的主要结论及相应对策，并简要介绍目前国有商业银行的改革和寻租治理情况。
The behavior that the mankind pursues one's own economic benefits can be divided into two kinds roughly: One kind is the productive activities of promoting social welfare, like the activities in production and creation, and the square deal under the normal market condition, etc.; Another kind is unproductive, which impairs social welfare, such as stealing, power-money deal, etc.. Rent-seeking theory is the economic theory taking studying the unproductive competition activity as main fact. Rent-seeking activities are unproductive activities to maintain economic benefits or go on economic benefits that is in existence already.
Rent-seeking activities exist generally in social economy fields. They cause the distortion of economic resource distribution, prevent the implementation of more effective mode of production; waste social resources, reduce economy efficiency, and may cause rent-seeking activities or" rent-avoiding the activity" of other levels , there is trend of vicious circle in these activities; hinder market mechanisms from functioning effectively.
The finance is the core of modern economy, and banks still occupies the key position in modern finance system. The state-run business banks are in subject status in the Chinese bank system. Under the specific reforming and developing background , still there is relatively general rent-seeking phenomena in the running of state-run business banks. Rent-seeking activities function at different levels, influencing the resource distribution and the efficiencies of state-run business banks seriously, and will cause a great deal of questions, which are important potential reasons that make the competitiveness of state-run business bank relatively low, and the risk or crisis form.
This text aims at studying the rent-seeking activities in the running of state-owned business banks, and their impacts on the competitiveness of the banks and bank risk. The article are divided into six parts altogether:
The first part is an introduction for the writing background, the theories relied on and studying method, the path to study and the framework, its viewpoints and conclusions. The second part mainly introduces rent-seeking theory, and on the basis of studying and surveying related documents, according to his understanding of the laws of rent-seeking activities and this theory adaptability to China, analyze characteristics of rent-seeking, define its concept ,analyze the reasons of rent-seeking, form and consequence produced , then put forward general understanding of the administration for rent-seeking. The third part will analyze the rent-seeking phenomena in the running of state-run business banks, pointing out that bank supervision fields, between enterprises and state-run business banks, between the government and state-run business banks, inside the state-run business banks, etc, there are different level and multi-form rent-seeking phenomena. And analyze the rent-seeking subjects, interaction, rent-seek
ing production mechanism, the source of rent-seeking cost and rent, the flowing of the rent in the course of rent-seeking. The fourth part mainly researches the influences of rent-seeking on the competitiveness of state-run business banks, risk and the crisis and even China's financial fragility. The fifth part attempts to carry on the positive research for the rent-seeking phenomena in running of state-run business bank, the target of which includes two following respects mainly: 1. The existence of the rent-seeking phenomena in the running of state-run business banks; 2. The effects of the rent-seeking activities in the running of state-run business banks. The sixth part of article is the conclusions of the whole thesis, and the corresponding countermeasures.
