风险投资的契约机制及风险评价方法研究
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摘要
风险投资作为一种新型的投融资制度，是科技创新与金融创新的有机结合，它能够有力地推动高新技术成果的转化，是促进技术创新并推动经济快速发展的重要因素。风险投资具有高风险、高收益、高度信息不对称和高度不确定性等特点，风险投资过程一般包括三个行为主体：风险投资者、风险投资家和风险企业家。制定有效的风险投资契约以及对风险投资项目的风险进行科学、合理的评价是保证风险投资能够顺利进行的关键，因此，本文结合风险投资的实际现状，在对风险投资相关国内外研究进行系统性综述的基础上，针对现有研究的不足，从理论角度深入研究风险投资运作过程中的契约机制以及风险评价方面的问题。本文主要包括以下几个方面的研究内容：
（1）基于报酬激励机制的视角，根据公司制和有限合伙制两种基金组织形式的运作特点建立模型，对两者的运作效率进行了比较研究。理论研究表明，在有限合伙制风险投资基金运作模式下，风险投资家付出的最优努力程度要大于在公司制风险投资基金中风险投资家付出的最优努力努力程度；有限合伙制下的风险投资者所获得的期望收入要大于公司制下的风险投资者所获得的期望收入。
（2）研究了信息不对称条件下风险投资者与风险投资家之间的契约机制。在构建契约模型时，本文结合风险投资基金运作实际情况，考虑风险投资家在项目初期对风险投资基金注入一定比例的个人资本金而持有股份（已有研究均忽略了现实风险投资基金中这一现象），同时在模型中引入了风险投资者可观测变量。在本文设计的契约模型下，通过信号传递和信息甄别机制有效地降低了逆向选择发生的可能性；通过监督机制提高了契约的激励强度，促使风险投资家努力工作，从而有助于解决风险投资者面临的道德风险问题。
（3）进一步研究了信息不对称条件下风险投资者与风险投资家之间的契约机制。在两阶段情况下，引入风险投资家的历史业绩作为先验信息来修正对其工作能力的判断，从而建立了风险投资家的报酬激励契约模型。本文基于风险投资家历史业绩建立的契约模型揭示了风险投资者的监督机制和激励机制对风险投资家行为的联合作用机理。理论研究表明，这种契约机制能够降低风险投资家的道德风险，提高风险投资基金的运作效率。
（4）研究了信息不对称条件下风险投资家与风险企业家之间的契约机制。本文把风险企业家的过度自信和风险投资家的监督努力两个重要因素结合起来，建立了符合风险投资实际运作情况的风险企业家报酬契约模型。研究了过度自信和监督努力这两个因素对风险投资参与者行为策略及代理成本的影响，从理论上证明了风险投资家存在一个最优监督分配比例。理论研究表明，风险企业家的过度自信行为和风险投资家的监督努力均有助于刺激风险企业家提高其努力水平，从而降低风险投资家的代理成本。
（5）研究了风险企业初始融资契约中现金流权和控制权的分配问题。本文引入了风险企业家创业之初投入的自有资本变量，建立了风险企业融资契约模型，分析了影响风险企业现金流权和控制权分配的重要因素及作用机理，进而揭示了现金流权和控制权之间的相互关系，并得到了风险投资家和风险企业家在初始融资契约签订时对现金流权和控制权分配的讨价还价区间。
（6）研究了风险投资项目的风险评价问题。考虑到专家主观认识和风险投资项目的不确定性，采用区间数对风险评价指标相对重要性程度进行刻画，综合运用不确定层次分析法和基于EWAA算子的多属性决策方法，得到了一定置信度下确定单个风险投资项目风险等级的评价准则；在针对多个风险项目的风险评价时，本文用区间数来描述风险评价指标的风险等级，并构建了基于区间型理想点的不确定多属性决策模型，从而实现对多个风险投资项目的风险排序。
Venture capital is an organic combination of science&technology innovation andfinancial innovation as a new pattern of financing. Venture capital can effectivelypromote the transformation of high-tech achievements, it plays a very important role inpromoting technological innovation and rapid economic development. Venture capitalhas the charateristics that high risk、high profits、serious asymmetry of information andhigh uncertainty, it involves in three participants that are venture investors、venturecapitalists and entrepreneurs. Venture capital can be successfully carried on isdependant on scientific、reasonable evaluation to the venture projects and efficientventure capital contracts. Hence, in this paper, we study the contractual mechanism andrisk analysis of venture capital on the basis of previous studies. There are followingseveral parts about my studies in the paper：
(1) Two models are set up to research on operational efficiency of the institutionof company and institution of limited partnership of venture capital found based on theperspective of compensation incentive mechanism. The theoretical researches showthat the degree of endeavor of venture capitalists in the institution of limitedpartnership is higher than that in the institution of company; the expected income ofventure investors in the institution of limited partnership is higher than that in theinstitution of company.
