媒体报道对高管薪酬的治理作用研究
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摘要
2007年由次贷危机引起的金融危机,致使全球经济陷入低谷,以美国为代表的一些国家不惜动用巨额财政资金去救助陷入危机的公司,与此同时,媒体报道出一些接受救助的公司高管人员年薪却是“天价”,这种恶劣行为受到全社会的猛烈抨击。随即,美、英、法、德等许多国家相继出台相关高管薪酬限制政策,据统计,在媒体报道和政府的强有力监管下,美国受到薪酬管制的企业高管2008年薪酬平均下降50%,2009年现金薪酬平均下降90%,非现金薪酬递延期延长,英、法、德等国金融企业高管薪酬也急速缩水。我国媒体几乎同时与世界各国媒体一样,开始关注国内企业高管高薪的问题,铺天盖地的相关报道出现在公众的视野,数百家企业高管由于薪酬的报道登上了媒体的头条,我国企业高管“天价”薪酬的问题也引起社会公众的强烈不满。2009年9月16日我国6部委联合下发了《关于进一步规范中央企业负责人薪酬管理的指导意见》。纵观金融危机期间国外上市公司高管薪酬改变的过程,新闻媒体无疑成为影响政府和公司决策的决定性因素,那么在我国媒体报道能否对高管薪酬产生影响呢?本文正是基于这一背景来探寻媒体对我国上市公司高管薪酬的治理作用。
通过本文的研究,以期达到以下目的：第一,寻找我国媒体报道对上市公司高管薪酬造成影响的证据。在传统的委托代理理论框架下,解决代理问题的方法在于激励和监督,这里的监督更多的强调内部监督,然而在缺乏内部监督的情况下,媒体无疑可以成为外部监督的一种手段,通过本文的研究可以验证媒体是否在上市公司高管薪酬制定过程中发挥了外部监督的作用。第二,探寻媒体报道的治理路径。媒体作为社会生活的另一个法庭,公众无时无刻不在感受到媒体报道所引发的各种治理效果,那么媒体到底是如何产生这些效果的?这个问题非常值得探究,探寻媒体报道的治理路径能够为媒体发挥社会监督功能提供良好的平台。第三,通过媒体报道对高管薪酬的治理效果,为完善我国上市公司高管薪酬体系,建立有效的薪酬激励机制提供理论依据。
本文的研究总共分为四个大的部分：
第一部分包括第一章和第二章,这部分是全文的铺垫。第一章是对全文的总体概述,对论文的研究背景、研究目的、研究意义、基本概念界定、研究思路、研究方法、论文创新和不足等基本情况做一个基本交代。第二章是文献综述,根据国内外有关媒体报道的治理文献,首先梳理了媒体报道对上市公司的公司治理作用,以期寻找媒体具有公司治理作用的证据；其次梳理了媒体报道对上市公司相关利益主体的影响作用,以期寻找媒体对上市公司高管影响的证据；最后在前两部分综述的基础上对国内外有关媒体报道对高管薪酬的治理作用进行综述。
第二部分就是论文的第三章,这部分是全文的理论研究。本章的研究意在探寻媒体报道对高管薪酬的治理路径,理论文献和实践经验为我们提供了三条路径：第一条路径是行政治理路径,基于政府规制理论,媒体报道会引起政府行政机构的介入,政府通过颁布政策法规使得上市公司高管薪酬进行调整。第二条路径是公司治理路径,基于三层次代理理论,媒体报道会引起社会舆论,负面报道会损害公司形象,薪酬委员会作为上市公司高管薪酬的制定部门理应对媒体报道作出相应的回应和调整。第三条路径是声誉治理路径,基于声誉机制理论,媒体报道会影响上市公司高管在职业经理人市场中的声誉,提高高管的声誉风险,从而给高管造成无形的压力,迫于压力高管对自身薪酬做出调整。对于以美国为例的西方发达国家而言,市场化程度较高,公司治理水平较为完善,职业经理人市场较发达,因此公司治理路径和声誉治理路径占据主导地位；对于以我国为例的发展中国家而言,市场正在转型过程中,公司治理水平有待于进一步提高,职业经理人市场正处在起步阶段,因此行政治理路径占据主导地位。三种治理路径都在国有企业和民营企业中起到一定的作用,但是相比于民营企业而言,国有企业的行政治理路径和声誉治理路径更为明显。
第三部分包括本文的第四章、第五章和第六章,这部分是全文的实证研究部分。
第四章实证研究媒体报道对高管薪酬水平的影响。结论表明：在我国媒体报道对上市公司高管薪酬具有影响作用,媒体对上市公司“天价”高管薪酬报道过后,高管薪酬会下降；并且媒体负面报道与官方媒体报道对高管薪酬的影响作用更为明显。同时,媒体监管的效果在一定程度上受制于企业性质以及企业实际控制人的影响,对于国有企业和垄断企业,媒体报道对高管薪酬的影响作用更为明显,并且媒体对这两类企业的报道所带来的股票收益波动为负的程度更大。但是,从我国目前媒体的有关高管薪酬的报道数量来讲,媒体对垄断企业和国有背景的企业报道数量较少,并且负面报道较少,制度和法律的因素在一定程度上制约了媒体的监管效果。
第五章实证研究媒体报道对高管薪酬公平性的影响。经过严格的理论推演和实证检验发现媒体报道能够提升高管薪酬的公平性,媒体发挥了应有的监管作用,提升了高管薪酬的外部公平、内部公平以及与员工之间的公平,对社会稳定健康发展起到了积极的作用。另外,被媒体报道的上市公司高管薪酬外部公平性与高管团队内部的薪酬公平性与未来公司业绩之间并没有显著的正相关关系,但高管与普通员工之间的薪酬公平性与未来公司业绩之间具有显著的正相关关系,说明在被媒体报道的上市公司中,缩小高管与员工之间的薪酬差距有利于未来业绩的提升。
第六章实证研究媒体报道对高管薪酬激励有效性的影响。结论表明：媒体报道过后,上市公司高管货币性薪酬下降,但股权性薪酬并没有出现下降的趋势。并且,媒体报道过后,上市公司高管货币性薪酬与公司非市场业绩的敏感性增强,但上市公司高管股权性薪酬与公司市场业绩的敏感性不强,无论是媒体报道前还是媒体报道后,样本均没有支持高管股权性薪酬激励的有效性。
第四部分就是论文的第七章,这部分是全文的总结。包括研究结论、研究启示、论文不足和未来的研究方向。
本论文的创新点在于：第一,有关媒体报道对高管薪酬的影响研究目前在我国尚处空白,本文的研究丰富了媒体报道的治理作用研究。综合国内外有关媒体报道的治理作用研究,大多围绕在公司治理层面,并且很多问题都没有涉及,理论文献研究范围过于局限,有关媒体报道对高管薪酬的影响研究目前在我国尚处空白,本文的研究丰富了媒体报道的治理理论研究。第二本文进一步拓展了媒体报道的治理路径,打开了媒体治理的研究视角。当前我国学者在研究媒体报道的治理作用时,大多从政府管制的角度论证媒体治理作用的有效性,本文利用政府规制理论、三层次代理理论和声誉理论,从政府、公司、高管三个层面推演媒体报道影响高管薪酬的路径,拓展了媒体报道的治理路径。第三,解决代理问题的传统监督手段仅限于内部监督,本文的研究证明了媒体报道是一种解决代理问题的外部监督手段。在传统的代理理论框架下,解决代理问题的方法在于激励和监督,监督更多地侧重于内部监督,例如在上市公司内部设立监事会等,本文结论表明媒体报道作为外部监督的有效手段,在一定程度上缓解了上市公司的代理问题。第四,相比于先前学者有关媒体报道的研究中仅进行单个层面的分析,本文的研究较为系统,形成了媒体报道对高管薪酬治理的体系。研究结论发现媒体报道会对高管薪酬具有监管作用,同时媒体报道会不仅仅会提升高管薪酬的公平性,还能促进高管薪酬激励的有效性。
