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环境资本项目融资商业化资本化运作论
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摘要
资本是赤裸裸的狼,对利益的穷尽追求是其本质终结。人类在开始主宰世界的漫长的历史征途中,本源上,仅只存在人力资本与自然资本的相互依存、相互作用、相互制约和相互转化的对立统一关系、且其始终贯彻着人类社会发展的全过程。人力资本在穷尽利益追求的同时,践踏了自然资本,于是形成传统的不可持续的发展模式,导致严重的区域性环境资本危机。
     尤其在目前的我国,这种危机无法有效解决的根源在于:环境与发展严重对抗形成区域性生态资本危机与生存危机,政府供给与经营环境资本的低效率加重了政府财政包袱、直接导致环境投资严重不足,区域性环境资本持续欠帐经营导致严重累积的环境问题,区域性环境资本缺乏收益回收的技术与政策支持制约了庞大民间资本的投资行为。上述根源的本质表明:如何实现政府资本投资不足迫切需要补充的环境资本项目与庞大的急待寻找投资项目的民间资本的有效结合,如何实现产权模糊、经营低效、急待适度退出环境市场的政府资本与产权清晰、经营效率良好的民间资本的有效结合,已成为当前我国政府和理论界特别关注的时代主题!
     本文从重塑环境资产的资本化经营理念开始,详细梳理了环境资产的四种收益机制:即环境资产的收益不可回收机制、物质增值收益机制、服务收费收益机制Ⅰ型(降低环境不经济性获取收益)和服务收费收益机制Ⅱ型(增加环境经济性获取收益),并归纳了环境资本经营收益回收的庇古税机制、科斯产权机制与环境资产类别的关系;同时在梳理现有收费性环境资产资本化经营的基础上,首次创新选择了当前政府最棘手的和理论研究空白的关键性问题,即具有外部经济性强度溢出而目前尚未有收益回收机制、投融资规模巨大、沉淀巨额政府财政资金、以及严重欠帐经营等特征的区域性环境资本项目融资供给与经营商业化资本化运作问题作为本文的研究核心;其取得的多项研究成果具有首创性,主要内容包括:
     (一)在深入分析目前我国区域性环境资本项目市场化供给的“瓶颈”问题的基础上,重点研究了阻碍区域性环境资本项目市场化融资供给的核心问题~区域性环境资本收益回报问题,首次创新提出了区域性环境资产生态服务价值流弥散理论,揭示了区域性环境资产外部经济性服务价值的实现机制,以及相邻的区域性环境资产生态服务价值流弥散叠加增强的网络效应;以此为基础,首次创新构建了外部经济性内部化的区域型环境资产包理论,从而将具有强烈正外部性溢出的区域性环境资产公共品转变为混合物品,实现了区域型环境资产包收益回报机制,奠定了民间资本市场化融资供给与经营区域性环境资本的前提基础;随
    