(2) A contractual mechanism between venture investors and venture capitalistsunder asymmetric information is studied. This model differs from traditional incentivecontracts models in considering venture capitalist’s own investment in venture fundsand an observable variable for venture investors. The theoretical researches show thatthe contracts model can keep away the adverse selection behavior by signalingmechanism and signal screening mechanism; the contracts model can raise theincentive intensity and inspire the venture capitalists to work hard, so it is effective tosolve the moral hazard problems.
(3) A contractual mechanism between venture investors and venture capitalistsunder asymmetric information is further studied. In the case of the two-period, a compensation incentive mechanism model is set up based on the venture capitalist’shistorical performance which is used to adjust the judgment on the venture capitalist’sability as prior information. The contracts model based on the venture capitalist’shistorical performance reveals the joint mechanism of supervision and incentivemechanisms of venture investors to the behavior of venture capitalists. The theoreticalresearches show that the incentive mechanism is effective to solve the moral hazardproblem and is helpful to improve the operational efficiency of venture capital fund.
(4) A contractual mechanism between venture investors and venture capitalistsunder asymmetric information is studied. By combining the overconfidence ofentrepreneurs and the monitoring of venture capitalists, an incentive contract model forventure capital is set up. An optimal ratio of the monitoring of venture capitalists isproved, the influence of the confidence and the monitoring on the behavior of theventure capital participants and the agency cost is discussed. The theoretical researchesshow that the overconfidence of entrepreneurs and the monitoring of venture capitalistsare helpful to increase the level of effort of entrepreneurs and decrease the agency costof venture capitalists.
(5) The allocation of cash flow rights and control rights in venture capital backedfirms is studied. A financial contracts model is set up by introducing the entrepreneur’sown capital in this paper. This paper analyzes the affecting factors and mechanism tothe allocation of cash flow rights and control rights, shows the relationship betweencash flow rights and control rights, gives the bargain intervals of entrepreneurs andventure capitalists about the allocation of cash flow rights and control rights. It isshown that, the more the entrepreneur’s own capital and the higher the venturecapitalist’s evaluation of the venture project and the ability of entrepreneurs, the littlecash flow rights and control rights venture capitalists will want; the relationshipbetween cash flow rights and control rights of venture capitalists is complementary butnot corresponding.
(6) The risk evaluation methods about the venture projects are studied. In view ofthe uncertainty about the venture projects and the understanding of specialists, basedon the interval number description of importance degree about risk evaluation indexsand the multiple attribute decision making, a new method for evaluating the risk ofventure capital investment is presented by applying the uncertain type analysis of hierarchy process and the EWAA operator. Through this method, based on a certainconfidence coefficient, we can determine the grade of the risk of a venture project;another method based on the interval type ideal point for the uncertain multipleattribute decision making is presented to evaluate the risks of venture capital projects.The ranks of the risk of several venture capital projects are achieved by using of thenew method.
（1）基于报酬激励机制的视角，根据公司制和有限合伙制两种基金组织形式的运作特点建立模型，对两者的运作效率进行了比较研究。理论研究表明，在有限合伙制风险投资基金运作模式下，风险投资家付出的最优努力程度要大于在公司制风险投资基金中风险投资家付出的最优努力努力程度；有限合伙制下的风险投资者所获得的期望收入要大于公司制下的风险投资者所获得的期望收入。
（2）研究了信息不对称条件下风险投资者与风险投资家之间的契约机制。在构建契约模型时，本文结合风险投资基金运作实际情况，考虑风险投资家在项目初期对风险投资基金注入一定比例的个人资本金而持有股份（已有研究均忽略了现实风险投资基金中这一现象），同时在模型中引入了风险投资者可观测变量。在本文设计的契约模型下，通过信号传递和信息甄别机制有效地降低了逆向选择发生的可能性；通过监督机制提高了契约的激励强度，促使风险投资家努力工作，从而有助于解决风险投资者面临的道德风险问题。
（3）进一步研究了信息不对称条件下风险投资者与风险投资家之间的契约机制。在两阶段情况下，引入风险投资家的历史业绩作为先验信息来修正对其工作能力的判断，从而建立了风险投资家的报酬激励契约模型。本文基于风险投资家历史业绩建立的契约模型揭示了风险投资者的监督机制和激励机制对风险投资家行为的联合作用机理。理论研究表明，这种契约机制能够降低风险投资家的道德风险，提高风险投资基金的运作效率。
（4）研究了信息不对称条件下风险投资家与风险企业家之间的契约机制。本文把风险企业家的过度自信和风险投资家的监督努力两个重要因素结合起来，建立了符合风险投资实际运作情况的风险企业家报酬契约模型。研究了过度自信和监督努力这两个因素对风险投资参与者行为策略及代理成本的影响，从理论上证明了风险投资家存在一个最优监督分配比例。理论研究表明，风险企业家的过度自信行为和风险投资家的监督努力均有助于刺激风险企业家提高其努力水平，从而降低风险投资家的代理成本。
（5）研究了风险企业初始融资契约中现金流权和控制权的分配问题。本文引入了风险企业家创业之初投入的自有资本变量，建立了风险企业融资契约模型，分析了影响风险企业现金流权和控制权分配的重要因素及作用机理，进而揭示了现金流权和控制权之间的相互关系，并得到了风险投资家和风险企业家在初始融资契约签订时对现金流权和控制权分配的讨价还价区间。
（6）研究了风险投资项目的风险评价问题。考虑到专家主观认识和风险投资项目的不确定性，采用区间数对风险评价指标相对重要性程度进行刻画，综合运用不确定层次分析法和基于EWAA算子的多属性决策方法，得到了一定置信度下确定单个风险投资项目风险等级的评价准则；在针对多个风险项目的风险评价时，本文用区间数来描述风险评价指标的风险等级，并构建了基于区间型理想点的不确定多属性决策模型，从而实现对多个风险投资项目的风险排序。