本论文的局限性在于：第一,本文采用报纸作为媒体的代表,限制了媒体报道的样本数量,加上报纸媒体在当今社会对公众生活的影响力有限,在一定程度上影响了本研究结论的稳健性。第二,论文按照控制人性质将媒体划分为官方媒体和非官方媒体,按照报道内容将媒体划分为负面报道和非负面报道,这种划分方式在部分文献中均有出现,但是并没有形成一个统一的量化标准,更多的依靠主观判断来划分,对论文的研究结论造成倾向性影响。第三,本论文的实证检验结论基本支持了所提出的假设检验,但尚有部分未得到验证。一方面受制于论文的研究样本有限,另一方面本论文的未来研究方向应该采取各种手段提升实证检验的稳健性。
Beginning in2007, the subprime mortgage crisis triggered the financial crisis led to the global economy into a downturn, Some countries as the United States used huge financial funds to bail out the company of the crisis. At the same time, some media reported that the receiving aid company executives annual salary is a "high price", this bad behavior were criticized by the whole society strongly. Immediately, the United States, Britain, France, Germany and many other countries have issued executive pay limit policy. According to statistics, the average corporate executive pay by media reports and government regulators in2008, the United States by the salary control decreased by50%, In2009, company executives cash salary fell by an average90%, non-cash compensation were deferred. Our media almost simultaneously with the world media started to pay attention the problem of domestic business executives high salaries, the avalanche of reports appeared in the public eye, hundreds of business executives due to salary reports boarded the headlines."High price" pay of corporate executives in China also aroused strong dissatisfaction of the public. September16,2009, six ministries jointly issued a "guidance" to further standardize the management of the person in charge of the central enterprises pay. Throughout the financial crisis, foreign listed companies executive pay during the process of change, the news media will undoubtedly become the decisive factor in government and corporate decision-making, so whether in the media reports in China have an impact on executive compensation? This article is based on this background to explore the role of the media on executive compensation and governance of listed companies in China.
The study is in order to achieve the following objectives:firstly, to find evidence of the impact of China's media reports of listed companies executive pay. Under the framework of the traditional principal-agent theory, the method to solve the agency problem is to motivate and supervise, where supervision is more emphasis on internal oversight, in the case of lack of internal oversight, however, the media undoubtedly can become a means of external oversight by this study verify that the media play in the listed company executive pay setting process, the role of external oversight. Secondly, to explore the path of the governance of the media reports. Another court of the media as a social life, the public always feel the effect of media reports triggered by a variety of governance, then the media is in the end how to produce these effects? This issue is worth exploring, explore the path of the media coverage of governance can provide a good platform for the media to play a social supervision. Thirdly, the treatment effect of media reports on executive compensation, to provide a theoretical basis for improving executive compensation system of China's listed companies, to establish an effective pay incentives.