Liu Hongtao(Finance) Directed by-Zhang Xu
寻租活动存在于经济社会各个领域。其扭曲经济资源配置，阻止更有效的生产方式的实施，浪费社会资源，降低经济效率，并会导致其它层次的寻租活动或“避租活动”，有恶性循环的趋势，阻碍市场机制有效发挥作用。
金融是现代经济的核心，银行在现代金融体系中仍居于核心地位。国有商业银行在中国银行体系中处于主体地位。在特定的改革和发展背景下，国有商业银行运营中仍存在着较为普遍的寻租现象。寻租活动在不同层次上发挥作用，影响着国有商业银行的资源配置和运营效率，并会导致诸多问题，是国有商业银行竞争力相对低下，风险和危机形成的重要潜在原因。
本文旨在研究国有商业银行运营中的寻租问题，及其对国有商业银行竞争力和风险的影响。文章共分为六个部分：
第一部分为导言，主要对论文的写作背景和意义、理论基础和研究方法、研究思路和框架、主要观点和结论进行概要介绍。第二部分介绍寻租理论。在研究寻租理论文献基础上，作者根据对寻租活动规律及该理论在中国适应性的认识，对寻租的特征进行分析，对寻租的概念进行界定，分析寻租产生的原因和机制，并提出对寻租治理的一般性认识。第三部分探讨国有商业银行运营中的寻租现象，指出在银行监管领域、国有企业与国有商业银行之间、政府与国有商业银行之间、国有商业银行内部等领域存在层次不同形式各异的寻租现象，并对寻租的主体、主体之间的相互关系、寻租的产生机制、寻租成本及租金来源、寻租过程中租金的流向进行分析。第四部分主要研究寻租对国有商业银行竞争力、银行风险乃至中国金融脆弱性的影响。第五部分试图对国有商业银行运营中的寻租现象进行实证分析，实证的对象主要包括两个方面：1．国有商业银行运营中寻租现象的存在性；2．国有商业银行运营中寻租问题的效应。文章第六部分为论文研究的主要结论及相应对策，并简要介绍目前国有商业银行的改革和寻租治理情况。
The behavior that the mankind pursues one's own economic benefits can be divided into two kinds roughly: One kind is the productive activities of promoting social welfare, like the activities in production and creation, and the square deal under the normal market condition, etc.; Another kind is unproductive, which impairs social welfare, such as stealing, power-money deal, etc.. Rent-seeking theory is the economic theory taking studying the unproductive competition activity as main fact. Rent-seeking activities are unproductive activities to maintain economic benefits or go on economic benefits that is in existence already.
Rent-seeking activities exist generally in social economy fields. They cause the distortion of economic resource distribution, prevent the implementation of more effective mode of production; waste social resources, reduce economy efficiency, and may cause rent-seeking activities or" rent-avoiding the activity" of other levels , there is trend of vicious circle in these activities; hinder market mechanisms from functioning effectively.
The finance is the core of modern economy, and banks still occupies the key position in modern finance system. The state-run business banks are in subject status in the Chinese bank system. Under the specific reforming and developing background , still there is relatively general rent-seeking phenomena in the running of state-run business banks. Rent-seeking activities function at different levels, influencing the resource distribution and the efficiencies of state-run business banks seriously, and will cause a great deal of questions, which are important potential reasons that make the competitiveness of state-run business bank relatively low, and the risk or crisis form.
This text aims at studying the rent-seeking activities in the running of state-owned business banks, and their impacts on the competitiveness of the banks and bank risk. The article are divided into six parts altogether:
The first part is an introduction for the writing background, the theories relied on and studying method, the path to study and the framework, its viewpoints and conclusions. The second part mainly introduces rent-seeking theory, and on the basis of studying and surveying related documents, according to his understanding of the laws of rent-seeking activities and this theory adaptability to China, analyze characteristics of rent-seeking, define its concept ,analyze the reasons of rent-seeking, form and consequence produced , then put forward general understanding of the administration for rent-seeking. The third part will analyze the rent-seeking phenomena in the running of state-run business banks, pointing out that bank supervision fields, between enterprises and state-run business banks, between the government and state-run business banks, inside the state-run business banks, etc, there are different level and multi-form rent-seeking phenomena. And analyze the rent-seeking subjects, interaction, rent-seek
ing production mechanism, the source of rent-seeking cost and rent, the flowing of the rent in the course of rent-seeking. The fourth part mainly researches the influences of rent-seeking on the competitiveness of state-run business banks, risk and the crisis and even China's financial fragility. The fifth part attempts to carry on the positive research for the rent-seeking phenomena in running of state-run business bank, the target of which includes two following respects mainly: 1. The existence of the rent-seeking phenomena in the running of state-run business banks; 2. The effects of the rent-seeking activities in the running of state-run business banks. The sixth part of article is the conclusions of the whole thesis, and the corresponding countermeasures.