Venture capital is an organic combination of science&technology innovation andfinancial innovation as a new pattern of financing. Venture capital can effectivelypromote the transformation of high-tech achievements, it plays a very important role inpromoting technological innovation and rapid economic development. Venture capitalhas the charateristics that high risk、high profits、serious asymmetry of information andhigh uncertainty, it involves in three participants that are venture investors、venturecapitalists and entrepreneurs. Venture capital can be successfully carried on isdependant on scientific、reasonable evaluation to the venture projects and efficientventure capital contracts. Hence, in this paper, we study the contractual mechanism andrisk analysis of venture capital on the basis of previous studies. There are followingseveral parts about my studies in the paper：
(1) Two models are set up to research on operational efficiency of the institutionof company and institution of limited partnership of venture capital found based on theperspective of compensation incentive mechanism. The theoretical researches showthat the degree of endeavor of venture capitalists in the institution of limitedpartnership is higher than that in the institution of company; the expected income ofventure investors in the institution of limited partnership is higher than that in theinstitution of company.
(2) A contractual mechanism between venture investors and venture capitalistsunder asymmetric information is studied. This model differs from traditional incentivecontracts models in considering venture capitalist’s own investment in venture fundsand an observable variable for venture investors. The theoretical researches show thatthe contracts model can keep away the adverse selection behavior by signalingmechanism and signal screening mechanism; the contracts model can raise theincentive intensity and inspire the venture capitalists to work hard, so it is effective tosolve the moral hazard problems.
(3) A contractual mechanism between venture investors and venture capitalistsunder asymmetric information is further studied. In the case of the two-period, a compensation incentive mechanism model is set up based on the venture capitalist’shistorical performance which is used to adjust the judgment on the venture capitalist’sability as prior information. The contracts model based on the venture capitalist’shistorical performance reveals the joint mechanism of supervision and incentivemechanisms of venture investors to the behavior of venture capitalists. The theoreticalresearches show that the incentive mechanism is effective to solve the moral hazardproblem and is helpful to improve the operational efficiency of venture capital fund.
(4) A contractual mechanism between venture investors and venture capitalistsunder asymmetric information is studied. By combining the overconfidence ofentrepreneurs and the monitoring of venture capitalists, an incentive contract model forventure capital is set up. An optimal ratio of the monitoring of venture capitalists isproved, the influence of the confidence and the monitoring on the behavior of theventure capital participants and the agency cost is discussed. The theoretical researchesshow that the overconfidence of entrepreneurs and the monitoring of venture capitalistsare helpful to increase the level of effort of entrepreneurs and decrease the agency costof venture capitalists.
(5) The allocation of cash flow rights and control rights in venture capital backedfirms is studied. A financial contracts model is set up by introducing the entrepreneur’sown capital in this paper. This paper analyzes the affecting factors and mechanism tothe allocation of cash flow rights and control rights, shows the relationship betweencash flow rights and control rights, gives the bargain intervals of entrepreneurs andventure capitalists about the allocation of cash flow rights and control rights. It isshown that, the more the entrepreneur’s own capital and the higher the venturecapitalist’s evaluation of the venture project and the ability of entrepreneurs, the littlecash flow rights and control rights venture capitalists will want; the relationshipbetween cash flow rights and control rights of venture capitalists is complementary butnot corresponding.
(6) The risk evaluation methods about the venture projects are studied. In view ofthe uncertainty about the venture projects and the understanding of specialists, basedon the interval number description of importance degree about risk evaluation indexsand the multiple attribute decision making, a new method for evaluating the risk ofventure capital investment is presented by applying the uncertain type analysis of hierarchy process and the EWAA operator. Through this method, based on a certainconfidence coefficient, we can determine the grade of the risk of a venture project;another method based on the interval type ideal point for the uncertain multipleattribute decision making is presented to evaluate the risks of venture capital projects.The ranks of the risk of several venture capital projects are achieved by using of thenew method.
引文
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