This study a total divided into four major parts:
The first part consists of Chapters I and II, this part of the full text of bedding. The first chapter is a general overview of the full text of research background, the significance of research, the basic concepts defined in the basic research ideas, research methods, papers, innovation and lack a basic explanation. The second chapter is a literature review, according to media reports at home and abroad governance literature, the first combed the role of the media reports on corporate governance of listed companies, in order to find evidence of the media has a corporate governance role; combed media reports related to the interests of listed companies the main effect, in order to find evidence of the media on the impact of executives of listed companies; the first two parts review on the basis of the domestic and foreign media reports on the governance role of executive compensation were reviewed.
The second part is the third chapter of the thesis, this part of the full text oftheoretical research. This chapter to explore the path of media reports on executive compensation, Theoretical literature and practical experience provides us with three paths:The first path is the administrative governance path, based on Government Regulation theory, media coverage will cause the involvement of government administrative agencies, the Government issued executive compensation policies and regulations of the listed companies to adjust. The second path is the path of corporate governance, based on the three-level agency theory, media reports and negative reports will damage the company image, the Remuneration Committee as listed the development of the company's executive compensation department should react accordingly and adjust the media coverage. The third path is a reputation management path, based reputation mechanism theory, media reports will affect the reputation of the executives of listed companies in the market of professional managers, under pressure of high tube to make adjustments on their own remuneration. For the Western developed countries to the United States, for example, corporate governance path and reputation management path is dominant; for developing countries to our country, for example, administrative governance path dominant. Three governance path in the state-owned enterprises and private enterprises to play a role, but compared to private enterprises, the administrative governance of state-owned enterprises path and the path of reputation management is more obvious.
The third part consists of Chapter Ⅳ, Chapters Ⅴ and Ⅵ, this part is part of the full text of the empirical research.