Liu Hongtao(Finance) Directed by-Zhang Xu
引文
1 陆丁．寻租理论．载《现代经济学前沿专題(第二辑)》．商务印书馆．1993
2 谭崇台．发展经济学的新发展．武汉．武汉大学出版社．1999
3 戈登．塔洛克．寻租——对寻租活动的经济学分析．李政军译．西南财经大学出版社．1999
4 张军．腐败现象的经济学分析．经济学动态．1996．2：59-61
5 谢平，陆磊．中国金融腐败研究：从定性到定量．载《比较》第八辑，中信出版社．2003．9
6 吴龙龙．金融监管领域的寻租现象分析．内蒙古财经学院学报．2003．3：48-51
7 姜再勇．关于现阶段我国商业银行竞争问题的探讨．当代经济研究．1999．6：58-65
8 魏遥．国有银行不良债权形成与清理的博奕分析．商丘师范学院学报 2003．2：70-72
9 周天勇．金融风险与资本社会化．北京．经济科学出版社．1999
10 杨思江．论国有商业银行分支机构“内寻租”行为的治理．中国投资管理 1998．5：38-41
11 林凤萍．国有商业银行与国有企业改革的比较研究．当代经济研究．2000．12：55-57
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13 王进军等．论国有商业银行的核心竞争力的培育和提高．金融论坛．2001．9：41-45
14 王都富．论我国国有商业银行综合竞争力的构造．金融论坛 2001．10：8-12
15 康彦彦．我国商业银行经营效率的秩和比评价．经济师．2003．8：15
16 王晓燕，吴冲锋．入世背景下中外银行的竞争实力对比——国内外28家银行的经营指标分析．金融论坛．2001．12：42-47
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19 武永胜．存贷款中的寻租行为分析．农村金融研究．2000．7：8-9
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52 网站：金羊网
2 谭崇台．发展经济学的新发展．武汉．武汉大学出版社．1999
3 戈登．塔洛克．寻租——对寻租活动的经济学分析．李政军译．西南财经大学出版社．1999
4 张军．腐败现象的经济学分析．经济学动态．1996．2：59-61
5 谢平，陆磊．中国金融腐败研究：从定性到定量．载《比较》第八辑，中信出版社．2003．9
6 吴龙龙．金融监管领域的寻租现象分析．内蒙古财经学院学报．2003．3：48-51
7 姜再勇．关于现阶段我国商业银行竞争问题的探讨．当代经济研究．1999．6：58-65
8 魏遥．国有银行不良债权形成与清理的博奕分析．商丘师范学院学报 2003．2：70-72
9 周天勇．金融风险与资本社会化．北京．经济科学出版社．1999
10 杨思江．论国有商业银行分支机构“内寻租”行为的治理．中国投资管理 1998．5：38-41
11 林凤萍．国有商业银行与国有企业改革的比较研究．当代经济研究．2000．12：55-57
12 焦瑾璞．中国银行业竞争力比较．北京．中国金融出版社．2002
13 王进军等．论国有商业银行的核心竞争力的培育和提高．金融论坛．2001．9：41-45
14 王都富．论我国国有商业银行综合竞争力的构造．金融论坛 2001．10：8-12
15 康彦彦．我国商业银行经营效率的秩和比评价．经济师．2003．8：15
16 王晓燕，吴冲锋．入世背景下中外银行的竞争实力对比——国内外28家银行的经营指标分析．金融论坛．2001．12：42-47
17 林建华．金融创新力与银行微观经营效益关系的探讨．金融论坛．2001．3：51-56
18 贤成毅，陈超惠．浅析我国银行表外业务落后的原因及对策．广西大学学报(哲学社会科学版)．2002．2：67-70
19 武永胜．存贷款中的寻租行为分析．农村金融研究．2000．7：8-9
20 蒋建华：商业银行内部控制与稽核．北京．京大学出版社．2002．8
21 贺卫．寻租经济学．中国发展出版社．1999．3
22 卢现祥．寻租经济学导论．北京．中国财政经济出版社．2000．8
23 朱伯铭．公共经济学．浙江大学出版社．2002
24 李政军．寻租理论在我国的研究与发展．经济社会体制比较(双月)，2002．3：104
25 金伯富．机会利益论—兼析其在金融体系中的应用．复旦大学出版社．2000．5
26 高晓红．激励与约束：国有商业银行信贷管理制度分析．当代经济科学2001．3：66-73
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52 网站：金羊网