    盆皿大李博士伦义
    《稀境资4项目触资育么化资4化运作伦》
    之,笔者采用超边际分析方法,进一步提出了区域型环境资产包市场化分工与专
    业化经营的超边际决策,创新构建了区域型环境资产包特许经营权连锁承包专业
    化经营理论。
     (二)从研究满足区域型环境资产包项目融资规模大、高风险性、资本化与
    专业化经营要求出发,首次创新提出了由环境投资银行、环境投资基金、环境信
    托基金、环境投资公司、环境经纪与租赁公司等组成的以政府为主导的“市场导
    向型”商业化环境金融体系框架,加快实现筹集民间资本,以市场机制培育大中
    型专业化环境资本项目经营公司,达到市场化经营区域型环境资产包项目的目
    的;同时进一步为不同性质的区域型环境资产包定制了最优的政府与民间资本整
    合的市场化融资与经营模式,如项目融资、BOT、TOT、ABS以及环境基金等,
    从而更加丰富和完善了大中型环境资本项目的投融资理论。
     (三)在深入分析我国传统环境制度存在的问题与缺陷的基础上,创新提出
    了以“市场为导向”的区域型环境资产包供给与经营的制度框架,其内容包括:
    加快政府职能改革,加快建立专职、统一、问责的高效政府职能机构,加快以循
    环经济理论为指导的环境法律制度改革,加快建立环境资本项目政府招标公示制
    度,加快完善以特许经营权市场化转移为基础的环境产权制度,加快供给以环境
    资本市场化融资为基础的融资制度等多项制度改革建议,希望其不仅能够为区域
    性环境资本项目市场化融资供给与经营提供制度保证,而且也能够对我国环境制
    度改革产生深远的理论意义。
     总之,通过建立了区域型环境资产包的收益回报机制、区域性环境资本项目
    市场化融资机制、以及区域性环境资本项目融资与经营的制度基础,真正实现了
    区域性环境资本项目融资供给与经营的政府资本适度退出、民间资本进入、产权
    体系清晰的政府与民间资本有机合作模式,达到了加快补足我国环境资本历史欠
    帐、有效提高环境资本经营效率、以及实现区域性环境资本项目商业化资本化经
    营的目标。
Capital is in essence the permanent greedy pursuer of profits. During the long course of dominating the world for human beings, the unity of opposites (in detail, the mutual dependence, mutual action, mutual restriction and mutual transformation), existing between the human capital and the natural capital, always runs through the development of human society. However, the human capital tramples on the natural capital while doing utmost to pursue profits, which facilitates the shape of traditional unsustainable development mode and even leads to severe regional crisis of environmental capital, In present China particularly, the source causing this irresolvable crisis lies in: 1) Regional ecologic capital crisis and existing crisis are formed by severe confrontation of environment and development. 2) The governmental financial burden, aggravated by the low efficiency of governmental supply and operating environment capital, results in grave deficient of environmental investment directly. 3) Continuing owing of
     regional environmental capital leads to grave environmental problems. 4) The deficiency of technique and policy support for income returns of regional environmental capital restrains the investment of huge civilian capital. All of the above indicates that it has become the highlight of the present government and theoretical field of China how to realize the effective combination of environmental capital projects (that is needed urgently for the government) and huge civilian capital (that is always seeking for projects as investment), and how to realize the effective combination of governmental capital (that remains to exit from environmental market urgently with unclear property right and low-efficient management) and civilian capital (that is of clear property right and high-efficient management).
    Starting from the capitalized operating concept that remolds the environmental capital, this dissertation lists four kinds of return mechanisms of environmental assets in de tail: no nrecoverable r eturn m echanism, m aterial inc rement r eturn mechanism, service charging mechanism (Type I: reducing return of environmental diseconomy) and service charging mechanism (Type II: increasing return of environmental economy). M eanwhile, t he r elation o f P igouvian t ax m echanism, C oase's p roperty mechanism about returns of operating environment capital and types of the environmental capital is concluded here. The most important is that this paper innovatively lists the problem that is quite troublesome for current governments and always regarded as the theoretical vacancy into the research core based on the
    
    
    
    
    analysis of capitalized management of present charging environmental assets. This crucial problem refers to financing and commercialized & capitalized operation of regional environmental capital projects, characterized with strong economical externality overflow without return mechanism yet, huge investment & financing scale, huge governmental fiscal capital and serious arrear management). The multiple research achievements are provided with initiative with the main contents as follows:
    1 . On the basis of thoroughly analyzing the current bottleneck problem of the marketized financing supply of regional environmental capital projects in China, the dissertation lays emphasis on the research of the key problem to hinder the marketized financing supply of regional environmental capital projects - the return of regional environmental capital, first puts forward the dispersion theory of ecological service value current of regional environmental assets initiatively, and reveals the implementation mechanism of the economic externality service value of the regional environmental assets, as well as the network effects of the dispersion, overlapping and boost of the ecological service value currents of neighboring regional environmental assets. Based on the theory, it first builds up the regional environmental assets pack (pool) theory of the intemalization of economical externality, thus changing the public goods of
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