The fourth chapter study the effect of media reports on executive pay levels. The results show that:the media reports would impact the executives of listed companies pay. After the listed company's executive compensation reports, executive compensation will decline. The effects of Negative media coverage and official media coverage are more apparent. The same time, the effect of media regulation is to some extent, subject to the corporate nature of the actual business people, state-owned enterprises and monopolies, the effect of media reports on executive compensation is more obvious, and the market reaction is greater. However, few reports of the enterprise in terms of the number of stories from our current media-related executive compensation, the media monopolies and state-owned background fewer number of stories, and negative, institutional and legal factors to some extent, restricted the media regulatory effect.
The fifth Chapter study the effect of media reports on the fairness of executive pay. Media coverage enhance the fairness of executive pay, played its role of monitoring, enhanced the fair of executive compensation and external equity, internal equity, as well as the fair of between employees, has played a positive role in social stability and healthy development. In addition, there is no significant positive correlation between media reports of listed companies, external equity and the senior management team of executive pay within the pay fairness and the future performance of the company, but the pay between executives and ordinary employees fairness is significant positive with the future performance of the company, indicating that media reports of listed companies, narrowing the pay gap between executives and employees are conducive to the enhancement of future performance.
The sixth Chapter study the effect of media reports on the effectiveness of executive compensation incentive. after the media reports, the listed company executives monetary remuneration fell, but the equity pay and no downward trend. After the media reports, the sensitivity of the monetary remuneration of the executives of listed companies and the company of non-market performance enhancements, butthe sensitivity of the market performance of listed companies executives stake sex remuneration and company, whether it is media coverage before and after the media reports, the sample do not support the effectiveness of executive equity incentive pay.
The fourth part is the seventh chapter of the thesis, a summary of the full text, Including research findings, research revelation, and future research directions.
The innovation of this paper is:firstly, the study of media reports on executive compensation in China is still blank, this study enriches the governance role of the media reports. Secondly, the study expand the control path of the media coverage, open the media governance perspective. Thirdly, Traditional monitoring tools to solve agency problems limited to the internal supervision, this study proved that media coverage is a solution to agency problems of external monitoring tools. Fourthly, compared to previous scholars, the media reports only a single level analysis, this study study the media reports on executive compensation governance system.
The limitations of this paper is:firstly, using the newspaper as representatives of the media, limiting the media reports the number of samples. Secondly, the media are divided into the official and non-official,negative and non-negative, this division rely more on subjective judgment. Thirdly, the empirical conclusions of the examination of this thesis are some unverified.
通过本文的研究,以期达到以下目的：第一,寻找我国媒体报道对上市公司高管薪酬造成影响的证据。在传统的委托代理理论框架下,解决代理问题的方法在于激励和监督,这里的监督更多的强调内部监督,然而在缺乏内部监督的情况下,媒体无疑可以成为外部监督的一种手段,通过本文的研究可以验证媒体是否在上市公司高管薪酬制定过程中发挥了外部监督的作用。第二,探寻媒体报道的治理路径。媒体作为社会生活的另一个法庭,公众无时无刻不在感受到媒体报道所引发的各种治理效果,那么媒体到底是如何产生这些效果的?这个问题非常值得探究,探寻媒体报道的治理路径能够为媒体发挥社会监督功能提供良好的平台。第三,通过媒体报道对高管薪酬的治理效果,为完善我国上市公司高管薪酬体系,建立有效的薪酬激励机制提供理论依据。
本文的研究总共分为四个大的部分：
第一部分包括第一章和第二章,这部分是全文的铺垫。第一章是对全文的总体概述,对论文的研究背景、研究目的、研究意义、基本概念界定、研究思路、研究方法、论文创新和不足等基本情况做一个基本交代。第二章是文献综述,根据国内外有关媒体报道的治理文献,首先梳理了媒体报道对上市公司的公司治理作用,以期寻找媒体具有公司治理作用的证据；其次梳理了媒体报道对上市公司相关利益主体的影响作用,以期寻找媒体对上市公司高管影响的证据；最后在前两部分综述的基础上对国内外有关媒体报道对高管薪酬的治理作用进行综述。
第二部分就是论文的第三章,这部分是全文的理论研究。本章的研究意在探寻媒体报道对高管薪酬的治理路径,理论文献和实践经验为我们提供了三条路径：第一条路径是行政治理路径,基于政府规制理论,媒体报道会引起政府行政机构的介入,政府通过颁布政策法规使得上市公司高管薪酬进行调整。第二条路径是公司治理路径,基于三层次代理理论,媒体报道会引起社会舆论,负面报道会损害公司形象,薪酬委员会作为上市公司高管薪酬的制定部门理应对媒体报道作出相应的回应和调整。第三条路径是声誉治理路径,基于声誉机制理论,媒体报道会影响上市公司高管在职业经理人市场中的声誉,提高高管的声誉风险,从而给高管造成无形的压力,迫于压力高管对自身薪酬做出调整。对于以美国为例的西方发达国家而言,市场化程度较高,公司治理水平较为完善,职业经理人市场较发达,因此公司治理路径和声誉治理路径占据主导地位；对于以我国为例的发展中国家而言,市场正在转型过程中,公司治理水平有待于进一步提高,职业经理人市场正处在起步阶段,因此行政治理路径占据主导地位。三种治理路径都在国有企业和民营企业中起到一定的作用,但是相比于民营企业而言,国有企业的行政治理路径和声誉治理路径更为明显。
第三部分包括本文的第四章、第五章和第六章,这部分是全文的实证研究部分。
第四章实证研究媒体报道对高管薪酬水平的影响。结论表明：在我国媒体报道对上市公司高管薪酬具有影响作用,媒体对上市公司“天价”高管薪酬报道过后,高管薪酬会下降；并且媒体负面报道与官方媒体报道对高管薪酬的影响作用更为明显。同时,媒体监管的效果在一定程度上受制于企业性质以及企业实际控制人的影响,对于国有企业和垄断企业,媒体报道对高管薪酬的影响作用更为明显,并且媒体对这两类企业的报道所带来的股票收益波动为负的程度更大。但是,从我国目前媒体的有关高管薪酬的报道数量来讲,媒体对垄断企业和国有背景的企业报道数量较少,并且负面报道较少,制度和法律的因素在一定程度上制约了媒体的监管效果。
第五章实证研究媒体报道对高管薪酬公平性的影响。经过严格的理论推演和实证检验发现媒体报道能够提升高管薪酬的公平性,媒体发挥了应有的监管作用,提升了高管薪酬的外部公平、内部公平以及与员工之间的公平,对社会稳定健康发展起到了积极的作用。另外,被媒体报道的上市公司高管薪酬外部公平性与高管团队内部的薪酬公平性与未来公司业绩之间并没有显著的正相关关系,但高管与普通员工之间的薪酬公平性与未来公司业绩之间具有显著的正相关关系,说明在被媒体报道的上市公司中,缩小高管与员工之间的薪酬差距有利于未来业绩的提升。
第六章实证研究媒体报道对高管薪酬激励有效性的影响。结论表明：媒体报道过后,上市公司高管货币性薪酬下降,但股权性薪酬并没有出现下降的趋势。并且,媒体报道过后,上市公司高管货币性薪酬与公司非市场业绩的敏感性增强,但上市公司高管股权性薪酬与公司市场业绩的敏感性不强,无论是媒体报道前还是媒体报道后,样本均没有支持高管股权性薪酬激励的有效性。
第四部分就是论文的第七章,这部分是全文的总结。包括研究结论、研究启示、论文不足和未来的研究方向。
本论文的创新点在于：第一,有关媒体报道对高管薪酬的影响研究目前在我国尚处空白,本文的研究丰富了媒体报道的治理作用研究。综合国内外有关媒体报道的治理作用研究,大多围绕在公司治理层面,并且很多问题都没有涉及,理论文献研究范围过于局限,有关媒体报道对高管薪酬的影响研究目前在我国尚处空白,本文的研究丰富了媒体报道的治理理论研究。第二本文进一步拓展了媒体报道的治理路径,打开了媒体治理的研究视角。当前我国学者在研究媒体报道的治理作用时,大多从政府管制的角度论证媒体治理作用的有效性,本文利用政府规制理论、三层次代理理论和声誉理论,从政府、公司、高管三个层面推演媒体报道影响高管薪酬的路径,拓展了媒体报道的治理路径。第三,解决代理问题的传统监督手段仅限于内部监督,本文的研究证明了媒体报道是一种解决代理问题的外部监督手段。在传统的代理理论框架下,解决代理问题的方法在于激励和监督,监督更多地侧重于内部监督,例如在上市公司内部设立监事会等,本文结论表明媒体报道作为外部监督的有效手段,在一定程度上缓解了上市公司的代理问题。第四,相比于先前学者有关媒体报道的研究中仅进行单个层面的分析,本文的研究较为系统,形成了媒体报道对高管薪酬治理的体系。研究结论发现媒体报道会对高管薪酬具有监管作用,同时媒体报道会不仅仅会提升高管薪酬的公平性,还能促进高管薪酬激励的有效性。
本论文的局限性在于：第一,本文采用报纸作为媒体的代表,限制了媒体报道的样本数量,加上报纸媒体在当今社会对公众生活的影响力有限,在一定程度上影响了本研究结论的稳健性。第二,论文按照控制人性质将媒体划分为官方媒体和非官方媒体,按照报道内容将媒体划分为负面报道和非负面报道,这种划分方式在部分文献中均有出现,但是并没有形成一个统一的量化标准,更多的依靠主观判断来划分,对论文的研究结论造成倾向性影响。第三,本论文的实证检验结论基本支持了所提出的假设检验,但尚有部分未得到验证。一方面受制于论文的研究样本有限,另一方面本论文的未来研究方向应该采取各种手段提升实证检验的稳健性。
Beginning in2007, the subprime mortgage crisis triggered the financial crisis led to the global economy into a downturn, Some countries as the United States used huge financial funds to bail out the company of the crisis. At the same time, some media reported that the receiving aid company executives annual salary is a "high price", this bad behavior were criticized by the whole society strongly. Immediately, the United States, Britain, France, Germany and many other countries have issued executive pay limit policy. According to statistics, the average corporate executive pay by media reports and government regulators in2008, the United States by the salary control decreased by50%, In2009, company executives cash salary fell by an average90%, non-cash compensation were deferred. Our media almost simultaneously with the world media started to pay attention the problem of domestic business executives high salaries, the avalanche of reports appeared in the public eye, hundreds of business executives due to salary reports boarded the headlines."High price" pay of corporate executives in China also aroused strong dissatisfaction of the public. September16,2009, six ministries jointly issued a "guidance" to further standardize the management of the person in charge of the central enterprises pay. Throughout the financial crisis, foreign listed companies executive pay during the process of change, the news media will undoubtedly become the decisive factor in government and corporate decision-making, so whether in the media reports in China have an impact on executive compensation? This article is based on this background to explore the role of the media on executive compensation and governance of listed companies in China.
The study is in order to achieve the following objectives:firstly, to find evidence of the impact of China's media reports of listed companies executive pay. Under the framework of the traditional principal-agent theory, the method to solve the agency problem is to motivate and supervise, where supervision is more emphasis on internal oversight, in the case of lack of internal oversight, however, the media undoubtedly can become a means of external oversight by this study verify that the media play in the listed company executive pay setting process, the role of external oversight. Secondly, to explore the path of the governance of the media reports. Another court of the media as a social life, the public always feel the effect of media reports triggered by a variety of governance, then the media is in the end how to produce these effects? This issue is worth exploring, explore the path of the media coverage of governance can provide a good platform for the media to play a social supervision. Thirdly, the treatment effect of media reports on executive compensation, to provide a theoretical basis for improving executive compensation system of China's listed companies, to establish an effective pay incentives.
This study a total divided into four major parts:
The first part consists of Chapters I and II, this part of the full text of bedding. The first chapter is a general overview of the full text of research background, the significance of research, the basic concepts defined in the basic research ideas, research methods, papers, innovation and lack a basic explanation. The second chapter is a literature review, according to media reports at home and abroad governance literature, the first combed the role of the media reports on corporate governance of listed companies, in order to find evidence of the media has a corporate governance role; combed media reports related to the interests of listed companies the main effect, in order to find evidence of the media on the impact of executives of listed companies; the first two parts review on the basis of the domestic and foreign media reports on the governance role of executive compensation were reviewed.
The second part is the third chapter of the thesis, this part of the full text oftheoretical research. This chapter to explore the path of media reports on executive compensation, Theoretical literature and practical experience provides us with three paths:The first path is the administrative governance path, based on Government Regulation theory, media coverage will cause the involvement of government administrative agencies, the Government issued executive compensation policies and regulations of the listed companies to adjust. The second path is the path of corporate governance, based on the three-level agency theory, media reports and negative reports will damage the company image, the Remuneration Committee as listed the development of the company's executive compensation department should react accordingly and adjust the media coverage. The third path is a reputation management path, based reputation mechanism theory, media reports will affect the reputation of the executives of listed companies in the market of professional managers, under pressure of high tube to make adjustments on their own remuneration. For the Western developed countries to the United States, for example, corporate governance path and reputation management path is dominant; for developing countries to our country, for example, administrative governance path dominant. Three governance path in the state-owned enterprises and private enterprises to play a role, but compared to private enterprises, the administrative governance of state-owned enterprises path and the path of reputation management is more obvious.
The third part consists of Chapter Ⅳ, Chapters Ⅴ and Ⅵ, this part is part of the full text of the empirical research.
The fourth chapter study the effect of media reports on executive pay levels. The results show that:the media reports would impact the executives of listed companies pay. After the listed company's executive compensation reports, executive compensation will decline. The effects of Negative media coverage and official media coverage are more apparent. The same time, the effect of media regulation is to some extent, subject to the corporate nature of the actual business people, state-owned enterprises and monopolies, the effect of media reports on executive compensation is more obvious, and the market reaction is greater. However, few reports of the enterprise in terms of the number of stories from our current media-related executive compensation, the media monopolies and state-owned background fewer number of stories, and negative, institutional and legal factors to some extent, restricted the media regulatory effect.
The fifth Chapter study the effect of media reports on the fairness of executive pay. Media coverage enhance the fairness of executive pay, played its role of monitoring, enhanced the fair of executive compensation and external equity, internal equity, as well as the fair of between employees, has played a positive role in social stability and healthy development. In addition, there is no significant positive correlation between media reports of listed companies, external equity and the senior management team of executive pay within the pay fairness and the future performance of the company, but the pay between executives and ordinary employees fairness is significant positive with the future performance of the company, indicating that media reports of listed companies, narrowing the pay gap between executives and employees are conducive to the enhancement of future performance.
The sixth Chapter study the effect of media reports on the effectiveness of executive compensation incentive. after the media reports, the listed company executives monetary remuneration fell, but the equity pay and no downward trend. After the media reports, the sensitivity of the monetary remuneration of the executives of listed companies and the company of non-market performance enhancements, butthe sensitivity of the market performance of listed companies executives stake sex remuneration and company, whether it is media coverage before and after the media reports, the sample do not support the effectiveness of executive equity incentive pay.
The fourth part is the seventh chapter of the thesis, a summary of the full text, Including research findings, research revelation, and future research directions.
The innovation of this paper is:firstly, the study of media reports on executive compensation in China is still blank, this study enriches the governance role of the media reports. Secondly, the study expand the control path of the media coverage, open the media governance perspective. Thirdly, Traditional monitoring tools to solve agency problems limited to the internal supervision, this study proved that media coverage is a solution to agency problems of external monitoring tools. Fourthly, compared to previous scholars, the media reports only a single level analysis, this study study the media reports on executive compensation governance system.
The limitations of this paper is:firstly, using the newspaper as representatives of the media, limiting the media reports the number of samples. Secondly, the media are divided into the official and non-official,negative and non-negative, this division rely more on subjective judgment. Thirdly, the empirical conclusions of the examination of this thesis are some unverified.
引文
11引自王海东《媒体的公司治理职能》。
12有关负面报道的定义引自董君兰《我国灾难报道中“台风眼”现象研究》。
25本文这里的货币性薪酬激励有效性的定义参考了谢娟《我国上市公司高管薪酬激励效果研究》一文中的研究结论。
26本文这里的股权性薪酬激励有效性的定义参考了谢娟《我国上市公司高管薪酬激励效果研究》一文中的研究结论。
30引自姜科《当下中国舆论监督研究》。
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12有关负面报道的定义引自董君兰《我国灾难报道中“台风眼”现象研究》。
25本文这里的货币性薪酬激励有效性的定义参考了谢娟《我国上市公司高管薪酬激励效果研究》一文中的研究结论。
26本文这里的股权性薪酬激励有效性的定义参考了谢娟《我国上市公司高管薪酬激励效果研究》一文中的研究结论。
30引自姜科《当下中国舆论监督研究》。
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